Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson Air Marshal Robb
Major General Hull Major General Laycock
Rear Admiral McCormick
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Colonel Twitchell
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

January 30, 1945
Top secret

Procedure for the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff that he should take the chair at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in Malta and he was glad to do so. He hoped, however, that a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff would take the chair at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at MAGNETO.

General Marshall agreed to this proposal.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should normally take place at 1430 daily.

Admiral King , in agreeing to this proposal, stated that alterations in the timing might have to be made in the light of circumstances.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet daily at 1430, circumstances permitting.

Agenda for the Conference (CCS 765/8)

Sir Alan Brooke tabled a note setting out proposals for the business to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each day.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should be earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time allowed.

It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end of the Japanese war should be so earmarked.

German Flying Bomb and Rocket Attacks

General Marshall referred to the data made available by the British Chiefs of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the course of his talk to the Congress he had stressed the importance of a common understanding in order to assist the formation of combined decisions and policies. He had stressed the necessity for teamwork and the importance of understanding the other man’s point of view and difficulties. The data with regard to flying bomb and rocket attacks on London had been of great value in this connection and had made a very strong impression on his audience.

Sir Alan Brooke said that on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff he would like to thank General Marshall for the action he had taken in this connection. Sir Alan Brooke outlined the suggestions which had been made to mitigate the German rocket attacks and the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on this matter.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the proposals for air action against the rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been decided to follow.

Sir Charles Portal then explained the difficulties which had arisen with regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers against industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation against the unique target of London had been felt to outweigh the advantages of the employment of this weapon.

General Marshall then outlined certain discussions he had had at Allied Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing small formations of fighter-bombers to attack communications and particularly for attacks against the entrances to tunnels, possibly by skip bombing. He felt that skip bombing might also be used against the entrances to the underground production plant where the rockets were assembled.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was not accurately informed as to the topography of the terrain above the underground factory concerned and thought it likely that baffles had been erected before the entrances. It was probably also extremely well defended by guns; however, the possibility of skip bombing the entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating. With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently discussed the possibility of further attacks on communications with General Spaatz, who was arranging that the long-range fighters of the Eighth Air Force should, as a matter of course, attack communications on their return from escorting daylight bombers.

General Marshall then referred to the possibility of the Germans instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in the Antwerp area in which the lock gates were a vital and vulnerable target.

Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack.

In reply to a question, Admiral King said that the Japanese suicide attacks were, on the whole, slightly less numerous than they had been, but they were still difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit instructions as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery against these attacks.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statements.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff adjourned until 1430.

Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)

At General Bedell Smith’s suggestion General Bull outlined the projected operations in Northwest Europe. The first phase entailed a closing up to the Rhine and the destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that river; the second phase consisted of obtaining bridgeheads across the Rhine; the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany and defeating her armed forces. The first phase was now going on. General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. Divisions were now being released from the southern front, and were already being moved up to the North to be available for the offensive operations VERITABLE and GRENADE, the latter of which was an alternative in the event that General Bradley’s present attack did not proceed with sufficient rapidity.

General Bull then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces would strike down in a southeasterly direction parallel to the Rhine while the Ninth United States Army would strike from its present position north of Aachen in the direction of Düsseldorf. A decision would shortly have to be taken as to whether it was worthwhile to continue General Bradley’s operations in the Ardennes. Operations were also in progress to clear the Colmar pocket and were being undertaken by French forces to be assisted by three United States divisions. It was obviously desirable, if it proved possible, to clear the entire west bank of the Rhine since by so doing security would be improved and additional divisions released for the offensive.

Turning to the second phase – the seizure of bridgeheads across the Rhine – General Bull explained that in the North between Emmerich and Wesel there were three good and two possible positions for bridging points. In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good bridging points and in addition two possible ones. In the center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were three possible bridging sites.

Field Marshal Montgomery’s operation VERITABLE would be launched between the eighth and tenth of February and operation GRENADE approximately a week later if the decision was taken to mount the latter. There was therefore a reasonable chance that the area west of the Rhine from Düsseldorf northwards would be clear of the enemy by the end of February. Field Marshal Montgomery would be instructed to grasp any possibility which presented itself of seizing bridgeheads on the lower Rhine during the southerly drive.

General Bull explained that the Supreme Commander was strongly of the opinion that a second line of advance into Germany must be available. It was for this reason that the bridgeheads in the Mainz-Mannheim area were to be seized. The line of advance of this army would be on Frankfurt and Kassel and would assist in isolating the Ruhr. In the North, Field Marshal Montgomery’s drive would be directed on Munster and would swing down toward Hamm. It had been estimated that logistically it would not be possible to maintain more than 35 divisions in the northern thrust until rail bridgeheads had been established across the Rhine. In the South there were no serious logistic limitations and up to 50 divisions could be maintained before rail bridgeheads had been established.

The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance of flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be maintained would be employed in the northern thrust but the short length of the river available for the crossings, together with other limiting factors, made it essential to have an alternative thrust available should the northern thrust be held up. The forces not employed in the two thrusts would be used to secure the remainder of the line and to stage diversions and threats.

General Bedell Smith explained that the only factor which had altered since General Eisenhower’s appreciations and intentions had been communicated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in SCAF 179 and SCAF 180 (CCS 761/3), was the factor of time which had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance. It was felt that on the Western Front freedom of movement could be counted on until the 15th of March. The Sixth Panzer Army was thought to be in process of withdrawal. There was no longer believed to be any serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and it was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery’s attack would start on 8 February.

Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, General Smith explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern thrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made to support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of 36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought had been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On the other hand, this area was so close to the area of the main effort that the Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened areas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General Eisenhower’s view the thrust in the North was absolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to be undertaken if at all possible.

In reply to a question, General Smith explained that it was obviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the operation would delay the main attack until midsummer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine. General Smith and General Bull explained that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The spring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower Rhine.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations, and that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those proposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising. The base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer to the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately threatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even further increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army. In the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communications thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on the whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of succeeding and that every other operation must be regarded as subsidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting too much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main northern attack.

Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it was felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had already been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith and General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180 was that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important as the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to engage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the withdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such reduction in strength as was taking place.

General Smith emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended to put into the northern effort every single division which could be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact that the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance was not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be of sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the important Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Commander’s view of the differentiation between the main and secondary thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be put there.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he welcomed this explanation. He had felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack to bog down.

General Marshall, in referring to a point previously made by Field Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving divisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In his view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows: the most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number of divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casualties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives of either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere. It was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with the aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the likelihood of our attacking in that area.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for relief and rehabilitation of tired units.

General Smith gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation. About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the remainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.

Turning to the employment of French divisions, General Smith said that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions was already moving, and they would be ready for action together with their corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain odd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the new French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire and Bordeaux.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not entirely agreed with the Supreme Commander’s plan as set out in SCAF 180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light of General Smith’s explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were loath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 761/4.

Sir Charles Portal drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180 which appeared out of keeping with General Smith’s explanation.

General Smith said that as he understood it, it had never been General Eisenhower’s intention to sweep the whole area west of the Rhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.

General Bull confirmed this view and said that such action had not been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was obviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.

General Smith said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine to the south.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9 of SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.

Admiral King drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified the position.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, General Smith said that the southern thrust was likely to start from some position between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In general, he felt that the Siegfried Line could be “nibbled through” by two or three good divisions in 15 days in almost any position.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF 180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note of it and should examine the record of General Smith’s explanation at their meeting on the following day.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff.

Coordination of Operations with the Russians

Sir Alan Brooke said that as he saw it, the only point was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still in full agreement with the instructions which they had issued to General Deane and Admiral Archer in FAN 477.

General Marshall confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff were still in complete agreement with the contents of this message, no answer to which had yet been received from the Russians. He felt it would be necessary to raise the issue with them during the forthcoming conference.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to press the Russians to agree at ARGONAUT to the proposals in the Appendix to CCS 741/6 (FAN 477).

The Combined Bomber Offensive (CCS 166 Series)

Sir Charles Portal explained that his object in raising this question was to find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views on the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Such a move, involving some 1,000 heavy bombers, would, of course, have considerable effect on the potentialities in other theaters.

General Kuter explained that CCS 400/2 did in effect give the commander of the United States strategic air forces the right to move such forces within the two theaters. He understood in fact that General Spaatz had been considering the possibility of moving the Fifteenth Air Force to the United Kingdom but had decided against such a course.

General Marshall said that he had directed an examination of the possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it, from southern France, thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po Valley. This proposal, however, had not commended itself to his staffs.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any large move as between theaters should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff since it had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters concerned. The number of bombers available in Italy, for instance, very materially affected the possibility of withdrawing ground forces from that theater.

General Marshall said that as he remembered it, the agreement with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.

Sir Charles Portal said that it had been felt that temporary moves of air units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view of the difficult weather and the fact that operating out of the United Kingdom was a highly specialized business.

Admiral King said that he considered the permanent allocations of forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If necessary, the paper under discussion (CCS 400/2) should be modified to bring it into line with this view.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was entirely reassured by General Marshall’s statement with regard to the future of the Fifteenth Air Force.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean.

Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany (CCS 772)

Sir Alan Brooke presented a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the planning date for the end of the war with Germany (CCS 772). He explained that it had been necessary to estimate such a date or dates in order to provide a basis for production and manpower planning.

General Marshall explained that United States production planning was based on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December, 1945.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 772 pending consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

Planning Date for the End of the War with Japan

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan as recommended in paragraph 32 of CCS 680/2.

The U-Boat Threat

Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that at present we were in a somewhat similar position to that of 1918. The ASDIC was proving less effective against present U-boat operations in shallow water where the tide affected the efficiency of the ASDIC. The Germans had discovered this and were working their submarines close inshore around the United Kingdom. At present they were operating principally in the Channel, the Irish Sea, and one had even penetrated the entrance to the Clyde. Our aircraft were also hampered by the extremely small target presented by the schnorkel. This relatively small object was normally used only some three feet above the water and ASV aircraft could therefore only detect it in calm weather.

Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their schnorkel which enabled them to detect the ASV emissions before the aircraft contacted the schnorkel.

In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea, an escort carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least four ships sunk in the Channel. He hoped, however, that the position would improve, and, in fact, two submarines had been sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further one south of Land’s End. The object was to force the submarines back into deep water where the ASDIC would be effective, and to achieve this deep mine fields were being laid in order to shut the enemy out of the Irish Sea.

The Chief of the Air Staff explained that from the air point of view new devices were being brought into action, … It must be remembered, however, that with a submerged submarine using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even after it had contacted the submarine, found difficulty in sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left no swirl at which to aim.

Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that the Germans were building new types of submarines which were a vast improvement over those which had been used previously. There were two new types: one of 1600 tons with a speed of up to 18 knots submerged, and carrying twenty torpedoes; the other, a small coastal type, was capable of 13 knots submerged and carried two torpedoes. The larger boat had an extremely long range. It was thought that these new boats would be coming into operation about the middle or end of February.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the foregoing statements.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

January 30, 1945
Top secret

Proposed Programme of Work

Tuesday, 30 January

  1. A. War Against Germany
  2. C. Co-ordination of Operations
    Bomblines, etc.
  3. E. Combined Bomber Offensive
  4. F. Planning Date for End of German War

Wednesday, 31 January

  1. B. Strategy in Mediterranean
  2. War Against Japan
    A. South-East Asia
    B. Allocation of Resources Between SEAC and China

Thursday, 1 February

  1. C. Pacific Operations
  2. D. Planning Date for End of Japanese War
  3. D. U-Boat Threat

Friday, 2 February

  1. Review of Cargo Shipping
  • Additional Item.
  • Oil Stocks
  1. Basic undertakings

Castille, 30.1.45.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 30 January 1945
CCS 772
Top secret

Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany

We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against Germany as follows:

  1. In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided by the latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on this subject. Their conclusions are:

a. If, as seems just possible, the Russians succeed in overrunning the eastern defences of Germany before the Germans can consolidate there, the effect might be to force the Germans so to denude the West as to make an Allied advance comparatively easy. As the result of such advances in the East and in the West, a German collapse might occur before mid-April, 1945.

b. On balance, however, we conclude that distance combined with stiffening German resistance is likely to bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. This will involve the loss of industrial Silesia.

c. As the result of the loss of industrial Silesia, production of finished armaments, mainly land armaments, would fall over a period of about six months by a quarter or more.

d. If, as now appears improbable, the Germans succeed in stopping the Russian advance forward of Upper Silesia, thus retaining their two main industrial areas, in Silesia and in the Ruhr, we nevertheless consider that the overall decline in Germany’s capacity to resist will be such that an Allied offensive in the West followed by a further Russian offensive in the summer should lead to the collapse of German resistance before November.

e. The need for forces to stem the Russian advance may cause a German withdrawal in Italy, at least to the line of the River Adige.

f. Germany, at any rate until the summer of 1945 when the U-boat campaign is expected to be at its height, is likely to retain sufficient forces to hold at least southern Norway.

  1. Based on the above, we have considered three cases:

a. The best case.
b. A reasonably favourable case.
c. An unfavourable case.

The best case

  1. It is clear from paragraph 1a above that there is a possibility that the result of the present Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by mid-April. We do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of this timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for planning purposes, as the earliest date for the defeat of Germany.

The reasonably favourable case

  1. Eastern Front. Distance and stiffening German resistance may well bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg–Giant Mountains. Thereafter, the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May or early June.

  2. Western Front. Preliminary operations to reach the Rhine should be completed before the end of March. An all-out Allied offensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early May, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany.

  3. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end of organised German resistance by the end of June.

The unfavourable case

  1. Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance is stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the late summer.

  2. Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to achieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a dispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching another offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer, but it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt in the third quarter of the year.

  3. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German organised resistance by the beginning of November.

Conclusion

  1. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower planning.

For planning purposes, we consider that:
a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30 June, 1945.
b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1 November, 1945.

Harriman-Churchill dinner meeting, evening

On board HMS Orion in Grand Harbor

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Harriman Prime Minister Churchill
Lieutenant General Schreiber

U.S. State Department (January 31, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
General of the Army Marshall Major General Anderson
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Major General Kuter Brigadier General Lindsay
Lieutenant General Somervell Captain McDill
Lieutenant General Smith Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Duncan Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral McCormick Colonel Dean
Major General Bull Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull Colonel Cary
Major General Wood Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Floriana, January 31, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of the CCS 182nd Meeting

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of the Conclusions of the CCS 182nd Meeting and approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)

General Marshall said that the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 761/4 had been presented at the 182nd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (30 January 1945) and discussed at that time. He called on General Bull for any additional comments he might wish to make at this time.

General Bull said that immediately following the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Smith had dispatched a telegram to General Eisenhower outlining certain changes that had been recommended in his plan, and that General Eisenhower’s reply was expected to arrive shortly. There was nothing that he could add until General Eisenhower’s views had been received.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the foregoing statement.

Planning Date for End of War with Germany (CCS 772 and JCS 1239)

General Marshall said that CCS 772, the British memorandum on this subject, had been presented at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 182nd Meeting (30 January 1945). Action had been deferred pending consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Staff Planners had studied the British proposals and now recommend in JCS 1239 that action on CCS 772 relative to the planning date for the end of the war with Germany be deferred until the end of the tripartite conversations at ARGONAUT.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff defer action on CCS 772 until the conclusion of ARGONAUT.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 762; JCS 1236 and JCS 1236/1; CCS 773)

General Marshall said that JCS 1236 contains an examination and discussion by the Joint Staff Planners of Allied strategy in Italy in the light of recent developments, and of the issues raised by the Supreme Allied Commander in CCS 762, with a view to establishing the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff as to operations in Italy. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions and the proposed directive in JCS 1236 as the basis for discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this point considered an advance copy of a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing a draft directive to SACMED, later circulated as CCS 773.

General Marshall drew attention to the proposal to withdraw 6 British, Canadian and American divisions from Italy for use in France. It was his opinion that only British and Canadian divisions should be withdrawn, and that the number should be reduced to five.

Admiral King concurred with General Marshall. He felt that, in the event of a flareup in the Balkans, the British would undoubtedly desire to withdraw additional British divisions for use in that area and that this contingency should not be overlooked.

General Kuter pointed out that the draft directive proposed by the British stated specifically that no tactical air forces were to be withdrawn. He considered it essential that a suitable proportion of the 12th Air Force should accompany the ground divisions to France.

General Marshall felt that before a decision was taken on the proposed directive, General McNarney’s views should be sought. He proposed a telegram for this purpose.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed and agreed upon certain amendments to the British directive.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the message to General McNarney proposed by General Marshall.

b. Directed the Secretaries to draft a memorandum embodying the agreed amendments to the British directive with a view to its circulation after the receipt of General McNarney’s views.

a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35)

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters (JCS 1238)

General Marshall said that the British Chiefs of Staff had presented a memorandum on operations in Southeast Asia Command in CCS 452/35, which contained a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.

In JCS 1238 the Joint Staff Planners had examined strategy in the Southeast Asia Command, India-Burma and China theaters in the light of recent developments and the recommendations of General Sultan and General Wedemeyer with a view to the formulation of a policy for guidance of this Conference.

After discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in JCS 1238, subject to the amendment of the memorandum in Appendix “A” as agreed during the discussion. (Appendix “A” subsequently circulated as CCS 452/36).

Estimate of the Enemy Situation – Europe (CCS 660/3)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of CCS 660/3.

Bombing of U-Boat Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (JCS 1219/1)

General Marshall said that JCS 1219/1 contained a study by the Joint Staff Planners of the possible resurgence of U-boat activity against North Atlantic shipping.

Admiral King felt that the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz was satisfactory but appeared to be drawn up on rather general lines.

Admiral Duncan explained that the directive had been purposely prepared in this manner after a discussion of the present air directive under which the bomber forces were operating.

General Anderson explained that the present bombing directive had been drawn up to indicate certain priorities which included petroleum reserves and the installations of the German Air Force. Bombing of these objectives had definite bearing on the overall effort. The destruction of petroleum reserves had the effect of cutting down the activities of the German Air Force, and slowing down the submarine and training programs. Certain areas were selected for each operation and at daily meetings targets were selected to take advantage of current opportunities. The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in JCS 1219/1 (Subsequently circulated as CCS 774).

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull General Riddell-Webster
Major General Hull Air Marshal Robb
Major General Anderson Major General Laycock
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Cabell
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Colonel Peck Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

Floriana, January 31, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 182nd Meeting

Sir Alan Brooke referred to the record of General Bull’s statement contained in the fourth paragraph of item 4 of the minutes. He had not understood that there was any question about operation GRENADE not being launched. He had, on the other hand, understood that operation VERITABLE was dependent on operation GRENADE. Was it visualized that VERITABLE would have to await the launching of GRENADE?

General Smith explained that General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. If this advance succeeded in reaching Euskirchen quickly, it would be equally effective in assisting operation VERITABLE as would operation GRENADE. VERITABLE was not, however, dependent on either operation. General Eisenhower was at present at General Bradley’s headquarters and was now deciding whether or not to cancel General Bradley’s operations and shift forces north in order to undertake GRENADE instead.

General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.

General Smith said that it was his personal opinion that it would probably be necessary to stop General Bradley’s operations and to launch operation GRENADE.

General Marshall pointed out that if General Bradley’s operations could achieve their objective in time there were certain advantages since the troops were already in position.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 182nd Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.

Operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 773)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 773).

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that the right course of action was to reinforce the decisive Western Front at the expense of the Mediterranean Theater which, of necessity, would then have to revert to the offensive-defensive in Italy. There was now no question of operations aimed at the Ljubljana Gap and in any event the advance of the left wing of the Russian Army made such an operation no longer necessary.

General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not yet in a position to give their final views on the draft directive, particularly with reference to possible moves of part of the Twelfth Air Force. However, there were certain United States proposals which he would like to put to the British Chiefs of Staff at once. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggested the following amendments: In paragraph 2 the substitution of the word “British” for “our” wherever it occurred; in paragraph 4 the substitution of “five” for “six” divisions; in paragraph 5, first sentence, the deletion of the words “United States” and “in equal proportions.”

General Marshall explained that it was felt wiser to leave the Fifth Army intact as a well-balanced organic force, and that it would be preferable to reinforce France with British and Canadian divisions in order to increase the strength of Field Marshal Montgomery’s army.

The United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to the removal of three divisions, British or Canadian, at once, and the remainder as soon as they could be released from Greece, since this was the only way of finding the additional forces required. The question of the equipment of Greek forces had also been considered, since on this depended the release of the British divisions now in that country, but this was a complicated problem which he would like to consider further. The United States proposal was therefore that five divisions, two of which should be Canadian and the remainder British, should eventually be moved to France. With regard to the transfer of these forces, a preliminary study went to show that use of air transport could expedite the transfer of at least the first two divisions. He felt that if motor transport could be provided for these divisions from the United Kingdom, the date by which they would be available for operations in France would be greatly expedited.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff originally estimated that six divisions could be spared from the theater. With regard to their nationality, there were obviously great advantages in moving the Canadian divisions to enable them to join up with the remainder of the Canadian forces in France. He was prepared to agree that the remaining divisions should be British. He felt it right to accept five divisions as a basis and this figure could be reconsidered later in the light of the situation.

Field Marshal Alexander said that the Canadian divisions were the easiest to move quickly; one was already out of the line and could be moved at once and the other approximately a fortnight later. He pointed out, however, that it would be difficult to find suitable British divisions since all were now in the line and they had been involved in hard fighting for a long period. He had no reserve divisions. He outlined the composition of the forces available to him in the Mediterranean Theater.

Sir Alan Brooke felt it unwise to go into the details of the formations to be moved at this stage. He accepted the United States proposals in principle. Two Canadian and one British divisions could be moved first and the remaining two British divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had in mind to propose the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the Twelfth Tactical Air Force to include five fighter groups, one light bomber group, one reconnaissance unit, and two squadrons of night fighters. These air forces would be used to assist the First French Army and the Seventh United States Army.

Field Marshal Alexander pointed out that if land formations were removed from him, it was all the more desirable to keep as much air power as possible in the theater. If it was absolutely necessary to withdraw air forces from him, he was most anxious that the United States medium and light bombers should not be taken, since British air forces in Italy were weak in those particular types.

General Smith said that he was not asking for light bombers to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean Theater to Northwest Europe.

General Anderson pointed out that the greatest need was for fighter-bombers. The Southern Group of Armies had been robbed of these in order to strengthen the northern forces. He felt that if the Mediterranean Theater was passing to the defensive and the troops were being transferred to Northwest Europe, then the appropriate air components should, if possible, accompany them. The main deficiencies in Northwest Europe were in P-47s which could be used as either fighters or fighter-bombers.

General Kuter explained that the proposal to move the 47th Light Bomber Group from Italy had been made in view of the fact that it was trained for night intruder work which it was felt would be of more value in Northwest Europe than in Italy.

General Smith said that he would be delighted to accept this group but only if Field Marshal Alexander could spare it. He was as concerned as Field Marshal Alexander himself as to the security of the Italian Front.

Field Marshal Alexander said that if General Smith would give him his minimum requirements, he would do his utmost to meet them.

General Smith said that the five fighter-bomber groups were his minimum requirement for France and the light bombers, though desirable, were not essential.

Field Marshal Alexander undertook to examine this proposal at once and to release these forces if this proved at all possible. He fully realized that if his theater was to go on the defensive it was his duty to give up all possible resources, provided only that his front remained reasonably secure.

General Smith said that he was entirely prepared to leave the final decision to Field Marshal Alexander.

Sir Alan Brooke referred to NAF 841 in which Field Marshal Alexander had requested approval to the equipment of certain additional Greek forces. He (Sir Alan Brooke) was most anxious that a decision on this proposal should be reached before the Combined Chiefs of Staff left Malta since such a decision would greatly accelerate the dates at which the British divisions could be released from Greece.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.

Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)

Sir Alan Brooke said the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the Supreme Commander’s operations as explained by General Smith and recorded in the minutes of the 182nd Meeting. This explanation, however, was not in complete accord with the proposals put forward in SCAF 180. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore were not prepared to approve SCAF 180 as at present drafted.

General Smith then presented a redraft of the Supreme Commander’s plan as contained in paragraph 21 of SCAF 180. This redraft was designed to bring the Supreme Commander’s proposals into line with his previous explanation of SCAF 180.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.

Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany (CCS 772)

General Marshall said that he felt it wiser to defer consideration of this item until after discussion with the Russian General Staff.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject until the conclusion of ARGONAUT

a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35 and 452/36)

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/35 had put forward a new draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia.

General Marshall said that he felt that the question of a directive to the Supreme Commander should be linked with the problem of the allocation of resources between the India-Burma and China Theaters. He drew attention to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 452/36) which, while concurring in the directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, linked this directive to an understanding as to the allocation of United States resources to the Southeast Asia Command. He felt that the situation was developing to a point where the resources of the China and Burma-India Theaters would be separated. U.S. resources required for China would not be available for operations in Malaysia. It was important that Admiral Mountbatten should be in no doubt as to the circumstances under which United States forces were available to him.

General Wedemeyer had recently estimated that some three squadrons of fighters would be required to protect the air route to China and had further implied that he was prepared to accept the responsibility of protecting with Chinese or United States troops the northern part of the Burma Road. This would, of course, relieve Admiral Mountbatten of these responsibilities. The situation was developing rapidly and the Japanese might well hold out in the Rangoon area in order to deny us that port but, in a matter of weeks, the Japanese sea communications to Burma, Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies would be cut by air operations out of the Philippines. This would materially reduce Admiral Mountbatten’s problems. Further, it would soon be possible to transfer more power to China, not so much additional tonnage but the all-important transport vehicles and light and medium artillery. The striking power then available to us on the far side of the Hump would be very different from that which we now had.

Summing up, General Marshall said that the proposed directive to Admiral Mountbatten was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided it was communicated to Admiral Mountbatten together with the policy with regard to the employment of United States forces outlined in CCS 452/36.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the phrase “with the forces at present at your disposal” contained in paragraph 3 of the draft directive was inserted in order to make it clear to Admiral Mountbatten that he should not undertake operations which could not be carried out without an increased allocation of resources.

Sir Charles Portal asked for clarification of the meaning of the United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum (CCS 452/36). Did this memorandum imply that, although Admiral Mountbatten could use for approved operations in Burma United States forces not required in China, such forces would not be available to him for use in Malaya?

General Marshall said that the memorandum was meant to make it quite clear that the employment of United States forces outside Burma must be the subject of fresh agreement and that Admiral Mountbatten must not be led to assume that they would be available to him.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 452/36 pending further study by the British Chiefs of Staff.

Estimate of the Enemy Situation – Europe (CCS 660/3)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS 660/3.

Bombing of U-Boat Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (CCS 774)

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that he would prefer to consider this memorandum at the same time as the paper he was putting forward with regard to the U-boat threat.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 774 pending study by the British Chiefs of Staff.

Interdelegation dinner meeting, evening, government house

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Stettinius Prime Minister Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Lieutenant General Schreiber
and various other members of the two Delegations

The meeting was “a large formal dinner at Government House” given by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Malta, Lieutenant General Schreiber, in honor of the American and British Delegations.

740.011 EW/1–2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, January 31, 1945
Top secret
[Excerpts]
  1. General information. Winant has been instructed to act in concert with his Soviet colleague in the EAC in approving French proposals regarding equality in connection with the handling of German matters. … The British still insist on the desirability of a tripartite declaration on Denmark but the Department intends instead to send a secret message to the Danish Freedom Council and Danish political leaders praising their assistance to the common cause. … It is understood that Subasic will not leave London until the regency council appointed by the King has been recognized by Tito. The Greek situation is developing normally and it is reported that EAM has accepted the Government’s proposal regarding the composition of the peace talk delegations. … As a result of extreme Soviet pressure, the Czechoslovak Cabinet has decided to recognize the Lublin Committee. … Discussion in EAC of control machinery for Austria will be resumed as soon as instructions are received by the Soviet and French representatives. The British have approved in principle French participation in the occupation of Austria. … Bohlen has a copy of a long memorandum from Mikolajczyk making proposals for the solution of Soviet-Polish difficulties.

  2. ALLSTATE. HORSESHOE.

  3. … (This is our fifth message.)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)

The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill

Malta, 1 February, 1945
P. M. (A) 2.
Prime Minister

Conversations with Mr. Stettinius

Poland
We found that we were in broad agreement on the necessity for finding a solution and that it was impossible for our Governments to recognise the Lublin Government. Mr. Stettinius stressed that failure to find a solution would greatly disturb American public opinion, and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the World Organisation.

  1. I agreed that a “Russian” solution of the question would be very likely to produce the latter result.

  2. We found that we had very similar ideas on the lines of a possible solution. We should have to stress to Marshal Stalin the unsatisfactory nature of the present state of affairs, with the Soviet recognising one Government in Lublin and ourselves another Government in London. (We, of course, ourselves have the added problem of the Polish forces, acting with ours, who owe allegiance to the London Government). There would be apparent to the world a definite divergence of view on a point of first-rate importance. This would give rise to uneasiness amongst our peoples and would afford valuable material to enemy propaganda.

  3. The time has probably gone by for a “fusion” of London and Lublin, and the only remedy that we can see is the creation of a new interim Government in Poland, pledged to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit. This would be representative of all Polish political parties and would no doubt include elements from the Lublin Government, from Poles in Poland, and from Poles abroad. There are no good candidates from the Government in London, but if M. Mikolajczyk and, perhaps, M. Romer and others such as M. Grabski could be included, that would make it much easier for us to recognize the new Government, which should be far more representative of Poland as a whole than is the Lublin Government.

  4. If it would facilitate the realisation of this plan, we should be ready to see the adoption of M. Mikolajczyk’s idea of a “Presidential Council” consisting of such men as the former Prime Minister, M. Witos, Archbishop Sapieha, M. Zulawski and M. Bierut. Such a Council could appoint the new Government.

  5. If the Russians persist in their present policy, that would only neutralise the efforts of all those in our two countries most anxious to work with Russia.

  6. There remains the territorial problem. As regards Poland’s eastern frontier, HMG have already agreed with the Russians and announced publicly that this should be the Curzon Line, giving Lwow to the USSR. The Americans may however still wish to press the Russians to leave Lwow to Poland. As regards Poland’s western frontier, we and the Americans agreed that Poland should certainly have East Prussia south and west of Königsberg, Danzig, the eastern tip of Pomerania and the whole of Upper Silesia. The Lublin Poles, no doubt with Soviet approval, are however also claiming not only the Oder line frontier, including Stettin and Breslau, but also the western Neisse frontier.

  7. The cessions upon which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the transfer of some 2½ million Germans. The Oder frontier, without Breslau and Stettin would involve a further 2¼ millions. The western Neisse frontier with Breslau and Stettin would involve an additional 3¼ millions making 8 millions in all.

  8. We were prepared last October in Moscow to let M. Mikolajczyk’s Government have any territories they chose to claim up to the Oder, but this was conditional upon agreement then being reached between him and the Russians and there was no question of our agreeing to the western Neisse frontier. It was agreed before we left London that we should oppose the western Neisse frontier. I also think that we should keep the position fluid as regards the Oder line frontier, and take the line that HMG cannot be considered as having accepted any definite line for the western frontier of Poland, since we need not make the same concessions to the Lublin Poles which we were prepared to make to M. Mikolajczyk in order to obtain a solution of the Polish problem. Even the Oder line frontier would severely tax the Polish capacity for absorption and would increase the formidable difficulties involved in the transfer of millions of Germans. We agreed with the Americans that in any event these transfers should be gradual and not precipitate.

  9. If the Russians refuse to accept any solution such as that outlined above, the present deadlock must continue. That would be bad, but a simple recognition of the Lublin Government would be even worse.

Stettinius-Eden conversation, morning

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden

Stettinius and Eden, who were both quartered on board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta, went ashore in the early part of the morning and took a walk, during the course of which, it seems, they “discussed some of the problems to be raised at Yalta.”

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
General of the Army Marshall Major General Hull
Fleet Admiral King Major General Wood
Major General Kuter Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Lieutenant General Somervell Brigadier General Lindsay
Lieutenant General Smith Captain Stroop
Vice Admiral Cooke Captain McDill
Rear Admiral Duncan Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral McCormick Colonel Lincoln
Major General Bull Lieutenant Colonel McRae
Major General Anderson
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Floriana, February 1, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

a. Approval of the Minutes of the JCS 184th Meeting

General Kuter requested that the last sentence of the remarks of General Anderson in Item 7 be changed to read: “The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.”

b. Approval of the Minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting

General Marshall requested the amendment of his remarks in the third paragraph of Item 1 to read as follows:

General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the minutes of the JCS 184th Meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the discussion.

b. Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the CCS 183rd Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the above discussion and to later minor amendments.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773)

General Marshall said that the Secretaries had prepared a draft of the directive to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which showed the amendments agreed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in their previous meeting. General McNarney’s views, which had just been received, indicate that on balance he prefers to have British divisions rather than American divisions transferred to France. Concerning the tactical air force, General McNarney expresses satisfaction with the present air-ground ratio. He considers that a proportionate reduction in fighter-bomber strength should accompany a reduction in the number of divisions. He considers the medium bombers should stay in Italy.

In light of General McNarney’s message and the discussions that have taken place, it seems that no American divisions should be taken from Italy and that the draft directive to General Alexander proposed by the British with the amendments already agreed to by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and agreed in part by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to General Alexander, with an information copy to General Eisenhower.

General Kuter proposed that a new paragraph 5 should be added to the directive as follows:

The U.S. Twelfth Air Force, less such units as may be selected by agreement between you and SCAEF, shall be made available for transfer to SCAEF, together with necessary service units.

An appropriate sequence of paragraphs in the directive was then discussed and agreed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared by the Secretaries, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 773/1).

Equipment of Allied and Liberated Forces (JCS 1240 and NAF 841)

General Marshall read a brief of JCS 1240 and proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee, subject to the following amendments:

Page 5, delete the last three lines of paragraph 11 and after the word “reviewing” add “NAF 841 again.”

Page 8, line 2, insert the words “already approved in principle” between the words “provision” and “of.”

Page 8, paragraph 9, line 3, after the word “review” delete the remainder of the sentence and substitute therefor “NAF 841 again.”

General Somervell said he felt certain that when the British restudy their requirements for the supply of Greek forces, they would find that they could not meet them. It might then be suggested that the agreed figure of equipment for 460,000 liberated manpower in Europe could be reduced to 400,000 and the equipment for the 60,000 remaining be applied to the requirement for the Greek Army.

After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1240, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall (Memorandum subsequently circulated as CCS 768/1).

Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, 452/36 and CCS 747/7)

General Marshall said that in CCS 452/35 the British proposed a directive to Admiral Mountbatten. In CCS 747/7 the British propose that transfer of forces from India-Burma to China be subject to CCS agreements. The United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/36 set forth a policy with respect to U.S. resources in the India-Burma Theater.

The point at issue appears to be whether the United States Chiefs of Staff can order transfers of resources when they do not jeopardize British forces engaged in approved operations in Burma or whether every transfer requires agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed by the British. The U.S. proposal as now written appears to safeguard sufficiently the British interests. Under the British proposal the Combined Chiefs of Staff would become involved in lengthy discussions of purely operational matters and the transfer of one air squadron or one Quartermaster company would be the subject for CCS decision unless acceptable to SACSEA.

No compromise should be accepted which involves CCS approval of transfer or requires discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff except where the British Chiefs think their forces are jeopardized. The U.S. paper provides clearly for this.

General Marshall recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the approval of the proposals made in the U.S. memorandum in CCS 452/36. By this action both the policy for the transfer of U.S. resources and the directive for Admiral Mountbatten will be approved. The British in their paper state their willingness to discuss means of reducing the time occupied in the discussion of projected moves. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should listen to whatever the British may propose in this respect since these discussions will be necessary when contemplated transfers might place British forces in jeopardy.

The Secretary stated that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to withdraw their paper, CCS 747/7, if the United States Chiefs of Staff will agree to delete the words “British forces engaged in” in the eighth line of the second paragraph of CCS 452/36, which paper would then be acceptable to them.

Colonel Lincoln said that the proposed British amendment would nullify the intentions of the United States Chiefs of Staff because it would transfer the “jeopardy” from the “forces engaged” to “operations.” While the jeopardy to the forces actually engaged in operations was a factual matter, it would be difficult to determine from the existing circumstances the question of the jeopardy of approved operations, some of which might not yet have been initiated. This was a matter over which there could be considerable difference of opinion. Discussion of such a point was likely to be time-consuming. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British, in lieu of their amendment, the substitution of the word “the” for the word “British” in the same line of the paragraph referred to above.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to adhere to the position outlined by them in CCS 452/36.

Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)

Admiral King said that this paper was on the agenda for the purpose of reaffirming the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operations for the defeat of Japan. He doubted the possibility of maintaining and defending a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk from bases in Kamchatka alone, but suggested reaffirming the paper for planning purposes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Reaffirmed their approval of CCS 417/11.

U-Boat Threat (CCS 774 and 774/1)

General Marshall said that CCS 774, upon which action had been deferred at the CCS 183rd Meeting, was the U.S. proposal for the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the disruption of the German U-boat program. In CCS 774/1 the British have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.

Admiral King was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in CCS 774 in the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall drew attention to the fact that the British paper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage being considered in current shipping studies and would provide the British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate some reply to the British if the point were raised.

Admiral King felt that the British paper might be accepted if the acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies established in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.

Admiral Cooke suggested that it might be preferable to note the paper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of CCS 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings on 1 April 1945.

Strategy in Northwest Europe

In closed session, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept SCAF 180 (Enclosure “B” to CCS 761/3) as amended by SCAF 194, and take note of SCAEF’s dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January 1945.

Annex
CRICKET 55 (1 February 1945)

Message by General Kuter to General Arnold

1 February 1945

The following letter received this date:

My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691 about British participation in the very long-range bombing of Japan and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1. we have made considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing potential.

The bombing of the Tirpitz proved that it is possible to increase the all-up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations and we now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles carrying a useful load of the order of 6,000 pounds with either the Lancaster or with its replacement the Lincoln. We are however carrying on with flight refueling experiments as an insurance.

The rate at which we will be able to bring our Bomber Force into action against Japan cannot finally be determined until we know more about the bases that will be available for our operations and the facilities we can count on at those bases. Assuming that bases are made available I estimate that our first squadrons could be fully operational in the Pacific 7 months after Germany is defeated, and the whole force some 5 months later.

This RAF force will be thoroughly experienced in the technique of night bombing and in sea-mining, and will be capable of dropping the very effective 1,500-pound British mines. I feel that particularly in these respects the Force will be able to make a valuable contribution to our efforts against Japan.

I am anxious to get our plans for the RAF very long-range Force into more concrete form, particularly with regard to the rate of its deployment, the provision of bases, availability of common user items, local defence and the general administrative arrangements for the contingent.

I would like to send the AOC designate of our Force together with a small number of staff officers, over to the United States at an early date in order to make contact with your Air Force authorities and the officers under whom he would be serving, to make as much progress as possible with these arrangements. It would also be helpful if he could visit the Pacific area and learn at first hand something about the operating conditions in that Theatre. Following this visit, I propose that the AOC would return to the United Kingdom to continue with the preparation of his Force. I realize the difficulties of deciding on the exact base facilities that will be available so far in advance, but I am anxious to make a definite start even on a small scale, and would be prepared to initiate planning on the assumption that you would make available to us, say, 4 bases for heavy bombers 6 months after Germany is defeated.

I would very much like to discuss this VLR project with you during this conference, either here or at MAGNETO.

Yours sincerely, Charles Portal.

Anticipating such proposal, I have cleared with JCS a reply which will infer favorable consideration after detailed presentation of desired visit to Theater at proposed conference here or at MAGNETO.

Understand Air Marshal Hugh Pugh Lloyd is AOC designate. Expect to arrange that Lloyd and party of 8 to 10 of his elected staff will arrive Washington after March 1 to spend 2 or 3 days in Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans studying probable course of air war on Japan and then 4 or 5 days in Headquarters XX Air Force for familiarization with means and methods of command and operations of XX Air Force and then visit to XX Air Force base in Mariannas and probably to Luzon.

Expect that 36 squadrons of VLR Lancasters or Lincolns under Lloyd will operate as a unit of XX Air Force.

All discussions will be based on condition that RAF unit will provide own aviation engineers and all services, will build, maintain and operate own bases, will provide all echelons of aviation maintenance and in general will be absolutely and completely self-supporting.

Will tie resurrection of WEARY WILLIE project into same conversation and hope to establish full freedom for our development and operation from French bases and freedom to develop and operate accurately controlled types from UK bases.

1 Like

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 10:30 a.m.

On board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Matthews Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Butler
Mr. Hiss Mr. Dixon

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

February 1, 1945, 10:30 a.m.

Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question

Territorial Problems
We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish frontier in the east which should run along the Curzon Line in the north and central section, and in the southern section should follow generally the eastern frontier line of the Lwow Province. This would give to Poland the Polish city of Lwow and the economically important oil fields. This frontier would correspond generally with one of the suggested frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.

In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.

If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out if these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Neisse Line.

Political Problems
The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason, without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and without causing the most serious repercussions in American public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of representative members of all important Polish political parties. This new interim government should not be in the form of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a solution might be an agreement at this meeting to set up a Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers (four if France would be included) with appointment of an interim Polish Government composed of the representatives of leading Polish political parties. This Presidential Council might be composed of Bierut, the present head of the Lublin Government, and a small number of Poles from inside Poland taken from the following list: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos – one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party and a former Prime Minister, Zulowski, a Socialist leader, Bishop Lukomski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba.

This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.

Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making up this government would, of course, be certain present members of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in particular Mikolajczyk.

U.K. Delegation Memorandum

February 1, 1945, 10:30 a.m.

Allied (Soviet) Control Commissions in Bulgaria and Hungary

HMG regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary,” and HMG suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11, 1944.

HMG also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities, HMG wish to ensure that:
a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commission. They should also have the right of direct access to the satellite authorities.

b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commissions should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of the satellite countries through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Governments or taking action which are not approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

c) The extent to which the British and the Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commissions will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions on the spot.

Roumania

HMG have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned HMG considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by HMG that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, HMG can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.

Foreign Ministers-Chiefs of Staff luncheon meeting

On board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Mr. Matthews

Stettinius: “The two Chiefs of Staff, after a thorough discussion of the question [of zones of occupation in Germany] with us, authorized us to cable our representatives on the European Advisory Commission in London that the two governments now approved the zones.”

740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–145: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Malta, 1 February 1945
Nr: CRICKET 45
Secret

For Acting Secretary of State
ONLY from Secretary Stettinius.

Have dispatched the following to Winant after conference which Eden and I had with General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.

You are Authorized immediately to inform the European Advisory Commission of this government’s approval of the protocol on zones of occupation for Germany. Eden is likewise telegraphing the British Government’s approval.

Please advise McCloy.

I have read many of the JCS/CCS meeting minutes but I wonder how do these directions trickle down the line to the chain of command and in what form. Are there any references that describe the process and its overall effectiveness during the war?

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Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson Major General Laycock
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

February 1, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 183rd Meeting

General Marshall said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:

General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

Field Marshal Brooke referred to the amended draft directive contained in CCS 773/1. He suggested that paragraph 4b of this directive should read as follows: “Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.”

It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.

Sir Charles Portal referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7c, which instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security of his front, though it might well be possible to release it after the Germans had withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.

In reply to a question, Sir Charles Portal confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German forces did not retire.

General Marshall said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the remainder of the directive should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under consideration.

General Marshall said he was not in favor of this proposal.

General Kuter suggested that General Eisenhower might require parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being transferred to him.

General Smith said that General Eisenhower’s first requirement, before any of the land forces, was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 768/1 until their next meeting.

a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, CCS 452/36)

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters (CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT))

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36.

General Marshall said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the words “British forces engaged in.” This he felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.

Sir Charles Portal explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36:

Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy recorded in CCS 452/36 and amended in the course of discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of CCS 452/36, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed above (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as CCS 452/37).

b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in CCS 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in CCS 452/37.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)

At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall and Admiral King explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the invasion of the Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration were:

(1) An attack on the Island of Hainan. This had the advantage not only of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations.

(2) An attack on North Borneo. The advantages of such an operation were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready for use.

(3) An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area. This operation was extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us.

When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time, it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.

In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.

With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that with U.S. troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations.

In view of the above considerations, it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.

The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.

The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months’ work could be achieved on this base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok which had previously been used as a base and staging point.

The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.

The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were convoying “civilian-type” supplies to the Maritime Provinces.

To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be under-taken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.

In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.

With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/11.

a. U-Boat Threat (CCS 774/1 and 774/2)

b. Bombing of Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (CCS 774)

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that CCS 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with General Marshall.

Sir Charles Portal, referring to CCS 774, said that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the “marginal effort” should be used against submarine targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it.

He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.

General Kuter said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.

Admiral King said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the action to be taken to counter it.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the Naval Staff would have liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets would in fact pay a more valuable dividend.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered the summary of countermeasures set out in CCS 774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 774/1 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 1945.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a directive based on CCS 774 and CCS 774/2.

Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/5 and 761/6)

In closed session, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of SCAF 180, as amended by SCAF 194 of 31 January, and as amplified by Message No. S-77211 of 31 January to General Smith.

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 1 February 1945
CCS 768/1 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces

  1. In the 183rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the forming of a Greek Army to take over responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAF 841, 25 January 1945.

  2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or “due in” the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.

  3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.

  4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of necessary matériel for:

a. The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions and supporting troops.

b. The Polish 2nd Division.

c. Six Belgium infantry brigades.

d. Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units (Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops.

  1. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.

  2. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.

  3. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as emphasized by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, dated 30 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem.

  4. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

  5. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review NAF 841 again.


Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 31 January 1945
CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret

Allocation of Resources Between India-Burma and China Theaters

  1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.

  2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.

  3. The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in CCS 308 no longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China rather than of warding off dangers.

  4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.

Stettinius-Churchill-Eden dinner meeting, evening

On board HMS Orion in Grand Harbor, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Stettinius Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden
Sir Alexander Cadogan

I hope the next conference is called Tea.

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U.S. State Department (February 2, 1945)

The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill

Malta, 2 February, 1945
P. M. (A) 4.
Prime Minister

The Future of Germany

As a result of developments in the war situation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to co-ordinate the policy of the major Allied Powers in regard to the future of Germany. It is clearly of paramount importance to future unity and security that there should be no divergence of policy between the Allies in dealing with Germany.

  1. The EAC was set up in 1943 to “study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities.” So far the Commission have agreed and referred to Governments three documents: (1) Terms of surrender for Germany, (2) protocol on zones of occupation, (3) control machinery for Germany. Of these (1) has been approved by all three Governments, and (2) and (3) so far by the United States and British Governments only.

  2. There are a considerable number of major questions of policy on which no decisions have been reached, though there have been exchanges of views at earlier conferences. In my view we should be wise to suspend final decisions until we see what conditions are in Germany. But there is a great deal of preparatory work which can and should be done. Governments have no doubt been studying all these questions individually; but the time has come when they could usefully be examined jointly by British, American, Soviet and French experts with a view to coordinating the individual studies. The obvious body to undertake this task is the EAC.

  3. I would accordingly suggest that at the forthcoming conference we should try to get general agreement that the EAC should be directed to examine and make joint recommendations at an early date to the member Governments regarding future political and economic policy towards Germany. In doing so, the Commission should pay particular attention to, inter alia, provisions for the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the prevention of rearmament, dismemberment, decentralisation, measures of economic security, reparation, the future of the Rheno-Westphalian basin, the Kiel area, and transfers of population.

  4. If this is agreed, it will be important that member Governments should ensure that their delegations are adequately staffed to cope with the increased work.

  5. It might also be useful, in order to give the public some idea of the Commission’s work, that the communiqué to be issued at the end of the Conference should announce the approval of the three Governments of the three documents so far negotiated by the EAC. This will, however, raise awkward problems as regards the French. While they are unlikely to propose any alterations of substance, they have not yet formally approved the documents, which will have to be recast in quadripartite form. We are telegraphing to the Foreign Office to ask (a) what effect it would be likely to have on the French if we announce the approval of the three Governments only of the three documents, and (b) whether they can devise a formula which we could use to cover the French.