Auch den Feindvölkern legt der Krieg Entbehrungen auf
Kalte Wohnungen in den USA und England
…
Reinhardt und Roosevelt
(wbk.) – Der deutsche Staatssekretär Reinhardt und der nordamerikanische Präsident Roosevelt haben sich in den letzten Tagen über die Staatshaushalte ihrer beiden Länder im Zusammenhang mit dem Übergang von der Kriegs- zur Friedenswirtschaft geäußert. In Kriegszeiten ist es allgemeiner Brauch, Zahlen so wenig wie möglich zu veröffentlichen, um dem Gegner keine Handhabe zu bieten. Reinhardt wie Roosevelt haben denn auch nur wenige absoluten Zahlen genannt.
In den ersten fünf Kriegsjahren hat das Reich die Hälfte seines durch die Kriegführung aufgeblähten Geldbedarfes aus ordentlichen Reichseinnahmen gedeckt. 1914 bis 1918 waren es nur 13 Prozent. Damals gab es Kriegsanleihen. Und damals gab es nach einem unglücklichen Ausgang im November 1918 in Österreich und Deutschland Inflationen, die allerdings erst viele Monate nach dem Waffenstillstand offensichtlich wurden und nicht unmittelbar nach der Niederlage. „Im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland ist eine Inflation völlig ausgeschlossen,“ sagt Reinhardt. Er hätte hinzufügen können, ebenso ausgeschlossen wie eine Kapitulation, ebenso wie ein nationaler Selbstmord à la Bukarest, Sofia, Helsingfors und Budapest. Ein Niederbruch des nationalsozialistischen Deutschlands würde jedoch genau so sicher das wirtschaftliche Chaos, die monetäre Unsicherheit, den völligen und unverzüglichen Zerfall des kunstvollen und bisher klaglos funktionierenden Systems der Ernährung der Städte, die Inflation usw. mit sich bringen, wie dies automatisch in allen „demokratisch“ besetzten Gebieten Europas seit Mitte 1943 der Fall war. Die seit 1933 bzw. 1939 verfolgte Linie der deutschen Budgetpolitik wird 1945 und auch weiterhin gerade weiterbeschritten werden. Es ist eine autoritäre Finanzierungspolitik, die andere Wege geht als die monetär-konservativen Feindmächte, die aber für eine gesunde und ausgeglichene staatliche Haushaltung nicht nur größeren Spielraum, sondern auch stärkere technische Gewandtheit hat als diese. Die anderen “Wege aber führen zu anderen Zielen, und diese Ziele sichern der Reichsmark das Vertrauen der schaffenden Bevölkerung.
Drei Ziele hat Reinhardt visiert: Wohnungsbau, Altersversorgung und Familienlastenausgleich. Ein nüchterner Mann der Zahlen, ein Steuerexperte, ein Budgetfachmann hat als die drei wichtigsten Finanzierungsaufgaben nach Kriegsende jene Vorhaben der NSDAP, bezeichnet, die die schnelle Weiterführung der Verwirklichung des deutschen Sozialismus verbürgen, und er hat erklärt, die Ordnung der Reichsfinanzen sei auch für den Kriegsrest gesickert, und neben einer echten Schuldentilgung sei nach dem Siege „ohne Schwierigkeiten“ die Finanzierung der großen Aufbaumaßnahmen und Sozialvorhaben möglich. Das ist wichtig. Budgetleuten fehlt großer Überschwang von Worten. Sie sind mit Versprechungen etwa genauso vorsichtig wie die deutsche Frau, die mit 200 RM. Bruttoeinkommen des Mannes eine fünfköpfige Familie erhalten muss, und die am Freitag die Zusammensetzung der Sonntagsmahlzeit bekanntgibt.
Innerhalb weniger Jahre wird das Reich den Bau einer genügend großen Zahl von gesunden Wohnungen zu erträglichen Preisen und Mieten erstellen. Wir alle, die wir in den vom Bombenterror verwüsteten Städten leben und dazu den vor 1939 aufgestauten Neubaubedarf kennen, wissen, dass es eine sehr große Anzahl von Wohnungen sein wird, daß die Spekulation Einfluss weder auf Gestaltung, Lage, noch auf Preise und Mieten haben wird. In der Bauwirtschaft wird kapitalistischen Gewinnhyänen von der NSDAP, ein Hinauswurf erster Güte bereitet werden. Für Jahrzehnte wird in diesem entscheidend wichtigen Wirtschaftszweig Hochzeit sein; der deutsche Schaffende schlechthin, nicht nur der Ausgebombte, wird gesund und preiswert wohnen.
Eine Finanzierung des totalen Familienlastenausgleiches lässt die Haushaltslage und Finanzpolitik des Reiches nach Kriegsende ebenfalls unverzüglich zu. Das Nettoeinkommen eines kinderlosen Ehepaares einer bestimmten Verdienstschicht wird nicht größer sein als das einer mit mehreren Kindern beglückten Familie der gleichen Berufsschicht. Der nächste Schritt auf dem Wege zur Verwirklichung des Familienlastenausgleiches wird die restlose Beseitigung aller Schulgelder, Leihgebühren und Lehrmittelkosten für alle Schulen und Hochschulen sein. Zusammen mit anderen Förderungsmaßnahmen wird dann der Weg für jede Begabung ohne Rücksicht auf die Einkommensverhältnisse der Eiter frei. Wer die Konsequenz und Zielsicherheit verfolgt hat, mit der im Großdeutschen Reich dem, tüchtigen Soldaten aus dem Mannschaftsstande die Offizierslaufbahn eröffnet wurde, und wer den Prozentsatz der aus dem Mannschaftsstand in den Offiziersstand aufgerückten Soldaten kennt, weiß, dass mit gleicher Rücksichtslosigkeit auf überholte Bedenken durch die Abschaffung aller Lehr- und Ausbildungskosten jeder Begabung der Weg zur Auswirkung erschlossen werden wird.
Und die Altersversorgung der deutschen Schaffenden, deren Planung bereits vor vielen Monaten vorgelegt wurde, und die ebenfalls umfassend und lückenlos sein soll, ist das dritte der direkten Finanzierungsziele des Staates und der Partei, die ohne Verzug angepeilt werden können. Dies bestätigte Reinhardt. Die wichtigsten Ziele der deutschen Nachkriegsfinanzierung sind im Innern des Reiches gelegen, sie liegen im deutschen Volk. Sie zu erreichen, heißt den Lebensstandard heben.
Mr. Roosevelt dagegen zielt in seiner jüngsten Budgetbotschaft an den Kongress über die Landesgrenzen hinweg. Das neue Budget 1945/46 berücksichtige den Übergang von dem Krieg zur Friedenswirtschaft. Die US-Regierung müsse alles tun, um alle nur möglichen Arbeitsmärkte offen zu halten. Die im Krieg gewaltig erhöhte Produktion müsse voll in Gang gehalten und ihr müssten auf jeden Fall ausreichende Absatzmöglichkeiten geschaffen werden. Roosevelt empfiehlt darum dem Kongress, das Johnson-Gesetz aufzuheben, das es verbot, säumigen Schuldnern aus dem ersten Weltkrieg Anleihen zu gewähren. Mit der Gewährung von Anleihen geht Hand in Hand die Verpflichtung des Geldnehmers, den Waren des Geldgebers Vorzugsstellungen einzuräumen. Zwecks Sicherung der Exporte schlägt Roosevelt weiter vor, die Beschlüsse von Bretton Woods zu genehmigen. Dadurch würde das US-Goldmonopol in dem internationalen Währungsplan und die Finanzübermacht der Yankees in der neuen Wiederaufbaubank wirksam werden können, die in Bretton Woods beschlossen worden sind.
Ein Hinweis auf die Größe und Bedeutung der nordamerikanischen Handelsmarine unterstreicht noch die wirtschaftsimperialistischen Absichten Roosevelts im Budgetjahr 1945/46. In die gleiche Richtung weisen die Erhöhungen, die die Haushaltsvoranschläge der konsularischen Dienste, der Handelsattachés, des Amtes für Außen- und Binnenhandel, der Verkehrsluftfahrt erfahren haben. Ohne Rücksichtnahme auf die Interessen des eigenen Volkes und aller übrigen Völker startet das nordamerikanische Hochkapital im Budgetjahr 1945/46 zur Verwirklichung seiner imperialistischen Zielsetzungen. Die deutschen und nordamerikanischen Budgetreden stellen somit Musterbeispiele dar je einer volksnahen und einer kapitalhörigen Finanzpolitik.
Neues Wiener Tagblatt (January 30, 1945)
Einleitungskämpfe auf Luzon
Angriffsrichtung der Amerikaner zielt in die Manilaebene
…
Führer HQ (January 30, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
In Ungarn setzte der Feind seine Angriffe zwischen Plattensee und Donau von Süden und Norden her fort. Gegenangriffe deutscher und ungarischer Verbände warfen die Bolschewisten aus einigen Einbruchsstellen. 40 Panzer und 20 Geschütze wurden im Bereich eines Armeekorps vernichtet. Die Besatzung von Budapest erwehrte sich im Burggelände heftiger von Schlachtfliegern unterstützter Angriffe von Westen und Norden. Zwischen der oberen Weichsel und der Oder verhinderten unsere Divisionen in harten Kämpfen die Durchbruchsversuche starker sowjetischer Kräfte.
Bei Ohlau versuchte der Feind, aus seinem Brückenkopf heraus weiter nach Westen zu stoßen. Im Raum von Steinau zerschlugen unsere Verbände stärkere Kräfte des Gegners und stellten die Verbindung zu der sich zäh verteidigenden Besatzung des Ortes wieder her.
Im Obra-Abschnitt und nördlich der Netze bei Driesen griff der Feind mit starken Panzerkräften in westlicher Richtung an. Schwere Kämpfe sind im Gange. Zwischen Schneidemühl und Kulm schiebt sich der Gegner weiter nach Norden vor. Am Unterlauf der Weichsel scheiterten schwächere feindliche Angriffe, während ein eigener Gegenangriff über die untere Weichsel nach Osten die Nogat zwischen Marienburg und westlich Elbing erreichte. Die Besatzung von Elbing verteidigt sich hartnäckig gegen starke feindliche Angriffe.
In Ostpreußen brachen unsere nach Westen angreifenden Divisionen den feindlichen Widerstand und gewannen bis zu dreißig Kilometer Raum. Aufklärungskräfte erreichten in kühnem Vorstoß den Brückenkopf Elbing und fügten dabei dem Feind schwere Verluste zu. Nördlich von Königsberg wurden die feindlichen Angriffe in erbitterten Kämpfen, in die auch deutsche Seestreitkräfte mit sichtbarer Wirkung eingriffen, aufgefangen. Bei den gestrigen Kämpfen in Ostpreußen wurden 53 Panzer und 24 Geschütze vernichtet.
An der kurländischen Front kam es nur zu örtlichen Gefechten.
Im Westen wurden auch gestern Angriffe der Kanadier gegen unseren Maas-Brückenkopf Gertruidenberg durch Artilleriefeuer zerschlagen. Schwere Kämpfe mit dem Feind, der seine Angriffe am Abend und in der Nacht fortsetzte, halten an.
An der Rurfront wurden mehrere feindliche Angriffe abgewiesen, nordwestlich Linnich vorübergehend verlorene Orte im Gegenstoß wieder gewonnen.
Beiderseits St. Vith stehen unsere Verbände in schwerem Kampf gegen die auf breiter Front angreifenden amerikanischen Divisionen. Nordöstlich der Stadt brach der Gegner nach heftigen Kämpfen in unsere Stellungen ein. Im südlichen Abschnitt wurde er abgewiesen oder in unserem Hauptkampffeld niedergezwungen.
Im oberen Elsass setzte der Gegner die Angriffe aus seinem Ill-Brückenkopf nördlich Kolmars fort. Es gelang ihm, in einem Abschnitt auf dem Südufer des Kolmarkanals Fuß zu fassen. Die im Gebiet von Thann und Sennheim angreifenden feindlichen Verbände blieben unter hohen blutigen Verlusten liegen.
In Mittelitalien wurden nordwestlich Faenza durch Stoßtrupps mehrere stark besetzte feindliche Kampfstände gesprengt.
In der Herzegowina warfen unsere Truppen den Gegner aus dem Raum von Mostar weit nach Süden zurück. Auch an der Drina und bei Virovitic, an der mittleren Drau sind erfolgreiche Unternehmungen gegen Bandenkräfte im Gange.
Anglo-amerikanische Terrorflieger griffen am gestrigen Tage Städte in Westfalen und im frontnahen Raum an. Größere Schäden entstanden in den Wohngebieten von Krefeld und Kassel. Außerdem wurden mehrere Krankenhäuser der Kinderheilanstalt Bethel erneut schwer beschädigt! Britische Kampfflugzeuge warfen in der vergangenen Nacht Bomben auf die Reichshauptstadt.
London liegt weiter unter unserem Vergeltungsfeuer.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (January 30, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
301100A January
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 297
Allied forces, continuing their eastward drive, have taken Büllingen. In the area northeast of St. Vith, we have made gains of nearly two miles against scattered resistance to take Herresbach, and have reached the vicinity of Holzheim, three miles northeast of Herresbach.
Our units have made gains in the vicinity of Maspelt, four miles south of St. Vith. Farther south we have taken Oberhausen, on the Our River, and some of our elements have crossed the river in the Oberhausen area against very strong resistance Kalborn has been cleared of the enemy and we have taken Roder. Putscheid, three miles northwest of Vianden is in our hands.
West of the lower Vosges Mountains and in northern Alsace a lull continued for the third day, with heavy snow hampering all movement.
Long-range artillery fire fell in the vicinity of Saverne.
Northeast of Colmar, we made local gains.
Our forces drew closer to Cernay from the west and east of the town.
Rail transportation targets over a wide area in western Germany were under air attack yesterday.
Fighter-bombers struck at rail traffic in the region of Rheine, Osnabrück and Herford in northwest Germany, railway yards in the areas of Düsseldorf, Düren, Köln and Prüm and farther south in the areas of Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern, Trier, Pirmasens, Mannheim and Stuttgart.
Escorted heavy bombers, in very great strength, attacked marshalling yards at Hamm, Munster, Koblenz, Niederlahnstein, Siegen east of Bonn, and Kassel. A tank plant at Kassel also was bombed. Rail traffic was strafed by many of the escorting fighters. Other escorted heavy bombers attacked a marshalling yard at Krefeld.
Concentrations of motor vehicles in the triangle formed by St. Vith, Trier and Bonn were attacked by fighter-bombers throughout the day. Nearly 700 vehicles were destroyed.
Escorted medium and light bombers struck at communications centers at Rheinbach, Kall, Blankenheim, Ahrweiler, Mayen and Wittlich. Railway yards at Bundenthal, a fortified positions at Habscheid southeast of St. Vith, railway bridges at Nonnweiler southeast of Trier, and in Rinnthal east of Pirmasens were also bombed.
Northeast of Colmar, fighter-bombers made a number of attacks on targets at Elsenheim and on enemy units outside the town.
In Holland, fighter-bombers attacked railway lines east of Dordrecht and in the area between Zwolle and Zutphen.
During the day, seven enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground. According to reports so far received, five of our heavy bombers and 10 fighters are missing.
Last night, objectives in Berlin were bombed.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/
Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others
ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section
NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409
AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
U.S. State Department (January 30, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Major General Wood | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Major General Anderson | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Dean | |
| Major General Bull | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Hull | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
January 30, 1945
Top secret
Agenda for Next U.S.-British Staff Conference (CCS 765/8)
General Marshall said that this paper set forth the British Chiefs of Staff suggestion for the agenda for the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions at CRICKET. He drew attention to the following changes which it embodied: paragraph 1 (E), the Combined Bomber Offensive; paragraph 1 (F), Planning Date for the End of the German War; paragraph 2 (D), Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War; and paragraph 4. He recommended approval of the paper as presented.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve CCS 765/8.
Overall Review of Cargo Shipping (JCS 1205/3)
General Marshall said that this subject was on the agenda in order to determine the status of the study. JCS 1205/3 contains the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners.
Admiral King recommended approval of the paper as presented.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in JCS 1205/3. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as CCS 746/7)
Strategy in Northwest Europe (JCS 1237 (ARGONAUT))
General Marshall said this subject had been placed on the agenda for examination and discussion of Allied strategy in Northwest Europe with a view to formulating the United States stand thereon. He called upon General Smith to discuss the present intentions of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in connection with future plans submitted in SCAF 180.
General Smith said that timing is the important consideration at present. As much as possible to occupy German forces should be accomplished while the Russian offensive is underway. Our present operations were making good progress, and with the withdrawal of the 15th Panzer Division, apprehension had been relieved. The plan outlined in General Eisenhower’s message had envisaged the disposal of certain operations such as the elimination of the Colmar pocket while proceeding with the necessary buildup for the main effort. It was estimated that a period of one week would be required to remove U.S. divisions engaged in operations in the south after which mopping up operations could be turned over to the French.
There were three distinct phases in General Eisenhower’s plan: (a) operations to the west of the Rhine, (b) operations involving the establishment of bridgeheads, and (c) operations to the east of the Rhine.
In the first place, the logistics implications of operations north of the Ruhr had been given serious study, and it had been estimated by the 21st Army Group that 20 to 21 divisions could be maintained in the area of main effort in the north. This size force was insufficient for the main drive, and the Supreme Allied Commander had taken an arbitrary stand that a force of at least 30 divisions, ultimately increased to 36, would be used in the main effort.
In the Ruhr area of the Rhine where the main effort would take place, there were three good and two possible points for establishing bridgeheads. General Smith desired to emphasize, however, that no matter how many divisions were employed in the effort, the crossing would be accomplished with but five, due to the restricted front. There is no foundation in the British analogy between the cross-Channel attack and the crossing of the Rhine. Our effort will obviously be met in strength behind the Ruhr, and General Eisenhower feels that if we employ everything in one effort at this point, the enemy may be able to prevent a successful operation by concentrating his forces. In order to draw off some of the strength that he will undoubtedly mass in this area, a secondary effort is necessary.
In the plan proposed by Field Marshal Montgomery, the Cologne-Bonn area had been selected for the secondary effort. The disadvantages seen in this plan were:
a. It is too close to the main crossing of the Rhine to draw off German forces.
b. The crossing points are not good, and
c. Crossings having been made, operations become difficult due to the nature of the terrain.
All of SCAEF’s examinations lead to the selection of the Frankfurt area for the secondary effort. This area is sufficiently separated from the main drive to attract enemy forces. From Frankfurt the drive would be directed toward Kassel, over which route the nature of the terrain would permit the relative ease of movement of armored forces. Also, the lines of communication in this southern area are better than those in the north.
The decision has not yet been made as to the area in which the secondary operation will be mounted. General Eisenhower prefers the Frankfurt-Kassel operation as the secondary effort. His great concern is to maintain flexibility, and in order to provide against the possibility of a slowing up of the main effort he is strongly in favor of this secondary drive.
In answer to a question by Admiral King, General Smith explained that it had been planned to provide a strategic reserve of ten divisions. Our infantry divisions are completely mobile and can be moved into position rapidly. If the secondary effort is accepted, it must of course go forward rapidly and not be allowed to stop at any point short of the objective. It is felt that forward movement can be adequately maintained by the rotation of the planned reserve.
In referring again to the planned effort in the Cologne-Bonn area, General Smith stated that SCAEF felt that a threat in this section would hold as many German forces as an actual crossing.
If it becomes impossible to accomplish the major effort before the 15th of March, the Germans could transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. We would then be extended west of the Rhine in a long line requiring 10 to 15 more divisions than if we were along the Rhine proper. If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our operations with the Russians in June.
General Bull explained the effect of the spring thaw, about 1 March, on the Rhine crossings. In the lower Rhine area, crossings would not be greatly affected, but upper Rhine crossings would not be possible after the first of March until the high water and ice had receded.
In response to an inquiry by General Marshall, General Smith explained that the operations in the Eifel area were all part of the buildup for the main effort in the north. He anticipated that General Bradley would encounter strong opposition when he approached the Rhine and would substitute operation GRENADE. He felt that if operation VERITABLE could be mounted by the 8th of February the main effort would be successful as far as timing is concerned.
General Marshall referred to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Appendix “A” to JCS 1237 and suggested certain amendments in the light of the British position concerning the operations referred to therein.
General Smith emphasized the necessity for maintaining flexibility in the Supreme Commander’s plans. It would be dangerous to try to define in detail how the battle should be fought. Too much depends upon the seizing of opportunities as they are presented. General Montgomery is now in agreement with General Eisenhower’s plan and is quite satisfied with the arrangements. General Eisenhower has committed himself to the main effort to the north and he, General Smith, as well as the rest of the Staff, felt that the main effort would not be successful unless a secondary effort were mounted.
General Marshall referred to the fourth paragraph of Appendix “A” to JCS 1237 and suggested certain amendments affecting command arrangements for SCAEF’s armies.
General Smith said he felt that the British would not raise the question of command at the present time. They had proposed that General Alexander be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, but due to General Montgomery’s attitude on this matter, the British position was not yet firm.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in Appendix “A” of JCS 1237 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 761/4 (ARGONAUT)).
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Major General Kuter | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Admiral Somerville | |
| Major General Bull | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Major General Anderson | Air Marshal Robb | |
| Major General Hull | Major General Laycock | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | ||
| Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | ||
| Colonel Twitchell | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Jacob | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
CCS Minutes
January 30, 1945
Top secret
Procedure for the Conference
Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff that he should take the chair at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in Malta and he was glad to do so. He hoped, however, that a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff would take the chair at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at MAGNETO.
General Marshall agreed to this proposal.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should normally take place at 1430 daily.
Admiral King , in agreeing to this proposal, stated that alterations in the timing might have to be made in the light of circumstances.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet daily at 1430, circumstances permitting.
Agenda for the Conference (CCS 765/8)
Sir Alan Brooke tabled a note setting out proposals for the business to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each day.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should be earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time allowed.
It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end of the Japanese war should be so earmarked.
German Flying Bomb and Rocket Attacks
General Marshall referred to the data made available by the British Chiefs of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the course of his talk to the Congress he had stressed the importance of a common understanding in order to assist the formation of combined decisions and policies. He had stressed the necessity for teamwork and the importance of understanding the other man’s point of view and difficulties. The data with regard to flying bomb and rocket attacks on London had been of great value in this connection and had made a very strong impression on his audience.
Sir Alan Brooke said that on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff he would like to thank General Marshall for the action he had taken in this connection. Sir Alan Brooke outlined the suggestions which had been made to mitigate the German rocket attacks and the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on this matter.
Sir Charles Portal then explained the proposals for air action against the rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been decided to follow.
Sir Charles Portal then explained the difficulties which had arisen with regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers against industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation against the unique target of London had been felt to outweigh the advantages of the employment of this weapon.
General Marshall then outlined certain discussions he had had at Allied Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing small formations of fighter-bombers to attack communications and particularly for attacks against the entrances to tunnels, possibly by skip bombing. He felt that skip bombing might also be used against the entrances to the underground production plant where the rockets were assembled.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was not accurately informed as to the topography of the terrain above the underground factory concerned and thought it likely that baffles had been erected before the entrances. It was probably also extremely well defended by guns; however, the possibility of skip bombing the entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating. With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently discussed the possibility of further attacks on communications with General Spaatz, who was arranging that the long-range fighters of the Eighth Air Force should, as a matter of course, attack communications on their return from escorting daylight bombers.
General Marshall then referred to the possibility of the Germans instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in the Antwerp area in which the lock gates were a vital and vulnerable target.
Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack.
In reply to a question, Admiral King said that the Japanese suicide attacks were, on the whole, slightly less numerous than they had been, but they were still difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit instructions as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery against these attacks.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statements.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff adjourned until 1430.
Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)
At General Bedell Smith’s suggestion General Bull outlined the projected operations in Northwest Europe. The first phase entailed a closing up to the Rhine and the destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that river; the second phase consisted of obtaining bridgeheads across the Rhine; the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany and defeating her armed forces. The first phase was now going on. General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. Divisions were now being released from the southern front, and were already being moved up to the North to be available for the offensive operations VERITABLE and GRENADE, the latter of which was an alternative in the event that General Bradley’s present attack did not proceed with sufficient rapidity.
General Bull then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces would strike down in a southeasterly direction parallel to the Rhine while the Ninth United States Army would strike from its present position north of Aachen in the direction of Düsseldorf. A decision would shortly have to be taken as to whether it was worthwhile to continue General Bradley’s operations in the Ardennes. Operations were also in progress to clear the Colmar pocket and were being undertaken by French forces to be assisted by three United States divisions. It was obviously desirable, if it proved possible, to clear the entire west bank of the Rhine since by so doing security would be improved and additional divisions released for the offensive.
Turning to the second phase – the seizure of bridgeheads across the Rhine – General Bull explained that in the North between Emmerich and Wesel there were three good and two possible positions for bridging points. In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good bridging points and in addition two possible ones. In the center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were three possible bridging sites.
Field Marshal Montgomery’s operation VERITABLE would be launched between the eighth and tenth of February and operation GRENADE approximately a week later if the decision was taken to mount the latter. There was therefore a reasonable chance that the area west of the Rhine from Düsseldorf northwards would be clear of the enemy by the end of February. Field Marshal Montgomery would be instructed to grasp any possibility which presented itself of seizing bridgeheads on the lower Rhine during the southerly drive.
General Bull explained that the Supreme Commander was strongly of the opinion that a second line of advance into Germany must be available. It was for this reason that the bridgeheads in the Mainz-Mannheim area were to be seized. The line of advance of this army would be on Frankfurt and Kassel and would assist in isolating the Ruhr. In the North, Field Marshal Montgomery’s drive would be directed on Munster and would swing down toward Hamm. It had been estimated that logistically it would not be possible to maintain more than 35 divisions in the northern thrust until rail bridgeheads had been established across the Rhine. In the South there were no serious logistic limitations and up to 50 divisions could be maintained before rail bridgeheads had been established.
The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance of flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be maintained would be employed in the northern thrust but the short length of the river available for the crossings, together with other limiting factors, made it essential to have an alternative thrust available should the northern thrust be held up. The forces not employed in the two thrusts would be used to secure the remainder of the line and to stage diversions and threats.
General Bedell Smith explained that the only factor which had altered since General Eisenhower’s appreciations and intentions had been communicated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in SCAF 179 and SCAF 180 (CCS 761/3), was the factor of time which had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance. It was felt that on the Western Front freedom of movement could be counted on until the 15th of March. The Sixth Panzer Army was thought to be in process of withdrawal. There was no longer believed to be any serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and it was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery’s attack would start on 8 February.
Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, General Smith explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern thrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made to support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of 36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought had been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On the other hand, this area was so close to the area of the main effort that the Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened areas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General Eisenhower’s view the thrust in the North was absolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to be undertaken if at all possible.
In reply to a question, General Smith explained that it was obviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the operation would delay the main attack until midsummer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine. General Smith and General Bull explained that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The spring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower Rhine.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations, and that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those proposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising. The base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer to the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately threatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even further increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army. In the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communications thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on the whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of succeeding and that every other operation must be regarded as subsidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting too much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main northern attack.
Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it was felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had already been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith and General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180 was that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important as the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to engage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the withdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such reduction in strength as was taking place.
General Smith emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended to put into the northern effort every single division which could be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact that the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance was not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be of sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the important Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Commander’s view of the differentiation between the main and secondary thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be put there.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he welcomed this explanation. He had felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack to bog down.
General Marshall, in referring to a point previously made by Field Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving divisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In his view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows: the most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number of divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casualties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives of either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere. It was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with the aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the likelihood of our attacking in that area.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for relief and rehabilitation of tired units.
General Smith gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation. About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the remainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.
Turning to the employment of French divisions, General Smith said that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions was already moving, and they would be ready for action together with their corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain odd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the new French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire and Bordeaux.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not entirely agreed with the Supreme Commander’s plan as set out in SCAF 180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light of General Smith’s explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were loath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 761/4.
Sir Charles Portal drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180 which appeared out of keeping with General Smith’s explanation.
General Smith said that as he understood it, it had never been General Eisenhower’s intention to sweep the whole area west of the Rhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.
General Bull confirmed this view and said that such action had not been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was obviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.
General Smith said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine to the south.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9 of SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.
Admiral King drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified the position.
In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, General Smith said that the southern thrust was likely to start from some position between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In general, he felt that the Siegfried Line could be “nibbled through” by two or three good divisions in 15 days in almost any position.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF 180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note of it and should examine the record of General Smith’s explanation at their meeting on the following day.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Coordination of Operations with the Russians
Sir Alan Brooke said that as he saw it, the only point was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still in full agreement with the instructions which they had issued to General Deane and Admiral Archer in FAN 477.
General Marshall confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff were still in complete agreement with the contents of this message, no answer to which had yet been received from the Russians. He felt it would be necessary to raise the issue with them during the forthcoming conference.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to press the Russians to agree at ARGONAUT to the proposals in the Appendix to CCS 741/6 (FAN 477).
The Combined Bomber Offensive (CCS 166 Series)
Sir Charles Portal explained that his object in raising this question was to find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views on the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Such a move, involving some 1,000 heavy bombers, would, of course, have considerable effect on the potentialities in other theaters.
General Kuter explained that CCS 400/2 did in effect give the commander of the United States strategic air forces the right to move such forces within the two theaters. He understood in fact that General Spaatz had been considering the possibility of moving the Fifteenth Air Force to the United Kingdom but had decided against such a course.
General Marshall said that he had directed an examination of the possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it, from southern France, thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po Valley. This proposal, however, had not commended itself to his staffs.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any large move as between theaters should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff since it had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters concerned. The number of bombers available in Italy, for instance, very materially affected the possibility of withdrawing ground forces from that theater.
General Marshall said that as he remembered it, the agreement with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.
Sir Charles Portal said that it had been felt that temporary moves of air units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view of the difficult weather and the fact that operating out of the United Kingdom was a highly specialized business.
Admiral King said that he considered the permanent allocations of forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If necessary, the paper under discussion (CCS 400/2) should be modified to bring it into line with this view.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was entirely reassured by General Marshall’s statement with regard to the future of the Fifteenth Air Force.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean.
Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany (CCS 772)
Sir Alan Brooke presented a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the planning date for the end of the war with Germany (CCS 772). He explained that it had been necessary to estimate such a date or dates in order to provide a basis for production and manpower planning.
General Marshall explained that United States production planning was based on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December, 1945.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 772 pending consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
Planning Date for the End of the War with Japan
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan as recommended in paragraph 32 of CCS 680/2.
The U-Boat Threat
Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that at present we were in a somewhat similar position to that of 1918. The ASDIC was proving less effective against present U-boat operations in shallow water where the tide affected the efficiency of the ASDIC. The Germans had discovered this and were working their submarines close inshore around the United Kingdom. At present they were operating principally in the Channel, the Irish Sea, and one had even penetrated the entrance to the Clyde. Our aircraft were also hampered by the extremely small target presented by the schnorkel. This relatively small object was normally used only some three feet above the water and ASV aircraft could therefore only detect it in calm weather.
Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their schnorkel which enabled them to detect the ASV emissions before the aircraft contacted the schnorkel.
In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea, an escort carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least four ships sunk in the Channel. He hoped, however, that the position would improve, and, in fact, two submarines had been sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further one south of Land’s End. The object was to force the submarines back into deep water where the ASDIC would be effective, and to achieve this deep mine fields were being laid in order to shut the enemy out of the Irish Sea.
The Chief of the Air Staff explained that from the air point of view new devices were being brought into action, … It must be remembered, however, that with a submerged submarine using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even after it had contacted the submarine, found difficulty in sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left no swirl at which to aim.
Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that the Germans were building new types of submarines which were a vast improvement over those which had been used previously. There were two new types: one of 1600 tons with a speed of up to 18 knots submerged, and carrying twenty torpedoes; the other, a small coastal type, was capable of 13 knots submerged and carried two torpedoes. The larger boat had an extremely long range. It was thought that these new boats would be coming into operation about the middle or end of February.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the foregoing statements.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
January 30, 1945
Top secret
Proposed Programme of Work
Tuesday, 30 January
- A. War Against Germany
- C. Co-ordination of Operations
Bomblines, etc. - E. Combined Bomber Offensive
- F. Planning Date for End of German War
Wednesday, 31 January
- B. Strategy in Mediterranean
- War Against Japan
A. South-East Asia
B. Allocation of Resources Between SEAC and China
Thursday, 1 February
- C. Pacific Operations
- D. Planning Date for End of Japanese War
- D. U-Boat Threat
Friday, 2 February
- Review of Cargo Shipping
- Additional Item.
- Oil Stocks
- Basic undertakings
Castille, 30.1.45.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Malta, 30 January 1945
CCS 772
Top secret
Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany
We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against Germany as follows:
- In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided by the latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on this subject. Their conclusions are:
a. If, as seems just possible, the Russians succeed in overrunning the eastern defences of Germany before the Germans can consolidate there, the effect might be to force the Germans so to denude the West as to make an Allied advance comparatively easy. As the result of such advances in the East and in the West, a German collapse might occur before mid-April, 1945.
b. On balance, however, we conclude that distance combined with stiffening German resistance is likely to bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. This will involve the loss of industrial Silesia.
c. As the result of the loss of industrial Silesia, production of finished armaments, mainly land armaments, would fall over a period of about six months by a quarter or more.
d. If, as now appears improbable, the Germans succeed in stopping the Russian advance forward of Upper Silesia, thus retaining their two main industrial areas, in Silesia and in the Ruhr, we nevertheless consider that the overall decline in Germany’s capacity to resist will be such that an Allied offensive in the West followed by a further Russian offensive in the summer should lead to the collapse of German resistance before November.
e. The need for forces to stem the Russian advance may cause a German withdrawal in Italy, at least to the line of the River Adige.
f. Germany, at any rate until the summer of 1945 when the U-boat campaign is expected to be at its height, is likely to retain sufficient forces to hold at least southern Norway.
- Based on the above, we have considered three cases:
a. The best case.
b. A reasonably favourable case.
c. An unfavourable case.
The best case
- It is clear from paragraph 1a above that there is a possibility that the result of the present Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by mid-April. We do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of this timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for planning purposes, as the earliest date for the defeat of Germany.
The reasonably favourable case
-
Eastern Front. Distance and stiffening German resistance may well bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg–Giant Mountains. Thereafter, the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May or early June.
-
Western Front. Preliminary operations to reach the Rhine should be completed before the end of March. An all-out Allied offensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early May, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany.
-
The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end of organised German resistance by the end of June.
The unfavourable case
-
Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance is stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the late summer.
-
Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to achieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a dispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching another offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer, but it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt in the third quarter of the year.
-
In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German organised resistance by the beginning of November.
Conclusion
- There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower planning.
For planning purposes, we consider that:
a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30 June, 1945.
b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1 November, 1945.
U.S. Navy Department (January 30, 1945)
CINCPOA Communiqué No. 246
More than 40 tons of bombs were dropped on Iwo Jima in the Volcanos by Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, on January 28 (West Longitude Date). An explosion was observed on an airstrip and several fires were started in storage areas.
Liberators of the same force bombed Marcus Island on the same date.
Night-flying StrAirPoa Marine Mitchells struck at shipping around the Bonins and Volcanos on January 29. Hits scored with rockets caused large explosions on a large enemy cargo ship and a medium cargo ship in the Bonins.
On January 28, fighters and torpedo aircraft of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing attacked shore and harbor installations on Yap in the Western Carolines.
Facilities on Babelthuap in the Palaus were attacked by Marine aircraft on January 29.
The Pittsburgh Press (January 30, 1945)
YANKS GAIN 3 MILES IN GERMANY
Doughboys slug ahead northeast of Monschau in waist-deep snow
Third Army to the south wins 2-mile-wide bridgehead across Reich frontier
…
U.S. vanguards hit last line before Manila
Reach bottleneck 23 miles from city
…
Hitler begins hoodoo year, his 13th and last in power
BULLETIN
LONDON, England – The Berlin radio said tonight that Adolf Hitler would speak from his headquarters at 5:15 p.m. ET in observance of the 12th anniversary of his rise to power.
LONDON, England (UP) – Adolf Hitler today began his 13th – and undoubtedly last year – of German power.
Hitler was silent but the German radio echoed with last-minute appeals to the populace to stand firm. From the Moscow radio was beamed a call by the Free German Committee for “all honest Germans to rise up.”
It was the second time since his assumption of power in Germany that Hitler had not marked the day with an important address. The previous occasion was Jan. 30, 1943, just after Stalingrad.
German jitters admitted
One German commentator openly admitted German jitters, declaring that “among millions of men which form a nation, there is always a certain percentage of those who in the final dramatic phase of the battle lose faith in the success of their cause.”
The Moscow broadcasts called on the German people to “join us in the fight against Hitler in this last hour. Catastrophe can only be averted by overthrow of Hitler.”
Other Moscow reports said that anti-Nazi posters had appeared in Berlin.
Whereabouts mystery
Hitler’s whereabouts was a mystery. He was reported variously in Berlin, touring the Eastern Front and holing up for a last stand in his mountaintop palace at Berchtesgaden.
But wherever he was, he must have realized that within the next few months – perhaps weeks – his country would go down to possibly the greatest defeat in history and he probably would be dead, in exile or awaiting trial as a war criminal.
The Red Army fast was closing in on Berlin and a massive Allied offensive was in preparation in the west.
Fires range in Berlin
Fires kindled by RAF bombs raged in the capital, hampering civilians frantically digging trenches and tank traps for the impending battle.
Even the Southern Front was threatened. A Nazi DNB dispatch said the German High Command was “considering withdrawing certain contingents of troops from Italy” to plug the gaps in the path of the Red Army.
DNB said German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, supreme commander in Italy, was demanding the mobilization of Italians from 18 to 60 to replace the withdrawn units, but it was certain that the Italians would not match them in either quality or quantity.
It appeared that Prime Minister Churchill’s prediction that the Germans would yield northern Italy “anytime now” was about to be fulfilled.
Of the once-great network of satellites and allies with which Hitler had ringed Germany, only puppet-ruled Slovakia and Norway remained, and their days, too, were numbered.
Slovakia has been invaded by the Red Army, and Germany was believed preparing to abandon the Nazi regime in Norway to its fate.
Committee approves Elliott as general – sister blamed for his dog’s ‘A’ priority
Soldier and couple protest nomination – Mrs. Boettiger away from capital
…
Streamliner delayed –
James Roosevelt explains appeal
Denies asking train be delayed
…
Draft of manpower called unnecessary by rail labor editor
End muddling and buck-passing with central agency, New Deal told
By Edward Keating, editor of Labor
…