U.S. State Department (January 30, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
|
Present |
|
United States |
|
United Kingdom |
General of the Army Marshall |
|
Major General Wood |
Fleet Admiral King |
|
Major General Anderson |
Major General Kuter |
|
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser |
Lieutenant General Somervell |
|
Brigadier General Lindsay |
Lieutenant General Smith |
|
Captain McDill |
Rear Admiral Duncan |
|
Colonel Peck |
Rear Admiral McCormick |
|
Colonel Dean |
Major General Bull |
|
Colonel Lincoln |
Major General Hull |
|
|
|
Secretariat |
|
|
Brigadier General McFarland |
|
|
Captain Graves |
|
JCS Minutes
January 30, 1945
Top secret
Agenda for Next U.S.-British Staff Conference (CCS 765/8)
General Marshall said that this paper set forth the British Chiefs of Staff suggestion for the agenda for the Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions at CRICKET. He drew attention to the following changes which it embodied: paragraph 1 (E), the Combined Bomber Offensive; paragraph 1 (F), Planning Date for the End of the German War; paragraph 2 (D), Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War; and paragraph 4. He recommended approval of the paper as presented.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve CCS 765/8.
Overall Review of Cargo Shipping (JCS 1205/3)
General Marshall said that this subject was on the agenda in order to determine the status of the study. JCS 1205/3 contains the recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners.
Admiral King recommended approval of the paper as presented.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in JCS 1205/3. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as CCS 746/7)
Strategy in Northwest Europe (JCS 1237 (ARGONAUT))
General Marshall said this subject had been placed on the agenda for examination and discussion of Allied strategy in Northwest Europe with a view to formulating the United States stand thereon. He called upon General Smith to discuss the present intentions of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, in connection with future plans submitted in SCAF 180.
General Smith said that timing is the important consideration at present. As much as possible to occupy German forces should be accomplished while the Russian offensive is underway. Our present operations were making good progress, and with the withdrawal of the 15th Panzer Division, apprehension had been relieved. The plan outlined in General Eisenhower’s message had envisaged the disposal of certain operations such as the elimination of the Colmar pocket while proceeding with the necessary buildup for the main effort. It was estimated that a period of one week would be required to remove U.S. divisions engaged in operations in the south after which mopping up operations could be turned over to the French.
There were three distinct phases in General Eisenhower’s plan: (a) operations to the west of the Rhine, (b) operations involving the establishment of bridgeheads, and (c) operations to the east of the Rhine.
In the first place, the logistics implications of operations north of the Ruhr had been given serious study, and it had been estimated by the 21st Army Group that 20 to 21 divisions could be maintained in the area of main effort in the north. This size force was insufficient for the main drive, and the Supreme Allied Commander had taken an arbitrary stand that a force of at least 30 divisions, ultimately increased to 36, would be used in the main effort.
In the Ruhr area of the Rhine where the main effort would take place, there were three good and two possible points for establishing bridgeheads. General Smith desired to emphasize, however, that no matter how many divisions were employed in the effort, the crossing would be accomplished with but five, due to the restricted front. There is no foundation in the British analogy between the cross-Channel attack and the crossing of the Rhine. Our effort will obviously be met in strength behind the Ruhr, and General Eisenhower feels that if we employ everything in one effort at this point, the enemy may be able to prevent a successful operation by concentrating his forces. In order to draw off some of the strength that he will undoubtedly mass in this area, a secondary effort is necessary.
In the plan proposed by Field Marshal Montgomery, the Cologne-Bonn area had been selected for the secondary effort. The disadvantages seen in this plan were:
a. It is too close to the main crossing of the Rhine to draw off German forces.
b. The crossing points are not good, and
c. Crossings having been made, operations become difficult due to the nature of the terrain.
All of SCAEF’s examinations lead to the selection of the Frankfurt area for the secondary effort. This area is sufficiently separated from the main drive to attract enemy forces. From Frankfurt the drive would be directed toward Kassel, over which route the nature of the terrain would permit the relative ease of movement of armored forces. Also, the lines of communication in this southern area are better than those in the north.
The decision has not yet been made as to the area in which the secondary operation will be mounted. General Eisenhower prefers the Frankfurt-Kassel operation as the secondary effort. His great concern is to maintain flexibility, and in order to provide against the possibility of a slowing up of the main effort he is strongly in favor of this secondary drive.
In answer to a question by Admiral King, General Smith explained that it had been planned to provide a strategic reserve of ten divisions. Our infantry divisions are completely mobile and can be moved into position rapidly. If the secondary effort is accepted, it must of course go forward rapidly and not be allowed to stop at any point short of the objective. It is felt that forward movement can be adequately maintained by the rotation of the planned reserve.
In referring again to the planned effort in the Cologne-Bonn area, General Smith stated that SCAEF felt that a threat in this section would hold as many German forces as an actual crossing.
If it becomes impossible to accomplish the major effort before the 15th of March, the Germans could transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. We would then be extended west of the Rhine in a long line requiring 10 to 15 more divisions than if we were along the Rhine proper. If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our operations with the Russians in June.
General Bull explained the effect of the spring thaw, about 1 March, on the Rhine crossings. In the lower Rhine area, crossings would not be greatly affected, but upper Rhine crossings would not be possible after the first of March until the high water and ice had receded.
In response to an inquiry by General Marshall, General Smith explained that the operations in the Eifel area were all part of the buildup for the main effort in the north. He anticipated that General Bradley would encounter strong opposition when he approached the Rhine and would substitute operation GRENADE. He felt that if operation VERITABLE could be mounted by the 8th of February the main effort would be successful as far as timing is concerned.
General Marshall referred to the last sentence of the third paragraph of Appendix “A” to JCS 1237 and suggested certain amendments in the light of the British position concerning the operations referred to therein.
General Smith emphasized the necessity for maintaining flexibility in the Supreme Commander’s plans. It would be dangerous to try to define in detail how the battle should be fought. Too much depends upon the seizing of opportunities as they are presented. General Montgomery is now in agreement with General Eisenhower’s plan and is quite satisfied with the arrangements. General Eisenhower has committed himself to the main effort to the north and he, General Smith, as well as the rest of the Staff, felt that the main effort would not be successful unless a secondary effort were mounted.
General Marshall referred to the fourth paragraph of Appendix “A” to JCS 1237 and suggested certain amendments affecting command arrangements for SCAEF’s armies.
General Smith said he felt that the British would not raise the question of command at the present time. They had proposed that General Alexander be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, but due to General Montgomery’s attitude on this matter, the British position was not yet firm.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in Appendix “A” of JCS 1237 as amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 761/4 (ARGONAUT)).
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
|
Present |
|
United States |
|
United Kingdom |
General of the Army Marshall |
|
Field Marshal Brooke |
Fleet Admiral King |
|
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal |
Major General Kuter |
|
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham |
Lieutenant General Somervell |
|
Field Marshal Wilson |
Lieutenant General Smith |
|
General Ismay |
Vice Admiral Cooke |
|
Admiral Somerville |
Major General Bull |
|
General Riddell-Webster |
Major General Anderson |
|
Air Marshal Robb |
Major General Hull |
|
Major General Laycock |
Rear Admiral McCormick |
|
|
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser |
|
|
Colonel Twitchell |
|
|
|
Secretariat |
|
Brigadier General McFarland |
|
Major General Jacob |
Captain Graves |
|
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones |
|
|
Commander Coleridge |
CCS Minutes
January 30, 1945
Top secret
Procedure for the Conference
Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff that he should take the chair at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in Malta and he was glad to do so. He hoped, however, that a member of the United States Chiefs of Staff would take the chair at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at MAGNETO.
General Marshall agreed to this proposal.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should normally take place at 1430 daily.
Admiral King , in agreeing to this proposal, stated that alterations in the timing might have to be made in the light of circumstances.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet daily at 1430, circumstances permitting.
Agenda for the Conference (CCS 765/8)
Sir Alan Brooke tabled a note setting out proposals for the business to be transacted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on each day.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should be earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time allowed.
It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end of the Japanese war should be so earmarked.
German Flying Bomb and Rocket Attacks
General Marshall referred to the data made available by the British Chiefs of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the course of his talk to the Congress he had stressed the importance of a common understanding in order to assist the formation of combined decisions and policies. He had stressed the necessity for teamwork and the importance of understanding the other man’s point of view and difficulties. The data with regard to flying bomb and rocket attacks on London had been of great value in this connection and had made a very strong impression on his audience.
Sir Alan Brooke said that on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff he would like to thank General Marshall for the action he had taken in this connection. Sir Alan Brooke outlined the suggestions which had been made to mitigate the German rocket attacks and the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on this matter.
Sir Charles Portal then explained the proposals for air action against the rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been decided to follow.
Sir Charles Portal then explained the difficulties which had arisen with regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers against industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation against the unique target of London had been felt to outweigh the advantages of the employment of this weapon.
General Marshall then outlined certain discussions he had had at Allied Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing small formations of fighter-bombers to attack communications and particularly for attacks against the entrances to tunnels, possibly by skip bombing. He felt that skip bombing might also be used against the entrances to the underground production plant where the rockets were assembled.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was not accurately informed as to the topography of the terrain above the underground factory concerned and thought it likely that baffles had been erected before the entrances. It was probably also extremely well defended by guns; however, the possibility of skip bombing the entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating. With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently discussed the possibility of further attacks on communications with General Spaatz, who was arranging that the long-range fighters of the Eighth Air Force should, as a matter of course, attack communications on their return from escorting daylight bombers.
General Marshall then referred to the possibility of the Germans instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in the Antwerp area in which the lock gates were a vital and vulnerable target.
Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack.
In reply to a question, Admiral King said that the Japanese suicide attacks were, on the whole, slightly less numerous than they had been, but they were still difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it. The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit instructions as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery against these attacks.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statements.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff adjourned until 1430.
Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)
At General Bedell Smith’s suggestion General Bull outlined the projected operations in Northwest Europe. The first phase entailed a closing up to the Rhine and the destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that river; the second phase consisted of obtaining bridgeheads across the Rhine; the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany and defeating her armed forces. The first phase was now going on. General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. Divisions were now being released from the southern front, and were already being moved up to the North to be available for the offensive operations VERITABLE and GRENADE, the latter of which was an alternative in the event that General Bradley’s present attack did not proceed with sufficient rapidity.
General Bull then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal Montgomery’s forces would strike down in a southeasterly direction parallel to the Rhine while the Ninth United States Army would strike from its present position north of Aachen in the direction of Düsseldorf. A decision would shortly have to be taken as to whether it was worthwhile to continue General Bradley’s operations in the Ardennes. Operations were also in progress to clear the Colmar pocket and were being undertaken by French forces to be assisted by three United States divisions. It was obviously desirable, if it proved possible, to clear the entire west bank of the Rhine since by so doing security would be improved and additional divisions released for the offensive.
Turning to the second phase – the seizure of bridgeheads across the Rhine – General Bull explained that in the North between Emmerich and Wesel there were three good and two possible positions for bridging points. In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good bridging points and in addition two possible ones. In the center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were three possible bridging sites.
Field Marshal Montgomery’s operation VERITABLE would be launched between the eighth and tenth of February and operation GRENADE approximately a week later if the decision was taken to mount the latter. There was therefore a reasonable chance that the area west of the Rhine from Düsseldorf northwards would be clear of the enemy by the end of February. Field Marshal Montgomery would be instructed to grasp any possibility which presented itself of seizing bridgeheads on the lower Rhine during the southerly drive.
General Bull explained that the Supreme Commander was strongly of the opinion that a second line of advance into Germany must be available. It was for this reason that the bridgeheads in the Mainz-Mannheim area were to be seized. The line of advance of this army would be on Frankfurt and Kassel and would assist in isolating the Ruhr. In the North, Field Marshal Montgomery’s drive would be directed on Munster and would swing down toward Hamm. It had been estimated that logistically it would not be possible to maintain more than 35 divisions in the northern thrust until rail bridgeheads had been established across the Rhine. In the South there were no serious logistic limitations and up to 50 divisions could be maintained before rail bridgeheads had been established.
The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance of flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be maintained would be employed in the northern thrust but the short length of the river available for the crossings, together with other limiting factors, made it essential to have an alternative thrust available should the northern thrust be held up. The forces not employed in the two thrusts would be used to secure the remainder of the line and to stage diversions and threats.
General Bedell Smith explained that the only factor which had altered since General Eisenhower’s appreciations and intentions had been communicated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in SCAF 179 and SCAF 180 (CCS 761/3), was the factor of time which had now become of great importance in view of the Russian advance. It was felt that on the Western Front freedom of movement could be counted on until the 15th of March. The Sixth Panzer Army was thought to be in process of withdrawal. There was no longer believed to be any serious threat to Strasbourg and there was a good chance of clearing up the Colmar pocket quickly, thus releasing four divisions. In view of the present diminution of German offensive capabilities in the West, it was essential to get to the Rhine in the North as soon as possible and it was hoped that Field Marshal Montgomery’s attack would start on 8 February.
Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, General Smith explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had said that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the northern thrust; this strength was obviously too small a proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of some 85 divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had directed that logistic arrangements be made to support initially 30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of 36 divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought had been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of forces. On the other hand, this area was so close to the area of the main effort that the Germans could quickly reinforce between these two threatened areas and little diversion of enemy strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General Eisenhower’s view the thrust in the North was absolutely essential, that in the South necessary and desirable and to be undertaken if at all possible.
In reply to a question, General Smith explained that it was obviously desirable to close the Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme Commander did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the operation would delay the main attack until midsummer or would militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion then ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities of crossing the Rhine. General Smith and General Bull explained that the lower Rhine could, it was believed, be crossed at any date after the first of March, though certain risks were entailed. The spring thaws affected the upper Rhine but had no effect on the lower Rhine.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that there was not sufficient strength available for two major operations, and that therefore it would be necessary to decide on one of those proposed. Of the two, the northern appeared the most promising. The base port of Antwerp was nearer, the armies were already closer to the Rhine in that area, and the advance into Germany immediately threatened the vital Ruhr area whose importance had been even further increased by the fall of Silesia to the advancing Russian Army. In the South, though the actual crossings might prove easier, our armies had further to go before being in a position to cross the Rhine and, after crossing, the country was less favorable for operations and our forces would be further from the Ruhr or the lines of communications thereto. It was therefore felt that the plan should be based on the whole effort being made in the North if this was to be certain of succeeding and that every other operation must be regarded as subsidiary to this main thrust. There was, it was felt, a danger of putting too much into the southern effort and thereby weakening the main northern attack.
Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff was in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole length, which it was felt would slow up the advance into Germany. This point had already been cleared up by the explanations given by General Smith and General Bull. The general impression gained from SCAF 180 was that the southern thrust was regarded to be almost as important as the northern and that it diverted too much strength from the latter, both in forces and in the available facilities such as bridging material. The present situation on the Eastern Front obviously necessitated the speeding up of operations in the West in order to engage as many Germans as soon as possible, both to prevent the withdrawal of forces to the East and to take advantage of such reduction in strength as was taking place.
General Smith emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended to put into the northern effort every single division which could be maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would also be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would be used for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible to overlook the fact that the northern attack would, of necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional front and might bog down. The southern advance was not intended to compete with the northern attack but must be of sufficient strength to draw off German forces to protect the important Frankfurt area and to provide an alternate line of attack if the main effort failed. He wished to make clear the Supreme Commander’s view of the differentiation between the main and secondary thrusts. Everything that could be put into the main effort would be put there.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he welcomed this explanation. He had felt that the southern advance might cause the northern attack to bog down.
General Marshall, in referring to a point previously made by Field Marshal Brooke as to the necessity of resting and relieving divisions in the line, agreed that this was vitally important. In his view the considerations involved in the plan were as follows: the most favorable spot logistically, that is, in the North; the fact that it was not safe to rely on one line of advance only; the number of divisions required to maintain security in the non-active parts of the line; the assessment of the number of divisions which could be logistically supported in the northern thrust. He considered it essential that there should be more than one possible line of advance. The strategic reserve should be fed into either advance in the light of how well that advance was succeeding. If extremely heavy casualties were sustained in the northern attack there were the alternatives of either battling through or switching the weight of attack elsewhere. It was his view that it was essential to have some other line of advance to turn to if we bogged down in the North. It was likely that the Germans would put up a heavy resistance in the North and, with the aid of jet-propelled reconnaissance aircraft, would assess the likelihood of our attacking in that area.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that after crossing the Rhine the strength of the main thrust would be reduced by the necessity for relief and rehabilitation of tired units.
General Smith gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. He said that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also be a strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit rotation. About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary attack and the remainder would be holding relatively quiet sectors of the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for rest and refit.
Turning to the employment of French divisions, General Smith said that every effort was being made to arm the new divisions as quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three of the new divisions was already moving, and they would be ready for action together with their corps troops by the latter part of April. The French had certain odd brigades and other units available at present and these, with the new French divisions, might be used to contain or reduce St. Nazaire and Bordeaux.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not entirely agreed with the Supreme Commander’s plan as set out in SCAF 180. This however had taken on a different complexion in the light of General Smith’s explanations. The British Chiefs of Staff were loath therefore to approve SCAF 180, as at present drafted, as had been suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 761/4.
Sir Charles Portal drew attention to paragraph 20 of SCAF 180 which appeared out of keeping with General Smith’s explanation.
General Smith said that as he understood it, it had never been General Eisenhower’s intention to sweep the whole area west of the Rhine clear of Germans before effecting crossings.
General Bull confirmed this view and said that such action had not been intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length was obviously desirable if it could be achieved without delay.
General Smith said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the North with their full strength it was likely that they would only have Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of the Rhine to the south.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the final sentence of paragraph 9 of SCAF 180 also implied equally important lines of advance.
Admiral King drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified the position.
In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, General Smith said that the southern thrust was likely to start from some position between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve this thrust if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In general, he felt that the Siegfried Line could be “nibbled through” by two or three good divisions in 15 days in almost any position.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that rather than approve SCAF 180 at the present time, he would prefer that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note of it and should examine the record of General Smith’s explanation at their meeting on the following day.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Coordination of Operations with the Russians
Sir Alan Brooke said that as he saw it, the only point was to insure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were still in full agreement with the instructions which they had issued to General Deane and Admiral Archer in FAN 477.
General Marshall confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff were still in complete agreement with the contents of this message, no answer to which had yet been received from the Russians. He felt it would be necessary to raise the issue with them during the forthcoming conference.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to press the Russians to agree at ARGONAUT to the proposals in the Appendix to CCS 741/6 (FAN 477).