America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–145: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Malta, 1 February 1945
Nr: CRICKET 45
Secret

For Acting Secretary of State
ONLY from Secretary Stettinius.

Have dispatched the following to Winant after conference which Eden and I had with General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.

You are Authorized immediately to inform the European Advisory Commission of this government’s approval of the protocol on zones of occupation for Germany. Eden is likewise telegraphing the British Government’s approval.

Please advise McCloy.

Führer HQ (February 1, 1945)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

In Ungarn wurden zwischen Sárvizkanal und Donau sowie nordöstlich Stuhlweißenburg starke sowjetische Angriffe nach harten Kämpfen aufgefangen. An der Oderfront scheiterten die Versuche des Gegners, seine Brückenköpfe zu erweitern unter Verlust zahlreicher Panzer.

Im Oder-Warthe-Bogen behaupteten unsere Truppen im Raum westlich Züllichau-Schwiebus und westlich Schwerin zahlreiche Stützpunkte gegen heftige Angriffe. Gegen feindliche Panzerspitzen, die bis in den Raum Sternberg–Zielenzieg vorstoßen konnten, sind Eingreifreserven angesetzt. Nördlich der Warthe drangen Kräfte des Gegners bis an die Oder nordwestlich Küstrin vor und trafen dort auf unsere neu herangeführten Reserven. Im Süden von Pommern wurden zahlreiche bolschewistische Angriffe abgewiesen und nach Norden vorgedrungene feindliche Aufklärungskräfte zurückgeworfen.

Die Besatzung von Posen verteidigte sich tapfer gegen die von mehreren Seiten angreifenden Sowjets. Nordwestlich Kulm und bei Elbing kam es zu wechselvollen Kämpfen.

In Ostpreußen verlief der Tag unter schweren Kämpfen bei Wormditt, Heilsberg, Friedland und beiderseits Königsbergs. 54 feindliche Panzer wurden dabei vernichtet.

Die sowjetischen Panzerspitzen und der feindliche Nachschubverkehr wurden auch gestern von unseren Schlacht- und Jagdfliegern angegriffen. 24 Panzer und 21 Geschütze wurden außer Gefecht gesetzt und Hunderte von Fahrzeugen zerstört.

An der kurländischen Front wiesen unsere Truppen zahlreiche Angriffe der Bolschewisten ab.

In Holland wurde die schwache, aus Fallschirmjägern bestehende Besatzung, die seit Woeben einen kleinen Brückenkopf südlich der Maas bei Gertruidenberg gegen weit überlegene feindliche Kräfte tapfer hielt, auf das Nordufer des Flusses zurückgenommen.

Die zahlreichen Angriffe, die die 1. amerikanische und Teile der 3. amerikanischen Armee an der gesamten Front zwischen Monschau und St. Vith auch gestern führten, blieben nach heftigen Kämpfen in der Tiefe unseres Hauptkampffeldes liegen.

Im oberen Elsass konnte der Feind seinen Einbruchsraum östlich und nordöstlich Kolmar etwas erweitern, verlor dabei aber 14 Panzer.

Sturm-Wikinge der Kriegsmarine, die in der Nacht zum 30. Jänner zum Kampf gegen den anglo-amerikanischen Nachschubverkehr an der Schelde-Mündung eingesetzt waren, melden die Versenkung eines Tankers. Darüber hinaus wurden durch unsere tapferen Besatzungen auf der Insel Schouwen fünf schwere Detonationen beobachtet, so dass mit der Versenkung weiterer Schiffe des Feindes durch diesen Einsatz gerechnet werden kann.

In der Herzegowina fügten unsere Truppen bei einem Angriff südlich Mostar dem Gegner hohe blutige Verluste zu. Zahlreiche Panzer und Gebirgsgeschütze wurden erbeutet oder vernichtet. In den Kämpfen, in denen ein beträchtliches Gebiet von den Banden gesäubert wurde, haben sich an der Seite deutscher Kräfte kroatische Verbände besonders ausgezeichnet.

Nordamerikanische Terrorflieger warten am gestrigen Tage Bomben im Großraum von Wien.

Das Fernfeuer auf London wird fortgesetzt.

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 1, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
011100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 299

Allied forces have completely cleared the enemy from the island of Kapelscheveer in the Meuse River area east of Geertruindenberg after heavy and prolonged fighting. Farther south, our units continued their attacks northeast of Monschau and have captured Eicherscheid and Imgenbroich.

Between Monschau and the area northeast of Clervaux, we have made general gains, advancing 5,000 yards in some places.

In the forest southeast of Hofen, our forces gained up to 4,000 yards, and pushed 1,000 yards east of Rocherath, through deep snow and occasional minefields. Our infantry elements have crossed the Belgian-German border in a 5,000-yard advance to within a mile west of Udenbreth. Another crossing of the border was made five miles southeast of Büllingen.

East and southeast of St. Vith, our units have taken Setz, Schlierbach, and Lommersweiler, and have cleared the enemy from Steffeshausen, three miles farther south.

In the bridgehead across the Our River, east of Weiswampach, our artillery repulsed an infantry counterattack, and we have advanced to a point one and one-half miles northeast of Welchenhausen, on the east bank of the river.

West of the lower Vosges Mountains and in the northern Alsace, activity was confined to patrolling and exchanges of small arms fire.

Northeast of Strasbourg, we have occupied Gambsheim and Bettenhofen against light resistance.

South of Strasbourg, our forces progressed about four miles to the Rhine-Rhone Canal in the area east of Benfeld.

Our bridgehead south of the Colmar Canal was enlarged with the aid of armor to a depth of approximately three miles. Resistance was spotty.

On the southern edge of the Colmar sector, the enemy continued to defend Cernay and Wittelsheim stubbornly. Violent street fighting has been in progress in both towns.

Weather drastically restricted air operations yesterday.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/

U.S. Navy Department (February 1, 1945)

Communiqué No. 571

Pacific Area.
The minesweepers USS HOVEY (DMS-11) and USS PALMER (DMS-5) and the LST-759 have been lost in the Philippine Area as the result of enemy action.

The next of kin of casualties have been informed.


Communiqué No. 572

The submarine USS GROWLER (SS-215) is overdue from patrol and presumed lost.

Next of kin of officers and crew have been informed.


CINCPOA Press Release No. 2

For Immediate Release
February 1, 1945

Chance Vought Corsair fighter aircraft have successfully completed their first regular operation from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers against the enemy in wartime.

These aircraft, which bear the official Navy designation of F4U‑1D, formed a portion of the fighter aircraft units used in the sustained fleet opera­tions against the Philippines, the coast of French Indochina, the coast of South China, Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, which began on 2 January 1945 (West Longitude Date).

The Corsair squadrons were flown and commanded by officers of the U.S. Marine Corps. Their performance contributed materially to the success which the U.S. Pacific Fleet achieved.

U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson Major General Laycock
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

February 1, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 183rd Meeting

General Marshall said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:

General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

Field Marshal Brooke referred to the amended draft directive contained in CCS 773/1. He suggested that paragraph 4b of this directive should read as follows: “Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.”

It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.

Sir Charles Portal referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7c, which instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security of his front, though it might well be possible to release it after the Germans had withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.

In reply to a question, Sir Charles Portal confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German forces did not retire.

General Marshall said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the remainder of the directive should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under consideration.

General Marshall said he was not in favor of this proposal.

General Kuter suggested that General Eisenhower might require parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being transferred to him.

General Smith said that General Eisenhower’s first requirement, before any of the land forces, was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 768/1 until their next meeting.

a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, CCS 452/36)

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters (CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT))

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36.

General Marshall said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the words “British forces engaged in.” This he felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.

Sir Charles Portal explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36:

Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy recorded in CCS 452/36 and amended in the course of discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of CCS 452/36, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed above (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as CCS 452/37).

b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in CCS 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in CCS 452/37.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)

At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall and Admiral King explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the invasion of the Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration were:

(1) An attack on the Island of Hainan. This had the advantage not only of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations.

(2) An attack on North Borneo. The advantages of such an operation were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready for use.

(3) An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area. This operation was extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us.

When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time, it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.

In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.

With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that with U.S. troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations.

In view of the above considerations, it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.

The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.

The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months’ work could be achieved on this base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok which had previously been used as a base and staging point.

The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.

The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were convoying “civilian-type” supplies to the Maritime Provinces.

To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be under-taken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.

In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.

With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/11.

a. U-Boat Threat (CCS 774/1 and 774/2)

b. Bombing of Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (CCS 774)

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that CCS 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with General Marshall.

Sir Charles Portal, referring to CCS 774, said that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the “marginal effort” should be used against submarine targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it.

He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.

General Kuter said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.

Admiral King said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the action to be taken to counter it.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the Naval Staff would have liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets would in fact pay a more valuable dividend.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered the summary of countermeasures set out in CCS 774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 774/1 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 1945.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a directive based on CCS 774 and CCS 774/2.

Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/5 and 761/6)

In closed session, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of SCAF 180, as amended by SCAF 194 of 31 January, and as amplified by Message No. S-77211 of 31 January to General Smith.

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 1 February 1945
CCS 768/1 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces

  1. In the 183rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the forming of a Greek Army to take over responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAF 841, 25 January 1945.

  2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or “due in” the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.

  3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.

  4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of necessary matériel for:

a. The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions and supporting troops.

b. The Polish 2nd Division.

c. Six Belgium infantry brigades.

d. Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units (Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops.

  1. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.

  2. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.

  3. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as emphasized by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, dated 30 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem.

  4. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

  5. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review NAF 841 again.


Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 31 January 1945
CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret

Allocation of Resources Between India-Burma and China Theaters

  1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.

  2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.

  3. The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in CCS 308 no longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China rather than of warding off dangers.

  4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.

The Pittsburgh Press (February 1, 1945)

Rangers rescue Bataan captives in daring raid on Jap prison

Yanks and guerrillas slaughter garrison to liberate 510 on Luzon
By Ralph Teatsorth, United Press staff writer

They never lost faith in flag

By H. D. Quigg, United Press staff writer

Nazis abandon some parts of Siegfried Line

Advancing Yanks find forts deserted

Yanks in Ardennes snow brave another Valley Forge

Sufferings not as great as Washington’s men, but shoes, clothing are inadequate
By B. J. McQuaid

Last Manila line smashed by Yanks

Drive puts Sixth Army 20 miles from city

Senate rips RFC from Commerce unit

George bill passed by 74-12 vote

Surplus auction called scandalous

La Guardia cites sale in New York

I DARE SAY —
Random harvest

By Florence Fisher Parry

Secrecy ordered in nursery probe

Negligence hinted in fire fatal to 17

Widow gets estate of Pendergast

At London sessions –
Perkins: AFL prestige threatened in conferences

Stand on Russian delegates hurts
By Fred W. Perkins, Pittsburgh Press staff writer

Japanese lost 5,000 in attack on Corregidor

Rescued chaplains tell of surrender

73 Negro soldiers get mutiny terms

Singapore raided by Superfortresses

Japs report attacks on homeland also


Jap midget sub blasted by LST