Combat patrols skirmish in Italy
Vienna refinery hit in record raid
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Floor scandal probe to be continued
Demand grows to put sports out of ‘money’
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Final portion of unforgiven tax payable
No refund credits against instalment
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U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)
Stettinius-Churchill-Eden dinner meeting, evening
On board HMS Orion in Grand Harbor, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Stettinius | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
U.S. State Department (February 2, 1945)
The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill
Malta, 2 February, 1945
P. M. (A) 4.
Prime Minister
The Future of Germany
As a result of developments in the war situation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to co-ordinate the policy of the major Allied Powers in regard to the future of Germany. It is clearly of paramount importance to future unity and security that there should be no divergence of policy between the Allies in dealing with Germany.
-
The EAC was set up in 1943 to “study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities.” So far the Commission have agreed and referred to Governments three documents: (1) Terms of surrender for Germany, (2) protocol on zones of occupation, (3) control machinery for Germany. Of these (1) has been approved by all three Governments, and (2) and (3) so far by the United States and British Governments only.
-
There are a considerable number of major questions of policy on which no decisions have been reached, though there have been exchanges of views at earlier conferences. In my view we should be wise to suspend final decisions until we see what conditions are in Germany. But there is a great deal of preparatory work which can and should be done. Governments have no doubt been studying all these questions individually; but the time has come when they could usefully be examined jointly by British, American, Soviet and French experts with a view to coordinating the individual studies. The obvious body to undertake this task is the EAC.
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I would accordingly suggest that at the forthcoming conference we should try to get general agreement that the EAC should be directed to examine and make joint recommendations at an early date to the member Governments regarding future political and economic policy towards Germany. In doing so, the Commission should pay particular attention to, inter alia, provisions for the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the prevention of rearmament, dismemberment, decentralisation, measures of economic security, reparation, the future of the Rheno-Westphalian basin, the Kiel area, and transfers of population.
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If this is agreed, it will be important that member Governments should ensure that their delegations are adequately staffed to cope with the increased work.
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It might also be useful, in order to give the public some idea of the Commission’s work, that the communiqué to be issued at the end of the Conference should announce the approval of the three Governments of the three documents so far negotiated by the EAC. This will, however, raise awkward problems as regards the French. While they are unlikely to propose any alterations of substance, they have not yet formally approved the documents, which will have to be recast in quadripartite form. We are telegraphing to the Foreign Office to ask (a) what effect it would be likely to have on the French if we announce the approval of the three Governments only of the three documents, and (b) whether they can devise a formula which we could use to cover the French.
Agreed Minutes
On Board HMS SIRIUS, Malta, 2 February 1945
Top secret
Mr. Eden asked Mr. Stettinius if there were any points which he wished to raise.
Mr. Stettinius said that he hoped it would be possible for agreement to be reached between the British and American Delegations forthwith on the urgent question of:
Zones of Occupation in Germany
Mr. Stettinius thought that though there had been agreement between the Americans and British on the zones of occupation in Germany, there were still relatively minor points outstanding, notably in connexion with the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. He thought it important to get agreement on these, particularly in view of the fact that the Russians might soon be in Berlin and have views of their own as regards the zones if our two Governments do not approve the carefully negotiated protocol.
Mr. Eden said that he understood that there were only certain small points unsettled; he agreed that it was desirable to get these tied up forthwith and thought that these points could be cleared up by agreement with the military authorities forthwith.
It was agreed that it would be most important for us to get the Russians to approve the protocols on control machinery and zones of occupation.
Mr. Stettinius next raised the question of zones for the French. The President was disposed to give the French a zone. This might include the southern part of the British zone and the northern part of the American, said Mr. Stettinius.
Sir A. Cadogan asked whether the Americans had had any indication from the French what zone they desired; he thought we should consult them before taking our decision. Neither the British nor the Americans had as yet had any such indication.
It was agreed that the approval of the Russians should be sought to the proposal that the Americans and British should agree on a zone with the French; it was also agreed that the French should be integrated into the control machinery.
Zones of Occupation in Austria
Mr. Eden raised the question of zones of occupation in Austria.
Mr. Matthews said that there had been general agreement as to the areas except as to exact extent of the Viennese zone.
Mr. Eden said that Sir William Strang had told the European Advisory Council that we favoured the American view on Vienna rather than the Russian. He was not sure, however, that apart from this issue there was in fact agreement as to zones.
It was recalled that the French had also asked for a zone in Austria.
Poland
Mr. Stettinius said that from the point of view of American public opinion it was extremely important that some equitable solution should be reached. It was impossible for the United States Government simply to recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. What seemed to be required was some kind of Council including all the relevant sections including M. Mikolajczyk. Failure to reach a satisfactory solution of this question at the forthcoming meeting would greatly disturb public opinion in America especially among the Catholics and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the post war world organisation. He asked whether the British had any formula.
Mr. Eden agreed that the British too could not simply recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. M. Mikolajczyk had put forward a suggestion for a presidential council which would be chosen partly from London elements, partly from the Lublin Provisional Government and partly from elements in Poland. Of the latter he instanced the Archbishop of Cracow, M. Witos and M. Zulawski, a leader of the Socialist party. He thought that M. Bierut would be a member of the presidential council from the Lublin Provisional Government.
Sir A. Cadogan thought the Russians might be suspicious of a proposal which might seem to them rather complicated. He suggested that we should ask them to agree to a new interim Government and that we might suggest a presidential council as one method of securing this. We should avoid suggesting a fusion between the Lublin Provisional Government and the London Government.
It was agreed, upon the proposal of Mr. Stettinius, that the two Delegations should put up notes to the President and the Prime Minister in the above sense, bringing out in particular the point of the prejudicial effect on American opinion of failure to reach a satisfactory solution, and also that this would put in an impossible position all those in Great Britain most anxious to work in with Russia.
The possibility was discussed of the Russians refusing to play.
It was agreed that a deadlock would be bad but that a simple recognition of the Lublin Provisional Government would be even worse.
Persia
Mr. Eden raised the subject of Persia. He said that the essential point was to maintain the independence of Persia which was still threatened by the pressure which the Russian Government had been maintaining for some time on the Persian Government, mainly in connexion with the oil concession which the Persian Government had declined to give them. He suggested that an offer might be made to the Russians for the withdrawal of troops gradually and pari passu, after the Governments had agreed that the supply route through Persia was no longer required, which might be about June. He was obliged, however, to make a reservation that our military might feel it necessary to retain certain troops for the protection of the vital oilfields in southern Persia.
Mr. Matthews pointed out that in this case the Russians would insist on maintaining troops in the north.
It was recalled that both Americans and British had a grievance against the Russians in that British and American companies had proceeded quite far in their applications for oil concessions in South Persia and that their negotiations had been arrested by the ham-handed procedure of the Russians in demanding a concession in the north which raised political issues.
It was agreed that for the three Powers to appear to default on the specific undertakings in the Tehran Declaration would have repercussions elsewhere, for instance in connexion with Dumbarton Oaks, and that it was important to try to get the Russians to agree (a) to the principle of gradual pari passu withdrawal and (b) that the Persian Government were entitled to decline to negotiate oil concessions as long as foreign troops were in occupation of their territory.
Warm Water Port for Russia (Straits and the Far East)
Mr. Stettinius said that the President had in mind the question of Russian interests in a warm water port. He enquired whether the British had any indication as to what the Russians wanted.
Mr. Eden said that the Russians certainly wished to revise the Montreux Convention. We had told them that they should put their ideas on paper. We had no clear indication of what they had in mind but it might be that they would wish for a regime for the Straits similar to that of the Suez Canal which would enable their warships to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean in time of war.
Mr. Eden continued that the Russians would be wanting a good many things, that we had not very much to offer them, but that we required a great deal from them. He felt, therefore, that we ought to arrange to put together all the things we wanted against what we had to give. This would apply to the Far East also. In his view if the Russians decided to enter the war against Japan they would take the decision because they considered it in their interests that the Japanese war should not be successfully finished by the U. S. and Great Britain alone. There was therefore no need for us to offer a high price for their participation, and if we were prepared to agree to their territorial demands in the Far East, we should see to it that we obtained a good return in respect of the points on which we required concessions from them.
In the course of discussion, the views were put forward that the Russians would certainly want the lower part of Sakhalin and transit rights in southern Manchuria.
China
The desirability of unity being achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity.
Mr. Eden could not account for this idea having arisen; we were most anxious that unity should be secured.
Mr. Stettinius said that he had not heard the report.
It was agreed that the military situation had improved somewhat, partly through the diversion of two divisions from Burma to China, and partly through the reopening of the Burma Road.
Mr. Stettinius urged that the British, Soviet and American Governments make every effort to bring about agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists.
Emergency High Commission for Europe
Mr. Stettinius referred to the two papers on this subject which Mr. Bohlen had communicated in London to Sir A. Cadogan. He asked Mr. Hiss to explain briefly their purpose.
Mr. Hiss said that the essential purpose was to secure unity of approach between the three Big powers to the manifold difficulties that must arise in liberated territories in Europe. The proposed High Commission would be a temporary body functioning until the World Organisation was set up. It would not include Germany, which was handled by the European Advisory Council; but in any case the scope including the psychological approach was different.
Mr. Stettinius stressed that the Commission would be composed of four members, i.e. by the inclusion of the French, or possibly more.
Mr. Eden made it clear that the British were much attracted by the proposal.
Mr. Matthews said that its presentation to the Russians would require considerable care, as the question of Poland was involved.
Mr. Eden foresaw that one difficulty would be to find members of the Council who would be able to take responsibility for decisions of importance – the Russians would find this particularly difficult. Apart from this there was the further difficulty that responsibility for such decisions vis-à-vis their own public opinion must rest with the Foreign Secretaries of each country, who could neither be permanently in session in a foreign country, nor delegate their duties beyond a certain measure.
Mr. Stettinius shared this view, but explained that the intention had been that the members of the proposed Council would refer to their home Governments before the Council took decisions of importance.
Mr. Eden raised the further point of the relation between the Council and quarterly meetings of the Foreign Secretaries to which he attached importance. It was felt that it should not be impossible to work [out?] an arrangement combining both plans.
There was some discussion as to the title of the body. It was felt that some title must be found which would not wound the susceptibilities of the smaller Allies and at the same time would not seem to cut across the duties of the European Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commissions in certain enemy countries. It was thought that Mr. Matthews’ suggestion of “Liberated Areas Emergency Council” deserved consideration.
Mr. Stettinius stressed that the proposal must still be regarded as informal and unofficial as the President had not yet approved it. The President had indeed some misgiving that its adoption might prejudice the prospects of the World Organisation which was the question of paramount importance.
Mr. Matthews pointed out that if the idea fructified some public announcement would be necessary as regards it and certain other kindred subjects.
Mr. Stettinius said that the ideal result of ARGONAUT would be two declarations, one bringing to birth the World Organisation and the other in regard to the Emergency High Commission. American public opinion keenly anticipated a satisfactory declaration as regards the World Organisation in the course of the next week, and if this were not forthcoming its prospects would be seriously jeopardised.
It was agreed that in view of the informality of the proposal the Prime Minister should be advised not to raise the question of the Emergency High Commission with the President.
Germany
Some discussion followed on the future of Germany. It was felt that both the political and economic aspects needed working out by some international body.
Mr. Stettinius enquired whether this was not in the province of the European Advisory Council and there was agreement that it was.
Mr. Eden summed up that with the Russians so close to Berlin it was urgently necessary to reach tripartite agreement.
(a) that a common political and economic policy in Germany was required,
(b) that no individual nation should take action without the agreement of the others, and
(c) that the European Advisory Council was the body in which detailed arrangements should be worked out.
Other questions requiring study would be the transfer of population and prisoners of war.
It was agreed that a note should be drafted embodying the views of the two Governments for the use of the President and the Prime Minister at ARGONAUT.
Dumbarton Oaks
Mr. Eden said that he liked the President’s proposal for overcoming the difficulty as regards voting by the Big Powers.
Mr. Matthews stressed that its adoption was virtually essential to the creation of the World Organisation.
Sir A. Cadogan agreed that it would hardly be possible to secure the latter with anything less.
At Mr. Stettinius’ request Mr. Hiss briefly described the American proposal. It distinguished between cases involving Enforcement and cases dealt with by Discussion. For the former unanimity in the part of the Great Powers would be necessary, whereas for the latter parties to the dispute, whether Big Powers or small, would not be entitled to vote. He stressed that this proposal, which had been described as a compromise, in effect was not so, but was actually the preferred solution of the United States Government.
Sir A. Cadogan endorsed this and agreed that this point should be made plain to the public.
Mr. Eden agreed.
It was agreed (1) that two types of documents were required; first, a document setting out the American proposal which would be the document to be presented to the Russians; and secondly, brief and clear explanations of it for the information of the President and the Prime Minister; and (2) that if approved it would be for the President to present the plan formally at ARGONAUT both to Marshal Stalin and to Mr. Churchill.
Points arising in the event of agreement being reached on Dumbarton Oaks plan
(a) Position of France and China – It was agreed that the French and Chinese Governments should be consulted as soon as agreement was reached, and if the Russians concurred that the French should be invited to be the Fifth Power sponsoring the plan. The United States Government would be responsible for communicating the documents to and obtaining the concurrence of both the French and Chinese Governments.
(b) The invitations to other States to be present at the eventual United Nations Conference should be issued jointly in the name of all five Governments and by each of them individually. It was realised that the Russian Government might raise some objection to this in connection with China.
Polish-German frontier
Mr. Eden said that the apparent desire of the Lublin Provisional Government to secure for Poland large additional sections of Germany involving eight million persons was causing him some anxiety. He thought that Poland was entitled to East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia, and certain other territories up to the Oder.
Mr. Matthews said that that was the American view and referred also to the inclusion of the eastern tip of Pomerania. He stressed also the American view that the transfer of populations should be gradual and not precipitate.
Sir A. Cadogan thought that agreement in principle between the Americans and British on this point might be registered now. This was agreed to.
Austro-Yugoslav frontier
Mr. Eden referred to the fact that British troops under the proposed zone arrangement would be responsible for the Austrian frontier with Yugoslavia, and that one could not exclude the possibility that Marshal Tito would wish to occupy part of Austrian territory which was claimed for Yugoslavia. The position would be safeguarded if the three Big Powers were to tell Marshal Tito that the frontiers must remain as they are until the Peace Treaty, at which claims of parties concerned would be settled.
Mr. Stettinius expressed concurrence in this procedure.
Conduct of the Russians in Eastern Europe
It was pointed out that there were two main questions on which we had reason for complaint in regard to Russian conduct (a) in connexion with the Control Commissions and (b) in connexion with the British and American oil interest in Roumania.
It was generally felt that while the position on the Control Commission for Roumania was now more satisfactory it was important to insist with the Russians that before the Commissions took action there must be prior consultation with the Americans and British. Should the Russian Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds, not covered in the Armistice, this should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government.
It was agreed that the British Delegation should draw up a paper which would include Hungary specifying the points on which dissatisfaction was felt with the Russian conduct in Eastern Europe. This paper, if the American Delegation concurred in it, would serve for presentation by Mr. Eden to M. Molotov at some meeting between the three Foreign Secretaries.
Civil Supplies
Mr. Eden raised this question and Mr. Stettinius said that he understood that Admiral Land had submitted a paper on the subject. It appeared that the British and American civil authorities were in agreement but it remained to persuade the American military.
It was understood that the next stage would be for the matter to be discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and if agreement were not reached by them, between the President and the Prime Minister.
Prisoners of War
Sir A. Cadogan said that he understood that the Russian Delegation at ARGONAUT would include an official who would be prepared to discuss this subject. There were in effect two questions, (a) the treatment of Allied civilian and military prisoners of war who were liberated by the Russians and (b) our own treatment of Russian prisoners of war who came into our hands.
It was agreed that the procedure for handling this with the Russian expert should be discussed by the American and British experts who were present at CRICKET.
Anglo-American warning to Germany about Allied prisoners of war
Mr. Matthews said that the State Department were disposed to agree with the text proposed by the Foreign Office but that the United States War Department had some views on the subject.
It was agreed that the timing of any statement would be important and that the proper time would be when the German collapse seemed imminent or when some German outrage was threatened.
Treatment of Major War Criminals
Mr. Eden said that when this was discussed at Moscow in October Marshal Stalin had disagreed with our view favouring some summary executions and had said that some form of judicial procedure was necessary. The Prime Minister was still considering what the British attitude on this subject would be.
Führer HQ (February 2, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
In Ungarn setzte der Feind seine Gegenangriffe zwischen Plattensee und Donau mit Schwerpunkt nordöstlich Stuhlweißenburg fort. Sie wurden im Wesentlichen abgewehrt, einige Einbrüche abgeriegelt oder durch Gegenangriffe deutscher und ungarischer Verbände beseitigt. Bei diesen Kämpfen hat der Obergefreite Karl Schuster in einem Panzergrenadierregiment als Richtschütze einer 7,5-Zeniimeier-Pak innerhalb 15 Minuten von sieben durchgebrochenen sowjetischen Panzern fünf abgeschossen, ferner zwei Lastkraftwagen mit angehängten Geschützen vernichtet und die Masse der begleitenden feindlichen Infanterie zusammengeschossen. Den Rest von 21 Bolschewisten nahm er gelangen.
An der Front zwischen der Hohen Tatra und dem Oderknie bei Grünberg kam es nur zu örtlich begrenzten Kampfhandlungen südlich Pless, nördlich Ratibor, nordwestlich Brieg und im Raume beiderseits Steinau. 32 Panzer wurden dort vernichtet.
Die Besatzungen von Schneidemühl und Posen erwehrten sich heftiger, von starkem Artillerie- und Salvengeschützfeuer unterstützter Angriffe der Bolschewisten. Im Südteil Pommerns scheiterten feindliche Angriffe bei Deutsch-Krone und Jastrow. Beiderseits der unteren Weichsel griff der Feind südwestlich Graudenz unter Einsatz mehrerer Schützendivisionen und zahlreicher Panzer an. Er wurde nach schwerem Kampf aufgefangen.
Im Raume Marienburg–Elbing und in Ostpreußen dauern die erbitterten Abwehrkämpfe in den bisherigen Schwerpunkten an. Trotz tieferer Einbrüche verhinderte die unerschütterliche Standhaftigkeit unserer Divisionen den erstrebten Durchbruch des zahlenmäßig überlegenen Feindes.
An der kurländischen Front führten die Bolschewisten zahlreiche erfolglose Vorstöße.
Die Luftwaffe bekämpfte mit starken Kräften sowjetische Panzer- und Infanteriekolonnen in den Schwerpunkten der Winterschlacht. Der Feind hatte außerordentlich hohe blutige Ausfälle und verlor gestern 52 Panzer, 27 Geschütze sowie 575 motorisierte und bespannte Fahrzeuge.
Im Westen stehen unsere Divisionen beiderseits Monschau in der Tiefe des Hauptkampffeldes in harten Abwehrkämpfen gegen die mit unverminderter Stärke angreifenden Amerikaner. Im Abschnitt östlich St. Vith dauern heftige Gefechte im Vorfeld unserer Westbefestigungen an.
An der Saarfront sowie im unteren Elsass blieben amerikanische Vorstöße erfolglos.
Im Einbruchsraum östlich und nordöstlich Kolmar konnte der Feind nach heftigen Kämpfen die Straße Neu-Breisach–Straßburg nach Osten überschreiten. Bei Thann und Sennheim schlugen unsere Truppen sämtliche feindlichen Angriffe zurück.
Teile der Besatzung von Gironde-Süd brachen, nachdem sie sich durch feindliche Minenfelder Gassen geschaffen hatten, tief in den Belagerungsring ein und rollten im Nahkampf einen größeren Grabenabschnitt auf. Der Gegner erlitt beträchtliche Verluste.
In Mittelitalien warfen unsere Truppen im Gegenangriff nördlich Faenza die vorübergehend in unsere Stellungen eingedrungenen Briten wieder zurück.
In Kroatien wurde im Raum östlich Kartovac eine stärkere Bande durch ein deutsches Jagdkommando überfallen und vernichtet. Die Masse ihrer Waffen fiel in unsere Hand.
Nordamerikanische Bomber richteten am gestrigen Tag einen Terrorangrifi gegen die Wohnviertel von Ludwigshafen. Weitere anglo-amerikanische Verbände warfen Bomben im rheinisch-westfälischen Raum sowie in Südostdeutschland, vor allem auf Graz. In der vergangenen Nacht waren die Städte Mannheim, Ludwigshafen und Mainz erneut das Ziel schwerer Terrorangriffe. Britische Kampfflugzeuge warfen in den Abendstunden und in der Nacht Bomben auf die Reickshauptstadt sowie auf Orte im westlichen Reichsgebiet.
London liegt weiter unter unserem Vergeltungsfeuer.
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| General of the Army Marshall | Major General Wood | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Cabell | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Captain Stroop | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Peck | |
| Major General Bull | Colonel Dean | |
| Major General Anderson | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Hull | Colonel Cary | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Floriana, February 1, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
a. Approval of Minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting
General Kuter stated that his remarks on British participation in the VLR bombing of Japan had been omitted from the minutes of the preceding Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. Since then he had received a letter on this subject from Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the British Air Staff, which he had forwarded to General Arnold with certain comments of his own. He requested for the purpose of record, that his message to General Arnold (CRICKET 55, dated 1 February 1945), less the last sentence, be attached as an annex to the minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting, subject to the attachment requested by General Kuter.
b. Approval of Minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the CCS 184th Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)
General Marshall said that the principal issue in this item was the transfer of the Twelfth Air Force. Air Marshal Portal had stated that he was opposed to leaving the adjustments to the theater commanders. General Marshall felt that it was undesirable to allow this matter to lapse and thus delay action on the transfer of ground forces. He proposed the substitution for paragraph 5, page 3 of CCS 773/1 of the following:
- Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. Your recommendations are desired at once.
General Marshall said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide the overall strength that should be withdrawn from the Twelfth Air Force for use in France and that the details of the withdrawal should be left to negotiations between SCAEF and SACMED. He felt that it might be necessary to debate the necessity for a larger part of the air force remaining in an inactive theater.
Admiral King felt that the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean was considering the use of air in as great strength as possible in the event of a German withdrawal.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend the substitution in the directive to SACMED of the new paragraph 5 proposed by General Marshall.
Provision of LVTs for Mediterranean
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)
General Marshall said that this subject had been discussed in the preceding JCS meeting (185th Meeting, 1 February 1945). General Smith had exhibited charts which showed that very little progress had been made in the provision of equipment for the approved figure of 460,000 liberated manpower. He recalled that a possible reduction in this figure had been mentioned and invited any further remarks on the subject.
General Somervell said that General Smith had informed General Riddell-Webster that a figure of 400,000 liberated manpower instead of 460,000 would be acceptable. The British had found that certain items of equipment, particularly shoes, were in short supply. They would, however, be able to provide for the lower figure. The overall problem of supply was extremely difficult. The figure of 172,000 liberated manpower agreed at OCTAGON had gradually increased to an overall of 1,000,000. The British had increased their commitments which included the equipment of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and some of the liberated manpower. The supply can be accomplished but not in a reasonable length of time.
General Bull felt that the only satisfactory solution to the problem was to reduce the requirements to fit the supplies available. This was especially desirable in order to avoid the bad feeling which would result from the arousing of false hopes.
General Somervell added that it might be possible to meet the requirements in phases starting with the figure of 300,000 and completing the remainder subject to the availability of equipment.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the foregoing statements.
U-Boat Threat
General Marshall said that the directive before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on countermeasures to the U-boat threat had been prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Item 6, CCS 184th Meeting.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the directive drafted by the Secretaries.
Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/7, 746/8, 746/9, and 746/10)
General Marshall said that the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board had on their own initiative submitted in CCS 746/10 a supplementary report to CCS 746/6. He recommended approval subject to the deletion of the word “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of CCS 746/10 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall.
Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwestern Europe
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)
General Marshall said that in CCS 775 the British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2 be reaffirmed subject to the amendment of paragraph h as indicated in this paper.
Admiral Duncan said that the Joint Staff Planners recommended the amendment of the first and last sentences of the paragraph in order to prevent the supply of liberated areas from being placed in the same category as the supply of allies such as France, Russia or China.
General Somervell explained that unless the last sentence of the proposed new paragraph is altered or deleted altogether, it will if accepted have the effect of giving first priority to shipping requirements for liberated areas. This would place shipments of civilian requirements ahead of British and American military requirements which, of course, could not be accepted. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the substitute paragraph subject to deletion of the last sentence. If the British would not accept deletion of the last sentence, the amendments proposed by Admiral Duncan might then be put forward as a compromise.
General Marshall suggested that the first line of the last sentence be deleted and that the phrase “without prejudice to the fulfillment of other basic undertakings” precede the words “to provide” in the remainder of the sentence.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that paragraph h be modified to read:
Provide assistance to each of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to apply this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Without prejudice to the fulfillment of the other basic undertakings to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity against Germany and Japan.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 2, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
021100A February
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 300
In the area northeast of Monschau, Allied forces continued mopping-up operations. Southeast of Monschau, we have made gains of from 800 to 3,000 yards against light resistance from pillboxes in the Monschau Forest.
Our units made additional gains in the forest east of Rocherath, and Krinkelt and are within a few hundred yards of the German border.
Schönberg, six miles east of St. Vith, is in our hands and we have advanced two miles farther east and crossed the Belgian-German border to capture Laudesfeld. Farther south, our elements are within one mile of Winterscheid and we have taken Eigelscheid and Heckhalenfeld east of the Our River.
Southeast of Haguenau near the Rhine, our forces broke a six-day lull in the Northern Alsace plain with an attack which gained up to two miles against strong resistance. We crossed the Moder River in these operations. Hard fighting is in progress at Oberhöfen.
Farther south, the Steinwald Forest, north of Gambsheim was cleared.
South of Strasbourg, the area between the Ill and the Rhine Rivers has been largely cleared by our infantry and armor. We have reached the Rhine at several points northeast of Colmar.
Gains up to three miles were made in our continuing drive south of the Colmar Canal. In this area, fighter-bombers attacked targets at Arztenheim, Baltzenheim and Biesheim, close to the west bank of the Rhine.
Our artillery has been firing on the enemy holding the Breisach railway bridge over the Rhine.
Enemy resistance continued strong on the southern edge of the Colmar sector where only local gains were made.
Escorted heavy bombers in great strength struck at objectives in Germany, including railway marshalling yards at Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Rhine bridges at Wesel, northwest of the Ruhr.
Other escorted heavy bombers attacked the railway junction of München-Gladbach, west of Düsseldorf.
Medium and light bombers with fighter escort attacked communication centers at Schleiden, Brandscheid and Prüm, rail bridges spanning the Rhine at Engers, the Lahn River at Nassau and the Moselle River at Eller, road junctions at Blankenheim, southeast of Schleiden and at Wittlich. During the operation, several barges on the Rhine northwest of Koblenz were destroyed.
Rail traffic north of the Ruhr in the areas of Bocholt, Dülmen, Coesfeld, and Burgesteinfurt and gun positions east of Coesfeld were attacked by fighter-bombers and rocket-firing fighters.
Last night, heavy bombers in very great strength made heavy attacks on the main railway centers at Mainz, Ludwigshafen and Siegen and light bombers struck at the rail network north of the Ruhr. Berlin also was bombed.
One enemy aircraft was shot down during the day and night fighters destroyed another during the night. One of our heavy bombers and three fighters are missing from the daylight operations.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/
Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others
ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section
NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409
AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
U.S. State Department (February 2, 1945)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Major General Kuter | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Field Marshal Alexander | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Admiral Somerville | |
| Major General Bull | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Major General Anderson | Air Marshal Robb | |
| Major General Hull | Major General Laycock | |
| Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | ||
| Brigadier General Cabell | ||
| Secretariat* | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Jacob | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
CCS Minutes
February 2, 1945
Top secret
Approval of Minutes of CCS 184th Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale – a commitment which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as possible.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note that SCAEF’s requirements in liberated manpower could be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000.
b. Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841 upon assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation from London, this implementation would not:
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Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of equipment, on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor
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Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.
Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/8)
Sir Alan Brooke suggested the substitution of the word “some” for the word “present” in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 746/10. With regard to paragraph 6d, he felt that it should be made clear that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at ARGONAUT should be completed before the conference ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs should remain at CRICKET.
General Marshall suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word “programs” in paragraph 5b.
Turning to CCS 746/8, Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/10 subject to the substitution of “some” for “present” in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.
b. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of CCS 746/8 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following: “Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.”
c. Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT.
Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwest Europe
Transfer of Tactical Air Forces from SACMED to SCAEF (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)
General Marshall said that as he saw it the British proposal left the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should move to Northwest Europe, which was the decisive theater in which additional airpower would produce the most valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff’s desire to strengthen the northern thrust.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the offensive on the Western Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front.
General Marshall pointed out that there was considerable air strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.
Sir Charles Portal said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the United States’ P-47s would be of the utmost help in cutting communications beyond the limits of the shorter-ranged British fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean.
There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph 2 of CCS 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups particularly required by General Eisenhower. He understood that such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers of the Twelfth Air Force.
General Marshall said he understood that the 6th Army Group was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.
General Kuter said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the main effort. All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when he required it.
General Marshall said that the French forces in the South were inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.
Sir Alan Brooke felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the Allied line in this sector would be very strong.
Field Marshal Alexander said he was anxious to retain the Twelfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air headquarters in southern France.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in CCS 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:
- Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Provision of LVTs for the Mediterranean
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U-Boat Threat
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6b of the CCS 184th Meeting.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders (Subsequently circulated as CCS 774/3).
Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)
In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our operations based on that country.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph 6h of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776).
General Marshall explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.
General Somervell pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U.S. military manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included under the military shipping requirements.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.
Interim Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that paragraph 6h of CCS 776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still under discussion.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of CCS 746/10 was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6h of the interim report along the lines indicated in CCS 775.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.
JCS to the President
Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
Nr: No #.
Top Secret memorandum for the President.
Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Law in their memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated areas made the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of the respective governments be ready to make recommendations to their heads of government at the coming conference concerning the allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting pressure against Japan, followed by concentration of full U.S.-U.K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.
The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.
The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.
The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has always been recognized and these are included under the theater commander’s military priorities. There is no doubt that more shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help out the liberated peoples. At best this could be only a trickle. The sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that considerations other than military may dictate some small allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority above everything but urgent military necessity.
Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
CCS 746/7
After considering CCS 746/6 the United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional relief supplies and home rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we can possibly give the populations of liberated territories in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as possible following out the overall objective which has been agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board Representatives in CCS 746/6 can gravely lower our military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory. The vital military point involved to the United States Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would almost certainly result from placing non-military requirements in a priority where they could compete with military needs essential to ending the global war successfully at the earliest date.
A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money and resources to the United States resulting from any prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much more than the actual number of days’ delay to a particular operation which would result from acceding to a demand for resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the British representatives of the combined military transportation committee that cuts in estimates for operations can be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U.S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a major cut below the theater commander’s minimum estimates. If anything the minimum U.S. military requirements may prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.
The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.
They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so overriding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.
Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:
Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.
It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:
A. First priority to
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Military requirements (including civil relief) vital to the successful conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. This may include military lend-lease for existing forces engaged in operations.
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Increasing the fighting forces of the United Nations in order to apply greater pressure against the Axis powers.
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Civilian requirements that are vital to the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the United Nations.
B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war-making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.
C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.
D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.
E. Requirements in higher priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower priorities.
F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.
G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.
H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.
740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, February 1, 1945
Secret
U.S. urgent
To the Secretary of State from Clayton.
Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control. On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and the United States of America signed an Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.
Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.
The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude towards the Shipping Agreement. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, has been to Stockholm to discuss the matter with Mr. Gunther, Swedish Foreign Minister, and subsequent thereto went to Moscow to discuss the matter.
Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador Winant is reported also inclined to this view. The consensus is that the Russians are suspicious of any arrangements which look like a combine of other powers with post-war implications, and are uncertain of their ability to maintain position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had relatively little experience. Another factor which may affect the Soviet attitude is the participation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Shipping Agreement.
It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and Great Britain should be made directly to Stalin to fully explain the Agreement, its intents and purposes, to clear up any misunderstandings. Through Mr. Harriman, Russia was kept informed of the preliminary negotiations and of the Agreement reached.
Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Malta, 1 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 775
Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept
The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2, paragraph 6, be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment.
For existing h. substitute the following:
h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.