40 von 130 abgeschossen
…
U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| General of the Army Marshall | Major General Hull | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Major General Wood | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Captain Stroop | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Bull | Lieutenant Colonel McRae | |
| Major General Anderson | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Floriana, February 1, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
a. Approval of the Minutes of the JCS 184th Meeting
General Kuter requested that the last sentence of the remarks of General Anderson in Item 7 be changed to read: “The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.”
b. Approval of the Minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting
General Marshall requested the amendment of his remarks in the third paragraph of Item 1 to read as follows:
General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the minutes of the JCS 184th Meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the discussion.
b. Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the CCS 183rd Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the above discussion and to later minor amendments.
Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773)
General Marshall said that the Secretaries had prepared a draft of the directive to SACMED proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, which showed the amendments agreed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in their previous meeting. General McNarney’s views, which had just been received, indicate that on balance he prefers to have British divisions rather than American divisions transferred to France. Concerning the tactical air force, General McNarney expresses satisfaction with the present air-ground ratio. He considers that a proportionate reduction in fighter-bomber strength should accompany a reduction in the number of divisions. He considers the medium bombers should stay in Italy.
In light of General McNarney’s message and the discussions that have taken place, it seems that no American divisions should be taken from Italy and that the draft directive to General Alexander proposed by the British with the amendments already agreed to by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and agreed in part by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to General Alexander, with an information copy to General Eisenhower.
General Kuter proposed that a new paragraph 5 should be added to the directive as follows:
The U.S. Twelfth Air Force, less such units as may be selected by agreement between you and SCAEF, shall be made available for transfer to SCAEF, together with necessary service units.
An appropriate sequence of paragraphs in the directive was then discussed and agreed.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prepared by the Secretaries, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 773/1).
Equipment of Allied and Liberated Forces (JCS 1240 and NAF 841)
General Marshall read a brief of JCS 1240 and proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee, subject to the following amendments:
Page 5, delete the last three lines of paragraph 11 and after the word “reviewing” add “NAF 841 again.”
Page 8, line 2, insert the words “already approved in principle” between the words “provision” and “of.”
Page 8, paragraph 9, line 3, after the word “review” delete the remainder of the sentence and substitute therefor “NAF 841 again.”
General Somervell said he felt certain that when the British restudy their requirements for the supply of Greek forces, they would find that they could not meet them. It might then be suggested that the agreed figure of equipment for 460,000 liberated manpower in Europe could be reduced to 400,000 and the equipment for the 60,000 remaining be applied to the requirement for the Greek Army.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1240, subject to the amendments proposed by General Marshall (Memorandum subsequently circulated as CCS 768/1).
Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, 452/36 and CCS 747/7)
General Marshall said that in CCS 452/35 the British proposed a directive to Admiral Mountbatten. In CCS 747/7 the British propose that transfer of forces from India-Burma to China be subject to CCS agreements. The United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/36 set forth a policy with respect to U.S. resources in the India-Burma Theater.
The point at issue appears to be whether the United States Chiefs of Staff can order transfers of resources when they do not jeopardize British forces engaged in approved operations in Burma or whether every transfer requires agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed by the British. The U.S. proposal as now written appears to safeguard sufficiently the British interests. Under the British proposal the Combined Chiefs of Staff would become involved in lengthy discussions of purely operational matters and the transfer of one air squadron or one Quartermaster company would be the subject for CCS decision unless acceptable to SACSEA.
No compromise should be accepted which involves CCS approval of transfer or requires discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff except where the British Chiefs think their forces are jeopardized. The U.S. paper provides clearly for this.
General Marshall recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the approval of the proposals made in the U.S. memorandum in CCS 452/36. By this action both the policy for the transfer of U.S. resources and the directive for Admiral Mountbatten will be approved. The British in their paper state their willingness to discuss means of reducing the time occupied in the discussion of projected moves. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should listen to whatever the British may propose in this respect since these discussions will be necessary when contemplated transfers might place British forces in jeopardy.
The Secretary stated that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to withdraw their paper, CCS 747/7, if the United States Chiefs of Staff will agree to delete the words “British forces engaged in” in the eighth line of the second paragraph of CCS 452/36, which paper would then be acceptable to them.
Colonel Lincoln said that the proposed British amendment would nullify the intentions of the United States Chiefs of Staff because it would transfer the “jeopardy” from the “forces engaged” to “operations.” While the jeopardy to the forces actually engaged in operations was a factual matter, it would be difficult to determine from the existing circumstances the question of the jeopardy of approved operations, some of which might not yet have been initiated. This was a matter over which there could be considerable difference of opinion. Discussion of such a point was likely to be time-consuming. He recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff propose to the British, in lieu of their amendment, the substitution of the word “the” for the word “British” in the same line of the paragraph referred to above.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to adhere to the position outlined by them in CCS 452/36.
Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)
Admiral King said that this paper was on the agenda for the purpose of reaffirming the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the operations for the defeat of Japan. He doubted the possibility of maintaining and defending a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk from bases in Kamchatka alone, but suggested reaffirming the paper for planning purposes.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Reaffirmed their approval of CCS 417/11.
U-Boat Threat (CCS 774 and 774/1)
General Marshall said that CCS 774, upon which action had been deferred at the CCS 183rd Meeting, was the U.S. proposal for the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz for the disruption of the German U-boat program. In CCS 774/1 the British have presented a paper on the U-boat threat during 1945.
Admiral King was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be obliged to accept the directive proposed in CCS 774 in the light of the British paper which implied that immediate action was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall drew attention to the fact that the British paper would provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage being considered in current shipping studies and would provide the British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8 percent which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies. He was merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to formulate some reply to the British if the point were raised.
Admiral King felt that the British paper might be accepted if the acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies established in the current studies. He advised against any attempt to revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at this time.
Admiral Cooke suggested that it might be preferable to note the paper and review the deficiencies in sailings at some future date.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of CCS 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings on 1 April 1945.
Strategy in Northwest Europe
In closed session, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept SCAF 180 (Enclosure “B” to CCS 761/3) as amended by SCAF 194, and take note of SCAEF’s dispatch No. S-77211 of 31 January 1945.
Annex
CRICKET 55 (1 February 1945)
Message by General Kuter to General Arnold
1 February 1945
The following letter received this date:
My dear Kuter. Since the British Chiefs of Staff issued CCS 691 about British participation in the very long-range bombing of Japan and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied in CCS 691/1. we have made considerable progress in the development of our VLR bombing potential.
The bombing of the Tirpitz proved that it is possible to increase the all-up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations and we now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles carrying a useful load of the order of 6,000 pounds with either the Lancaster or with its replacement the Lincoln. We are however carrying on with flight refueling experiments as an insurance.
The rate at which we will be able to bring our Bomber Force into action against Japan cannot finally be determined until we know more about the bases that will be available for our operations and the facilities we can count on at those bases. Assuming that bases are made available I estimate that our first squadrons could be fully operational in the Pacific 7 months after Germany is defeated, and the whole force some 5 months later.
This RAF force will be thoroughly experienced in the technique of night bombing and in sea-mining, and will be capable of dropping the very effective 1,500-pound British mines. I feel that particularly in these respects the Force will be able to make a valuable contribution to our efforts against Japan.
I am anxious to get our plans for the RAF very long-range Force into more concrete form, particularly with regard to the rate of its deployment, the provision of bases, availability of common user items, local defence and the general administrative arrangements for the contingent.
I would like to send the AOC designate of our Force together with a small number of staff officers, over to the United States at an early date in order to make contact with your Air Force authorities and the officers under whom he would be serving, to make as much progress as possible with these arrangements. It would also be helpful if he could visit the Pacific area and learn at first hand something about the operating conditions in that Theatre. Following this visit, I propose that the AOC would return to the United Kingdom to continue with the preparation of his Force. I realize the difficulties of deciding on the exact base facilities that will be available so far in advance, but I am anxious to make a definite start even on a small scale, and would be prepared to initiate planning on the assumption that you would make available to us, say, 4 bases for heavy bombers 6 months after Germany is defeated.
I would very much like to discuss this VLR project with you during this conference, either here or at MAGNETO.
Yours sincerely, Charles Portal.
Anticipating such proposal, I have cleared with JCS a reply which will infer favorable consideration after detailed presentation of desired visit to Theater at proposed conference here or at MAGNETO.
Understand Air Marshal Hugh Pugh Lloyd is AOC designate. Expect to arrange that Lloyd and party of 8 to 10 of his elected staff will arrive Washington after March 1 to spend 2 or 3 days in Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff Plans studying probable course of air war on Japan and then 4 or 5 days in Headquarters XX Air Force for familiarization with means and methods of command and operations of XX Air Force and then visit to XX Air Force base in Mariannas and probably to Luzon.
Expect that 36 squadrons of VLR Lancasters or Lincolns under Lloyd will operate as a unit of XX Air Force.
All discussions will be based on condition that RAF unit will provide own aviation engineers and all services, will build, maintain and operate own bases, will provide all echelons of aviation maintenance and in general will be absolutely and completely self-supporting.
Will tie resurrection of WEARY WILLIE project into same conversation and hope to establish full freedom for our development and operation from French bases and freedom to develop and operate accurately controlled types from UK bases.
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 10:30 a.m.
On board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Mr. Matthews | Sir Alexander Cadogan | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Butler | |
| Mr. Hiss | Mr. Dixon |
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
February 1, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question
Territorial Problems
We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish frontier in the east which should run along the Curzon Line in the north and central section, and in the southern section should follow generally the eastern frontier line of the Lwow Province. This would give to Poland the Polish city of Lwow and the economically important oil fields. This frontier would correspond generally with one of the suggested frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.
In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.
If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out if these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Neisse Line.
Political Problems
The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason, without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and without causing the most serious repercussions in American public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of representative members of all important Polish political parties. This new interim government should not be in the form of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a solution might be an agreement at this meeting to set up a Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers (four if France would be included) with appointment of an interim Polish Government composed of the representatives of leading Polish political parties. This Presidential Council might be composed of Bierut, the present head of the Lublin Government, and a small number of Poles from inside Poland taken from the following list: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos – one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party and a former Prime Minister, Zulowski, a Socialist leader, Bishop Lukomski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba.
This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.
Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making up this government would, of course, be certain present members of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in particular Mikolajczyk.
U.K. Delegation Memorandum
February 1, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Allied (Soviet) Control Commissions in Bulgaria and Hungary
HMG regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary,” and HMG suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11, 1944.
HMG also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.
During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities, HMG wish to ensure that:
a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commission. They should also have the right of direct access to the satellite authorities.
b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commissions should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of the satellite countries through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Governments or taking action which are not approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.
c) The extent to which the British and the Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commissions will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.
d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions on the spot.
Roumania
HMG have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned HMG considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by HMG that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, HMG can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.
Foreign Ministers-Chiefs of Staff luncheon meeting
On board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Mr. Matthews |
Stettinius: “The two Chiefs of Staff, after a thorough discussion of the question [of zones of occupation in Germany] with us, authorized us to cable our representatives on the European Advisory Commission in London that the two governments now approved the zones.”
740.00119 Control (Germany)/2–145: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
Malta, 1 February 1945
Nr: CRICKET 45
Secret
For Acting Secretary of State
ONLY from Secretary Stettinius.
Have dispatched the following to Winant after conference which Eden and I had with General Marshall and Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke.
You are Authorized immediately to inform the European Advisory Commission of this government’s approval of the protocol on zones of occupation for Germany. Eden is likewise telegraphing the British Government’s approval.
Please advise McCloy.
Führer HQ (February 1, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
In Ungarn wurden zwischen Sárvizkanal und Donau sowie nordöstlich Stuhlweißenburg starke sowjetische Angriffe nach harten Kämpfen aufgefangen. An der Oderfront scheiterten die Versuche des Gegners, seine Brückenköpfe zu erweitern unter Verlust zahlreicher Panzer.
Im Oder-Warthe-Bogen behaupteten unsere Truppen im Raum westlich Züllichau-Schwiebus und westlich Schwerin zahlreiche Stützpunkte gegen heftige Angriffe. Gegen feindliche Panzerspitzen, die bis in den Raum Sternberg–Zielenzieg vorstoßen konnten, sind Eingreifreserven angesetzt. Nördlich der Warthe drangen Kräfte des Gegners bis an die Oder nordwestlich Küstrin vor und trafen dort auf unsere neu herangeführten Reserven. Im Süden von Pommern wurden zahlreiche bolschewistische Angriffe abgewiesen und nach Norden vorgedrungene feindliche Aufklärungskräfte zurückgeworfen.
Die Besatzung von Posen verteidigte sich tapfer gegen die von mehreren Seiten angreifenden Sowjets. Nordwestlich Kulm und bei Elbing kam es zu wechselvollen Kämpfen.
In Ostpreußen verlief der Tag unter schweren Kämpfen bei Wormditt, Heilsberg, Friedland und beiderseits Königsbergs. 54 feindliche Panzer wurden dabei vernichtet.
Die sowjetischen Panzerspitzen und der feindliche Nachschubverkehr wurden auch gestern von unseren Schlacht- und Jagdfliegern angegriffen. 24 Panzer und 21 Geschütze wurden außer Gefecht gesetzt und Hunderte von Fahrzeugen zerstört.
An der kurländischen Front wiesen unsere Truppen zahlreiche Angriffe der Bolschewisten ab.
In Holland wurde die schwache, aus Fallschirmjägern bestehende Besatzung, die seit Woeben einen kleinen Brückenkopf südlich der Maas bei Gertruidenberg gegen weit überlegene feindliche Kräfte tapfer hielt, auf das Nordufer des Flusses zurückgenommen.
Die zahlreichen Angriffe, die die 1. amerikanische und Teile der 3. amerikanischen Armee an der gesamten Front zwischen Monschau und St. Vith auch gestern führten, blieben nach heftigen Kämpfen in der Tiefe unseres Hauptkampffeldes liegen.
Im oberen Elsass konnte der Feind seinen Einbruchsraum östlich und nordöstlich Kolmar etwas erweitern, verlor dabei aber 14 Panzer.
Sturm-Wikinge der Kriegsmarine, die in der Nacht zum 30. Jänner zum Kampf gegen den anglo-amerikanischen Nachschubverkehr an der Schelde-Mündung eingesetzt waren, melden die Versenkung eines Tankers. Darüber hinaus wurden durch unsere tapferen Besatzungen auf der Insel Schouwen fünf schwere Detonationen beobachtet, so dass mit der Versenkung weiterer Schiffe des Feindes durch diesen Einsatz gerechnet werden kann.
In der Herzegowina fügten unsere Truppen bei einem Angriff südlich Mostar dem Gegner hohe blutige Verluste zu. Zahlreiche Panzer und Gebirgsgeschütze wurden erbeutet oder vernichtet. In den Kämpfen, in denen ein beträchtliches Gebiet von den Banden gesäubert wurde, haben sich an der Seite deutscher Kräfte kroatische Verbände besonders ausgezeichnet.
Nordamerikanische Terrorflieger warten am gestrigen Tage Bomben im Großraum von Wien.
Das Fernfeuer auf London wird fortgesetzt.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 1, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
011100A February
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 299
Allied forces have completely cleared the enemy from the island of Kapelscheveer in the Meuse River area east of Geertruindenberg after heavy and prolonged fighting. Farther south, our units continued their attacks northeast of Monschau and have captured Eicherscheid and Imgenbroich.
Between Monschau and the area northeast of Clervaux, we have made general gains, advancing 5,000 yards in some places.
In the forest southeast of Hofen, our forces gained up to 4,000 yards, and pushed 1,000 yards east of Rocherath, through deep snow and occasional minefields. Our infantry elements have crossed the Belgian-German border in a 5,000-yard advance to within a mile west of Udenbreth. Another crossing of the border was made five miles southeast of Büllingen.
East and southeast of St. Vith, our units have taken Setz, Schlierbach, and Lommersweiler, and have cleared the enemy from Steffeshausen, three miles farther south.
In the bridgehead across the Our River, east of Weiswampach, our artillery repulsed an infantry counterattack, and we have advanced to a point one and one-half miles northeast of Welchenhausen, on the east bank of the river.
West of the lower Vosges Mountains and in the northern Alsace, activity was confined to patrolling and exchanges of small arms fire.
Northeast of Strasbourg, we have occupied Gambsheim and Bettenhofen against light resistance.
South of Strasbourg, our forces progressed about four miles to the Rhine-Rhone Canal in the area east of Benfeld.
Our bridgehead south of the Colmar Canal was enlarged with the aid of armor to a depth of approximately three miles. Resistance was spotty.
On the southern edge of the Colmar sector, the enemy continued to defend Cernay and Wittelsheim stubbornly. Violent street fighting has been in progress in both towns.
Weather drastically restricted air operations yesterday.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/
Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others
ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section
NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409
AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
U.S. Navy Department (February 1, 1945)
Communiqué No. 571
Pacific Area.
The minesweepers USS HOVEY (DMS-11) and USS PALMER (DMS-5) and the LST-759 have been lost in the Philippine Area as the result of enemy action.
The next of kin of casualties have been informed.
Communiqué No. 572
The submarine USS GROWLER (SS-215) is overdue from patrol and presumed lost.
Next of kin of officers and crew have been informed.
CINCPOA Press Release No. 2
For Immediate Release
February 1, 1945
Chance Vought Corsair fighter aircraft have successfully completed their first regular operation from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers against the enemy in wartime.
These aircraft, which bear the official Navy designation of F4U‑1D, formed a portion of the fighter aircraft units used in the sustained fleet operations against the Philippines, the coast of French Indochina, the coast of South China, Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, which began on 2 January 1945 (West Longitude Date).
The Corsair squadrons were flown and commanded by officers of the U.S. Marine Corps. Their performance contributed materially to the success which the U.S. Pacific Fleet achieved.
U.S. State Department (February 1, 1945)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Major General Kuter | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Field Marshal Alexander | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Admiral Somerville | |
| Major General Bull | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Major General Anderson | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Hull | ||
| Major General Wood | ||
| Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | ||
| Brigadier General Cabell | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Jacob | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
CCS Minutes
February 1, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
Approval of Minutes of CCS 183rd Meeting
General Marshall said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:
General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments.
Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)
Field Marshal Brooke referred to the amended draft directive contained in CCS 773/1. He suggested that paragraph 4b of this directive should read as follows: “Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.”
It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.
Sir Charles Portal referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7c, which instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security of his front, though it might well be possible to release it after the Germans had withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.
In reply to a question, Sir Charles Portal confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German forces did not retire.
General Marshall said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that the remainder of the directive should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under consideration.
General Marshall said he was not in favor of this proposal.
General Kuter suggested that General Eisenhower might require parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being transferred to him.
General Smith said that General Eisenhower’s first requirement, before any of the land forces, was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.
Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 768/1 until their next meeting.
a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, CCS 452/36)
b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters (CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT))
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36.
General Marshall said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the words “British forces engaged in.” This he felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.
Sir Charles Portal explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36:
Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Alan Brooke said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy recorded in CCS 452/36 and amended in the course of discussion.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of CCS 452/36, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed above (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as CCS 452/37).
b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in CCS 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in CCS 452/37.
c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).
Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)
At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall and Admiral King explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the invasion of the Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration were:
(1) An attack on the Island of Hainan. This had the advantage not only of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations.
(2) An attack on North Borneo. The advantages of such an operation were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready for use.
(3) An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area. This operation was extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us.
When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time, it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.
In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.
With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that with U.S. troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations.
In view of the above considerations, it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.
The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.
The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months’ work could be achieved on this base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok which had previously been used as a base and staging point.
The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.
The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were convoying “civilian-type” supplies to the Maritime Provinces.
To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be under-taken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.
In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.
With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/11.
a. U-Boat Threat (CCS 774/1 and 774/2)
b. Bombing of Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (CCS 774)
General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that CCS 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April.
Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with General Marshall.
Sir Charles Portal, referring to CCS 774, said that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the “marginal effort” should be used against submarine targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it.
He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.
General Kuter said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.
Admiral King said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the action to be taken to counter it.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the Naval Staff would have liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets would in fact pay a more valuable dividend.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered the summary of countermeasures set out in CCS 774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 774/1 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 1945.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a directive based on CCS 774 and CCS 774/2.
Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/5 and 761/6)
In closed session, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of SCAF 180, as amended by SCAF 194 of 31 January, and as amplified by Message No. S-77211 of 31 January to General Smith.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Malta, 1 February 1945
CCS 768/1 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret
Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces
-
In the 183rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the forming of a Greek Army to take over responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAF 841, 25 January 1945.
-
It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or “due in” the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.
-
The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.
-
The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of necessary matériel for:
a. The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions and supporting troops.
b. The Polish 2nd Division.
c. Six Belgium infantry brigades.
d. Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units (Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops.
-
The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.
-
Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.
-
The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as emphasized by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, dated 30 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem.
-
Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.
-
Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review NAF 841 again.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Malta, 31 January 1945
CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret
Allocation of Resources Between India-Burma and China Theaters
-
The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.
-
They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.
-
The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in CCS 308 no longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China rather than of warding off dangers.
-
In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.
The Pittsburgh Press (February 1, 1945)
Rangers rescue Bataan captives in daring raid on Jap prison
Yanks and guerrillas slaughter garrison to liberate 510 on Luzon
By Ralph Teatsorth, United Press staff writer
…