Der Imperialist
…
Führer HQ (January 31, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
In Ungarn blieben feindliche Angriffe zwischen Drau und Plattensee ebenso wie zwischen Plattensee und Donau erfolglos. Im Westteil von Budapest stemmt sich die deutsch-ungarische Besatzung mit bewundernswerter Tapferkeit gegen den schweren Ansturm des Gegners. Im Nordteil wurden die Stellungen auf eine verkürzte Frontlinie zurückgenommen.
An der oberschlesischen Front kam es nur in mehreren Abschnitten zwischen Pless, Ratibor und Brieg zu größeren Gefechten. Südöstlich Rybnik vernichteten unsere Truppen 40 Geschütze und fügten den Sowjets hohe blutige Verluste zu. Bei Ohlau und beiderseits Steinau wurden die aus ihren Oder-Brückenköpfen angreifenden Bolschewisten nach wechselvollen Kämpfen im Gegenangriff aufgefangen.
Starke deutsche Kräfte haben sich aus dem Raum Kalisch zurückgekämpft, nachdem sie, laufend durch Transportverbände der Luftwaffe versorgt, die Masse einer sowjetischen Panzerarmee längere Zeit im Kampf gebunden hatten. Von dort aus stießen sie den südlich Lissa stehenden feindlichen Verbänden in die Flanke und verwehrten ihnen den Übergang über die Oder. Seit dem 18. Jänner vernichtete diese Kampfgruppe über 230 Panzer.
Im Oder-Warthe-Bogen und nördlich der Warthe stehen unsere Truppen in schweren Kämpfen mit nach Westen vordringenden feindlichen Infanterie- und Panzerkräften. Nördlich Flatow und nördlich Krone an der Brahe sind Gegenangriffe gegen die dorthin vorgedrungenen feindlichen Aufklärungsverbände im Gange. An der unteren Weichsel und an der Nogat scheiterten bolschewistische Vorstöße.
Gegen unseren Angriff aus dem Westteil Ostpreußens führten die Sowjets starke Gegenangriffe, die in erbitterten Kämpfen nach Abschuss von 40 Panzern abgeschlagen wurden. Südlich Königsberg warfen Panzergrenadiere den bis an das Frische Haff vorgedrungenen Feind zurück und stellten die vorübergehend verlorengegangene Verbindung zur Stadt wieder her. In schweren Abwehrkämpfen vernichtete die Besatzung von Königsberg 27 feindliche Panzer. Seestreitkräfte unterstützten auch am gestrigen Tage die Kämpfe unserer Truppen an der samländischen Küste.
In Kurland blieben erneute Durchbruchsversuche der Bolschewisten auf Libau ohne Erfolg.
Unsere Jagd- und Schlachtflieger setzten im ungarischen Raum und zwischen den Karpaten und der Ostsee trotz starker Behinderung durch die Wetterlage 29 Panzer und 44 Geschütze außer Gefecht, zerstörten 455 Fahrzeuge und fügten den Sowjets hohe blutige Verluste zu.
Die Kämpfe in der Mitte der Westfront haben auf den Abschnitt von Monschau übergegriffen. Nach heftiger Artillerievorbereitung konnten die dort angreifenden Verbände der 1. amerikanischen Armee in einige Orte eindringen, in denen heftige Kämpfe im Gange sind. Im Forst von Monschau wurde der Gegnerdurch Gegenangriffe aufgefangen oder zurückgedrängt. Beiderseits St. Vith setzte der Feind seine Durchbruchsversuche fort, blieb jedoch im Abwehrfeuer aller Waffen liegen. An der Mosel- und Saarfront und im unteren Elsass verlief der Tag ruhig.
Im Oberelsass versuchte der Gegner erneut, unseren in den Wasgenwald vorspringenden Stellungsbogen von beiden Flanken her abzuschneiden. Von seinen aus dem Abschnitt von Grußenheim nach Osten vorstoßenden Panzern wurde die Hälfte vernichtet. Am Kolmarkanal konnte der Feind seine örtlichen Brückenköpfe etwas erweitern. Nördlich Mülhausen und im Gebiet von Sennheim scheiterte der zum Durchbruch nach Norden ansetzende Feind an der tapferen Gegenwehr unserer Truppen unter schweren Verlusten. Eingebrochener Gegner wurde im Gegenstoß wieder geworfen.
Anglo-amerikanische Tiefflieger griffen west- und südwestdeutsches Gebiet an und fügten der Zivilbevölkerung Verluste zu.
Das Vergeltungsfeuer auf London dauert an.
U.S. State Department (January 31, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| General of the Army Marshall | Major General Anderson | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Captain McDill | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Captain Stroop | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Dean | |
| Major General Bull | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Hull | Colonel Cary | |
| Major General Wood | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Floriana, January 31, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of Minutes of the CCS 182nd Meeting
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of the Conclusions of the CCS 182nd Meeting and approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)
General Marshall said that the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 761/4 had been presented at the 182nd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (30 January 1945) and discussed at that time. He called on General Bull for any additional comments he might wish to make at this time.
General Bull said that immediately following the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, General Smith had dispatched a telegram to General Eisenhower outlining certain changes that had been recommended in his plan, and that General Eisenhower’s reply was expected to arrive shortly. There was nothing that he could add until General Eisenhower’s views had been received.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the foregoing statement.
Planning Date for End of War with Germany (CCS 772 and JCS 1239)
General Marshall said that CCS 772, the British memorandum on this subject, had been presented at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 182nd Meeting (30 January 1945). Action had been deferred pending consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Staff Planners had studied the British proposals and now recommend in JCS 1239 that action on CCS 772 relative to the planning date for the end of the war with Germany be deferred until the end of the tripartite conversations at ARGONAUT.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff defer action on CCS 772 until the conclusion of ARGONAUT.
Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 762; JCS 1236 and JCS 1236/1; CCS 773)
General Marshall said that JCS 1236 contains an examination and discussion by the Joint Staff Planners of Allied strategy in Italy in the light of recent developments, and of the issues raised by the Supreme Allied Commander in CCS 762, with a view to establishing the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff as to operations in Italy. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions and the proposed directive in JCS 1236 as the basis for discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this point considered an advance copy of a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing a draft directive to SACMED, later circulated as CCS 773.
General Marshall drew attention to the proposal to withdraw 6 British, Canadian and American divisions from Italy for use in France. It was his opinion that only British and Canadian divisions should be withdrawn, and that the number should be reduced to five.
Admiral King concurred with General Marshall. He felt that, in the event of a flareup in the Balkans, the British would undoubtedly desire to withdraw additional British divisions for use in that area and that this contingency should not be overlooked.
General Kuter pointed out that the draft directive proposed by the British stated specifically that no tactical air forces were to be withdrawn. He considered it essential that a suitable proportion of the 12th Air Force should accompany the ground divisions to France.
General Marshall felt that before a decision was taken on the proposed directive, General McNarney’s views should be sought. He proposed a telegram for this purpose.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed and agreed upon certain amendments to the British directive.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the message to General McNarney proposed by General Marshall.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft a memorandum embodying the agreed amendments to the British directive with a view to its circulation after the receipt of General McNarney’s views.
a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35)
b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters (JCS 1238)
General Marshall said that the British Chiefs of Staff had presented a memorandum on operations in Southeast Asia Command in CCS 452/35, which contained a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia.
In JCS 1238 the Joint Staff Planners had examined strategy in the Southeast Asia Command, India-Burma and China theaters in the light of recent developments and the recommendations of General Sultan and General Wedemeyer with a view to the formulation of a policy for guidance of this Conference.
After discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in JCS 1238, subject to the amendment of the memorandum in Appendix “A” as agreed during the discussion. (Appendix “A” subsequently circulated as CCS 452/36).
Estimate of the Enemy Situation – Europe (CCS 660/3)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of CCS 660/3.
Bombing of U-Boat Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (JCS 1219/1)
General Marshall said that JCS 1219/1 contained a study by the Joint Staff Planners of the possible resurgence of U-boat activity against North Atlantic shipping.
Admiral King felt that the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz was satisfactory but appeared to be drawn up on rather general lines.
Admiral Duncan explained that the directive had been purposely prepared in this manner after a discussion of the present air directive under which the bomber forces were operating.
General Anderson explained that the present bombing directive had been drawn up to indicate certain priorities which included petroleum reserves and the installations of the German Air Force. Bombing of these objectives had definite bearing on the overall effort. The destruction of petroleum reserves had the effect of cutting down the activities of the German Air Force, and slowing down the submarine and training programs. Certain areas were selected for each operation and at daily meetings targets were selected to take advantage of current opportunities. The general directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and bases.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in JCS 1219/1 (Subsequently circulated as CCS 774).
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (January 31, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
311100A January
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 298
Allied forces attacking in the vicinity of Simmerath, northeast of Monschau, made gains of one to three miles to reach Kesternich and capture Konzen.
We have taken Rohren, two miles east of Monschau, in an advance of 3,000 yards against increasing resistance.
East of Malmedy, we have taken Wirtzfeld and have pushed on to Rocherath and Krinkelt, where fighting is in progress against stiffening opposition. East of Büllingen, our infantry made gains of 3,000 yards against moderate resistance to take Murrignen. The towns of Hünningen and Honsfeld also are in our hands. Farther to the south, we have cleared the enemy from Holzheim and have gained one mile northeast of the town.
South of St. Vith, our units are fighting in the vicinity of Steffeshausen, east of the Our River near the Belgian-German border. Farther to the south, we have cleared the German town of Welchenhausen, on the east bank of the Our River. Our patrols are along the west bank of the river in the area east and southeast of Clervaux.
Weather curtailed air operations yesterday, however, rail and road transport, communications and troops in a triangular area formed by Heidelberg, Karlsruhe and Stuttgart, were attacked by fighter-bombers. Included among the targets hit were railway yards at Bruchsal, road and rail bridges in the areas of Heilbronn and Pforzheim, and troops and horse drawn artillery in the Karlsruhe and Pforzheim areas.
From the Saarbrücken area to the Rhine in northern Alsace, activity was confined to patrolling, minor exchanges of small arms and scattered artillery fire.
Northeast of Colmar, our forces gained more than a mile after crossing the Colmar Canal, and entered Horbourg-Wihr, Bischwihr and Muntzenheim. Southeast of Bischwihr, stiff resistance was met in the vicinity of Fortschwihr, where hard fighting is in progress. East and southeast of Fortschwihr, fighter-bombers struck at the fortified city of Düren and villages of Enzen and Widensolen, road junctions west of the Rhine-Rhone Canal.
On the southern edge of the Colmar sector, local gains tightened the ring around Cernay. Farther east, we have reached the outskirts Wittelsheim and have entered the town.
Fighter-bombers destroyed a pontoon bridge over the Rhine northeast of Mulhouse.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/
Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others
ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section
NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409
AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Major General Kuter | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Smith | Field Marshal Alexander | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Admiral Somerville | |
| Major General Bull | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Major General Hull | Air Marshal Robb | |
| Major General Anderson | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Wood | ||
| Brigadier General Cabell | ||
| Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Jacob | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Colonel Peck | Commander Coleridge |
CCS Minutes
Floriana, January 31, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
Approval of Minutes of CCS 182nd Meeting
Sir Alan Brooke referred to the record of General Bull’s statement contained in the fourth paragraph of item 4 of the minutes. He had not understood that there was any question about operation GRENADE not being launched. He had, on the other hand, understood that operation VERITABLE was dependent on operation GRENADE. Was it visualized that VERITABLE would have to await the launching of GRENADE?
General Smith explained that General Bradley was endeavoring to advance on the Prüm-Bonn axis. If this advance succeeded in reaching Euskirchen quickly, it would be equally effective in assisting operation VERITABLE as would operation GRENADE. VERITABLE was not, however, dependent on either operation. General Eisenhower was at present at General Bradley’s headquarters and was now deciding whether or not to cancel General Bradley’s operations and shift forces north in order to undertake GRENADE instead.
General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.
General Smith said that it was his personal opinion that it would probably be necessary to stop General Bradley’s operations and to launch operation GRENADE.
General Marshall pointed out that if General Bradley’s operations could achieve their objective in time there were certain advantages since the troops were already in position.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 182nd Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
Operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 773)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 773).
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that the right course of action was to reinforce the decisive Western Front at the expense of the Mediterranean Theater which, of necessity, would then have to revert to the offensive-defensive in Italy. There was now no question of operations aimed at the Ljubljana Gap and in any event the advance of the left wing of the Russian Army made such an operation no longer necessary.
General Marshall stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not yet in a position to give their final views on the draft directive, particularly with reference to possible moves of part of the Twelfth Air Force. However, there were certain United States proposals which he would like to put to the British Chiefs of Staff at once. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggested the following amendments: In paragraph 2 the substitution of the word “British” for “our” wherever it occurred; in paragraph 4 the substitution of “five” for “six” divisions; in paragraph 5, first sentence, the deletion of the words “United States” and “in equal proportions.”
General Marshall explained that it was felt wiser to leave the Fifth Army intact as a well-balanced organic force, and that it would be preferable to reinforce France with British and Canadian divisions in order to increase the strength of Field Marshal Montgomery’s army.
The United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to the removal of three divisions, British or Canadian, at once, and the remainder as soon as they could be released from Greece, since this was the only way of finding the additional forces required. The question of the equipment of Greek forces had also been considered, since on this depended the release of the British divisions now in that country, but this was a complicated problem which he would like to consider further. The United States proposal was therefore that five divisions, two of which should be Canadian and the remainder British, should eventually be moved to France. With regard to the transfer of these forces, a preliminary study went to show that use of air transport could expedite the transfer of at least the first two divisions. He felt that if motor transport could be provided for these divisions from the United Kingdom, the date by which they would be available for operations in France would be greatly expedited.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff originally estimated that six divisions could be spared from the theater. With regard to their nationality, there were obviously great advantages in moving the Canadian divisions to enable them to join up with the remainder of the Canadian forces in France. He was prepared to agree that the remaining divisions should be British. He felt it right to accept five divisions as a basis and this figure could be reconsidered later in the light of the situation.
Field Marshal Alexander said that the Canadian divisions were the easiest to move quickly; one was already out of the line and could be moved at once and the other approximately a fortnight later. He pointed out, however, that it would be difficult to find suitable British divisions since all were now in the line and they had been involved in hard fighting for a long period. He had no reserve divisions. He outlined the composition of the forces available to him in the Mediterranean Theater.
Sir Alan Brooke felt it unwise to go into the details of the formations to be moved at this stage. He accepted the United States proposals in principle. Two Canadian and one British divisions could be moved first and the remaining two British divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had in mind to propose the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the Twelfth Tactical Air Force to include five fighter groups, one light bomber group, one reconnaissance unit, and two squadrons of night fighters. These air forces would be used to assist the First French Army and the Seventh United States Army.
Field Marshal Alexander pointed out that if land formations were removed from him, it was all the more desirable to keep as much air power as possible in the theater. If it was absolutely necessary to withdraw air forces from him, he was most anxious that the United States medium and light bombers should not be taken, since British air forces in Italy were weak in those particular types.
General Smith said that he was not asking for light bombers to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean Theater to Northwest Europe.
General Anderson pointed out that the greatest need was for fighter-bombers. The Southern Group of Armies had been robbed of these in order to strengthen the northern forces. He felt that if the Mediterranean Theater was passing to the defensive and the troops were being transferred to Northwest Europe, then the appropriate air components should, if possible, accompany them. The main deficiencies in Northwest Europe were in P-47s which could be used as either fighters or fighter-bombers.
General Kuter explained that the proposal to move the 47th Light Bomber Group from Italy had been made in view of the fact that it was trained for night intruder work which it was felt would be of more value in Northwest Europe than in Italy.
General Smith said that he would be delighted to accept this group but only if Field Marshal Alexander could spare it. He was as concerned as Field Marshal Alexander himself as to the security of the Italian Front.
Field Marshal Alexander said that if General Smith would give him his minimum requirements, he would do his utmost to meet them.
General Smith said that the five fighter-bomber groups were his minimum requirement for France and the light bombers, though desirable, were not essential.
Field Marshal Alexander undertook to examine this proposal at once and to release these forces if this proved at all possible. He fully realized that if his theater was to go on the defensive it was his duty to give up all possible resources, provided only that his front remained reasonably secure.
General Smith said that he was entirely prepared to leave the final decision to Field Marshal Alexander.
Sir Alan Brooke referred to NAF 841 in which Field Marshal Alexander had requested approval to the equipment of certain additional Greek forces. He (Sir Alan Brooke) was most anxious that a decision on this proposal should be reached before the Combined Chiefs of Staff left Malta since such a decision would greatly accelerate the dates at which the British divisions could be released from Greece.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.
Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/3 and 761/4)
Sir Alan Brooke said the British Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the Supreme Commander’s operations as explained by General Smith and recorded in the minutes of the 182nd Meeting. This explanation, however, was not in complete accord with the proposals put forward in SCAF 180. The British Chiefs of Staff therefore were not prepared to approve SCAF 180 as at present drafted.
General Smith then presented a redraft of the Supreme Commander’s plan as contained in paragraph 21 of SCAF 180. This redraft was designed to bring the Supreme Commander’s proposals into line with his previous explanation of SCAF 180.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.
Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany (CCS 772)
General Marshall said that he felt it wiser to defer consideration of this item until after discussion with the Russian General Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject until the conclusion of ARGONAUT
a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35 and 452/36)
b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/35 had put forward a new draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia.
General Marshall said that he felt that the question of a directive to the Supreme Commander should be linked with the problem of the allocation of resources between the India-Burma and China Theaters. He drew attention to a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 452/36) which, while concurring in the directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, linked this directive to an understanding as to the allocation of United States resources to the Southeast Asia Command. He felt that the situation was developing to a point where the resources of the China and Burma-India Theaters would be separated. U.S. resources required for China would not be available for operations in Malaysia. It was important that Admiral Mountbatten should be in no doubt as to the circumstances under which United States forces were available to him.
General Wedemeyer had recently estimated that some three squadrons of fighters would be required to protect the air route to China and had further implied that he was prepared to accept the responsibility of protecting with Chinese or United States troops the northern part of the Burma Road. This would, of course, relieve Admiral Mountbatten of these responsibilities. The situation was developing rapidly and the Japanese might well hold out in the Rangoon area in order to deny us that port but, in a matter of weeks, the Japanese sea communications to Burma, Malaysia and the Netherlands East Indies would be cut by air operations out of the Philippines. This would materially reduce Admiral Mountbatten’s problems. Further, it would soon be possible to transfer more power to China, not so much additional tonnage but the all-important transport vehicles and light and medium artillery. The striking power then available to us on the far side of the Hump would be very different from that which we now had.
Summing up, General Marshall said that the proposed directive to Admiral Mountbatten was acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided it was communicated to Admiral Mountbatten together with the policy with regard to the employment of United States forces outlined in CCS 452/36.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the phrase “with the forces at present at your disposal” contained in paragraph 3 of the draft directive was inserted in order to make it clear to Admiral Mountbatten that he should not undertake operations which could not be carried out without an increased allocation of resources.
Sir Charles Portal asked for clarification of the meaning of the United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum (CCS 452/36). Did this memorandum imply that, although Admiral Mountbatten could use for approved operations in Burma United States forces not required in China, such forces would not be available to him for use in Malaya?
General Marshall said that the memorandum was meant to make it quite clear that the employment of United States forces outside Burma must be the subject of fresh agreement and that Admiral Mountbatten must not be led to assume that they would be available to him.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 452/36 pending further study by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Estimate of the Enemy Situation – Europe (CCS 660/3)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS 660/3.
Bombing of U-Boat Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (CCS 774)
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that he would prefer to consider this memorandum at the same time as the paper he was putting forward with regard to the U-boat threat.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 774 pending study by the British Chiefs of Staff.
The Pittsburgh Press (January 31, 1945)
7 divisions push toward Siegfried Line
Starting point of Nazi drive passed by Yanks
…
Japs on Bataan isolated by new American invasion
Eighth Army troops drive to base of Luzon Peninsula after bloodless landing
…
Hitler threatens bloodbath for ‘cowardice’ in Reich
Serves notice Nazis will fight on and show no mercy to Germans who waver
LONDON, England (UP) – Adolf Hitler’s 12th anniversary speech was seen today as a warning that Germany will fight on – even after the fall of Berlin – regardless of consequences for as long as his Nazi regime can control the army and restless hordes of war workers.
He served notice that the Nazi government will show no mercy toward any who waver from the policy of resistance to the end. The public execution of the deputy mayor of Breslau “for cowardice,” as announced by the Berlin radio, was believed symbolic of bloodbaths to come, perhaps already underway.
Hitler spoke for 16 minutes last night over the Berlin radio in commemoration of the start of his 13th year as ruler of Germany. The decision to speak was apparently made at the last moment, for Nazi broadcasts less than 24 hours earlier said the Fuehrer was too busy with the military situation to speak.
Listeners familiar with Hitler’s voice said they were certain that it was the Fuehrer speaking, though he sounded tired and omitted rhetorical outbursts of his heyday.
He pledged Germany to “wield the sword, no matter where and under what circumstances until final victory crowns our efforts.” Those who would “stab the nation in the back out of cowardice or lack of character will definitely and under all circumstances die ingloriously,” he warned.
Will stop at nothing
He said:
Whatever our enemies may devise, whatever suffering they may inflict on German towns, German provinces and especially on German people, it pales compared with the unimaginable misery and distress which would befall us if the plutocratic Bolshevist conspiracy should become victorious…
For this reason, we are even more determined to save our people in this struggle from this most horrible fate and we are determined to stop at nothing and to follow steadfastly and loyally the commandment of the self-preservation of our nation.
Hitler appealed for every man, woman and child in the Reich, the ailing as well as the healthy, to come to the aid of the Reich against the Red Army.
Stake life and soul
He said:
I expect every German to do his duty to the last. I expect him to render every sacrifice demanded of him.
From the healthy, I expect that they should stake they very life and soul in this struggle.
From the ailing and from those who cannot be spared for other reasons, I expect that they should work to the last ounce of their strength.
Of our town dwellers, I expect that they shall forge the weapons for the struggle.
From the farmer, I expect restriction of his own consumption to the utmost possible limits so that he can furnish bread for the soldiers and the workers engaged in this struggle.
I expect all women and girls to support this struggle with the utmost fanaticism as before.
Crisis will be mastered
However grave the German crisis may be at the moment, Hitler said, “it will finally be mastered by our unalterable will, by our readiness for sacrifice and by our abilities.”
He predicted that Britain not only “will fail to tame Bolshevism, but her own line of development will run more and more on the lines of this disintegrating disease.”
He said:
They will never get rid of the specters which they raised from the steppes of Asia. All small European nations which, believing in the promises of the Allies, capitulated, now face complete extinction.
From 3 months to 5 years –
16 babies die as fire levels boarding house used by war workers
Screams of victims awaken neighborhood – parents file silently through funeral home
…
Japs report deaths of 5 more generals
By the United Press
The Japanese Domei Agency today reported the deaths of five more Jap Army generals, bringing to 28 the number who have died since May 23, 1944. The Domei dispatch was recorded by FCC monitors.