Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 10:30 a.m.
On board HMS Sirius in Grand Harbor, Malta
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Mr. Matthews | Sir Alexander Cadogan | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Butler | |
| Mr. Hiss | Mr. Dixon |
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
February 1, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Concrete Proposals on the Polish Question
Territorial Problems
We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish frontier in the east which should run along the Curzon Line in the north and central section, and in the southern section should follow generally the eastern frontier line of the Lwow Province. This would give to Poland the Polish city of Lwow and the economically important oil fields. This frontier would correspond generally with one of the suggested frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council.
In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.
If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out if these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Neisse Line.
Political Problems
The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason, without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and without causing the most serious repercussions in American public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of representative members of all important Polish political parties. This new interim government should not be in the form of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a solution might be an agreement at this meeting to set up a Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers (four if France would be included) with appointment of an interim Polish Government composed of the representatives of leading Polish political parties. This Presidential Council might be composed of Bierut, the present head of the Lublin Government, and a small number of Poles from inside Poland taken from the following list: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos – one of the leaders of the Polish Peasant Party and a former Prime Minister, Zulowski, a Socialist leader, Bishop Lukomski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba.
This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.
Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making up this government would, of course, be certain present members of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in particular Mikolajczyk.
U.K. Delegation Memorandum
February 1, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Allied (Soviet) Control Commissions in Bulgaria and Hungary
HMG regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary,” and HMG suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11, 1944.
HMG also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.
During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities, HMG wish to ensure that:
a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commission. They should also have the right of direct access to the satellite authorities.
b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commissions should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of the satellite countries through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Governments or taking action which are not approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.
c) The extent to which the British and the Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commissions will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.
d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commissions on the spot.
Roumania
HMG have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned HMG considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by HMG that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, HMG can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.