Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners
Québec, 18 August 1943.
Secret
Enclosure to CCS 317
| References: | a. CCS 288; CCS 288/1; CCS 288/2. |
| b. CCS 104th Meeting, Item 3. |
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals
The problem
To consider the requirements for materiel for equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals, and the determination of basic policies which will govern the meeting of such requirements.
Discussion
During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for equipping 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry). By 1 September 1943, the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.
General Eisenhower has recommended (radio BOSCO-IN-21, 13 Aug 1943) (Appendix “A”) that equipment for remaining French troops be accelerated in a manner that would provide for a total of four armored and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations advises that such a program would satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference. The requisite equipment can be made available to meet such requirements without prejudice to currently directed operations, i.e., BOLERO/SICKLE, and operations in the Pacific It should be noted, however, that approximately 60% of the equipment required must be withheld from advance shipments to the United Kingdom, to be made up prior to departure of United Kingdom units concerned. This can be done.
During the first four to five months following an initial assault on the continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for the buildup and maintenance of the United Nations forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months will be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of French Army units on the continent and their initial employment. Thus, it would appear that no continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the initial assault.
Balkan forces are capable of mounting approximately six modified divisions and supporting troops (175,000) (Appendix “B”). They should be supplied with captured German and Italian equipment, if available, inasmuch as they are familiar therewith, and their strategic position does not further substantiate commitments from other sources.
It is assumed that Polish forces will continue to fight with the British and they need not be considered as sacrificed by non-support of the Polish “Secret Army” as an organized unit. Moreover, the formation of Polish divisions and brigades can only be accomplished after the fall of Germany, at which time existence of a formal Polish Army for the defeat of Germany would not be necessary (Appendix “C”).
In respect to equipping the Turkish forces, it is presumed that this program will not extend beyond that envisaged at TRIDENT. In view of the apparent inability of the Turkish forces to properly assimilate, maintain, and train with such equipment as has been provided to them, it is questionable as to whether the political benefits that would accrue from furnishing any further equipment would outweigh the advisability of retaining such equipment for other purposes.
The aggregate strengths of forces which might be available to the United Nations and which are now located in Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland totals about 150,000 men (Appendix “D”). Since potential forces in none of these countries constitutes a force which of itself could carry out extensive offensive operations, it is assumed that such forces would be available only for garrison and interior guard duty.
It is the opinion of the War Shipping Administration that cargo shipping captured should be operated for rehabilitation and support of the occupied country. This policy will reduce shipping load on United Nations and will save the time and expense of repair and rehabilitation of vessels in U.S. ports. Personnel vessels should be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.
Recommendations
It is recommended that:
a. The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 Aug. 1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September-31 December 1943.
b. Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio of 13 August 1943.
c. Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or guard duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. Equipment to be furnished through CG, ETO, for Northern France and through CG, NATO, for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished as far as practicable from captured German and Italian items.
d. In accordance with CCS 303/3, Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (par. 6d and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the Balkans will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be limited to 175,000 men (six divisions and supporting troops).
e. No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement that all material must be flown in will limit the forces that can be equipped to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions). This is to be a British commitment.
f. The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional equipment.
g. Equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low Countries be limited to basic individual equipment for a total force aggregating 150,000 men, together with certain categories of light infantry weapons and light motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces to be equipped as soon as operations by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of Norway, Holland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The Balkans to be equipped through CG, NATO.
h. That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs c to g, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war matériel.
i. That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war matériel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs a, b and d above, be considered to be a responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs c, e, f, and g to be considered as a responsibility of the United Kingdom.
j. Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable, to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.
Appendix “A”
Secret
Rearmament of the French
During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for the equipping of 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry).
By 1 September 1943 the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.
a. By radiogram W7177 (BOSCO-IN-21, 13 August 1943), the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, recommends that equipment for the remaining French troops be provided as follows:
| September, 1943 | One infantry and one armored division (less certain units) |
| October, 1943 | One infantry division |
| November, 1943 | One infantry division |
| December, 1943 | One armored division |
Equipment for supporting and service units to be provided on a proportionate basis for each month.
b. The proposal outlined in a above will provide for a total of four armored (on a slightly reduced scale) and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, advises that this, considering also the Koenig Division, which was equipped by the British, will satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference.
Equipment, allowing minor substitutions, can be made available to meet the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above, provided that priority above that for pre-shipments to the United Kingdom is granted. About 60% of the equipment for French units would necessarily be withheld from pre-shipment to the United Kingdom. These shortages can be made up in time to equip U.K. units prior to departure. Provision of this equipment will not prejudice currently directed operations in the Pacific, BOLERO, or SICKLE. Any equipment left behind by U.S. divisions transferred from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom will be credited against this requirement. Shipping can be made available as requested by General Eisenhower (180,000 ship tons in September and 150,000 ship tons per month, October, November, and December).
The provision of equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph 5 [3?] above, will satisfy the United States obligation of the Casablanca Conference. There is no further known requirement for equipment for French units from United States sources. During the first four to five months following the initial assault on the Continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for build-up of the combat forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months would be required between the start of reorganization and re-equipment of French Army units on the Continent, and their initial employment. Thus, it would appear that no Continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the assault.
Certain resistance groups in France are being equipped by air delivery with small arms. This is a British commitment. Any demands on the United States for weapons or equipment for this purpose will be negligible.
It may be necessary to clothe and equip local defense units organized in France after the invasion is well under way. Arms for such units would undoubtedly be limited to small arms and light weapons. It is believed that any such equipment should be provided from and limited to that available from captured enemy (Italian) supplies, and should not be set up as an obligation of the United States Government.
Appendix “B”
Secret
Balkans
The Balkan guerrilla forces are estimated to number around 175,000; however, some estimates have placed this figure as high as 300,000. The former figure is based on recent intelligence reports and is considered to be reliable. These forces are divided into several political groups, operating independently, the strongest of which is General Mihailovitch’s Chetniks. However, it is doubtful that even he can command the loyalty of more than 175,000 to 200,000 men.
In addition to these forces, recent radio report from the Mediterranean Theater quotes a Yugoslavian representative as being desirous of establishing a training corps, on the fall of Italy, in some Italian territory, preferably Sicily, to consist of 30,000 to 40,000 Yugoslavian prisoners of war now in Italy. The State Department is very emphatic in the opinion that a maximum of 6,500 Yugoslavian and 1,800 Greek prisoners of war will be liberated on the fall of Italy, and that any claims of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in excess of this figure would constitute an attempt to create a Free Yugoslav Army to lend national prestige in peace conference negotiations. The liberated prisoners of war available therefore appear to be relatively insignificant in comparison to the tangible guerrilla forces, and, moreover, the time that would be consumed in training such a force would render them valueless in the conquest of Germany.
In the past, supply of these forces has been effected by the British Middle East Command, in some 100 scattered sorties, dropping only the bare essentials of medical supplies, etc. Their principal needs are machine guns, light (horse) artillery and medical supplies.
The supply of equipment to the Balkans therefore devolves to a consideration of furnishing an equivalent of the requirements for a force commensurate with the 175,000 guerrillas.
Equipment to be supplied to the Balkans should be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport. The latter method must supplement the former before any substantial amount of equipment can be made available to a force aggregating 175,000 men.
Appendix “C”
Secret
Polish Forces
Polish forces in the U.K. consist of approximately 40,000 men, including one armored division, one parachute brigade, 13 air squadrons and some light naval vessels. In the Middle East, Polish forces contain about 73,000 men, including two infantry divisions, one tank brigade, and corps troops. In both of the above elements, the supply of materiel and equipment has been from British sources, including some lend-lease transactions, and the supply status of each is approximately 75% complete.
There is an additional Polish force of approximately 65,000 men, in the occupied territory, known as the “Secret Army.” Various estimates of this force have run as high as 300,000 men, however the former figure is based on U.S. Army Intelligence information and is considered to be reliable. In addition to supplying the Polish forces in the U.K. and Middle East, the British have occasionally dropped small quantities of explosives, and communications equipment, to this “Secret Army,” from the air.
Supply of the forces in the U.K. and Middle East having been undertaken by the British (these elements are now a part of British forces in the respective area), the equipping of Polish forces evolves to the requirements of the “Secret Army.” This requirement amounts to equipment for an equivalent of fifty infantry battalions which must be flown in, and would require an estimated 500 sorties initially. The Polish Genera] Staff estimates this force could fight in isolation for about 20 days and its continued existence would depend on a break through contact by other Allied Forces within that time.
The Polish plan further envisages the transporting of the U.K. and Middle East Forces into Poland by air after the break through contact with the “Secret Army” has been established. These, with other liberated Polish Forces, would be organized into 16 infantry divisions and six dismounted cavalry brigades. This latter phase is not considered as advantageous inasmuch as the effect of it cannot be realized until such time as it is no longer needed.
It is clear that sabotage and intelligence operations are desirable and the operation of 50 rifle battalions will considerably aid in this activity, as well as occupy the attention of considerable German forces. However, current intelligence digests indicate Russia will violently oppose any arming of the Poles in Poland due to the well-known Polish-Russian enmity.
To support this operation, including supply of initial equipment, would require some 2,000 sorties by heavy transport planes and this air lift cannot be spared without seriously affecting other operations.
Appendix “D”
Secret
Norway, Low Countries
In giving consideration to the possible need for supplying equipment and matériel to the forces of free neutrals of nations at present occupied by Axis forces and which might come within the scope of possibly having to be rearmed by the United Nations, estimates have been confined to Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. The table which follows indicates (on the basis of informal estimates furnished by a representative of the Joint Intelligence Committee) the strengths of the armed forces of each nation at or about the time each became involved in the war, as well as the indicated potential strengths of that portion of the manpower of each nation which might be available for reequipment, rearming, training and service in the event of a United Nations reoccupation:
| Country | Estimated Strength at Outbreak of War | Possible Strength To Be Equipped |
|---|---|---|
| Norway | 17,000 | 40,000* |
| Denmark | 11,000 | 10,000† |
| Belgium | 650,000 | 50,000* |
| Holland | 400,000 | 50,000* |
| — | ||
| 150,000 |
From the above table it is apparent that the aggregate strength of the forces which might be available for rearming in all of these countries totals 150,000 troops. Since potential forces in none of these countries constitute a force which of itself could carry out extended offensive operations, it is presumed that such forces would be supplied only to the extent of basic individual equipment, together with certain categories of small arms and light motor vehicles. Considering the reequipment of all of these nations as a complete total requirement, and assuming that such reequipment would not take place until, at the earliest, sometime after 1 January 1944 (the estimated date on which the rearming of the French forces as presently contemplated would be completed), it is not considered that any great problem of supply would be involved and that quantities of the requisite materiel could be made available without unduly affecting the equipment status of American forces.
Assuming (for conservative purposes) that the reequipment of all of these countries would be coincidental, which of course would not be the case, a total maximum shipping requirement of some six to eight ships might be required but this could be made available without any effect on the BOLERO/SICKLE operation or operations as presently contemplated and planned for the South and Southwest Pacific areas.
It is, of course, obvious that a determination must be made at the earliest practicable moment in the event any or all of these countries, or any contiguous countries, are to be reequipped and rearmed. Such plans must indicate the approximate date on which rearming and reequipping would be required and, in general, the type force that it would be considered advisable to rearm and reequip for each country with the forces available to it and the nature of operations in which it is contemplated such forces might become engaged, i.e., garrison and police duty, or actual components of an offensive fighting force. It is also essential that a determination be made at the earliest practicable date as to how much equipment would be supplied and the source of the equipment.
†For police purposes only.
*Estimated on basis of ability to form and train units upon liberation.
