Austrian Archduke rejected by Army
…
Wolfert: Japanese lag in developing battle areas
Failure to improve roads hampered attacks on Guadalcanal
By Ira Wolfert
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Terrific artillery barrage massacres Japs on ridge
Infantry follows up to take care of those who escaped rain of shells in New Guinea
By Hal O’Flaherty
…
British arrive in U.S. to help map Jap drives
Special military-naval-air mission pledges cooperation
…
Little incidents at Québec –
Bickel: Churchill works at night, Roosevelt is early riser
And between the two, you see, they keep the Axis jittery with an around-the-clock attack
By Karl A. Bickel, Scripps-Howard staff writer
Québec, Canada –
There is an amiable and rather distinguished lamp post just to the left of the cavern-like entrance to the Château Frontenac that has become a center of journalistic interest here of late and where in consequence practically a continuous press conference is held.
The lamp post observed today:
Everything that I say is entirely on the record and based upon careful study of the best trends, military, naval and economic, as I have observed them drift in and out of the Château over the past 48 hours.
Thereupon the lamp post expounds the situation.
It is out of material no deeper than that the reports on plots and plans and intrigues developing out of the three-man conversations in the long rooms inside the old Citadel on the hill emanate. To date, Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill and King have been at it, off and on, for something over 50 hours and little incidents do escape.
Churchill works late
Mr. Churchill, it develops, does his best thinking after midnight and loves to roam about his suite mulling over his plans, checking on maps and papers, comfortably enwrapped in a big dressing gown and smoking one of those terrific cigars that alone would lay most men out. If it is at all possible, he loves to break into the Roosevelt bedroom some hour after 1 a.m. and try out a sudden inspiration on the presidential mind. The grapevine has it that if there is any one thing that could cause a rift of irritation between the two great men, it’s occasioned by these early morning impulses on the part of the Prime Minister.
On the other hand, Mr. Roosevelt, it is said, works best in the early morning hours and thus when the Prime Minister emerges from his quarters later in the morning, the President is all set for him. And so, between the two and with the active support of Mr. King and Mr. Eden, an around-the-clock psychological attack upon the Axis is maintained.
Work when they praise
Early in the day, a procession of generals, admirals, political and economic experts and others file out of the Château for Mr. Roosevelt’s headquarters. Before 8 o’clock, the President is receiving them, getting compact memorandums that he is so insistent upon, checking up points that arouse his interest, indicating new lines for further investigation. Newcomers appear as the earlier groups are disposed of, and until noon, the President is busy receiving and absorbing information he needs for later conferences with Churchill, King and Eden.
There is not set time for the conferences between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt. The two are housed together in the Citadel and their apartments open into the same general living quarters.
They do their work as they like and then wander into the general quarters and meet. Whenever they meet, the conference is on.
There is a feeling here that the conference is developing into a much bigger thing than was originally planned. Earlier thought that it was primarily to cover the Pacific area must be discarded because it is obviously covering the whole field of conflict today and the evolution of that conflict tomorrow.
It is obvious too that Russia is much in the minds of the two men, and while Joseph Stalin is not in the comfortable living rooms of the Citadel in person, he is there in fact every moment of the day.
Although no hint is given as to future plans for a direct contact with the Russian leader, it is felt that it is inevitable that such a meeting must follow this one and soon. And that if it is held, it will probably be in Moscow.
Russians ask second front talks – ‘soon’
‘And action must follow,’ Moscow newspaper’s editorial says
Moscow, USSR (UP) –
The authoritative political review War and the Working Class said today that a British-Soviet-American conference called for the avowed purposes of solving the question most important to the Soviet Union – the second front – would be most welcome, but must not be “just another conference.”
Saying that the time had come “to pass from words to action,” the review declared editorially that while the Québec Conferences consolidated the British and American bloc:
Québec, as can be seen from the number of its participants, does not yet express the viewpoint of the whole Anglo-Soviet-American coalition.
The statement was the first authoritative comment here on the Québec Conference since the TASS News Agency announced that Russia was not invited.
‘Must solve problems’
The review said:
Many people who are seriously worried about necessity of intensifying the war effort of all three countries and who are truly interested in the common cause, raise the question of a conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States.
Of course, such a conference must not be just another conference after which the most important problems, as the fight against Hitlerite Germany, will remain unsolved.
‘Way for early victory’
Presently when quick decisive actions are particularly necessary, a conference of the three powers should decide the principal and most urgent question – a question of shortening the war.
The publication maintained that the military situation was such that the coalition could accomplish a victory over Germany and its vassals this year, but said postponement of the second front in Europe until next year would prolong the war and “once more put off the collapse of Hitlerite Germany.”
‘Lost’ bomber crew safe after six days
…
U.S. increases China strength
‘Sufficiency’ promised for blow at Japan
…
Editorial: The Québec question
Inclusion of Secretary of State Hull and Foreign Minister Eden in the Anglo-American war conference is welcome proof that delayed problems of foreign political policy will be faced jointly. That most of them will be solved – or indeed can be solved without the presence of other Allies – is too much to expect. But at least more political unity between London and Washington can be achieved on French, Italian and Russian questions, to mention only a few; and that is the necessary beginning for larger Allied agreement.
The Nazi propaganda radio now blatantly extends the feelers for a fake peace which Berlin and Rome have been making less publicly for months, particularly since the fall of Mussolini. The danger that the Axis in losing the war will win the peace, by a convenient change of color and other hocus-pocus to wangle soft terms instead of unconditional surrender is one with which the Québec conferees must deal.
This is the basic issue in Allied policy toward Italy today, and will soon be in our policy relating to such satellite countries as Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as Fascist Spain.
Also, the same issue is involved in Allied disagreement concerning Eastern European frontiers in particular and the post-war political settlement in general. Russia wants the Baltic states, and parts of Finland, Poland and Romania.
In addition to those territories which Stalin considers essential to Russian security, he is also said to want to dominate or protect Eastern Europe and northern Iran in exchange for sanctioning British spheres of influence in Western Europe and southern Iran.
Will Russia, or Britain, or the United States, or all three, or the United Nations as a whole, have the determining voice in Germany’s status? Stalin’s own statements and the manifesto of his Moscow “Free Germany Committee” indicate that Russia might be willing to make a soft peace with the German Army after the fall of Hitlerism, while the Churchill-Roosevelt terms are unconditional surrender.
These differences cannot be solved by ignoring them. Recent experience proves they grow worse unless faced. Somehow an agreement on basic European policy must be reached with Stalin. Presumably that will be possible only after a prior tentative agreement by Britain and the United States, plus a willingness to meet Russia partway in a mutual adjustment to which all can give vigorous support.
Meanwhile, the sweep of military events is determining political events to our disadvantage. The fall of Mussolini caught the Allies political unprepared, which enabled Hitler and Badoglio to strengthen the Nazi hold on northern Italian bases which we had hoped to get. Of more importance, Russian advances on the Eastern Front are giving Stalin dominant influence in a future German settlement because there is neither an Allied political agreement or a Western land front. Where and when the Western Allies invade the continent are questions of vast political consequence.
Thus, military and political problems have been fused by the heat of battle, and no longer can be separated. This is nobody’s fault. It is inevitable that military victories precipitate political questions. This is embarrassing, but it is a great opportunity for statesmanship.
The hope is that Allied statesmen – including Stalin – are realistic enough to know that they must stick together, that if Germany can divide them, she certainly will win the peace and may even win the war.
Aqua articles are criticized by Patterson
Inaccuracies are charged before full evidence is submitted
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
OWI conducting survey of post-war Poland views
Study requested by unidentified military agency; pro-Russian charges hurled
…
Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
Somewhere in Sicily, Italy – (by wireless)
Lt. Gen. Omar Nelson Bradley is 50. He is married, and has a daughter who is the apple of his eye.
Mrs. Bradley is living at West Point for the duration, as are the wives of several other generals in this area. Their daughter, Elizabeth, who is 19, will be a senior at Vassar this fall. It’s only 30 miles from Vassar to West Point, so she can be with her mother for weekends.
Each of them writes to the general about three times a week, so on the average, he gets about one letter a day from home. They usually write him V-letters.
He writes back about twice a week, although during hard campaigns, two or three weeks sometimes get by without his having time to write. When he does write, he pecks out the letters on a portable typewriter, using a very proficient two-finger system.
Elizabeth is majoring in French at Vassar, and this summer she had the ecstatic experience of talking to Gen. Henri Giraud in his own language and asking him about her father, whom Giraud had seen just before leaving Africa. Gen. Bradley, incidentally, doesn’t speak any foreign language.
‘Second greatest general’
The whole Bradley family is devout in its esteem for Gen. George C. Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff. When Gen. Bradley got his third star, Elizabeth wrote him a letter of congratulations in which she said they knew he was “the greatest general in the world – next to Gen. Marshall.”
Gen. Bradley is a tall man, who seems thin although he weighs 182 pounds. His legs are long and he is a terrific walker. Recently, Hanson Baldwin did a piece about him in The New York Times which Mrs. Bradley wrote her husband was “an excellent piece except he called you medium height, which makes me furious.” Actually, the general is just half an inch under 6 feet, in his socks.
The general is deeply tanned. He is getting bald on top, and the rest of his hair is cut short and speckled with gray. His head flares out above the ears more than the average man’s, giving him a “dome” and an air of erudition. He wears faintly tinted tortoise-rimmed glasses.
It would be toying with the truth to call him handsome, instead of good-looking. His face shows the kindness and calmness that lie behind it.
To me, Gen. Bradley looks like a schoolteacher rather than a soldier. When I told him that, he said I wasn’t so far wrong, because his father was a country schoolteacher and he himself has taught at West Point and other places. His specialty was mathematics.
The general doesn’t smoke at all. He takes his cigarette rations and gives them away. He drinks and swears in great moderation. There is no vulgarity in his speech. Back home, he says, he and Mrs. Bradley probably took one drink a month before supper. Over here, where liquor is hard to get, he drinks hardly ever, but he does pour a dust-cutting libation for visitors who show up at suppertime. He has three bottles of champagne that somebody gave him, and he had been saving them for the capture of Messina.
The general’s voice is high and clear, but he speaks so gently you don’t hear him very far away. His aides say they have never known him to speak harshly to anyone. He can be firm, terribly firm, but he is never gross, nor rude. His quality of “ordinariness” puts people at their ease.
‘Makes you feel like a general’
A quaking candidate for a commission in the officers’ school at Fort Benning, Georgia, was once interviewed by Gen. Bradley, and when the soldier came out, he said:
Why, he made me feel like a general myself.
He is just the opposite of a “smoothie.” His conversation is not brilliant or unusual, but it is packed with sincerity. The general still has the Midwest in his vocabulary – he uses such expressions as “fighting to beat the band” and “a horse of another color.”
Gen. Bradley is a hard man to write about, in a way, just because he is so normal. He has no idiosyncrasies, no superstitions, no hobbies. He doesn’t collect seashells. He doesn’t read Schopenhauer. There is nothing odd or spectacular about him.
He laughs good-naturedly at small things and has an ordinary Midwestern sense of humor. One day at Sidi Nsir, after Gen. Eisenhower had been visiting there, Gen. Bradley walked into the room where his chief of staff was working and said:
Bill, Gen. Eisenhower says you’re out of uniform today.
The chief of staff – a colonel and an old friend of Gen. Bradley’s – was perturbed. He looked at his leggings, his necktie, his shirt – everything seemed all right to him. And then Gen. Bradley said:
No, no, it isn’t your clothes. You’ve got on the wrong insignia.
Whereupon he walked over, unpinned the eagle from the colonel’s shirt collar, and pinned on a star. That was his way of informing his friend he had been promoted to brigadier general.
West Point at war
‘They also serve who stand and wait’
By Jess Stearn, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
U.S. State Department (August 20, 1943)
Roosevelt-Churchill discussions
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
Roosevelt and Churchill, accompanied by Hopkins, Harriman, Brown, Mrs. Churchill, and Thompson, went on a fishing trip, and that Roosevelt and Churchill had an opportunity for discussions during the drive to and from Lac de L’Épaule. According to an informal memorandum by Harriman, which states that Roosevelt and Churchill “had a discussion of the Pacific war after lunch” and contains the following details of the conversation:
The Prime Minister was arguing for “S[umatra]” which I gathered did not particularly appeal to the President. The Prime Minister was enthusiastic over this conception. As a matter of fact, it is impossible because the shipping is not available. The President was more interested in “B[urma].” The President used most of the glasses and saltcellars on the table making a “V”-shaped diagram to describe the Japanese position in the semi-circular quadrant from western China to the South Pacific, indicating the advantages of striking from either side, thereby capturing the sustaining glasses, and the disadvantage of trying to remove the outer ones one by one. It was not too serious but a pleasant relaxation.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Admiral Noble | |
| Major General Handy | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Major General Fairchild | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Brigadier General Kuter | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Brigadier Porter | |
| Commander Freseman | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Long | Brigadier Macleod | |
| Captain Buzzard | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | Brigadier Redman | |
| Captain Royal | Commander Coleridge | |
| Colonel Cornwall-Jones |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
August 20, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
**Secret**
Conclusions of the Previous Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 112th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Naval and Air Commanders for Operation OVERLORD
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the following British suggestion for Air and Naval Commanders for OVERLORD:
Naval Commander: Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth (Admiral Sir Charles Little)
Air Commander: Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command (Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory)
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals (CCS 317)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like to have time to refer this matter to London where the officers most qualified to advise were situated. It might be necessary to handle it at a later date through the Joint Staff Mission.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Sardinia – Fifth Column Activities (CCS 318/1)
Previous Reference: CCS 112th Mtg. Min, Item 7.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft telegram to General Eisenhower on the subject of the use of OSS and SOE organizations in Sardinia.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested certain amendments to this telegram, including a reference to operations in Corsica.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed, with certain amendments, to the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the signal contained in CCS 318/1 (Subsequently dispatched as FAN 198).
Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan (CCS 313)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not had sufficient time to arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the plan and would like to hear the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The early action required by U.S. forces in the Pacific appeared to be generally agreed by the Combined Staff Planners, except for differing views as to the emphasis to be laid on operations in New Guinea. It was with regard to operations of British forces that the various alternatives existed.
Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the recommendations put forward by the U.S. Planners with certain amendments which he outlined.
General Marshall said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to undertake the recapture of the whole of Burma; only thus could the main road to China be reopened. Akyab and Ramree must be taken before the next monsoon. Operations further south, i.e., against Sumatra, would, he considered, be a diversion from the main effort which must be concentrated with a view to clearing Burma.
Sir Alan Brooke then outlined the various operations which could be undertaken from India.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there seemed to be two alternatives. In both cases the first step would be the recapture of North Burma. After that, it would be possible either to press on with the reconquest of the whole of Burma and later attack Singapore or, alternatively, to recapture Singapore and afterwards clear Southern Burma. The extent of the operations this season was dependent on the reply from the Commander in Chief, India, with regard to the lines of communications through Assam. The capture of Akyab was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, since it provided the necessary air base. The Prime Minister had suggested an alternative operation, the capture of the northern tip of Sumatra. It was not possible to undertake in 1944 both the capture of Akyab and that of Northern Sumatra. The Akyab operation could take place in March and the Sumatra operation, which was not dependent on the monsoon, could take place in May. The North Sumatra operation was being examined and necessitated a force of some four divisions. This was only a slightly larger force than that required for Akyab.
From an examination of the courses of action put forward by the Planners, it appeared that the opening of a port in China could be accomplished at approximately the same time, whether this was done by an overland advance through China after opening the main Burma Road, or, whether it was done by sea-borne attacks from Singapore after opening the Malacca Straits.
It was, in any event, essential to develop to the maximum the air route into China. It was the only method of supplying that country. On the defeat of Germany a great number of aircraft should be available. In addition to this it was necessary to decide on the main line of advance, either overland or by sea from Singapore. In each case the Ledo Road would first be opened and then either Akyab captured as a preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, or Northern Sumatra captured as a preliminary for an attack on Singapore, Whatever course of action was adopted, great developments would have to be undertaken with regard to base facilities in India.
Admiral Leahy asked if an attack on the Kra Isthmus, as an alternative to the attack on Northern Sumatra, had been examined.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that though this line of advance had certain advantages, the difficulty was the lack of any ports on that coast.
Admiral King said that he had always considered Bangkok as the most valuable prize. If this town could be captured, it would be unnecessary to assault Rangoon, since all Japanese lines of communication to it could be effectively cut, and it would fall into our lap.
Sir Charles Portal said that on the assumption that the war against Germany was completed by the autumn of 1944, he believed that the air route to China could be vastly increased. According to the plan, no substantial amount of supplies could get into China by any road before 1946. The United Nations would have a tremendous production of heavy bombers, transports and air crews which, when the drain of active operations against Germany ceased, would rapidly build up into vast numbers. Similarly, the other requirements for the air route, such as radio aids, would be plentiful.
To achieve results, however, from these vast forces it would be necessary at once to start building up the necessary facilities and to make preparations for deploying and employing the aircraft. Numbers would be so large that, if necessary, unserviceable aircraft could be scrapped rather than large repair depots should be set up. Maximum efforts must be made, if necessary at the expense of operations to open the southern road. By 1945 it could be possible for the air supply route to reach such magnitude that delivery by the Ledo and even the main Burma roads would be insignificant in proportion. He realized that there were great difficulties in the construction of airfields particularly in China. Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio could be used which would increase the load. Air forces could develop a direct air offensive on Japan and ground forces could be thrown in to stiffen the Chinese troops required to safeguard the base area. Japanese opposition everywhere would be weakened and their morale lowered. Operations on these lines would be, he felt, more profitable than tedious land operations to open the main land route. As he visualized it, it would, by the methods he had outlined, be possible to continue attacks on the periphery of the wheel to achieve attrition, to attack the heart of Japan (the center of the wheel) by air, with devastating results on her industry and morale, while at the same time the westerly drive in the Pacific would cut the spokes of the wheel. Thus he believed the earliest collapse of Japan could be achieved, but a greater effort must be made to build up the air route. A study of the logistic possibilities should be made at once, after which the route must be built up, if necessary at the expense of ground operations.
General Marshall said that he felt it important that in view of the immense difficulties of ground operations in the area concerned, that the most effective application of our air superiority should be considered and that we should capitalize on the effects of this superiority.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was very strongly in agreement with General Marshall and had himself been thinking on the same lines. He had been impressed by the small number of aircraft (22) required to maintain three of Brigadier Wingate’s groups. The air could be directed by these groups onto vital enemy points. Penetration by these methods with lightly armed forces assisted and supplied by the air, could, he felt, produce quicker results than the laborious advances of land forces, accompanied by the necessary building of road communications. With regard to the seizure by air action of potential air bases, he believed that while this, in certain cases, could be achieved, it must be remembered that troops and anti-aircraft weapons were essential in the initial stages and that the bases could not be held by air action alone until the enemy had been driven back to a certain distance from them.
General Arnold said that he considered that further use could be made of the vast number of fighters and light bombers which would later be available for direct action against the Japanese all over Burma. They could attack railroads, bridges and troops and vehicles on the march.
Sir Charles Portal agreed that this had great possibilities but pointed out the risk of delaying the air operations out of China by building up too heavy a force of lighter aircraft for operations in Burma.
Both General Marshall and Sir Alan Brooke agreed that the tactical conception of operations in Burma employing air reinforcement and air support and supply to long-range penetration groups should be studied as a matter of urgency.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that to attack Japan it would be necessary to base forces far into China. The Chinese forces required to hold the essential bases would require considerable supplies which would effect a reduction in the air effort itself. In addition to the development to the maximum of the air route, the Ledo Road, with pipelines for gasoline, and then a sea route into China, must be developed. Operations to clear Lower Burma by means of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with air support or operations against either the Kra Isthmus or Singapore could be undertaken. He would be interested to know which it was believed would most assist the United States thrust in the Pacific, particularly with regard to the synchronization of these operations with corresponding operations in the Islands.
Admiral King said that in view of the nature of the country he did not believe that an attack on Rangoon would divert many Japanese forces. Operations, however, against the vital center of Bangkok or into China to develop the air offensive would, he thought, both produce strong Japanese reactions. The Japanese, however, had no shortage of troops. Their major deficiencies were in aircraft and shipping. Shipping was their main bottleneck since this was required to support all their operations throughout a wide area, including their air operations. This being the case, he believed that the initial main effort of the air forces based in China should be against shipping and port facilities.
Sir Charles Portal said that he agreed with Admiral King’s conception of the vital importance of striking at Japanese shipping from the air.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had had a most valuable discussion. He would like to have the subject further considered on the following day. It was important to get the background as to possibilities by the various methods which had been discussed and to decide on a long-range plan and to relate immediate operations to this general policy.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Immediate Operations in the Mediterranean
Reference: CCS Memo for Information No. 132.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum setting out the main points in the various signals which had recently been exchanged between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the latest information seemed to show that the Germans had some 16 divisions in Italy. The majority of these appeared to be in the north and there was a tendency to move the headquarters of units in the south into the Naples area.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS Memo for Information No. 132.
Military Considerations in Relation to Spain (CCS 321)
Sir Alan Brooke said that there had been no time to refer the British paper with regard to policy in relation to Spain to the Foreign Office but it set out the military considerations involved.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved this paper.
Military Considerations in Relation to Turkey (CCS 322)
General Marshall said it seemed that the present scale of equipment to Turkey was too high and might be reduced.
Sir Alan Brooke agreed with this view. The Turks were not absorbing all the equipment now being provided. Their training and repair facilities were inadequate. He believed that supplies should be slowed down to a “trickle” and they should not be given more than they could usefully absorb and employ.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved this paper.
Military Considerations in Relation to Russia
Sir Alan Brooke outlined the present position in Russia. In general, the Russians were in a stronger position than ever before. He believed that they had reserves available for further offenses in the autumn. Hungary was understood to be seeking to negotiate a separate peace and neither Rumania nor Finland were desirous of remaining in the war. The Germans would, he thought, be forced to hold all their existing divisions on the Russian front or even to reinforce them. This would facilitate our operations in Italy and OVERLORD. He did not believe that there was any chance of the Germans achieving a negotiated peace with the Russians who had too much to wipe off the slate.
General Marshall referred to the forming of a “Free Germany” movement within Russia. From reports he had received, it appeared that Russia was turning an increasingly hostile eye on the capitalistic world, of whom they were becoming increasingly contemptuous. Their recent “Second Front” announcement, no longer born of despair, was indicative of this attitude. He would be interested to know the British Chiefs of Staff’s views on the possible results of the situation in Russia with regard to the deployment of Allied forces – for example, in the event of an overwhelming Russian success, would the Germans be likely to facilitate our entry into the country to repel the Russians?
Sir Alan Brooke said that he had in the past often considered the danger of the Russians seizing the opportunity of the war to further their ideals of international communism. They might try to profit by the chaos and misery existing at the end of hostilities. He had, however, recently raised this point with Dr. Beneš, who had forecast the Russian order to international communist organizations to damp down their activities. Dr. Beneš’ view had been that since Russia would be terribly weakened after the war, she would require a period of recovery, and to speed up this recovery would require a peaceful Europe in which she could take advantage of the markets for her exports.
There would, however, Sir Alan Brooke considered, be Russian demands for a part of Poland, at least part of the Baltic States, and possibly concessions in the Balkans. If she obtained these territories, she would be anxious to assist us in maintaining the peace of Europe.
With regard to Russia’s air power, Sir Charles Portal said that in view of her superiority on the Eastern Front, the results achieved were disappointing. This, he believed, was largely due to lack of adequate training and handling.
In discussing the possibility of the Germans releasing forces from the Eastern Front for operations elsewhere by the shortening of their line, Admiral King said that he was doubtful whether the shortening of a line would in fact allow Germany to divert divisions elsewhere. The shortening of the line would enable the Russians to intensify their dispositions on this shorter front.
Synthetic Harbors
Lord Louis Mountbatten reported that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were now on their way to Québec to discuss the matter with the appropriate United States officers.
Hull-Eden meeting, afternoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Hull | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Alexander Cadogan | |
| Mr. Atherton |
740.0011 EW/8–2045
Department of State Minutes
August 20, 1943
Secret
LIFEBELT
Mr. Eden first spoke of the operation LIFEBELT. He said that arrangements had now been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister for entry into the Azores by British forces, exclusively, on the understanding that within two weeks after the start of the operation efforts would be made by the British to obtain the consent of the Portuguese for American forces to join them in the islands. He further said that such assurances as the Portuguese had asked had been given by the British Government with respect to the withdrawal of British forces from Portuguese territory after the war and also with respect to the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in all her territories. Mr. Eden suggested that assurances along similar lines would be asked by the Portuguese from the United States. Such assurances might be given if we felt like doing so at the time request was made for American forces to join the operation. Comment was made that this was a reversal of the previous position taken by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had stated their objection to confining the operations exclusively to the British and had referred to the original decision to use force, if necessary, in order to make the Islands available for Allied operations.
Conditions of Surrender for Italy
Mr. Eden brought up the question of the discussions which had been going on between the Prime Minister and the President as to the conditions of surrender to be given the Italians in the event of tender of unconditional surrender being received by the Allied forces or governments. He said that it was the Prime Minister’s view that the long, comprehensive document was the form to be preferred.
The Secretary said that he had gone over this document, which, as far as he was concerned, appeared to be satisfactory but that he understood the President’s view to be that General Eisenhower was now empowered to present the military requirements which would be imposed in the event of an Italian surrender, and that any further political, financial and economic terms which had not yet been finally agreed upon as between the two Governments would be handed to the Italians at a later time.
Both the Secretary of State and Mr. Eden agreed that this matter would take further discussion with the Prime Minister and President before being entirely clarified.
Russia and China
The Secretary then, stated there had been some considerable publicity giving the impression that Stalin had not been invited to the Quebec Conference and remarked that it appeared to be rather fruitless to continue the system of inviting Stalin to the conferences, and that some attempt should be made to arrive at a basis of talks with Stalin in order to come to grips, if possible, with Soviet general policy and cooperation, if possible, in the much broader picture of the maintenance of peace and world security. The Secretary pointed out that everything seemed to go back to the Russian demands for territory, which was another way of looking for security. He made the point that security was world-wide, and if we could draw the Russians into a broad discussion, then the emphasis would not remain merely on the smaller countries on Russia’s western border.
Mr. Eden agreed to the necessity of making a new approach to this problem, but stated frankly he had no suggestions to make and would welcome any ideas that were put forward to accomplish this purpose. He furthermore felt that this should be done without any loss of time.
The Secretary said that he had given a great deal of thought to this problem and would come back to the subject again with Mr. Eden.
(He did not touch on the four-power declaration which he had already drafted and placed in the hands of the President as he preferred to await the President’s move on that subject first. The first mention of the four-power arrangement in the form of a draft declaration was made by the President at the dinner that same evening attended by the Prime Minister, the Secretary, and Mr. Eden at the Citadel.)
The Secretary also spoke of the necessity for keeping China not only closely informed but cooperating in the general broad over-all picture as we went forward with the war. He said he realized that the Chinese could not be brought into all of the strategic conferences naturally, but he had had visits from Chinese representatives who indicated that the Chinese were feeling rather badly about not being included in discussions pertaining to the war against Japan in which they were important factors, and they were convinced conversations on this subject would take place in Québec.
Rome an Open City
Mr. Eden brought up the question of the Italian move to have Rome declared an open city.
The Secretary brought Mr. Eden up to date on the American position which was disclosed in the correspondence between the Papal Delegate in Washington and the Department. Upon receiving word from the Papal Delegate that the Italians had decided to have Rome declared an open city and asking for the conditions under which the Allies would be prepared to accept such a declaration, the Papal Delegate was informed that the matter was under consideration and that there was no reason why the Italian authorities could not proceed in any manner they desired to fulfill the requirements of such a declaration.
The Secretary went on to say, however, that the American Government had made no commitment whatever on the subject, nor was any commitment contemplated as far as we were concerned.
Mr. Eden expressed his agreement and satisfaction with the position thus far taken, which left entire freedom of action to the two governments.
Dependent Peoples
The Secretary brought up the subject of dependent peoples, but Mr. Eden did not appear to be ready to go forward with this subject.
Greece and Yugoslavia
Mr. Eden then spoke of the message which had been sent by the King of Greece to both governments, requesting advice on their part as to the position he should take in the face of demands of certain Greek elements that he renounce any intention of coming to Greece until a plebiscite on the subject of the monarchy had been taken in that country.
Mr. Eden then went on to say they were having great difficulties with the Yugoslav Government as the young king had just accepted the resignation of the Yugoslav cabinet in connection with the refusal of the Croat member of the cabinet to agree to the transfer of the Yugoslav Government from London to Cairo. It was Mr. Eden’s opinion, however, that the transfer would be accomplished within two or three weeks, and that it was much better for the Yugoslav Government to carry on its operations from Cairo where it was nearer the situation.
Senate Cooperation in Approval of Wartime International Agreements
Mr. Eden inquired as to the recent published stories that an agreement had been arrived at between the Senate and the State Department which would provide for approval by the Senate of international agreements entered into by the United States during the wartime period.
The Secretary explained that the situation was not exactly as reported. He said that for some time now he had been carrying on conversations with members of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate and other important Senators, with a view to keeping them informed of the Government’s plans with regard to certain international arrangements which became necessary in the carrying out of the war effort. He cited as an example the United Nations arrangement with respect to relief and rehabilitation (UNRRA). He told how he had shown copies of the draft arrangement on this subject to the Senators, had explained to them how the legislative function in connection with providing of funds and approval of the arrangement was provided for in the text of the draft, and had offered to meet any reasonable suggestions with respect to changes of wording in order to make the position of the legislative branch of the government clear in all respects. He said that he had met with considerable success in these conversations up to the present, and he proposed to continue along those lines in as great a detail as was necessary in order to keep the Senate informed of the plans of the Executive in all these respects.
French Committee of National Liberation
Mr. Eden brought up the subject of relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation. There was a somewhat lengthy review of the negotiations extending over a period of two years or more, in which the Secretary made the point that at no time had the policy of the American Government not been fully agreed in, by telegrams from the Prime Minister to the President, which Mr. Eden admitted.
The discussion ran along the lines of the British taking the position that de Gaulle was their only friend in 1940, the Secretary raising as against this attitude the objectives and actions of the United States Government, including the prevention of the French Fleet and the French North African bases from falling into German hands, Admiral Leahy’s work in keeping up the spirit and courage of the French population in France, the U.S. naval support long before we were in the war, and the lease-lend aid. It then became evident that neither Mr. Eden nor Sir Alexander Cadogan had seen the last State Department Formula which had been transmitted to the President within a few days after receiving the last British Formula on the subject. Copies of the State Department draft, which was almost word for word the same as the British last suggested formula, were then produced. After examining them, Mr. Eden said he felt that the Prime Minister could not accept a formula which did not contain the word, “recognition.” There was some discussion on this point in order to bring out the American view that “recognition” was only given to a government or some form of government, whereas in this case it was understood that both the British and the U.S. Governments had no intention whatever of considering the French Committee as a government.
Mr. Eden made the suggestion at the end of this discussion that it might be necessary for the two Governments to adopt their own formulas and make their announcements in their own separate ways.
The Secretary followed this by a remark that such a procedure, even if done at identically the same moment, would mean an obvious divergence of views.
Mr. Eden said that he realized any such policy would be so considered and regretted any such possibility.
The Secretary replied that he very much regretted the consideration of such a divergence of views but that if the British could stand it, we could.
The Secretary then made a convincing and reasoned marshalling of the situation as it affected the long-term view of the United States toward the whole French situation and the future of France itself.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Québec, 20 August 1943.
Secret
CCS 301/2
| References: | a. CCS 301 |
| b. CCS 301/1 |
Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943-44
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposed subparagraph for inclusion in paragraph 8 of CCS 301, circulated as CCS 301/1, does not express the importance of the maintenance and buildup of the air route into China, or the intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard thereto.
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend the inclusion of the following subparagraph in paragraph 8 of CCS 301, in lieu of the subparagraph presented in CCS 301/1:
(i) Air Route into China
Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the China-Burma-India Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:
- Keeping China in the war.
- Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
- Equipping Chinese ground forces.