U.S. State Department (August 15, 1943)
|
Present |
|
| United States |
|
United Kingdom |
| Admiral Leahy |
|
General Brooke |
| General Marshall |
|
Admiral of the Fleet Pound |
| Admiral King |
|
Air Chief Marshal Portal |
| General Arnold |
|
Field Marshal Dill |
| Lieutenant General Somervell |
|
Vice Admiral Mountbatten |
| Vice Admiral Willson |
|
Lieutenant General Ismay |
| Rear Admiral Cooke |
|
General Riddell-Webster |
| Rear Admiral Badger |
|
Admiral Noble |
| Major General Handy |
|
Lieutenant General Macready |
| Major General Fairchild |
|
Air Marshal Welsh |
| Major General Barker |
|
Captain Lambe |
| Brigadier General Kuter |
|
Brigadier Porter |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer |
|
Air Commodore Elliot |
| Commander Freseman |
|
Brigadier Macleod |
| Commander Long |
|
Brigadier MacLean |
|
Secretariat |
|
| Brigadier General Deane |
|
Brigadier Redman |
| Captain Royal |
|
Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
August 15, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the Previous Meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 106th and 107th meetings. The detailed record of the meetings was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Rome – An Open City (CCS 306)
Sir Alan Brooke referred to the FAN message which had been sent to General Eisenhower yesterday telling him to make no further attacks on Rome nor any statements from Allied Force Headquarters pending clarification and further instructions regarding the Press reports indicating that the Italian Government had declared Rome an open city. He felt it was now necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take a new decision in the matter.
Admiral Leahy said that he felt that it would be impossible to reach a decision until the matter had been discussed with the President and suggested that no action should be taken until his views had been obtained.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt it the duty of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to express the military point of view to the Chiefs of Government for them to make whatever decisions might be necessary politically.
Sir Charles Portal said that it appeared that Rome had unilaterally been declared an open city by the Italians. He felt that General Eisenhower should be allowed to retain his freedom of decision until the Combined Chiefs of Staff were restrained from this by political action. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had advised their Government that acceptance of open city status for Rome was fraught with much difficulty for the Allies in the future. It might be preferable that we had Rome in our possession to use its communications and to risk German bombing.
Admiral Leahy suggested that no disadvantage would be suffered by refraining from bombing.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that it might be desirable from the military point of view to bomb and that a signal should be sent to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff revoking yesterday’s decision and giving him a free hand.
Sir Charles Portal said that the only reports that he had received regarding the latest bombing effort on Rome were that it had achieved success against its targets and that there had been little or no damage caused to non-military targets.
Admiral King referred to the French declaration of Paris as an open city at the time of their collapse. Then the Germans moved into Paris and used it as a base. Did this establish a precedent for the Allies in relation to Rome?
Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the danger of political pressure later if the Allies were to agree indeed to Rome being considered an open city.
Admiral King agreed that if we were in any way a party now to its being declared an open city our hands would be tied.
Sir Charles Portal said that he understood that the U.S. and British Governments had agreed to take no action regarding any request for Rome to be made an open city.
Admiral King suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should encourage the two Governments to make no reply and that this would leave us free to bomb. He also referred to the possibility of the danger of political capital being made regarding this whole question in the future.
General Marshall affirmed that the political complications in the U.S. would tend to be so serious that clearance from the President must be obtained before yesterday’s message was cancelled. He agreed that it should be reaffirmed that the Allies should in no way commit themselves to agreeing regarding the reported declaration of Rome as an open city and that an early recommendation to this effect should be made to the two Governments.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the President and Prime Minister should be informed at once:
a. Of yesterday’s “stand still” order regarding the bombing of Rome and that they should be advised that from the military point of view the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was that the order should be revoked;
b. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered that the two Governments should in no way commit themselves on the subject of Rome being declared an open city.
Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (CCS 303)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would first like to say, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, that after reading CCS 303 they believed that there was a great similarity of outlook between themselves and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. Such divergencies as there were did not appear to be fundamental. The British Chiefs of Staff were in entire agreement that Overlord should constitute the major offensive for 1944 and that Italian operations should be planned with this conception as a background.
The plan for OVERLORD was based on three main conditions being created in order to give it reasonable prospect of success. Firstly, reduction in German fighter strength; secondly, German strength in France and the Low Countries and her ability to reinforce during the first two months must be kept at specified limits; and thirdly, the problem of beach maintenance must be solved. He believed that the OVERLORD plan envisaged too rapid a rate of advance and too small a margin of superiority, bearing in mind our experience in fighting German forces. It was essential, therefore, to insure that the Germans had available to them the minimum possible number of divisions in France and that their rate of reinforcement should be as slow as possible.
Operations in Italy, therefore, must have as their main object the creation of a situation favorable to a successful OVERLORD. This could be achieved by holding German reserves and by reducing German fighter strength by bombing fighter factories in Southern Germany from Italian airdromes.
He considered, therefore, that the statement (CCS 303, para. 4b (3)) in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum that as between OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, when there is a shortage of resources, OVERLORD will have an overriding priority, was too binding. Sufficient forces must be used in Italy in order to make OVERLORD a possibility.
There were two further points in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper which he would like elucidated. How far north was it proposed our forces in Italy should go, and what strength was it estimated would be required to hold that line? He understood that the line proposed was the “Apennine” line across the neck of Italy. He believed that this should be regarded as the first stage only, and that if possible, the northwestern plains should also be seized. Fighter factories in Southern Germany could be bombed from Central Italy but far greater results could be achieved by the use of those airdromes in the Milan-Turin area. Whether or not this area could be seized would depend on the amount of resistance met and could not be decided now, since the number of German divisions which would be deployed against us could not, at this stage, be assessed. Some 20 divisions might be required to hold the neck of Italy which might entail retaining three of the seven divisions earmarked for OVERLORD. If the Milan-Turin area were taken, then all seven might be required, but a decision should be deferred until it could be seen what forces were required to attain the desired result, i.e., the production of the situation requisite for a successful OVERLORD.
He agreed, however, that trained “battle experienced” troops were required for OVERLORD and therefore it would be necessary to exchange those of the extra divisions required with others from the U.S. or the U.K.
Sir Alan Brooke then explained, with the aid of a map, the possible lines which might be held in Italy. He pointed out that the occupation of the northwestern part of Italy would afford a gateway into Southern France through which troops, possibly French, might attack in conjunction with the amphibious operations suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. He asked finally that certain details of the Appendices might be revised by the Combined Staff Planners.
General Arnold pointed out that the desired targets in Germany could be reached by heavy bombers based in the Florence area, which would lie within the line across the neck of Italy. He felt that the advantage of having these northern fields was outweighed by the disadvantage of the additional forces required to gain and hold them.
Sir Charles Portal said that the advantages of the Turin-Milan area were considerable. There were many excellent airfields in the Turin-Milan area, capable of operating within a reasonably short period a thousand heavy and a thousand medium bombers, whereas fields in the south would have to be extended and improved and the rate of buildup would therefore be slower. Further, the Germans would make good use of the northern airfields and would not have the barrier of the Alps between them and our bases.
Admiral King said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff had serious doubts as to the possibility of accomplishing OVERLORD.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British view was that OVERLORD would be a success if the three conditions laid down in General Morgan’s paper were brought about, and it was essential to take the necessary steps to insure the achievement of these conditions.
Admiral King said he did not believe that the achievement of the necessary conditions was dependent solely on operations in Italy. The necessary conditions might be produced by many other factors, such as, operations in Russia, the result of those already taking place in Sicily, and the air offensive from the United Kingdom.
General Marshall said that it seemed to him that the essence of the problem was whether or not the required conditions for a successful Overlord could only be made possible by an increase in the strength in the Mediterranean. Only by giving an operation overriding priority could success be insured. TORCH was a perfect example of this concept. He agreed that if resistance was weak, we should seize as much of Italy as possible. It would be better if we, and not the Germans, held the northern airfields, though almost as much could be achieved from the Florence area. On the other hand, unless a decision were taken to remove the seven divisions from the Mediterranean, and unless overriding priority was given to OVERLORD, he believed that OVERLORD would become only a subsidiary operation. A delay in the decision would have serious repercussions on our ability to build up for OVERLORD and any exchange of troops, as had been suggested would absorb shipping and complicate logistic considerations of ‘supply as far back as the Mississippi River. Recently in North Africa an additional unexpected requirement for 60,000 service troops had arisen. This requirement had been met but with very serious results for planned expansion and movement to other theatres. Not only would the OVERLORD buildup be hampered, but operations in the Pacific would also suffer.
If OVERLORD was not given overriding priority, then in his opinion the operation was doomed and our whole strategic concept would have to be recast and the United States forces in Britain might well be reduced to the reinforced army corps necessary for an opportunist cross-Channel operation.
General Barker had submitted a paper with regard to the required conditions. This note (the main points of which General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff) pointed out that in the view of the Combined COSSAC Staff, the required condition[s] concerning the German buildup did not imply that the operation became impracticable if the conditions were not achieved but rather that more extensive use would have to be made of available means to reduce the enemy’s ability to concentrate his forces.
To sum up, he felt that unless OVERLORD were given overriding priority it would become a minor operation, in which case we should be depending for the defeat of Germany on air bombing alone. This had achieved great results, but its final result was still speculative. We must make a plan and bring our strength against Germany in such a way as to force Germany to feel it. An “opportunist” operation would be cheaper in lives but was speculative. If we relied on this, we were opening a new concept which in his view weakened our chances of an early victory and rendered necessary a reexamination of our basic strategy, with a possible readjustment towards the Pacific.
In the course of discussion, the following points were made:
a. In the British view, successful operations in France necessitated a preponderance of force. It was essential to achieve this preponderance in order to avoid a catastrophe, which might seriously delay our ultimate victory. Success depended not on the absolute strength of the United [Allied?] forces available for OVERLORD, but on the relative strength of those forces vis-à-vis the Germans opposed to them. This relative strength could best be achieved by operations in Italy, aimed at containing the maximum German forces, and by air action from the best possible Italian bases to reduce the German fighter forces. By agreeing now to the withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean, risks might be run in that theatre which would not only prejudice the success of OVERLORD, but might make it impossible of successful achievement.
In the British view OVERLORD was the main operation and all operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting OVERLORD.
b. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that unless overriding priority were given to OVERLORD the operation would never materialize. In every previous operation, requirements had arisen additional to those originally envisaged. These requirements might also arise in Italy and must not be met by unilateral action. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should now take a decision that Operation OVERLORD should have overriding priority and maintain this decision in order that the success of the operation could be insured. Any departure from this concept must entail a reconsideration of our basic strategy.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to give further consideration to CCS 303 at their next meeting;
b. Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to examine the Appendices and amend as necessary.
Operation OVERLORD – Outline Plan (CCS 304), “Synthetic” Harbors (CCS 307)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed a note (CCS 304) by the British Chiefs of Staff on the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD.
In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Lord Louis Mountbatten outlined the various methods by which the problem of beach maintenance could be overcome.
General Barker and Brigadier MacLean of the COSSAC Staff explained the main features of the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD, as set out in British Chiefs of Staff paper, COS (43) 416 (O), and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in authorizing him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.
Air and Naval Command – Operation OVERLORD
Sir Charles Portal said that he would like to have an opportunity to discuss with General Arnold the question of an Air Commander for OVERLORD. At present Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was giving the necessary decisions but the Air Commander should be selected as soon as possible.
Sir Dudley Pound said that consideration had been given to the problem of naval command for OVERLORD. The majority of the forces to be employed would be trained, organized and operate under the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth. He had been given a special Chief of Staff to assist him in this matter. The Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, could be given control over adjacent commands as might be necessary. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should endorse the appointment of the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, as Naval Commander in Chief.
Admiral King said he would like to consider this suggestion.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. That the British Chief of the Air Staff and General Arnold would examine the question of the appointment of an Air Commander for OVERLORD and would put up their recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the end of QUADRANT.
b. Of the proposals by the British Admiralty that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, should carry out the duties of Naval Commander for OVERLORD, with authority over the Naval Commanders, Plymouth and Dover, for this purpose; and deferred a decision on this matter.
