America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 286/3

Formation of U.S. Assault Forces for Operation OVERLORD

The British request that the Americans man all the craft allocated to Assault Force “O,” the American Naval Assault Force for OVERLORD based in the Plymouth Command, was considered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff who declined to undertake this commitment for the reasons given in CCS 286/2.

There has been an opportunity during Quadrant for this matter to be further investigated by the Combined Staffs. As a result, we now wish to put forward a modified proposal. We withdraw the request that the U.S. should man the shipborne types of landing craft, namely 16 LCS(M), 15 Hedgerow fitted LCA and 60 ordinary LCA, as these will be carried in British ships. However, in view of the fact that the remaining craft will be assigned to, and will train with, the American Naval Assault Force under a U.S. Naval Commander, we suggest that it would be reasonable that U.S. crews be provided. The craft involved are 12 LCT(R), 5 LCG(L), 11 LCF(L), 48 LCP(L) fitted for smoke-laying and not hoistable, and the personnel required amount to 135 officers and 1,511 men.

We ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the decision conveyed in 286/2 to this extent.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 314

Allocation of Landing Craft (Operation OVERLORD – Vehicle Lift)

We have been examining the landing craft position for Operation OVERLORD. It appears probable that there will be a shortage of vehicle lift of 870 vehicles, or 13 per cent of the total lift, compared with the calculations made at TRIDENT. This shortage is made up as follows:

  • LCT (3 or 4) – 57
  • LCT (5) – 15

The reasons for this shortage are as follows:
a. 164 LCG (M) which it was hoped to build in the United Kingdom, will not be ready in time. In order to compensate to some extent for this and in order to provide supporting fire for the U.S. assaults, it has been necessary to convert 43 LCT (3 and 4) to LCT(R) or LCG(L).

b. In the TRIDENT calculations it was assumed that the 44 LCT (4 and 5) employed in close mobile net protection duties with the Fleet at Scapa Flow, would all be available for OVERLORD. Recent developments in anti-ship weapons make it impossible to dispense with this type of protection. Every effort is being made to substitute other types of craft and 15 LCTs have been released. The Admiralty are going to try and release more, but at present they must retain 14 LCT (4) and 15 LCT (5).

Under the TRIDENT decisions, 18 LCTs were to be brought back from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. It will be necessary for these to sail before bad weather starts in the Bay of Biscay. Admiral Cunningham has been asked whether these craft are taking part in AVALANCHE and when they can be released. The importance of ensuring their passage home has been emphasized. Owing to the casualties in HUSKY having been less than expected, we may get more back from this source, which would help us reduce the deficit. But we cannot count on this yet.

We have studied various methods by which the shortage in lift for OVERLORD could be wiped out. It seems that the only practicable method would be to arrange by some means an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for OVERLORD from American sources. The British Chiefs of Staff ask that the possibility of this should be explored.

Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 317
References: a. CCS 288; CCS 288/1; CCS 288/2.
b. CCS 104th Meeting, Item 3.

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals

The problem

To consider the requirements for materiel for equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals, and the determination of basic policies which will govern the meeting of such requirements.

Discussion

During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for equipping 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry). By 1 September 1943, the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.

General Eisenhower has recommended (radio BOSCO-IN-21, 13 Aug 1943) (Appendix “A”) that equipment for remaining French troops be accelerated in a manner that would provide for a total of four armored and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations advises that such a program would satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference. The requisite equipment can be made available to meet such requirements without prejudice to currently directed operations, i.e., BOLERO/SICKLE, and operations in the Pacific It should be noted, however, that approximately 60% of the equipment required must be withheld from advance shipments to the United Kingdom, to be made up prior to departure of United Kingdom units concerned. This can be done.

During the first four to five months following an initial assault on the continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for the buildup and maintenance of the United Nations forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months will be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of French Army units on the continent and their initial employment. Thus, it would appear that no continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the initial assault.

Balkan forces are capable of mounting approximately six modified divisions and supporting troops (175,000) (Appendix “B”). They should be supplied with captured German and Italian equipment, if available, inasmuch as they are familiar therewith, and their strategic position does not further substantiate commitments from other sources.

It is assumed that Polish forces will continue to fight with the British and they need not be considered as sacrificed by non-support of the Polish “Secret Army” as an organized unit. Moreover, the formation of Polish divisions and brigades can only be accomplished after the fall of Germany, at which time existence of a formal Polish Army for the defeat of Germany would not be necessary (Appendix “C”).

In respect to equipping the Turkish forces, it is presumed that this program will not extend beyond that envisaged at TRIDENT. In view of the apparent inability of the Turkish forces to properly assimilate, maintain, and train with such equipment as has been provided to them, it is questionable as to whether the political benefits that would accrue from furnishing any further equipment would outweigh the advisability of retaining such equipment for other purposes.

The aggregate strengths of forces which might be available to the United Nations and which are now located in Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland totals about 150,000 men (Appendix “D”). Since potential forces in none of these countries constitutes a force which of itself could carry out extensive offensive operations, it is assumed that such forces would be available only for garrison and interior guard duty.

It is the opinion of the War Shipping Administration that cargo shipping captured should be operated for rehabilitation and support of the occupied country. This policy will reduce shipping load on United Nations and will save the time and expense of repair and rehabilitation of vessels in U.S. ports. Personnel vessels should be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:
a. The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 Aug. 1943) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September-31 December 1943.

b. Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio of 13 August 1943.

c. Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or guard duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. Equipment to be furnished through CG, ETO, for Northern France and through CG, NATO, for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished as far as practicable from captured German and Italian items.

d. In accordance with CCS 303/3, Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (par. 6d and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the Balkans will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be limited to 175,000 men (six divisions and supporting troops).

e. No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement that all material must be flown in will limit the forces that can be equipped to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions). This is to be a British commitment.

f. The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional equipment.

g. Equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low Countries be limited to basic individual equipment for a total force aggregating 150,000 men, together with certain categories of light infantry weapons and light motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces to be equipped as soon as operations by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of Norway, Holland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The Balkans to be equipped through CG, NATO.

h. That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs c to g, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war matériel.

i. That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war matériel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs a, b and d above, be considered to be a responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs c, e, f, and g to be considered as a responsibility of the United Kingdom.

j. Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable, to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.

Appendix “A”
Secret

Rearmament of the French

During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for the equipping of 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry).

By 1 September 1943 the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.

a. By radiogram W7177 (BOSCO-IN-21, 13 August 1943), the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, recommends that equipment for the remaining French troops be provided as follows:

September, 1943 One infantry and one armored division (less certain units)
October, 1943 One infantry division
November, 1943 One infantry division
December, 1943 One armored division

Equipment for supporting and service units to be provided on a proportionate basis for each month.

b. The proposal outlined in a above will provide for a total of four armored (on a slightly reduced scale) and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, advises that this, considering also the Koenig Division, which was equipped by the British, will satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference.

Equipment, allowing minor substitutions, can be made available to meet the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above, provided that priority above that for pre-shipments to the United Kingdom is granted. About 60% of the equipment for French units would necessarily be withheld from pre-shipment to the United Kingdom. These shortages can be made up in time to equip U.K. units prior to departure. Provision of this equipment will not prejudice currently directed operations in the Pacific, BOLERO, or SICKLE. Any equipment left behind by U.S. divisions transferred from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom will be credited against this requirement. Shipping can be made available as requested by General Eisenhower (180,000 ship tons in September and 150,000 ship tons per month, October, November, and December).

The provision of equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph 5 [3?] above, will satisfy the United States obligation of the Casablanca Conference. There is no further known requirement for equipment for French units from United States sources. During the first four to five months following the initial assault on the Continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for build-up of the combat forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months would be required between the start of reorganization and re-equipment of French Army units on the Continent, and their initial employment. Thus, it would appear that no Continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the assault.

Certain resistance groups in France are being equipped by air delivery with small arms. This is a British commitment. Any demands on the United States for weapons or equipment for this purpose will be negligible.

It may be necessary to clothe and equip local defense units organized in France after the invasion is well under way. Arms for such units would undoubtedly be limited to small arms and light weapons. It is believed that any such equipment should be provided from and limited to that available from captured enemy (Italian) supplies, and should not be set up as an obligation of the United States Government.

Appendix “B”
Secret

Balkans

The Balkan guerrilla forces are estimated to number around 175,000; however, some estimates have placed this figure as high as 300,000. The former figure is based on recent intelligence reports and is considered to be reliable. These forces are divided into several political groups, operating independently, the strongest of which is General Mihailovitch’s Chetniks. However, it is doubtful that even he can command the loyalty of more than 175,000 to 200,000 men.

In addition to these forces, recent radio report from the Mediterranean Theater quotes a Yugoslavian representative as being desirous of establishing a training corps, on the fall of Italy, in some Italian territory, preferably Sicily, to consist of 30,000 to 40,000 Yugoslavian prisoners of war now in Italy. The State Department is very emphatic in the opinion that a maximum of 6,500 Yugoslavian and 1,800 Greek prisoners of war will be liberated on the fall of Italy, and that any claims of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in excess of this figure would constitute an attempt to create a Free Yugoslav Army to lend national prestige in peace conference negotiations. The liberated prisoners of war available therefore appear to be relatively insignificant in comparison to the tangible guerrilla forces, and, moreover, the time that would be consumed in training such a force would render them valueless in the conquest of Germany.

In the past, supply of these forces has been effected by the British Middle East Command, in some 100 scattered sorties, dropping only the bare essentials of medical supplies, etc. Their principal needs are machine guns, light (horse) artillery and medical supplies.

The supply of equipment to the Balkans therefore devolves to a consideration of furnishing an equivalent of the requirements for a force commensurate with the 175,000 guerrillas.

Equipment to be supplied to the Balkans should be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport. The latter method must supplement the former before any substantial amount of equipment can be made available to a force aggregating 175,000 men.

Appendix “C”
Secret

Polish Forces

Polish forces in the U.K. consist of approximately 40,000 men, including one armored division, one parachute brigade, 13 air squadrons and some light naval vessels. In the Middle East, Polish forces contain about 73,000 men, including two infantry divisions, one tank brigade, and corps troops. In both of the above elements, the supply of materiel and equipment has been from British sources, including some lend-lease transactions, and the supply status of each is approximately 75% complete.

There is an additional Polish force of approximately 65,000 men, in the occupied territory, known as the “Secret Army.” Various estimates of this force have run as high as 300,000 men, however the former figure is based on U.S. Army Intelligence information and is considered to be reliable. In addition to supplying the Polish forces in the U.K. and Middle East, the British have occasionally dropped small quantities of explosives, and communications equipment, to this “Secret Army,” from the air.

Supply of the forces in the U.K. and Middle East having been undertaken by the British (these elements are now a part of British forces in the respective area), the equipping of Polish forces evolves to the requirements of the “Secret Army.” This requirement amounts to equipment for an equivalent of fifty infantry battalions which must be flown in, and would require an estimated 500 sorties initially. The Polish Genera] Staff estimates this force could fight in isolation for about 20 days and its continued existence would depend on a break through contact by other Allied Forces within that time.

The Polish plan further envisages the transporting of the U.K. and Middle East Forces into Poland by air after the break through contact with the “Secret Army” has been established. These, with other liberated Polish Forces, would be organized into 16 infantry divisions and six dismounted cavalry brigades. This latter phase is not considered as advantageous inasmuch as the effect of it cannot be realized until such time as it is no longer needed.

It is clear that sabotage and intelligence operations are desirable and the operation of 50 rifle battalions will considerably aid in this activity, as well as occupy the attention of considerable German forces. However, current intelligence digests indicate Russia will violently oppose any arming of the Poles in Poland due to the well-known Polish-Russian enmity.

To support this operation, including supply of initial equipment, would require some 2,000 sorties by heavy transport planes and this air lift cannot be spared without seriously affecting other operations.

Appendix “D”
Secret

Norway, Low Countries

In giving consideration to the possible need for supplying equipment and matériel to the forces of free neutrals of nations at present occupied by Axis forces and which might come within the scope of possibly having to be rearmed by the United Nations, estimates have been confined to Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. The table which follows indicates (on the basis of informal estimates furnished by a representative of the Joint Intelligence Committee) the strengths of the armed forces of each nation at or about the time each became involved in the war, as well as the indicated potential strengths of that portion of the manpower of each nation which might be available for reequipment, rearming, training and service in the event of a United Nations reoccupation:

Country Estimated Strength at Outbreak of War Possible Strength To Be Equipped
Norway 17,000 40,000*
Denmark 11,000 10,000†
Belgium 650,000 50,000*
Holland 400,000 50,000*
150,000

From the above table it is apparent that the aggregate strength of the forces which might be available for rearming in all of these countries totals 150,000 troops. Since potential forces in none of these countries constitute a force which of itself could carry out extended offensive operations, it is presumed that such forces would be supplied only to the extent of basic individual equipment, together with certain categories of small arms and light motor vehicles. Considering the reequipment of all of these nations as a complete total requirement, and assuming that such reequipment would not take place until, at the earliest, sometime after 1 January 1944 (the estimated date on which the rearming of the French forces as presently contemplated would be completed), it is not considered that any great problem of supply would be involved and that quantities of the requisite materiel could be made available without unduly affecting the equipment status of American forces.

Assuming (for conservative purposes) that the reequipment of all of these countries would be coincidental, which of course would not be the case, a total maximum shipping requirement of some six to eight ships might be required but this could be made available without any effect on the BOLERO/SICKLE operation or operations as presently contemplated and planned for the South and Southwest Pacific areas.

It is, of course, obvious that a determination must be made at the earliest practicable moment in the event any or all of these countries, or any contiguous countries, are to be reequipped and rearmed. Such plans must indicate the approximate date on which rearming and reequipping would be required and, in general, the type force that it would be considered advisable to rearm and reequip for each country with the forces available to it and the nature of operations in which it is contemplated such forces might become engaged, i.e., garrison and police duty, or actual components of an offensive fighting force. It is also essential that a determination be made at the earliest practicable date as to how much equipment would be supplied and the source of the equipment.

For police purposes only.
*Estimated on basis of ability to form and train units upon liberation.

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
Operational priority

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

We have both arrived here with our staffs and will probably remain in conference for about ten days. We fully understand the strong reasons which lead you to remain on the battlefronts, where your presence has been so fruitful of victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize once more the importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan are suitable but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed to Fairbanks in order to survey the whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for a rendezvous and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. Prime Minister will remain on this side of the Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

Should it prove impossible to arrange the much-needed meeting of the three heads of governments, we agree with you that a meeting of the foreign office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character as, of course, final decisions must be reserved to our respective governments.

Generals Eisenhower and Alexander have now completed the conquest of Sicily in thirty-eight days. It was defended by 315,000 Italians and 90,000 Germans, total 405,000 soldiers. These were attacked by thirteen British and United States Divisions and with a loss to us of about 18,000 killed and wounded, 23,000 German and 7,000 Italian dead and wounded were collected and 130,000 prisoners. Apart from those Italians who have dispersed in the countryside in plain clothes, it can be assumed that all Italian forces in the island have been destroyed. Masses of guns and munitions are lying scattered about all over the island. Over 1,000 enemy aircraft have been taken on the airfields. We are, as you know, about soon to attack the Italian mainland in heavy strength.

CHURCHILL
ROOSEVELT

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Québec, 18 August 1943.

Secret
Urgent

With the approval of the President and the Prime Minister the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that you immediately send 2 staff officers, 1 U.S. and 1 British, to Lisbon to report upon arrival to the British Ambassador. For Eisenhower, FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 196, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They should take with them the Armistice terms already agreed and previously sent to you. The British Ambassador in Lisbon has been directed to arrange a meeting with General “C” at which your staff officers will be present.

At this meeting a communication to General “C” will be made on the following lines:
a. The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on the terms stated in the document to be handed to him. (He should then be given the Armistice Terms for Italy already agreed and previously sent to you. He should be told that these do not include political, economic or financial terms which will be communicated later by other means.)

b. These terms do not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favor of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do, in fact, aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations, however, state without reservation that wherever Italian forces or Italians fight Germans, or destroy German property, or hamper German movement, they will be given all possible support of the forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile, provided information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied, allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect the movement and operations of German forces.

c. The cessation of hostilities between the United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower. (NOTE: General Eisenhower should make this notification a few hours before Allied Forces land in Italy in strength.)

d. Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the Armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the allies and to resist the Germans. (NOTE: As will be seen from 2c above, the Italian Government will be given a few hours’ notice.)

e. The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice, order that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans shall be immediately released.

f. The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice, order the Italian Fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

General “Charlie” should be told that meanwhile there is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines which should be suggested to him:
a. General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the Germans knowing.

b. Minor sabotage throughout the country, particularly of communications and airfields used by the Germans.

c. Safeguard of allied Prisoners of War. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great, they should be released.

d. No Italian Warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

e. No merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

f. Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian Coast Defenses.

g. Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to Italy by United Nations.

General Eisenhower’s representatives must arrange with General “Charlie” a secure channel of communication between Italian Headquarters and General Eisenhower.

Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, late evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King

The dinner party at the Citadel broke up at midnight, after which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Mackenzie King “sat together for quite a little time.” Roosevelt and Churchill held discussions after dinner “until another late retiring.”

Völkischer Beobachter (August 19, 1943)

Auch in London muß man erkennen:
‚Deutsche ungeheuer stark‘

Ernüchterung angesichts des Scheiterns der Sowjetoffensive

Besonders hohe Feindverluste: 317 Sowjetpanzer und 98 Terrorflugzeuge
Sowjet-Durchbruchsversuche bei Isjum gescheitert

dnb. Aus dem Führer-Hauptquartier, 18. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:

Im Kampfgebiet von Isjum setzte der Feind seine Angriffe mit starken Infanterie- und Panzerkräften fort. In harten Kämpfen wurden seine Durchbruchsversuche unter Abschuß zahlreicher Panzer zum Scheitern gebracht.

Auch im Raum südlich und südwestlich Bjelgorod brachen alle sowjetischen Angriffe blutig zusammen. 92 Sowjetpanzer wurden vernichtet. Bei den Angriffs- und Abwehrkämpfen in diesem Raum hat sich die SS-Panzergrenadierdivision „Totenkopf“ besonders ausgezeichnet.

Auch südlich und südwestlich Wjasma, südwestlich Belyj und südwestlich des Ladogasees scheiterten alle Durchbruchsversuche der Sowjets in erbitterten Kämpfen.

Die Verluste des Feindes in den Kämpfen an der Ostfront waren gestern besonders hoch. Insgesamt wurden 317 Panzer vernichtet.

Bei der Bekämpfung von Schiffszielen vor der algerischen Küste versenkten deutsche Kampfflieger einen feindlichen Transporter mittlerer Größe und beschädigten ein weiteres Handelsschiff.

Feindliche Fliegerverbände, die am gestrigen Tage nach Süddeutschland einflogen, verloren schon nach den bisherigen Feststellungen durch Jagd- und Flakabwehr 51 viermotorige Bomber und fünf Jagdflugzeuge. In zwei süddeutschen Städten hatte die Bevölkerung Verluste. Über den besetzten französischen Gebieten sowie in Südfrankreich wurden fünf weitere feindliche Flugzeuge zum Absturz gebracht. Ein eigenes Jagdflugzeug ging verloren.

In der vergangenen Nacht warf der Feind eine große Anzahl von Spreng- und Brandbomben auf Orte im norddeutschen Küstengebiet. Es entstanden Personenverluste. Nachtjäger und Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe schossen aus den britischen Bomberverbänden mindestens 37 Flugzeuge ab.

Deutsche Kampfflugzeuge stießen in der Nacht zum 18. August nach Südost- und Mittelengland vor und belegten unter anderem die Industriestadt Lincoln wirksam mit Bomben aller Kaliber.

In den Kämpfen auf Sizilien haben sich die Panzerdivision „Hermann Göring,“ die 15. Panzer- und die 29. Panzergrenadierdivision, die 1. Fallschirmjägerdivision und die 22. Flakbrigade ruhmvollst bewährt.

Sizilien im Lichte der Feindpresse –
Es war eine harte Lehre

Von unserer Stockholmer Schriftleitung

Stockholm, 18. August –
Aus allen Berichten der englischen und amerikanischen Kriegsberichterstatter geht die Enttäuschung darüber hervor, daß die englisch-amerikanischen Streitkräfte eine verlustlose Evakuierung Siziliens nicht verhindern konnten. Und peinlich überrascht muß man nun im Hauptquartier Eisenhowers feststellen, daß es leider nicht geglückt sei, „den Deutschen ein Dünkirchen zu bereiten.“

Es in dem enttäuschten Bericht eines amerikanischen Kriegskorrespondenten heißt:

Den Deutschen scheint es gelungen zu sein, einen ganzen Teil ihrer Truppen zu evakuieren.

Der Daily Express schreibt in einem ersten Kommentar zu der neu entstandenen Lage:

Alle Hoffnungen sind nicht erfüllt worden. Es wird sich wahrscheinlich zeigen, daß die deutschen Hauptstreitkräfte entkommen sind. RAF-Piloten haben es erzählt, daß der Flakschirm, den die Deutschen über die Straße von Messina spannen konnten, das erstaunlichste war, was sie in ihrer gesamten Praxis erlebt hatten.

Der Daily Express schreibt weiter:

Es seien ‚geradezu Feuertunnels‘ von den deutschen Geschützen gebildet worden und die englisch-amerikanischen Flugzeugführer hätten ihnen voller Respekt den Namen „Flakalleen“ gegeben. Aus diesem Grunde unterscheide sich die deutsche Evakuierung auf Sizilien bedeutend von dem „eigenen ethischen Rückzug der Engländer aus Dünkirchen.

‚Hoch härterer Stahl‘

Auch der Star bedauert lebhaft, daß die Operationen auf Sizilien nicht mit einem Dünkirchen endeten:

Es war kein Spaziergang für die Engländer und die Amerikaner, sondern es forderte viel Material und große Anstrengungen – daran muß man bei den Spekulationen über kommende alliierte Großunternehmungen denken.

Evening News warnt gleichfalls davor, die künftigen Kämpfe zu leicht zu nehmen. „Ein Angriff gegen die Festung Hitlers wird auf noch härteren Stahl stoßen,“ stellt das Londoner Blatt fest.

Widerwillige Eingeständnisse dieser Art finden sich in der gesamten englischen Presse. Obwohl es den Engländern nur schlecht in den Kram paßt, müssen sie sich wohl oder übel zu einem Lob über die Tüchtigkeit der deutschen Soldaten bereit finden und sie verbinden es mit dem von oben her gewünschten „Feldzug gegen den Überoptimismus,“ der das englische Volk aus seinen verfrühten Siegesträumereien herausreißen soll.

Daß es mit einer überwältigenden Luftüberlegenheit allein nicht getan ist, haben die Kämpfe auf Sizilien gleichfalls erwiesen. Der Londoner Vertreter von Svenska Dagbladet spricht von „einer Überraschung negativer Art“ für die Engländer und schreibt, daß die Hoffnungen vieler Sachverständiger enttäuscht wurden:

In London hat man sich an vielen Stellen vorgestellt, daß die alliierte Luftüberlegenheit Sizilien zu einer Kapitulation im Stil Pantellerias zwingen würde. Obwohl diese Überlegenheit in runden Ziffern 10:1 war, konnte diese Art der Entscheidung nicht erreicht werden.

Man habe darum in London eingesehen, daß eine moderne Landungsoperation dieses Umfanges ein schwere Opfer forderndes Unternehmen werde, wenn „die Verteidiger Beweise der gleichen Zähigkeit geben, wie die Deutschen es getan haben.“ Die alliierte Kriegführung müsse darum bereit sein, für alle neuen und wichtigeren Operationen einen noch weitaus höheren Preis zu bezahlen.

Angst um die zweite Front

Der von Moskau mit viel Nachdruck gestartete „Zweite-Front-Feldzug“ ist jetzt von der englischen Presse aufgegriffen worden, nicht so sehr aus der bekannten Servilität allen bolschewistischen Wünschen gegenüber, sondern aus der unverhüllt gezeigten Furcht, daß die Sowjetunion vielleicht eines Tages zur Defensive übergehen könnte. Abgesehen von der kommunistischen Zeitung Daily Worker, deren „Pflicht“ es ja ist, sich für die baldige Errichtung einer zweiten Front einzusetzen, haben sich darum gleich zwei einflußreiche Zeitungen auf einmal, der Daily Express und das News Chronicle, für den neuen Feldzug zur Verfügung gestellt.

News Chronicle zeichnet sich dabei durch eine besonders scharfe Tonart aus. Das liberale Blatt unterstreicht die militärische Notwendigkeit für England und die USA., so schnell wie möglich eine zweite Front zu eröffnen und sagt, „falls sie diese Gelegenheit verpassen,“ die düstersten Folgen voraus.

Ist es nicht denkbar, daß die Sowjets nach zwei Jahren kolossaler Verluste beschließen könnten, ihre Armee künftig eine defensive Rolle spielen zu lassen, während sie die restlichen offensiven Kämpfe und Verluste den Engländern und Amerikanern überlassen würden?

Ein derartiger sowjetrussischer Beschluß würde eine große Anzahl deutscher Divisionen und Luftgeschwader für den Westen frei machen. Der Krieg würde dadurch um viele Monate oder um Jahre verlängert werden und es sei darum notwendig, in den Sowjets den offensiven Geist zu erhalten, das aber gehe allein durch die Schaffung einer zweiten Front.

Morrison ist ungemütlich

Innenminister Herbert Morrison sprach zum zweiten Jahrestag der Gründung des nationalen Feuerwehrdienstes und gab einen Tagesbefehl an alle Mitglieder des Feuerwehrdienstes in England und Wales heraus. Morrison warnte darin vor einem Nachlassen der Anstrengungen, der Feind könne wilde Schläge austeilen. Trotz allem, was getan worden sei, bestehe noch immer die Notwendigkeit, sich weiter auszubilden. Man dürfe nicht selbstzufrieden werden. Es sei notwendig, daß der Feuerwehrdienst immer bereit sei.

Italienischer Wehrmachtbericht –
Feindkreuzer torpediert

dnb. Rom, 18. August –
Die harte Schlacht in Sizilien, in der die italienisch-deutschen Truppen 40 Tage lang erbittert gegen die starke Übermacht der englisch-amerikanischen Luft-, See- und Landstreitkräfte kämpften, fand, wie der Italienische Wehrmachtbericht vom Mittwoch meldet, gestern ihren Abschluß. Die letzten Nachhutverbände verließen die nordöstlichste Spitze der Insel und erreichten die Küste Kalabriens.

Die italienisch-deutsche Luftwaffe war sehr aktiv, griff wirksam feindliche im Hafen von Biserta vor Anker liegende Schiffe an und verursachte im Hafen von Syrakus einen starken Brand. Ein Tanker wurde bei der Insel Cani von einem unserer Bomber getroffen und in Brand gesetzt. Torpedoflugzeuge trafen einen feindlichen Kreuzer in der Nähe von Cap Passero, versenkten ein Handelsschiff nördlich von Bone und beschädigten einen weiteren Dampfer des gleichen Geleitzuges schwer. Zwei feindliche Flugzeuge wurden von Jägern abgeschossen.

Feindliche Flugzeuge warfen Bomben auf Castrovillari, das Gebiet von Salerno und einige Ortschaften der Umgebung von Neapel. Es entsland einiger Schaden. Ein Verband viermotoriger Flugzeuge verlor in Norditalien drei Flugzeuge, die von der Flak abgeschossen wurden, ein viertes Flugzeug stürzte, von unserer Bodenabwehr getroffen, bei Hyeres ab.

Browns und Werths Vernichtungsplan für den ‚Weltfrieden‘ –
Deutschlands Auslieferung an die Sowjetmörder

Hube – der einarmige Panzergeneral –
Die Seele des sizilianischen Widerstandes

Von Kriegsberichter Lutz Koch

dnb. …, 18. August, pk. –
Wenn heute die tapferen deutschen Divisionen, die mehr als fünf Wochen auf Sizilien der vielfachen Überzahl an Soldaten, Waffen und Material der 8. englischen und 7. amerikanischen Armee mit einem beispiellosen Heldentum standgehalten haben, sich auf europäischem Festland befinden, um mit den dort schon stehenden anderen deutschen Divisionen den Kontinent selbst gegen anglo-amerikanische Landungsabsichten verteidigen zu können, so ist das nicht zuletzt das große Verdienst des Kommandierenden Generals der deutschen Truppen auf Sizilien, General der Panzertruppe Hans Hube. Schon in dem Augenblick, als ihm die oberste militärische Führung zur Verteidigung Siziliens nach dem Süden berief, war es neben der Organisierung des beispielhaften Widerstands an allen sizilianischen Fronten, der Tag für Tag schwerere Lücken in die englisch-nordamerikanische Angriffsfront riß und zu einem waren Aderlaß der von den Achsenmächten schon auf tunesischem Boden erprobten Feindarmeen wurde, damals schon seine Aufgabe, eine mögliche Aufgabe des Inselraums zu planen und ihr eine Durchführung zu geben, die ordnungsgemäße Rückführung der Einheiten, vor allem auch der wertvollen schweren Waffen und der Fahrzeuge, so sicherzustellen, daß auf dem Festland sofort wieder schlagartig einsatzbereite. Verbände vorhanden waren.

Wenn man weiß, wie das Angreifen, das Durchboxen um jeden Preis zu der besonderen Charakteristik dieses Panzergenerals gehört, der trotz eines schon im Weltkrieg verlorenen Armes der soldatischen Berufung seiner Familie treu blieb und im Ablauf von 17 Monaten das Ritterkreuz, das Eichenlaub und zuletzt am 21. Dezember 1942 das Eichenlaub mit Schwertern zum Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes für außerordentliche Führungs- und Tapferkeitstaten vom Führer verliehen bekam, kann man sich auch vorstellen, wie stark gerade diesen sich immer im Angriff verzehrenden General diese besondere Aufgabe zunächst seelisch belastet haben mag.

Zwei Ziele mußten erfüllt werden: Zerschlagung der gegnerischen Angriffe unter Einsatz aller Machtmittel und damit Gewinnung von Zeit, um das zweite, die planvolle Rückverlegung der Fronten, das langsame Heranschieben der Einheiten an die Straße von Messina und schließlich die allmähliche Rückführung von Menschen und Material bewerkstelligen zu können. Nichts ist dem mutig Kämpfenden verhaßter als das ständige Schielen nach einer Rückendeckung oder das Bewußtsein, daß die im Augenblick behauptete Stellung schon in Tagen oder Stunden aufgegeben wird.

Allzu leicht – wie oft haben wir das bei unseren Feinden erlebt – wird eine solche theoretische Planung zu einer hemmungslosen Flucht. Nur einer Truppe wie den deutschen Sizilien-Divisionen konnte die höhere Führung in vollem Vertrauen den Befehl geben, zu kämpfen und dennoch in einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt das Feld zu räumen, weil ein höherer Zweck das Zurückgehen notwendig machte.

Die kämpferischen Qualitäten des Panzergenerals Hube, der einst im August 1941 das Ritterkreuz erhielt, weil der damalige Generalmajor an der Spitze seiner Panzerdivision in kühner, unaufhaltsamer Verfolgung des sowjetischen Gegners im südlichen Abschnitt der Ostfront maßgeblich zu den entscheidenden Erfolgen einer deutschen Armee beigetragen ha mußten sich nun in dieser Organisierung des ständigen harten Zupackens nach vorne und des allmählichen Herauslösens entbehrlicher Teile in doppeltem Sinne bewähren.

General Hube zwang in den letzten Wochen des Sizilien-Feldzuges, als sich für alle schon das Zurückgehen klar abzeichnete, seinen sich heldenmütig kämpfenden Einheiten ebenso seinen Willen zum Durchhalten und allzeit zu jedem Gegenschlag bereiten Zurückgehen auf die immer sich verengende Dreieckstellung mit der Spitze Messina auf, wie er es einst bei der großen Kesselschlacht von Kiew getan hatte, wo er, meist bei den vordersten Angriffstruppen führend, den ungestümen Drang nach vorwärts auf den letzten Soldaten seiner Division übertrug, so entscheidende Erfolge durch seine persönliche Tapferkeit miterringen half und dafür schon im Jänner 1942 das Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz erhielt.

Als 62. Soldat der deutschen Wehrmacht hat er diese hohe Auszeichnung aus der Hand des Führers empfangen, und, noch nicht ein Jahr später, wird ihm als 22. Offizier der deutschen Wehrmacht das Eichenlaub mit Schwertern als „einem in zahlreichen Kämpfen zweier Kriege und jetzt in verantwortungsvoller Stellung auf das höchste bewährten Offizier“ verliehen.

Der Kommandeur auf der letzten Fähre

Noch als von den Divisionen nur noch Bataillone und schließlich nur noch Kompanien auf der Insel waren, fand die kämpfende Front ihren „Kommandierenden“ mitten unter sich, genau so wie die anderen deutschen Generale mit den letzten Teilen ihrer Divisionen sich übersetzen ließen.

Der aufrecht auf der letzten Fähre die Insel bei Messina, das in Rauch und Flammen untergeht, verlassende General Hube, der kämpfende Soldat unter seinen Männern, die sich fünf Wochen wie die Löwen geschlagen haben, wird in der letzten Stunde des Sizilien-Kampfes noch einmal zum Symbol des Widerstandes. Er hat seine Divisionen zu manchem Abwehrsieg auf der Insel geführt, und – das ist sein einmaliges und großes Verdienst – er hat sie mit ihren Waffen zurückgebracht, um sie in die europäische Abwehrfront dort einbauen zu können, wo er angesichts der Straße von Messina und der nahen sizilianischen Insel in jeder Minute die blutvolle Erinnerung des sizilianischen Heldenkampfes unserer Soldaten und schwerster, vernichtender Verluste des Gegners vor Augen hat.

Sizilien und Messina wurden zu keinem deutschen Dünkirchen, und General Hube ist es, der von der aufgegebenen Insel das wehende Banner des Widerstandes über die Straße von Messina, die nach dem Willen des Gegners unser Grab hätte sein sollen, nach der Festung Europa herüberbrachte.

The Pittsburgh Press (August 19, 1943)

YANKS RIP FRENCH AIRPORTS
Heavy blasts heard from Channel area

Buildings in England shake as air offensive is resumed

U.S. warships shell Italy

Allies bombard mainland from land, sea, air; harbors blasted
By Reynolds Packard, United Press staff writer

Jap New Guinea air base erased by Allied raiders

28 of 30 enemy fighters shot down over Wewak in cleanup attack northwest of Salamaua
By Brydon Taves, United Press staff writer

What the f?!! 12 years old? How is that not pedophila

1 Like

Giving me some Child Bride flashbacks…

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Invasion plan all prepared, Québec hears

Commander-in-Chief also believed chosen for European push
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

KingRooseveltChurchill
Fate of Europe may be decided at the Allied conferences in Québec at which these men are some of the leading figures. At the top are Canadian Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill; below, President Roosevelt and the Earl of Athlone, Governor General of Canada.

Québec, Canada –
Military decisions for the early invasion of Western Europe have been completed, including the naming of the Allied general who will direct the decisive campaign, it appeared today as President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill took up related political strategy.

The name of the Allied commander for the moment is a closely guarded secret, but Mr. Churchill is known to favor Gen. Harold Alexander, at present chief of land operations under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Mediterranean Theater. Gen. Eisenhower would also be a contender but, in the event of a simultaneous smash from the south, his services would probably be required there.

May pick ‘dark horse’

There has been some speculation here that a “dark horse” or relatively unknown military man might get the important post, such as Maj. Gen. Alexander Gatehouse, commander of armored forces at El Alamein.

The Allies must also name a commander for the East Asia Theater, which was created by separation from the India Command. Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck succeeded Field Marshal Viscount Wavell as commander-in-chief in India when the latter was appointed Viceroy. It was believed that the East Asia Command would go to an American.

Eden in Québec

Anthony Eden, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, arrived here yesterday.

U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull said in Washington that he expects to leave late today for Québec. He will be accompanied by James C. Dunn, State Department political advisor on European affairs.

It was apparent Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill are dealing with the highest phases of both the military and political campaigns when it was revealed they had no scheduled callers at the historic Citadel where they are living in complete informality under one roof.

It was apparent to observers here that, as the political questions are taken up, the Soviet Union more and more became an integral part of the picture. While it was certain that precise boundaries will not be discussed in the absence of the governments-in-exile or without prior consultation with China and the Soviet Union, the territorial demands of all must undoubtedly be foreseen and appraised.

The Russians have for centuries desired an opening on the warm waters of the Pacific and on the Mediterranean. China, too, undoubtedly will have some claim on certain territories, such as Hong Kong and Formosa.

A further element in the political picture was the planning necessary to maintain the hopes of the conquered peoples of Western Europe who have become increasingly restless and impatient at the tardiness of the Allies in rescuing them from their Nazi conquerors.

Seeks diversion of foe

Important in connection with future political relationships was Russian dissatisfaction with Allied failure to divert in any large number of German forces on the Eastern Front. Russia’s desires have called for the removal of at least 60 German divisions of the more than 200 ranged against her.

From Algiers came reports of intensive massing and regrouping of the Allied armies in the Mediterranean area which, it was predicted, would permit speedier execution of the plans Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill were drawing. In that connection, it was to be remembered that the United States, as well as the other Allies, have had several months to transport men and equipment while the North African and Sicilian campaigns were being pushed.

Keep Axis guessing

For that reason, it may well be that final plans already prepared by the chiefs of staff will not cause any substantial regrouping or rearrangement of men and material and shipping.

Meanwhile, Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill were losing no opportunity to keep the Axis guessing about where and when the next great blow will be struck.

Decisions of the greatest importance were being made in the heavily-protected Citadel. And the principals were only too happy to see the Axis squirming in uninformed discomfort over what activation of the plans being made here will mean to the German and Jap armies and conquests.

Invasion expected

Some tangible information on the conferences will be made available today by White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early after he confers with Brendan Bracken, head of the British Ministry of Information.

This much was certain: The decisions of the Québec conferences will be manifest only on the battlefields on the world, probably soon. It was generally accepted here that these manifestations would be a full-scale invasion of Europe.

Meanwhile, there were widely circulated reports that Mr. Churchill or Mr. Eden, or both, would go to Moscow at the conclusion of the conference to tell Premier Joseph Stalin about the decisions.

Tougher WLB cracks down on CIO union

Checkoff denied at Chrysler; anthracite case taken in hand

Rah rah rah – rugh!
Female grid coach plans to teach surprise system

She is going to fool her players, opponents and herself