|
Present |
|
| United States |
|
United Kingdom |
| Admiral Leahy |
|
General Brooke |
| General Marshall |
|
Admiral of the Fleet Pound |
| Admiral King |
|
Air Chief Marshal Portal |
| General Arnold |
|
Field Marshal Dill |
| Lieutenant General Somervell |
|
Vice Admiral Mountbatten |
| Vice Admiral Willson |
|
Lieutenant General Ismay |
| Rear Admiral Cooke |
|
General Riddell-Webster |
| Rear Admiral Badger |
|
Admiral Noble |
| Major General Handy |
|
Lieutenant General Macready |
| Major General Fairchild |
|
Air Marshal Welsh |
| Brigadier General Kuter |
|
Captain Lambe |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer |
|
Brigadier Porter |
| Commander Freseman |
|
Air Commodore Elliot |
| Commander Long |
|
Captain Tollemache |
|
Secretariat |
|
| Brigadier General Deane |
|
Brigadier Redman |
| Captain Royal |
|
Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
August 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the Previous Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these conclusions, certain amendments made to CCS 319/3 would necessitate consequential amendments in CCS 319/2.
Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 319/3)
Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister contained in CCS 319/3.
Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below.
In the course of discussion, General Marshall suggested that there might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that it had originally been thought that it might be possible to put the Commander-in-Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter’s operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented.
General Marshall said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties, but had hoped that some system similar to the French “zones des armées” might be instituted.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that this point had also been considered and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area.
General Arnold suggested that with regard to the examination of future operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, since the possession of these islands would be of great value to operations in this Theater.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the Planning Staff would certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the operations which they had been instructed to examine.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (subsequently circulated as CCS 319/4), and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at the Citadel.
Japanese Treatment of Prisoners
General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum on the treatment of U.S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. This memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme.
Pipeline From India to China (CCS 312; 312/1)
It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in CCS 312 might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma.
General Somervell said that the U.S. craft sent to India for the pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired.
After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved, subject to prior requirements of military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.
Operations From India (CCS 327)
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that there were three possible courses open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44, and that it seemed clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow of the full accomplishment of more than one of these.
General Somervell pointed out that operations in North Burma would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the capacity of the lines of communication.
After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.
b. That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he should regard the decision in a above as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the lines of communication.
Movement of the QUEENS (CCS 246/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the QUEENS should revert to running on a 21-day cycle.
Amphibians for OVERLORD (CCS 326)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 326 until after the QUADRANT conference.
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals (CCS 317/1-317/2-317/3)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 1943 be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September–31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.
b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio (W7177) of 13 August 1943.
Operation RANKIN (CCS 320)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces could be used for occupation purposes. An insufficient emphasis had been laid on the value of air power to quell the population.
Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.
Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the recommendation, contained in Paragraph 20b, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group was of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN contained in CCS 320, but directed that this plan be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.
b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would give early consideration to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom.
Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories (CCS 324/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of CCS 324/1.
Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic (CCS 222/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this paper.
Meeting With Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day.
Future Meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1030 on Tuesday, 24 August.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Québec, 23 August 1943.
Most secret
CCS 327
Operations From India
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We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
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These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.
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Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief’s views, and we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:
a. Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at TRIDENT for Northern Burma.
b. The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.
c. If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinleck’s opinion the extensive use of LRPGs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the LRPGs must be followed up by our main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.
d. Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer-term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.
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We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
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Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943-44; and it seems clear that the existing capacity of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:
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First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the airlift to China.
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Second Course. To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.
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Third Course. To adopt a longer-term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.
- We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the L. of C.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Québec, 23 August 1943.
Most secret
CCS 317/3
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals
We agree with the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once subparagraphs 10a and b of CCS 317, provided that the following is inserted at the end of subparagraph a, “insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.”
If you agree, we suggest that the necessary action should now be taken without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT.