CANDIDLY SPEAKING —
Read it and eat!
By Maxine Garrison
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Millett: Proud days are promised for children of soldiers
Lucky are fathers who are permitted to remain at home but others will be true heroes
By Ruth Millett
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World Series teams may tour war area
Plans revealed prematurely through ‘leak;’ War Department OK awaited
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U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)
Roosevelt-Robertson meeting, forenoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Canada | |
| President Roosevelt | Mr. Robertson |
During the morning Roosevelt received Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs.
I’m finished with it 
1 Like
Roosevelt-Churchill-Soong luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | China |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Foreign Minister Soong |
| Mr. Hopkins |
Roosevelt lunched with Churchill, Soong, and Hopkins. Soong thanked Hull for mentioning to Roosevelt at Québec the problem of “the 40,000 tons of munitions promised China by Canada and later revoked by Canada at the request of Mr. Currie” and “said that he [Soong] followed this up with a talk with the President which was satisfactory.” The occasion on which Soong discussed this question with Roosevelt has not been definitely identified, but the luncheon meeting of August 23, 1943, appears to have been the most likely opportunity for such a discussion.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Admiral Noble | |
| Major General Handy | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Major General Fairchild | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Brigadier General Kuter | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Wedemeyer | Brigadier Porter | |
| Commander Freseman | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Long | Captain Tollemache | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | Brigadier Redman | |
| Captain Royal | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
August 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the Previous Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these conclusions, certain amendments made to CCS 319/3 would necessitate consequential amendments in CCS 319/2.
Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 319/3)
Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister contained in CCS 319/3.
Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below.
In the course of discussion, General Marshall suggested that there might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that it had originally been thought that it might be possible to put the Commander-in-Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter’s operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented.
General Marshall said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties, but had hoped that some system similar to the French “zones des armées” might be instituted.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that this point had also been considered and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area.
General Arnold suggested that with regard to the examination of future operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, since the possession of these islands would be of great value to operations in this Theater.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the Planning Staff would certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the operations which they had been instructed to examine.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (subsequently circulated as CCS 319/4), and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at the Citadel.
Japanese Treatment of Prisoners
General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum on the treatment of U.S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. This memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme.
Pipeline From India to China (CCS 312; 312/1)
It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in CCS 312 might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma.
General Somervell said that the U.S. craft sent to India for the pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired.
After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved, subject to prior requirements of military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.
Operations From India (CCS 327)
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that there were three possible courses open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44, and that it seemed clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow of the full accomplishment of more than one of these.
General Somervell pointed out that operations in North Burma would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the capacity of the lines of communication.
After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.
b. That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he should regard the decision in a above as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the lines of communication.
Movement of the QUEENS (CCS 246/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the QUEENS should revert to running on a 21-day cycle.
Amphibians for OVERLORD (CCS 326)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 326 until after the QUADRANT conference.
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals (CCS 317/1-317/2-317/3)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 1943 be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September–31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.
b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio (W7177) of 13 August 1943.
Operation RANKIN (CCS 320)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces could be used for occupation purposes. An insufficient emphasis had been laid on the value of air power to quell the population.
Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.
Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the recommendation, contained in Paragraph 20b, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group was of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN contained in CCS 320, but directed that this plan be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.
b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would give early consideration to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom.
Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories (CCS 324/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of CCS 324/1.
Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic (CCS 222/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this paper.
Meeting With Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day.
Future Meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1030 on Tuesday, 24 August.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Québec, 23 August 1943.
Most secret
CCS 327
Operations From India
-
We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
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These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.
-
Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief’s views, and we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:
a. Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at TRIDENT for Northern Burma.
b. The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.
c. If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinleck’s opinion the extensive use of LRPGs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the LRPGs must be followed up by our main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.
d. Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer-term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.
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We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
-
Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943-44; and it seems clear that the existing capacity of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:
- First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the airlift to China.
- Second Course. To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.
- Third Course. To adopt a longer-term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.
- We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the L. of C.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Québec, 23 August 1943.
Most secret
CCS 317/3
Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals
We agree with the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once subparagraphs 10a and b of CCS 317, provided that the following is inserted at the end of subparagraph a, “insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.”
If you agree, we suggest that the necessary action should now be taken without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT.
Roosevelt-Mountbatten meeting, 5 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Vice Admiral Mountbatten |
Roosevelt conferred with Mountbatten for half an hour beginning at 5 p.m.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | General Brooke | |
| Admiral Leahy | Admiral of the Fleet Pound | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshal Dill | |
| General Arnold | Vice Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Rear Admiral Brown | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | Brigadier Jacob |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
August 23, 1943, 5:30 p.m.
Secret
At the request of the Prime Minister, Brigadier Jacob read CCS 819/3[319/4], a draft of the Final Report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister containing the conclusions of the Quadrant Conferences.
There was no comment on Sections I, II, and III.
Facilities in the Azores Islands
With reference to Section IV, paragraph 1b, the Prime Minister asked if any measures had been taken as yet to prepare a combined British-U.S. convoy including escorts and air support to move to the Azores about two weeks after the original British occupation on 8 October.
Admiral King said that arrangements would be made for such a convoy to leave the United States on or about 20 October.
Emergency Operation to Enter the Continent
The President asked if a study was being made regarding an emergency entrance of the Continent and indicated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians.
General Brooke replied that General Morgan’s staff had prepared plans for such an entry and that they were based on several contingencies. These include ‘a weakening of German resistance, a withdrawal of the German forces from France, or a complete German collapse.
Operation OVERLORD
The Prime Minister stated that he wished it definitely understood that British acceptance of the planning for Operation OVERLORD included the proviso that the operation could only be carried out in the event that certain conditions regarding German strength were met. These included the number of German divisions to be in France and a definite superiority over the German fighter force at the time of the initial assault. Further, that if it developed that the German ground or air fighter strength proved to be greater than that upon which success of the plan was premised, the question as to whether or not the operations should be launched would be subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In this connection he suggested that the United Nations have a “second string to their bow” in the form of a prepared plan to undertake Operation JUPITER. He did not in any way wish to imply that he was not wholeheartedly in favor of OVERLORD, but, at the same time, he wished to emphasize that its launching was dependent upon certain conditions which would give it a reasonable chance for success.
It was decided that the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister should include a paragraph which would provide for continued planning for the launching of Operation JUPITER in the event that OVERLORD should have to be abandoned.
The Prime Minister also discussed the question of moving seven trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England. He agreed that at this time the decision to return the seven divisions to England was firm but that it was subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if the strategic situation seemed to make such review advisable. He asked General Brooke if that was definitely understood.
General Brooke said that at the present time it was planned that the seven trained divisions would return from the Mediterranean to England to participate in OVERLORD unless the situation forced the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reconsider this decision. This decision of course would be dependent upon the enemy situation at the time. It might be necessary to keep one or two of these trained divisions in the Mediterranean in order to create a more favorable situation for the success of OVERLORD or to avoid a setback in Italy.
The Prime Minister said that if it becomes necessary to make an interchange of divisions between England and the Mediterranean, it might be clone without prejudice to the move of the seven divisions by exchanging others. For example, it might be necessary to send out a second Canadian division to complete a Canadian Corps and bring home a British division in its place. Meanwhile, he stated he had heard Brigadier MacLean give a presentation of the OVERLORD plan and that it seemed sound, but should be strengthened.
General Marshall agreed to this and pointed out that actually there would be four and one-half divisions in the initial assault rather than a force of three divisions which had been suggested at the last conference with the President and the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister asked if this would include an attack on the inside of the Cotentin Peninsula.
General Marshall said the present plans would not provide for such an operation but that if more landing craft could be made available there was a possibility that this landing would be included in the initial assault.
The Prime Minister expressed some surprise that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, had been designated as Naval Commander and he indicated that he had always thought of this officer as having administrative rather than outstanding tactical ability. He agreed with the choice of Air Commander-in-Chief.
Sir Dudley Pound said that he felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth was the logical person to be given this command, particularly at this time. During the preliminary phases much of the naval planning and operations had to be accomplished between adjoining naval commands in Great Britain and he was the logical person to coordinate it. He said that if later events indicated the desirability, there would be no difficulty in designating a new commander.
The Prime Minister said that he had thought of giving this position to Admiral Ramsay who had been in command of the British naval operations in the attack on Sicily under the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean. He would accept the present arrangement only if it were subject to review on the appointment of the Supreme Commander.
In discussing the transport of troops across the channel, the President recalled that in 1917 two light American passenger vessels, the HARVARD and the YALE, had been sent to England and had been utilized very successfully in transporting troops across the channel. He suggested that the world should be combed to see if vessels of this type could not be made available and thus increase the troop lift from England to France.
Admiral King said that the United States had been pretty well explored in this connection but he would see what else could be done.
The Prime Minister indicated the possibility of asking Canada to help out in this respect.
Operations in Italy and Southern France
The Prime Minister said that there had recently been rumors that the Germans were planning to defend the Ravenna-Genoa Line in Italy, which is about 50 or 60 miles north of the Ancona-Pisa Line. He thought that our forces should proceed as far beyond their objective as possible with the troops allocated for the purpose.
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt the Germans must defend on the forward or southern slope of the Apennines, in which case they would be somewhat south of the Ravenna-Genoa Line.
Admiral King agreed with this and thought that the terrain dictated a German defense on the Leghorn-Ancona position.
The Prime Minister felt that the further north in Italy the United Nations were able to progress, the easier would become the supply of guerrillas who might be assembled in the Maritime Alps. In this connection he said he was glad to see that steps had already been taken to investigate the possibility of intensifying fifth column activities in Sardinia. He thought that organizations such as the OSS and the British SOE should certainly enter Sardinia at this time. However, he suggested that if Italy capitulates, Sardinia would probably come into our hands without a struggle.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there were conflicting reports in this regard. One was that the Germans would attempt to hold Sardinia and another was that they were assembling landing craft between Sardinia and Corsica for the purpose of effecting an evacuation.
The Prime Minister said that if an advance into Southern France appeared to be likely he thought that General Giraud and General de Gaulle should be brought into consultation by General Eisenhower and that French forces should be fully utilized.
The President indicated that he felt guerrilla operations could be initiated in south central France as well as in the Maritime Alps.
The War Against Japan
The Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that the Chiefs of Staff included provision that plans should be made for the defeat of Japan within 12 months after the collapse of Germany; this at least would be a target towards which we should work and it discouraged planning on the basis of a prolonged war of attrition.
The paragraphs concerning operations in the Central Pacific were read and the Prime Minister suggested that these should result in bringing on a naval battle with the Japanese Fleet.
Admiral King said that was one of their main purposes but he did not feel that a large battle would develop until our forces had reached the Marianas.
Operations in the India-Burma0China Theater
The Prime Minister then asked for an explanation of what was meant by the directive to the Commanding General of the Southeast Asia Command that he should give priority to operations in Northern Burma but at the same time keep in mind the long-term necessities for improving the lines of communication.
Sir Alan Brooke said that priority must be set between operations and the maintenance of the lines of communications. This directive to the Commanding General, Southeast Asia Command, had been put forward to emphasize the importance of the Burma operations and, at the same time, to caution him to take a long-range view of the necessity for building up his lines of communication, without which no communications would be possible.
General Arnold pointed out to the President that in giving priority to the operations in Northern Burma, the delivery of supplies into China might be reduced. He said he did not disagree with the decision but he had been charged with the responsibility for the delivery of supplies to China and he wished to point out that giving first priority to the reconquest of Northern Burma might make it impossible for him completely to fulfill his responsibility.
The Prime Minister said that this would be largely a matter of judgment for the commander on the ground. He cited the necessity of sending some 2,000 men to Yunnan as part of General Wingate’s force to cover the Chinese advance from Yunnan. This would be an instance in which the delivery of supplies to China would be temporarily but justifiably interfered with.
The President said that he wished to establish some proviso which would prevent commanders on the supply lines in China confiscating supplies intended for China for use in their own theaters.
General Marshall replied that he thought that situation had been pretty well taken care of However, he said that it was necessary for someone on the ground to have authority to make decisions regarding priorities. He said that if, for example, it was arbitrarily decided to use the entire capacity of the air transport route to supply General Chennault with gasoline, this very decision might jeopardize the success of the Burma operations which in themselves were essential to keeping China in the war.
The Prime Minister then referred to studies that were directed in the report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said that as far as he was concerned he had no objection to a study being made regarding the capture of Singapore but he was very much opposed to such an operation being adopted for 1945 if action in 1944 was thereby curtailed.
He would personally be quite unable to agree to an operation for the capture of Akyab and Ramree as the main amphibious operation for the Indian Ocean in 1944. At the TRIDENT Conference, the capture of Akyab had been spoken of as a preliminary to operations in Southern Burma for the capture of Rangoon. Rangoon had then been dropped out for 1943-44, but Akyab had been retained, mainly to please Chiang Kai-shek. Later developments showed that the capture of Akyab would be a dangerous, sterile and costly operation directed against a point where the Japanese would be expecting attack. If we undertook it, we would hamstring operations in the Indian Ocean area to little purpose. He was quite prepared for a study of the operation to be made, and it might well prove right to carry it out as a sequel to some more profitable operation elsewhere; but he would not himself be able to subscribe to it as our main amphibious operation in the coming year.
The President said General Wingate had informed him that the capture of Rangoon would not cut the Japanese line of communications since they were now largely supplied overland from French Indo China and Thailand.
Southeast Asia Command
The President asked if Thailand was included in the Chinese Theater.
Admiral Leahy replied that both French Indo China and Thailand had been included in the Chinese Theater. At the beginning of the discussion on the Southeast Asia Command, it had been intended that French Indo China should be included in it. However, any operations in this area were so far in the future that it was not necessary to include French Indo China in the new command at this time. The situation with regard to Thailand, however, was quite different. Operations to be undertaken by the Southeast Asia Command might well envisage a conquest of Thailand. Forces of the Southeast Asia Command were in a position to carry out such an operation if it appeared to be desirable, whereas, Chinese forces could do nothing as far as this area is concerned. He therefore felt that regardless of what the commitments to the Generalissimo might have been, Thailand should definitely be included in the area of the Southeast Asia Command.
Admiral King indicated that a check was to be made to see if French Indo China and Thailand had not been removed from the Chinese Theater in a more recent definition of bounds.
The Prime Minister said that he was anxious to make a public announcement regarding the formation of the Southeast Asia Command and also to indicate who the commander was to be. He thought that such a public announcement would indicate that much of the discussions at the QUADRANT Conferences had been concerned with the war against Japan which would set forth a sufficient reason as to why Russia had not been included in the deliberations. He asked General Ismay to make up a short statement for release to the press.
The President said that the statement should make it clear that the Generalissimo still retains command of the Chinese Theater.
General Marshall said that the announcement should be written in such a way as not to mention the use of Chinese troops in the Southeast Asia Command or give any indication of General Stilwell’s place in the command setup. He said that General Stilwell is still the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff and that it would be offensive to the Generalissimo if he were not to be consulted before Stilwell was assigned his additional position. Moreover, he might expect that a Chinese deputy would be appointed. Actually, General Stilwell is being made Deputy Supreme Commander for the purpose of protecting Chinese interests and also to try and insure that Chinese forces would carry out their share of the plans devised by the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.
Admiral King pointed out that the mere announcement of the formation of the Southeast Asia Command would indicate General Stilwell’s status at once. He thought that any announcement should be delayed until after the Generalissimo had been informed of the decisions.
Mr. Hopkins said that Dr. Soong had said that he had just had a telegram from the Generalissimo saying that the Supreme Allied Commander should be appointed forthwith.
The Prime Minister thought that any difficulty could be overcome by making the announcement to the press extremely brief. He suggested, for example, that it might be as follows:
It has been decided to establish a combined separate Southeast Asia Command. The Supreme Commander will be (here give the officer designated by name).
He felt that the shorter the announcement the better it would be. General agreement was expressed with this proposal.
The Prime Minister then asked General Marshall if it would not be wise to place a paragraph in the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister providing for the designation of a British liaison officer as a member of General MacArthur’s staff.
General Marshall replied that he did not feel it would be necessary to include such a statement in the paper, but that he would see that the suggestion was carried out immediately.
Spain
The Prime Minister asked if the Chiefs of Staff’s recommendations regarding Spain had been submitted to the Foreign Office.
General Ismay informed him that the suggestions had been sent to the Foreign Office but no comments had as yet been received.
The Prime Minister indicated then that before committing himself on these recommendations he would like to have the advice of his government. He said that personally he did not favor putting “economic screws” on Spain at this time. The situation was still too critical. For instance, there were the negotiations with Portugal which should be settled before a new attitude regarding Spain is adopted. He said, however, that in any event even though the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were approved, the timing as to their execution would have to be determined by the governments.
Turkey
The Prime Minister expressed disagreement with the proposal to have the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East empowered to determine what amount of supplies Turkey could absorb. He felt that this decision should be retained by the British Government. He said that the time has now come to ask Turkey for something in return for the aid which the United Nations have been giving her. He thought the Turks would be considerably relieved if they were only asked to carry out the recommendations submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than being asked to give up their neutrality and enter the war.
It was decided to delete any reference to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East’s being allowed to determine the amount of supplies to be given Turkey.
Meeting of Dr. Soong with the Combined Chiefs of Staff
After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would ask Dr. Soong to meet with them on Tuesday, 24 August.
740.00119 European War 1939/1656
Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs
Washington, August 23, 1943.
Memorandum
Mr. Matthews: I attended a drafting session at the War Department this morning in connection with the terms, other than military, to be imposed upon Italy in the event of a surrender. The military terms are already in General Eisenhower’s possession. Representatives of the British Embassy military and naval missions were present. These further terms were drawn up and agreed to by both the British and American representatives for transmission to Quebec today with the exception of four articles nos. 3, 4, 5a and 29. The British representatives were unable to accept these articles and we agreed to send them to Quebec pointing out our differences. Among the articles to which the British could not give their concurrence were:
No. 3, the exercise of the prerogatives of the crown will be suspended in all Italian territories. The powers of the central Italian Government will be suspended in all occupied areas as are designated by the allied commander-in-chief as Military Districts.
No. 4 …
No. 5a. Subject to the supreme authority of the allied commander-in-chief, the Italian Government will exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers in all unoccupied areas, these functions to continue only until, the general military situation permitting, the people of Italy shall have an opportunity freely to determine the form of permanent government, based on democratic principles, to be established in their country.
The other points on which we agreed to disagree were of a military character and of no particular concern to the Department.
Already approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, under General Hilldring, was the draft instrument of surrender of Italy called the “comprehensive” document because it includes military as well as other terms. This document is designed to supersede the military terms already in General Eisenhower’s hands and give him one complete instrument of surrender. This plan and procedure are generally preferred by the British representatives. It has been agreed to, as stated above, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and in our opinion is all right as far as it goes. We do not feel, however, in spite of its designation as “comprehensive” that it is sufficiently complete.
The American representatives generally favor the alternate plan and procedure which are to supplement the military terms already in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief with the additional terms necessary to define our relationship to the defeated Italian Government. These further terms, we believe, are more complete than the “comprehensive” document and do in fact contain certain political provisions not included in the “comprehensive” document.
When I left the Pentagon Building this noon, it was agreed that both plans would be sent to Quebec by plane today with the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff select the plan and procedure they prefer.
About 2:30 p.m. Colonel Laux of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department called to say that General Hilldring felt that the British reservations on the “American document” prejudiced the entire acceptance of the American plan; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be inclined to take the document on which agreement had been reached and wondered if the Department would not be willing to withdraw the two articles quoted above which caused our British colleagues to withhold their approval. He said that the War Department was prepared to withdraw the two articles of military character to which the British objected. I told the Colonel that the Department felt very strongly about retaining the two political articles referred to; that it was true that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff chose the “British plan” these political provisions would not appear, but that we felt they should be submitted to Quebec for consideration. I said that while I regretted to have to insist on inclusion of certain terms which might jeopardize the acceptance of the whole “American plan,” I felt that we could not omit them and thus leave ourselves open to possible future charges from the military that we had failed to give them proper advice on certain political phases of the highest importance with respect to the Italian situation. He asked if the Department’s position was, then, that we could not agree to have the controversial political provisions withdrawn and I answered in the affirmative.
J WESLEY JONES
Hull-Eden meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary Hull | Foreign Secretary Eden |
Eden and Hull had “a brief but useful discussion about Soviet frontiers,” and that he had given Hull a note about “probable Russian demands.” It is possible that this meeting was also the occasion on which a British paper on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation which is marked “7:30 p.m. August 23” was handed to Hull.
740.00119 EW/8–2543: Telegram
The British Foreign Secretary to the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
QUADRANT, [undated.]
Most secret
Important
President and Prime Minister are now agreed on text of comprehensive instrument for text of which see my telegram No. [blank.]
Please telegraph this to H.M. Ambassador in Lisbon, instructing him that if and when Italians return, it should be given to them with the explanation that this document embodies the points already handed to them and also contains the additional points which they were warned to expect.
Combined Chiefs of Staff are sending text to General Eisenhower, with similar instructions, in case Italians get into direct touch with his Headquarters.
The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State
Québec, August 23, 1943.
In December 1941 Stalin informed the Foreign Secretary that he regarded the question of USSR’s western frontiers as “the main question for us in the war.”
Stalin during the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Moscow in 1941, Molotov in London in 1942 and Maisky speaking to the Foreign Secretary in March 1943, have all said that Curzon Line with minor modifications would be satisfactory basis for frontier settlement.
Neither His Majesty’s Government nor, so far as we are aware, United States Government, have indicated to Soviet Government what their views on this question are. We have little doubt, however, that the Soviet Government would be much easier to deal with on Polish and other matters if His Majesty’s Government and United States Government could let them know that we are prepared in practice to contemplate a substantial measure of satisfaction on what we understand Soviet territorial claims to be, while not abandoning our principle of not recognising during the war any territorial changes.
His Majesty’s Government consider that an equitable solution of Russian claims would be something on the following lines: (a) Poland to receive in the west Danzig, East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and to be content in the east with the Curzon Line adjusted to include city of Lwów in Poland. (b) Other frontiers. – Eventual recognition of Russia’s 1941 frontiers with Finland and Roumania, and of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States.
If the views of the United States Government do not differ radically from the above, there might be a basis for a joint intimation of our views to Soviet Government, in the course of any discussion with them of the general post-war settlement. His Majesty’s Government wish to consider advisability of such action now because:
(a) Recent exchanges of personal telegrams between the Prime Minister and Stalin show that the latter desires closer consultation on future operations. This is natural now that we are embarked on operations in Europe which are likely soon to affect south-eastern Europe more or less directly. The views of Soviet Government will have to be taken into consideration and their attitude is likely to be suspicious and uncooperative unless they get some reassurances upon this “main question” of frontiers.
(b) When some time ago His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow broached with M. Molotov the question of the Soviet attitude to postwar questions in Germany, he received a definite indication that the Soviet Government wished to discuss such matters with His Majesty’s Government and United States Government, with a view to reaching firm agreement. The matter has not been pursued pending discussion with United States Government, but if we want to break down Soviet suspicions and get into real contact with them on major matters we think it unwise to leave discussions further in suspense. The organisation of a Free German Movement is an added reason for resuming discussions.
We for our part would not wish to announce formally any understanding that might be reached with the Soviet on these lines, and we should also ask them to keep it to themselves until such time as it could be presented as part of a general territorial settlement.
We must face the fact that, if we do proceed thus, we cannot be certain that publicity will not be given to the facts either from the Soviet or the Polish side.
There could, of course, be no intention of giving the Soviet Government satisfaction on the point of frontiers unless they, on their side, are willing to play a useful part in post-war organisation as we conceive it. But it is so certain that the Russians will raise this point if we get into discussion that it seems essential that we should know how we propose to deal with it.
There could, of course, be no question at this stage of any agreement written or unwritten with the Soviet Government on frontier question. This would be contrary to the assurances we gave Poland in 1941 when the Soviet Polish Treaty was signed and again in 1942 at time of the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet treaty. We should therefore propose to inform the Polish Government that in our view no final settlement of Polish-Soviet difficulties can be found so long as there is no agreement on the frontier question. This question will have to be solved sooner or later. It could be left until the Soviet armies re-enter Polish territory, but it is our belief that a satisfactory solution would then be all the harder to obtain. We and the United States Government would propose therefore to approach the Soviet Government in the matter and discuss it with them.
It is probable that the Soviet Government would agree to something on the lines of paragraph 3(a) above. We know that it is difficult, maybe impossible, for this or any Polish Government, during the course of the war, to accept any surrender of former Polish territory. But it might perhaps help them if the United States and United Kingdom Governments were to recommend to them such a solution, conditional on Poland receiving the compensation indicated.
Dunn-Cadogan meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Alexander Cadogan |
The meeting was concerned with terms for the surrender of Italy. From a memorandum from Dunn to Hull on this subject dated September 1, 1943:
Some time ago the British Chiefs of Staff brought before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a paper numbered CCS 258 which was a draft of conditions for surrender of Italy. This document came to be known thereafter as the long or comprehensive document. This paper was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and was found by that Committee to be out of order as the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca had declared the intention of the two Governments to pursue the war against the Axis until an unconditional surrender of the enemy. This view was concurred in by the Department of State, and when referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President was also confirmed by him. The War Department then proceeded to draw up a document containing the conditions to be imposed upon Italy in the event of an unconditional surrender by that nation. Although some discussion with regard to this latter document was entered into with the British members of the Civil Affairs Committee and the War Department draft was referred by the British members to London, no advance was ever made with regard to establishing this latter paper as an agreed document. In the meantime, indications suddenly appeared after the fall of Mussolini that the Italians might surrender at any time. Through cable correspondence between the Prime Minister and the President, military terms to be imposed upon Italy in the event of surrender were agreed to and were transmitted to General Eisenhower through the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the General’s use in the event of Italy tendering surrender. The General was also informed that political and economic conditions would be transmitted to him later and that in imposing the military terms on any Italian representatives he should mention that other conditions would be communicated at a later date.
The British were persistent in their efforts to have the long comprehensive document accepted and agreed to by the American Government for use as a single document comprising all conditions, military and other than military, in one paper. This matter came before you when we arrived at Quebec in the first conversation you had with Mr. Eden there. You will recall that you immediately mentioned the matter to the President and that the President took the position that there was no reason to change the arrangement which was in effect at that time, that is, that General Eisenhower had the military terms to be imposed upon the Italians in the event of a surrender and that other conditions could be sent him for transmission to the Italians after the military terms had been imposed. You did inform Mr. Eden, and I believe also the President, that as far as the content of the long paper was concerned that was entirely agreeable to the Department as far as concerned the matters contained therein which were other than military.
Apparently Mr. Eden and Mr. Churchill, after bringing this matter up with the President, were satisfied that agreement had been reached between the President and Mr. Churchill that the long document should be substituted for the military terms which had been sent to General Eisenhower. Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan informed me on Monday, August 23, the day before we left Quebec, that on the strength of the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the President, Mr. Eden had sent a telegram6 to the British Ambassador in Lisbon to substitute the long document for the military terms in any subsequent dealings with the Italians.
Mr. Cadogan asked me if we would clear this matter with the President and have the Chiefs of Staff send a similar telegram to General Eisenhower. I informed Mr. Cadogan that that was a matter not within the province of the Department of State, and if he wished to have such a matter cleared through the Chiefs of Staff it should be taken up through the medium of the British Chiefs of Staff. It was not until Thursday, August 26, that you were informed by General Deane that the President had directed the Chiefs of Staff to instruct General Eisenhower to substitute the long document for the previously agreed upon military terms.
Apparently, from the reports coming from Lisbon and from Algiers, there has been considerable confusion introduced into the dealings with the Italians by reason of the action taken by the British Government in instructing the British Ambassador at Lisbon to introduce the longer comprehensive document into the conversations.
The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development to the President
Washington, August 23, 1943.
Secret
Memorandum for the President
[Subject:] TUBEALLOY – Interchange with the British.
We await your instructions regarding interchange with the British on this subject as a result of correspondence with Sir John Anderson recently placed in your hands through Mr. Hopkins. A report on the present status of the whole project has just been forwarded to General Marshall.
The next steps, if you approve the correspondence regarding interchange, are to convene a combined committee, which will lay down rules for security and arrange conferences between scientific groups as needed to expedite the program fully.
I suggest, before you leave the Prime Minister, one step to accelerate matters. It would help if a top British scientist, accepted and of sound judgment, could be sent here as chief liaison under Sir John Anderson, to help make arrangements for the committee’s work. He should be of the caliber of Sir Henry Dale or Sir Henry Tizard, and not one of the group working experimentally on a single phase of the problem.
I hasten to make this suggestion for the following reason. In previous negotiations difficulty was encountered because the British representative was an industrialist, Mr. Akers of International Chemical Industries. This same man is now here, apparently to make similar arrangements. He recently, and without consulting us, brought four eminent British scientific workers here for interchange. As we cannot use them until the combined committee has laid down the rules, they are likely to think us reluctant to interchange, whereas the exact opposite is true and we are anxious to get appropriate interchange going in an orderly fashion, so that relations will not this time become tangled. Akers is a very able man, but not the one to handle this matter.
We will proceed promptly with the whole affair on receiving your instructions.
V. BUSH
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of the Navy Knox | Mrs. Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Mr. Early | Minister of Information Bracken | |
| Admiral Leahy |
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary Hull | ||
| Mr. Dunn |
Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation was probably a major subject of discussion.
Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the British Government
Québec, August 23, 1943.
Recognition of French Committee of National Liberation
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, desire again to make clear their purpose of co-operating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.
His Majesty’s Government accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war, that it is the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied co-operation and that it administers those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.
In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of His Majesty’s Government with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.
It is common ground between His Majesty’s Government and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely. The present declaration does not therefore constitute recognition of the Committee as a Government of France or of the French Empire.
On these understandings His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom recognise the French Committee of National Liberation.
His Majesty’s Government take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the Committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close co-operation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.
Völkischer Beobachter (August 24, 1943)
Bei den Terrorangriffen vom 17. August –
155 Abschüsse in 20 Stunden
Über ein Drittel der bei Tag eingeflogenen Feindbomber heruntergeholt
…
Der Erfolg unserer Luftwaffe im Mittelmeer –
1,7 Millionen BRT. versenkt oder beschädigt
Eigener Bericht des „Völkischen Beobachters“
…
Durcheinander im angekündigten Nervenkrieg –
‚Europa zuerst‘ oder ‚Japan zuerst‘
Von unserer Stockholmer Schriftleitung
…
U.S. State Department (August 24, 1943)
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, forenoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary Hull | Foreign Secretary Eden |
Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation was the principal subject of discussion, and it was presumably at this meeting that the final decision was taken that the United States and British Governments would issue separate statements on this subject.