Québec Conference 1943 (QUADRANT)

107

The Pittsburgh Press (August 22, 1943)

Bickel: Parley plans double punch against enemy

Jab into Western Europe, smash at Japan may come together
By Karl A. Bickel, Scripps-Howard staff writer

Québec, Canada – (Aug. 21)
The Roosevelt-Churchill conference took a sudden shift to the East today.

Rumors that Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell had arrived were a dime a dozen. British Eastern military experts were said to be on the ground. Swinging from the political repercussions of the meetings the “dope” ran to soldiers and sailors, naval changes and a fiercely up stepped tempo in the military planning.

One fading functionary said, as he revived himself on a Scotch and soda:

Our boys are dead on their feet from work.

The strategists are talking about a quick one-two, a short left-arm military jab on the European west coast and a long right swing in the Far East. The Kharkov battle, it is held, has again been underestimated. It was originally regarded as a desperate drive for the capture of a great Soviet city and German strongpoint preliminary to chasing the Germans to the Dnieper.

May break back

Today, the military experts here say that Kharkov is vastly more than that. Kharkov, they assert, is proving to be the point where Stalin is literally breaking the back of the mightiest of the German armies. If the Russians capture Kharkov and secure a real breakthrough, they have either smashed or enclosed the German armies to the south, freed the Caucasus and so endangered the German hold on the Crimea as to make it impossible to hold.

The Dnieper will no longer be sufficient protection and Hitler’s armies may well have to roll back onto Polish and even East Prussian soil. This ism of course, the most optimistic viewpoint but there is no question but that the tempo of things today is vastly swifter than yesterday, that the note is all military.

Stalin’s insistence, that the Western Front is the only front, is still potent with the captains and the kings on the hill, but the war is being regarded as a one-front war now from Russia to Tokyo.

Change strategy

Some observers indeed saw indications of the development of a new strategy involving the abandonment of the theory calling for the initial crushing of Hitler and the slower process of smashing Hirohito.

Instead, they envisaged destruction of Japan on approximately the same time schedule as Berlin. This would have obvious advantages, permitting the democracies to come into the peace conferences with the tremendous asset of a conquered Japan free and clear of any Soviet liens. The United States and Great Britain would then have a stronger position than that of uneasy minority stockholders in the assets of a global war.

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108

U.S. State Department (August 22, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of War Stimson Mrs. Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Subaltern Mary Churchill
Minister of Information Bracken
Colonel Willis-O’Connor

From Stimson’s diary:

… At the Citadel I was told the President wished to see me for a few minutes before we assembled at lunch and I was shown into a little room where he was waiting alone. He told me that Churchill had voluntarily come to him [at Hyde Park] and offered to accept Marshall for the Overlord operation. This the President said relieved him of the embarrassment of being obliged to ask for it. He also discussed with me Marshall’s successor, mentioning Eisenhower. I told him I already thought of that as a very possible solution.

After this brief talk which very greatly reassured me, we went into lunch at which there were present the President, Churchill, Mrs. Churchill, Subaltern Mary Churchill, Brendan Bracken, Harry Hopkins, and aides of the two generals. I sat between Mr. and Mrs. Churchill who were very cordial and friendly. Before we went in to luncheon, Churchill took me out on the parapet ostensibly to show me the view and then he told me that he had suggested Marshall to the President. He said he had done this in spite of the fact that he had previously promised the position to Brooke and that this would embarrass him somewhat, but he showed no evidence of retreating from his suggestion to the President. I was of course greatly cheered up to find that the whole matter was going so successfully.

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109

Memorandum by the Military Assistant Secretary to the British War Cabinet 

Undated

Suggested Statement to Be Made to Mr. Soong

  1. The building up of the air route to China has been going on according to plan in spite of difficulties, and deliveries in August are expected to be over 7,000 tons. Expansion will continue.

  2. We are intending to carry out the largest operations in Northern Burma during the coming winter, which the physical limitations of the lines of communication, which have been aggravated by the recent floods in Bengal, will allow us to carry out. The start of these operations will be coordinated with those of the Chinese by General Stilwell. Their object is to enable us to join hands with the Chinese forces, and thus to pave the way for the eventual opening of the Ledo Road to China.

  3. An amphibious operation against the Japanese will be launched from India in 1944. The point of attack will be settled after the completion of further studies which have been set on foot.

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110

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 5:30 p.m.

The President returned to the Citadel at 5:45 p.m., at which time he had a conference with Secretary Hull and Mr. Eden until 7:30 p.m. This conference was resumed between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Hopkins Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Dunn
Mr. Atherton

Agenda Prepared by the British Delegation

August 22, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Agenda

  1. Proposed joint U.S.-U.K. declaration about German crimes in Poland. Polish Government has made request for this to U.S. and ourselves.

  2. Civil administration of liberated friendly territory in Europe. Difference between this and AMGOT. Need to make use of exiled governments.

  3. Convoys to Russia. To inform the Americans of line we have taken.

  4. Joint statement on Palestine. American proposal which we approved and want, and they have now abandoned. Can it be re-examined.

  5. Encouragement of fraternization with American troops in U.K. Matter was raised by Secretary of State for War. I should like authority to talk to Gen. Marshall about it.

  6. Policy towards Greece. The King’s appeal to President and Prime Minister.

  7. Recognition of French Committee of National Liberation. Our draft amended declaration.

  8. United Nations’ Four-power Declaration.

  9. Italian Surrender Terms.

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111 
740.0011 EW/8–2243

Department of State Minutes 

August 22, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Strictly confidential

The Meeting followed an agenda previously prepared by the British.

Polish Statement

The first subject discussed was the text of the statement to be issued by the two Governments with respect to the atrocities against Polish citizens in the Lublin area where the population was outstandingly Polish. The discussion hinged on a text prepared by the British and which was generally agreed to as appropriate for issuance on the subject at this time even though it was not expected to have any real effect on the situation.

Liberated Areas

There was discussion of the text of a statement which had been prepared by the United States with a view to clearing up misrepresentation and apprehension as to putting military government into effect in the friendly and Allied countries which will be liberated by the military operations undertaken on the Continent against Germany.

With very minor amendments the draft text was adopted with the decision that it would first be conveyed to the Soviet Government and China and the refugee governments directly concerned, with eventual view to publication.

The Prime Minister suggested that the timing of publication would be on or about September 15, which corresponded roughly with the date fixed for the opening of Parliament. This was generally agreed to.

Convoys to Russia

This discussion turned on the text of a communication to the Soviet Government with respect to the temporary suspension of convoys to Russia in view of other military operations, the convoys to be resumed at the end of September or early in October.

Statement on Palestine Situation

The question of a statement with respect to the Palestine situation during the period of the war was discussed and views were exchanged as to the advisability of making any statement at this time and, if so, as to its form.

Both the President and Prime Minister agreed that this question should be held in abeyance and should be discussed further between the two Governments from month to month as the war situation developed, and any decision on the matter was left to the light of these further exchanges of views on the matter.

Fraternization Between U.S. and British Soldiers in the British Isles

It was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that all possible steps should be taken to promote fraternization between the U.S. and British forces in the British Isles and, with a view to accomplishing this end, Mr. Eden should speak to General Marshall, to General Devers and to Norman Davis as to methods for its accomplishment.

The King of Greece

This discussion turned on the subject of the message from the King of Greece recently received by the President and the Prime Minister, in which the King of Greece asked advice from the President and Prime Minister as to the action the King should take, in view of the request of certain Greek elements that His Majesty should not return to Greece until after a plebiscite on the subject of the Monarchy had been held.

At the request of the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden read a report on the present political situation of Greece prepared by the British Foreign Office.

At the further request of the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander Cadogan read a communication on the subject from General Smuts, who advocated, as a matter of fair play, that the King of Greece not be precluded from entering his own country and resuming his former position, subject, perhaps, to later decision by the people of Greece as to the future form of the Greek régime.

There was some discussion then on the general subject of the attitude of the British and U.S. Governments toward the constituted governments of the refugee countries. It was decided, in general, that the two Governments should continue to support the governments and régimes as now recognized by them generally through the period up to the defeat of the enemy.

Mr. Hull pointed out that this attitude was in line with the attitude adopted in the statement with respect to administration of liberated areas, decided upon under Subject 2 of the agenda above.

With specific reference to the situation of the Greek King it was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that the British Foreign Office should reply to the King’s telegram, supporting his contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and submit the question of the Royal House to plebiscite.

The President said the United States Government would not take any different position.

The Prime Minister further stated, on his own initiative, that the British Government would instruct the British agents who were working with the guerrilla elements in Greece to refrain from encouraging those elements to put forward political claims as to the future form of government of Greece at this time.

The French Committee of National Liberation

After some discussion The Prime Minister stated that all the liberal elements in the world, including the governments in exile and the Soviet Government, were demanding an immediate decision granting full recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation.

The President took the view that we had to think of the future of France itself, which he felt would be in no way advanced by turning over the whole control of the French people to the present group comprising the French Committee.

After a further rather lengthy discussion, the suggestion of the President was accepted that the President himself draft the form of statement which he thought should be made.

As it was getting late and it was not possible to make further advance on this subject until the two views were further reconciled it was decided to await the President’s draft to which he said he would apply himself that evening.

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112 
800.0146/8–2243

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation 

Québec Conference, 22 August 1943.

Statement on Liberated Areas

The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory, must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories conquered by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of each government and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with its function of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved.

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113

Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Québec, 22 August 1943.

Secret
Enclosure to CCS 222/3

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic

a. CCS 222/2 indicates that convoy UGS 16, sailing 26 August, has 91 firm presenters as against a convoy limit of 80 ships.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested by the Combined Military Transportation Committee to give a decision on one of two alternatives:
(i) To raise the limit of UGS convoys.
(ii) To indicate the priority which should be assigned the presenters involved so that 80 ships can be selected.

a. With regard to alternative (1), the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, has established the limit on the number of ships in UGS convoys at 80 for security reasons.

b. The immediate problem in priorities has been solved in large part by the withdrawal of 6 U.S. Army vessels and 2 BMWT vessels from the list of presenters. The convoy limitation of 80 ships now is exceeded by 3.

c. It is quite possible that, of the remaining 83 vessels, at least 3 may fail to meet the convoy sailing date.

Recommendations

  1. It is recommended that:

a. Three vessels be nominated for withdrawal from the convoy, if necessary, in the following priority:

  • First withdrawal – 1 BMWT vessel
  • Second withdrawal – 1 WSA vessel
  • Third withdrawal – 1 BMWT vessel
  • Vessel or vessels to be selected by the agency concerned.

b. All vessels should be prepared to sail.

  1. In view of the fact that indications point to a recurrence of this problem in subsequent months, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy fix the earliest practical date when a program of four UGS convoys per month will be established.

  2. It is further recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegate to the Combined Military Transportation Committee the executive authority to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority:
    a. U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean.
    b. U.S. and British ships destined for India.
    c. U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.
    d. U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.
    e. Ships destined for Persian Gulf.
    f. Lend lease to Turkey.
    g. Miscellaneous.

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114

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Québec, 22 August 1943.

Secret
CCS 317/2

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals

Action on CCS 317 has been deferred pending further study of the subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, recommend that immediate decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in paragraph 10a and b of that paper. These paragraphs pertain to the equipment of French forces in North Africa. A decision at this time is necessary because of certain administrative arrangements which should be carried out at once in the event that the recommendations are to be approved.

H. REDMAN
J. K. DEANE
Combined Secretariat

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115 
740.0011 EW/8–2243

Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Adviser on Political Relations 

Washington, August 22, 1943.

Secret

PA/D – Mr. Dunn The attached message was left with me yesterday by an officer of the OSS. It is of interest as another “feeler” and channel from the Badoglio Govt.… the author of the message is Dulles. I told the OSS to make no reply to the question raised by the latter.

J WESLEY JONES

[Attachment]

Bern, August 20, 1943.

A reliable cutout has transmitted to me a report from … which states that Italy, according to Foreign Minister Guariglia, remains prepared to cease resistance on condition that we can guarantee plane protection against the Nazis, and they are willing to open the airports, and so forth. It would seem that … is anxious to be in touch with me directly. It is very possible that Guariglia and Rosso are making use of him here. Until I receive instructions, I am continuing to handle … with care, as an intelligence source only, and by means of cutouts.

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116

Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the U.S. Government 

Québec, August 22, 1943.

Secret

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the Government of the United States our expectation that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war. It will be for the French people themselves to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It does constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations until during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until the French and Allied authorities are completely liberated soil is freed from its invaders and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the U.S. Government 

Québec, August 22(?), 1943.

Secret

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of French people and French territories from the oppression of the enemy.

The Government of the United States accordingly welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the United States that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the Government of the United States with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, proceed to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

On these understandings, the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge the authority of the Committee.

The Government of the United States notes the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration [in] each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle, in cooperation with all the Allies, until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

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117

Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the Secretary of State 

Québec City, August 22, 1943.

Most secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am sending you, herewith, a copy of our draft letter to the Delegate in Canada of the French Committee of National Liberation, about which I think I spoke to you yesterday. I have given a copy to Mr. Churchill and am sending one to the President.

Yours very sincerely,
W. L. MACKENZIE KING

[Enclosure]

Draft Note

Ottawa, August 6, 1943.

Most secret

Draft Note to the French Delegate in Ottawa

Sir, I have the honour to refer to your note of June 11 with which you transmitted the text of the Declaration adopted at Algiers on June 3 by which the French Committee of National Liberation was established.

[Here follows, with minor editorial differences and one difference in phrasing, the text of the Canadian statement on this subject released on August 26, 1943.]

Accept [etc.]

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118

Harriman-Bracken meeting, early evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Harriman Minister of Information Bracken

From an informal memorandum by Harriman:

Before dinner sold Bracken a bill of goods for Steve Early – that the President and Prime Minister should have a joint Press conference, which Bracken had evidently been opposing with a view to substituting a cocktail party in which newspaper men could mingle with all the Chiefs of Staff.

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119

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Subaltern Mary Churchill

Roosevelt dined with the Churchill family from 8 to 10 p.m.

120 
740.00116 European War 1939/1136

The Dutch Ambassador to President Roosevelt 

Washington, August 22, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President, In the course of Her latest visit to Hyde Park the Queen discussed with you the opportunity of issuing a declaration with a view to preventing as much as possible destruction by the Germans upon their leaving the occupied countries. The Queen discussed this idea also with the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary, who were in favour of it and asked for a draft declaration. Such a draft has now been prepared and approved by Her Majesty.

Acting upon instructions I have just received, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft which has also been handed to the British Foreign Office.

Dr. van Kleffens instructs me moreover to submit to you the request that this draft be discussed with the British Prime Minister, if this would be agreeable to you.

I beg to add that the Queen would have no objection against a shorter and more strongly worded text.

Dr. van Kleffens would highly appreciate if further consultations could take place for the final drafting of this declaration and its subsequent handling, especially with regard to the opportune moment of its publication. In this connection Dr. van Kleffens ventures the suggestion whether it would be desirable to ask the Soviet Union to participate.

With my highest esteem [etc.]
A. LOUDON

[Enclosure]

Draft Declaration

In the regions of Europe which Germany has occupied, the German authorities and their subordinates have shown a measure of harshness and cruelty which not only violates clear and binding rules of international law but runs counter to the most elementary feelings of common decency. Confinement in concentration camps of evil and sinister repute, seizure of hostages (a practice expressly forbidden in a solemn treaty of 1907, to which Germany has expressly adhered) and large-scale deportation of men and even of women, are common German practice and these are far from being the worst offences committed in the name of Germany. In many cases, especially in Eastern Europe and with regard to the Jews, German action assumed proportions of bestiality. Wholesale slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people will be forever a blot on the German name. In the economic field the Germans have taken measures indicating that far from their showing any regard for the occupied countries and their population, they are bent upon crippling the resources of those territories. The German nation as a whole may not as yet have a full knowledge of all the savagery and brutality committed in its name. But that nation cannot be presumed to be ignorant of what has been and still is being done. Remembering further what the German authorities did towards the end of the last war in territory then under their occupation, the Governments of . . . . . . . issue the following warning to the German Government, civil and military authorities and people:

When the hour of liberation strikes for the occupied regions, those Germans who are stationed there may receive orders, or feel inclined to do their utmost not to leave the territory they hold before having wrought havoc, not only by an attempt to destroy objects of value to the wellbeing of the country concerned but also by murdering or deporting a still larger part of the population. All Germans should bear in mind that those guilty of such acts will be held responsible for their misdeeds, not only the leaders and authorities who plan crimes of this kind or give orders to commit them, but also the actual perpetrators. Moreover, from now on any further action against the population of the occupied regions including that part of the population that has been deported to Germany – In complete disregard of international law – either as prisoners or as hostages, as workers in war-industries or otherwise, any act of destruction calculated to obstruct the resumption of the economic or social life of the occupied countries to impoverish them or to impede their recovery, exposes Germany and the Germans to retaliation of the severest kind.

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121

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 

Moscow, August 22, 1943.

[Translation]
Secret

Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to Premier Minister Winston Churchill.

  1. I have received your message[s] concerning the negotiations with the Italians and the new terms of armistice with Italy. Thank you for the information.

Mr. Eden told Mr. Sobolev that Moscow was fully informed about the negotiations with Italy. I have, however, to say that Mr. Eden’s statement does not correspond with reality, as I have received your message in which long passages are omitted and which has no concluding paragraphs. In view of this, it is necessary to state that the Soviet Government is not informed about the negotiations of the British and the Americans with the Italians. Mr. Kerr gives assurance that within a short time he will receive the complete text of your message; although the three days have passed, and Ambassador Kerr has not yet given me the complete text of the message. I cannot understand how such delay could have occurred during the transmission of the information on such important matter.

  1. I believe that the time is ripe to organize the military-political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain and the USSR with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different Governments dissociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

  2. I am waiting for the complete text of your message concerning the negotiations with Italy.

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122

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill conferred from 11 p.m. until midnight.

123

U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)

Roosevelt-Robertson meeting, forenoon

Present
United States Canada
President Roosevelt Mr. Robertson

During the morning Roosevelt received Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs.

124

The Pittsburgh Press (August 23, 1943)

Québec puzzle –
Russia only major ally now absent

Australia and China join in war conferences now nearing an end
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Québec, Canada –
Announcement that Australian representation was being added to the Québec Conference today focused new attention on the absence of Russia, now the only one of the big Allied fighting powers without some representative in the war talks led by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Sir William Glasgow, High Commissioner for Australia in Canada, was due from Ottawa. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox arrived by plane from Washington. And there was some indication that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, absent from Washington, might have been called into the conference.

Deny connection

Represented now by top men in the Québec war conferences approaching a conclusion were the United States, Great Britain, Canada, China and Australia.

Official sources still denied any connection between the Québec Conference and the Russian withdrawal of Ambassador Maxim Litvinov from Washington. But they admitted that the timing of the announcement raised a multitude of questions as to the impression the Soviet was trying to convey to the world.

Virtually every important war figure in the higher echelons of the British, American and Canadian governments was on hand. Mr. Roosevelt scheduled a series of continuous conferences during the day and it was definitely known that the meetings are at a point of final approval of a master plan for destructive operations against the Axis the remainder of this year.

Mystery continues

As the arrivals of new officials here continued so did the air of mystery over the conference of the past seven days. Last night, some officials tacitly advised some of their contacts that today would bring a big announcement. A morning press conference produced the news that Mr. Churchill and Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King were to make an automobile tour of the city.

Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, lunched with President Roosevelt and was expected to remain for additional talks in the afternoon. Mr. Roosevelt was devoting some time in preparing his Ottawa speech.

May blitz cities

While official sources cautioned against excluding any war theater from speculation, there were increasing indications that an intensification of the aerial offensive against Italy was near. The plans, it was believed, called for such cities as Naples, Brindisi and Taranto to be “Hamburged” from the air, and then, if the Italian government still refused to capitulate, an invasion.

Dr. Soong’s arrival yesterday was followed by a statement from White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early:

The President expected to confer as soon as possible with Dr. Soong. Mr. Churchill will participate in these discussions which have to do with the plans for the war on Japan, the emphasis being given to that and all points pertaining to the war on Japan.

Welcomes Stimson

Yesterday, the conference at the Citadel began right after breakfast. Mr. Roosevelt welcomed Mr. Stimson, then lunched with the Prime Minister and the War Secretary and a number of others.

After lunch, the President drove to the Isle d’Orleans with Mrs. Churchill and inspected several old churches. Lewis O. Douglas, American deputy war shipping administrator, who was once principal of McGill University and who has an intimate knowledge of Québec Province, acted as “guide.”

Hold long parley

After the drive, Mr. Roosevelt joined Mr. Churchill, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary for External Affairs in the British government, and James C. Dunn, State Department political advisor.

The conference began about 5:30 p.m. and lasted far into the night. It obviously involved bigtime foreign policy from the political standpoint.

While the intensive conferences were going on in the Citadel, the armed staff chiefs and many of their aides, including some secretarial help and technical experts, cruised on the St. Lawrence and the Saguenay Rivers. Leaving Saturday night, they returned late yesterday.

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125

Québec sure Reds won’t make peace

Allied strategy based on belief that Russia will stay in war
By Henry J. Taylor

Québec, Canada –
The overwhelming fact which emerged from this conference cannot be told officially. The absolute conviction among the conferees in the Québec discussions is that Germany and Russia will not make an armistice or in any way arrive at a separate peace.

The reason this cannot be told officially is, of course, because this source of widespread anxiety and speculation throughout the United States and Great Britain cannot be recognized officially. But this correspondent has established the fact through direct contact and individual inquiry.

The directives emanating from this conference and every plan decided here are based on the conviction that there will be no diminution of fighting on Germany’s Eastern Front.

This possibility effects every fundamental in Allied strategy. In a military problem so large as this you cannot make alternate plans which include such an eventuality as this. It bears directly on the size of our forces needed for victory., the time and place of opening the so-called second front, the disposition of the British Navy from European waters to help us in the Pacific, the design of our Air Force equipment and organization, the type of it we are willing to supply Russian under Lend-Lease and, most of all, the length of the war and its cost in blood, sweat and tears.

The time comes when you have to make up your mind. The time has come. The minds are made up. Plans which would be disastrous if the Germans were in any way released from fighting on their Eastern Front have been agreed to here and the die is cast.

The news value of this dispatch – and it is vastly important news – is that anyone in our country or abroad who believes that there may be a reproachment between Russia and Germany differs with the final judgment of the conference of Québec.

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126

U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill-Soong luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom China
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Minister Soong
Mr. Hopkins

Roosevelt lunched with Churchill, Soong, and Hopkins. Soong thanked Hull for mentioning to Roosevelt at Québec the problem of “the 40,000 tons of munitions promised China by Canada and later revoked by Canada at the request of Mr. Currie” and “said that he [Soong] followed this up with a talk with the President which was satisfactory.” The occasion on which Soong discussed this question with Roosevelt has not been definitely identified, but the luncheon meeting of August 23, 1943, appears to have been the most likely opportunity for such a discussion.

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