Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

438

U.S. State Department (July 29, 1945)

Truman-Molotov meeting, noon

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Foreign Commissar Molotov
Secretary Byrnes Mr. Golunsky
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Bohlen

Bohlen Minutes

Potsdam, July 29, 1945, noon
Top secret

MR. MOLOTOV said that Marshal Stalin had caught cold and that his doctors would not let him leave his house. Therefore, he asked that the President excuse him for not coming to the agreed meeting and it would also be impossible for the Marshal to have a meeting this afternoon.

After a suitable expression of regret at the Marshal’s indisposition, etc., THE PRESIDENT said he would ask Mr. Byrnes to take up the points he had had in mind to discuss with Marshal Stalin.

THE SECRETARY said that there were two principal questions, in his opinion, which remained outstanding and if they could reach a decision on those it would be possible to consider winding up the Conference. These questions were:

  1. The Polish western boundary.
  2. German reparations.

THE SECRETARY said that if we were able to get an agreement on reparations along the lines of his proposals to Mr. Molotov that the United States was prepared to go further to meet the Soviet wishes in regard to the Polish western frontier and would make the following proposal in that regard. (He handed Mr. Molotov a copy of the proposed United States suggestion with regard to the Polish western frontier, copy attached).

After it had been translated, MR. MOLOTOV said that this would not put under Polish administration the area between the Eastern and Western Neisse. He said the Poles were most insistent upon receiving this and he recalled that Mr. Mikołajczyk had made a most convincing and definite argument before the three Foreign Ministers as to the vital importance of this area for Poland.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that this was true, but that since the final determination of the boundary would await the peace settlement, it did not follow that Poland might not receive this additional area if the peace conference so desired. He then said that as the President had frequently remarked, it had been agreed at Yalta and elsewhere that there would be four occupying powers in Germany, but that we now had a situation when there was in fact a fifth – Poland – which had been assumed without consultation or agreement with the United States, French, or British Governments.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that this was no one’s fault; it was an extraordinary condition, since all Germans had fled the region.

THE PRESIDENT then remarked that he had thought that this suggestion would be agreeable to the Soviet Delegation, since in his opinion it represented a very large concession on our part and he hoped Mr. Molotov would submit it to Marshal Stalin.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he would, of course, do so but he thought he could say here that Marshal Stalin was most insistent that this region as well should be placed under Polish administration.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that for the purpose of the occupation of Germany we had, of course, thought that all of this area would be the responsibility of the Soviet occupying forces.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that even though the Poles were administering this, Soviet troops were still in the area. He repeated, however, that he would submit the proposal to Marshal Stalin.

THE SECRETARY then inquired whether Mr. Molotov had had an opportunity to really think about his proposal in regard to reparations, namely, that each country look to its own zone for reparations and then exchange reparations between zones.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the Secretary’s proposal was acceptable in principle but that the Soviet Delegation would like to have clarity on certain points, in particular, the amount of equipment which would be turned over from the Ruhr to the Soviet Union. He said they had spoken of equipment to the amount of two billion dollars or five or six million tons.

(Mr. Molotov did not specify exactly what he meant by five or six million tons, whether productive capacity or actual weight of equipment).

THE SECRETARY explained that our experts felt that it was impossible to put any specific dollar value or tonnage on the equipment which would be available for reparations from the Ruhr, but that our proposal was to offer the Soviet Union 25% of the total equipment considered as available for reparations from the Ruhr.

MR. MOLOTOV said that 25% of an undetermined figure meant very little and that they wished to have a fixed sum or quantity agreed upon.

THE SECRETARY replied that at Yalta Mr. Maisky, who was the only one who would mention figures, had suggested in his proposal a total of twenty billion for reparations from Germany, of which ten billion would go to the Soviet Union. He said that from further study and the discussions here it had been made clear that these figures had no relation to reality and that this was a very good illustration of the danger of attempting to fix sums prematurely. He added that if we were to do that now, in the absence of sufficient data, six months from now if the figure turned out to be incorrect the Soviet Government might charge we were going back on the agreement reached at the Berlin Conference.

There was further discussion on this point, with MOLOTOV maintaining his position that some fixed sum be set otherwise the percentage would be meaningless, and THE SECRETARY maintaining from our point of view that it would be impossible to give any fixed figure. There was an extended discussion as to the Soviet share of reparations, with the Secretary maintaining that according to our calculations 50% of the national wealth of Germany lay in the Soviet zone, and with Mr. Molotov stating that according to their calculations only 42% lay in the Soviet zone.

MR. MOLOTOV said that under their figures the Russians would be entitled to obtain some reparations from the British, American and French zones in order to complete the 50%.

THE SECRETARY said that in his opinion percentage figures fixed at Yalta were no more agreed to except as a basis of discussion than had been the actual amounts of reparations.

THE PRESIDENT stated that what they were trying to do here was to fix a workable plan for reparations and that he desired to see the Soviet Union receive 50% of the total.

MR. MOLOTOV expressed his appreciation at the President’s statement.

THE SECRETARY reviewed his argument in favor of his proposal, pointing out that it would do away with almost certain points of friction in the future.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether we still intended to have some central German administration, not a government, but some central organization through which the Control Council could operate in matters affecting finance, transport, foreign trade, etc. on which it had been agreed to treat Germany as an economic whole. He pointed out that if reparations were not treated as a whole, what would happen to overall treatment of economic matters.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that under his scheme nothing was changed in regard to overall treatment of German finance, transport, foreign trade, etc. The Secretary subsequently repeated this statement in reply to a further observation of Mr. Molotov that the reparation proposal would affect the overall economic administration of Germany. The Secretary then said there was one other subject he had forgotten to mention, namely, that of the division of the German navy and merchant fleet.

THE PRESIDENT stated that in his opinion they had reached agreement on that, namely, that Russia was to get one-third of the navy now and that the merchant fleet was to be utilized in the war against Japan, with one-third earmarked for the Soviet Union.

THE SECRETARY thought it would be well to embody that agreement in writing and suggested the formation of a sub-committee for that purpose. He added that part of the agreement had been Mr. Churchill’s suggestion that a large part of the submarines be destroyed.

MR. MOLOTOV said what they desired was one-third of the navy and one-third of the merchant fleet. He said that the Soviet Union was also interested in shipping for the Far Eastern war and that, of course, they would be used for that purpose.

THE PRESIDENT said it was his understanding that the merchant fleet should be used for the prosecution of the war against Japan.

THE SECRETARY said that the Russian portion should be earmarked and used in the Pacific.

MR. MOLOTOV repeated that the Soviet Union would use these ships in the Pacific.

THE SECRETARY said in addition to that question, it would be important to clarify the question of replacement. For example, if the Soviets did use them in the war and they were sunk, it would be necessary to consider the question of their replacement.

Reverting to the subject of reparations, MR. MOLOTOV said he wished to have the Secretary’s proposal clearly in mind; as he understood it the Soviet Union would look to its own zone for a fixed amount of reparations and would receive as reparations 25% of the equipment from the Ruhr available for reparations.

THE SECRETARY replied that this was not quite accurate, since in the first place the Soviet Union would take what it wished from its zone, and second, the 25% to go to the Soviet Union from the Ruhr would be exchanged for food, coal and other products needed in western Germany from the Soviet zone.

MR. MOLOTOV said they [the United States?] had understood that all the equipment which the Soviets might receive from the Ruhr would have to be balanced off by exports from the Soviet zone. He said he had understood that only part would be so covered and that in any event it was a matter for discussion as to how much and what the Soviet zone could offer in return.

THE SECRETARY added that there had been another possibility, namely, instead of 25% from the Ruhr alone, the Soviets could receive 12½% of equipment available for reparations from the French, British and American zones taken together.

MR. MOLOTOV returned to the question of a fixed sum and inquired whether the Secretary could give him even a rough estimate of what we thought might be available to the Soviet Union.

THE SECRETARY repeated that he was unable to do this[–]that all our experts agreed that it was impossible to place any value on the equipment available for reparations for the following reason[s]:

  1. It was difficult to agree on a standing valuation to be placed on the equipment; and,
  2. The Soviets would undoubtedly have preferences as to the type of machinery which would affect the valuation.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that they were interested in heavy metallurgical machinery, machine-building and chemical installations. He added that they had proposed using 1938 prices.

THE SECRETARY answered that our experts thought it was impossible at this stage to fix any value; it would require long study on the spot and therefore we preferred the percentage basis. During the course of this discussion the Secretary remarked that at Yalta at one point Mr. Maisky had suggested ten billion in reparations for the United States and that our experts considered that there were only three or four billion dollars in all of possible reparations in western Germany. What, therefore, would Mr. Molotov say if we should ask for an additional six billion from the Soviet zone to make up the figure mentioned by Mr. Maisky. The Secretary added that he was merely citing this illustration to show the danger in agreement on any fixed sum.

MR. MOLOTOV said that in conclusion he had one other matter that the Marshal wished him to take up and that was the immediate cause of the Soviet entry into the Far Eastern war. He said that the Soviet Government considered that the best method would be for the United States, England and the other allies in the Far Eastern war to address a formal request to the Soviet Government for its entry into the war. He said that this could be based on the refusal of the Japanese to accept the recent ultimatum to surrender and made on the basis of shortening the war and saving of lives. He added, of course, that the Soviet Government was assuming that the agreement with the Chinese would be signed before the Soviet Union entered the war.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would, of course, examine carefully this Soviet request.

439

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 29, 1945]

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, to west of Stettin to the Oder and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the eastern Neisse River and along the eastern Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

440

Truman-Attlee meeting, 4:30 p.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Prime Minister Attlee
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Bevin
Sir Alexander Cadogan

According to Truman, at this meeting the British participants were informed of the suggestion made by Molotov earlier in the day concerning a formal request to the Soviet Government to enter the war against Japan.

441

President Truman to Prime Minister Attlee

Babelsberg, July 29, 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In accordance with my letter of July 25, I enclose a copy of a memorandum directive on the issuance of Lend-Lease munitions, which I have today sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This directive eliminates the delivery of Lend-Lease material for the occupation of Axis countries. In other respects I believe it adequately covers your expressed desires.

I have noted the suggestion in the letter of July 24, that postwar economic arrangements be discussed in Washington, say in September. Mr. W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, will be in London shortly for the UNRRA Council meeting, and I have instructed him to engage in informal conversations with your people about these matters. When he has reported to me in Washington, we shall be able to decide upon arrangements for further discussions with your representatives.

Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

[Enclosure]

The President to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945
Top secret

Memorandum Directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Referring to my memorandum of 5 July, 1945, quoted herewith following:

Approval of the issue to Allied Governments of Lend Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan, and it will not be used for any other purpose.

It may be given the following interpretation:

  1. Issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to all Allied Governments, including Latin American countries is authorized when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is to be used in direct support of redeployment of American troops, or Allied troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan.

  2. Supply of Allied service units that are directly serving United States forces in any area with subsistence, supply, and equipment (except arms and ammunition) is authorized.

  3. Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the USSR is authorized in accordance with my directive of 11 May, 1945, when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it can be considered as for use in the war against Japan.

  4. Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the British Empire is authorized for the direct support of redeployment of American troops, and of British troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan, taking into account commitments for approved combined operations against Japan. In accordance with my memorandum of 17 July, 1945 to the Prime Minister, and subject to the elimination of the requirements for occupational forces in Axis countries, such issue should be generally in accord with schedules of requirements and other terms arrived at by British and American supply representatives in October-November 1944, subject to changing strategic demands as well as to usual supply, procurement, and allocation considerations and procedures.

  5. Replacement and maintenance on a military Lend-Lease basis of French units which have already been equipped by the U.S. under the North African Rearmament Program, Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and Air Forces Program is authorized for subsistence until August 31, 1945, and for other items of equipment and supply until September 30, 1945.

  6. Supply of maintenance items for U.S. equipment now in the possession of Allied armies may be issued for purposes other than those specifically approved in this memorandum against payment under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State Department and Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established procedure.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

442

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Babelsberg, July 29, 1945]
[Translation]

Proposal of [on?] Reparations From Germany

  1. Exactions of once-for-all removals from the national wealth of Germany in payment for reparations (plants, shops, equipment, materials, etc.) will be made by each government in its zone of occupation within two years after capitulation.

  2. Removals must be made with a view to the quickest restoration of the economy of those countries which have suffered from German occupation. The necessity of an over-all reduction of the war potential of Germany must also be taken into account.

  3. Because of the enormous losses of the Soviet heavy industry and also because of the small quantity of German enterprises of this kind in the Soviet zone of occupation and because of the insufficiency of the total resources of this zone, the USSR must receive in addition to the removals made in her zone, also from 5½ to 6 million tons on a special list of equipment in complete and workable condition on the reparations account from the Western Zones and predominantly from the Ruhr District. This equipment will be used for the restoration of the various branches of Soviet industry which have suffered from the enemy, and in the first instance for the metallurgical, chemical, and machine building industries. These removals must begin immediately upon the acceptance of this decision and will terminate not later than May 10, 1947. For this purpose a special agency will be created by the Allied Commission on Reparations.

  4. The USSR will also receive corporation shares valued at $500,000,000 of industrial and transport companies which have remained in the Western Zones and which have the greatest significance from the point of view of an over-all reduction of the military potential of Germany.

  5. Exactions of annual deliveries of goods from the current production will not be made on a zone basis but on an over-all German basis. The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange a general plan for receiving and allocating these deliveries among the nations which have the right to them. The total sum of these deliveries will amount to 8 billion dollars and will be for a period of 10 years. The USSR share in these deliveries will amount to 50% of the total sum.

  6. The following goods will be accepted in the form of possible deliveries; coal, brown coal, metals, metal products, cement, building materials, scrap metal[,] timber, potash, paper, sugar, chemical and glass products, machines, river boats, medical instruments, agricultural products, cattle, etc. As a basis for computation, the 1938 price – valued in dollars – will be accepted with an increase of 10%.

  7. The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange the plan of allocating the external assets and claims of Germany among the nations which have a right to receive reparations.

  8. In regards to that part of reparations which must be covered by once-for-all removals, the USSR will take upon herself, and for her own account, the settlement of the reparations claims of Poland. The United States of America and Great Britain will do the same in regards to France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Norway.

443

Forrestal-Bevin conversation

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Forrestal Foreign Secretary Bevin

Forrestal’s diary entry: “From there went to see Ernest Bevin and found Bevin in very good form. He said in answer to my question that the only industries they proposed to nationalize were power, railroads, mines, and textiles up to the spinning mills. He indicated he had no use for Laski. He spoke highly and appreciatively of Anthony Eden. He said he was quite familiar with tactics of the Communists because he had had to deal with them in his own labor unions in England.

“I asked him a question about the Emperor in Japan, whether he thought we ought to insist on destruction of the Emperor concept along with the surrender. He hesitated and said this question would require a bit of thinking, but he was inclined to feel there was no sense in destroying the instrument through which one might have to deal in order to effectively control Japan. He then made a rather surprising statement – for a liberal and a labor leader: ‘It might have been far better for all of us not to have destroyed the institution of the Kaiser after the last war – we might not have had this one if we hadn’t done so. It might have been far better to have guided the Germans to a constitutional monarchy rather than leaving them without a symbol and therefore opening the psychological doors to a man like Hitler.’

“He said he was determined to get going what he called the three historic axes of European trade – the Baltic axis, that is to say, the old Hanseatic League; the Antwerp axis, and the Genoa axis. He said these three were the classic foci of European trade for hundreds of years back, that if they could be restored to activity, it would do much to bring about revival of commerce in Europe.

“I asked him how he was going to deal with Southeastern Europe, that is, the Balkans, which would be under the control of Russia, and he said he didn’t think the Balkans amounted to much in the way of business. I differed with this.”

444

Despres-Minc conversation

Present
United States Poland
Mr. Despres Mr. Minc
Mr. Rajchman 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2945

Memorandum by the Adviser on German Economic Affairs

[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945

I conveyed to Mr. Minc Mr. Clayton’s regret that he was unable to accept the Minister’s invitation to visit the Silesian coal fields, explaining that Mr. Clayton was heavily engaged with other matters as the conference drew toward a close. I then told Mr. Minc that we thought it would be useful for him to talk to the American military authorities in Berlin, who were now transporting coal from the Ruhr to meet their share of Berlin’s requirements; in order to explore the possibility of drawing upon Silesian coal instead, and I said that, subject to his acceptance of the invitation, we had arranged an appointment for him with Maj. General Echols. Mr. Minc replied that he would consult the other members of his Government and let me know. (He subsequently accepted, and a meeting with General Echols took place the following morning.) I then outlined the scope of functions of EECE, ECO and the projected Inland Transport Organization and expressed the hope that the Polish Government would acquaint itself with these organizations with a view to active participation in their work. Mr. Minc asked a number of questions regarding the functions, activities to date and membership of these organizations and said that he would look into the matter further.

Mr. Minc then stated that he was most eager to acquaint the United States Government as fully as possible with the present economic position and needs of Poland, in order to enable us to consider against a background of knowledge their requests for imports and for credits. He asked how this might best be accomplished. I said that we proposed to attach a well-qualified economic man to Ambassador Lane’s staff, and that we hoped that the Polish Government would extend to such man the fullest opportunities for familiarizing himself with the situation. I suggested that it would also be useful for the Polish Government to send a small number of well-qualified people to Washington for financial and supply matters. Mr. Minc expressed the personal view that it would be most desirable if the United States Government could send a special survey mission to Poland which would spend a couple of months there and then return to Washington and report. I suggested that before extending any formal invitation along these lines, it would be well to discuss this matter informally with Ambassador Lane.

After my conversation with Minc had been completed, Dr. Rajchman furnished the following bits of information:

  1. It is a criminal offense for a Russian commander to allow any freight cars to move eastward empty. Large amounts of supplies are seen passing through Poland, including numbers of German livestock.

  2. Dr. Rajchman believes that the Russians have adopted a three-year program of removals from their zone of occupation. They have set a physiological minimum standard of living for the German population and plan to leave only enough resources to support this minimum.

  3. For a time the Russians carried out removals from the territory newly transferred to the Polish administration, but under an agreement with the Polish Government these removals were discontinued on a specified date.

  4. The Red Army is having considerable difficulty in effecting the redeployment of their forces from Germany. They are believed to have had 12 million men on the whole Eastern Front. There are a number of roving bands of Red Army troops (AWOL). They are shot when caught, but drastic punishment has not solved the problem.

  5. Except for Warsaw, which has been far more thoroughly demolished than Berlin, material damage in Poland has not been serious. Loss of life is estimated at 5,500,000, over half Jews.

445

The Pittsburgh Press (July 29, 1945)

Military chiefs meet with Big Three

New Prime Minister joins other leaders
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

…

446

Attlee to push program of Labor Party

Flies to Berlin with Foreign Secretary

…

447

Editorial: Big Three means nations

…

448

Youngstown Vindicator (July 29, 1945)

What we’re up against in Asia

Our task will only have begun with the defeat of Japan – problem of Europe is small in comparison – we’re in the Pacific to stay
By Sen. Elbert Thomas, D-Utah

…

449

U.S. State Department (July 29, 1945)

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Sunday, July 29:

1000: The President attended Protestant church services at the Coliseum. The services were conducted by Captain Northern.

1130: Mr. Molotov, accompanied by Mr. Galounsky (interpreter) called at the Little White House. The President, Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Galounsky conferred for more than an hour. Generalissimo Stalin was indisposed and could not attend.

The President presented autographed pictures to Colonel General S. N. Kruglov, Lieutenant General N. D. Gorlinski and Colonel M. M. Koretsky of the Red Army. These officers, members of the Soviet Advance party, had charge of arrangements at Babelsberg for the housing and security of the Big Three.…

Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon.

1630: Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House. They conferred for some time with the President and Secretary Byrnes.

There was no meeting of the Big Three today. Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed.

1930: Captain Ross was a dinner guest at the White House this evening. Dinner music was furnished by an Army band.

450

The Syonan Shimbun (July 30, 1945)

Invincible country like Nippon will never think of surrender

Army spokesman ridicules foe proclamation

…

451

Nippon will pursue immutable policy until victory is won

Premier Suzuki rejects foe proclamation

…

452

Foe makes peace offer to Nippon terms outlined

…

Peace offer aimed to check foe’s war-weariness

…

453

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 30, 1945)

Japan lehnt Ultimatum ab

Die japanische Regierung ist gewillt, den Krieg bis zum bitteren Ende auszesechten

NEW YORK, 29. Juli (Reuters) – Der Japanische Rundfunk gab bekannt, dass Ministerpräsident Suzuki das Ultimatum der Alliierten, zu kapitulieren, abgelehnt hat. Radio Tokio fügte hinzu, dass Suzuki in einem Interview die Entschlossenheit der japanischen Regierung den Krieg fortzusetzen zum Ausdruck brachte. Die kaiserlich-japanische Regierung wird die Aufforderung zur Übergabe durch die Alliierten nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen.

Zur Ablehnung des Ultimatums durch Japan schreibt der Reuter-Korrespondent William Hardcastle: „Die nach den letzten Angriffen von Superfestungen entstandenen ungeheuren Brände wüteten noch in drei japanischen Kriegsindustrie-Zentren, als die japanischen Minister von dem 77-jährigen Premier, Admiral Suzuki, in aller Eile in die Residenz berufen wurden, um das Ultimatum der Großmächte, „Übergabe oder Zerstörung“, zu besprechen. Nach einer dreistündigen Kabinettssitzung verkündete die japanische Nachrichtenagentur an die Alliierten eine herausfordernde Antwort, in der es heißt, dass „Japan den Krieg seiner feststehenden Politik entsprechend bis zum bitteren Ende ausfechten werde.“

Die gesamte Propaganda-Maschine der Vereinigten Nationen wird eingesetzt, um das japanische Volk von der Proklamation in Kenntnis zu setzen. Von Superfestungen werden Flugblätter mit der Aufforderung an die Japaner, ihre Regierung zu stürzen, kreuz und quer über das ganze japanische Mutterland abgeworfen. Der Sprecher der US-Regierung, Kapitän zur See, E. M. Zacharias, sprach zum japanischen Volk und sagte, dass Japan nur die Wahl zwischen der Annahme der Bedingungen oder völliger Vernichtung hätte. Die Führer Japans könnten nicht länger ihrem Volk die Wahrheit über die Niederlage Japans vorenthalten. Japan müsse den Weg der Vernunft wählen, da seine ganze Zukunft davon abhängt. Wenn das ‚japanische Volk durch seine selbstherrliche Militärclique gezwungen würde, den Weg des Verderbens zu wählen, dann werden Schweiß und Mühe von Jahrhunderten umsonst gewesen sein.

Die Pressestimmen prangern durchgehend die eigensinnige Haltung des japanischen Kabinetts an. Die New York Times schreibt unter anderem: „Die Bedingungen dieses letzten Friedensangebotes der alliierten Regierungen wurden zurückgewiesen und somit muss und wird der Krieg im Pazifik auf dem Schlachtfeld entschieden werden. Die Bedingungen der Alliierten waren so günstig und großzügig, wie man es angesichts der langen Liste brutaler und verräterischer Angriffe Japans gerade noch verantworten konnte.“ Die New York Herald Tribune äußert sich: „Es besteht kein Anlass, durch die glatte Zurückweisung des in Potsdam erlassenen Ultimatums beunruhigt oder überrascht zu sein. Japan wird immer noch durch seine Militärclique beherrscht. Wie lange sie den Japanern noch ihre Entscheidung aufzwingen kann, ist eine andere Frage. Der Nervenkrieg, nur möglich durch Amerikas Stärke und Japans Schwäche. kann es den japanischen Militaristen bald unmöglich machen, weiteren Widerstand zu verlangen.“

454

L’Aube (July 30, 1945)

Cédant a une suggestion d’Attlee –
Les « Trois Grands » ajourneront-ils les grandes décisions à l’automne ?

…

455

U.S. State Department (July 30, 1945)

Conversation between members of the U.S. and Polish Delegations

It is not known definitely who participated in this conversation, although it appears from Despres’ memorandum of his conversation with Minc on July 29 that Major General Echols was one of the participants for the United States.

Diary Entry by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
[Translation]

A Polish-American conference was held at the headquarters of the Polish Delegation concerning a transaction with regard to 2,500 tons of coal to be delivered to the American occupation sector in Berlin. The transaction was based on a payment in dollars, but the Polish side retained the right to accept oil or gasoline in payment for the supply of coal. The Americans would provide railroad freight cars for the coal and would send them to the place of loading.

456

Byrnes-Molotov meeting, 4:30 p.m.

Present
United States Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Pavlov

Bohlen Minutes

Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 4:30 p.m.
Top secret

THE SECRETARY said he wanted to talk to Mr. Molotov on two or three questions of importance still open before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting this afternoon.

He said, first of all, he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that in regard to the Polish western frontier, we were prepared as a concession to meet the Soviet desire and he, therefore, had a revised paper on this subject (copy attached). He pointed out that this would put Polish administration up to the western as against the eastern Neisse.

MR. MOLOTOV expressed his gratification at this proposal.

THE SECRETARY then said the next question was Italy and the entry of Italy into the United Nations. He had again been endeavoring to find a compromise between his British and Soviet friends. He proposed a new sentence at the end of the third paragraph and a new paragraph regarding freedom of the allied press to report on events in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland (copy attached).

MR. MOLOTOV, after hearing a translation of these changes, said while he could not say finally he believed that they would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.

THE SECRETARY then said we come to the most difficult of all the questions, namely, that of reparations. He said that he had a new proposal to make and handed Mr. Molotov the revised United States formula (copy attached). He emphasized that this was a United States proposal and that he had not yet consulted the British, adding that if they could reach agreement here on this question he would go to see the British this afternoon and endeavor to persuade them to agree.

MR. MOLOTOV studied the new proposals and then asked who was to determine what equipment was suitable for reparations.

THE SECRETARY replied that he thought since the Ruhr lay in the British zone that that would be for the British to determine on the basis of what must be left there in order to maintain the minimum required standard of living.

MR. MOLOTOV said he thought that determination of reparation materials should be done on an Allied basis in which the Soviets would participate. He suggested that it either be the Control Council or the Reparations Commission.

THE SECRETARY said that that was a possibility and should be studied. He said the Control Council operating for all Germany could determine the general norms of living standards, but that the final authority would probably remain in the commander-in-chief of the given zone, since he was responsible for that zone.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the Secretary’s draft did not mention any possibility of the Control Council or the Reparations Commission determining what equipment was available for reparations. Mr. Molotov then proposed that instead of the 12% [15%?] of reparations to be received without exchange that that figure be raised to 25%, thus making 25% from the Ruhr to be exchanged and 25% without exchange to the Soviet Union.

THE SECRETARY said he doubted if the British would agree to any such figure. He felt that it would be difficult enough to get them to agree to his proposal.

MR. MOLOTOV then reverted to his argument of yesterday and to the necessity of having a fixed figure either in dollars or in pounds. He repeated all his arguments on this point.

THE SECRETARY replied for his part, giving the arguments as to why it was impossible and dangerous for us to attempt to fix a definite figure either for tonnage or for dollar value at this time.

MR. MOLOTOV said he could only give a preliminary opinion and would, of course, have to consult Marshal Stalin. He said he thought the three points of difficulty would be:

  1. who was to determine reparations equipment,
  2. the absence of a fixed sum, and
  3. the question of deliveries from the Soviet zone.

He said that before meeting Mr. Byrnes today they had prepared a counter suggestion and he handed the Secretary a copy in Russian (copy in translation attached). He then said he wished to talk about the Ruhr, that he felt that in confining the removals for the Soviet Union to the Ruhr area it narrowed the base, since there was industrial equipment in the United States zone as well.

THE SECRETARY explained that the United States from its zone would have to help meet claims from other countries, such as France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and others. He said that under his scheme the Soviet Union would be responsible for reparations to Poland, but that the reparations for other countries would come from the western zones.

MR. MOLOTOV said that despite the difference still existing he felt that some progress had been made in this question of reparations and he would so report to Marshal Stalin. He then said they had a proposal in regard to the question of the Ruhr as a whole. He recalled that there had been much discussion at previous conferences in regard to the internationalization of the Ruhr, but he said that nothing lately had been heard of it.

THE SECRETARY reminded Mr. Molotov that at one time President Roosevelt had been in favor of the dismemberment of Germany but had subsequently changed his mind. He recalled Marshal Stalin’s talks with Mr. Hopkins last spring on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed and said that the paper he was now handing to the Secretary merely dealt with the setup of an Allied Commission composed of the four occupying powers to administer the Ruhr under the general direction of the Control Council (copy attached). Mr. Molotov said he had two other papers to hand the Secretary: one in regard to Italian and Austrian reparations based on the discussions of the Big Three, and the other, concerning war criminals which listed the first ten of such war criminals which were to be brought to trial in the near future. (Copies attached).

THE SECRETARY remarked that he had understood that Marshal Stalin had agreed to drop reparations from Austria.

MR. MOLOTOV replied they might be prepared to withdraw the reference to Austria but that the Yugoslavs would be offended, adding however, that if Yugoslavia received reparations from other sources she might be satisfied.

THE SECRETARY, in conclusion, said he wished to emphasize once again that these proposals were United States proposals and had not yet received British consent.

457 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945

Western Frontier of Poland

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River2 and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945

Admission to the United Nations

The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the ratification of peace treaties with these countries.

The three Governments express the desire that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declared that:

  1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

  2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045

Proposal by the U.S. Delegation

[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945

German Reparations

Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus

(a) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets.

(b) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet government without payment or exchange of any kind in return.