Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

72

Matthews Minutes

February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss’ notes.

Poland

PRESIDENT: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.

STALIN: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the émigré Poles?

PRESIDENT: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.

But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a small portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.

The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.

STALIN: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three allies.

PRESIDENT: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.

PRIME MINISTER: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.

However, I am more interested in the question of Poland’s sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland against Hitler’s brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good-sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty’s Government cordially support the President’s suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.

Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.

STALIN: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britian the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland’s frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.

I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918–1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin’s position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.

Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchuski [Arciezewski], which is in reality under the President Brachewicz [Raczkiewicz]. All these people were against the agreement and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government “bandits” and “traitors.” Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, won’t hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski [Zeligowski] but they won’t hear of Mikolajczyk. Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.

Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfils this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.

The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.

PRIME MINISTER: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.

73

Völkischer Beobachter (February 6, 1945)

Roosevelts Plan zur Weltherrschaft

wh. Berlin, 5. Februar – Wer es unternimmt, sich ein Bild von der Dreimächtekonferenz zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill zu machen, tut gut daran, nicht nur an die akuten Probleme (wie vor allem an den Plan, das deutsche Volk mit Sirenenklängen zu ködern) oder etwa an Polen, Griechenland, Italien usw. zu denken, sondern sich auch zu fragen: Was ist das vorige Mal in Teheran vor sich gegangen und was plant Roosevelt eigentlich, von dem man sagen kann, dass er sich am meisten um das Dreiertreffen bemüht hat?

Es hat lange gedauert, bis man aus authentischer amerikanischer Quelle erfuhr, was wirklich in Teheran passierte, aber die Wahrheit über Teheran enthüllte gleichzeitig den „Großen Plan“ des amerikanischen Präsidenten. Forrest Davis, ein Publizist, der in Washington nicht nur zu Hause ist, sondern auch im Weißen Haus immer eine offene Tür findet, hat in der konservativen und äußerst populären amerikanischen Wochenzeitschrift Saturday Evening Post mit ihrer Auflage von weit über drei Millionen berichtet, wie sich Roosevelt die Nachkriegswelt vorstellt. Sein Plan bedeutete die absolute Beherrschung der Welt durch die USA, Moskau und England, unter gnädiger Anhörung Tschungkings und Frankreichs, nach der Vernichtung des Reiches, Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes und völliger Niederwerfung Japans.

Dieser „Große Plan“ einer Kontrolle der Welt durch Moskau, Washington und London steht und fällt zweifellos mit der Notwendigkeit, Moskau aus seiner ideologischen Vereinsamung und dem sich daraus ergebenden revolutionären Herrschaftsanspruch herauszulösen, um es wieder in die „Familie der demokratischen Nationen“ einzureihen. Der amerikanische Präsident hofft offensichtlich, dass es möglich wäre, Stalin und die Sowjetunion in eine solche Weltorganisation westlerischer Prägung einzugliedern. Roosevelt ist bereit, alles auf diese Hoffnung zu setzen. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie er in Teheran mit nervösen Spielerhänden eine Chesterfield nach der anderen in seinem langen Zigarettenhalter entzündete, während er versuchte, Stalin von seinem „Größen Plan“ zu begeistern, um aber zu sehen, dass der Mann aus dem Kreml erst dann wirkliches Interesse zeigte, als ihm durch Roosevelt Konzessionen gemacht worden sind, die alles auslöschen, was in London seit 1939 an Plänen für Europa in mühseliger diplomatischer Arbeit geschaffen worden war.

Welche Vorteile verspricht sich Roosevelt von seinem Plan, wenn er bereit ist, soviel dafür auf das Spiel zu setzen?

  • Der Präsident in Washington vertritt die These, dass keine Machtkonstellation in der Welt in der Lage wäre gegen den Stachel der drei zu lecken, solange gegen eine solche wie auch immer geartete Machtballung die Riesenkapazität der amerikanischen maschinellen Produktion und die Wucht der sowjetischen Menschenmassen gestellt werden könnten. Deshalb ist Roosevelt bereit, für eine Zusammenarbeit Moskau-Washington auch angesichts größter Schwierigkeiten einzutreten. Der bisherige Verlauf des jetzigen Weltkrieges wird von ihm dabei als Hauptargument benützt.

  • Der Mann im Weißen Hause fürchtet, dass bei einem Zusammenbruch seines Planes sowohl die Sowjetunion wie auch England eine verzweifelte Jagd nach Interessengebieten und Verbündeten in Europa beginnen würden, wodurch in kurzer Zeit ein neuer Weltbrand seinen Anfang nehmen müsste. Roosevelt fürchtet sogar, eine Ausschaltung Stalins von der „Weltorganisation“ würde ermöglichen, dass der zweite Weltkrieg pausenlos in den dritten Weltkrieg übergehen könnte, denn Amerika könnte aus klaren und im Weißen Haus eindeutig vertretenen geopolitischen Gründen niemals dulden, dass Europa mit der Sowjetunion zusammen einen eurasischen Block bilde. Umgekehrt weiß Roosevelt, dass ein völlig von Großbritannien beherrschtes Europa von Moskau als ständige Bedrohung aufgefasst werden würde. Um deshalb die wilde Jagd nach Interessengebieten in Europa zu verhindern, glaubt Roosevelt, alles versuchen zu müssen, um Stalin erst einmal grundsätzlich in die „Familie der demokratischen Völker“ einzubauen, auch um den Preis von Konzessionen an den Sowjetwillen zur Einflussnahme in Europa.

  • So sehr Roosevelt seinen „Großen Plan“ auch deshalb wünscht, weil er glaubt, bei einer allgemeinen „Weltkontrolle“ die USA ausschlaggebend zu sehen, so schließt doch sein weiteres Bemühen, Tschungking als „Anhängsel“ in den Plan zu verankern, einen sehr praktischen Grund ein. Wenngleich Tschungking-China eindeutige totalitäre Tendenzen aufweist, so steht Roosevelt doch hinter Tschiangkaischek, weil er dadurch hofft, 450,000.000 Chinesen als Abnehmer für seine überschüssige Produktion an Autos, Eisschränken und Radios zu gewinnen. Auch in Asien würde das Nichtzusammenarbeiten der Sowjets in dieser Weltorganisation eine gewissenlose Jagd nach Interessensphären bringen. Diesmal allerdings zwischen Washington und Moskau, wobei es keineswegs entschieden ist, ob Japan die ihm von Roosevelt zugedachte Rolle des „kleinen Mannes“ spielen würde.

Die Roosevelt-Planung für die Schaffung einer Weltordnung auf Grundlage des Gleichgewichts der Großmächte mit Washington als Zünglein an der Waage erscheint den Amerikanern einleuchtend. Trotzdem gibt es Amerikaner, deren Bedenken in die Öffentlichkeit dringen. Diese Männer erklären, dass durch Teheran und was dann folgte, Roosevelt heute bereits dastehe, wo Wilson 1919 sich im Versailler Spiegelsaal befunden habe. Wie Wilson hat Roosevelt seine Hoffnung für die Weltsicherheit auf eine zentrale fixe Idee aufgebaut. Wilsons „Großer Plan“ war der „Völkerbund.“ Wilson war beredt, um diesem Plan das Leben zu schenken, Punkt für Punkt seiner Gerechtigkeit versprechenden 14 Punkte aufzugeben oder umdeuten zu lassen. Roosevelts „Großer Plan“ ist ein Weltsystem mit einer „Drei-Mächte-Konstellation“ an Stelle eines Völkerbundes, von dem Roosevelt glaubt, dass er scheitern musste, weil weder genug Macht dahinterstand, noch die Völker in der Lage waren, die Ideale eines solchen Instruments in die Praxis umzusetzen. Roosevelt glaubt, dass seine Drei-Mächte-Konstellation diese Macht besitzt; aber auch er ist bereit, um seine fixe Idee durchzusetzen, Punkt für Punkt seiner „Atlantik-Charta“ über den Haufen zu werfen oder in Kompromissen ersticken zu lassen, deren verhängnisvollster das der „freien Hand für Moskau in Europa“ ist. Dem Ehrgeiz Roosevelts soll Europa geopfert werden, vor allem das deutsche Volk, dessen Todesurteil nach dem Willen des Judentums Stalin Vollstreckern soll.

Den Morgenthau-Plan in der Tasche

br. Bern, 5. Februar – Man erinnere sich an den Morgenthau-Plan, der darauf hinausläuft, Deutschland nach dem erhofften Siege seiner Gegner jeder Industrie zu berauben und es, soweit man es nicht unter seine Nachbarn aufteilt, zu einem „großen Kartoffelacker“ zu machen.

Der Plan wurde damals in einem ungelegenen Augenblick bekannt, denn er schien in seiner Hirnverbranntheit geeignet, die Aussichten Roosevelts auf eine abermalige Wiederwahl zu stören.

Nun ist Roosevelt wiedergewählt – nun glaubt man wieder offener sprechen zu können. Und so meldet eine nordamerikanische Agentur in Verbindung mit der Dreierkonferenz in aller Harmlosigkeit: „Roosevelt habe im Augenblick nur den Morgenthau-Plan bei sich, der als Grundvorschlag der Vereinigten Nationen vorgelegt werden soll.“ Also nicht ein unverbindlicher Privatvorschlag ist dieser Plan jetzt, sondern ein offizieller Vorschlag, mit dem der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten zur Konferenz mit Stalin und Churchill gefahren ist. Nun weiß man wenigstens, was gemeint ist, wenn diese drei ihren angekündigten Aufruf an das deutsche Volk starten sollten, um nach Wilsons Vorbild wieder einmal zu versichern, es werde gar nicht so schlimm werden, wenn Deutschland nur erst einmal kapituliert habe.

74

U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council

Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

C. Voting

  1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

  2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

  3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.

Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) It is entirely consonant with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.

Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.

First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world to which I have referred.

Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.

It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.

Yalta, February 6, 1945
75

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Voting Procedure

Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary

  1. Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.

American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and – we believe – the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.

  1. Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.

In the Tehran Declaration, the three powers stated:

We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…

Without this good will on the part of all members of the Organization – even if it could be established – its future would be uncertain.

To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation of the Organization, we must avoid the charge of great power domination.

  1. Unity of the great powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.

If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.

Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.

To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.

Yalta, February 6, 1945
76

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.

Proposed Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and Analysis of the Effects of That Formula

The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:

C. Voting

  1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

  2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

  3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.

Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:

I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on

  1. Admission of new members;
  2. Suspension of a member;
  3. Expulsion of a member;
  4. Election of the Secretary General.

II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.

III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:

  1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;

  2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;

  3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;

  4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.

IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.

V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.

VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.

The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:

I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;

II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;

III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;

IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;

V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.

77

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 6, 1945

Mr. President: Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru – and say we will talk it over again tomorrow. It is 7.15

HARRY

78

The Pittsburgh Press (February 6, 1945)

Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill meet

European policy statement likely

LONDON, England (UP) – The “Big Three” conference was underway today and observers here expected it to conclude with a broad statement of European policy, supplementing and perhaps expanding the Atlantic Charter.

High U.S. conferees favored a detailed announcement of the conclusions reached. But it was questionable whether the conference statement would reveal many of the decision by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

Observers believed they would issue a statement charting the general course of their policy, but leaving many key questions unanswered publicly.

There were strong reasons to believe they would disclose little if anything of their plans for the future of Germany beyond a broad statement of intent. Russia’s intention toward Japan was believed almost certainly not to be revealed at this time.

That the conference was underway was confirmed for the first time by Sir Walter Citrine, general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress

He made the disclosure at the opening session of the World Trade Union Conference in explaining why Mr. Churchill could not address the meeting.

Mr. Churchill had promised to speak at the conference, but instead sent a message of greetings to the delegates.

Speculation continued over the whereabouts of the “Big Three” meeting, with most sources suggesting the Black Sea area or possibly Stalingrad. One theory was that some sessions at least were being held aboard a warship, perhaps American, with Mr. Roosevelt as host.*

Gen. Charles de Gaulle expressed French resentment that he hadn’t been invited to participate in the conference and laid down French conditions for post-war Europe in a radio address yesterday.

His conditions were: French military occupation of the whole length of the Rhine River; separation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr Basin from the “German state or states,” and independence of “the Polish, Czech, Austrian and Balkan peoples.”

Japs show concern

The Japanese betrayed increasing concern that Marshal Stalin would align Russia with the United States and Britain against Japan at the conference.

They obviously feared that Marshal Stalin, flushed by victories over the German Army. will give Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill a definite promise to throw at least part of the Red Army against the Japs after Germany has surrendered.

The influential Tokyo newspaper Asahi, as quoted by the German Transocean Agency, said the question of Soviet participation would “most certainly be raised,” since the Pacific war situation was “nearing the decisive stage.”

79

Editorial: Time to tell the Germans

German morale is the growing question mark as the Red armies sweep on toward Berlin, as Anglo-American planes bomb the panicky capital and Gen. Eisenhower moves through the Siegfried Line. That morale must be much less affected by propaganda and counter-propaganda than by the actual chaos and carnage which the German people see and feel. And yet propaganda does continue to play a part. At least Herr Goebbels, who has been more consistently successful than Hitler or the generals, is shouting louder than ever.

He is harping on two strings. One is German pride. He says: Remember how the Russians held out at Leningrad and Moscow (Stalingrad is passed over as too painful for reminders), how the Poles took it at Warsaw, how Londoners refused to crack under the blitz and planned to fight on elsewhere if their capital fell. Then he asks: Will Germans, the superior race, weaken when inferior Russians, Poles and Britons stood firm? That’s a good line. It may stiffen some sagging German spines.

Goebbels’ second line is the appeal to German fear of Allied retaliation. He says: If Germany surrenders, she will be destroyed. This is also potent. The Germans know the bestial record of their armies in conquered lands, they see the foreign slave labor which has been brought into Germany, they know they have earned the hatred and revenge of the world.

Because there is much truth in the situation which Goebbels is now exploiting with an evil twist, it is not easy for the Allies to counter his propaganda. They cannot deny that there is hatred of Germans among those who have survived the barbarism of German occupation. Nor do the Allies wish to sugarcoat the truth that the settlement terms will be hard, that everything necessary will be done by the victors to prevent another revival of German power of conquest.

But we think the Allies, within the realm of honesty and reason, could be more effective in counter-propaganda. They can emphasize, more than they have done, the official statements of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin that unconditional surrender means destruction of Nazism and German aggressive power, but not of the German people. The sooner there is a joint Big Three declaration of that kind the better.

Moreover, the Big Three ultimatum should stress that the danger of destruction of the German people would not be created but removed by an armistice. They should be told that Hitler’s plan to continue the war means national suicide, that German cities will be wiped out at a rate hitherto undreamed, that millions upon millions of Germans will die needlessly. In sober truth Germany today is facing destruction – not because the Allies will it; but because the German people, who started the war under Nazi orders, go on making war under Nazi orders.

80

Background of news –
Since Tehran

By Bertram Benedict

It is now 14 months since the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union signed their joint declaration at Tehran, in Iran.

In those 14 months, there has been no other meeting of the Big Three, although Mr. Roosevelt conferred with Mr. Churchill at Quebec in September and Mr. Churchill with Stalin at Moscow in the following month. There have been three great international conferences in the United States on post-war problems: at Chicago, on aviation; at Bretton Woods, on financial relations; at Dumbarton Oaks, on world organization.

The main Tehran Declaration (there was another on Iran) was largely political, but probably the most vital decisions reached were military. Now, with the Red armies near Berlin, the most vital decisions of the Big Three may well be political, on what to do after victory over Germany.

Since Tehran, British and American relations with Chiang Kai-shek have deteriorated, although a little improvement seems to have been achieved of late. Fourteen months ago, the Generalissimo conferred with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill (Russia is not at war with Japan) at Cairo prior to the Tehran meeting, and the three issued a joint declaration on the territorial future of Japan.

Reds were still in Russia

When the Tehran conference met, the Red armies were still on Russian soil. British and American armies were on the continent of Europe only in Italy, and there they were still south of Rome. But in January 1944, the Red Armies reached the old border of Poland and lifted the siege of Leningrad; in March, they were in the Ukraine; in April, in the Balkans; in August, in East Prussia.

On June 6, two days after Rome fell, the Allies landed in Normandy; on August 15, they invaded southern France; on August 25, they took Paris; on September 12, they were on German soil in the west. And on July 20, a German army group tried to assassinate Hitler.

In the Pacific, the Marshalls were invaded in February 1944 and Saipan in June; by August 15, the Japanese were all out of India; late in October, U.S. troops landed on Leyte in the Philippines and the U.S. Navy inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese Navy in a naval battle; on December 16, the Americans landed on Luzon and began their march on Manila; and Tokyo has come under systematic bombing from the air.

Roosevelt policy strengthened

Since Tehran, Germany has lost every ally in Europe, and Turkey has broken diplomatic and economic relations with Berlin. At the time of Tehran, the Axis held 20 European capitals. Only five are left.

President Roosevelt goes to a new conference with Mr. Stalin and Mr. Churchill strengthened politically by his reelection, by the election defeat of some outstanding opponents of his foreign policy, by a larger majority for his party in the House, by retention of his party majority in the Senate.

81

U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)

Log of the Trip

Tuesday, February 6, 1945

0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia for Washington with White House mail.

1300: Luncheon at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan, Justice Byrnes, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m. The Prime Minister did not return to Vorontsov, as he was due back at Livadia at 4 p. m. (1600) for another conference. Instead, he accepted the loan of the room occupied by Admiral Brown and General Watson and took a short nap at Livadia.

1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S. For Great Britain For the USSR
The President. The Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden. Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy. Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Clark Kerr. Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes. Mr. Jebb. Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Bridges. Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss. Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Bohlen. Major Birse.

The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed on at today’s meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington time).

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Miss Harriman and Mr. Spaman made a motor trip to Sevastopol today.

1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.

2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Early and Mr. Flynn.

This afternoon Commander Tyree, Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Long, Mr. Holmes and Mr. O’Driscoll left Livadia by automobile for Saki. At Saki they enplaned for Cairo to complete the advance arrangements incident to the President’s forthcoming visit to Egypt.

82

U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Top secret
Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Roberts
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Lindsay
Major General Kuter Brigadier General Bessell
Lieutenant General Somervell Brigadier General Everest
Vice Admiral Cooke Commodore Burrough
Major General Bull Colonel Peck
Major General Deane Colonel Lincoln
Major General Anderson Colonel Cary
Major General Hull Captain Stroop
Major General Wood Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick Lieutenant Colonel McRae
Rear Admiral Duncan Commander Clark
Rear Admiral Olsen
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, 10 a.m.

Approval of Minutes of CCS 186th Meeting

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Utilization of the Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest Area (JCS 1241)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin’s agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.

General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945, and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix “A” of JCS 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.

Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777; JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT); JCS 1266/1 (Wash.))

Admiral Leahy said that JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expresses agreement with the British proposal in CCS 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of JCS 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as CCS 777/1).

Supplies and Equipment Requested by the USSR (JCS 1138/3, JCS Info. Memo 360 – MILEPOST SUMMARY)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed JCS 1138/2 and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation MILEPOST. In JCS 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that JCS 1138/3 be approved.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.

Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater Berlin” (JCS 577/28)

Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater Berlin,” the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Zone of Limitation for British and U.S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet Armies

General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.

General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term “bombline” because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression “zone of limitation.” There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words “British and U.S.” wherever the word “Allied” occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.

General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.

Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.

After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U.S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the British-U.S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as JCS 1243).

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.

Report by Combined Shipping Staffs

General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.

The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.

Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell’s, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of General Somervell’s report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.

83 
740.00114 EW/2-545

The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State

Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret

My Dear Secretary of State: As you know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed with the Russians during the present Conference is the question of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in western and southern Europe and British and American nationals liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as possible.

In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARGONAUT. I intend therefore to ask M. Molotov for discussions to be opened between the experts of the three parties concerned at once, in order to reach agreement upon a satisfactory text.

There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as SHAEF have already reported, that the only V real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.

It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the United States. I am however without any information on the United States plans on this. General Eisenhower has recently pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff once again to provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles until the present large numbers have been cleared. No doubt your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower’s telegram, and I should be very glad if you could tell me whether you will be in a position to make any statement to the Russians about the United States plans.

Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.

Yours sincerely,
ANTHONY EDEN

84 
740.00114 EW/2-545

The War Shipping Administrator to the Secretary of State

Yalta, February 5, 1945
Secret

Memorandum:

To: Mr. Stettinius
From: Admiral Land

Subject: MR. EDEN’S LETTER TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO MEET RUSSIAN REPATRIATION REQUIREMENTS

  1. After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.

  2. Following this authorization, Eisenhower requested use of two large troopships for repatriation of large numbers of Russians on hand, this movement to be from Marseille.

  3. In Washington the CMTC in the belief the British Chiefs of Staff had failed to implement the approval described in paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether Eisenhower’s request had been made in ignorance of CCS decision on availability of lift.

  4. Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers at CRICKET indicates that implementation had been intentionally held up because of these two factors:
    (a) Type of ship required.
    (b) Policy on Russian repatriation to be established.

  5. The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U.S. transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large type. This changes U.S. conception at time of original British request referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U.S. troop movement capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.

85 
740.00114 EW/2-545

The British Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Foreign Commissar

Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret

You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October, I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of caring for and repatriating Soviet citizens and British subjects liberated respectively by Allied forces in the south and west and by the Soviet forces in the east of Europe.

Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20 January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a Reciprocal Agreement on this matter. We have examined this redraft and, subject to what is stated below, I am glad to say that it is generally acceptable. I understand that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government at the same time.

In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government’s Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.

I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.

On 20 January, your Government also presented to the British Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom. This redraft is also generally satisfactory, but there are a few points on it which require clarification and amendment. I would suggest that this Agreement should also be remitted to the same British and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present Conference.

I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.

I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.

I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal Agreement.

His Excellency Monsieur V. M. MOLOTOV

[Enclosure]

Redraft of Soviet Government’s Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and Allied Armies

Article 1

All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3

Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.

Article 4

Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.

Article 5

Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.

(Redrafted) Article 6

Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting Parties, may until their repatriation, be employed on a voluntary basis on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.

Article 7

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

Article 8

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

86 
740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 7 [8], 1945
Top secret

War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall which indicates that JCS on February 7 approved with certain changes British preliminary text of agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also for liberated persons. (This is our message No. 27) While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266, the agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to JCS staff with you:

  1. Protection of Geneva Convention which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens captured in German uniform who demand such protection.

  2. Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.

  3. Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.

  4. Question of the liberation and repatriation of other United Nations citizens.

  5. Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.

(ALLSTATE HORSESHOE) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266 and 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached.

87

JCS to the President

Yalta, 6 February 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin’s approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.

(Sec JCS)

88

The President’s Chief of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army

Yalta, 7 February 1945
Top secret

My Dear General Antonov: The U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P.M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.

For the U.S. Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, USN

89

The First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army to the President’s Chief of Staff

Crimea, 7 February 1945
Top secret

[TRANSLATION]

Dear Admiral Leahy: In reply to your letter of the seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with you on the eighth of February at three o’clock in the afternoon at the headquarters of the Russian Staff.

I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.

Yours very respectfully,
ANTONOV
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
General of the Army

90

Völkischer Beobachter (February 7, 1945)

London bestätigt den Betrugsversuch am deutschen Volk

Stockholm, 6. Februar – Das englische Nachrichtenbüro Exchange Telegraph stellt lange Kombinationen über die Dreierkonferenz an. Es berichtet, dass in London sehr viel über eine Kapitulationsaufforderung, die man an das deutsche Volk richten wolle, gesprochen werde. Exchange Telegraph bestätigt damit den Agitationsschwindel, auf den wir seit langem vorbereitet sind und der ohne Frage eine Neuauflage des Wilson-Bluffs von 1918 sein soll.

Die deutsche Presse hat einmütig dieses Betrugsmanöver der plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltverschwörer bereits beantwortet. Sie hat den Betrügern die Maske vom Gesicht gerissen und diesen Versuch als das entlarvt, was er in Wirklichkeit ist, nämlich einen Versuch, das deutsche Volk von seiner Führung zu trennen und seine Einigkeit zu sprengen, um damit die moralische Widerstandskraft zu zerbrechen. Die Kriegsverbrecher in Moskau, Washington und London haben bei ihrem Vorhaben übersehen, dass sie es heute nicht mehr mit dem deutschen Volk von 1918 zu tun haben. Die Lehre des Wilson-Schwindels hat genügt, um zu wissen, dass hinter allen Manövern des Feindes seine brutalen Vernichtungspläne stehen, über die uns der englische Hassfanatiker Vansittart und die jüdischen Vernichtungspolitiker Morgenthau und Ilja Ehrenburg nicht im unklaren gelassen haben.

Wir sind genau darüber unterrichtet, dass der Feind den Wilson-Schwindel nur deshalb noch einmal zu starten versucht, weil er erkannt hat, dass es unmöglich ist, uns militärisch in die Knie zu zwingen. Wir haben die Krisen von 1944 überstanden, haben den gemeinen Bombenterror hingenommen und sind nicht daran zerbrochen, wir werden auch die bolschewistische Flut zum Stehen bringen und den heiligen deutschen Boden von den bolschewistischen Horden befreien. Gerade weil wir wissen, welche ungeheure Kraft in der deutschen Einigkeit ruht, sehen wir mit festem Vertrauen in die Zukunft.

Wir sind uns des Ernstes der Lage und der Gefahren, die Deutschland umlauern, sehr wohl bewusst. Aber wir wissen auch, dass es sich lohnt, zu verteidigen und von neuem zu erobern, was wir uns, in den wenigen Aufbaujahren, die uns nach der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung gegönnt waren, geschaffen haben. Nicht umsonst beschimpft und begeifert die feindliche Presse die nationalsozialistische Organisation und die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung des deutschen Volkes. Man hat im Feindlager begriffen, dass sich gerade darin die Einheit und die Geschlossenheit der deutschen Nation verkörpert. Der Grundgedanke unseres gesamten völkischen Lebens, die nationalsozialistische Volksgemeinschaft, ist das Fundament, auf dem die deutsche Macht und Kraft beruhen. Dieses Fundament will der Feind zerstören.

Sein Sturmlauf gegen die deutsche Einigkeit ist uns immer wieder die Bestätigung dafür, dass allein unser Zusammenhalten, das Füreinander stehen, unsere Opferbereitschaft und Zukunft sind. Das deutsche Volk hat sich die sozialistische Lehre nicht erkämpft, um sie über Bord zu werfen, wenn der Feind uns irgendeinen Köder hinwirft, durch den er den für ihn blutigen Waffengang zu verkürzen versucht. Deutschland verteidigt diese Idee mit dem ganzen Einsatz seiner Kraft und wird sie zum Siege führen. Das Bekenntnis: „Ein Führer, ein Volk! Ein Volk, ein Reich!“ ist die Parole unseres Kampfes, für den unsere Soldaten ihr Leben einsetzen und für den die Heimat arbeitet und opfert, unbeirrt, unbeugsam und fanatisch.

91

U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Yusupov Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Maisky
Mr. Hiss Mr. Jebb Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page Mr. Dixon Mr. Novikov
Mr. Harrison Mr. Golunsky
Major Theakstone

Page Minutes

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subject[s]:

  1. DUMBARTON OAKS

  2. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

  3. CREATION OF A COMMISSION TO STUDY THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

  4. THE INTEGRATION OF FRANCE INTO THE GERMAN CONTROL MACHINERY ON CONDITION THAT FRANCE WERE TO RECEIVE A ZONE OF OCCUPATION

  5. REPARATIONS

Dumbarton Oaks

Mr. Stettinius inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday’s plenary session. He said that if so, he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the World Security Organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.

The Dismemberment of Germany

Mr. Molotov recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument to the addition of the words “and the dismemberment” after the word “demilitarization.” He suggested that a sub-committee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.

It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinski, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12 which would include the addition of the word “dismemberment” and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.

Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany

Mr. Molotov suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the EAC the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the EAC should be carefully considered.

Mr. Eden pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the EAC the French would participate in this work.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.

Mr. Molotov stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the EAC.

Mr. Eden remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to insure the proper functioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the afore-mentioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.

Mr. Eden stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.

Mr. Molotov continued that he was not insisting on a commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.

Messrs. Stettinius and Eden stated that this would be agreeable.

Mr. Eden stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.

Mr. Molotov stated that he of course had the right to deputize someone to represent him.

The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to receive a Zone of Occupation

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this matter and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation, he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that de Gaulle in all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone, they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the EAC. He pointed out that the Prime Minister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.

Mr. Molotov stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.

It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (a) it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (b) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the EAC, while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should agree that no other power should be given a zone of occupation.

Mr. Molotov suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.

Reparations

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief. He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 percent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22-23 billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards comparable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item, it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to 30 billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 30-35 percent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18-20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5-6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.

Mr. Eden stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.

Mr. Molotov stated that there would be no objections to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon’s plenary session the foreign secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared, he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinius’ proposal that the foreign ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a reparations commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it would be helpful for the American Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.

Mr. Molotov stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the reparations Commission in Moscow.

Mr. Molotov’s interpreter then read a second paper on the creation of the reparations commission. Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison with it.

Mr. Molotov was in agreement with this proposal.