America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

[NormanStewart]

Burmafront in Bewegung

…

[NormanStewart]

London bestätigt den Betrugsversuch am deutschen Volk

Stockholm, 6. Februar – Das englische Nachrichtenbüro Exchange Telegraph stellt lange Kombinationen über die Dreierkonferenz an. Es berichtet, dass in London sehr viel über eine Kapitulationsaufforderung, die man an das deutsche Volk richten wolle, gesprochen werde. Exchange Telegraph bestätigt damit den Agitationsschwindel, auf den wir seit langem vorbereitet sind und der ohne Frage eine Neuauflage des Wilson-Bluffs von 1918 sein soll.

Die deutsche Presse hat einmütig dieses Betrugsmanöver der plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltverschwörer bereits beantwortet. Sie hat den Betrügern die Maske vom Gesicht gerissen und diesen Versuch als das entlarvt, was er in Wirklichkeit ist, nämlich einen Versuch, das deutsche Volk von seiner Führung zu trennen und seine Einigkeit zu sprengen, um damit die moralische Widerstandskraft zu zerbrechen. Die Kriegsverbrecher in Moskau, Washington und London haben bei ihrem Vorhaben übersehen, dass sie es heute nicht mehr mit dem deutschen Volk von 1918 zu tun haben. Die Lehre des Wilson-Schwindels hat genügt, um zu wissen, dass hinter allen Manövern des Feindes seine brutalen Vernichtungspläne stehen, über die uns der englische Hassfanatiker Vansittart und die jüdischen Vernichtungspolitiker Morgenthau und Ilja Ehrenburg nicht im unklaren gelassen haben.

Wir sind genau darüber unterrichtet, dass der Feind den Wilson-Schwindel nur deshalb noch einmal zu starten versucht, weil er erkannt hat, dass es unmöglich ist, uns militärisch in die Knie zu zwingen. Wir haben die Krisen von 1944 überstanden, haben den gemeinen Bombenterror hingenommen und sind nicht daran zerbrochen, wir werden auch die bolschewistische Flut zum Stehen bringen und den heiligen deutschen Boden von den bolschewistischen Horden befreien. Gerade weil wir wissen, welche ungeheure Kraft in der deutschen Einigkeit ruht, sehen wir mit festem Vertrauen in die Zukunft.

Wir sind uns des Ernstes der Lage und der Gefahren, die Deutschland umlauern, sehr wohl bewusst. Aber wir wissen auch, dass es sich lohnt, zu verteidigen und von neuem zu erobern, was wir uns, in den wenigen Aufbaujahren, die uns nach der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung gegönnt waren, geschaffen haben. Nicht umsonst beschimpft und begeifert die feindliche Presse die nationalsozialistische Organisation und die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung des deutschen Volkes. Man hat im Feindlager begriffen, dass sich gerade darin die Einheit und die Geschlossenheit der deutschen Nation verkörpert. Der Grundgedanke unseres gesamten völkischen Lebens, die nationalsozialistische Volksgemeinschaft, ist das Fundament, auf dem die deutsche Macht und Kraft beruhen. Dieses Fundament will der Feind zerstören.

Sein Sturmlauf gegen die deutsche Einigkeit ist uns immer wieder die Bestätigung dafür, dass allein unser Zusammenhalten, das Füreinander stehen, unsere Opferbereitschaft und Zukunft sind. Das deutsche Volk hat sich die sozialistische Lehre nicht erkämpft, um sie über Bord zu werfen, wenn der Feind uns irgendeinen Köder hinwirft, durch den er den für ihn blutigen Waffengang zu verkürzen versucht. Deutschland verteidigt diese Idee mit dem ganzen Einsatz seiner Kraft und wird sie zum Siege führen. Das Bekenntnis: „Ein Führer, ein Volk! Ein Volk, ein Reich!“ ist die Parole unseres Kampfes, für den unsere Soldaten ihr Leben einsetzen und für den die Heimat arbeitet und opfert, unbeirrt, unbeugsam und fanatisch.

[NormanStewart]

US-Preisdiktatur für Brasilkaffee

…

[NormanStewart]

Führer HQ (February 7, 1945)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Die Verteidiger von Budapest zerschlugen auch gestern wieder alle feindlichen Angriffe.

An der Oderfront konnte der Gegner seine Brückenköpfe nördlich Ratibor, bei Brieg und Küstrin geringfügig erweitern.

Im südlichen Pommern und Westpreussen hielt der feindliche Druck nach
Norden im Raum Pyritz–Arnswalde–DeutschKrone an. Nordwestlich Schwetz wurden feindliche Angriffe abgewehrt. Die Besatzungen von Graudenz und Elbing behaupten sich gegen den starken feindlichen Ansturm.

In Ostpreußen wurden die an den bisherigen Brennpunkten fortgesetzten Durchbruchsversuche der Bolschewisten in harten Kämpfen vereitelt. Bei Landsberg warfen unsere Truppen die Sowjets trotz heftiger Gegenwehr zurück. Im Samland ließen die Angriffe des Feindes auf Grund seiner schweren Verluste nach. Es gelang dort unseren Grenadieren, im Gegenangriff eine Frontlücke zu schließen und bei diesen Kämpfen 48 sowjetische Panzer und 57 Geschütze zu vernichten.

Unsere Seestreitkräfte unterstützen wirksam die schweren Kämpfe des Heeres im Samland und griffen am 6. Februar mit gutem Erfolg erstmalig auch in die Abwehrschlacht um Elbing ein. Marineflak schoss drei feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter zwei viermotorige Bomber, ab.

Im Westen schlugen unsere Truppen die an der unteren Roer angreifenden Engländer zurück. Am Oberlauf des Flusses scheiterten amerikanische Angriffe bis auf einen geringfügigen Einbruch.

Beiderseits der Sohnee-Eifel nahmen die Orts- und Bunkerkämpfe an Heftigkeit und Ausdehnung zu. Von der Sauer- und Moselfront wird starkes feindliches Artilleriefeuer gemeldet.

Angriffe der Amerikaner gegen den Saar-Brückenkopf zwischen Forbach und Saargemünd sowie bei Bliesbruck scheiterten. Eingebrochener Feind wurde im Gegenstoß wieder geworfen.

Im oberen Elsass gelang es, unsere Truppen in einen verkleinerten Brückenkopf zurückzuführen. Dort wiesen sie zwischen Neubreisach und dem Rhein den nach Süden angreifenden Gegner ab. Ebenso wurden starke feindliche Angriffe auf Ensisheim im Gegenstoß zerschlagen.

In Mittelitalien wird auf den Höhen hinter dem Sergiotal nordöstlich von Callicano örtlich gekämpft.

Im Raum von Mostar in der Herzegowina sind erneut Kämpfe mit den dort angreifenden Bandenkräften im Gange.

Amerikanische Terrorverbände warfen Bomben auf Magdeburg und Orte des thüringisch-sächsischen Raumes, wo vor allem Schäden in den Wohnvierteln von Chemnitz entstanden.

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Faschistisch-republikanische Einheiten sowie Verbände des Heeres und der Waffen-SS und der Polizei unter Führung des Höchsten SS- und Polizeiführers und bevollmächtigten Generals der deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien, SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Wolff haben in mehrwöchigen hartnäckigen Gebirgskämpfen größere Gebiete Oberitaliens von starken Bandenkräften gesäubert. Die Banden verloren dabei mehrere tausend gezählte Tote. Über 80.000 Bandenkämpfer wurden zur Niederlegung der Waffen gezwungen. Durch diese Kampfhandlungen wurde das oberitalienische Gebiet im wesentlichen vom Bandenterror befreit.

[NormanStewart]

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 7, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
071100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP

(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 305

Allied forces northeast of Monschau, have pushed 1,000 yards south from Bergstein against minefields and defended pillboxes, and to the southwest we have gained 500 yards to a point approximately one mile west of Schmidt. Our infantry elements have pushed another 1,000 yards to the east of Steckenborn.

South of the Urftstausee, we have reached the area one and one-half miles east of Morsbach. Scheuren, one-half mile northwest of Schleiden, is in our hands and heavy fighting continues in Hellenthal, three miles southwest of Schleiden.

Our forces have captured Schlausenbach, on the edge of the Schneifel Forest and we have made small gains in the forest southeast of Schlausenbach. Southwest of the forest, a counterattack in the vicinity of Brandscheid resulted in stiff fighting. Farther southwest, our units have taken Habscheid. Southwest of Habscheid, we have captured Grosskampenberg and Lützkampen.

East of the Mosele River in the Remich area, we repulsed a small counterattack in the woods one-half mile southeast of Tettingen.

Between the battle area and the Rhine, medium and light bombers attacked the communications centers of Sötenich, Bad Munstereifel and Wittlich, and an ammunition dump at Rheinbach. Fighter-bombers struck at fortified places in the Euskirchen-Mayen area.

In the southern Alsace Plain, we have occupied Neuf-Brisach. The western approaches to the Rhine bridges leading to Vieux-Breisach were taken and further progress was made to the south between the Rhine and the Rhine-Rhone Canal.

To the southwest, the Ill River was crossed at a number of points and we continued to make gains in the direction of the Rhine-Rhone Canal. The villages of Battenheim, Baldersheim and Sausheim, northeast of Mulhouse were liberated.

Enemy troops in the Hardt Forest were strafed and a railyard at Vieux-Breisach was attacked by fighter-bombers.

Communication targets in holland and northwest Germany were attacked yesterday by medium and fighter-bombers. A bridge at Deventer was the target for escorted medium bombers, while fighter-bombers struck at bridges, locomotives and rolling stock and cut rail lines, particularly in central Holland and to the north and northeast of the Ruhr. A fuel dump at Emmerich was attacked by medium bombers, and fighter-bombers attacked an ammunition dump at Amersfoort and an oil storage plant north of Lingen.

A vehicle depot at Bergisch-Gladbach was attacked by medium and light bombers.

Fighter-bombers struck at motor transport, railyards and rolling stock in the Düsseldorf area; railyards in the region of Würzburg, Landau and Trier; and rolling stock and motor transport in the Trier and Karlsruhe areas.

Railyards at Rastatt and Offenburg, and a rail bridge at Rastatt were targets for fighter-bombers, which also attacked rolling stock near Rastatt and Mahlberg.

More than 1,300 heavy bombers escorted by more than 850 fighters attacked railyards and industrial targets at Magdeburg and Chemnitz and other points over a wide area of central Germany. Many of the escort strafed ground targets in western Germany, destroying three enemy aircraft on the ground and destroying or damaging locomotives, freight cars and military vehicles.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Yusupov Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Page	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Novikov
	Mr. Harrison	Mr. Golunsky
	Major Theakstone

Page Minutes

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subject[s]:

1. DUMBARTON OAKS

2. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

3. CREATION OF A COMMISSION TO STUDY THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

4. THE INTEGRATION OF FRANCE INTO THE GERMAN CONTROL MACHINERY ON CONDITION THAT FRANCE WERE TO RECEIVE A ZONE OF OCCUPATION

5. REPARATIONS

Dumbarton Oaks

Mr. Stettinius inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday’s plenary session. He said that if so, he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.

Mr. Molotov remarked that the World Security Organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.

The Dismemberment of Germany

Mr. Molotov recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument to the addition of the words “and the dismemberment” after the word “demilitarization.” He suggested that a sub-committee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.

It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinski, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12 which would include the addition of the word “dismemberment” and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.

Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany

Mr. Molotov suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the EAC the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the EAC should be carefully considered.

Mr. Eden pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the EAC the French would participate in this work.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.

Mr. Molotov stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the EAC.

Mr. Eden remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to insure the proper functioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the afore-mentioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.

Mr. Molotov stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.

Mr. Eden stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.

Mr. Molotov continued that he was not insisting on a commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.

Messrs. Stettinius and Eden stated that this would be agreeable.

Mr. Eden stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.

Mr. Molotov stated that he of course had the right to deputize someone to represent him.

The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to receive a Zone of Occupation

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this matter and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation, he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that de Gaulle in all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone, they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the EAC. He pointed out that the Prime Minister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.

Mr. Molotov stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.

It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (a) it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (b) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the EAC, while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.

Mr. Eden stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should agree that no other power should be given a zone of occupation.

Mr. Molotov suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.

Reparations

Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief. He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 percent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22-23 billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards comparable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item, it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to 30 billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 30-35 percent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18-20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5-6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.

Mr. Eden stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.

Mr. Molotov stated that there would be no objections to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon’s plenary session the foreign secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.

Mr. Molotov stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared, he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinius’ proposal that the foreign ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a reparations commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.

Mr. Stettinius stated that it would be helpful for the American Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.

Mr. Molotov stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the reparations Commission in Moscow.

Mr. Molotov’s interpreter then read a second paper on the creation of the reparations commission. Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.

Mr. Molotov maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison with it.

Mr. Molotov was in agreement with this proposal.

[NormanStewart]

Matthews Notes

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, noon

Dumbarton – No clarification needed

Agenda

1. Dismemberment. Formula Art 12. Next=Commission to study.

Mol: suggests Eden, Winant & Gousev.

Eden: on terms of reference

Mol. Perhaps no commission necessary.

Eden: Worried about absence of Fr. They are neighbors The three can decide on French participation Eden has right to deputize M: Thinks we should limit to these 2 proposals

Eden: Zone agreed on. S. M. want control machinery postponed & studied in EAC Eden wants immediate admission

Reparations

Mol. Explains paper

Maisky: Explains how figure reached ½ immed ½ in annual 1 bil. Ge. natl wealth=125 bil. before war. Reduction 40% after war 75 bil at end of war. Mobile part of natl wealth=70%=22 or 23 bil. of this 10 bil removal. This would give G. Middle European level standard of living Before war 30 bil natl income Lower by 30% after war=18 or 19 bil Propose to take 1 bil annually not big sum.

Eden: Whether exertion in war should be a basis or whether sufferings at hands of enemy. On either basis would stand well.

In general agreement on principles of Par. 2.

S. Prep, to study. As Pres said U.S. not interested except for invest possible raw materials. Hopes we can agree Com. to start immed.

M: Business of U.S. but they thought it fair. Our losses & Brit very great. Not ready to discuss at this conference. But would be studied by Moscow Commis.

E: Should Com. examine econ. security provisions

Mol: To extent necessary for reparations.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 7, 1945, noon

2/7 12.00 meeting ERS, Molotov, Eden Amb H, Doc, Page, A. H. – Cadogan, Clark-Kerr, Jebb, Theakstone, Dixon, Harrison, ? – Vishinsky, Maisky, Gusev, Galunsky, Novikof

ERS at outset asked if there were any q’s re D. O. which we failed to make clear yesterday If so I am prepared to answer with my colleagues any q’s that may remain open & to expand in any way

Mol. Not quite prepared to ask any q’s now

ERS merely made the offer but no desire to discuss it. No new points to bring up.

Mol. Thanks

ERS Ready at any time now or later

ERS report – 1 p. by 4 p. m.

2/7 For Mins Mol. Chm

France

→Report: We are agreed that Fr. should have a zone of occupation in Ger. for occup. by Fr. forces. Mr. Mol & ERS believe q. of particip by Fr. in Control Com. should be studied by EAC. Ed. believes particip of Fr. in Con. Com should be agreed to now. [Ed would also be willing say 3 For Mins agree that if Fr. is admitted to Con. Com. no other power should be given zone]

Reparations

Mol: add 20,000,000,000 total

Principles – Eden wants add suffering to ¶ 1 Agreed by Mol. Eden in prin agrees with ¶ 2

ERS wants study memo – will do so promptly & discuss it at your pleasure. Pres. at plenary session that U S would be interested in no reparations except for. investments & perhaps raw materials Would be surprised if it would approach figure suggested. Perhaps Brit would take some of what U S gives up. Mol. up to U S & Brit.

Hopes can report we agreed Commission should be est. immediately to go to work.

Mol. ready to go on when Brit & Am. Delegs. have had time study R draft.

→Report we have discussed this q. today; Will discuss it further & agreed Com. should be est in Mos. & begin work immediately

ERS asked Mol. if wants discuss work labor here or later. Mol – may not be ready to discuss here but agreed will be discussed by Rep. Commission at Mos.

Machinery

Mol . Amendment delete “on recommend, of the Allied Com. Or on their own initiative” OK Ed. Change “may” to “shall” OK

ERS: Approves doc. On understanding we have not yet agreed on principles

Ed. Should Rep. Com. Study control of Ger. Industry for security purposes.

ERS–EAC, Rep Com, & D.O. Staff Com. All may do this

Ed. Amended suggestion: We should consider whether this Com.

ERS: Control machinery should have responsibility for control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparation Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policies of the Control machinery & establish liaison. Agreed.

Mol. It is bus. Not only of Com but also of 3 govts

[NormanStewart]

Soviet Proposal on French Zone of Occupation in Germany

February 7, 1945, noon

Regarding a Separate Zone of Occupation in Germany to Be Allotted to France

1. It has been found desirable to allot to France a separate zone of occupation in Germany for occupation by French forces.

2. It has been decided that the French occupational authorities shall exercise control in their zone of occupation under the general guidance of the Control Council.

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Soviet Proposal on Reparations from Germany

February 7, 1945, noon

Basic Principles of Exaction of Reparations from Germany

1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the enemy.

All other countries are to receive reparations in the second place.

2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date, reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two following forms:

a) removals in a single payment at the end of the war from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport, shipping and other enterprises remaining in Germany, etc.) these removals to be carried out for the purpose of military and economic disarmament of Germany.

These removals are to be completed within two years of the end of the war.

b) Annual deliveries of commodities during 10 years after the end of the war.

3. The total sum of the German reparations in the form of removals from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war is fixed at 20 billion dollars.

This amount shall be distributed as follows:
a) USSR – 10 billion dollars,
b) United Kingdom and USA – 8 billion dollars,
c) All other countries – 2 billion dollars.

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Soviet Proposal on the Establishment of an Allied Reparation Commission

February 7, 1945, noon

Regarding the Organization of an Allied Reparation Committee

The Allied Reparation Committee shall be set up on the following basis:

1. The Committee shall consist of three representatives one from USSR, the United Kingdom and USA. Each representative shall be entitled to call in to assist in the work of the Committee any number of experts.

2. The function of the Committee shall be to work out a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany according to the principles adopted at the Crimean Conference of the Three Powers.

3. The Governments of USSR, USA and the United Kingdom shall determine the moment when the representatives of other Allied Powers will be invited to participate in the Allied Committee as well as define the forms of participation of these Powers in the Committee.

4. The activities of the Committee shall proceed in strict secrecy.

5. The Allied Reparation Committee shall be established in Moscow.

[NormanStewart]

Fourth plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse

Bohlen Minutes

February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subject[s]:

1. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

2. POLAND

3. WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION

4. ZONE OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY FOR FRANCE AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTROL COMMISSION

The President said in regard to the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality of any Polish Government since he thought in some years there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added that before proceeding with the Polish question he understood that Mr. Molotov had a report on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers today.

Mr. Molotov then read the results of the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, as follows:

Decisions Adopted at the Meeting of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden

February 7, 1945

Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany

(a) A. Y. Vyshinski, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument “unconditional surrender of Germany” having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word “dismemberment.”

(b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusev.

Regarding the Zone of Occupation in Germany for France

(a) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.

(b) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, V. M. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius feel [it] desirable to refer the question to the EAC. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.

Regarding the Reparations to be Exacted from Germany

(a) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.

(b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the City of Moscow. It was agreed that the Committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.

(c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the reparations from Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean Conference.

The President said that we are all grateful for the productive work of the three Foreign Ministers.

The Prime Minister added that he joined the President in thanking the Committee for their fruitful work but he said that since he had only heard their report orally he would wish to study the English translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he would be in complete agreement.

The President inquired whether the document included Mr. Eden’s reservation on France, to which Mr. Eden replied in the affirmative.

The Prime Minister stated that the British Government was unconvinced by the argument that it would be possible to accord a zone to the French without participation in the Control Commission. If the French were given a zone without participation they would cause endless trouble. If we were strict in our zones, they might be lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the utmost importance that there should be uniformity in the treatment of Germany by the three or four Allies. He repeated that he felt the Control Commission for Germany would be a subordinate instrument as was the case in Italy, although we recognized that the German Commission would have more important tasks. He said he wished to make it clear that he did not consider that French participation in the Control Commission would give them any right to attend a conference such as this one, at least for the time being. He said he must state frankly that he found the arguments on the subject somewhat futile since it was obvious that France would accept no zone unless they were given participation in the Control Commission and he for one thought that they were right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the European Advisory Commission which was a weaker body and particularly as France was represented on the Commission and only a deadlock could result with the French and British on one side and the Russians and Americans on the other. He therefore was of the opinion that the matter should be settled here, but it still required further study.

Marshal Stalin inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that it should be settled now or later.

The Prime Minister answered that it should be done now, but at some later stage of this Conference.

The President then observed that would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days.

The Prime Minister answered that he felt that once they had separated after this Conference it would be difficult to settle the question.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the three Governments had been able to settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal Stalin then said that in the European Advisory Commission they could at least have the benefit of the French opinion which was not represented here.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The President said that he agreed that France should not join this body but he was doubtful whether this would keep them quiet. He then suggested that they go on with the Polish question.

Marshal Stalin stated that he had received the President’s letter containing the suggestion that they summon here from Lublin two representatives from the Lublin Government and two representatives from other elements of Polish public opinion and that in the presence of these four Poles they should endeavor to settle the question of a new interim government for Poland which would be pledged to hold free elections when conditions permitted. He said he noted that there were three personalities from London, namely, Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, who had been mentioned by the President as possible members of this new government. He said he had received the President’s letter only an hour and a half ago and he had endeavored to reach the Lublin Poles by telephone but had been informed that they were away in Cracow and Lutz [Łódz?]. He had attempted to ascertain their opinion. As to the others, he was not sure that they could be located in time for them to come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection especially Vicenta Witos and Sapieha. The Marshal added that Mr. Molotov has worked out some proposals on the Polish question which appeared to approach the President’s suggestions, but that these proposals were not typed out. He suggested, therefore, that they proceed to the consideration of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and he would ask Mr. Molotov to state the views of the Soviet Government.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday we have heard Mr. Stettinius give a full report and explanations of the President’s proposals and that this report and explanation had been satisfactory and had made the issue clear to the Soviet Delegation. He said that they had always also followed closely Mr. Churchill’s remarks on the subject. He added that after hearing Mr. Stettinius’ report and Mr. Churchill’s remarks, which had clarified the subject, the Soviet Government felt that these proposals fully guaranteed the unity of the Great Powers in the matter of preservation of peace. Since this had been the main Soviet purpose at Dumbarton Oaks and they felt that the new proposals fully safeguarded this principle, he could state that they were entirely acceptable and that they had no comments to offer. He felt that there was full agreement on this subject. Mr. Molotov said that there was one question raised at Dumbarton Oaks, mainly [namely?] that of participation of the Soviet Republics as initial members of the World Organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were those of the British and American Governments. He said the Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which had occurred in February of last year and he did not think that this Conference should ignore this request.

It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of the Soviet Republics as original members. These three Republics were the Ukrainian, White Russian and Lithuanian and he felt that three or at any rate two should have the right to participate as original members. He said that it was superfluous to explain the size, population and importance of the Ukraine, White Russia or Lithuania or their importance in foreign affairs. He said that as these three Republics had borne the greatest sacrifices in the war and were the first to be invaded by the enemy, it was only fair, therefore, that these three or at any rate two be original members. He said that the Soviet Government put these proposals before the President and the Prime Minister and hoped that they would be accepted.

The President then inquired whether Mr. Molotov meant members of the Assembly.

Mr. Molotov replied “yes,” that they should be included among other members of that body. The Dominions of the British Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the President’s proposals and withdrew any objections or amendments but would request that three, or at least two, of the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to become equal members of the World Organization.

The President said he was very happy to hear from Mr. Molotov the agreement of the Soviet Government to his proposals on voting in the Council. He felt that this was a great step forward which would be welcomed by all the peoples of the world. He said that he thought the next step was to consider the question of summoning a conference to organize the setting up of the World Organization. He said he thought that this conference could take place at the end of March, although it might be physically possible to do it within the next four weeks. He added that he had been greatly interested in what Mr. Molotov had said in regard to the participation of the Soviet Republics. He added that the British Empire, the USSR and the United States were very different in structure and in tradition. The British Empire, for example, had many large units, such as Canada, Australia, etc. The USSR had a different national structure. The United States had one language and one Foreign Minister. He felt, therefore, that Mr. Molotov’s suggestion should be studied, particularly in the light of the possibility that if the larger nations were given more than one vote it might prejudice the thesis of one vote for each member. He mentioned that certain countries are large in area, though small in population and referred in this connection to Brazil which he said was smaller than the USSR but larger than the United States. On the other hand, there were some countries that were small in area but large in population, such as Honduras and Haiti. He also mentioned the fact that there were a number of nations associated with the United Nations, such as Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Iceland, and others, which had broken relations with Germany but which were not at war. He concluded with the statement that he felt that the important thing was to proceed with the plans for a conference to set up the World Organization and that the question of the admission of countries not members of the United Nations could be considered either at that time or after the organization was in operation. He said he suggested, therefore, that the question raised by Mr. Molotov should be studied by the Foreign Ministers who might also make recommendations as to the time and place of the conference and as to what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he would like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov for this great step forward which he felt would bring joy and relief to the peoples of the world. On the question of membership of the Soviet Republics, he said this had been put before us for the first time. He said he must agree with the President that the United States and the British Empire were different, that during the last twenty-five years the Self-Governing Dominions have taken their place in world affairs and have worked for peace and, if he might say so, for the furtherance of Democratic processes. The Dominions had come into the war when Great Britain declared war against Germany, knowing full well the weakness of Great Britain at that time. Great Britain had had no means of forcing them into this decision and into which [sic] they knew they could not often be consulted on major matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any organization which would reduce the status of the Dominions or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr. President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her path. He said he could understand their point of view, as they were represented by only one voice in comparison with the British organization which had a smaller population, if only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore, that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal which in no way constituted a final negation. He added, however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to London and he asked Marshal Stalin to excuse him as he could not give a precise answer today.

The President remarked that his recommendations had been somewhat different. He had merely meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question as well as that of the time and place of the conference and who should be invited.

The Prime Minister said that he did not disagree with the President’s suggestions but he felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and their Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such conference would be able to have behind them the full thought of the vital forces of their countries.

The President observed that he had only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the world organization, and that the world organization itself would probably not come into being for from three to six months after the conference.

The Prime Minister said that he had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still be under the German yoke and would be represented by governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own people would be questionable. Other countries would be starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be there with a loud voice. There would be other countries represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering could really undertake the immense task of the future organization of the world.

The President repeated his proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers could consider (1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be invited.

The Prime Minister said he had no object[ion] to the Foreign Ministers discussing this point but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical question but one of great decision. With this qualification, he agreed to the President’s proposal.

Marshal Stalin remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make decisions but merely report to the Conference.

There was a short intermission at this point.

The Prime Minister said that he proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary importance but which should be considered.

The President and Marshal Stalin agreed.

The President then said, jokingly, that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last year to Tehran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures must be considered for helping those countries like Persia that did not have any purchasing power. He mentioned that before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He therefore very much hoped that the new world organization would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.

The President added that there was a parallel, he thought, in Europe in that certain countries had adequate supplies of power, such as coal and water power, and those countries had cheap and abundant electric power, whereas other countries within fifty miles had neither. He felt that this situation was wrong. He mentioned that in the Soviet Union and its various republics consideration had been given to the problem of a country as a whole, and in the United States the TVA had the same idea. He mentioned that in the region of the TVA electric current was sold at the same price throughout the area. He concluded that, having said his piece, he would now refer to Mr. Molotov for his proposals in regard to the Polish question.

Mr. Molotov then read his proposals in regard to the Polish question, as follows:

1. It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-8 kilometers in favor of Poland.

2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and farther to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western).

3. It was deemed desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish émigré circles.

4. It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.

5. It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for organization by general voting of permanent organs of the Polish Government.

6. V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three Governments.

After reading the proposals, Mr. Molotov said he would like to add that they had attempted to reach the Poles in Poland by telephone but they had been unable to do so and it was apparent that time would not permit the carrying out of the President’s suggestion to summon the Poles to the Crimea. He said he felt that the proposals he had just put forward went far toward meeting the President’s wishes.

The President replied that he must say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr. Molotov’s suggestions. He said there was just one word he did not like and that was “émigré.” He said he did not see any necessity to go to émigrés since you could find enough Poles in Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the Poles in the Poland government in London and he knew only Mr. Mikolajczyk. He concluded by saying he would like to have an opportunity, with Mr. Stettinius, to study Mr. Molotov’s proposals, to which Marshal Stalin agreed.

The Prime Minister said he shared the President’s dislike of the word “émigré.” The word had originated during the French revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven out of a country by his own people. He said in the case of the Poles this wasn’t true, since they had left their country as a result of the brutal German attack. He therefore preferred in place of the word “émigré” to refer to them as “Poles temporarily abroad.” He said in regard to the second point of Mr. Molotov’s proposals he would always support the movement of Polish frontiers to the west since he felt they should receive compensation, but not more than they can handle. He said it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that it got indigestion. He said he felt that there was a considerable body of British public opinion that would be shocked if it were proposed to move large numbers of Germans, and although he personally would not be shocked he knew that that view existed in England. He said he felt if it were confined to East Prussia, six million Germans probably could be handled quite aside from moral grounds, but the addition of the line west of the Neisse would create quite a problem in this respect.

Marshal Stalin remarked that most Germans in those areas had already run away from the Red Army.

The Prime Minister said this, of course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the question of space in Germany for these deported persons he felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million casualties in this war and would probably have a million more would simplify that problem.

Marshal Stalin replied that the Germans might well have one or possibly two million more casualties.

The Prime Minister said that he wasn’t afraid of the problem of transfer of populations provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not only in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference should be made to other democratic leaders from within Poland itself.

Marshal Stalin agreed and the words “and from inside Poland” were added at the end of paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.

The Prime Minister then concluded that he agreed with the President that it would be well to sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did feel that some progress had been made.

At the President’s suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow afternoon.

[NormanStewart]

Matthews Minutes

February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret

President: I think we should take up the Polish question. When we concluded our meeting yesterday Marshal Stalin had explained his views. I have nothing special to add to what I said yesterday. I think it is particularly important to find a solution of the governmental question. I am not so concerned with frontiers. I am likewise not so concerned on the question of the continuity of the government. There hasn’t really been any Polish government since 1939. It is entirely in the province of the three of us to help set up a government – something to last until the Polish people can choose. I discard the idea of continuity. I think we want something new and drastic – like a breath of fresh air. But before we go on with Poland I think Mr. Molotov should report to us on the meeting of the three foreign ministers.

Molotov reads his report.

Prime Minister: I wish to thank the committee for their labor. I am in general agreement with the report with a single exception. However, I should like to see in writing what has been decided as I have only now been orally informed of what took place. On the question of giving the French a zone but not a place on the control commission His Majesty’s Government remains quite unconvinced. No solution has been found for controlling the French while they are controlling the Germans. If the French decide to accept the task of having a zone and wish to be tiresome they could produce conditions in their zone which would cause trouble in the other zones. If we decide to be strict they could be lenient. If we decide to be lenient they could be strict. I firmly believe that there must be uniformity in treatment of Germany between the four allies or there will be endless bitter disputes. I regard the Allied Control Commission as a subordinate instrument to the will of the governments. In principle, it is no more than the Allied Commission in Italy but they have a much more important task. I do not think that giving France a place on the control machinery gives any right to the French to sit in on these meetings of the three of us. But all this argument seems to me futile. I feel sure that the French will take no zone unless they are given participation on the control council. I must say I think they are right. Who would they get their directions from? For this reason I feel that the proposed plan will not work. Likewise, I feel that there is no use handing over what we cannot settle here to a weaker body such as the European Advisory Commission where the French are sitting. So why not settle it here. I suggest that we should give the question further study and settle it here.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

President: Shall we go on with the discussion of Poland?

Stalin: I have received the President’s message. It contains a proposal to call from Poland two representatives of the Lublin government and two from the opposite camp, so that in our presence these four would settle the question of the new Polish government. If this is successful, the new provisional government should in the shortest possible time organize elections in Poland. This message of the President’s also proposes that some more Poles from London – Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski, should also take part in the new government. I received this letter an hour and a half ago. I immediately gave instructions to find Bierut and [Osóbka-]Morawski so that I could talk with them on the phone. The result was that at the moment they are outside Warsaw at Lodz or Cracow but they will be found and I must ask them how to find the representatives on the other side and what they think of the possibility of their coming. I can then tell how soon they will arrive. If Vicente Witos or Sapieha could come here it would facilitate a solution but I do not know their addresses. I am afraid we have not sufficient time. Meanwhile, Molotov has prepared a draft to meet in a certain extent the President’s proposal. Let us hear it when it arrives as the translation is not yet finished. Meanwhile, we might talk of Dumbarton Oaks.

Molotov here gave his explanation of the Russian acceptance of our voting procedure and of their request for the inclusion of three representatives in the assembly. This is being covered by Mr. Hiss’s notes.

The President made some remarks on the low purchasing power of Persians and other nations which he stated was another reason for organizing the world organization. He likewise threw out the idea of setting up a TVA for Europe. Mr. Moltov’s proposal then arrived.

Molotov: I have here the proposals which I should like to make. (He reads them.) We are still trying to telephone the Polish leaders but without success and I am afraid there will not be time for them to come to this conference. That makes it impossible to try the President’s proposal. On the other hand I think these proposals meet the President’s wishes.

President: I think we are making definite progress. I should like to wait until tomorrow to study these proposals and to talk them over with the Secretary of State and officials of the State Department. There is one word in them I do not like. That is “émigré.” It is not necessary to take *émigrés. There may be people who are now in Poland who are now satisfied. May we postpone discussion?

Stalin: Yes, certainly.

Prime Minister: I share the President’s dislike of the word “émigré.” It was applied during the French Revolution to people driven out by their own countrymen, but the Poles were driven out by a brutal enemy. With regard to the frontier on the River Neisse I should like to say a word. I have always qualified a movement west by the Poles, but say that the Poles should be free to take territory but not more than they wish or can manage. I do not wish to stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion. I also feel conscious of the large school of thought in England which is shocked at the idea of transferring millions of people by force. Personally I am not shocked but much of the opinion in England is. However, the exchange of Greeks and Turks was a great success but that only involved two million. If the Poles take East Prussia and Silesia that means moving six millions. That is manageable but there will be big arguments against it still.

Stalin: There will be no more Germans there for when our troops come in the Germans run away and no Germans are left.

Prime Minister: Then there is the problem of how to handle them in Germany. We have killed six or seven million and probably will kill another million before the end of the war.

Stalin: One or two?

Prime Minister: Oh I am not proposing any limitation on them. So there should be room in Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy. I am not afraid of the problem of the transfer of populations as long as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what can be put in the place of the dead in Germany.

I have only one other comment. It is a reference in Mr. Molotov’s plan to the utilization of some democratic leaders from émigré circles. Would Marshal Stalin be willing to add “and some within Poland itself.” This was also suggested in the President’s message.

Stalin: Yes, that is acceptable.

Prime Minister: Well, I am in agreement with the President’s suggestion that we should sleep on this till tomorrow.

Stalin: I likewise find this acceptable.

The meeting is adjourned until four tomorrow.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

February 7, 1945, noon

“Crimea Conf.”

Plenary

2/7 4:10 p. m.

Ed Page – added to Mol. report – given to Chip

D. O.

Mol. – Yesterday heard full report from ERS We are satisfied with this report & we have got some explanations (to ask). After this report & after these explanations certain q’s became much clearer We paid much atten to what Church told us After report of ES & remarks of Church the q is considerably clarified for us In the light of these explanations & remarks we believe it would secure the unan. of 3 powers in guar. p. & sec. after the war. Our position in the qs of D. O. essentially was to secure max. of unity among 3 gt. powers in q of p & sec after the war. We believe the decs. taken at D. O & modifications suggested by Pres will secure collab by all nations great & small after war. … we consider the proposals which were presented as acceptable to us We believe that now there is reach full agt & clarity among ourselves I have to touch upon one q. which was raised in D. O. but not decided yet. This is the q about particip of Sov. Reps in the org. of sec. You know our point of view It is based on the modifs carried out in our Const. in Feb of last yr. We explained our point of view & know the point of view of US Govt & Brit Govt We consider its fair that should not pass these qs without notice but do not raise this q now in same form as in D. O.

We would consider it fair that at least 3 of our Reps or perhaps 2 be accepted as orig members. Have in mind Ukraine, Byelo Russia & Lith. Those 3 or at any rate 2 have full rts to be considered orig. members.

Ukraine’s Importance, pop., econ importance all well known I don’t want to go into detail in describing also import, of B-R & Lith also from point of view of for. rels These reps made the greatest sacrifices in this war The peoples of U,-B-R & Lith have suffered very much in this war & were 1st to be invaded Would be fair of these 3 or at any rate 2 be accepted as orig. members. The Sov Govt requests Pres & PM these 3 or at least 2 be accepted among other Un. Ns I would like to mention in this connection that the domins of Brit crown approached int. rels gradually & showed great patience. This gives us the example & reason to withdraw our orig. proposal advanced at D. O. & propose now 3 or at least 2 be accepted as orig. members. Among members of Ass. these few reps certainly should find place due them. Their role & sacrifices in this war entitle

Pres. Much gratified at what Mol. has said in acceding to the gen. plan That is making real progress. Next thing we have consider is timing What is next step. Invitations will go out to all nations that have had a place in this war

Church – the Ger War Pres Yes

Pres No use talking much further about Un Ns We are all agreed except it has not been set up. Next we should invite all nations to assemble. Gt. sentiment in US be held soon as possible – end of Mar., 1st of April

Physically repres. of Un Ns could meet in 4 wks – 1 month. Personally I think that quicker q of Un Ns meeting is determined, quicker we can take up what Mr Mol has said which is very interesting to me. But that in itself will mean the later meetings after the organ. is set up As a practical matter when we have this organizing meeting whom shall we ask? Nations in the war or those associated but not in the war. For instance shall we invite – – The assoc. nations have broken rels with Ger. but have not declared war. We Read list. We’ve got to decide who we’re going to invite What we have heard from Mr Mol. gives me a very great int. in matter of a vote for Uk, Wh. R, Lith. We 3 M. St., P. M & I have different views because our terrs. are so very different The Brit Em has great pops like Austr, Can., S Af Sov Govt has great masses of pop. like 3 areas Mol mentioned. US is contiguous – no colonies, const. provides for 1 For Min. Those things require study, require study of q of more than 1 vote for the larger nations in the world. In same way certain nations have large terrs. Brazil smaller than S. U but larger than U. S. In same way many small countries like Haiti, Honduras & we should consider whether by giving any govt more than 1 vote we would break down prin of 1 vote for each. ∴ if we can agree on gen plan for meeting to organ. U Ns we can consider these q’s by For Mins or at the meeting of the organizers

Pres: For Mins have so successful suggested q. of voting in Ass. be referred to For Mins. Also to recommend time & place of a conf.

Church: I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mar. St. & Sov Govt for the enormous step they have taken to put forward D. O. I’m sure the agt of the 3 gt powers such as has already been expressed around this table will give joy & relief to thinking people around the world. On the q of voting membership of the Ass., it has been put before us in quite a new form by our R. friends & allies

Everyone I’m sure will feel that here again a very remarkable advance to gen. agt. has been made. I must fully agree with the Pres that the position of the US & of the Brit Em. are different. We have our 4 selfgoverning domins, that for nearly a quarter of a century have played a part in the organ. of p. which broke down before the present war. All these 4 doms have worked for p & for democratic purposes & all without hesitation sprang into the war when we declared it though they knew how weak we were. We had no means of compelling them & no rt. to give them any summons but they came freely in a matter in which they could only be partially consulted. We could never agree to any system which excluded them from the position they have held & justified for over ¼ of a century. It is for this very reason that I could not listen to the proposal of the Sov Govt without a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart goes out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds & conquering & beating down the tyrant in her path. I should feel that a nation so great with 180,000,000 people would perhaps have cause to look at our Brit org with a questioning eye if they had but one vote when their nos. far exceed our own, speaking of whites. I was very glad that the Pres made an answer which could in no way be considered a final neg. to the consideration of this proposal. I must not however exceed my own personal auth. We have only just heard this new proposal & I should like to discuss it with the For Sec & possibly send a tel. to the Brit. War Cab. We only want to see done what is rt & fair. ∴ I will ask the Mar. to excuse me if I do not give precise final answer on behalf of HMG here today. I will not lose time.

Pres My motion was a little different It did not call for a dec. today. Refer the study to For Mins & second where it should be held & who should be invited.

Church Very glad – we are putting great deal on them – very large & simple Re meeting suggested by Pres I shouldn’t think it desirable hold it so early as March. In Mar. we shall be at the very height of the battle on both the fronts, more millions of soldiers will be engaged than ever before. Our dom. problems in Eng are very complicated with shortage of labor, housing & need of supplying fighting forces at the front. We also have a Par which is in active life from day to day & claims large share of the atten. of the Mins. incl. For Sec.

We are now already a quarter thru Feb I wonder also whether state of the world & Eur. particularly is such as not to make a meeting diff. of all the Un Ns If they are charged with the most tremendous tasks of the future will they have behind them the full thought of their people. Will they have anything left over after vital needs of the war are met. I wonder what the aspect of the Ass. would wear. Could premiers be present?

Pres: This is not a meeting of the Ass. – only of the organizing conf.

Church But they would be same people How many of the nations there will still be in the bondage of the Gers. We do not know how they will represent their people. Another group will be starving in their frightful misery amid the scenes of war. Holland will be there with her ghastly ruins. Fr. will be there with a loud voice. With all these agonized communities will also be joined a large no. of nations who have not suffered at all in the war. Ns that have not even declared war. I can not think that the meeting of such an ass. would be free from the danger of becoming chaotic. Some ns will be screaming in agony & others will be calmly weighing the problems of the future. I see particular diffs for an early meeting so far as Brit. is concerned

Church Position in Eng though perfectly calm & steady is governed by our own const. We may have a gen. election impending. May have new parliament to carry with us, may have entirely new set of ministers

Will always do our best to comply with the Pres. wishes but I feel it absolutely nec. to put on record the very great diff. which I see, practically And I should be very disappointed if the settlement of the membership of Ass was postponed till new meeting of Un Ns can be held

Pres again propose to refer to For Mins to study membership & date & place of meeting & who should be invited

Stalin agreed

Church I said earlier no objection to it being discussed by For Mins but is not a technical matter but one of large & broad dec. Not at all sure matters will be advanced by the discussion

St. 3 Mins will meet, discuss & report

Agreed

(Intermission)

Church. proposed Iran be remitted to For Mins

→{	(Pres says to ERS he can cable Chiang & get consent re voting immediately	}
He would not consult France, merely invite Fr. to the meeting} While waiting for Molotov’s paper on Pol.

Pres. raised q. of int. economics – another reason for early estab. of Un Ns Org – should be some way of getting ns that have no purchasing power to get some – historically Persia well wooded before Turks came – no erosion, water – today poorest place I have ever seen in the world. That is why I hope new Un Ns Org. will concern itself with those countries that have no money with which to get goods While on this subject – parallel one – in Eur. some areas have coal, cheap power & light from water. Why favoritism to those who have coal & water or cheap elec. light rates when others 50 miles away have no water, no light Sov. govts. all the Soviets are all thinking in terms like that. We are thinking in terms like that – TVA

Poland

Mol. In E. Curzon line, 5-8 Kms digression in some regions in favor of Pol.

In W. from Stettin along Oder, then along Neisse

Add some emigres to Pol. Govt

Allies recog. Pol Govt now

Prov. Govt. hold elections soon as possible

Mol, Harr., Clark-Kerr to consider & report enlarging Pol. Govt President’s proposals

Can’t reach Poles by phone in time to come here

Pres. We are making real progress

Wants ERS study this tonight.

Knows one word he doesn’t like – “emigre”

Not nec. take emigres Like to have S. D. study it until tomorrow Church Agrees with Pres re “emigre”

Re Neisse – we have always qualified movement of Pol. frontier to W that they shouldn’t take much more than they wish or can take care of. Great pity to stuff Pol. goose so full of Ger. food that he died of indigestion. Large school of opin. shocked by transferring many millions of people by force. I am not. Referred to success of Gk-Turk transfers after last war – but only ½ million

If take E. Pr. Silesia up to Oder means 6,000,000 Gers. That might be managed with modern facilities

St. Says there are no more Gers there. Where our troops come in they find no Gers.

Church We have killed 5 or 6 mil. prob. another million before the end. There ought to be room in Ger. for people transferred They will be needed to fill vacancies So not afraid of prob. of transferring pop. so long as proportioned.

[NormanStewart]

Draft of Letter from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

February 7, 1945, noon
DRAFT

My Dear Marshal Stalin, I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determinations that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka Morawski from the Lublin government and also any two of the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski [Zulawski], Professor Buyak [Bujak], and Professor Kutzeba [Kutrzeba]. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland, the United States Government, and I am sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to disassociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

[NormanStewart]

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Yalta, February 6, 1945
Top secret

My Dear Marshal Stalin: I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind.

In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.

You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Bierut and Mr. Osobka-Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Bishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. If, as a result of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer, the United States Government, and I feel sure the British Government as well, would then be prepared to examine with you conditions in which they would dissociate themselves from the London government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

[NormanStewart]

The President’s Special Assistant to the President

Yalta, February 7, 1945

Mr. President I think you should try to get this referred to Foreign ministers before there is trouble.

HARRY

---

The President’s Special Assistant to the President, and Reply by the President

Yalta, February 7, 1945

All of the below refers to Churchill’s opposition to early calling of conference of United Nations.

There is something behind this talk that we do not know of its basis.

Perhaps we better to wait till later tonight what is on his mind.

All this is rot! local politics

I am quite sure now he is thinking about the next election in Britain.

[NormanStewart]

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Top secret
ARGONAUT 51

Top secret and personal for Ambassador Winant from Secretary Stettinius.

In view of certain discussions here, please take no repeat no action with regard to our position on French participation in German affairs until further instructions.

War Department please furnish copy of above message to Acting Secretary of State Grew, Washington, for his information and notify him above relates to sentence fourth from end of his number 21 to Secretary Stettinius.

ARGONAUT, February 7, 1945

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Navy Department (February 7, 1945)

CINCPOA Communiqué No. 251

Marine Mitchells of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, attacked shipping in and around the Bonins and Volcanos on the night of February 6 (East Longitude Date). A large ship in a convoy north of the Volcanos was hit with rockets and a second ship in a convoy north of the Bonins was left smoking after an explosion aboard caused by rocket attacks.

Seventh Army Air Force Liberators of the Strategic Air Force bombed barracks and other installations at Chichijima and Ototojima in the Bonins on the same date. Three enemy fighters were seen airborne over the targets.

The enemy base at Kataoka on Shumushu in the Kurils was bombed by 11th AAF Liberators on February 6.

Corsair fighters of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing destroyed a bridge, set trucks afire and struck defense positions on Babelthuap in the Palaus on February 6.

A pier and bridge on Yap in the Western Carolines were hit by Marine fighters and torpedo planes on the same date.

On February 6, Marine fighters bombed enemy installations on Rota in the Marianas.

---

CINCPOA Press Release No. 4

For Immediate Release
February 7, 1945

FADM C. W. Nimitz, USN, and the plans and operations elements of his staff have moved to Advance Headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas in the Forward Area.

The first communiqué to be released at Advance Headquarters by FADM Nimitz was No. 244, issued on 28 January 1945. Transfer of the personnel and equipment to the advance headquarters was made without incident by surface units of the fleet and by naval aircraft.

Present with FADM Nimitz at his advance headquarters are VADM C. H. McMorris (USN), Chief of Staff, and RADM Forrest Sherman (USN), Deputy Chief of Staff.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 7, 1945)

Sea of fire sweeps Manila

Trapped Japs burn city as U.S. troops stalk them in streets

MANILA, Philippines (UP) – U.S. troops fought fire and the Jap enemy through the streets of burning Manila today in the final tragic act of the capital’s liberation.

Several thousand Japs, scattered in isolated pockets throughout Manila, were dying in a welter of flame and gunfire. The enemy apparently was determined to destroy much of the city before surrendering it to Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s liberating army.

The cornered enemy blasted and burned everything about them in a frenzy of senseless destruction that began at sundown Monday, after they had blown up most of the water pumping stations to hamper effective firefighting.

Whole areas of the city were engulfed in a roaring sea of fire as the flames spread from the downtown business section into the northern districts, roasting Filipino civilians and Jap suicide squads alike.

The conflagration mushroomed from block to block throughout Monday night and on into daylight Tuesday, fed by exploding gasoline and munitions dumps.

Tokyo radio said that U.S. troops in Manila have fallen into a “most clever and well-prepared trap.”

The Japs shelled Santo Tomas and Bilibid Prison internment camps, where thousands of Allied civilians who had been interned by the Japs still were sheltered. In midafternoon, the Japs made four direct hits on the main Santo Tomas University building.

Buildings were burning on all sides of Santo Tomas, but the camp not yet was touched by fire and its water pumps were working.

Stalk Jap survivors

Grim-faced U.S. infantrymen and Filipino guerrillas stalked the survivors of the Jap garrison through the streets, finishing them off with gun, grenade and bayonet. Others were dynamiting buildings to create fire-gaps that might check the flames.

The Japs estimated at several thousand, faced three U.S. divisions, but they apparently were committed to a suicidal stand and there was little prospect of a general surrender. Every sniper and isolated pocket of resistance probably will have to be cleared out before Manila finally is liberated.

It was estimated that Jap destruction and the ravages of battle have caused two billion dollars damage in the city.

The Japs still had a number of mortars and some artillery inside Manila and had anti-aircraft batteries operating around Nichols Field to the south, where units of the 11th Airborne Division ran into tough opposition as late as Monday night. One U.S. plane was shot down by enemy flak over Manila Monday.

Hard fighting ahead

Gen. MacArthur, who returned to Manila today, ordered divine thanksgiving services. He told huis men that “you will shortly complete the liberation of the Philippines,” but it was plain that some hard fighting lay ahead in Manila, and elsewhere on Luzon, despite the fact that the Japs are so scattered and broken that their position is militarily hopeless.

Vanguards of the 11th Corps who sealed off Bataan from the north over the weekend and started down the east coast of the peninsula were reported meeting stubborn resistance south of Dinalupihan and it was expected that the several hundred enemy troops on Bataan would dig in for a finish fight.

Far to the north, the Japs launched a heavy counterattack against U.S. positions northeast of Rosario Sunday night, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Bitter fighting was also continuing around San Jose, to the southeast, where the Americans were pushing up into the Caraballo Mountains, as well as in the bypassed Munoz area farther south.

U.S. Liberator bombers staged another heavy raid on Corregidor Monday, dropping 180 tons of bombs without aerial or anti-aircraft opposition.

Other bombers pounded the Aparri and Tuguegarao airfields to discourage any Jap idea of moving in aerial movements.

The New Delhi radio quoted Tokyo as saying that U.S. troops have landed on Bohol Island, midway between Leyte and Cebu in the south-central Philippines.

[NormanStewart]

Patton slashes into West Wall in new drive

Third Army crosses from Luxembourg

…

[NormanStewart]

Peggy, Corregidor heroine, rescued in Manila camp

Army nurse was mentioned by Lt. Kelly, of PT-boat fame, in They Were Expendable

SAN FRANCISCO, California – “Peggy,” the Army nurse who was left behind on Corregidor when Lt. Robert Bolling Kelly of the famed Torpedo Squadron Three had to depart on his PT-boat for the southern Philippines, has been saved.

Peggy and Lt. Kelly were the hero and heroine of William L. White’s famous book, They Were Expendable, and millions of Americans thrilled to their tragic story when they read the book or its condensation in Readers’ Digest or saw the movie.

“Peggy” had a job to do on Corregidor and Lt. Kelly thought, as he left her, that their end would be the same, for both were expendable. But neither of them was.

Rescued in Manila

Peggy. identified as 2nd Lt. Beulah Greenwalt, has been rescued from Santo Tomas internment camp in Manila, relatives were informed today.

Peggy was a cute brunette, about medium height and had a firm way of telling you what to do, Lt. Kelly said.

Peggy was one of 14 Army nurses who had served on Corregidor during the agonizing last days of the Philippines battle in 1942. She arrived in Manila in 1941 after serving at Letterman Army Hospital in San Francisco.

Met in hospital

Lt. Kelly is now a lieutenant commander on the staff of Rear Adm. W. L. Ainsworth. commander of destroyers, Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor.

He was married last summer in Massachusetts and with his wife is en route to the West Coast after serving at a Miami PT base.

Lt. Kelly was one of the band of brave PT pilots who blasted Jap ships from the Philippines waters and covered Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s trip out of Corregidor.

He met Peggy in the Corregidor hospital. Their “dates” were mostly spent sitting at the mouth of the huge tunnel in “The Rock” and they talked about what would happen to them, and whether they would get out.

He last saw Peggy at the PT base in March. Peggy came for dinner with the crew. He knew then he was leaving her – but – in a way you don’t tell anybody.

Peggy telephoned him March 11, when they had planned to discuss a “date.” But Kelly had received orders making that night the time for departure.

He told Peggy it was goodbye. He couldn’t tell her where he was going or if he was coming back. The connection was broken by two generals who wanted to talk to each other and he never spoke to Peggy again. His boat sneaked out of the harbor early that night.

Three planes were later sent from Australia. One got through but one plane, with Peggy aboard, cracked up. Kelly didn’t know then whether she was a prisoner or perhaps was in the hills with the few who managed to carry on the fight.

Lt. Kelly said he still remembered her last words when he told her goodbye. She only said it had been very nice, speaking in a voice that seemed to come from far away.

He always hoped, Lt. Kelly said, that what the generals had to say to each other was important.