Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 1 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Sir Alexander Cadogan | |
| Mr. Byrnes | ||
| Mr. Harriman |
Third plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Marshal Stalin |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Byrnes | Sir Edward Bridges | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Harriman | Mr. Jebb | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Matthews | Mr. Wilson | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Hiss | Mr. Dixon | Mr. Pavlov |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse |
Bohlen Minutes
Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret
Subjects:
- WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
- THE POLISH QUESTION
World Security Organization
The President inquired whether the committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the Conference.
Mr. Stettinius said it had been decided to insert the word “dismemberment” of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional surrender terms, but that Mr. Molotov had had some additional phrases which he wished to see put in.
Mr. Molotov replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional words.
Mr. Stettinius then said that they could report full agreement to insert the word “dismemberment” into Article 12 of the surrender terms but that they would like to have some more time before reporting on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the control commission.
The Prime Minister said that he had not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to guard the Western approaches to the Channel.
The President said that he had spoken on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in the United States would be prepared to support an international organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this might change their attitude in regard to the question of troops. The President then added that he felt the Conference should now proceed to the consideration of the United States proposal in regard to Dumbarton Oaks. He felt strongly that all the nations of the world shared a common desire to see the elimination of war for at least fifty years. He said he was not so optimistic as to believe in eternal peace, but he did believe fifty years of peace were feasible and possible. He said that since neither he, Marshal Stalin, nor the Prime Minister had been present at Dumbarton Oaks he would ask the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) who had been chairman of that conference to explain the United States position on the question of voting in the Security Council.
Mr. Stettinius then read the following statement of the American position on voting in the Council:
Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.
On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:
C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members: provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.
We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.
The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.
Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure,First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.
Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.
We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5 of last year provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.
It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President’s proposal.
The President suggested that the Secretary of State (Mr. Stettinius) might usefully analyze the effect of the United States proposal on the decisions in the Council.
Mr. Stettinius reported as follows:
II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.
Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:
I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on
- Admission of new members;
- Suspension of a member;
- Expulsion of a member;
- Election of the Secretary General.
II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.
III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:
Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;
What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;
Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.
IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.\
V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.
VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.
The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:
I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;
III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;
IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.
Marshal Stalin inquired what was new in Mr. Stettinius, statement that had not been included in the President’s message of December 5, 1944.
The President replied that there had been no change of any significance.
Mr. Stettinius said that there had been a minor drafting change (this minor change was explained to Mr. Molotov by Mr. Bohlen on the document).
Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Government attached great importance to the question of voting in the Security Council and, therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready to discuss the question tomorrow.
The Prime Minister stated that the British Government had given the most careful consideration to the United States proposals. He had not agreed with the original proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks since he was anxious that the realities of the situation of the Three Great Powers should be considered, but in studying the President’s latest proposal his anxieties on that score had been removed. He could thus say that on behalf of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Empire and, he believed, the Self-Governing Dominions the President’s new proposals were entirely satisfactory. He said that in the last resort world peace depended on the friendship and cooperation of the three Governments, but that the British Government would consider that they were committing an injustice if reservation were not made for free statement of then grievances by small countries. The matter looks as though the Three Great Powers were trying to rule the world, whereas, our desires are to save the world and save it from a repetition of the horrors of this war. He said he felt that the Three Major Powers should make a proud submission. He said that he had looked into the whole matter as it would affect British interests and would give an illustration of why the British Government does not think the President’s proposal would bring any harm to British interests. He said, for example, if China should raise the question of the return of Hongkong under the President’s proposal, both China and Great Britain would be precluded from voting in regard to the methods of settlement of this controversy, as listed in the five points of the analysis read by Mr. Stettinius. In the last analysis Great Britain would be protected against any decision adverse to her interests by the exercise of the veto power under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius’ analysis.
Marshal Stalin inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on the assembly.
Mr. Eden replied “yes, but not on the Council unless elected.”
Marshal Stalin then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return of the Suez Canal.
The Prime Minister replied that he hoped that Marshal Stalin would let him finish his illustration in regard to Hong Kong.
The Prime Minister said that under paragraph 3 of Mr. Stettinius’ analysis Great Britain would in fact have the right by their veto to stop all action against Great Britain by the Council of the World Organization. He, therefore, felt that it would not be necessary for Great Britain to agree to any decision contrary to her own interests and, for example, Great Britain would not be required to return Hongkong unless they felt that this should be done. China should, however, have the right to speak and the same considerations would apply to Egypt if that country had a complaint in regard to the Suez Canal. He concluded that he felt that insofar as the United States was concerned the same considerations would also apply. For example, in the event that Argentina raised a complaint against the United States.
The President then said that he recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had stated:
We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…
The President added that he thought this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in progress.
The Prime Minister said that since he saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to associate the British Government with them. He added that because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.
Marshal Stalin said that he would like to have this document to study, since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr. Churchill thought that China after raising the question of Hongkong would be satisfied with merely expressing her opinion, he was mistaken since China would want a decision. The same was true of Egypt in the possible question of the Suez Canal. He added that it was not a question of one power or three powers desiring to be masters of the world since he felt that the Dumbarton Oaks organization put a brake on that. He said that he would like to ask for further clarification on what powers Mr. Churchill had in mind when he spoke of a desire to rule the world. He said that he was sure Great Britain had no such desire, nor did the United States and that that left only the USSR.
The Prime Minister replied that he had spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place themselves so high over the others that the whole world would say these three desired to rule.
Marshal Stalin then said ironically that it looks as though two Great Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a more serious question than the voting procedure or the question of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as the three of them lived none of them would involve their countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from now none of them might be present. A new generation would come into being not knowing the horrors of the present war. He felt that there was, therefore, an obligation to create for the future generation such an organization as would secure peace for at least fifty years. He said the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future between the three Great Powers and that the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future. The covenant of the new World Organization should have this as its primary task. He said the greatest danger was conflict between the three Great Powers represented here, but that if unity could be preserved there was little danger of the renewal of German aggression. He said, therefore, a covenant must be worked out which would prevent conflicts between the three Great Powers. Marshal Stalin apologized for not having had an opportunity for studying in detail the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. He said he had been busy on other matters. He said that as he understood it, there were two categories of disputes involved in Mr. Stettinius’ explanation: (1) conflicts which would require the application of sanctions, economic, political or military, and (2) conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means. He said in regard to the first the permanent members had a right to vote even if they were parties to such disputes. Under the second category, however, in conflicts susceptible to settlement by peaceful means, the parties in dispute would not be allowed to vote. He added that we Russians were being accused of spending too much time on the technique of voting, which he admitted. But they attached great importance to this question since all decisions were made by votes and they were interested in the decisions, not in the discussions. He said, for example, if China or Egypt raised complaints against England they would not be without friends or protectors in the assembly.
Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettinius pointed out that under the United States proposal the power of the World Organization could not be directed against any of the permanent members.
Marshal Stalin said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the unity of our united front.
The Prime Minister replied that he saw the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and that would remain the function of diplomacy.
Marshal Stalin said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a crusade.
The Prime Minister answered that at that time the British and French Governments were very angry at the Soviet Union and in any event any such action was impossible under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.
Marshal Stalin said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question of the mobilization of opinion against one country.
The Prime Minister answered that he thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very much if either the President or Marshal Stalin would lead a savage attack against Great Britain and he felt this applied also to the other two countries.
The President then said that he felt that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact would become fully known to the world no matter what voting procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.
The Polish Question
The President inquired whether the Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the next meeting.
The Prime Minister said that he hoped that at least a start could be made today.
The President said that the United States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and that there were times when a long distance point of view was useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed the American people were in general favorably inclined to the Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland, but he felt that if the Soviet Government would consider a concession in regard to Lwow and the oil deposits in the Province of Lwow that would have a very salutary effect. He said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration and would not insist on it. He said that in regard to the government he wished to see the creation of a representative government which could have the support of all the great powers and which could be composed of representatives of the principal parties of Poland. He said one possibility which had been suggested was the creation of a Presidential Council composed of Polish leaders which could then create a government composed of the chiefs of the five political parties – Workers Party, Peasant Party, Socialist Party, etc. He said that one thing must be made certain and that was that Poland should maintain the most friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union.
Marshal Stalin replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.
The President said he had merely put forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the Polish question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he didn’t know personally any members of the London government or Lublin government, but he had met Mr. Mikolajczyk who had made a deep impression on him as a sincere and an honest man.
The Prime Minister said that he had consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the British Government would support the Curzon Line, even leaving Lwow to the Soviet Union. He had been criticized for this and so had Mr. Eden, but he felt that after the burdens which Russia had borne in this war the Curzon Line was not a decision of force but one of right. He said he remained in that position. Of course, he added, if the mighty Soviet Union could make some gesture to the much weaker country, such as the relinquishment of Lwow, this act of magnanimity would be acclaimed and admired. He said he was much more interested in sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the frontier line—he wanted to see the Poles have a home where they could organize their lives as they wished. That was an objective that he had often heard Marshal Stalin proclaim most firmly, and he put his trust in those declarations. He said that he therefore had not considered the question of the frontier as a question of vital importance. It must not be forgotten, however, that Great Britain had gone to war to protect Poland against German aggression at a time when that decision was most risky, and it had almost cost them their life in the world. He said Great Britain had no material interest in Poland, but the question was one of honor and that his government would therefore never be content with a solution which did not leave Poland a free and independent state. The freedom of Poland, however, did not cover any hostile designs or intrigue against the USSR, and none of us should permit this. It is the earnest desire of the British Government that Poland be mistress in her own house and captain of her soul. He said that the British Government recognized the present Polish government in London but did not have intimate contact with it. He said he had known Mr. Mikolajczyk, Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer and had found them good and honest men. He inquired whether there might be some possibility of forming a government here for Poland which would utilize these men. If this could be done all the great powers could then recognize it as an interim government until such time as the Poland government [Polish people?] by free vote could select and form their own government. He concluded by saying he was interested in the President’s suggestion.
At the suggestion of Marshal Stalin, there was a ten-minute intermission.
Marshal Stalin then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish question: Mr. Churchill had said that for Great Britain the Polish question was one of honor and that he understood, but for the Russians it was a question both of honor and security. It was one of honor because Russia had many past grievances against Poland and desired to see them eliminated. It was a question of strategic security not only because Poland was a bordering country but because throughout history Poland had been the corridor for attack on Russia. We have to mention that during the last thirty years Germany twice has passed through this corridor. The reason for this was that Poland was weak. Russia wants a strong, independent and democratic Poland. Since it was impossible by the force of Russian armies alone to close from the outside this corridor, it could be done only by Poland’s own forces. It was very important, therefore, to have Poland independent, strong and democratic. It is not only a question of honor for Russia, but one of life and death. It was for this reason that there had been a great change from the policies of the Czars who had wished to suppress and assimilate Poland. In regard to the questions raised here on which we have different opinions, the following might be said:
In regard to the Curzon Line, concessions in regard to Lwow and the Lwow Province, and Mr. Churchill’s reference to a magnanimous act on our part, it is necessary to remind you that not Russians but Curzon and Clemenceau fixed this line. The Russians had not been invited and the line was established against their will. Lenin had opposed giving Bialystok Province to the Poles but the Curzon Line gives it to Poland. We have already retreated from Lenin’s position in regard to this province. Should we then be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau? We could not then return to Moscow and face the people who would say Stalin and Molotov have been less sure defenders of Russian interest than Curzon and Clemenceau. It is, therefore, impossible to agree with the proposed modification of the line. I would prefer to have the war go on although it will cost us blood in order to compensate for Poland from Germany. When he was in Moscow Mr. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear that Poland’s frontier would extend to the West Neisse River and I favor the Polish frontier on the West Neisse and ask the conference to support this proposal.
As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. Churchill has said it would be good to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue, for without participation of the Poles it is impossible to create a Polish government. I am called a dictator and not a democrat, but I have enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted – the question can only be settled with the consent of the Poles. Last autumn in Moscow there was a good chance for a fusion of the various Polish elements and in the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Lublin Poles various points of agreement were reached as Mr. Churchill will remember. Mikolajczyk left for London but did not return since he was expelled from office precisely because he wanted agreement. Artieszewski [Arciszewski] and Raskiewiycz [Raczkiewicz] are not only against agreement but are hostile to any idea of an agreement. Artieszewski has characterized the Lublin Poles as bandits and criminals and they naturally pay him back in the same coin. It will be difficult to bring them together. The Warsaw Poles, Bierut and Osubka Morawski, do not even want to talk about any fusion with the London government. I asked them what concessions they might make in this respect and they said they could tolerate Jelikowski [Zeligowski] or Grabski but they do not even want to hear about Mikolajczyk being prime minister. I am prepared to support any attempt to reach a solution that would offer some [chance] of success. Should we ask the Warsaw Poles to come here or perhaps come to Moscow? I must say that the Warsaw government has a democratic base equal at least to that of de Gaulle.
As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task. There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain permission to operate, agents of the London government are violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London government have done I see the first are good and the second bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even the non-military man will understand this situation.
The Prime Minister said that he must put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments have different sources of information in Poland and therefore they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He believed, he added, that with the best of all their information he could not feel that the Lublin government represents more than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if the people were free to express their opinion. One of the reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.
The Conference then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.
Hiss Notes
Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
| Livadia | ||||
| Note to Pres | Tonight | |||
| for ERS | Harriman | |||
| re VIII C | Page | } Gromyko who else? | ||
| AH | ||||
| redraft of provision | Voting Plenary | |||
| Letter from ERS to vish. for set of pictures | ||||
| 2/6 | 4.15 pm – 6.20 | |||
| (Then Poland) |
- Pres, ERS, Leahy, Bohlen, Byrnes, Harriman
- P.M., Eden, Cadogan, Interpreter (military), Sir Ed. Bridges, Clark-Kerr
- Stalin, Molotov, Maisky, Vishinsky, Gusev, Gromyko
| 1. Behind: | Hopkins, Matthews, A. H. |
| 2. “: | Jebb, Dixon, Wilson |
| 3. “: | Pavolov |
ERS reported that the words “and the dismemberment” be added to Art XII of Articles of Surrender. Mr. Mol. has a further proposal which will require more discussion. Ask to submit final report tomorrow
Molotov withdraws his suggestion
ERS made final report
Church, said instrument of dismemberment had not been approved by Cabinet but he is glad agt has been reached
Church: Position of Fr. becomes of great importance to us. Must have a strong French army
Pres: Pub. opinion in US will determine; – but in his opinion if we get D.O. much more likely to take part in world activity
ERS Read analysis
Pres: ERS explain US proposal as he was at D.O. & none of 3 heads of deleg. were.
Feel strongly people going to insist on getting something that will ensure peace, not for all time, but say for 50 years
ERS: read statement
3 ribbon copies to each of 3 heads of deleg.
Pres. suggested ERS read types of decisions requiring unan.
Agreed
I shall first present 6 situations in which unan. of great powers must be maintained at all times
Read I to VI of Part II our paper (analysis)
I shall now read the situations which also require etc… in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute
Read I to IV [V?]
Pres that ends the reading & explanation of part of the procedure
Thing we have to remember – objective of the 5 great & of all nations is same & on a q. of procedure there ought not be any real difficulty
Stalin: Would like to know what is new in proposals read by ERS as compared with Dec. 5
Asked about minor phraseological change
Long discussion
Asked for more time to study the proposal made by ERS as compared with Pres. proposal
Could we put it off to tomorrow
Church. Agrees to study of this particular & to adjourn q. to tomorrow
I cannot conceal from the company that HMG that has examined the U.S. proposal – the general proposal – with very close attention. I did not feel myself wholly in agt. with the orig. proposal at DO I have been anxious to make sure that the realities of the positions of the 5 great powers have been fully faced
On studying the Pres. new proposal my anxieties have been removed so far as Brit Com of Ns & Brit Empire are concerned.
I & the self governing dominions have the feeling that of course whether world peace is achieved on a lasting found, can only depend in the last resort upon the collab of the 3 great powers
Not doing justice to our true heart felt intentions if didn’t provide for the free statement of grievances by the many smaller states of the world
It might look as if we were claiming to rule the world – we 3 Whereas our desire is to serve the world & to preserve it from renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the lap of its inhabs. ∴ I feel that we great powers – 3 – should make what I would call a proud submission to the commun of the world. Within the limits stated. I’ve naturally been looking at this as to how it would affect the fortunes & ints of Brit Em & Com. I’m going to take a part, instance to illustrate why I do not feel this submission wh. we make to the whole world will be damaging to Brit, interests. The case I take is a difficult one which affects Gt. Brit. I take the case of HK If we agree to the proposal of the US let us suppose Ch. asks us to return HK to them. We should have a right to state our case fully ag. any case made by the Ch. But we should not be allowed to vote on the qs set out – the 5 q’s set out at the end of this doc. (missed sentence – see Jebb)
St. Who is we
Church I’m speaking only of the Brit Govt
St. Will Eg. take part in the Assembly?
Church In Ass. but not in Coun. unless elected
St. Any member of Ass. could freely express his opin.
Church: Yes & so long as Brit G concerned these 5q’s the Brit Govt would not be allowed to vote. I say we agree to these procedural matters being decided without our vote – I’m only taking HK illus. – we means Brit Govt
I humbly beg to be allowed to keep to illus. I introduced & then others can follow
What his majesty’s Govt could not agree to is that the other matters in ¶ III the 4 matters set out there
I consider that we are suff. safeguarding ag. being overruled in a matter affecting sovereignty because of our rights under ¶ III
We have in fact the right by our veto power to stop all further action ag. us by the world organ.
∴ I can not feel that we should have to agree to any dec. contrary to our free choice in these matters as set out. We should be protected by our rt. of veto ag. all measures of the kind in ¶ III
No (missed more)
On other hand I feel it would be wrong that Ch. should not have oppor to state its case fully & Coun not have powers in last 5 ¶s US paper & we not vote on those
In the same way if Eg raises a q. ag the Brit affecting Suez canal–
Pres. read sentence from Tehran re good will
HMG see no danger from their own point of view in associating themselves with prop. in the US paper & we see great advantage in the 3 great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without even allowing them to state their case. In fact we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt. to state the case & we rely on ¶ III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us.
(Absent see Doc)
St. If any nation raise any import, q. will raise not only q. but will want a dec. Already have rt to express opin in Ass. Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising q of HK would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.
Will demand a dec.
∴ matter is much more serious than merely to secure for each nation rt. to express its opin
Also it is not a matter of 3 powers liking to be master of world, D.O. proposals should be a break upon such a group of powers. I don’t know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken & see not everything.
I would like to ask my friend Mr Ch. to name which powers might intend domin world
Im sure Mr Ch & Brit doesn’t want domin. I’m sure US hasn’t opin. of this kind. USSR hasn’t There remains only 1 power. China
Church I was speaking of 3 great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they were trying to domin world – not any 1 power but the 3 Not 1 but a trinity
(St) If 2 great powers accept provs. which excuse them from that. 1 power has not yet agreed to that
I will examine the doc. & perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.
Think much more serious q than rt of powers express opin or appear domin world
I fear – we are not now & will not allow that any of our gt countries – act of agg. But in 10 yrs time we will disappear – new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war & forget what we been thru
Seems we would like to secure peace at least for 50 yrs. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of 3 powers in future & for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) The greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves If unity Ger danger not very great & now we have to think how to create --that our great powers & poss. Ch. & Fr. will keep united fronts in future There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.
I must apologize I was real busy other matters & not chance study this q in detail As far as I understand what was said by Ams today all points divided in 2 categories–
In 1st cat. as I understood belong such things as sanctions econ, pol & mil & in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions
Also understood that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council
I understood in consid. of q’s of 1st cat.
perm, members being party to dispute has rt. to vote & not be asked to withdraw
But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote.
We Rs being accused talking too much about how to vote. But Issues are being decided by vote & we are interested in the decisions & less in discussions Can discuss for 100 yrs & nothing settled, but I’m interested in decs.
Suppose Ch. suggests HK be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr Church Ch & Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in Ass. & possibly some protectors
Church: I would say no when it came to use of Leag. powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvinced
St: Is it so.
Church It is as I understand it
Eden They could talk & complain but no dec. could be taken without our consent
ERS No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm, members of Sec. Coun.
Maisky No recommend, could be made
Maisky These 5 points will not be decisions but only discussions?
ERS Yes
St I’m afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity
Church See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds & is not prevented by World Org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves
St: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc cannot forget the case which occurred in Dec 39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit & Fr. used Leag. ag us & eventually expelled us, & isolated us & later mobilised all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade
Church: we were very angry, were all alone
St: How guar, such thing not occur ag.
Church We couldn’t do it here
St. Couldn’t we make more obstacles in way of it
Church: Expulsion must be unan. & gt. power could veto.
St. First time we have
Pres: Should emphasize action like Fin. one would be impossible as would require unan. of 5
St. Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion
Church. I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us, agitation be worked up & lot of abuse be levelled at one of us. Might be Brit I can only say dip. would be active
Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity
I’m quite sure Mar. St. wouldn’t make a harsh att on Brit Em-- verbally I mean – without talking to us first We would get to some arrangement, in any event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed
St: I would prob. but what of Maisky
Pres: Let’s put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote not impair unity. Will be differences – will be known – will be talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in Coun. will in no sense impair unity but will promote it & will demonstrate confid. have in each other & in justice
St tomorrow continue, meanwhile study
Poland
In intermission Gromyko indicated he had not understood from L.P. the changes in 3rd ¶ of our proposal. I straightened him out on the score of texts but he was still not clear satisfied that the effect of the reference to VIII C was clear or desirable. He also said he would have great difficulty explaining its effect to his colleagues. He said it would be much easier for the Rs if we could drop the whole reference & asked if Pres would agree to that. I said I thought so
Matthews Minutes
February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret
The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in Mr. Hiss’ notes.
Poland
PRESIDENT: I should like to bring up Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the Curzon line. Most Poles, like the Chinese, want to save face.
STALIN: (interrupting) Who will save face, the Poles in Poland or the émigré Poles?
PRESIDENT: The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction.
But the most important matter is that of a permanent government for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a small portion of the Polish people. What people want is the creation of a government of national unity to settle their internal differences. A government which would represent all five major parties (names them) is what is wanted. It may interest Marshal Stalin that I do not know any of the London or of the Lublin government. Mikolajczyk came to Washington and I was greatly impressed by him. I felt that he was an honest man.
The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.
STALIN: (interrupting) Friendly not only to the Soviet but all three allies.
PRESIDENT: This is my only suggestion. If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make peace much easier.
PRIME MINISTER: I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon line, that is to say, leaving Lvov with Soviet Russia. I have been much criticized and so has Mr. Eden especially by the party which I represent. But I have always considered that after all Russia has suffered in fighting Germany and after all her efforts in liberating Poland her claim is one founded not on force but on right. In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action.
However, I am more interested in the question of Poland’s sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have always heard Marshal Stalin proclaim with the utmost firmness. It is because I put my trust in his declaration about the sovereign independence and freedom of Poland that the frontier question I consider not of supreme importance. This is what is dear to the hearts of the nation of Britain. This is what we went to war against Germany for—that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone here knows the result it was to us unprepared as we were and that it nearly cost us our life as a nation. Great Britain had no material interest in Poland. Her interest is only one of honor because we drew the sword for Poland against Hitler’s brutal attack. Never could I be content with any solution that would not leave Poland as a free and independent state. However, I have one qualification: I do not think that the freedom of Poland could be made to cover hostile designs by any Polish government, perhaps by intrigue with Germany, against the Soviet. I cannot conceive that the world organization would ever tolerate such action or leave it only to Soviet Russia to take proper measures. Our most earnest desire which we care about as much as our lives is that Poland be mistress in her own house and in her own soul. I earnestly hope that we shall not separate without taking a practical step with this objective. At the present time there are two governments about which we differ. I have never seen any of the present London government. We recognize them but have not sought their company. But Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski are men of good-sense and we have confidence in them. We remain in informal but friendly contact with them. There will be great criticism against us all if we let them divide us when we have such great tasks and common hopes. Can we not make a government here in Poland. A provisional or interim government, as the President said, pending free elections so that all three of us can extend recognition as well as the other United Nations. Can we not pave the way for a free future on the future constitution and administration of Poland? If we could do that we should leave the table with one great step accomplished toward future peace and the prosperity of Central Europe. I am sure that effective guarantees can be laid down to secure the line of communications of the victorious Red Army in its battle to defeat Germany. His Majesty’s Government cordially support the President’s suggestion and present the question to our Russian allies.
Stalin suggests a ten-minute intermission.
STALIN: The Prime Minister has said that for Great Britian the question of Poland is a question of honor. For Russia it is not only a question of honor but also of security. It is a question of honor for Russia for we shall have to eliminate many things from the books. But it is also a question of security of the state not only because we are on Poland’s frontier but also because throughout history Poland has always been a corridor for attack on Russia. It is sufficient that during the last thirty years our German enemy has passed through this corridor twice. This is because Poland was weak. It is in the Russian interest as well as that of Poland that Poland be strong and powerful and in a position in her own and in our interests to shut the corridor by her own forces. The corridor cannot be mechanically shut from outside by Russia. It could be shut from inside only by Poland. It is necessary that Poland be free, independent and powerful. It is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet State. That is why Russia today is against the Czarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland. This is the basis of our policy and we favor a strong independent Poland.
I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon line. The President has suggested modification, giving Poland Lvov and Lvov Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918–1919. Russia was not invited and did not participate. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data. Lenin opposed it. He did not want to give Bialystok and Bialystok Provinces to Poland but the Curzon line gives them to Poland. We have retreated from Lenin’s position. Some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow. I prefer that the war continue a little longer and give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of Germany. I asked Mikolajczyk what frontier he wanted. Mikolajczyk was delighted to hear of a western frontier to the river Neisse. I must say that I will maintain this line and ask this conference to support it. There are two Neisse rivers. The east and the west. I favor the west.
Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish government without Poles. It must be with participation of Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. Mikolajczyk returned to London and was kicked out of the government. The present London government of Archuchuski [Arciezewski], which is in reality under the President Brachewicz [Raczkiewicz]. All these people were against the agreement and hostile to the idea. They called the Lublin government “bandits” and “traitors.” Naturally the Lublin government paid the same coin to the London government. It is difficult to bring them together. The principal personalities, Bierut, Osobka-Morawski, won’t hear of the London government. I ask what kind of concessions can be made. They can tolerate Grabski and General Jelikowski [Zeligowski] but they won’t hear of Mikolajczyk. Under these circumstances I am prepared to support any attempt to create unity if there is some chance of success. I am prepared to call the Warsaw Poles here or better to see them in Moscow. But frankly, the Warsaw government has as great a democratic basis in Poland as de Gaulle has in France.
Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfils this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.
The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.
PRIME MINISTER: I must put on record that both the British and Soviet governments have different sources of information in Poland and get different facts. Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin government represents even one third of the Polish people. This is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that the underground might have collisions with the Lublin government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish nation.
Roosevelts Plan zur Weltherrschaft
wh. Berlin, 5. Februar – Wer es unternimmt, sich ein Bild von der Dreimächtekonferenz zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill zu machen, tut gut daran, nicht nur an die akuten Probleme (wie vor allem an den Plan, das deutsche Volk mit Sirenenklängen zu ködern) oder etwa an Polen, Griechenland, Italien usw. zu denken, sondern sich auch zu fragen: Was ist das vorige Mal in Teheran vor sich gegangen und was plant Roosevelt eigentlich, von dem man sagen kann, dass er sich am meisten um das Dreiertreffen bemüht hat?
Es hat lange gedauert, bis man aus authentischer amerikanischer Quelle erfuhr, was wirklich in Teheran passierte, aber die Wahrheit über Teheran enthüllte gleichzeitig den „Großen Plan“ des amerikanischen Präsidenten. Forrest Davis, ein Publizist, der in Washington nicht nur zu Hause ist, sondern auch im Weißen Haus immer eine offene Tür findet, hat in der konservativen und äußerst populären amerikanischen Wochenzeitschrift Saturday Evening Post mit ihrer Auflage von weit über drei Millionen berichtet, wie sich Roosevelt die Nachkriegswelt vorstellt. Sein Plan bedeutete die absolute Beherrschung der Welt durch die USA, Moskau und England, unter gnädiger Anhörung Tschungkings und Frankreichs, nach der Vernichtung des Reiches, Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes und völliger Niederwerfung Japans.
Dieser „Große Plan“ einer Kontrolle der Welt durch Moskau, Washington und London steht und fällt zweifellos mit der Notwendigkeit, Moskau aus seiner ideologischen Vereinsamung und dem sich daraus ergebenden revolutionären Herrschaftsanspruch herauszulösen, um es wieder in die „Familie der demokratischen Nationen“ einzureihen. Der amerikanische Präsident hofft offensichtlich, dass es möglich wäre, Stalin und die Sowjetunion in eine solche Weltorganisation westlerischer Prägung einzugliedern. Roosevelt ist bereit, alles auf diese Hoffnung zu setzen. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie er in Teheran mit nervösen Spielerhänden eine Chesterfield nach der anderen in seinem langen Zigarettenhalter entzündete, während er versuchte, Stalin von seinem „Größen Plan“ zu begeistern, um aber zu sehen, dass der Mann aus dem Kreml erst dann wirkliches Interesse zeigte, als ihm durch Roosevelt Konzessionen gemacht worden sind, die alles auslöschen, was in London seit 1939 an Plänen für Europa in mühseliger diplomatischer Arbeit geschaffen worden war.
Welche Vorteile verspricht sich Roosevelt von seinem Plan, wenn er bereit ist, soviel dafür auf das Spiel zu setzen?
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Der Präsident in Washington vertritt die These, dass keine Machtkonstellation in der Welt in der Lage wäre gegen den Stachel der drei zu lecken, solange gegen eine solche wie auch immer geartete Machtballung die Riesenkapazität der amerikanischen maschinellen Produktion und die Wucht der sowjetischen Menschenmassen gestellt werden könnten. Deshalb ist Roosevelt bereit, für eine Zusammenarbeit Moskau-Washington auch angesichts größter Schwierigkeiten einzutreten. Der bisherige Verlauf des jetzigen Weltkrieges wird von ihm dabei als Hauptargument benützt.
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Der Mann im Weißen Hause fürchtet, dass bei einem Zusammenbruch seines Planes sowohl die Sowjetunion wie auch England eine verzweifelte Jagd nach Interessengebieten und Verbündeten in Europa beginnen würden, wodurch in kurzer Zeit ein neuer Weltbrand seinen Anfang nehmen müsste. Roosevelt fürchtet sogar, eine Ausschaltung Stalins von der „Weltorganisation“ würde ermöglichen, dass der zweite Weltkrieg pausenlos in den dritten Weltkrieg übergehen könnte, denn Amerika könnte aus klaren und im Weißen Haus eindeutig vertretenen geopolitischen Gründen niemals dulden, dass Europa mit der Sowjetunion zusammen einen eurasischen Block bilde. Umgekehrt weiß Roosevelt, dass ein völlig von Großbritannien beherrschtes Europa von Moskau als ständige Bedrohung aufgefasst werden würde. Um deshalb die wilde Jagd nach Interessengebieten in Europa zu verhindern, glaubt Roosevelt, alles versuchen zu müssen, um Stalin erst einmal grundsätzlich in die „Familie der demokratischen Völker“ einzubauen, auch um den Preis von Konzessionen an den Sowjetwillen zur Einflussnahme in Europa.
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So sehr Roosevelt seinen „Großen Plan“ auch deshalb wünscht, weil er glaubt, bei einer allgemeinen „Weltkontrolle“ die USA ausschlaggebend zu sehen, so schließt doch sein weiteres Bemühen, Tschungking als „Anhängsel“ in den Plan zu verankern, einen sehr praktischen Grund ein. Wenngleich Tschungking-China eindeutige totalitäre Tendenzen aufweist, so steht Roosevelt doch hinter Tschiangkaischek, weil er dadurch hofft, 450,000.000 Chinesen als Abnehmer für seine überschüssige Produktion an Autos, Eisschränken und Radios zu gewinnen. Auch in Asien würde das Nichtzusammenarbeiten der Sowjets in dieser Weltorganisation eine gewissenlose Jagd nach Interessensphären bringen. Diesmal allerdings zwischen Washington und Moskau, wobei es keineswegs entschieden ist, ob Japan die ihm von Roosevelt zugedachte Rolle des „kleinen Mannes“ spielen würde.
Die Roosevelt-Planung für die Schaffung einer Weltordnung auf Grundlage des Gleichgewichts der Großmächte mit Washington als Zünglein an der Waage erscheint den Amerikanern einleuchtend. Trotzdem gibt es Amerikaner, deren Bedenken in die Öffentlichkeit dringen. Diese Männer erklären, dass durch Teheran und was dann folgte, Roosevelt heute bereits dastehe, wo Wilson 1919 sich im Versailler Spiegelsaal befunden habe. Wie Wilson hat Roosevelt seine Hoffnung für die Weltsicherheit auf eine zentrale fixe Idee aufgebaut. Wilsons „Großer Plan“ war der „Völkerbund.“ Wilson war beredt, um diesem Plan das Leben zu schenken, Punkt für Punkt seiner Gerechtigkeit versprechenden 14 Punkte aufzugeben oder umdeuten zu lassen. Roosevelts „Großer Plan“ ist ein Weltsystem mit einer „Drei-Mächte-Konstellation“ an Stelle eines Völkerbundes, von dem Roosevelt glaubt, dass er scheitern musste, weil weder genug Macht dahinterstand, noch die Völker in der Lage waren, die Ideale eines solchen Instruments in die Praxis umzusetzen. Roosevelt glaubt, dass seine Drei-Mächte-Konstellation diese Macht besitzt; aber auch er ist bereit, um seine fixe Idee durchzusetzen, Punkt für Punkt seiner „Atlantik-Charta“ über den Haufen zu werfen oder in Kompromissen ersticken zu lassen, deren verhängnisvollster das der „freien Hand für Moskau in Europa“ ist. Dem Ehrgeiz Roosevelts soll Europa geopfert werden, vor allem das deutsche Volk, dessen Todesurteil nach dem Willen des Judentums Stalin Vollstreckern soll.
Den Morgenthau-Plan in der Tasche
br. Bern, 5. Februar – Man erinnere sich an den Morgenthau-Plan, der darauf hinausläuft, Deutschland nach dem erhofften Siege seiner Gegner jeder Industrie zu berauben und es, soweit man es nicht unter seine Nachbarn aufteilt, zu einem „großen Kartoffelacker“ zu machen.
Der Plan wurde damals in einem ungelegenen Augenblick bekannt, denn er schien in seiner Hirnverbranntheit geeignet, die Aussichten Roosevelts auf eine abermalige Wiederwahl zu stören.
Nun ist Roosevelt wiedergewählt – nun glaubt man wieder offener sprechen zu können. Und so meldet eine nordamerikanische Agentur in Verbindung mit der Dreierkonferenz in aller Harmlosigkeit: „Roosevelt habe im Augenblick nur den Morgenthau-Plan bei sich, der als Grundvorschlag der Vereinigten Nationen vorgelegt werden soll.“ Also nicht ein unverbindlicher Privatvorschlag ist dieser Plan jetzt, sondern ein offizieller Vorschlag, mit dem der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten zur Konferenz mit Stalin und Churchill gefahren ist. Nun weiß man wenigstens, was gemeint ist, wenn diese drei ihren angekündigten Aufruf an das deutsche Volk starten sollten, um nach Wilsons Vorbild wieder einmal zu versichern, es werde gar nicht so schlimm werden, wenn Deutschland nur erst einmal kapituliert habe.
Okraß: Der Dank des Vaterlandes
Von Hermann Okraß
Es liegt im Wesen des Krieges, dass er von den breiten Massen zumeist in einem Rausch der Begeisterung begonnen wird.
Bei Beginn eines Krieges Kriegsziele aufzustellen, die die Flamme der nationalen Leidenschaften hochschlagen lassen, ist für eine intelligente Staatsführung nicht schwer. Der Kriegsausbruch 1914 war für beide Seiten ein Beispiel dafür. Es dröhnt die Militärmusik, die Fahnen rauschen und die Reden tönen. Es ist Krieg, es ist Männerzeit, „ins Feld, in die Freiheit gezogen.“
Nach einigen Monaten sieht die Welt anders aus. An den Fronten wird der Krieg wahr. Es muss bitter gestorben werden. In der Heimat wandelt sich das Leben. Die Menschen werden ernst. Und gehen gar Jahre ins Land, dann beginnen Augen und Ohren der Soldaten hellwach zu werden und sie zeigen ein verdammt gesteigertes Interesse für die Dinge der Heimat, denn wer einen hohen Berg erklettern muss, hinter dem sich das Land der Zukunft auftun soll, mag gern etwas mehr von diesem Land hören als die Parole, dass drüben Milch und Honig fließt. Massen mit einem Zauberwort in Bewegung zu setzen, ist nicht die größte der Künste, in Bewegung gesetzte Massen mit einem Zauberwort aufzuhalten aber? Goethes Zauberlehrling rief entsetzt den Meister zur Hilfe: „Herr, die Not ist groß, die ich rief, die Geister, werde ich nicht los.“
Stabssergeant Ralph Martin von der US-Army ist ein echter Jimmy, ein amerikanischer Frontsoldat. Sein Beitrag in der amerikanischen Soldatenzeitung Stars and Stripes deutet jedenfalls darauf hin.
Wir US-Soldaten in der Kampfzone sind von bittersten Zukunftssorgen erfüllt. Zahlreiche meiner Kameraden denken nur daran, dass sie, wenn sie aus dem Kriege heimkehren, keine Unterkunfts- und Arbeitsgelegenheiten mehr finden werden. Sie glauben auch nicht an den Patriotismus ihrer einstigen Arbeitgeber und haben wenig Hoffnung, dass man ihnen, wenn der Krieg zu Ende geht, nur weil sie Soldaten waren, ein Anrecht auf Arbeit zuerkennen wird.
Wir haben das sehr dunkle Gefühl, dass Frontsoldat Ralph Martin, sofern er nicht inzwischen in den Trichtern bei Aachen für die Kriegsziele seiner Oberen gefallen ist, wenig Glauben an den Dank seines Vaterlandes in sich trägt. Und ohne Glauben kämpft es sich auf der anderen Seite nicht gut.
Ein echter Tommy ist der Fliegersoldat Harries von der britischen RAF. Wenn er auch sonst nicht viel ist, so ist er doch Preisträger im Preisausschreiben seiner Frontzeitung Gen, die ihre Leser nach der Stellungnahme zu einer „klassenlosen britischen Gesellschaftsordnung“ befragte. Tommy Harries holte sich den ersten Preis, weil er die Auffassung vertrat:
Der Mittelstand der britischen Gesellschaftsordnung ist die widerlichste Angelegenheit, die man sich überhaupt vorstellen kann. Eine Mittelstandswelt nach dem heutigen britischen Vorbild wäre entsetzlicher als Dantes siebente Hölle. Das Hauptunglück Englands ist, dass es jedem Briten praktisch unmöglich gemacht wird, von einer Gesellschaftsklasse in die andere hinüberzuwechseln.
Tommy Harries ist ungerecht. Natürlich kann er von einer Klasse in die andere wechseln. Er kann zum Beispiel, wenn er aus der ehrenwerten Klasse der Frontsoldaten wegen schwerer Verwundung ausgemustert wird, als Bettler oder Straßenmusikant durchs Land ziehen. Zwar ist er dann erheblich gesunken, aber immerhin, er ist übergewechselt. Denn allein damit, dass der Abgeordnete der Labour-Partei George Rüssel Strauss vor dem Unterhaus forderte, man möge das Bettelunwesen der Ausgemusterten verbieten, weil es demoralisierend auf die Frauen der noch kämpfenden Soldaten wirke, dürfte Tommy nicht gedient sein. Auf jeden Fall scheint auch Tommy nicht davon überzeugt zu sein, dass sein Vaterland ihm eines Tages besonders dankbar ist. Aber mag er seine Rechnung eines Tages daheim selbst vorlegen. Wir haben Tommy und Jimmy nichts getan, wir haben sie nicht bedroht, wir wollten ihnen kein Brot nehmen, kein Land, keine Ehre und keinen Ruhm. Wir wollten unser Haus bauen und in Frieden unserer Arbeit leben. Wir wollten Danzig, und das war unser Recht.
Wir wollen aber nicht der deutschen Unsitte frönen und uns anderer Leute Kopf zerbrechen. Tommy und Jimmy scheint der „Dank des Vaterlandes,“ von Deutschlands Kriegsopfern nach dem verlorenen großen Kriege als Parole höhnend vor hungernden Demonstrationskolonnen hergetragen, nicht so ganz sicher. Die Zauberer drüben haben die Geister der Erkenntnis gerufen. Ob sie sie wieder loswerden? Tommy und Jimmy reden so seltsame Worte. Klassenlose Gesellschaft, Anrecht auf Arbeit, Patriotismus der Arbeitgeber, bitterste Zukunftssorgen, Rechte der Soldaten, Aufstieg innerhalb der Gesellschaft. Wir entsinnen uns genau, dass diese Begriffe im Nachkriegsdeutschland, als Nationalsozialismus und Kommunismus aufeinanderprallten, in den Diskussionen der Aktivisten laufend vorkamen. Als Adolf Hitler dann an die Macht kam, wurde weniger darum diskutiert, sondern nach klaren Programmen vorgegangen und gearbeitet. Und als der Krieg uns ansprang, hat Adolf Hitler kein Kriegsziel proklamiert, sondern schlicht und einfach erklärt: „Die deutsche Wehrmacht hat den aktiven Schutz des Reiches übernommen.“ Mehr war auch nicht zu erklären. Vom Dank des Vaterlandes, von Kriegszielen kein Wort. Dadurch unterschieden sich 1914 und 1939 bei uns. Wir hatten ein Friedensziel, das war der nationalsozialistische Staat, das Großdeutsche Reich. Wenn wir schon ein Kriegsziel hatten, dann war es die Verteidigung dieses Staates.
Der Krieg rast heute seinem Höhepunkt entgegen. Es kann nicht mehr weit bis zu den Gipfeln sein. Hinter den Gipfeln aber liegt das Land, in dem das aus dem Kriege heimkehrende Volk leben soll. Das Vaterland. Was Tommy und Jimmy von ihren Vaterländern halten, das haben sie uns in sorgenden, anklagenden Prägen erzählt. Warum aber fragt der deutsche Landser nicht? Warum steht niemand bei uns auf und verspricht den Dank des Vaterlandes? Weil bei uns niemand aufzustehen hat, um den Dank des Vaterlandes zu versprechen, denn der Staat, um den wir kämpfen, gehört dem Soldaten und dem Schaffenden. Sie beide, wir alle, haben um ihn gekämpft, gelitten, gehungert, geblutet. Den Kämpfenden, den Schaffenden gehört er. Sollen sie sich selbst den Dank versprechen? Soll der Soldat mit seiner rechten Hand dankbar seine Linke schütteln? Klassenlose Gesellschaft? Kommunistische Leitsätze kennen wir nicht. Wir haben eine Gesellschaftsordnung der Leistung, des Einsatzes, der Opferbereitschaft. Eine sozialistische Gesellschaftsordnung, keine kommunistische. Anrecht auf Arbeit? Alte Forderung der NSDAP, hundertmal proklamiert und tausendmal bewiesen. Patriotismus der Arbeitgeber? Eine Selbstverständlichkeit für jeden anständigen deutschen Unternehmer. Für die unanständigen hat das sozialistische Deutschland anderweitige Beschäftigung. Zukunftssorgen? Das private Schicksal mag und soll den einzelnen Volksgenossen beschäftigen. Dass aber die Volkskameradschaft den anständigen Volksgenossen nicht hungern lässt, das weiß ein jeder. Aufstieg innerhalb der Gemeinschaft? Wo ein Gefreiter Staatsführer werden kann, ein Landarbeiter Reichsstatthalter, ein Schiffsjunge General, nun, da dürfte eine solche Frage ohne Diskussion sein. Uns allen ist um das Reich der Zukunft nicht bange. Für Spießer und Schieber, für Bonzen und Faulpelze wird wenig Platz darinnen sein. Das aus dem Kriege mit harten Gesichtern und blutenden Wunden heimkehrende Volk wird wenig freundlich mit ihnen verfahren, mögen sie auch heute noch da und dort den Augen der Kämpfer und Schaffenden entgehen.
Wir zogen 1939 ohne Kriegsziel aus. Unser Kriegsziel war auch unser Friedensziel, unser sozialistisches Reich. Wir werden müde und abgekämpft, aber aufrecht und selbstbewusst in dieses Reich heimkehren, aber die Flamme der sozialistischen Leidenschaft und des nationalen Stolzes wird heller brennen denn zuvor. Sie wurde in diesem Kampf stark entfacht. Den Dank des Vaterlandes? Wir brauchen ihn nicht. Denn dieses Vaterland wird unser sein, ein Vaterland der Soldaten, der Arbeiter und Bauern, das Vaterland der Kämpfer und der Schaffenden.
Kein Zeichen der Schwäche
Tokio, 5. Februar – Die Zeitung Tokio Schimbun widmet der „deutschen Schicksalsstunde,“ wie sie es nennt, einen Leitartikel, in dem sie hervorhebt, dass angesichts der bolschewistischen Flut das deutsche Volk wie ein Mann aufgestanden sei.
Es gebe keine Zeichen der Schwäche wie etwa im Jahre 1918. Jetzt gebe es nur eine Wahl: Bis zum Ende zu kämpfen! Der Endsieg werde dem gehören, der bis zuletzt die Fahne hochhalte. Dem deutschen Volk komme der Sieg zu, und es werde dann seinen gefallenen Soldaten die Worte des Führers Zurufen können: „Und ihr habt doch gesiegt!“
Diese Gedanken träfen aber nicht nur, so fährt das japanische Blatt fort, für Deutschland zu, sondern ebenso auch für Japan, das jetzt auf den Philippinen seinen Schicksalskampf zu bestehen habe und gelobe, an Härte und Kampfentschlossenheit nicht hinter dem deutschen Waffengefährten zurückzustehen.
Die Yankees in Manila
Tokio, 5. Februar – Amerikanische Truppen sind am Sonntag um 17 Uhr aus der Richtung von San Fernando in Manila eingebrochen, meldet die japanische Nachrichtenagentur Domei von einem Stützpunkt auf den Philippinen.
In dem Bericht heißt es, dass die US-Truppen unter dem Schutz starken Artilleriefeuers und Luftabschirmung am Sonntag in die nördlichen Vororte von Manila ein¬drangen und von dort aus am Nachmittag in die Stadt vorstießen. Die japanischen Truppen unternahmen heftige Gegenangriffe. In der Nachbarschaft der Universität Santo Tornas finden Straßenkämpfe statt.
Führer HQ (February 6, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Im südlichen Grenzgebiet der Slowakei und nördlich der Westbeskiden wurden einige Einbruchsstellen, die der Feind erzielen konnte, abgeriegelt. Im Stadtgebiet um die Budapester Burg leistet die Besatzung weiterhin heroischen Widerstand gegen die mit überlegenen Kräften angreifenden Bolschewisten.
An der Oderfront wurden im Verlauf harter Angriffs- und Abwehrkämpfe zwischen Ratlbor und Glogau 71 feindliche Panzer abgeschossen, davon allein 22 durch die Besatzung von Brieg. Südwestlich von Brieg konnte der Feind seinen Brückenkopf trotz zäher Gegenwehr unserer Truppen ausweiten.
Der Pionier Justus Jürgensen des Pionierbauersatz- und Ausbildungsbataillons Crossen an der Oder sprengte unter Aufopferung seines eigenen Lebens die Oderbrücke bei Fürstenberg, er wurde nachträglich mit dem Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes ausgezeichnet.
Feindliche Angriffe gegen unsere Sperrstellungen östlich Frankfurt an der Oder und gegen Küstrin wurden abgewiesen. Den Sowjets gelang es gestern, in das Stadtinnere von Posen einzudringen. Schwere Häuserkämpfe sind dort im Gange.
Im Südteil von Pommern und Westpreußen griff der Feind ohne Erfolg an. 51 Panzer und 71 Geschütze wurden in diesen Kämpfen vernichtet. Die Besatzung der Stadt Elbing verteidigte sich zäh gegen die anstürmenden Bolschewisten.
In Ostpreußen an der gesamten Front dauern die erbitterten Kämpfe an. Gegenangriffe unserer Verbände engten feindliche Einbruchsstellen ein.
In Kurland verlief der Tag ohne wesentliche Kampfhandlungen.
Im Westen setzten die Engländer und Amerikaner entlang der gesamten Roerfront ihre Aufklärungstätigkeit teilweise unter starker Einnebelung fort.
Im Kampfgebiet von Schleiden wiesen unsere Truppen zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe ab, während es südlich der Urftalsperre dem Gegner gelang, örtlich vorzudringen. Aus dem Westwallabschnitt östlich St. Vith werden heftige Orts- und Bunkerkämpfe gemeldet.
Unsere Artillerie bekämpfte feindliche Ansammlungen bei Bischweiler mit zusammengefasstem Feuer.
Die nordwestlich der Ill in den Vogesen stehenden deutschen Verbände kämpften sich befehlsgemäß über den Fluss zurück. Der Feind, der in die Absetzbewegungen hineinzustoßen versuchte, wurde abgewiesen.
Nach starker Artillerievorbereitung geführte Feindangriffe aus Enzisheim scheiterten unter hohen Verlusten für den Gegner.
In Mittelitalien eroberten unsere Truppen im Sergiotal bei Gallicano vorübergehend verlorengegangene Stellungen im Gegenstoß zurück. Aufklärungsvorstöße des Gegners südlich Bolognas blieben ohne Erfolg.
In Ostkroatien wurden Bandenangriffe gegen die Syrmienfront unter hohen Verlusten für den Feind abgewiesen. An der mittleren Drina eroberten unsere Grenadiere nach harten Kämpfen die Stadt Zvornik.
Nordamerikanische Terrorbomber griffen am gestrigen Tag Regensburg und weitere Orte im südlichen Reichsgebiet an. In der Nacht stießen britische Kampfflugzeuge bis zur Reichshauptstadt vor.
Die Heeresunterofflziersschule Jauer hat unter Führung ihres Kommandeurs Oberst Reichardt die Stadt Steinau in heldenhaftem Kampf fünf Tage lang gegen die Angriffe weit übeijegener Infanterie- und Panzerkräfte des Feindes gehalten. Erst als alle Munition verschossen war, hat sich die tapfere Besatzung befehlsgemäß zu den eigenen Linien durchgeschlagen.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 6, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
061100A February
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 304
Allied armored elements have taken the towns of Strauch and Steckenborn, in the area six miles northeast of Monschau. Our units have cleared the high ground east of Ruhrberg and are on the Roer River below the Urftalsperre Dam. Other elements have reached the dam and control it.
Our infantry units two miles north of Schleiden have made a 1,500-yard gain to the east. Other units are fighting in Hellenthal, two and one half miles southwest of Schleiden. Farther south, Brandscheid has been cleared of the enemy and we have made gains in the Schneifel Forest, two miles east of Buchet.
The area north of Strasbourg and west of the Rhine was the quietest it has been in recent weeks.
The Colmar sector has been split by juncture of our units from the north and south sides at Rouffach.
Near the Rhine, the road from Neuf-Brisach to the Rhine bridges at Vieux-Breisach was cut and the village of Vogelsheim, just south of the road and one mile east of Neuf-Breisach, was reached.
The west bank of the Ill River has been almost completely cleared of the enemy.
In the high Vosges Mountains, enemy units which were cut off are being pursued through difficult terrain. Mittlach and Muhlbach-sur-Munster in the upper Fecht River Valley were liberated, and Walbach in the lower valley was cleared.
In the south, Guebwiller and a number of nearby towns were liberated.
During the four days ending with the 3 February, Allied forces in the west captured 6,912 prisoners.
Bad weather prevented air operations yesterday.
Last night, Berlin was bombed by a force of light bombers.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/
Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others
ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section
NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409
AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council
Review of Status of this Question
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.
At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.
On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:
C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.
Analysis of the American Proposal
(a) It is entirely consonant with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.
(b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.
We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.
The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.
Reasons for the American Position
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.
First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world to which I have referred.
Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for justice for all members of the organization.
It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill on December 5, 1944, provide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations.
Yalta, February 6, 1945
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Voting Procedure
Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary
- Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.
American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and – we believe – the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.
- Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.
In the Tehran Declaration, the three powers stated:
We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world…
Without this good will on the part of all members of the Organization – even if it could be established – its future would be uncertain.
To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation of the Organization, we must avoid the charge of great power domination.
- Unity of the great powers is one of our major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our proposal.
If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.
Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in any event.
To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.
Yalta, February 6, 1945
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Leningrad, February 6, 1945, 4 p.m.
Proposed Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and Analysis of the Effects of That Formula
The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:
C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.
Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:
I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on
- Admission of new members;
- Suspension of a member;
- Expulsion of a member;
- Election of the Secretary General.
II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.
III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:
-
Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
-
Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;
-
What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;
-
Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.
IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.
V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.
VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.
The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:
I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;
III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;
IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.
The President’s Special Assistant to the President
Yalta, February 6, 1945
Mr. President: Why not let this wind up today when Stalin is thru – and say we will talk it over again tomorrow. It is 7.15
HARRY
The Pittsburgh Press (February 6, 1945)
JAPS IN MANILA CUT OFF
City’s fall proclaimed – ‘On to Tokyo!’ slogan of MacArthur now
Bataan Peninsula sealed – Americans prepare for assault on Corregidor
MANILA, Philippines (UP) – Three U.S. divisions today encircled fanatically resisting Jap remnants in Manila.
The action virtually completed the liberation of the Philippines and setting the stage for the next phase of the march on Tokyo.
Gen. Douglas MacArthur officially proclaimed the fall of Manila, capital of the Philippines and largest city yet liberated in the Pacific war, and said the motto of his command now was: “On to Tokyo!”
He said the “complete destruction” of the doomed enemy garrison of Manila was imminent and revealed that another 1,350 U.S. and Allied war prisoners and civilian internees had been freed yesterday with the capture of ancient Bilibid Prison.
Other U.S. forces avenging the bitter defeats of 1942 sealed off Bataan Peninsula and were believed preparing for an early assault on Fort Corregidor in Manila Bay.
Gen. MacArthur said in a statement accompanying his daily communiqué:
The fall of Manila marks the end of one great phase of the Pacific struggle and set the stage for another.
With Australia safe, the Philippines liberated, and the ultimate redemption of the East Indies and Malaya thereby made a certainty, our motto becomes, “On to Tokyo!”
Writing off the eventual loss of Manila, Jap propagandists said that the coming of the Americans to Manila was “exactly what our side waited for, and our bleeding tactics will now enter the positive stage.”
Drive from south
The 11th Airborne Division completed the stranglehold on the battered Jap garrison in Manila by smashing into the city from the south yesterday after an overnight dash of 35 miles.
The 37th Infantry Division, pouring into the capital from the north, and the 1st Cavalry Division, from the east, linked up in the heart of Manila and cleared all of the city north of the Pasig River with the exception of scattered groups of snipers.
The Japs blew up the Quezon and Ayala Bridges across the broad Pasig as they fell back into the southern half of Manila for a last stand. Two other bridges remained intact, however, and may have been captured by the Americans.
Explosions shake ground
Jap demolition squads continued their destructive work in southern Manila, working feverishly against their own imminent destruction. Numerous fires cast a heavy pall of smoke over the city and explosions shook the ground at frequent intervals.
With the 11th Airborne Division’s thrust into southern Manila however, the enemy garrison could be considered “hopelessly trapped,” Gen. MacArthur said.
The 37th Infantry Division captured Bilibid Prison in the northern half of Manila yesterday, releasing more than 800 war prisoners and about 550 additional civilian internees, including women and children.
5,500 prisoners rescued
That brought to more than 5,500 the number of Allied prisoners rescued in the past week, including those at the Santo Tomas University concentration camp in Manila and the Cabanatuan prison camp in Central Luzon.
Most were Americans, but the number also included a scattering of British, Australians, Dutch and other Allied nationals. Gen. MacArthur said the names of those rescued at Santo Tomas and Bilibid would be released as soon as they have been tabulated, probably a matter of several days.
“Every facility of the Armed Forces is being devoted to the care and attention of those who have been rescued,” Gen. MacArthur’s communiqué said.
Hospital move in
Food trucks were revealed to have reached Santo Tomas only a few hours after 1st Cavalry Division spearheads freed the camp. Huge mobile hospitals rolled into Manila today to care for medical cases.
Bataan Peninsula, where the Americans made a bloody stand in 1942 before retiring to Corregidor, was sealed off by a junction of the Eighth Army’s 11th corps and the Sixth Army’s 14th Corps at Dinalupihan, 37 miles northwest of Manila.
With U.S. forces in control of all roads leading into Bataan, the way was blocked for any prolonged Jap stand on the peninsula.
Corregidor bombed
Continuing to prepare the way for an attack on Corregidor, the largest force of Liberators yet struck the island in two raids Saturday. Corregidor must be captured before Manila Bay can be opened to American shipping.
To the north, the First Corps seized most of San Jose, 80 miles above Manila and only 37 miles from the east coast of Luzon, in a drive that cut the main road to the Balete Pass and Cagayan Valley.
More dead on Leyte
Fierce fighting continued in the Munoz sector, seven miles southwest of San Jose, where 25 enemy tanks, many trucks, pillboxes and artillery pieces have been destroyed. Units north of San Jose engaged the Japs in Pupao and advance five miles along the Villa Verde Trail into the Caraballo Mountains.
On Leyte in the central Philippines, U.S. troops counted an additional 733 enemy dead or prisoners.
U.S. patrol planes in the China Sea sank two small freighters off Amoy on the China coast, bombed and strafed parked aircraft at Swatow Airdrome, started fires at Takao, Formosa, and sank a fuel-laden vessel northwest of Formosa.
Bilibid prisoners saved from fire
MANILA, Philippines (UP) – A caravan of U.S. jeeps and trucks roared through the sniper-infested streets of Manila last night to rescue 1,003 prisoners and internees from Bilibid Prison when Jap fires raging on three sides, threatened to engulf the former federal penitentiary.
Every man in the 37th Infantry Division was turned out to evacuate the men, women and children of Bilibid.
Military authorities said the evacuation was completed just in time. Jap mortar fire had been dropping in the civilian and prisoner of war compounds all day. Shortly after the prison was cleared, Jap machine-gun fire started to rake the prison yard.
Those evacuated were 639 U.S. prisoners of war and 465 civilian internees. The civilian group included approximately 392 Americans, 71 British, one Mexican and one Chinese. There were 214 women, 169 men and 82 children, a dozen of whom had been born at the Baguio Prison Camp.