Discharged veteran must carry 1-C card
…
Offer to buy mills is made by U.S. Steel
Provo and Fontana plants are wanted
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Post-war job estimate held too optimistic
Economic lists basic errors in forecasts
…
U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)
Log of the Trip
Tuesday, February 6, 1945
0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia for Washington with White House mail.
1300: Luncheon at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan, Justice Byrnes, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m. The Prime Minister did not return to Vorontsov, as he was due back at Livadia at 4 p. m. (1600) for another conference. Instead, he accepted the loan of the room occupied by Admiral Brown and General Watson and took a short nap at Livadia.
1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:
| For the U.S. | For Great Britain | For the USSR |
|---|---|---|
| The President. | The Prime Minister. | Marshal Stalin. |
| Mr. Stettinius. | Mr. Eden. | Mr. Molotov. |
| Admiral Leahy. | Mr. Cadogan. | Mr. Vyshinski. |
| Mr. Hopkins. | Mr. Clark Kerr. | Mr. Maisky. |
| Justice Byrnes. | Mr. Jebb. | Mr. Gousev. |
| Mr. Harriman. | Mr. Bridges. | Mr. Gromyko. |
| Mr. Matthews. | Mr. Wilson. | Mr. Pavlov. |
| Mr. Hiss. | Mr. Dixon. | |
| Mr. Bohlen. | Major Birse. |
The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed on at today’s meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington time).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Miss Harriman and Mr. Spaman made a motor trip to Sevastopol today.
1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.
2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Early and Mr. Flynn.
This afternoon Commander Tyree, Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Long, Mr. Holmes and Mr. O’Driscoll left Livadia by automobile for Saki. At Saki they enplaned for Cairo to complete the advance arrangements incident to the President’s forthcoming visit to Egypt.
U.S. Navy Department (February 6, 1945)
CINCPOA Communiqué No. 250
Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, bombed storage and barracks areas on Hahajima in the Bonins on February 4 (East Longitude Date).
On February 4 and 5, Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force attacked targets on Iwo Jima in the Volcanos.
Fighters of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing bombed barges and buildings in the Palaus on February 4 and 5.
Marine torpedo planes destroyed a pier and buildings on Yap in the Western Carolines on February 5.
Mitchell bombers of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing bombed airfield installations and destroyed a building on Ponape in the Carolines on February 6. The attack was made through intense anti-aircraft fire. One of our aircraft was lost.
Neutralizing attacks on enemy held bases in the Marshalls were continued on February 5 by Navy search planes of Fleet Air Wing Two.
U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
Top secret
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Roberts | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Bessell | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Everest | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Commodore Burrough | |
| Major General Bull | Colonel Peck | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Anderson | Colonel Cary | |
| Major General Hull | Captain Stroop | |
| Major General Wood | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Lieutenant Colonel McRae | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Commander Clark | |
| Rear Admiral Olsen | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Leningrad, February 7, 1945, 10 a.m.
Approval of Minutes of CCS 186th Meeting
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
Utilization of the Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest Area (JCS 1241)
Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin’s agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.
General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945, and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix “A” of JCS 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.
Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777; JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT); JCS 1266/1 (Wash.))
Admiral Leahy said that JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expresses agreement with the British proposal in CCS 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) and recommended approval.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of JCS 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as CCS 777/1).
Supplies and Equipment Requested by the USSR (JCS 1138/3, JCS Info. Memo 360 – MILEPOST SUMMARY)
Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed JCS 1138/2 and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation MILEPOST. In JCS 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that JCS 1138/3 be approved.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.
Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater Berlin” (JCS 577/28)
Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater Berlin,” the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zone of Limitation for British and U.S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet Armies
General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.
General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term “bombline” because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression “zone of limitation.” There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words “British and U.S.” wherever the word “Allied” occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.
General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.
Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U.S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the British-U.S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as JCS 1243).
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.
Report by Combined Shipping Staffs
General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.
The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.
Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell’s, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.
In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of General Somervell’s report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.
740.00114 EW/2-545
The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State
Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret
My Dear Secretary of State: As you know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed with the Russians during the present Conference is the question of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in western and southern Europe and British and American nationals liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as possible.
In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARGONAUT. I intend therefore to ask M. Molotov for discussions to be opened between the experts of the three parties concerned at once, in order to reach agreement upon a satisfactory text.
There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as SHAEF have already reported, that the only V real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.
It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the United States. I am however without any information on the United States plans on this. General Eisenhower has recently pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff once again to provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles until the present large numbers have been cleared. No doubt your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower’s telegram, and I should be very glad if you could tell me whether you will be in a position to make any statement to the Russians about the United States plans.
Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.
Yours sincerely,
ANTHONY EDEN
740.00114 EW/2-545
The War Shipping Administrator to the Secretary of State
Yalta, February 5, 1945
Secret
Memorandum:
To: Mr. Stettinius
From: Admiral Land
Subject: MR. EDEN’S LETTER TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO MEET RUSSIAN REPATRIATION REQUIREMENTS
-
After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.
-
Following this authorization, Eisenhower requested use of two large troopships for repatriation of large numbers of Russians on hand, this movement to be from Marseille.
-
In Washington the CMTC in the belief the British Chiefs of Staff had failed to implement the approval described in paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether Eisenhower’s request had been made in ignorance of CCS decision on availability of lift.
-
Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers at CRICKET indicates that implementation had been intentionally held up because of these two factors:
(a) Type of ship required.
(b) Policy on Russian repatriation to be established. -
The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U.S. transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large type. This changes U.S. conception at time of original British request referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U.S. troop movement capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.
740.00114 EW/2-545
The British Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Foreign Commissar
Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret
You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October, I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of caring for and repatriating Soviet citizens and British subjects liberated respectively by Allied forces in the south and west and by the Soviet forces in the east of Europe.
Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20 January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a Reciprocal Agreement on this matter. We have examined this redraft and, subject to what is stated below, I am glad to say that it is generally acceptable. I understand that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government at the same time.
In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government’s Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.
I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.
On 20 January, your Government also presented to the British Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom. This redraft is also generally satisfactory, but there are a few points on it which require clarification and amendment. I would suggest that this Agreement should also be remitted to the same British and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present Conference.
I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.
I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.
I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal Agreement.
His Excellency Monsieur V. M. MOLOTOV
[Enclosure]
Redraft of Soviet Government’s Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and Allied Armies
Article 1
All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.
Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
Article 2
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.
The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.
Article 3
Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.
Article 4
Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.
Article 5
Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.
Article 6
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.
(Redrafted) Article 6
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting Parties, may until their repatriation, be employed on a voluntary basis on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.
Article 7
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.
Article 8
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.
740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, February 7 [8], 1945
Top secret
War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall which indicates that JCS on February 7 approved with certain changes British preliminary text of agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also for liberated persons. (This is our message No. 27) While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266, the agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to JCS staff with you:
-
Protection of Geneva Convention which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens captured in German uniform who demand such protection.
-
Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.
-
Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.
-
Question of the liberation and repatriation of other United Nations citizens.
-
Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.
(ALLSTATE HORSESHOE) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266 and 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached.
JCS to the President
Yalta, 6 February 1945
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin’s approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.
(Sec JCS)
The President’s Chief of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army
Yalta, 7 February 1945
Top secret
My Dear General Antonov: The U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P.M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.
For the U.S. Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, USN
The First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army to the President’s Chief of Staff
Crimea, 7 February 1945
Top secret
[TRANSLATION]
Dear Admiral Leahy: In reply to your letter of the seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with you on the eighth of February at three o’clock in the afternoon at the headquarters of the Russian Staff.
I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.
Yours very respectfully,
ANTONOV
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
General of the Army
London bestätigt den Betrugsversuch am deutschen Volk
Stockholm, 6. Februar – Das englische Nachrichtenbüro Exchange Telegraph stellt lange Kombinationen über die Dreierkonferenz an. Es berichtet, dass in London sehr viel über eine Kapitulationsaufforderung, die man an das deutsche Volk richten wolle, gesprochen werde. Exchange Telegraph bestätigt damit den Agitationsschwindel, auf den wir seit langem vorbereitet sind und der ohne Frage eine Neuauflage des Wilson-Bluffs von 1918 sein soll.
Die deutsche Presse hat einmütig dieses Betrugsmanöver der plutokratisch-bolschewistischen Weltverschwörer bereits beantwortet. Sie hat den Betrügern die Maske vom Gesicht gerissen und diesen Versuch als das entlarvt, was er in Wirklichkeit ist, nämlich einen Versuch, das deutsche Volk von seiner Führung zu trennen und seine Einigkeit zu sprengen, um damit die moralische Widerstandskraft zu zerbrechen. Die Kriegsverbrecher in Moskau, Washington und London haben bei ihrem Vorhaben übersehen, dass sie es heute nicht mehr mit dem deutschen Volk von 1918 zu tun haben. Die Lehre des Wilson-Schwindels hat genügt, um zu wissen, dass hinter allen Manövern des Feindes seine brutalen Vernichtungspläne stehen, über die uns der englische Hassfanatiker Vansittart und die jüdischen Vernichtungspolitiker Morgenthau und Ilja Ehrenburg nicht im unklaren gelassen haben.
Wir sind genau darüber unterrichtet, dass der Feind den Wilson-Schwindel nur deshalb noch einmal zu starten versucht, weil er erkannt hat, dass es unmöglich ist, uns militärisch in die Knie zu zwingen. Wir haben die Krisen von 1944 überstanden, haben den gemeinen Bombenterror hingenommen und sind nicht daran zerbrochen, wir werden auch die bolschewistische Flut zum Stehen bringen und den heiligen deutschen Boden von den bolschewistischen Horden befreien. Gerade weil wir wissen, welche ungeheure Kraft in der deutschen Einigkeit ruht, sehen wir mit festem Vertrauen in die Zukunft.
Wir sind uns des Ernstes der Lage und der Gefahren, die Deutschland umlauern, sehr wohl bewusst. Aber wir wissen auch, dass es sich lohnt, zu verteidigen und von neuem zu erobern, was wir uns, in den wenigen Aufbaujahren, die uns nach der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung gegönnt waren, geschaffen haben. Nicht umsonst beschimpft und begeifert die feindliche Presse die nationalsozialistische Organisation und die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung des deutschen Volkes. Man hat im Feindlager begriffen, dass sich gerade darin die Einheit und die Geschlossenheit der deutschen Nation verkörpert. Der Grundgedanke unseres gesamten völkischen Lebens, die nationalsozialistische Volksgemeinschaft, ist das Fundament, auf dem die deutsche Macht und Kraft beruhen. Dieses Fundament will der Feind zerstören.
Sein Sturmlauf gegen die deutsche Einigkeit ist uns immer wieder die Bestätigung dafür, dass allein unser Zusammenhalten, das Füreinander stehen, unsere Opferbereitschaft und Zukunft sind. Das deutsche Volk hat sich die sozialistische Lehre nicht erkämpft, um sie über Bord zu werfen, wenn der Feind uns irgendeinen Köder hinwirft, durch den er den für ihn blutigen Waffengang zu verkürzen versucht. Deutschland verteidigt diese Idee mit dem ganzen Einsatz seiner Kraft und wird sie zum Siege führen. Das Bekenntnis: „Ein Führer, ein Volk! Ein Volk, ein Reich!“ ist die Parole unseres Kampfes, für den unsere Soldaten ihr Leben einsetzen und für den die Heimat arbeitet und opfert, unbeirrt, unbeugsam und fanatisch.
Führer HQ (February 7, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Die Verteidiger von Budapest zerschlugen auch gestern wieder alle feindlichen Angriffe.
An der Oderfront konnte der Gegner seine Brückenköpfe nördlich Ratibor, bei Brieg und Küstrin geringfügig erweitern.
Im südlichen Pommern und Westpreussen hielt der feindliche Druck nach
Norden im Raum Pyritz–Arnswalde–DeutschKrone an. Nordwestlich Schwetz wurden feindliche Angriffe abgewehrt. Die Besatzungen von Graudenz und Elbing behaupten sich gegen den starken feindlichen Ansturm.
In Ostpreußen wurden die an den bisherigen Brennpunkten fortgesetzten Durchbruchsversuche der Bolschewisten in harten Kämpfen vereitelt. Bei Landsberg warfen unsere Truppen die Sowjets trotz heftiger Gegenwehr zurück. Im Samland ließen die Angriffe des Feindes auf Grund seiner schweren Verluste nach. Es gelang dort unseren Grenadieren, im Gegenangriff eine Frontlücke zu schließen und bei diesen Kämpfen 48 sowjetische Panzer und 57 Geschütze zu vernichten.
Unsere Seestreitkräfte unterstützen wirksam die schweren Kämpfe des Heeres im Samland und griffen am 6. Februar mit gutem Erfolg erstmalig auch in die Abwehrschlacht um Elbing ein. Marineflak schoss drei feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter zwei viermotorige Bomber, ab.
Im Westen schlugen unsere Truppen die an der unteren Roer angreifenden Engländer zurück. Am Oberlauf des Flusses scheiterten amerikanische Angriffe bis auf einen geringfügigen Einbruch.
Beiderseits der Sohnee-Eifel nahmen die Orts- und Bunkerkämpfe an Heftigkeit und Ausdehnung zu. Von der Sauer- und Moselfront wird starkes feindliches Artilleriefeuer gemeldet.
Angriffe der Amerikaner gegen den Saar-Brückenkopf zwischen Forbach und Saargemünd sowie bei Bliesbruck scheiterten. Eingebrochener Feind wurde im Gegenstoß wieder geworfen.
Im oberen Elsass gelang es, unsere Truppen in einen verkleinerten Brückenkopf zurückzuführen. Dort wiesen sie zwischen Neubreisach und dem Rhein den nach Süden angreifenden Gegner ab. Ebenso wurden starke feindliche Angriffe auf Ensisheim im Gegenstoß zerschlagen.
In Mittelitalien wird auf den Höhen hinter dem Sergiotal nordöstlich von Callicano örtlich gekämpft.
Im Raum von Mostar in der Herzegowina sind erneut Kämpfe mit den dort angreifenden Bandenkräften im Gange.
Amerikanische Terrorverbände warfen Bomben auf Magdeburg und Orte des thüringisch-sächsischen Raumes, wo vor allem Schäden in den Wohnvierteln von Chemnitz entstanden.
Faschistisch-republikanische Einheiten sowie Verbände des Heeres und der Waffen-SS und der Polizei unter Führung des Höchsten SS- und Polizeiführers und bevollmächtigten Generals der deutschen Wehrmacht in Italien, SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Wolff haben in mehrwöchigen hartnäckigen Gebirgskämpfen größere Gebiete Oberitaliens von starken Bandenkräften gesäubert. Die Banden verloren dabei mehrere tausend gezählte Tote. Über 80.000 Bandenkämpfer wurden zur Niederlegung der Waffen gezwungen. Durch diese Kampfhandlungen wurde das oberitalienische Gebiet im wesentlichen vom Bandenterror befreit.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 7, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
071100A February
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 305
Allied forces northeast of Monschau, have pushed 1,000 yards south from Bergstein against minefields and defended pillboxes, and to the southwest we have gained 500 yards to a point approximately one mile west of Schmidt. Our infantry elements have pushed another 1,000 yards to the east of Steckenborn.
South of the Urftstausee, we have reached the area one and one-half miles east of Morsbach. Scheuren, one-half mile northwest of Schleiden, is in our hands and heavy fighting continues in Hellenthal, three miles southwest of Schleiden.
Our forces have captured Schlausenbach, on the edge of the Schneifel Forest and we have made small gains in the forest southeast of Schlausenbach. Southwest of the forest, a counterattack in the vicinity of Brandscheid resulted in stiff fighting. Farther southwest, our units have taken Habscheid. Southwest of Habscheid, we have captured Grosskampenberg and Lützkampen.
East of the Mosele River in the Remich area, we repulsed a small counterattack in the woods one-half mile southeast of Tettingen.
Between the battle area and the Rhine, medium and light bombers attacked the communications centers of Sötenich, Bad Munstereifel and Wittlich, and an ammunition dump at Rheinbach. Fighter-bombers struck at fortified places in the Euskirchen-Mayen area.
In the southern Alsace Plain, we have occupied Neuf-Brisach. The western approaches to the Rhine bridges leading to Vieux-Breisach were taken and further progress was made to the south between the Rhine and the Rhine-Rhone Canal.
To the southwest, the Ill River was crossed at a number of points and we continued to make gains in the direction of the Rhine-Rhone Canal. The villages of Battenheim, Baldersheim and Sausheim, northeast of Mulhouse were liberated.
Enemy troops in the Hardt Forest were strafed and a railyard at Vieux-Breisach was attacked by fighter-bombers.
Communication targets in holland and northwest Germany were attacked yesterday by medium and fighter-bombers. A bridge at Deventer was the target for escorted medium bombers, while fighter-bombers struck at bridges, locomotives and rolling stock and cut rail lines, particularly in central Holland and to the north and northeast of the Ruhr. A fuel dump at Emmerich was attacked by medium bombers, and fighter-bombers attacked an ammunition dump at Amersfoort and an oil storage plant north of Lingen.
A vehicle depot at Bergisch-Gladbach was attacked by medium and light bombers.
Fighter-bombers struck at motor transport, railyards and rolling stock in the Düsseldorf area; railyards in the region of Würzburg, Landau and Trier; and rolling stock and motor transport in the Trier and Karlsruhe areas.
Railyards at Rastatt and Offenburg, and a rail bridge at Rastatt were targets for fighter-bombers, which also attacked rolling stock near Rastatt and Mahlberg.
More than 1,300 heavy bombers escorted by more than 850 fighters attacked railyards and industrial targets at Magdeburg and Chemnitz and other points over a wide area of central Germany. Many of the escort strafed ground targets in western Germany, destroying three enemy aircraft on the ground and destroying or damaging locomotives, freight cars and military vehicles.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
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ORIGINATING DIVISION
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NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
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U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon
Yusupov Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Matthews | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Hiss | Mr. Jebb | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Page | Mr. Dixon | Mr. Novikov |
| Mr. Harrison | Mr. Golunsky | |
| Major Theakstone |
Page Minutes
Leningrad, February 7, 1945, noon
Top secret
Subject[s]:
-
DUMBARTON OAKS
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THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
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CREATION OF A COMMISSION TO STUDY THE PROCEDURE FOR THE DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY
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THE INTEGRATION OF FRANCE INTO THE GERMAN CONTROL MACHINERY ON CONDITION THAT FRANCE WERE TO RECEIVE A ZONE OF OCCUPATION
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REPARATIONS
Dumbarton Oaks
Mr. Stettinius inquired at the outset whether there were any questions regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had failed to make clear at yesterday’s plenary session. He said that if so, he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any questions which remained open or which needed to be expanded.
Mr. Molotov remarked that the World Security Organization had not been referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued that although he had a few questions to advance he was not prepared to go into this subject at the present time.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points to bring up.
The Dismemberment of Germany
Mr. Molotov recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in Article 12 of the German surrender instrument to the addition of the words “and the dismemberment” after the word “demilitarization.” He suggested that a sub-committee consisting of British, American and Soviet representatives be appointed to work out the exact wording of Article 12.
It was decided to authorize Messrs. Vyshinski, Cadogan and Matthews to make a final redraft of Article 12 which would include the addition of the word “dismemberment” and to authorize a commission consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev to study the question of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany.
Creation of a Commission to Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of Germany
Mr. Molotov suggested that such a commission be set up in London consisting of Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a most important matter. If this question were not referred to the EAC the prestige of that body would surely be diminished. He, therefore, thought that the question of taking away this work from the EAC should be carefully considered.
Mr. Eden pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were included in the EAC the French would participate in this work.
Mr. Stettinius stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr. Winant as the American representative.
Mr. Molotov stated that the subject under discussion was the study of procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over to the EAC.
Mr. Eden remarked that he thought that the body handling this question should go further than merely studying questions of procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he believed, should examine when this separation should take place; should look into boundary questions and measures needed to insure the proper functioning and survival of the new states. What relations should be permitted between them and foreign powers should also be studied. He stated that it might be necessary to request that a report be drawn up on the practicability of the dismemberment of Germany. He also questioned whether the commission was to undertake the type of work referred to in the afore-mentioned terms of reference or merely to decide how this work was to be done.
Mr. Molotov stated that he did not believe that there was any need for a special commission at this stage and suggested that the question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any directive to form an actual commission.
Mr. Eden stated that they had not; however they had the power to make recommendations.
Mr. Molotov continued that he was not insisting on a commission.
Mr. Eden stated that he felt worried about the absence of the French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a mistake to keep them out.
Mr. Molotov suggested that the question of French participation be subsequently decided by Messrs. Eden, Winant and Gusev in London.
Messrs. Stettinius and Eden stated that this would be agreeable.
Mr. Eden stated that in view of his many activities it might be impossible for him personally to participate in the London discussions.
Mr. Molotov stated that he of course had the right to deputize someone to represent him.
The Integration of France into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France were to receive a Zone of Occupation
Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this matter and inquired whether it could be used for a basis of discussion.
Mr. Eden stated that since it had been agreed upon that France would receive a zone of occupation, he hoped that it might also be agreed that France would participate on the Control Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed the opinion that de Gaulle in all probability would refuse to accept a zone if he did not have the same treatment on the Control Commission as the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain. Even if France were to accept a zone, they would always have trouble in administering it if they were not represented on the commission. He maintained that he could not see why it was any more of a departure to have France on the commission than on the EAC. He pointed out that the Prime Minister opposed enlarging the present three-power conferences; however, he could not see how the participation of France on the Control Commission would affect this view.
Mr. Molotov stated that he felt that at the present stage the question of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to study French participation on the Control Commission it could be done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.
It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report to the plenary session stating that: (a) it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation; and, (b) with respect to the question concerning the participation of France in the Control Commission, Messrs. Molotov and Stettinius considered it appropriate to submit this question to the consideration of the EAC, while Mr. Eden considered it appropriate to study the question at the present time and to assign to France a place on the Control Commission.
Mr. Eden stated that he believed that if France were admitted to the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should agree that no other power should be given a zone of occupation.
Mr. Molotov suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss that question at the present conference.
Reparations
Mr. Molotov submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in brief. He requested Mr. Maisky to explain the considerations which formed the basis of the Soviet statement.
Mr. Maisky stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that this national wealth would be reduced by 40 percent or less during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22-23 billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be left to Germany which would secure for that country living standards comparable to those prevailing in Central Europe. These were lower than in Germany but quite decent. With respect to the second item, it had been figured that the national income of Germany before the war amounted to 30 billion dollars annually. The war would lower this income by 30-35 percent and would bring it to the neighborhood of approximately 18-20 billion. The Soviet Government proposed to take one billion dollars annually, or 5-6 per cent from the German national income. This was not a large sum and could be supported by Germany.
Mr. Eden stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.
Mr. Molotov stated that there would be no objections to the addition in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr. Eden.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary session had stated that the United States itself would not be interested in large reparations, except with respect to German foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the hope that at this afternoon’s plenary session the foreign secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence work on the question of reparations.
Mr. Molotov stated that whenever the British and American representatives were prepared, he would be ready to continue the discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr. Stettinius’ proposal that the foreign ministers report to the plenary session that the question of reparations had been discussed, would be discussed further, and that a reparations commission would be set up in Moscow which would immediately commence work on this question.
Mr. Stettinius stated that it would be helpful for the American Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.
Mr. Molotov stated that this question was very complicated, that the Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the reparations Commission in Moscow.
Mr. Molotov’s interpreter then read a second paper on the creation of the reparations commission. Mr. Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet agreed on the principles mentioned in it.
Mr. Eden inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should not also be authorized to study German industry in connection with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference of the commission.
Mr. Molotov maintained that the commission would deal with German industry only in connection with reparations. The question of security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it was not the principal task of the commission.
Mr. Stettinius suggested that as a practical measure the German Control Commission should have the responsibility for the control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparations Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison with it.
Mr. Molotov was in agreement with this proposal.