Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall		Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith		Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke		General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick		Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull		General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson		Major General Laycock
Major General Hull
Major General Wood
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
	Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Jacob
Captain Graves		Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
		Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

February 1, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 183rd Meeting

General Marshall said that he would like the first statement attributed to him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:

General Marshall said that in recent discussions General Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with General Bradley’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launching GRENADE.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 183rd Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall and to later minor amendments.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

Field Marshal Brooke referred to the amended draft directive contained in CCS 773/1. He suggested that paragraph 4b of this directive should read as follows: “Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.”

It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.

Sir Charles Portal referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt that Field Marshal Alexander might well prefer to retain the Twelfth Air Force, since he was losing three divisions at once, in order to enable him to carry out that part of his directive contained in paragraph 7c, which instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also require it to maintain the security of his front, though it might well be possible to release it after the Germans had withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.

In reply to a question, Sir Charles Portal confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German forces did not retire.

General Marshall said that in his view it was important to transfer such air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that the remainder of the directive should be approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander should be informed that the question of the transference of parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under consideration.

General Marshall said he was not in favor of this proposal.

General Kuter suggested that General Eisenhower might require parts of the Twelfth Air Force before the ground troops which were being transferred to him.

General Smith said that General Eisenhower’s first requirement, before any of the land forces, was for two groups of fighter-bombers. These were urgently required in view of the lack of such types on the southern part of the front. The move of these two groups could, he believed, be very quickly accomplished.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 768/1 until their next meeting.

a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 452/35, CCS 452/36)

b. Allocation of Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters (CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT))

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36.

General Marshall said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff wished to delete the words “British forces engaged in.” This he felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied that operations rather than forces should not be placed in jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.

Sir Charles Portal explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking only that discussion should take place before such a move was ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of CCS 452/36:

Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke said that in the light of this redrafting, the British Chiefs of Staff would withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme Commander of the policy recorded in CCS 452/36 and amended in the course of discussion.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the policy set out in the first and second paragraphs of CCS 452/36, subject to the amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed above (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently circulated as CCS 452/37).

b. Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in CCS 452/35, subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to the policy set out in CCS 452/37.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff withdraw CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT).

Pacific Operations (CCS 417/11)

At the request of Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall and Admiral King explained the future course of operations in the Pacific and various plans and projects which were under examination by the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the invasion of the Tokyo Plain in December of 1945. However, these operations involved the use of forces which would have to be redeployed from Europe after the defeat of Germany. The actual dates of these operations were therefore dependent on the date of the defeat of Germany. The length of time required for redeployment varied between four and six months, depending on whether the troops involved had actually been committed in Europe. At the present time all ground forces allocated to the Pacific were already in that theater and there would be no additional formations which could be moved there until the end of the German war. It was important, however, that during the necessary interval before the attack on the Empire itself could be carried out that the Japanese should be given no respite. It was intended to use this interval to obtain positions designed to assist in the final defeat of Japan. There were various possible courses of action after the capture of the Ryukyus and Bonins to achieve this object. The possible operations now under consideration were:

(1) An attack on the Island of Hainan. This had the advantage not only of securing an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land communications but also afforded a new airway into the heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a more active part in operations.

(2) An attack on North Borneo. The advantages of such an operation were that it secured to the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that area. In this connection it was interesting to note that certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required but little refinement before it was ready for use.

(3) An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo area. This operation was extremely valuable in broadening the base for air attack against the Island Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River. The area concerned contained a series of islands and a peninsula and was therefore one in which operations against the Japanese could be undertaken without permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against us.

When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time, it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.

In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.

With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not visualized that major United States forces would be used in mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather, it was hoped that with U.S. troops holding certain key positions, the rearmed Philippine Army and guerillas would be able to carry out the necessary mopping-up operations.

In view of the above considerations, it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.

The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.

The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed. A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar and it was estimated that three months’ work could be achieved on this base before any work could be done to render Manila available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been developed in Ulithi which was some 1100 miles to the westward of Eniwetok which had previously been used as a base and staging point.

The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.

The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were convoying “civilian-type” supplies to the Maritime Provinces.

To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be under-taken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.

In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.

With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/11.

a. U-Boat Threat (CCS 774/1 and 774/2)

b. Bombing of Assembly Yards and Operating Bases (CCS 774)

General Marshall said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that CCS 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of April.

Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with General Marshall.

Sir Charles Portal, referring to CCS 774, said that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were very few days in the month available for such operations in Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was that the “marginal effort” should be used against submarine targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual bombing, the aircraft concerned would divert their efforts to a submarine target if one existed with clear weather over it.

He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.

General Kuter said that some directive on the subject of the submarine menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.

Admiral King said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive on the action to be taken to counter it.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the Naval Staff would have liked to see some additional emphasis being placed on the bombing of submarine targets. He had, however, been convinced that the attacks on oil targets would in fact pay a more valuable dividend.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then considered the summary of countermeasures set out in CCS 774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 774/1 and agreed to review this paper on 1 April 1945.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a directive based on CCS 774 and CCS 774/2.

Strategy in Northwest Europe (CCS 761/5 and 761/6)

In closed session, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of SCAF 180, as amended by SCAF 194 of 31 January, and as amplified by Message No. S-77211 of 31 January to General Smith.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 1 February 1945
CCS 768/1 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces

1. In the 183rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31 January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency for implementing action during the current conference covering the forming of a Greek Army to take over responsibility for internal security within Greece as set forth in NAF 841, 25 January 1945.

2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or “due in” the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.

3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.

4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of necessary matériel for:

a. The French Metropolitan Rearmament Program of eight divisions and supporting troops.

b. The Polish 2nd Division.

c. Six Belgium infantry brigades.

d. Internal security, mobile military labor, and miscellaneous units (Liberated Manpower Program) aggregating 460,000 troops.

5. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.

6. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.

7. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated manpower has been under study since early November. In view of the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as emphasized by General Eisenhower in SCAF 193, dated 30 January 1945, the United States Chiefs of Staff request that the British Chiefs of Staff take such action as is necessary to insure an early solution to this problem.

8. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

9. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review NAF 841 again.

---

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 31 January 1945
CCS 747/7 (ARGONAUT)
Top secret

Allocation of Resources Between India-Burma and China Theaters

1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.

2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.

3. The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff accepted without discussion in conference the United States reservation stated in CCS 308 no longer apply. A year ago, British land forces were not committed to operations in which their security was dependent to the same extent upon air transportation as it is now. Moreover, the situation in China was not such as to demand such urgent increase of the Fourteenth Air Force as to preclude prior discussion. It was more a question of taking advantage of opportunities in China rather than of warding off dangers.

4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.

[NormanStewart]

Stettinius-Churchill-Eden dinner meeting, evening

On board HMS Orion in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Secretary Stettinius		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Foreign Secretary Eden
		Sir Alexander Cadogan

[rit_upy]

I hope the next conference is called Tea.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 2, 1945)

The British Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister Churchill

Malta, 2 February, 1945
P. M. (A) 4.
Prime Minister

The Future of Germany

As a result of developments in the war situation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to co-ordinate the policy of the major Allied Powers in regard to the future of Germany. It is clearly of paramount importance to future unity and security that there should be no divergence of policy between the Allies in dealing with Germany.

2. The EAC was set up in 1943 to “study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities.” So far the Commission have agreed and referred to Governments three documents: (1) Terms of surrender for Germany, (2) protocol on zones of occupation, (3) control machinery for Germany. Of these (1) has been approved by all three Governments, and (2) and (3) so far by the United States and British Governments only.

3. There are a considerable number of major questions of policy on which no decisions have been reached, though there have been exchanges of views at earlier conferences. In my view we should be wise to suspend final decisions until we see what conditions are in Germany. But there is a great deal of preparatory work which can and should be done. Governments have no doubt been studying all these questions individually; but the time has come when they could usefully be examined jointly by British, American, Soviet and French experts with a view to coordinating the individual studies. The obvious body to undertake this task is the EAC.

4. I would accordingly suggest that at the forthcoming conference we should try to get general agreement that the EAC should be directed to examine and make joint recommendations at an early date to the member Governments regarding future political and economic policy towards Germany. In doing so, the Commission should pay particular attention to, inter alia, provisions for the disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany and the prevention of rearmament, dismemberment, decentralisation, measures of economic security, reparation, the future of the Rheno-Westphalian basin, the Kiel area, and transfers of population.

5. If this is agreed, it will be important that member Governments should ensure that their delegations are adequately staffed to cope with the increased work.

6. It might also be useful, in order to give the public some idea of the Commission’s work, that the communiqué to be issued at the end of the Conference should announce the approval of the three Governments of the three documents so far negotiated by the EAC. This will, however, raise awkward problems as regards the French. While they are unlikely to propose any alterations of substance, they have not yet formally approved the documents, which will have to be recast in quadripartite form. We are telegraphing to the Foreign Office to ask (a) what effect it would be likely to have on the French if we announce the approval of the three Governments only of the three documents, and (b) whether they can devise a formula which we could use to cover the French.

[NormanStewart]

Agreed Minutes

On Board HMS SIRIUS, Malta, 2 February 1945
Top secret

Mr. Eden asked Mr. Stettinius if there were any points which he wished to raise.

Mr. Stettinius said that he hoped it would be possible for agreement to be reached between the British and American Delegations forthwith on the urgent question of:

Zones of Occupation in Germany

Mr. Stettinius thought that though there had been agreement between the Americans and British on the zones of occupation in Germany, there were still relatively minor points outstanding, notably in connexion with the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. He thought it important to get agreement on these, particularly in view of the fact that the Russians might soon be in Berlin and have views of their own as regards the zones if our two Governments do not approve the carefully negotiated protocol.

Mr. Eden said that he understood that there were only certain small points unsettled; he agreed that it was desirable to get these tied up forthwith and thought that these points could be cleared up by agreement with the military authorities forthwith.

It was agreed that it would be most important for us to get the Russians to approve the protocols on control machinery and zones of occupation.

Mr. Stettinius next raised the question of zones for the French. The President was disposed to give the French a zone. This might include the southern part of the British zone and the northern part of the American, said Mr. Stettinius.

Sir A. Cadogan asked whether the Americans had had any indication from the French what zone they desired; he thought we should consult them before taking our decision. Neither the British nor the Americans had as yet had any such indication.

It was agreed that the approval of the Russians should be sought to the proposal that the Americans and British should agree on a zone with the French; it was also agreed that the French should be integrated into the control machinery.

Zones of Occupation in Austria

Mr. Eden raised the question of zones of occupation in Austria.

Mr. Matthews said that there had been general agreement as to the areas except as to exact extent of the Viennese zone.

Mr. Eden said that Sir William Strang had told the European Advisory Council that we favoured the American view on Vienna rather than the Russian. He was not sure, however, that apart from this issue there was in fact agreement as to zones.

It was recalled that the French had also asked for a zone in Austria.

Poland

Mr. Stettinius said that from the point of view of American public opinion it was extremely important that some equitable solution should be reached. It was impossible for the United States Government simply to recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. What seemed to be required was some kind of Council including all the relevant sections including M. Mikolajczyk. Failure to reach a satisfactory solution of this question at the forthcoming meeting would greatly disturb public opinion in America especially among the Catholics and might prejudice the whole question of American participation in the post war world organisation. He asked whether the British had any formula.

Mr. Eden agreed that the British too could not simply recognise the Lublin Provisional Government. M. Mikolajczyk had put forward a suggestion for a presidential council which would be chosen partly from London elements, partly from the Lublin Provisional Government and partly from elements in Poland. Of the latter he instanced the Archbishop of Cracow, M. Witos and M. Zulawski, a leader of the Socialist party. He thought that M. Bierut would be a member of the presidential council from the Lublin Provisional Government.

Sir A. Cadogan thought the Russians might be suspicious of a proposal which might seem to them rather complicated. He suggested that we should ask them to agree to a new interim Government and that we might suggest a presidential council as one method of securing this. We should avoid suggesting a fusion between the Lublin Provisional Government and the London Government.

It was agreed, upon the proposal of Mr. Stettinius, that the two Delegations should put up notes to the President and the Prime Minister in the above sense, bringing out in particular the point of the prejudicial effect on American opinion of failure to reach a satisfactory solution, and also that this would put in an impossible position all those in Great Britain most anxious to work in with Russia.

The possibility was discussed of the Russians refusing to play.

It was agreed that a deadlock would be bad but that a simple recognition of the Lublin Provisional Government would be even worse.

Persia

Mr. Eden raised the subject of Persia. He said that the essential point was to maintain the independence of Persia which was still threatened by the pressure which the Russian Government had been maintaining for some time on the Persian Government, mainly in connexion with the oil concession which the Persian Government had declined to give them. He suggested that an offer might be made to the Russians for the withdrawal of troops gradually and pari passu, after the Governments had agreed that the supply route through Persia was no longer required, which might be about June. He was obliged, however, to make a reservation that our military might feel it necessary to retain certain troops for the protection of the vital oilfields in southern Persia.

Mr. Matthews pointed out that in this case the Russians would insist on maintaining troops in the north.

It was recalled that both Americans and British had a grievance against the Russians in that British and American companies had proceeded quite far in their applications for oil concessions in South Persia and that their negotiations had been arrested by the ham-handed procedure of the Russians in demanding a concession in the north which raised political issues.

It was agreed that for the three Powers to appear to default on the specific undertakings in the Tehran Declaration would have repercussions elsewhere, for instance in connexion with Dumbarton Oaks, and that it was important to try to get the Russians to agree (a) to the principle of gradual pari passu withdrawal and (b) that the Persian Government were entitled to decline to negotiate oil concessions as long as foreign troops were in occupation of their territory.

Warm Water Port for Russia (Straits and the Far East)

Mr. Stettinius said that the President had in mind the question of Russian interests in a warm water port. He enquired whether the British had any indication as to what the Russians wanted.

Mr. Eden said that the Russians certainly wished to revise the Montreux Convention. We had told them that they should put their ideas on paper. We had no clear indication of what they had in mind but it might be that they would wish for a regime for the Straits similar to that of the Suez Canal which would enable their warships to pass from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean in time of war.

Mr. Eden continued that the Russians would be wanting a good many things, that we had not very much to offer them, but that we required a great deal from them. He felt, therefore, that we ought to arrange to put together all the things we wanted against what we had to give. This would apply to the Far East also. In his view if the Russians decided to enter the war against Japan they would take the decision because they considered it in their interests that the Japanese war should not be successfully finished by the U. S. and Great Britain alone. There was therefore no need for us to offer a high price for their participation, and if we were prepared to agree to their territorial demands in the Far East, we should see to it that we obtained a good return in respect of the points on which we required concessions from them.

In the course of discussion, the views were put forward that the Russians would certainly want the lower part of Sakhalin and transit rights in southern Manchuria.

China

The desirability of unity being achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity.

Mr. Eden could not account for this idea having arisen; we were most anxious that unity should be secured.

Mr. Stettinius said that he had not heard the report.

It was agreed that the military situation had improved somewhat, partly through the diversion of two divisions from Burma to China, and partly through the reopening of the Burma Road.

Mr. Stettinius urged that the British, Soviet and American Governments make every effort to bring about agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists.

Emergency High Commission for Europe

Mr. Stettinius referred to the two papers on this subject which Mr. Bohlen had communicated in London to Sir A. Cadogan. He asked Mr. Hiss to explain briefly their purpose.

Mr. Hiss said that the essential purpose was to secure unity of approach between the three Big powers to the manifold difficulties that must arise in liberated territories in Europe. The proposed High Commission would be a temporary body functioning until the World Organisation was set up. It would not include Germany, which was handled by the European Advisory Council; but in any case the scope including the psychological approach was different.

Mr. Stettinius stressed that the Commission would be composed of four members, i.e. by the inclusion of the French, or possibly more.

Mr. Eden made it clear that the British were much attracted by the proposal.

Mr. Matthews said that its presentation to the Russians would require considerable care, as the question of Poland was involved.

Mr. Eden foresaw that one difficulty would be to find members of the Council who would be able to take responsibility for decisions of importance – the Russians would find this particularly difficult. Apart from this there was the further difficulty that responsibility for such decisions vis-à-vis their own public opinion must rest with the Foreign Secretaries of each country, who could neither be permanently in session in a foreign country, nor delegate their duties beyond a certain measure.

Mr. Stettinius shared this view, but explained that the intention had been that the members of the proposed Council would refer to their home Governments before the Council took decisions of importance.

Mr. Eden raised the further point of the relation between the Council and quarterly meetings of the Foreign Secretaries to which he attached importance. It was felt that it should not be impossible to work [out?] an arrangement combining both plans.

There was some discussion as to the title of the body. It was felt that some title must be found which would not wound the susceptibilities of the smaller Allies and at the same time would not seem to cut across the duties of the European Advisory Council and the Allied Control Commissions in certain enemy countries. It was thought that Mr. Matthews’ suggestion of “Liberated Areas Emergency Council” deserved consideration.

Mr. Stettinius stressed that the proposal must still be regarded as informal and unofficial as the President had not yet approved it. The President had indeed some misgiving that its adoption might prejudice the prospects of the World Organisation which was the question of paramount importance.

Mr. Matthews pointed out that if the idea fructified some public announcement would be necessary as regards it and certain other kindred subjects.

Mr. Stettinius said that the ideal result of ARGONAUT would be two declarations, one bringing to birth the World Organisation and the other in regard to the Emergency High Commission. American public opinion keenly anticipated a satisfactory declaration as regards the World Organisation in the course of the next week, and if this were not forthcoming its prospects would be seriously jeopardised.

It was agreed that in view of the informality of the proposal the Prime Minister should be advised not to raise the question of the Emergency High Commission with the President.

Germany

Some discussion followed on the future of Germany. It was felt that both the political and economic aspects needed working out by some international body.

Mr. Stettinius enquired whether this was not in the province of the European Advisory Council and there was agreement that it was.

Mr. Eden summed up that with the Russians so close to Berlin it was urgently necessary to reach tripartite agreement.

(a) that a common political and economic policy in Germany was required,
(b) that no individual nation should take action without the agreement of the others, and
(c) that the European Advisory Council was the body in which detailed arrangements should be worked out.

Other questions requiring study would be the transfer of population and prisoners of war.

It was agreed that a note should be drafted embodying the views of the two Governments for the use of the President and the Prime Minister at ARGONAUT.

Dumbarton Oaks

Mr. Eden said that he liked the President’s proposal for overcoming the difficulty as regards voting by the Big Powers.

Mr. Matthews stressed that its adoption was virtually essential to the creation of the World Organisation.

Sir A. Cadogan agreed that it would hardly be possible to secure the latter with anything less.

At Mr. Stettinius’ request Mr. Hiss briefly described the American proposal. It distinguished between cases involving Enforcement and cases dealt with by Discussion. For the former unanimity in the part of the Great Powers would be necessary, whereas for the latter parties to the dispute, whether Big Powers or small, would not be entitled to vote. He stressed that this proposal, which had been described as a compromise, in effect was not so, but was actually the preferred solution of the United States Government.

Sir A. Cadogan endorsed this and agreed that this point should be made plain to the public.

Mr. Eden agreed.

It was agreed (1) that two types of documents were required; first, a document setting out the American proposal which would be the document to be presented to the Russians; and secondly, brief and clear explanations of it for the information of the President and the Prime Minister; and (2) that if approved it would be for the President to present the plan formally at ARGONAUT both to Marshal Stalin and to Mr. Churchill.

Points arising in the event of agreement being reached on Dumbarton Oaks plan

(a) Position of France and China – It was agreed that the French and Chinese Governments should be consulted as soon as agreement was reached, and if the Russians concurred that the French should be invited to be the Fifth Power sponsoring the plan. The United States Government would be responsible for communicating the documents to and obtaining the concurrence of both the French and Chinese Governments.

(b) The invitations to other States to be present at the eventual United Nations Conference should be issued jointly in the name of all five Governments and by each of them individually. It was realised that the Russian Government might raise some objection to this in connection with China.

Polish-German frontier

Mr. Eden said that the apparent desire of the Lublin Provisional Government to secure for Poland large additional sections of Germany involving eight million persons was causing him some anxiety. He thought that Poland was entitled to East Prussia and part of Upper Silesia, and certain other territories up to the Oder.

Mr. Matthews said that that was the American view and referred also to the inclusion of the eastern tip of Pomerania. He stressed also the American view that the transfer of populations should be gradual and not precipitate.

Sir A. Cadogan thought that agreement in principle between the Americans and British on this point might be registered now. This was agreed to.

Austro-Yugoslav frontier

Mr. Eden referred to the fact that British troops under the proposed zone arrangement would be responsible for the Austrian frontier with Yugoslavia, and that one could not exclude the possibility that Marshal Tito would wish to occupy part of Austrian territory which was claimed for Yugoslavia. The position would be safeguarded if the three Big Powers were to tell Marshal Tito that the frontiers must remain as they are until the Peace Treaty, at which claims of parties concerned would be settled.

Mr. Stettinius expressed concurrence in this procedure.

Conduct of the Russians in Eastern Europe

It was pointed out that there were two main questions on which we had reason for complaint in regard to Russian conduct (a) in connexion with the Control Commissions and (b) in connexion with the British and American oil interest in Roumania.

It was generally felt that while the position on the Control Commission for Roumania was now more satisfactory it was important to insist with the Russians that before the Commissions took action there must be prior consultation with the Americans and British. Should the Russian Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds, not covered in the Armistice, this should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government.

It was agreed that the British Delegation should draw up a paper which would include Hungary specifying the points on which dissatisfaction was felt with the Russian conduct in Eastern Europe. This paper, if the American Delegation concurred in it, would serve for presentation by Mr. Eden to M. Molotov at some meeting between the three Foreign Secretaries.

Civil Supplies

Mr. Eden raised this question and Mr. Stettinius said that he understood that Admiral Land had submitted a paper on the subject. It appeared that the British and American civil authorities were in agreement but it remained to persuade the American military.

It was understood that the next stage would be for the matter to be discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and if agreement were not reached by them, between the President and the Prime Minister.

Prisoners of War

Sir A. Cadogan said that he understood that the Russian Delegation at ARGONAUT would include an official who would be prepared to discuss this subject. There were in effect two questions, (a) the treatment of Allied civilian and military prisoners of war who were liberated by the Russians and (b) our own treatment of Russian prisoners of war who came into our hands.

It was agreed that the procedure for handling this with the Russian expert should be discussed by the American and British experts who were present at CRICKET.

Anglo-American warning to Germany about Allied prisoners of war

Mr. Matthews said that the State Department were disposed to agree with the text proposed by the Foreign Office but that the United States War Department had some views on the subject.

It was agreed that the timing of any statement would be important and that the proper time would be when the German collapse seemed imminent or when some German outrage was threatened.

Treatment of Major War Criminals

Mr. Eden said that when this was discussed at Moscow in October Marshal Stalin had disagreed with our view favouring some summary executions and had said that some form of judicial procedure was necessary. The Prime Minister was still considering what the British attitude on this subject would be.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

	Present
General of the Army Marshall		Major General Wood
Fleet Admiral King		Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Major General Kuter		Brigadier General Cabell
Lieutenant General Somervell		Brigadier General Lindsay
Vice Admiral Cooke		Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Duncan		Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick		Colonel Peck
Major General Bull		Colonel Dean
Major General Anderson		Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull		Colonel Cary
	Secretariat
	Brigadier General McFarland
	Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Floriana, February 1, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

a. Approval of Minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting

General Kuter stated that his remarks on British participation in the VLR bombing of Japan had been omitted from the minutes of the preceding Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. Since then he had received a letter on this subject from Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the British Air Staff, which he had forwarded to General Arnold with certain comments of his own. He requested for the purpose of record, that his message to General Arnold (CRICKET 55, dated 1 February 1945), less the last sentence, be attached as an annex to the minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting, subject to the attachment requested by General Kuter.

b. Approval of Minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the CCS 184th Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

General Marshall said that the principal issue in this item was the transfer of the Twelfth Air Force. Air Marshal Portal had stated that he was opposed to leaving the adjustments to the theater commanders. General Marshall felt that it was undesirable to allow this matter to lapse and thus delay action on the transfer of ground forces. He proposed the substitution for paragraph 5, page 3 of CCS 773/1 of the following:

5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. Your recommendations are desired at once.

General Marshall said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide the overall strength that should be withdrawn from the Twelfth Air Force for use in France and that the details of the withdrawal should be left to negotiations between SCAEF and SACMED. He felt that it might be necessary to debate the necessity for a larger part of the air force remaining in an inactive theater.

Admiral King felt that the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean was considering the use of air in as great strength as possible in the event of a German withdrawal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend the substitution in the directive to SACMED of the new paragraph 5 proposed by General Marshall.

Provision of LVTs for Mediterranean

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

General Marshall said that this subject had been discussed in the preceding JCS meeting (185th Meeting, 1 February 1945). General Smith had exhibited charts which showed that very little progress had been made in the provision of equipment for the approved figure of 460,000 liberated manpower. He recalled that a possible reduction in this figure had been mentioned and invited any further remarks on the subject.

General Somervell said that General Smith had informed General Riddell-Webster that a figure of 400,000 liberated manpower instead of 460,000 would be acceptable. The British had found that certain items of equipment, particularly shoes, were in short supply. They would, however, be able to provide for the lower figure. The overall problem of supply was extremely difficult. The figure of 172,000 liberated manpower agreed at OCTAGON had gradually increased to an overall of 1,000,000. The British had increased their commitments which included the equipment of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and some of the liberated manpower. The supply can be accomplished but not in a reasonable length of time.

General Bull felt that the only satisfactory solution to the problem was to reduce the requirements to fit the supplies available. This was especially desirable in order to avoid the bad feeling which would result from the arousing of false hopes.

General Somervell added that it might be possible to meet the requirements in phases starting with the figure of 300,000 and completing the remainder subject to the availability of equipment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the foregoing statements.

U-Boat Threat

General Marshall said that the directive before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on countermeasures to the U-boat threat had been prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Item 6, CCS 184th Meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the directive drafted by the Secretaries.

Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/7, 746/8, 746/9, and 746/10)

General Marshall said that the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board had on their own initiative submitted in CCS 746/10 a supplementary report to CCS 746/6. He recommended approval subject to the deletion of the word “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of CCS 746/10 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall.

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwestern Europe

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)

General Marshall said that in CCS 775 the British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2 be reaffirmed subject to the amendment of paragraph h as indicated in this paper.

Admiral Duncan said that the Joint Staff Planners recommended the amendment of the first and last sentences of the paragraph in order to prevent the supply of liberated areas from being placed in the same category as the supply of allies such as France, Russia or China.

General Somervell explained that unless the last sentence of the proposed new paragraph is altered or deleted altogether, it will if accepted have the effect of giving first priority to shipping requirements for liberated areas. This would place shipments of civilian requirements ahead of British and American military requirements which, of course, could not be accepted. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the substitute paragraph subject to deletion of the last sentence. If the British would not accept deletion of the last sentence, the amendments proposed by Admiral Duncan might then be put forward as a compromise.

General Marshall suggested that the first line of the last sentence be deleted and that the phrase “without prejudice to the fulfillment of other basic undertakings” precede the words “to provide” in the remainder of the sentence.

After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that paragraph h be modified to read:

Provide assistance to each of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to apply this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Without prejudice to the fulfillment of the other basic undertakings to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity against Germany and Japan.

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall		Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell		Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith		Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke		General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick		Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull		General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson		Air Marshal Robb
Major General Hull		Major General Laycock
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
	Secretariat*
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Jacob
Captain Graves		Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
		Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

February 2, 1945
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 184th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale – a commitment which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as possible.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note that SCAEF’s requirements in liberated manpower could be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000.

b. Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841 upon assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation from London, this implementation would not:

1. Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of equipment, on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor

2. Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.

Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/8)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested the substitution of the word “some” for the word “present” in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 746/10. With regard to paragraph 6d, he felt that it should be made clear that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at ARGONAUT should be completed before the conference ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs should remain at CRICKET.

General Marshall suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word “programs” in paragraph 5b.

Turning to CCS 746/8, Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/10 subject to the substitution of “some” for “present” in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.

b. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of CCS 746/8 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following: “Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.”

c. Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT.

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwest Europe

Transfer of Tactical Air Forces from SACMED to SCAEF (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

General Marshall said that as he saw it the British proposal left the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should move to Northwest Europe, which was the decisive theater in which additional airpower would produce the most valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff’s desire to strengthen the northern thrust.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the offensive on the Western Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front.

General Marshall pointed out that there was considerable air strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the United States’ P-47s would be of the utmost help in cutting communications beyond the limits of the shorter-ranged British fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean.

There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph 2 of CCS 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups particularly required by General Eisenhower. He understood that such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers of the Twelfth Air Force.

General Marshall said he understood that the 6th Army Group was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.

General Kuter said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the main effort. All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when he required it.

General Marshall said that the French forces in the South were inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.

Sir Alan Brooke felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the Allied line in this sector would be very strong.

Field Marshal Alexander said he was anxious to retain the Twelfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air headquarters in southern France.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in CCS 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:

5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Provision of LVTs for the Mediterranean

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U-Boat Threat

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6b of the CCS 184th Meeting.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders (Subsequently circulated as CCS 774/3).

Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our operations based on that country.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph 6h of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776).

General Marshall explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.

General Somervell pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U.S. military manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included under the military shipping requirements.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.

Interim Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that paragraph 6h of CCS 776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still under discussion.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of CCS 746/10 was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6h of the interim report along the lines indicated in CCS 775.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.

[NormanStewart]

JCS to the President

Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
Nr: No #.

Top Secret memorandum for the President.

Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Law in their memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated areas made the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of the respective governments be ready to make recommendations to their heads of government at the coming conference concerning the allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting pressure against Japan, followed by concentration of full U.S.-U.K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.

The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.

The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has always been recognized and these are included under the theater commander’s military priorities. There is no doubt that more shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help out the liberated peoples. At best this could be only a trickle. The sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that considerations other than military may dictate some small allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority above everything but urgent military necessity.

Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
CCS 746/7

After considering CCS 746/6 the United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional relief supplies and home rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we can possibly give the populations of liberated territories in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as possible following out the overall objective which has been agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board Representatives in CCS 746/6 can gravely lower our military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory. The vital military point involved to the United States Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would almost certainly result from placing non-military requirements in a priority where they could compete with military needs essential to ending the global war successfully at the earliest date.

A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money and resources to the United States resulting from any prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much more than the actual number of days’ delay to a particular operation which would result from acceding to a demand for resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the British representatives of the combined military transportation committee that cuts in estimates for operations can be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U.S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a major cut below the theater commander’s minimum estimates. If anything the minimum U.S. military requirements may prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.

They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so overriding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.

Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:

Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.

It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:

A. First priority to

1. Military requirements (including civil relief) vital to the successful conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. This may include military lend-lease for existing forces engaged in operations.

2. Increasing the fighting forces of the United Nations in order to apply greater pressure against the Axis powers.

3. Civilian requirements that are vital to the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war-making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.

D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.

E. Requirements in higher priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower priorities.

F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.

G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.

H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 1, 1945
Secret
U.S. urgent

To the Secretary of State from Clayton.

Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control. On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and the United States of America signed an Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.

Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.

The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude towards the Shipping Agreement. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, has been to Stockholm to discuss the matter with Mr. Gunther, Swedish Foreign Minister, and subsequent thereto went to Moscow to discuss the matter.

Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador Winant is reported also inclined to this view. The consensus is that the Russians are suspicious of any arrangements which look like a combine of other powers with post-war implications, and are uncertain of their ability to maintain position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had relatively little experience. Another factor which may affect the Soviet attitude is the participation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Shipping Agreement.

It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and Great Britain should be made directly to Stalin to fully explain the Agreement, its intents and purposes, to clear up any misunderstandings. Through Mr. Harriman, Russia was kept informed of the preliminary negotiations and of the Agreement reached.

Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 1 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 775

Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2, paragraph 6, be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment.

For existing h. substitute the following:

h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger		Mrs. Oliver
Secretary Stettinius		Foreign Secretary Eden
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 6:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Fleet Admiral Leahy		Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall		Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter		Field Marshal Wilson
		General Ismay
	Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland		Major General Jacob

CCS Minutes

February 2, 1945
Top secret

The Meeting had under consideration an interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 776/1).

The President expressed his appreciation of the amount of progress which had been made in so short a time in the military discussions.

The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph.

a. Paragraph 6h
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that discussion was proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to be included in this paragraph.

General Marshall said that the wording proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff raised a new question which involved placing supplies for liberated areas, over and above those required for the prevention of disease and unrest, in the same category as operational requirements. This would entail a change in the general priority at the expense of essential military requirements, which the United States Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to accept.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the British import program would be affected. He pointed out that Great Britain had had less than half her pre-war imports for over five years, and he was afraid lest the requirements of liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements, would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped to import into Great Britain in 1945.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the wording of the proposed basic undertaking was still under discussion, and the matter was not submitted for consideration at the present meeting.

The Prime Minister, referring to paragraph 6f, thought that great efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the Dardanelles.

Admiral King said that this was all in hand and the first convoy was expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused by the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been ready to receive the supplies.

b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8)
The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet come to take drastic measures at the expense of other operations, though it might be necessary to do so if the U-boat campaign developed in the way expected.

c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10)
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that complete agreement had been reached on this question.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of having plenty of divisions available for the support of the main operation in the North, so that tired divisions could be replaced.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this had been allowed for. Ten divisions would be in reserve and available to replace tired divisions in the battle. Other divisions could also be taken from the less active parts of the front.

The Prime Minister inquired what action had been taken on SCAF 180.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had taken note of this telegram. General Bedell Smith had given further explanations of General Eisenhower’s proposed operations, and two further telegrams had been received from the latter. SCAF 180 should be read in the light of these additional explanations and telegrams.

The Prime Minister questioned the meaning of the words “to close the Rhine” which occurred in paragraph 10 of the report.

It was explained that these words were a quotation from General Eisenhower’s signal, and were understood to mean making contact with, or closing up to, the Rhine.

d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11, 12, and 13)
The President inquired whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that if the forces proposed were withdrawn from the Italian Front, enough troops would be left behind for the task in hand.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Field Marshal Alexander had been consulted and had agreed to the withdrawal of three divisions forthwith, and two further divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

The Prime Minister said that there should be no obligation to take forces away from Greece until the situation there admitted of their withdrawal. It was necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a broad-based government.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to paragraph 4 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Appendix “A” to the report), in which it was stated that further complete formations after the first three divisions would be sent as they could be released from Greece.

The Prime Minister said that he expected that by the time the first three divisions had moved it would be possible to start withdrawing troops from Greece. He was in full agreement with the course proposed, and was particularly glad that General Marshall had taken the view that Canadian and British troops should be withdrawn. There were special reasons for desiring the transfer to France of the Canadian Corps. He was also anxious that the British contribution to the heavy fighting which would be taking place in Northwest Europe should be as great as possible.

In reply to an inquiry by the President, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson said that he was in complete agreement with the course proposed.

With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, Sir Charles Portal explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that the move of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and proposals for further moves were to be made by the Supreme Commanders in consultation.

The Prime Minister agreed that it would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces from Italy, as to do so would be to relieve the Germans of an ever-present anxiety.

Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Prime Minister said that he attached great importance to a rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any surrender of the German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we should occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Russians.

Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, the Prime Minister said that he presumed that the phrase “the territory of Yugoslavia” should be interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of Yugoslavia. There were certain territories which were claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy and he was unwilling to give any suggestion of support to the claims of either side. For example, Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern Europe and the question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely reserved.

The President agreed and said that he was unwilling to see either the Yugoslavs or the Italians in complete control.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the phrase as used in the report applied to the present territory of Yugoslavia.

The War Against Japan

e. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (paragraphs 18 and 19)
The Prime Minister said that the main object of the operations to clear the enemy from Burma was to liberate the important army engaged there for further operations against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs had come to any conclusion on what these further operations should be.

Sir Alan Brooke referred to Appendix “C” of the report, which contained the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The directive gave as the next task the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca.

The Prime Minister hoped there would be time to review this matter in accordance with developments. For example, if the Japanese forces in Java or Sumatra were greatly weakened, small detachments might be able to go in and liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go where a good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the Japanese, particularly in the air, as this was the only way which the British had been able to discover of helping the main American operations in the Pacific.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Supreme Allied Commander was directed to submit his plans, and it would then be possible to review the matter.

The Prime Minister inquired whether paragraph 18 meant that there would be no help from United States air forces in operations in the Kra Peninsula, Malaya, et cetera.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any such help would be the subject of a separate agreement when the plan had been received.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the President had not been somewhat disappointed at the results achieved by the Chinese, having regard to the tremendous American efforts which had been made to give them support.

The President said that three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor.

General Marshall pointed out that the picture in China was now considerably changed. In the first place, certain well-trained Chinese troops were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma. Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first artillery for the Chinese Army had been able to go through. Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go well, additional trained Chinese troops could move back to China, and it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be in existence.

The Prime Minister said that it now appeared that the American and British operations in this part of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on into China and the British effort was turning to the south. He inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move of British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part in the operations there.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the facilities for sending equipment and supplies into China allowed of the support of Chinese forces, who required a considerably lower scale than British troops. These facilities certainly could not support British troops as well.

General Marshall agreed that the maintenance of British forces in China was not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead for critical operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps, which had a stiffening of United States personnel in their tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, et cetera, and there was an effective air force. These forces should now be able to insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they pleased in China. The aid which could be given by these forces to the American arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this way be initiated – one arm of the pincer being represented by the forces assaulting the selected spot on the Chinese Pacific Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the pincer would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm would be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the American main operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the Philippines had changed the picture in Southeast Asia, and would make further operations by Admiral Mountbatten’s forces much easier. He felt that it was important that Admiral Mountbatten should know what forces would be available to him in these operations, and that he should not plan on a false assumption. The American military authorities in Southeast Asia would know what United States forces could at any time not be supported logistically in China. These could be made available to Admiral Mountbatten in Burma. It might even be possible to bring air forces back from China for specific operations. Admiral Mountbatten should, however, be under no illusion as to what forces he could count on for his operations.

The Prime Minister repeated that if the Americans made any request for British troops to go into China, he would certainly be prepared to consider it.

Admiral Leahy said that all the transportation available was fully required for the forces now in China, or earmarked for China.

General Marshall agreed, and said that he did not think it would be practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had been secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only a very little in the way of equipping the Chinese ground army. Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs of the American air forces. It would now be possible to handle the requirements of the Chinese ground forces.

Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix “B,” which contained an outline of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific, the Prime Minister inquired whether it had been decided to delay the assault on Japan until after the close of the German war.

General Marshall said that this delay had been necessitated by the fact that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and service troops, could not be made available in sufficient quantities to enable the main operations against Japan to be carried out. If the German war had ended in December of 1944, it would have been possible to operate against Kyushu in the autumn of 1945. There were also certain seasonal limitations on operations in this area.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that such a great measure of agreement had been reached. He understood that the present report was merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast of the progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be rendered later.

The President agreed, and again expressed his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions, and Sir Alan Brooke explained that arrangements were being made to keep all the accommodations available at Malta so that the conference could be resumed there if necessary after the discussions with the Russians.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their agreement with this action, and said that although final plans need not be made until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at Malta on the return journey would be desirable.

The Meeting then adjourned.

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger		Mrs. Oliver
Secretary Stettinius		Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Byrnes
Fleet Admiral Leahy

[NormanStewart]

Log of the Trip

Friday, February 2, 1945

0000: In Mediterranean Sea, enroute Malta from Gibraltar, steaming on various courses and at various speeds while conforming to our prescribed routing.

0610: We sighted the island of Sicily, bearing 055, distant 50 miles.

0616: We sighted the islands of Goza and Malta, bearing 115, distant 32 miles.

0935: We passed through the submarine net gate and entered Grand Harbor, Valetta, Malta. The President was on deck as we entered port. From the very large crowd evident, it appeared that all Malta was out to greet him. Both sides of the channel were lined with people of Malta.

1001: The Quincy moored, starboard side to, at Berth 9 in Grand Harbor, Valetta. The USS Memphis (light cruiser and flagship of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, Commander Eighth Fleet) was present in Malta. Prime Minister Churchill and his party were at Grand Harbor and witnessed our arrival from the deck of the HMS Sirius (light cruiser), moored across the channel from where the Quincy tied up.

Total distance steamed, Newport News to Malta, 4883 miles.

Colonel Park and the following listed members of our advance party were awaiting us on the dock at Grand Harbor and joined us as soon as the Quincy had been moored: Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Holmes, Mr. Wood and Mr. O’Driscoll.

A few days before our arrival at Malta we began to receive disconcerting messages from the Prime Minister about the difficulties of reaching Yalta and the unhealthy living conditions there. The first gun came from Mr. Hopkins who stated, “He (the Prime Minister) says that if we had spent ten years on research we could not have found a worse place in the world than Yalta… He claims it is good for typhus and deadly lice which thrive in those parts.” This was followed by other messages from the Prime Minister, who reported the drive from the airfield at Saki to Yalta as being six hours, instead of two hours as originally reported by Mr. Harriman; and that one of his people had reported the mountain part of the drive as frightening and at times impassable, and the health conditions as wholly unsanitary, as the Germans had left all buildings infested with vermin. It was, therefore, a great relief upon arriving at Malta to find from Mr. Harriman and members of our advance party (headed by Colonel Park) that although we would face a difficult drive after landing at the airport at Saki, it would not be too tiring if completed during daylight and if we had clear weather. We were also informed that the medical officers of the USS Catoctin had accomplished a very effective job of debugging at Yalta.

1020: Secretary of State Stettinius, Ambassador Harriman, and Mr. Hopkins came on board the Quincy to confer with the President. Sergeant Robert Hopkins came on board with his father, Mr. Harry L. Hopkins. Sergeant Hopkins had joined his father at Paris.

1042: His Excellency, the Governor-General of Malta (Lieutenant General Sir Edmond Schreiber) came on board the Quincy and called on the President. The President was on deck (port side, first superstructure deck) at the time, enjoying the warm sun. He received all his distinguished guests there during the forenoon.

1052: Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, came on board and called on the President.

1107: General of the Army George C. Marshall came on board and called on the President. A short time later Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King called and he and Fleet Admiral Leahy joined the President and General Marshall in a conference.

1143: Admiral Harold R. Stark, USN (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe) and Vice Admiral Hewitt came on board and called on the President.

1148: Prime Minister Churchill and his daughter, Section Officer Sarah Oliver (WAAF), came on board the Quincy and called on the President.

1155: The Right Honorable Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, came on board and called on the President.

1300: The President entertained at lunch in his quarters aboard the Quincy. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

1415: The Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber and Miss Schreiber came on board and called on the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

1430: Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, USN (Ret.), Director of War Shipping Administration, came on board and called on the President.

1443: The President, the Governor-General, Mrs. Schreiber, Miss Schreiber, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger left the ship for a 30-mile auto drive about the Island of Malta. They visited the countryside and the towns of Medina, Chajn Tuffieha and Valetta. The Prime Minister left the ship at the same time but did not accompany the President on the drive. The President rode in the car with the Governor-General, while the ladies followed in a second car. During the course of the drive Palace Square in Valetta was visited and the President was shown the stone replica of the scroll that he presented to the people of Malta on his previous visit, December 8, 1943. The replica is mounted in the side of the Palace building, near the main entrance.

To those of us who had been with the President on his previous visit, the many signs of rebuilding were most evident all about the island.

The weather was delightful. The average temperature was 58.

1625: The President and Mrs. Boettiger returned to the ship from their drive.

1630: The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff came on board and the President met with them in his quarters. Present were: Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King and Major General L. S. Kuter (representing General of the Army H. H. Arnold who was ill and did not attend this conference), and the President.

1800: The Prime Minister, accompanied by the members of the British Staff, came on board. The President then met with the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (American and British) in his cabin. Present were: The President, the Prime Minister, Fleet Admiral Leahy, General of the Army Marshall, Fleet Admiral King, Major General Kuter, Field Marshal H. Maitland Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F. A. Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. B. Cunningham, General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, and Major General Jacob. Major Randolph Churchill came on board with his father but did not attend the meeting. The meeting adjourned at 1850. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been in conference at Malta for several days prior to our arrival and this was the first plenary meeting with the President and the Prime Minister.

2000: The President was host at dinner in his quarters. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mrs. Oliver and Mrs. Boettiger.

2215: The Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and Mrs. Oliver left the ship.

2230: Lieutenant (jg) A. L. Conrad, USNR, special courier, left the ship with White House mail to proceed to Washington via air transportation.

2300: The President and members of his party left the Quincy by automobile for the Luqa Airfield, Malta. On arrival at the airfield, they embarked in assigned aircraft to await scheduled departure times. The entire British and American delegations to the Conference at Yalta were on the move and departed from Malta during the night. This involved approximately 700 people, so that the Luqa airport was a very busy place throughout the night. Commencing at about 2330, huge planes took off at about 10-minute intervals all night long. The Air Transport Command aircraft specially fitted for the President’s use was used by the President for all flights on this cruise. It has private quarters for the President and an elevator which lowers to ground level to facilitate his embarking and disembarking.

The President turned in at once as his plane was not scheduled to take off until 0330 tomorrow.

2330: Colonel Park, Commander Clark, Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Chief Warrant Officer Cornelius, departed Malta for Saki, USSR. They were embarked in the State Department plane.

2345: The special cargo aircraft transporting our heavy baggage and freight departed Malta for Saki. Embarked were Agents Dorsey and Williams and Messmen Estrada, Calinao, Floresca and Sarate. Air Transport Command planes were used exclusively by the American delegation.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (February 3, 1945)

Neuer Riesenbetrug am deutschen Volk geplant

Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill wollen Wilson-Schwindel übertrumpfen

vb. Berlin, 2. Februar – Seit einem halben Jahr planen die Feindmächte eine Neuauflage des Teheraner Dreiertreffens. Nunmehr sind Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill an einem geheimgehaltenen Ort zu einer solchen Konferenz zusammengetreten.

Alle Meldungen der feindlichen Presse stimmen darin überein, dass die drei Hauptkriegsschuldigen sich vor allem mit Deutschland beschäftigen wollen, und dass dabei wieder der alte Plan hervorgeholt worden ist, den berüchtigten Wilson-Betrug von 1918 zu wiederholen und das deutsche Volk durch plumpe Agitationskniffe über die tatsächlichen Kriegsziele der drei großen Räuber hinwegzutäuschen.

Obwohl sie selbst unablässig von der „unbedingten Kapitulation“ sprechen und die Zerstückelung des Reiches sowie eine weitgehende Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes zu offiziellen Kriegszielen erhoben haben, wollen sie es trotzdem wagen, einen solchen Versuch zur Zermürbung des deutschen Kampfwillens zu unternehmen, weil sie erkennen müssen, dass sie den Krieg auf dem Schlachtfeld nicht gewinnen können.

Wer einen solchen Betrug ins Auge fasst, gesteht damit ein, dass er mit seinem Latein völlig zu Ende ist. Ein Teil des deutschen Volkes hat sich 1918 durch das 14-Punkte-Programm Wilsons in seinem Kampfgeist erschüttern lassen und geglaubt, dass man tatsächlich nach der Niederlegung der Waffen einen erträglichen Frieden erhalten werde. Ausdrücklich hatten sich alle Alliierte durch die Note vom 5. November 1918 dazu verpflichtet, Frieden auf der Grundlage der 14 Punkte zu schließen. Nicht ein einziger dieser Punkte ist eingehalten worden, nachdem Deutschland kapituliert hatte. Man hat rein deutsche Gebiete vom Reichskörper losgerissen, ungeheure Tribute gefordert und das Versailler Diktat darauf abgestellt, das deutsche Volk bis aufs Blut zu demütigen und sein Leben zu vergiften.

Diesem Betrug folgte ein zweiter. Vor der Unterzeichnung des Diktats wurde den deutschen Unterhändlern von englischen und amerikanischen Mittelsmännern gesagt, sie sollten ruhig unterschreiben, weil dafür Sorge getragen würde, die Durchführung des Diktats verständnisvoll zu handhaben und seine schlimmsten Bedingungen zu revidieren.

Nichts von alledem ist geschehen! Das Versailler Diktat ist auf das brutalste durchgeführt worden und es gibt zahlreiche Fälle, in denen über seine Bestimmungen noch weit hinausgegangen worden ist deutsche Soldaten, die heldenmütig für ihr Volk gekämpft hatten, mussten als „Kriegsverbrecher“ von deutschen Gerichten verurteilt werden. Deutschland wurde völlig wehrlos gemacht, seine Währung künstlich zerstört, seine Wirtschaft ruiniert und zur Beute ausländischer, meist jüdischer Schieber, gemacht. Das war eine Bilanz, die selbst jene feigen Verräternaturen belehrte die bei der Unterzeichnung des Diktats gemeint hatten, es werde „alles nicht so schlimm kommen.“

1918 war das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker proklamiert worden, aber es galt nicht für die Deutschen. Millionen von ihnen kamen unter Fremdherrschaft, andere Millionen wurden zu einem kleinstaatlichen Hungersdasein in dem österreichischen Reststaat verurteilt. 40 Millionen Franzosen vermaßen sich, die Vorherrschaft auf einem Kontinent auszuüben, dessen 80 Millionen starkes deutsches Volk zu dauernder Nichtigkeit verurteilt werden sollte.

Betrug reihte sich also an Betrug, und es war nur selbstverständlich, dass sich die „Sieger“ von 1919 niemals an das Abrüstungsversprechen von Versailles hielten, das sie nach erfolgter deutscher Entwaffnung erfüllen sollten. Als nach endlosen Verhandlungen, im Jahre 1933 eine Klärung erfolgte, ergab sich als Herzenswunsch der alten Ententegenossen folgendes Bild:

Sie selbst wollten gerüstet bleiben und Deutschland sollte weiter verboten sein, eine wirksame Landesverteidigung aufzubauen. Deutschland, so forderten sie, müsse erst eine längere „Bewährungsfrist“ durchmachen, ehe es sich einige moderne Waffen zulegen dürfe.

Als Wilson im Jänner 1918 die 14 Punkte verkündet hatte, besaßen die anderen Alliierten noch kein festes Kriegszielprogramm, obwohl sie in mehreren Geheimabkommen weitgehende Raubpläne verfolgten. Diesmal aber liegen die Dinge ganz anders.

Ihr Programm: Vernichtung

Die Bolschewisten, die Amerikaner und die Briten mögen in vielen Punkten verschiedene Anschauungen vertreten, soweit sich ihre Weltherrschaftsansprüche überschneiden, aber in einem sind sie sich völlig einig: in einem abgrundtiefen und vernichtungswütigen Hass gegen das deutsche Volk, der von den jüdischen Drahtziehern eifrig geschürt wird, in dem Willen, dass aus diesem Krieg kein Deutschland mehr hervorgehen dürfe, das irgendwann noch mehr bedeuten könne, als ein halbkoloniales Anhängsel dieser oder jener Weltmacht, ob sie nun im Zeichen von Hammer und Sichel steht oder als Ausbeutungsobjekt der Wall Street ausgeliefert ist – in beiden Fällen dem triumphierenden Judentum zum Fraß vorgeworfen.

Es ist völlig gleichgültig, in welchen Abschattierungen die Absicht, Deutschland auszutilgen, sich bekundet, wie weit der Schlächterwahn Oberwiegt oder die Gier nach auszubeutenden Arbeitssklaven, oder welche Daseinsformen dieser oder Jener Partner einem zerbrochenen und zerfetzten Deutschland aufzwingen möchte. Im Endergebnis kommt überall das gleiche heraus: Zerstören, ausmorden, ausplündern. versklaven und entehren!

Es ist wohl beispiellos in der gesamten Geschichte, dass unter solchen Umständen überhaupt daran gedacht wird, den alten Betrug von 1918 wieder aufzuwärmen. Aber tatsächlich geht man schon seit der ersten Konferenz in Quebec im August 1943 mit diesem Gedanken um und hat ihn nur deshalb noch nicht in die Wirklichkeit umgesetzt, weil man durch militärische Teilerfolge in dem Wahn bestärkt wurde, man könne das Reich militärisch in die Knie zwingen. Allen Ernstes erwartete man damals, nach Italien werde auch Deutschland kapitulieren und es würde sich in Berlin genau wiederholen, was sich in Rom ereignet hatte.

Das deutsche Volk ist aber entgegen allen Hoffnungen seiner Feinde in den schweren Wechselfällen der letzten beiden Jahre nur noch härter und noch entschlossener geworden, sich in diesem Kampf auf Leben und Tod siegreich durchzusetzen und sein Lebensrecht für alle Zeiten zu sichern. Es war eine besonders bittere Enttäuschung für die Kriegsverbrecher in Moskau, Washington und London, dass der 20. Juli 1944 zu einem völlig anderen Ergebnis führte, als sie sich das erträumt hatten. Und ebenso haben die massierten Stürme auf unsere Fronten im Westen und Osten wohl Gelände gewinnen können, den deutschen Kampfwillen aber zu keiner Zeit geschwächt, sondern in Stunden sichtbarer Gefahr so sichtbar gesteigert, dass man draußen an einer Erkenntnis nicht vorbeikommt:

Das deutsche Volk kapituliert niemals

Sie möchten sich daher an uns mit einem Aufruf wenden, diese drei, die jetzt irgendwo zusammenhocken und darüber brüten, ob sich der deutsche Block nicht doch von innen hersprengen ließe, wenn der Druck von außen her ein solches Ergebnis nicht verspreche.

Roosevelt und Churchill haben es zuerst im August 1941 mit der Atlantik-Charta versucht, in einer Zeit, da das äußere Bild des Krieges keineswegs günstig für die Briten und Bolschewisten war. Inzwischen ist dieses Papier längst bis zur Unkenntlichkeit vergilbt und in den Washingtoner Archiven unauffindbar verkramt worden. Das war nur selbstverständlich, denn seine Unterzeichner haben nie ernstlich daran gedacht, der Welt einen Frieden £u geben, der diesen Namen wirklich verdient. Was sie 1919 nicht zustandebrachten, können sie heute natürlich erst recht nicht leisten. Was ihnen im eigenen Land nicht gelingt, können sie erst recht der Welt nicht bringen.

Zwei Jahre später überwog in Teheran bereits die reine Gewaltpolitik Stalinscher Prägung und Churchill und Roosevelt atmeten erleichtert auf, dass sie auf diese Weise von ihren verlogenen Deklamationen auf dem Atlantik loskamen. Inzwischen ist alles sehr viel klarer und deutlicher hervorgetreten: Die Völker Europas wurden unzweideutig an die Sowjets verschachert, England und Amerika haben über ihr Schicksal nichts mehr mitzureden und müssen sich mit der Rolle eines Zutreibers für Moskau begnügen, wofür sie ein Trinkgeld in Gestalt umfangreicher bolschewistischer Warenbestellungen nach dem Kriege erwarten. Am Rande dieser Konferenz bewegt sich der Pariser Filialleiter des Kremls, der seine Befehle von Stalin schon erhalten hat, zugleich mit dem Versprechen, dass die Gaullisten ihren Hass gegen Deutschland zur Genüge austoben dürften.

De Gaulles Außenminister hat schon bei der Rückkehr aus Moskau klipp und klar gesagt, dass die Sowjets Frankreich das Rheinland und Westfalen zuschanzen wollten, wie sie dem Lubliner Polensowjet den größten Teil Ostdeutschlands zugesprochen haben. Hier wie dort hat Churchill seinen Segen bereits erteilt, und Roosevelt wird zweifellos das gleiche tun. Von dieser Basis aus also möchte man das deutsche Volk anreden. Welche Worte man wählen wird, wird sich zeigen, wahrheitsgemäß müsste man ungefähr folgendes sagen:

Legt die Waffen nieder, damit wir euch fressen können! Tretet die Hälfte eures Volksbodens ab, dann dürft ihr auch damit rechnen, dass nur die Hälfte von euch massakriert wird und die andere Hälfte ihr Dasein in Sklaverei fristen darf. Am besten erreicht ihr das dadurch, dass ihr eure Einigkeit aufgebt, denn niemals wart ihr schwächer und missachteter als in den Zeiten der Zersplitterung und Uneinigkeit. Lasst euch durch britische Gouvernanten und amerikanische Soldateska umerziehen, damit ihr recht schnell ein Volk von erbärmlichen Duckmäusern werdet, das nicht mehr gegen den Stachel zu lecken wagt.

So etwa müsste dieser Aufruf lauten, wenn er einigermaßen der Wahrheit entspräche. Sollte man aber wieder zur Wilson-Tonart übergehen, so hieße das dem deutschen Volk eine politische Instinktlosigkeit unterstellen, wie sie möglicherweise Briten und Amerikaner gegenüber den Sowjets besitzen, die aber sonst wohl auf dem ganzen Erdball nirgendwo angetroffen werden kann.

Mit dem Betrug von 1919 im Gedächtnis und all die wahnwitzigen Vernichtungspläne, vor Augen, die als derartige Vernichtungsprogramme vorgelegt werden, lässt sich das deutsche Volk nicht betrügen. Unter tatkräftiger Führung ist es vor zwölf Jahren mit dem größten Erfolg daran gegangen, Deutschland aus hoffnungslosem Verfall emporzureißen und das matte Herz Europas wieder zum Schlagen zu bringen. Es hat auf allen Gebieten Beispielhaftes geleistet, ist mit sozialen Fragen fertig geworden, deren Tragweite in England und Amerika heute noch nicht einmal begriffen wird. Es hat den Krieg mit gesundem politischem Sinn und einem. Opfermut ohnegleichen und mit heldenhafter Tapferkeit durchgestanden und ist in klarer Erkenntnis seiner Aufgaben und Ziele unbeugsam entschlossen, durch alle Prüfungen hindurch den Sieg zu erringen.

Dumm und unverschämt

Ein solches Volk von außen her anreden zu wollen, ist nicht nur dumm, sondern von einer so plumpen Unverschämtheit, dass dahinter der vorwärtspeitschende Zwang zum Handeln sichtbar wird. Zu einem solchen schamlosen Hausieren, zu einem derartigen kindischen Versuch, in einem großen Volk kleine Gefühle erwecken zu wollen, greift nur der, der es dringend nötig hat.

Wir kennen den Vernichtungswillen des Feindes, aber wir wissen ebenso gut, dass auch bei ihm nur mit Wasser gekocht wird. Wir kennen die Grenzen seiner Macht und seiner Leistungskraft und sind uns bewusst, dass hier schon weithin ein Höchstmaß erreicht ist, das nicht mehr übersteigert werden kann. So begreifen wir sehr wohl, dass es ihm dringend darum zu tun ist, weitere Blutopfer zu sparen, die fortschreitende Zerrüttung des eigenen nationalen Gefüges aufzuhalten und möglichst schnell zu einem Frieden zu kommen, ehe sich die Fragwürdigkeit des eigenen politischen Daseins allzu deutlich erweist.

In dieser Lage sollten selbst jene drei, mögen sie in Moskau sitzen oder sonstwo, begreifen, dass sie sich mit ihren Plänen, soweit sie das deutsche Volk betreffen, nur lächerlich machen werden. Was sie in Wirklichkeit zu bieten haben, wissen wir genau: Genickschüsse, Fesseln, Hunger, Not und Seuchen. Mögen sie ruhig glauben, dass sie einen Keil zwischen Führung und Volk treiben könnten, indem sie ein paar belanglose Floskeln zu Papier bringen, sie dürfen gewiss sein, dass sie damit ihren früheren Enttäuschungen die allergrimmigste hinzufügen werden und dass ihnen auch mit der Waffe die Antwort zuteilwerden wird, die dieser Herausforderung entspricht.

Nur mit Verachtung wird das deutsche Volk dieses plumpe Manöver zur Kenntnis nehmen und daraus den Schluss ziehen, dass der Gegner, der zu solchen schäbigen Mitteln greift, selbst nicht mehr an seine Sache glaubt. Umso fanatischer und zielbewusster werden wir für Leben und Freiheit welterkämpfen, und es wird sich dann zeigen, ob wir es am Kriegsende auf der Gegenseite noch mit jenen drei zu tun haben, die ihre Völker und die ganze Erde in ein Meer von Blut und Brand gestürzt haben, und deren Verbrechen Sühne fordert, wenn es noch eine höhere Gerechtigkeit gibt.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 3, 1945)

‘Big Three’ reported studying armistice terms for Nazis

South Russia suggested as meeting place for Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin

LONDON, England (UP) – President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Joseph Stalin were believed studying armistice terms for Germany today at their “Big Three” conference.

There were a number of signs that the long-awaited meeting had finally begun, with the approval of terms for a defeated Reich the most urgent item on the agenda.

Though official secrecy cloaked the site of the meeting, unconfirmed reports placed it somewhere in southern Russia.

A Tokyo broadcast, however, said the three Allied leaders were “reportedly” in session in Cairo.

The Jap-controlled Singapore radio guessed the meeting was being held at a “Romanian Black Sea port.”

The European Advisory Commission was understood to have drafted armistice terms for Germany for final approval of Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin. Washington sources said the terms were put in textual form and initialed by the commission some weeks ago.

The nature of the terms was kept secret. As in the case of Italy, they probably will not be published immediately, if at all.

While there was no indication of impending German collapse, it was believed the “Big Three” wished to be prepared in the event that the Germans decide to capitulate when the Red Army reaches Berlin.

The lightning-like Soviet drive into eastern Germany gave the armistice question precedence over pressing political problems affecting Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.

The German press saw the meeting as a prelude to an Allied propaganda campaign to break Germany’s morale and hasten her surrender. Headlines in Berlin newspapers warned the German people against listening to surrender demands.

Adolf Hitler’s newspaper Voelkischer Beobachter carried a banner headline asserting that a “gigantic deceit is planned,” while the Nachtausgabe saw a “new big humbug maneuver” in the making.

[NormanStewart]

Editorial: Stalin, Junkers and peace

The most important issue before the Big Three meeting is security through international organization versus security through balance of power. The United States wants the former. Russia has been acting for the latter. Britain goes along with Russia one minute, and the next yearns for better protection than her old system.

At the heart of the problem, of course, is Germany. there will be no enduring peace after Nazi defeat if German militarism can revive, as after World War I. Hence the necessity of making German demilitarization realty effective this time, and of creating healthy conditions under which the European people – including the Germans – will develop toward self-rule rather than another frustrate brand of totalitarianism.

At the Big Three meeting President Roosevelt will have two aces. One is the superior economic, financial, naval and airpower of the United States in the post-war world. The other is the willingness of the United States – including the Republicans, as represented by Sen. Vandenberg – to enter a peacetime military alliance to enforce Axis demilitarization, provided Russia and Britain will accept a genuine international organization instead of their balance of power system.

Marshal Stalin, however, also has aces. He has the biggest land power of the world in the strategic center of the Euro-Asian continents. In Eastern Europe, he has established a solid belt of puppet governments from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, with the exception of Greece – if that is an exception in the end. In Western Europe he has a separate post-war alliance with France.

Moreover, Stalin has a “Free Germany Committee” of Junker marshals and generals ready to rule the Reich after Nazi defeat, if he so decides – as he has used the Hungarian generals for his regime in that country. This would be the opposite of demilitarization; it would perpetuate the caste which always has been the heart and brain of German militarism. As long ago as Nov. 6, 1942, Stalin state publicly:

It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that this is impossible in regard to Germany, ass it is in regard to Russia, but it is also inadvisable from the point of view of the future.

Stalin’s diplomatic achievement in Europe to date is equaled only by his military success, which grows by the hour. How is Russia’s vast power to be used? We assume Stalin’s purpose is Russian security and prosperity

But we question the ability of Stalin or any other leader, no matter how powerful his nation, to obtain world peace through this sphere of influence system – much less to build a peaceful or a free Germany around the Junkers militarists. The Junkers always will find some Hitlerian demagog as a partner; and they not only will destroy world peace again, but also, if necessary, betray their Russian friends as they did in 1941. Unless, that is, the Allies this time wipe out German militarism completely along with Nazism, as they are pledged to do.

So, we hope that President Roosevelt in this meeting can persuade Stalin that an international security organization which makes the settlements and enforces them – in Germany and Eastern Europe as elsewhere – is a better bet in the long run for Russia than settlements dictated by the Kremlin and dependent on puppets. Secretary of State Hull persuaded him of that at the Moscow conference, when Stalin promised to give up his one-man settlements and his “Free Germany Committee” in favor of Big Three cooperation in a free international organization.

But this time the agreement must last.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 3, 1945)

Log of the Trip

Saturday, February 3, 1945

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1210: The President’s plane (#1), escorted by five fighters, arrived at Saki [in the Crimea]. The fighters had joined the flight at Athens. A sixth P-38 had to turn back to Athens because of engine trouble.

At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Stettinius and Ambassador Harriman. It was explained that Marshal Stalin had not yet arrived in the Crimea.

The President did not leave his plane at once but remained embarked until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.

Distance traveled, Malta to Saki, 1375 miles.

We were met at Saki by Agents Rowley, Peterson, Deckard, Campion, Savage and Griffith, members of our advance party.

1230: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime Minister disembarked and came over to the President’s plane. The President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band playing the Star-Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Third Internationale. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister. The President took the review while seated in the jeep.

1306: The ceremonies at the airport over, the President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia Palace, near Yalta, some 80 miles distant. Mrs. Boettiger rode with the President. All automobiles used in our caravan were furnished by the Soviet Government and were operated by Russian drivers.

The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West. We saw few, if any, trees and many reminders of the recent fighting there – gutted-out buildings, burned out tanks and destroyed German railroad rolling stock that had been abandoned and burned by them in their flight.

From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the “Route Romanoff” to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the west side of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea – 5,055 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (4,760 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.

1750: We passed through the city of Yalta.

1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference. Miss Kathleen Harriman (daughter of Ambassador Harriman) was at Livadia to greet the President and Mrs. Boettiger.

We were all very tired, so it was a case of bathing, dining and to bed for us this evening.

The Prime Minister’s party proceeded separately from the President’s and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.

Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Mr. Cornelius had arrived at Livadia several hours before us and had our map room and communications center set up and in operation when the President arrived. Commander Smith had been at Livadia for several days. He had come to the Crimea in the Catoctin.

2100: Lieutenant Bogue, who had remained behind at Malta to handle any last-minute communications for our party and had left Malta on one of the last planes of our flight, arrived at Livadia, completing the arrival of our party.

The U.S. minesweepers Pinnacle and Implicit were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The naval auxiliary Catoctin, the liberty ship William Blount and the minesweepers Incessant and Incredible were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 80 miles to the southwest. The Soviet authorities had declined to permit the Catoctin or the William Blount to continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of the Black Sea. This task group had been sailed from the Mediterranean Area some ten days previously in order to be on hand to furnish miscellaneous services to the American Delegation at Yalta. These ships were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the present war and they opened communications with Sevastopol and Yalta.

Because the Catoctin could not come to Yalta, or closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by landline (teletype) with the Catoctin which vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the conference. For the first few days we experienced “wire trouble” between Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communication engineers eventually laid an entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further wire trouble was experienced.

Yalta
Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1928 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley of the river Utchan-Su and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold blasts headed that way and permits the warm sun to exert its full effect in and around Yalta. The mean annual temperature there is 56.65. The thermometer hovered around 40 during our visit but it was not at all uncomfortable.

Livadia Palace
The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palace of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Svitski Korpus.

After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tubercular patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) at the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President’s bedroom.

The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in completely renovating the place during the three weeks period immediately preceding the conference; amazing because of the critical shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other Soviet cities or from local sanitoria and rest homes. It should be added here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Backus, MC-V(S), USNR, and Lieutenant T. W. Sullivan, MC-V(S), USNR, (both from the USS Catoctin) did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an infested building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.

The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white Inkerman granite in 1911, in the style of the Italian renaissance, from plans by the architect Krasnov. It stands on the site of the former palace which, except for the church, had been entirely demolished. Situated more than 150 feet above the sea, it commands a striking panorama of the mountains and the sea to the east and north. Wings extend from the rear of the main building to form two courts, one modeled after the Convent Court of St. Mark (Florence, Italy), and the other is of Moorish design.

The first floor of the 50-room palace was used by Nicholas and his son, Alexi, for living quarters. The left wing, facing the sea, contained the Czar’s study and bedroom. The room used as the President’s private dining room was formerly a billiard room. The large room used as the main conference room was the ballroom-banquet hall.

The second floor was used principally by the Czarina and her four daughters. The room occupied by General Marshall was formerly the Imperial bedroom and that used by Admiral King was the Czarina’s boudoir. The second-floor conference hall was formerly a private reception room of the Czarina. The second-floor dining room was a private sitting room used only by the Czar’s family.

The parks and gardens, which stretch down to the seaside, contain fifteen miles of paths and lanes lined with cypress, cedar, yew and bay trees. There are many rare and beautiful plants and trees in the parks, brought there from all over the world by Count Potocki and the Romanov family during the Nineteenth and early part of the Twentieth Centuries.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 4, 1945)

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy		Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
General of the Army Marshall		Brigadier General Lindsay
Fleet Admiral King		Brigadier General Bessell
Major General Kuter		Brigadier General Everest
Lieutenant General Somervell		Commodore Burrough
Vice Admiral Cooke		Colonel Peck
Major General Deane		Colonel Ritchie
Major General Bull		Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull		Colonel Cary
Major General Wood
Rear Admiral Duncan
Rear Admiral McCormick
Rear Admiral Olsen		Commander Clark
Brigadier General Roberts
	Secretariat
	Brigadier General McFarland
	Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Yalta, February 4, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

Agenda for Tripartite Discussions at Argonaut (JCS 1176/9, JCS 1227/3 and JCS Info. Memo 359)

Admiral Leahy said that there had not been time to study the papers before the meeting and asked for a summary.

Admiral Cooke explained that the Joint Staff Planners and the members of the U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, had met to bring up to date all matters dealing with negotiations with the Russians. These discussions had resulted in the circulation of JCS 1176/9 and JCS 1227/3. He said that the two major items to be considered were:

1. coordination with the Russians in the matter of operations in the field;
2. negotiations with the Russians concerning Far Eastern matters.

The first item involved British, U.S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U.S. and the USSR. This matter has been the subject of examination by the special U.S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.

The papers before the Chiefs were presented by the Planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.

The agenda items listed in Appendix “A” in JCS 1227/3 have been presented to the Soviets and the British. To date no answer has been received from the Soviets.

In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Deane expressed the opinion that the Soviets would withhold their views on the agenda until they met in formal tripartite session. The Russian military staff would be adequately represented at such a meeting and having already received the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the agenda items, they would be prepared to discuss them.

General Marshall said it was important to keep the consideration of military matters alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.

Admiral King felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.

Admiral Cooke said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff a rather free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U.S. staffs. Further, it was felt by the Planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Military Missions to Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.

General Marshall felt that the first and important step should be to inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix “A” and “B” of JCS 1227/3.

Admiral Leahy said that he would undertake to do this.

Admiral King emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.

Admiral Leahy said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be briefed on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions.

---

JCS to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army

Yalta, 3 February 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for General Antonov

It is the desire of the American Staff to discuss with the Soviet Staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?