A Nazi’s spirit rises – and falls!
Diary of a German in the Ardennes
Joy is unbounded till Yanks hit back
By B. J. McQuaid
…
A Nazi’s spirit rises – and falls!
‘Pussyfoot’ Johnson, leader in Prohibition era, dies
82-year-old crusader carried on his fight in U.S. as well as foreign countries
…
U.S. State Department (February 3, 1945)
Log of the Trip
Saturday, February 3, 1945
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1210: The President’s plane (#1), escorted by five fighters, arrived at Saki [in the Crimea]. The fighters had joined the flight at Athens. A sixth P-38 had to turn back to Athens because of engine trouble.
At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Stettinius and Ambassador Harriman. It was explained that Marshal Stalin had not yet arrived in the Crimea.
The President did not leave his plane at once but remained embarked until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.
Distance traveled, Malta to Saki, 1375 miles.
We were met at Saki by Agents Rowley, Peterson, Deckard, Campion, Savage and Griffith, members of our advance party.
1230: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime Minister disembarked and came over to the President’s plane. The President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band playing the Star-Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Third Internationale. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister. The President took the review while seated in the jeep.
1306: The ceremonies at the airport over, the President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia Palace, near Yalta, some 80 miles distant. Mrs. Boettiger rode with the President. All automobiles used in our caravan were furnished by the Soviet Government and were operated by Russian drivers.
The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West. We saw few, if any, trees and many reminders of the recent fighting there – gutted-out buildings, burned out tanks and destroyed German railroad rolling stock that had been abandoned and burned by them in their flight.
From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the “Route Romanoff” to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the west side of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea – 5,055 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (4,760 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.
1750: We passed through the city of Yalta.
1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference. Miss Kathleen Harriman (daughter of Ambassador Harriman) was at Livadia to greet the President and Mrs. Boettiger.
We were all very tired, so it was a case of bathing, dining and to bed for us this evening.
The Prime Minister’s party proceeded separately from the President’s and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.
Commander Tyree, Major Putnam and Mr. Cornelius had arrived at Livadia several hours before us and had our map room and communications center set up and in operation when the President arrived. Commander Smith had been at Livadia for several days. He had come to the Crimea in the Catoctin.
2100: Lieutenant Bogue, who had remained behind at Malta to handle any last-minute communications for our party and had left Malta on one of the last planes of our flight, arrived at Livadia, completing the arrival of our party.
The U.S. minesweepers Pinnacle and Implicit were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The naval auxiliary Catoctin, the liberty ship William Blount and the minesweepers Incessant and Incredible were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 80 miles to the southwest. The Soviet authorities had declined to permit the Catoctin or the William Blount to continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of the Black Sea. This task group had been sailed from the Mediterranean Area some ten days previously in order to be on hand to furnish miscellaneous services to the American Delegation at Yalta. These ships were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the present war and they opened communications with Sevastopol and Yalta.
Because the Catoctin could not come to Yalta, or closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by landline (teletype) with the Catoctin which vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the conference. For the first few days we experienced “wire trouble” between Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communication engineers eventually laid an entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further wire trouble was experienced.
Yalta
Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1928 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley of the river Utchan-Su and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold blasts headed that way and permits the warm sun to exert its full effect in and around Yalta. The mean annual temperature there is 56.65. The thermometer hovered around 40 during our visit but it was not at all uncomfortable.
Livadia Palace
The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palace of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Svitski Korpus.
After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tubercular patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) at the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President’s bedroom.
The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in completely renovating the place during the three weeks period immediately preceding the conference; amazing because of the critical shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other Soviet cities or from local sanitoria and rest homes. It should be added here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant Commander L. H. Backus, MC-V(S), USNR, and Lieutenant T. W. Sullivan, MC-V(S), USNR, (both from the USS Catoctin) did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an infested building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.
The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white Inkerman granite in 1911, in the style of the Italian renaissance, from plans by the architect Krasnov. It stands on the site of the former palace which, except for the church, had been entirely demolished. Situated more than 150 feet above the sea, it commands a striking panorama of the mountains and the sea to the east and north. Wings extend from the rear of the main building to form two courts, one modeled after the Convent Court of St. Mark (Florence, Italy), and the other is of Moorish design.
The first floor of the 50-room palace was used by Nicholas and his son, Alexi, for living quarters. The left wing, facing the sea, contained the Czar’s study and bedroom. The room used as the President’s private dining room was formerly a billiard room. The large room used as the main conference room was the ballroom-banquet hall.
The second floor was used principally by the Czarina and her four daughters. The room occupied by General Marshall was formerly the Imperial bedroom and that used by Admiral King was the Czarina’s boudoir. The second-floor conference hall was formerly a private reception room of the Czarina. The second-floor dining room was a private sitting room used only by the Czar’s family.
The parks and gardens, which stretch down to the seaside, contain fifteen miles of paths and lanes lined with cypress, cedar, yew and bay trees. There are many rare and beautiful plants and trees in the parks, brought there from all over the world by Count Potocki and the Romanov family during the Nineteenth and early part of the Twentieth Centuries.
U.S. State Department (February 4, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Bessell | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Everest | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Commodore Burrough | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Peck | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Ritchie | |
| Major General Bull | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Hull | Colonel Cary | |
| Major General Wood | ||
| Rear Admiral Duncan | ||
| Rear Admiral McCormick | ||
| Rear Admiral Olsen | Commander Clark | |
| Brigadier General Roberts | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Yalta, February 4, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
Agenda for Tripartite Discussions at Argonaut (JCS 1176/9, JCS 1227/3 and JCS Info. Memo 359)
Admiral Leahy said that there had not been time to study the papers before the meeting and asked for a summary.
Admiral Cooke explained that the Joint Staff Planners and the members of the U.S. Military Mission, Moscow, had met to bring up to date all matters dealing with negotiations with the Russians. These discussions had resulted in the circulation of JCS 1176/9 and JCS 1227/3. He said that the two major items to be considered were:
- coordination with the Russians in the matter of operations in the field;
- negotiations with the Russians concerning Far Eastern matters.
The first item involved British, U.S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U.S. and the USSR. This matter has been the subject of examination by the special U.S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.
The papers before the Chiefs were presented by the Planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.
The agenda items listed in Appendix “A” in JCS 1227/3 have been presented to the Soviets and the British. To date no answer has been received from the Soviets.
In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Deane expressed the opinion that the Soviets would withhold their views on the agenda until they met in formal tripartite session. The Russian military staff would be adequately represented at such a meeting and having already received the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the agenda items, they would be prepared to discuss them.
General Marshall said it was important to keep the consideration of military matters alive during the conference while political talks were taking place on higher levels.
Admiral King felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier Stalin to discuss the matters set out in the agenda.
Admiral Cooke said that the views of the Russian military staff would probably not be discussed freely unless Premier Stalin had previously given his approval. The President should tell Premier Stalin to give his staff a rather free hand in the preliminary discussions with the British and U.S. staffs. Further, it was felt by the Planners that the President should get the consent of the Prime Minister to set up direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Military Missions to Moscow. This, it was felt, was the proper approach to the desired arrangement.
General Marshall felt that the first and important step should be to inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the President the agenda as outlined in Appendix “A” and “B” of JCS 1227/3.
Admiral Leahy said that he would undertake to do this.
Admiral King emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of direct liaison between General Eisenhower and the U.S. and British Missions in Moscow and endorsed the suggestion of having the President speak to the Prime Minister on this subject.
Admiral Leahy said that he would attempt to have military matters presented first at the meeting with the President this morning. This would enable the President to be briefed on the subjects which are now under discussion prior to his talks on political matters.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note that Admiral Leahy would inform the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite sessions.
JCS to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army
Yalta, 3 February 1945
Top secret
Memorandum for General Antonov
It is the desire of the American Staff to discuss with the Soviet Staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?
Meeting of the President with his advisers, 10:30 a.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present |
|---|
| The President |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy |
| General of the Army Marshall |
| Fleet Admiral King |
| Major General Kuter |
| Secretary Stettinius |
| Mr. Harriman |
| Mr. Matthews |
| Mr. Hiss |
| Secretary |
| Brigadier General McFarland |
JCS Minutes
February 4, 1945, 10:30 a.m.
Top secret
Admiral Leahy said there were two matters which the Chiefs of Staff considered it desirable to have settled at the tripartite meeting scheduled for 1700 today. The first was to get Marshal Stalin to instruct the Red General Staff to participate in full, free and frank discussions with the U.S. and British Staffs. It was also desirable to get agreement to effect the needed coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alexander and the Soviet General Staff by having them deal with each other directly through the Heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow.
General Marshall said that the establishment of direct liaison for day-to-day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Marshall pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He thought the British reluctance to agree to direct liaison was probably due to the objection which the Russians had raised to the presence of General Burrows on the proposed tripartite liaison committee and to the fear that General Eisenhower would become involved in the settlement of matters which would be more appropriate for consideration on a higher level.
Mr. Harriman said with reference to discussions between the Russian and Allied staffs that Marshal Stalin’s formal approval of the discussions would be necessary before it would be possible to get any information of value from the Russian General Staff.
At this point, a memorandum from the President to the Prime Minister enclosing a memorandum requesting Marshal Stalin to agree to the proposed method of liaison through the Military Mission in Moscow was presented to the President, signed by him and dispatched at once to the Prime Minister.
The President considered the agendas contained in Appendices “A” and “B” of JCS 1227/3.
In answer to the President’s question with reference to item e, General Marshall explained that Milepost requirements and progress was not a matter for discussion with the British but with the Russians only.
In reply to the President’s question as to whether the British troops released from Burma would go into China, General Marshall said that the British had not raised this point. He thought it more likely that the British troops would be used in Thailand.
The President asked if any material and supplies would be stockpiled in Petropavlovsk.
General Marshall replied that the Russians wanted some of it there but the bulk of it was desired at Vladivostok.
General Marshall then read to the President a telegraphic report summarizing the situation on all war fronts and explained it on the map.
The President stated any action in Indochina which resulted in damage to the Japanese was satisfactory to him. He had no objection to any U.S. action which it was considered desirable to take in Indochina as long as it did not involve any alignments with the French.
Mr. Stettinius informed the President that there were seven major topics which he thought the President should be prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin. The first was the question of the post-war international organization. The matter of immediate interest was the question of who was to be invited to attend the next conference on this subject and where the conference was to be held. He indicated a number of locations which would be suitable and stated that he had options on all of the desirable places in the United States if this country should be selected as the site.
The second topic was the matter of the creation of an emergency European high commission to function during the interim period between the end of the war and the setting up of the permanent organization.
The President indicated that he preferred periodic meetings between Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov to the creation of a formal commission.
The third topic was the treatment of Germany, political and economic.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the Russians were interested in taking this up as the first subject to be discussed by the tripartite conference. The fourth topic was the subject of Poland.
The fifth topic was the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The attitude manifested by the Russians toward the U.S. and British delegations on these commissions made necessary an early clarification of the situation.
The sixth subject was the question of Iranian relations.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the British were willing to withdraw troops in Iran in June.
The seventh topic was China. It was desirable to seek Soviet and British assistance in composing the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists.
Mr. Stettinius stated that papers have been prepared by the Department of State on all of the subjects listed and would be available for the President’s information.
Mr. Harriman stated that Marshal Stalin would very likely wish to raise the question of what the Russians would get out of the Pacific war. He stated they would want the southern half of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. They would wish to maintain the status quo in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control over the railroad running to Dairen.
The President said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the status quo in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on the other questions.
At this point Mr. Matthews and Mr. Hiss entered the meeting to discuss the papers prepared by the Department of State for the President.
The Secretary of State to the President
Malta, February 2, 1945
Memorandum of Suggested Action Items for the President
-
International Organization
We should seek adoption of United States proposal for voting formula and agreement to announce immediately calling of general United Nations Conference.(Copies of text of United States proposal and analysis thereof are available if you wish to hand them to Churchill and Stalin.)
Argumentation: Our proposal safeguards unity of the great powers so far as is possible by any formula – enforcement action will require unanimous vote – only with respect to discussion will a party to a dispute not be able to vote. Latin American and other small powers will be disillusioned if discussion can be vetoed.
NOTE: If the voting issue is settled, additional points would have to be agreed to before a United Nations Conference could be called: International Trusteeships, France as fifth sponsoring power, list of nations to be invited, date of conference and its being held in United States, invitations to be by United States on behalf of other four sponsoring powers, United States to consult China and France on behalf of Britain and Russia, form of announcement of agreement on International Organization matters (we have available the necessary papers on these points).
-
Adoption of Emergency European High Commission
(Copies of draft text of declaration and of accompanying protocol are available if you wish to hand them to Stalin and Churchill.)Argumentation: Unity of great power policy with respect to liberated and Axis satellite countries is highly desirable, and France should be included as one of the great powers for this purpose.
-
Treatment of Germany
(a) Final agreement should be reached with respect to control machinery and zones of occupation. Announcement should be made of such agreement and of the earlier agreement on surrender terms.(b) Boundaries: It is not expected that definitive, detailed commitments will have to be made at this time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position has been prepared and is available.
(c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities with neighboring states. Transfers should be carried out gradually under international supervision.
(d) Long range economic policies: We should favor abolition of German self-sufficiency and its position of economic domination of Europe, elimination of certain key industries, prohibition of manufacture of arms and of all types of aircraft, and continuing control to achieve these aims.
-
Poland
(a) Boundaries: We favor the Curzon line in the north and center and, in the south, the eastern line of Lwow Province, which would correspond generally with one of the frontiers proposed in 1919 to the Supreme Allied Council. Transfer of German territory to be limited to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg to Russia), a small coastal salient of Pomerania, and Upper Silesia.(b) We should be prepared to assist in the formation of a new representative interim government pledged to free elections when conditions permit. We should urge inclusion in a provisional government of Mikolajczyk (Peasant Party is most important in Poland) and other moderate Poles abroad. We should not agree to recognize the Lublin “government” in its present form.
-
Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary
Our representatives must be assured of: (a) freedom of movement, and (b) consultation before decisions are made by the Control Commissions. -
Iran
We should seek Soviet agreement not to press for oil concessions in Iran until termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops. -
China
We should seek Soviet and British support for our efforts to bring about Kuomintang-Communist agreement.Argumentation: Cooperation between the two groups will expedite conclusion of the war in the Far East and prevent possible internal conflict and foreign intervention in China.
Hiss Notes
Yalta, February 4, 1945
2/4 Byrnes
Jebb
Jebb joined us
Jebb said: Have paper on Dep. Areas – which has been cleared thru Dominions & is now being considered by War Cabinet
He then read rapidly a paper containing following points
-
Goal is Int. collabor, to promote well-being of colonial peoples by:
(a) develop self govt
(b) social & econ devel.
(c) ? -
Majority of problems are not in dep. areas themselves
-
… need something broader & more flexible than mandates
-
Proposal – regional bodies
-
Full publicity re colonial admn – desire uniformity of admn.
Proposal: Regional bodies could make recommends. to individual govts or gen. decl.
Eur H Com.
(a) Jebb said might continue as regional body
(b) Wants it also to make provisional demarcations
(c) Mix with quarterly meetings to be held at its seat.
Put temporary nature into Protocol
To assist, where conditions require, in the maintenance of internal order, such assistance to include where other means fail the joint use of force.
to take, upon the unanimous decision of the Commission, action designed to accomplish the following aims:
When the emergency which has given rise to action by the Commission in any country has terminated the Commission will terminate
Justice Byrnes 2:15
(Leahy earlier meeting: get US troops out of Eur)
Pres. fears taking internal rep.
Pres. doesn’t like “big” organ.
Mr. B doesn’t like indep. autb. of U.S. Commissioner Would prefer decl. with auth. to Ambassadors to act as specified in protocol. Ambs. are appointed with consent of Pres. & are under control of Sec.
Mr. B fears any agency would perpetuate itself
Redraft as mere decl. – ad hoc commission for any country
Will Clayton
(wbk.) – Im Dezember 1944 hat der Präsident der USA, Roosevelt, seinen Außenminister Cordell Hüll entlassen und zum Nachfolger dieses 74-jährigen Politikers den verhältnismäßig sehr jungen Edward R. Stettinius – er ist Anfang der vierziger Jahre – ernannt und damit den Sprössling eines bedeutenden Teilhabers des Bankhauses Morgan und Mitglied einer international bekannten Wirtschaftsdynastie.
Stettinius hat sofort das Außenamt der USA mit neuen und ihm wesensgleichen Personen bestückt. Unter anderen übernahm der Enkel des Dollarmilliardärs und Ölmagnaten Rockefeller, Nelson Rockefeller, als Assistent Secretary einen der sechs höchsten Beamtenposten im State Department, wie das Außenministerium der USA genannt wird, und wird die Außenhandelsbeziehungen der USA zu den iberoamerikanischen Staaten lenken.
Leiter der Außenhandelsabteilung des US-Außenamtes jedoch wurde Will Clayton. Er wird der engste Mitarbeiter und Berater des neuen Außenministers sein. Wie dieser und Nelson Rockefeller stammt er aus dem Big Business, dem großen Geschäft. Er ist zwar schon 64 Jahre alt, aber in seinen Methoden robust wie ein Cowboy.
Angefangen hat Will Clayton als kleiner Büroangestellter. Bis zum Jahre 1940 hat er sich wenig mit Politik befasst. Er war leitender Direktor der Baumwollfirma Anderson, Clayton and Co. und der größte Baumwollhändler der USA und der Welt geworden. Er gibt sich, auch heute noch, nach seinem Beruf befragt, als Baumwollmakler aus.
Die neue US-Außenpolitik ist exportorientiert. Diese Linie hat ihr Roosevelt selbst vorgeschrieben, der die drohende soziale Nachkriegskrise durch Vollbeschäftigung der nordamerikanischen Wirtschaft und Ausfuhr der großen, dann verfügbaren Ausfuhrüberschüsse mit Staatshilfe auf allen verfügbaren Absatzmärkten bannen will. Die Dollarmillionäre und Industriekönige versuchen jetzt im persönlichen Einsatz das soziale Problem zu lösen. Sie treten aus der politischen Anonymität, in der sie bisher und auch während der 1929 ausgebrochenen Weltwirtschaftskrise konsequent verharrten, nunmehr heraus. Entweder steht ihnen das Wasser des Umsturzes bis zum Halse oder aber es verleitet eine besonders gigantische Möglichkeit des Raubes von öffentlichen Geldern, Staatsfunktionäre zu werden. Vielleicht trifft beides gleichzeitig zu. Wall Street wird also durch seine Beauftragten Stettinius, Clayton, Rockefeller usw. von den höchsten Staatsstellen aus und unter Einsatz der gesamten imperialen Macht der USA den Versuch unternehmen, das Gespenst des sozialen Erdrutsches in den USA dadurch zu verscheuchen, dass die Quelle der gesellschaftlichen Unruhe, die Arbeitslosigkeit, verschüttet wird. Die USA werden mit allen Kapazitäten produzieren und Stettinius und seine Leute werden mit Anleihen, Bestechungen, Druck und Drohung die offenen Märkte erweitern, geschlossene aber öffnen wollen. Der Hochkapitalismus wagt seinen größten Einsatz, riskiert aber im Falle des Misserfolges auch die dankbar stärkste Kompromittierung.
Will Clayton hat nach »einer Ernennung zum Chef der Außenhandelsabteilung im State Department vor dem Senatsausschuss für Auswärtiges erklärt, er befürworte Kredite an fremde Länder, vor allein an Südamerika, nicht aber an ausländische Industrien, die ohne hohen Zollschutz nicht bestehen könnten, so dass Europa nur geringe Chancen hat. Er wird sich vor allem der Verwirklichung des fünften Programmpunktes seines Chefs Stettinius zu widmen haben, der lautet: „Starke Expansion des nordamerikanischen Außenhandels, um in den USA Vollbeschäftigung sicherzustellen.“ Und sicherlich wird er als Fachmann den Export nordamerikanischer Rohbaumwolle und Baumwollwaren besonders betreuen, der in der Amtszeit Roosevelts in der Walt so viel Terrain verloren hat. Gerade in dieser Hinsicht visiert die nordamerikanische Baumwollwirtschaft England als wichtigsten Konkurrenten, Was in London bereits erkannt worden ist. Die vor kurzem erfolgte Veröffentlichung des sogenannten Platt-Berichtes, der Arbeit einer nordamerikanischen Studienkommission über die Zukunft der Weltbaumwollwirtschaft, dürfte unter Zustimmung, wenn nicht Mitarbeit Mr. Claytons erfolgt sein.
Der Bericht enthält eine äußerst scharfe Kritik der britischen Baumwollpolitik, gegen die sich das englische Baumwollverarbeitungszentrum Lancashire durch verschiedene Repräsentanten erregt und erbost zur Wehr gesetzt hat. Die Cotton and Rayon Merchant Association in London wirft dem Platt-Bericht vor, er versuche in der Welt den Eindruck ungenügender Tüchtigkeit und geringer Leistungsfähigkeit der britischen im Vergleich zur US-Baumwollindustrie zu erwecken, was dem britischen Export abträglich sein könne.
Wie auf dem Gebiet der Baumwollwirtschaft, so ist es auch in anderen Branchen: die US-Industriellen und -Händler würden in einer von ihnen maßgebend gestalteten Nachkriegswirtschaft beim Kampf um den Auslandsabsatz den personell verjüngten, materiell unvergleichlich massiven Machtapparat des State Department der USA hinter sich haben. Briten und Bolschewisten würden natürlich zu ähnlich „direkten Methoden“ übergehen, wie sie Mr. Stettinius anzuwenden pflegt. Es würde eine harte Auseinandersetzung werden, die ganz gewiss nicht zum Ziel dauernder Vollbeschäftigung in den drei „Demokratien,“ sondern zur Verschärfung der inneren und äußeren Spannungen und zu neuen blutigen Auseinandersetzungen führen würde. Dieser Entwicklung steht der ebenso sinnvolle wie tapfere Kampf Deutschlands und Japans entgegen, der neue und für die Völker ersprießlichere Perspektiven eröffnet.
Führer HQ (February 4, 1945)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
In Ungarn versuchte der Feind unsere Front zwischen Plattensee und Velencesee mit Unterstützung zahlreicher Panzer einzudrücken. Die angreifenden Bolschewisten wurden durch Gegenangriffe in die Verteidigung gedrängt und verloren 26 Panzer. In Budapest verteidigt die heroisch kämpfende Besatzung die Burg und die südlich und südwestlich davon gelegenen Stadtteile hartnäckig gegen den weit überlegenen Feind.
Zwischen den Westbeskiden und der oberen Oder scheiterten heftige Angriffe der Bolschewisten. An der Oderfront zwischen Ratibor und dem Oderbruch wurden alle Versuche des Feindes, seine Brückenköpfe auszuweiten, vereitelt. Mehrere dieser Brückenköpfe wurden durch unsere Gegenangriffe eingeengt, bei Glogau 21 Panzer, in der Mehrzahl durch Nahkampfmittel, vernichtet. Angriffe der Bolschewisten gegen unsere Stellungen südöstlich Frankfurt an der Oder und vor Küstrin blieben ohne Erfolg. Die Besatzungen von Schneidemühl und Posen standen auch gestern in erbitterten Abwehrkämpfen.
Auch an der pommerschen Front kam es zu heftigen Gefechten bei Pyritz, Arnswalde und nordöstlich Jastrow. Die Besatzung von Thorn kämpfte sich befehlsgemäss zu den eigenen Linien durch. Westlich Schwetz stießen Panzer und Grenadiere tief in die Flanke des Feindes und fügten ihm hohe Verluste zu. Die Verteidiger der Marienburg und der Stadt Elbing wehrten zahlreiche sowjetische Angriffe ab.
An der Südfront Ostpreußens trat der Feind zwischen Wormditt und Bartenstein zum Angriff an. In schwerem Ringen verhinderten unsere Divisionen den vom Gegner erstrebten Durchbruch. Nordwestlich Königsberg konnten die Sowjets in Richtung auf die Danziger Bucht Gelände gewinnen. Gegenangriffe sind angesetzt.
Unsere Seestreitkräfte unterstützten auch am 2. und 3. Februar die schweren Kämpfe des Heeres an der Küste Nordsamlands.
In Kurland setzte der Feind seine Angriffe in Richtung Libau mit neu herangeführten Infanterie- und Panzerverbänden fort, während südlich Frauenburg seine Angriffswucht nachließ. In beiden Kampfräumen zerbrach der feindliche Ansturm nach Abschuß von 40 Panzern am hartnäckigen Widerstand unserer Divisionen.
Die Luftwaffe griff mit starken Kräften an der mittleren Ostfront die sowjetischen Vorhuten und den Nachschubverkehr an. Der Feind erlitt hohe blutige Verluste und büßte nach bis jetzt vorliegenden Meldungen 26 Panzer, 16 Geschütze und über 500 Fahrzeuge ein. In Luftkämpfen wurden 14 sowjetische Flugzeuge abgeschossen.
Im Westen zerschlug unsere Artillerie englische Panzerkräfte, die südlich Roermond unsere Hauptkampflinie zu durchstoßen versuchten. An der mittleren Roer halten lebhafte feindliche Bewegungen an: auch das Artilleriefeuer verstärkte sich, so daß in diesem Abschnitt demnächst mit dem erneuten Beginn feindlicher Großangriffe gerechnet werden muss.
Nordöstlich Monschau blieben feindliche Angriffe erfolglos, doch konnte der Gegner östlich der Stadt nach heftigen Kämpfen unsere Truppen in den Raum von Schleiden und nördlich davon zurückdrängen. Auch an den Westbefestigungen weiter südlich kam es zu erbitterten Kämpfen mit angreifenden amerikanischen Verbänden, die nach geringen Erfolgen zum Stehen gebracht wurden.
Im Kampfgebiet von Bischweiler warfen unsere Truppen im Gegenangriff den vorgedrungenen Feind wieder zurück, machten dabei Gefangene und vernichteten eine größere Anzahl feindlicher Panzer.
Angriffe der Amerikaner im Abschnitt von Kolmar wurden abgewiesen. Nördlich Neubreisach sowie im Raum nördlich und nordwestlich Mülhausen stehen unsere Divisionen in heftigen Abwehrkämpfen. Im Oberelsass wurden gestern 27 Panzer und Panzerspähwagen vernichtet.
Im Monat Jänner machten unsere Truppen an der Westfront 8.327 Gefangene und erbeuteten oder vernichteten 1.197 Panzer und 55 Panzerspähwagen sowie 98 Geschütze.
Vor Dünkirchen zwang unser Feuer gegnerische Panzer zum Abdrehen. Schwächere Angriffe gegen das Vorfeld von St. Nazaire wurden zerschlagen.
Der feindliche Nachschubstützpunkt Antwerpen liegt andauernd unter unserem Fernbeschuss.
Die Reichshauptstadt war am gestrigen Tage das Ziel eines Terrorangriffs der Nordamerikaner. Es entstanden vorwiegend in der Stadtmitte Schäden an Wohnhäusern und Kulturbauten sowie Verluste unter der Zivilbevölkerung. Auch im westlichen und südwestlichen Reichsgebiet trafen die Angriffe anglo-amerikanischer Tiefflieger und kleinerer Bomberverbände wieder vorwiegend die Zivilbevölkerung. Britische Terrorflieger warfen in den Abendstunden Bomben auf Orte im rheinisch-westfälischen Raum. Luftverteidigungskräfte brachten 49 anglo-amerikanische Flugzeuge, darunter 43 viermotorige Bomber, zum Absturz.
Das Vergeltungsfeuer auf London dauert mit nur kurzen Unterbrechungen an.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 4, 1945)
FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN
ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section
DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
041100A February
TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT
TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
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(18) SHAEF REAR
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(REF NO.)
NONE
(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR
Communiqué No. 302
Allied forces in the Monschau area pushed from one to three miles deeper into Germany to capture the towns of Hammer, Harperscheid and enter Dreiborn. Resistance from small arms and mortar fire was heavy. Udenbreth, about seven miles south of Harperscheid, was cleared after heavy fighting in the town.
In the border area, eleven miles northeast of St. Vith, we have taken Losheim and Manderfeld. Southeast of St. Vith, we captured Bleialf after overcoming strong resistance in the town.
Our units which pushed eastward in the area of the Luxembourg-Belgium-German border intersection have reached the vicinity of Grosskampenberg. German positions in this area are strongly defended.
East of Diekirch, we have cleared the enemy from Hoesdorf on the west bank of the Our River.
Southeast of Haguenau we have cleared Rohrwiller, and after three days of hard fighting have taken most of Oberhofen. Stiff resistance and flooded terrain resulted in our withdrawal in the vicinity of Herrlisheim and from Offendorf.
All of Colmar has been liberated and we have driven some four miles south of the city. We have freed Winzenheim, west of Colmar, and several other towns nearby. To the east, hard fighting continued in the approaches to fortified Neuf-Brisach. Fighter-bombers struck at targets in the city and enemy communications leading to this sector.
Gains on the southern side of the Colmar sector, where we have reached the outskirts of Pulversheim, have narrowed the distance from our forces in the north to those in the south to less than twelve miles.
Twenty-five hundred tons of bombs were dropped with good results on military objectives in Berlin yesterday by more than 1,000 escorted heavy bombers. Objectives included important military and governmental offices, the Anhalter railway station and the Templehof railyards. Large fires were stated in the target areas.
More than 400 escorted heavy bombers attacked rail yards at Magdeburg, and a synthetic oil plant in the Magdeburg suburb of Rothensee with unobserved results.
Escort for these attacks was provided by more than 900 fighters. The escort shot down 21 enemy fighters in the air, destroyed 14 on the ground and strafed ground targets in northwest Germany, destroyed or damaged locomotives, freight cars and other objectives. Other fighters patrolled airfields in northwest Germany.
Thirty-five bombers and five fighters are missing from these operations.
The E-boat shelters at Ijmuiden and naval establishments at Portershaven near Maassluis were attacked by other escorted heavy bombers with 12,000-pound bombs. Last night, heavy bombers attacked targets in western Germany with the synthetic oil plants at Bottrop and Dortmund as the main objectives.
German billets at Dunkerque and the rail bridge at Zwolle were attacked yesterday by medium bombers.
Mortar positions and troops in the neighborhood of Babyloniënbroek, transportation targets in Holland and northwest Germany, particularly to the north and northeast of the Ruhr were attacked by fighter bombers. Locomotives and rolling stock, as well as motor transport and barges were attacked and rail lines were cut in several places.
Farther south, fighter-bombers struck at railyards in the areas of Zülpich and Euskirchen and also attacked a number of trains, principally in the Euskirchen area, and motor transport to the northwest of Bonn. A motor transport repair and storage depot at Bergisch Gladbach, rail bridges at Ahrweiler and Sinzig and a rail yard at Jünkerath, as well as the communications centers at Dahlem and Wittlich were targets for medium and light bombers.
Fourteen fighter-bombers are missing from the day’s operations.
COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S
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U.S. State Department (February 4, 1945)
Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, 4:00 p.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| President Roosevelt | Marshal Stalin | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
Bohlen Minutes
Yalta, February 4, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret
Subject: GENERAL DISCUSSION
After an exchange of amenities, in which the President thanked Marshal Stalin for all the successful efforts that had been made for his comfort and convenience, the President said that the military situation was considerably improved since they had last met.
Marshal Stalin replied that this was certainly true, and that the Soviet armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the Oder.
The President replied that he had made a number of bets on board the cruiser coming over as to whether the Russians would get to Berlin before the Americans would get to Manila.
Marshal Stalin remarked that he was certain the Americans would get to Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was at present very hard fighting going on for the Oder line.
There followed a discussion about the climate and characteristics of the Crimea.
The President said that he had been very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal Stalin would again propose a toast to the execution of 50,000 officers of the German Army.
Marshal Stalin replied that because of the honest bloodshed in fighting the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and had had little time to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the creative work of human beings.
The President agreed with this.
Marshal Stalin then inquired about the military situation on the Western Front.
The President replied that General Marshall, at the five o’clock meeting, would give a detailed outline of the situation and plans, but he could say now that there was an offensive planned for the 8th of February and another on the 12th, but that the main blow of the Anglo-American armies on the Western Front would take place in March.
Marshal Stalin expressed gratification at this news, and said that General Antonov of the Soviet General Staff would give a detailed review of the situation on the Eastern Front at the five o’clock meeting. He added that if it were possible to capture the Ruhr and Saar regions the Germans would be deprived of all sources of coal, since the Russians had already captured the Silesia basin.
The President said he felt that the armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he hoped General Eisenhower could communicate directly with the Soviet Staff rather than through the Chiefs of Staff in London and Washington as in the past.
Marshal Stalin agreed and thought it was very important and promised that the staffs while here would work out the details of this suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a possibility that the German collapse would come before absolute military defeat.
The President inquired whether the Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further offensive action.
Marshal Stalin replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which there were five or six, fierce battles were in progress on the Eastern front.
The President said that one of the difficulties on the Western Front was that we had no secure bridgeheads and that on the upper Rhine the current was so strong with floating ice that it made it very difficult for pontoon operations, but that General Eisenhower felt once he reached the Rhine, he would be able to cross it, but he did not expect this before March. He added that the British had wanted to make a major crossing of the Rhine on the north sector in Holland, but since we had four times the number of men in France that the British had we felt we were entitled to have an alternative, which would be either through Holland or in the region of Mainz.
The President then inquired how Marshal Stalin had gotten along with General de Gaulle.
Marshal Stalin replied that he had not found de Gaulle a very complicated person, but he felt he was unrealistic in the sense that France had not done very much fighting in this war and de Gaulle demanded full rights with the Americans, British and Russians who had done the burden of the fighting.
The President then described his conversation with de Gaulle in Casablanca two years ago when de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.
Marshal Stalin replied that de Gaulle does not seem to understand the situation in France and that in actual fact the French contribution at the present time to military operations on the Western Front was very small and that in 1940 they had not fought at all.
The President replied that he recently decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen who had had previous military training.
Marshal Stalin said that was good insofar as it would help the American armies but at present he felt the de Gaulle army was very weak.
The President said he had recently heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright any German territory but they are willing to have it placed under international control.
Marshal Stalin replied that was not the story de Gaulle had told in Moscow – there he said the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and he wished to have French troops placed there in permanency.
The President said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.
The President then said that he understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal Stalin appeared to agree, but he went on to say that one outstanding question was that of a French zone of occupation. The President said he had had a good deal of trouble with the British in regard to zones of occupation. He said that he would of [have] preferred to have the northwest zone which would be independent of communications through France, but the British seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in France and then return political control to the British.
Marshal Stalin inquired whether the President thought France should have a zone of occupation, and for what reason.
The President said he thought it was not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of kindness.
Both Marshal Stalin and Mr. Molotov spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason to give France a zone. Marshal Stalin said that question would have to be considered further here at Yalta.
As it was then three minutes to five, the President suggested that they proceed to the conference room where the military staffs were gathered.
First plenary meeting, February 4, 1945, 5:00 p.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | Marshal Stalin |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | General of the Army Antonov |
| Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | ||
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov | |
| Major General Kuter | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Major General Deane | Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov | |
| Brigadier General Mc-Farland | Field Marshal Alexander | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Harriman | General Ismay | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Bohlen | Major Birse | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Maisky | ||
| Mr. Pavlov |
Bohlen Minutes
Yalta, February 4, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret
Subject: THE MILITARY SITUATION
Marshal Stalin said he hoped the President would again consent to opening the meeting.
The President replied that his opening of this meeting, as had been the case in Tehran, was not based on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said that he was honored to open this great Conference and he wished first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid arrangements made by Marshal Stalin and his assistants for their comfort and convenience. He said that he knew that all the people he represented wished peace above all and the war to be over as soon as possible. He said that he felt that we understood each other much better now than we had in the past and that month by month our understanding was growing. For this reason, he felt safe in proposing that the talks be conducted in an informal manner in which each would speak his mind frankly and freely, since he had discovered through experience that the best way to conduct business expeditiously was through frank and free speaking. He said he knew that while they were here in Yalta they would cover the map of the world, but today he thought that military questions, particularly those on the most important front of all, the Eastern Front, should be the subject of discussion. He said he wished to add that when the Red Armies advanced into Germany 25 kilometers, it was doubtful whether the Soviet people were more thrilled than those of the United States and those of Great Britain. Here, he thought, it would be most appropriate if the Marshal would ask one of his staff officers to give a detailed report on the Eastern Front.
General Antonov then read a prepared paper, giving in great detail the background development of the Soviet offensive of early January, the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires with regard to the actions of their Allies. (A copy in translation of General Antonov’s report is attached hereto.)
In regard to the part of the Soviet report where General Antonov referred to the number of divisions which were being moved to the East, the Prime Minister asked if he could go into more detail as to where they were coming from.
General Antonov stated that they anticipated that there would be five German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western Front, eight from Italy, and eight from the interior of Germany which would be moved to the Eastern Front to reinforce the Germans.
The President then inquired whether in the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the gauge of the railroads from the customary European gauge to the wide Russian gauge.
General Antonov replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore, necessary to widen the gauge on a few important lines of the railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to supply the troops.
The President said that as our armies are now approaching each other in Germany it was important that the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a definite place in Germany where the different gauges would meet.
Marshal Stalin answered at this point that the greater part of the German railroad lines would remain of their customary gauge and that it was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was absolutely necessary.
The Prime Minister then said that he had a number of questions in regard to General Antonov’s report, that he felt that the Anglo-American and Russian staffs which were here gathered for the first time should discuss these technical military matters between themselves. He added, for example, that it was important to find out how long it would take the enemy to move these divisions from Italy and the Western Front to the Eastern Front and whether the Allies could be of more help by reinforcing the Western Front or by leaving the divisions in Italy, or by moving across the Adriatic into the Balkans. He suggested that General Marshall, with the President’s approval, present a picture of the operations on the Western Front.
General Marshall then gave the following general summary of the situation on the Western Front:
The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the East than they had been when the German offensive began.
In the last week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his divisions for future offensive action and was engaged in eliminating enemy pockets on the southern sector of the line north of Switzerland. He was exerting pressure on the base of the Ardennes bulge for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Germans were in sufficient force to successfully oppose a movement Northeast in the direction of Bonn or whether such an operation would require special preparation. He had ascertained that the German resistance was too strong and four days ago has ceased operations in this area and begun to transfer divisions to the North. North of Switzerland operations were being directed toward the elimination of German positions around Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar had been taken but the First French Army was advancing very slowly north of Mulhausen.
Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.
Field Marshal Montgomery in command of the 21st British Army Group and the United States Ninth Army is preparing offensive action in a Southeast direction north of Düsseldorf. A supporting operation is planned by the Ninth Army in a northeast direction toward the same objective. The first of these operations is expected to commence on February 8 and the second approximately a week later. These two operations are designed to drive the Germans East of the Rhine and to cross the river North of the Ruhr. This operation will be the main blow of the Anglo-American armies. Airborne divisions will be used in large numbers to land East of the Rhine.
The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.
In the South the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Roer River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperilling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.
Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfort as an alternative if the main operation in the North suffers a check.
Operations on the Western Front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the town of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.
Marshal Stalin then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the actual destruction done by the tactical air force.
General Marshall replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the German oil production had been reduced to about 20% of its former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail communications and assembly yards. In these operations were included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into Germany.
In reply to a question General Marshall stated that there were approximately 32 enemy divisions on the Italian front, 27 German and 5 Italian, facing an approximately equal number of Allied divisions. The Allied forces have superiority in fighter aircraft in this theater.
General Marshall mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and their threat was potential rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British Isles because the tide made it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. The Allied heavy bomber force has been striking heavily at submarine pens and construction yards but first priority was still being given to enemy oil production and refining centers.
General Marshall concluded by saying that Field Marshal Brooke might have something to add to his report on the military situation.
The Prime Minister said he hoped that Field Marshal Brooke would have some news, but he certainly hoped that Admiral Cunningham would be able to speak on the help the Soviet Armies could give in the U-boat war, since Danzig was the principal point of construction of U-boats.
Marshal Stalin asked what were the other points.
Admiral Cunningham replied: Kiel and Hamburg.
The Prime Minister said that we had had great experience with the United States forces in working out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers. There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff on this subject.
Marshal Stalin then asked a number of questions particularly relating to the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in the Northern area and those designated for the attacks on February 8 and February 15. He said that on the central front in Poland the Soviet Army had enjoyed a superiority of 100 divisions over the Germans as well as overwhelming artillery supremacy. He added that they had had 9,000 planes on a relatively narrow front in Eastern Poland. He said that the Red Army had had 9,000 tanks on the breakthrough sector on the central front.
General Marshall said that approximately one in three Allied divisions was armored comprising 200-300 units. There was some discussion as to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in which General Marshall said that a German panzer division which they had encountered on the Western Front had had a complement of 23,000 men, at which Marshal Stalin expressed surprisee.
The Prime Minister said that he understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately 10,000 men.
Sir Charles Portal , in reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, said that we would have 8,000 to 9,000 aircraft on the section of the Western Front designated for the attack, of which 4,000 would be Anglo-American heavy bombers capable of carrying 3 to 4 tons of bombs each.
The Prime Minister said, in reply to Marshal Stalin’s observations that they had 180 Soviet divisions against 80 German divisions on the central front in Poland, that the Anglo-American armies had never had a superiority in manpower but that their superiority had rested in air power and armor.
General Marshall stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German divisions on the Western Front opposing 78 Anglo-American divisions.
Marshal Stalin then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief description in the manner in which the special Soviet artillery “break-through” divisions had been organized. He said that these artillery divisions had from 300 to 400 guns and in addition to offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the attack. For example, on a front from 35 to 45 kilometers, Marshal Konev had had six artillery “break-through” divisions and the corps artillery, which meant that for every kilometer there were some 230 guns of heavy calibre. The result was after a two-hour bombardment a gate was opened in the front through which the Soviet forces advanced fifteen kilometers the first day. The German losses in killed and wounded were very heavy and the survivors were severely stunned and shellshocked. Marshal Stalin then said that they had explained their desires from their Allies, but that they had learned from the discussions already undertaken that their desires had already been met, and inquired what were the wishes of the Allies in regard to the Red Army.
The Prime Minister said first of all that he wished to express the gratitude of England and he was sure of America for the massive power and successes of the Soviet offensive.
Marshal Stalin replied that this was not a desire. Marshal Stalin then said that the Soviet Union was not bound by any agreement at Tehran to conduct a winter offensive and despite what some people had thought no demand or request had been received from the President or the Prime Minister in regard to such an offensive. The President had asked him to receive a representative, Air Marshal Tedder, from General Eisenhower’s staff to discuss the situation and he had, of course, immediately agreed. He said that he mentioned this only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders who not only fulfilled formal obligations but went farther and acted on what they conceived to be their moral duty to their Allies. He said Air Marshal Tedder had explained the desire, which he presumed was that of the President and the Prime Minister, that the Soviet army continue their offensive operations until the end of March. Marshal Stalin said that they would do it if the weather and road conditions permitted.
The President said that he thoroughly agreed with Marshal Stalin’s statement since at the Tehran Conference it had been merely agreed that each partner would move as quickly and as far as possible against the common enemy. He said at that time he personally was facing an election, and that it had been impossible to make detailed plans far into the future. Also at that time our armies were separated by many miles. Now, however, the President said, with our armies approaching each other it should be possible to coordinate more closely our operational plans.
The Prime Minister remarked that the reason no request had been made on Marshal Stalin was because of the complete confidence which the President and he felt in the Marshal, the Russian people and the efficiency of the Russian military, and therefore, there had been no attempt to strike any bargain. He had always been thoroughly confident that when an offensive was possible the Red Army would attack. The Prime Minister added that no matter what discussions Air Marshal Tedder had had in Moscow, he felt that it was of the highest importance that the three staffs which were assembled here for the first time should really work out together detailed plans for the coordination of the joint blows against Germany; so that if the Soviet offensive came to a halt because of the weather or road conditions the Allied armies could move. The best of all would be for both armies to attack simultaneously from the East and the West.
Marshal Stalin agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to take into account what had occurred; that when the Anglo-American armies were on the offensive in the West the Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that the war would be over before summer.
Mr. Churchill replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.
Admiral Cunningham then gave a short review of the situation in regard to German submarines. He said that the threat was more potential than actual at the present time. The Germans had kept technically ahead of the Allies although the present sinkings around the British Isles were not serious. We knew, however, that based on a prefabricated method of construction the Germans were building large submarines of a new type fitted out with the latest devices and with high underwater speed. He said that these submarines were being built primarily at Kiel, Hamburg and Danzig and that since the Marshal had asked for our desires he would give a naval desire, namely, that the Red Army should as soon as possible take Danzig where 30% of the German submarine construction was being carried out.
The President asked if Danzig was within range of Soviet artillery fire.
Marshal Stalin replied in the negative but expressed the hope that it soon would be.
It was then agreed that the Military Staffs would meet tomorrow at 12:00 noon at the Soviet villa at Koreis and that tomorrow, February 5, there would be a meeting at the Livadia Palace at 4:00 p.m. between the President, Marshal Stalin, and the Prime Minister and the three Foreign Ministers on the political treatment of Germany.
CCS Minutes
Yalta, February 4, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret
Marshal Stalin asked the President to open the meeting.
The President said that he was very happy to open such a historic meeting in such a lovely spot. In view of the conveniences and comforts that had been provided the visiting delegations, he wished to thank Marshal Stalin for all that he had found time to do in this regard in the midst of the prosecution of the war. He said that the United States, British and Russian delegations would understand each other better and better as we go along. We could therefore proceed informally to discuss frankly and freely among ourselves the matters necessary to the successful prosecution of the common cause in which we all are engaged. There was much that required discussion, the whole map in Europe in fact. Today, however, the conversations by common agreement would be concerned with Germany. In this connection he felt sure that the British and American people were viewing with a satisfaction as deep as must be that of the Soviet people themselves the successful advances of the Soviet armies against the common enemy.
Marshal Stalin said that Colonel General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff, would outline the situation existing on the Eastern Front.
General Antonov made the following statement:
Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into attack on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians, a distance of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal Rokossovsky, along the north bank of the Vistula cutting off East Prussia from central Germany; forces of Marshal Zhukov, south of the Vistula against Poznan; forces of Marshal Konev, against Chenstokhov-Breslau; forces of General Petrov, in the area of the Carpathians against Novo Targ. The greatest blow was delivered by the army groups of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, and Konev on the Ostrolenka-Crakow front, 300 kilometers.
Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.
The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the central group of the enemy. For this purpose, this operation was conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to our attack by a swift transfer of power onto the flank at the expense of the central sector of our front; thus, out of 24 tank divisions on our front, representing the principal German striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions were located in Courland), and thus on the central part of the front there remained only 4 tank divisions. The aim of the High Command was accomplished.
On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.
The massing of artillery on the sectors of the break-through amounted to 220-230 guns (from 75 mm and above) on one kilometer of the front.
The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions – low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.
Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.
The following results were achieved:
a. During the 18 days of the advance, the Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main offensive.
Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25-30 kilometers per day.
b. The Soviet troops came out onto the Oder River on the sector from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and south and seized the Silesian industrial area.
c. They cut across the main roads and cut off enemy groups in East Prussia from central Germany; thus, in addition to the Courland group (26 divisions) isolated 27 divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torne, Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 15 divisions.
d. Breakthroughs in force of long duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.
e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against which we sustained the following losses:
| Prisoners | –about 100,000 men |
| Casualties | –about 300,000 men |
| Total | –approximately 400,000 men |
Probable enemy action:
a. The Germans will defend Berlin for which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops in the area of the Oder River, setting up the defense here at the expense of withdrawn troops and at the expense of reserves being moved over from Germany, Western Europe and Italy.
For the defense of Pomerania, they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.
b. The Germans will probably cover the direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.
The shifting of enemy troops:
a. On our front there have already appeared:
| From the central regions of Germany | –9 division |
| From the Western European Front | –6 divisions |
| From Italy | –1 division |
| Total | 16 divisions |
b. In the process of being shifted:
- 4 tank divisions
- 1 motorized division
- 5 divisions
c. It is probable that there will yet be shifted up to 30–35 divisions (at the expense of the Western European Front, Norway, Italy, and reserves located in Germany).
In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 divisions.
Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable:
- To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front.
- To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes.
- The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East.
It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy.
In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.
The President asked whether the Russians proposed to change the gauge of the railroad rolling stock captured from the Germans or to widen the gauge of the lines.
General Antonov replied that much of the equipment was unfit for use. At present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines that are most vital to supply. These lines were being widened only as a matter of necessity as, manifestly, the available resources are not sufficient to widen all the railroads in Germany. The greater part of the German lines will remain intact.
The Prime Minister stated that the British Delegation would have a number of questions to address to the Russians. As these were of a technical and military nature, he thought it would be more advantageous if they could be brought up between the military staffs.
The Prime Minister then suggested that General Marshall explain to Marshal Stalin the impending operations on the Western Front.
The President pointed out the increasing necessity for coordinating the operations of the three Allies now that the British and American armies are getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short distance separating the Western and Eastern Fronts the Germans are now able to transfer their reserves quickly from one front to the other.
General Marshall then gave a résumé of the operations planned for the Western Front. He said that the German bulge in the Ardennes had now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced in some areas beyond the line originally held. During the past week General Eisenhower has been regrouping his forces and conducting operations designed to eliminate enemy pockets in the southern part of the line north of Switzerland. At the same time, he has been maintaining pressure in the Ardennes area in order to determine whether the Germans were present in sufficient forces to resist a movement northeast towards Bonn. Because of the resistance encountered, it was decided four days ago to cease operations and to transfer divisions further north. In the southern end of the line, operations were being directed towards the elimination of the German positions in the vicinity of Mulhausen and Colmar. Colmar has now been occupied but the advance of the First French Army north of Mulhausen has been very slow.
North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the Rhine are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will be possible to reduce the number of divisions in the front line and release them for other employments. Some released divisions are even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations.
Field Marshal Montgomery, in command of the 21st Army Group and Ninth U.S. Army, is preparing an operation designed to strike towards the southeast in order to reach the line of the Rhine from Düsseldorf north. A complementary operation has been planned in a northeast direction towards the same objective, which it is hoped can be launched about a week later than the first operation. By means of these two operations it is hoped to drive the Germans east of the Rhine north of Düsseldorf and then to cross the river north of the Ruhr. This crossing will constitute the main effort of the British and American armies and into it will be put all of the divisions which it is logistically possible to support. In addition, airborne troops in large numbers will land east of the Rhine.
From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing prior to 1 March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate initially only five divisions.
Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt which can be exploited if the main effort in the North should fail to go through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans, there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing may be swept away by the release of the impounded water.
The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on operations on the Western Front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air.
United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done to panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes.
The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted in a reduction of German oil production to 20 percent of the former capacity. The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian Front. When weather prevents profitable operations in the Po Valley, they are directed against communications leading into Germany.
There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian Front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and rolling stock has been heavy.
Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine war as the result of technical developments which are making the detection of the submarines increasingly difficult. The submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult for ASDIC to locate them. In order to counter this submarine resurgence, heavy bombers are being employed to strike at submarine assembly points whenever these operations do not interfere with the bombing of the German oil supplies.
In concluding, General Marshall said he would be glad to have Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought desirable.
The Prime Minister stated he would be very glad for Field Marshal Brooke to do this and stated that he would like for Admiral Cunningham also to say a word about the submarine operations.
The Prime Minister pointed out that Danzig is the place where much of the assembling of the submarines is done and expressed satisfaction in the thought that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which are daily drawing closer.
In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister said that other submarine assembling points were Kiel and Hamburg.
Field Marshal Brooke said that General Marshall had fully covered the situation now existing on the Western Front and the operations which are contemplated for the future. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in full accord with the plan for the future operations which General Marshall had outlined.
The Prime Minister stated that both the British and Americans have amphibious branches in their services. The officer commanding the British amphibious branch is at present in ARGONAUT and he, the Prime Minister, would like very much to have him meet with the Russian amphibious experts and obtain from them any information which the Russians would be kind enough to provide.
In reply to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall explained that the front of the main effort in the impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of 25 or 30 miles and afforded room for not more than five divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the Rhine down as far as Düsseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He pointed out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be necessary to assault initially on a narrow front but this front would be expanded as rapidly as possible. He said that the Ruhr was very heavily fortified and for that reason would be bypassed. However, troops attacking on this front would soon get into good tank country.
In answer to a question from Marshal Stalin, General Marshall said the reserves available for the proposed attack were believed to be ample.
Marshal Stalin said that he asked the question because in the Russian central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know how many tanks the Allies expected to employ.
General Marshall said that roughly one in every three divisions employed would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General Eisenhower will have 89 divisions at his disposal to cover the front from the Mediterranean to Holland, not including Italy; nine of these were French and all the remainder were either British or American.
Through answers to his questions, it was made clear to Marshal Stalin that there are nearly 10,000 Allied tanks in the European Theater. The British divisions number 18,000 men, the American divisions 14,000, and armored divisions contain 10,000. There will be available 4,000 heavy bombers, each carrying up to 3,000 pounds of bombs.
Marshal Stalin explained that in their attack on the central German position, the Russians employed 100 divisions, which was 20 more than the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance that the British and Americans would have over the Germans.
The Prime Minister pointed out that the British and American forces had overwhelming preponderance in airplanes and armored troops but not great preponderance in infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting to the full such superiority in strength as existed.
Marshal Stalin said that the British and Americans had asked the Russians to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the wishes of the British and Americans were.
The Prime Minister said that his greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration as he witnessed the marvelous advance of the Russian troops. He said the British and Americans recognized the hard and difficult task lying before them in their impending operations but had full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask from the Russians was that the Russians continue to do as they are doing now.
Marshal Stalin said there had been no demand from the British and Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was exerted by them to bring it about.
The President had asked that information of the offensive be given to General Eisenhower in order to assist him in his planning and Air Marshal Tedder, who came to Moscow as General Eisenhower’s representative, had requested that the Russian offensive continue to the end of March but this was understood to be a request from the military leaders.
Marshal Stalin said they had staged their winter offensive because they felt it to be their duty as Allies to do it. They greatly appreciated the attitude manifested by both the President and the Prime Minister in this matter.
The Prime Minister said the reason that neither the British nor Americans had made any attempt to bargain with Marshal Stalin was because of their faith in him and in the Russian people and the realization that they could be depended on to do the right thing. It was his opinion that regardless of the discussions which had been held with Air Marshal Tedder, matters should be fully discussed now by the three Staffs in order to determine what is the best course to pursue with respect to the coordinating of the action on the Western and Eastern Fronts. It was imperative that the two offensives should be integrated so as to get the best results.
Marshal Stalin agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He thought it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as he was not at all certain that the war would be over by that time.
Admiral Cunningham said that he would like to add something to General Marshall’s statement on the submarine warfare. He said while the submarine threat was potentially great it was not very serious at the moment. The point is, however, that the Germans are building large numbers of new types of U-boats. As these will have high underwater speed and embody all the latest technical devices, it will be very difficult for the Allied air and surface craft to deal with them. In Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig the new submarines were being built by prefabrication methods. His greatest wish as a naval man was for the Russians to take Danzig as quickly as possible for in that city about 30 percent of the U-boats were being constructed.
In answer to a question by the President, Marshal Stalin stated that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of the Russian guns but it was hoped that it soon would be.
Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting. After discussion, it was agreed that the Staffs of the three nations would meet at 1200 on Monday, 5 February, at the headquarters of the Russian Delegation.