America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

7952

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
General of the Army Marshall Major General Wood
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Major General Kuter Brigadier General Cabell
Lieutenant General Somervell Brigadier General Lindsay
Vice Admiral Cooke Captain Stroop
Rear Admiral Duncan Captain McDill
Rear Admiral McCormick Colonel Peck
Major General Bull Colonel Dean
Major General Anderson Colonel Lincoln
Major General Hull Colonel Cary
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Graves

JCS Minutes

Floriana, February 1, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret

a. Approval of Minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting

General Kuter stated that his remarks on British participation in the VLR bombing of Japan had been omitted from the minutes of the preceding Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting. Since then he had received a letter on this subject from Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the British Air Staff, which he had forwarded to General Arnold with certain comments of his own. He requested for the purpose of record, that his message to General Arnold (CRICKET 55, dated 1 February 1945), less the last sentence, be attached as an annex to the minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the minutes of the JCS 185th Meeting, subject to the attachment requested by General Kuter.

b. Approval of Minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the CCS 184th Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Strategy in the Mediterranean (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

General Marshall said that the principal issue in this item was the transfer of the Twelfth Air Force. Air Marshal Portal had stated that he was opposed to leaving the adjustments to the theater commanders. General Marshall felt that it was undesirable to allow this matter to lapse and thus delay action on the transfer of ground forces. He proposed the substitution for paragraph 5, page 3 of CCS 773/1 of the following:

  1. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. Your recommendations are desired at once.

General Marshall said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide the overall strength that should be withdrawn from the Twelfth Air Force for use in France and that the details of the withdrawal should be left to negotiations between SCAEF and SACMED. He felt that it might be necessary to debate the necessity for a larger part of the air force remaining in an inactive theater.

Admiral King felt that the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean was considering the use of air in as great strength as possible in the event of a German withdrawal.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend the substitution in the directive to SACMED of the new paragraph 5 proposed by General Marshall.

Provision of LVTs for Mediterranean

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

General Marshall said that this subject had been discussed in the preceding JCS meeting (185th Meeting, 1 February 1945). General Smith had exhibited charts which showed that very little progress had been made in the provision of equipment for the approved figure of 460,000 liberated manpower. He recalled that a possible reduction in this figure had been mentioned and invited any further remarks on the subject.

General Somervell said that General Smith had informed General Riddell-Webster that a figure of 400,000 liberated manpower instead of 460,000 would be acceptable. The British had found that certain items of equipment, particularly shoes, were in short supply. They would, however, be able to provide for the lower figure. The overall problem of supply was extremely difficult. The figure of 172,000 liberated manpower agreed at OCTAGON had gradually increased to an overall of 1,000,000. The British had increased their commitments which included the equipment of Yugoslavs, Greeks, and some of the liberated manpower. The supply can be accomplished but not in a reasonable length of time.

General Bull felt that the only satisfactory solution to the problem was to reduce the requirements to fit the supplies available. This was especially desirable in order to avoid the bad feeling which would result from the arousing of false hopes.

General Somervell added that it might be possible to meet the requirements in phases starting with the figure of 300,000 and completing the remainder subject to the availability of equipment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the foregoing statements.

U-Boat Threat

General Marshall said that the directive before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on countermeasures to the U-boat threat had been prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with Item 6, CCS 184th Meeting.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the directive drafted by the Secretaries.

Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/7, 746/8, 746/9, and 746/10)

General Marshall said that the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board had on their own initiative submitted in CCS 746/10 a supplementary report to CCS 746/6. He recommended approval subject to the deletion of the word “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of CCS 746/10 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendment proposed by General Marshall.

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwestern Europe

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)

General Marshall said that in CCS 775 the British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2 be reaffirmed subject to the amendment of paragraph h as indicated in this paper.

Admiral Duncan said that the Joint Staff Planners recommended the amendment of the first and last sentences of the paragraph in order to prevent the supply of liberated areas from being placed in the same category as the supply of allies such as France, Russia or China.

General Somervell explained that unless the last sentence of the proposed new paragraph is altered or deleted altogether, it will if accepted have the effect of giving first priority to shipping requirements for liberated areas. This would place shipments of civilian requirements ahead of British and American military requirements which, of course, could not be accepted. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the substitute paragraph subject to deletion of the last sentence. If the British would not accept deletion of the last sentence, the amendments proposed by Admiral Duncan might then be put forward as a compromise.

General Marshall suggested that the first line of the last sentence be deleted and that the phrase “without prejudice to the fulfillment of other basic undertakings” precede the words “to provide” in the remainder of the sentence.

After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that paragraph h be modified to read:

Provide assistance to each of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to apply this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Without prejudice to the fulfillment of the other basic undertakings to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity against Germany and Japan.

7953

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 2, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
021100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP

(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 300

In the area northeast of Monschau, Allied forces continued mopping-up operations. Southeast of Monschau, we have made gains of from 800 to 3,000 yards against light resistance from pillboxes in the Monschau Forest.

Our units made additional gains in the forest east of Rocherath, and Krinkelt and are within a few hundred yards of the German border.

Schönberg, six miles east of St. Vith, is in our hands and we have advanced two miles farther east and crossed the Belgian-German border to capture Laudesfeld. Farther south, our elements are within one mile of Winterscheid and we have taken Eigelscheid and Heckhalenfeld east of the Our River.

Southeast of Haguenau near the Rhine, our forces broke a six-day lull in the Northern Alsace plain with an attack which gained up to two miles against strong resistance. We crossed the Moder River in these operations. Hard fighting is in progress at Oberhöfen.

Farther south, the Steinwald Forest, north of Gambsheim was cleared.

South of Strasbourg, the area between the Ill and the Rhine Rivers has been largely cleared by our infantry and armor. We have reached the Rhine at several points northeast of Colmar.

Gains up to three miles were made in our continuing drive south of the Colmar Canal. In this area, fighter-bombers attacked targets at Arztenheim, Baltzenheim and Biesheim, close to the west bank of the Rhine.

Our artillery has been firing on the enemy holding the Breisach railway bridge over the Rhine.

Enemy resistance continued strong on the southern edge of the Colmar sector where only local gains were made.

Escorted heavy bombers in great strength struck at objectives in Germany, including railway marshalling yards at Mannheim, Ludwigshafen and Rhine bridges at Wesel, northwest of the Ruhr.

Other escorted heavy bombers attacked the railway junction of München-Gladbach, west of Düsseldorf.

Medium and light bombers with fighter escort attacked communication centers at Schleiden, Brandscheid and Prüm, rail bridges spanning the Rhine at Engers, the Lahn River at Nassau and the Moselle River at Eller, road junctions at Blankenheim, southeast of Schleiden and at Wittlich. During the operation, several barges on the Rhine northwest of Koblenz were destroyed.

Rail traffic north of the Ruhr in the areas of Bocholt, Dülmen, Coesfeld, and Burgesteinfurt and gun positions east of Coesfeld were attacked by fighter-bombers and rocket-firing fighters.

Last night, heavy bombers in very great strength made heavy attacks on the main railway centers at Mainz, Ludwigshafen and Siegen and light bombers struck at the rail network north of the Ruhr. Berlin also was bombed.

One enemy aircraft was shot down during the day and night fighters destroyed another during the night. One of our heavy bombers and three fighters are missing from the daylight operations.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
7954

U.S. State Department (February 2, 1945)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon

Montgomery House, Floriana, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Major General Kuter Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Smith Field Marshal Alexander
Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay
Rear Admiral McCormick Admiral Somerville
Major General Bull General Riddell-Webster
Major General Anderson Air Marshal Robb
Major General Hull Major General Laycock
Brigadier General Loutzenheiser
Brigadier General Cabell
Secretariat*
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob
Captain Graves Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Commander Coleridge

CCS Minutes

February 2, 1945
Top secret

Approval of Minutes of CCS 184th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces (CCS 768/1)

Sir Alan Brooke said that he understood that the question of equipment for Allied and liberated forces had been under discussion by General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster. It was understood that the requirement for internal security for mobile military labor and miscellaneous units could be cut from a total commitment of 460,000 to 400,000 and equipped on the scale of British forces rather than a United States scale – a commitment which he believed that the British could undertake. It would however be necessary to confirm this with the War Office, which would be done as quickly as possible.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note that SCAEF’s requirements in liberated manpower could be reduced from 460,000 to 400,000.

b. Agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841 upon assurance by the British Chiefs of Staff that, subject to confirmation from London, this implementation would not:

  1. Interfere with the provision already affirmed in principle of equipment, on the scale for British forces, for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor

  2. Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.

Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/8)

Sir Alan Brooke suggested the substitution of the word “some” for the word “present” in the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 746/10. With regard to paragraph 6d, he felt that it should be made clear that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at ARGONAUT should be completed before the conference ended. To enable this to be achieved it would be necessary for the shipping team to go to MAGNETO unless it could be definitely decided that the conference would be continued at CRICKET after the MAGNETO discussions had been concluded. It was generally agreed that the shipping staffs should remain at CRICKET.

General Marshall suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word “programs” in paragraph 5b.

Turning to CCS 746/8, Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff accepted the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff, provided that a sentence could be added to paragraph 4 to make it clear that coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/10 subject to the substitution of “some” for “present” in the first line of paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” in the fourth line of paragraph 5b.

b. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of CCS 746/8 subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following: “Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.”

c. Agreed that during the absence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in ARGONAUT, the shipping staffs would continue their studies at CRICKET with a view to the submission of a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to the conclusion of ARGONAUT.

Levels of Supply of Petroleum Products in U.K. and Northwest Europe

Transfer of Tactical Air Forces from SACMED to SCAEF (CCS 773/1 and 773/2)

General Marshall said that as he saw it the British proposal left the matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later. He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force should move to Northwest Europe, which was the decisive theater in which additional airpower would produce the most valuable results. A move of the tactical air force to the southern part of the line in France was complementary to the British Chiefs of Staff’s desire to strengthen the northern thrust.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the offensive on the Western Front would be assisted by action on the Italian Front.

General Marshall pointed out that there was considerable air strength in Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event the United States’ P-47s would be of the utmost help in cutting communications beyond the limits of the shorter-ranged British fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised 4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the Mediterranean.

There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement. The commander concerned must of course say which he required first, but there were also political factors involved. The public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for the present fitted in well with this political consideration since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal interpretation of the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph 2 of CCS 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups particularly required by General Eisenhower. He understood that such a move was agreeable to Field Marshal Alexander and would leave three fighter-bomber groups in Italy. He understood, however, that it was important that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force should remain in Italy since they administered and controlled the medium bombers and troop carriers of the Twelfth Air Force.

General Marshall said he understood that the 6th Army Group was inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.

General Kuter said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the main effort. All this force should be made available to General Eisenhower to move when he required it.

General Marshall said that the French forces in the South were inadequately provided with air support and the air forces in question were urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.

Sir Alan Brooke felt that when this pocket had been eliminated the Allied line in this sector would be very strong.

Field Marshal Alexander said he was anxious to retain the Twelfth Air Force headquarters but he had many able officers in the theater from among whom he would be glad to provide General Eisenhower a new air headquarters in southern France.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in CCS 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:

  1. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Provision of LVTs for the Mediterranean

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U-Boat Threat

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in accordance with Conclusion 6b of the CCS 184th Meeting.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to dispatch it to all appropriate commanders (Subsequently circulated as CCS 774/3).

Basic Undertakings (CCS 775)

In reply to a question from Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our operations based on that country.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic undertakings contained in paragraph 6h of the interim report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776).

General Marshall explained that the British proposal would introduce a new category of basic undertakings which would affect the availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen. Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.

General Somervell pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and unrest and requirements to implement the U.S. military manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included under the military shipping requirements.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on this subject.

Interim Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that paragraph 6h of CCS 776 should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was still under discussion.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the paragraph dealing with cargo shipping could not yet be inserted since British acceptance of CCS 746/10 was conditional upon the rewording of paragraph 6h of the interim report along the lines indicated in CCS 775.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.

7955

JCS to the President

Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
Nr: No #.

Top Secret memorandum for the President.

Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Law in their memorandum of agreement concerning shipping for liberated areas made the recommendation that the military and civilian authorities of the respective governments be ready to make recommendations to their heads of government at the coming conference concerning the allocation of shipping. The British Chiefs of Staff have twice been asked to reaffirm the overall objective of bringing about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan and the overall strategic concept of beating Germany first while simultaneously extending unremitting pressure against Japan, followed by concentration of full U.S.-U.K. resources on Japan. Twice the British Chiefs of Staff have conditioned their continued acceptance of these basic agreements with the statement that this acceptance is subject to any decisions concerning shipping at the coming conference.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.

The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.

The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has always been recognized and these are included under the theater commander’s military priorities. There is no doubt that more shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help out the liberated peoples. At best this could be only a trickle. The sound and quickest step toward giving the aid wanted is to end the war quickly. The Chiefs of Staff recognize that considerations other than military may dictate some small allocations of shipping to non-military purposes in a priority above everything but urgent military necessity.

Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 30 January 1945
Top secret
CCS 746/7

After considering CCS 746/6 the United States Chiefs of Staff agree that additional relief supplies and home rehabilitation for liberated areas are most desirable. They consider, however, the basic truth is that the best help we can possibly give the populations of liberated territories in Europe or elsewhere is to win the war as quickly as possible following out the overall objective which has been agreed up to this time. The principles for allocation of shipping proposed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board Representatives in CCS 746/6 can gravely lower our military effectiveness and may jeopardize complete victory. The vital military point involved to the United States Chiefs of Staff is the cost in American lives which would almost certainly result from placing non-military requirements in a priority where they could compete with military needs essential to ending the global war successfully at the earliest date.

A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money and resources to the United States resulting from any prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much more than the actual number of days’ delay to a particular operation which would result from acceding to a demand for resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the British representatives of the combined military transportation committee that cuts in estimates for operations can be made without adverse effects on those operations, the U.S. has already reviewed its military requirements and made a major cut below the theater commander’s minimum estimates. If anything the minimum U.S. military requirements may prove to be higher than contained in the study to date.

The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.

They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so overriding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.

Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:

Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.

It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:

A. First priority to

  1. Military requirements (including civil relief) vital to the successful conduct of current and projected operations in accordance with agreed strategic concepts. This may include military lend-lease for existing forces engaged in operations.

  2. Increasing the fighting forces of the United Nations in order to apply greater pressure against the Axis powers.

  3. Civilian requirements that are vital to the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war-making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.

D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.

E. Requirements in higher priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower priorities.

F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.

G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.

H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.

7956 
740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 1, 1945
Secret
U.S. urgent

To the Secretary of State from Clayton.

Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control. On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom and the United States of America signed an Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.

Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.

The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude towards the Shipping Agreement. Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, has been to Stockholm to discuss the matter with Mr. Gunther, Swedish Foreign Minister, and subsequent thereto went to Moscow to discuss the matter.

Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador Winant is reported also inclined to this view. The consensus is that the Russians are suspicious of any arrangements which look like a combine of other powers with post-war implications, and are uncertain of their ability to maintain position in negotiations relating to problems with which they have had relatively little experience. Another factor which may affect the Soviet attitude is the participation of the Polish Government-in-Exile in the Shipping Agreement.

It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and Great Britain should be made directly to Stalin to fully explain the Agreement, its intents and purposes, to clear up any misunderstandings. Through Mr. Harriman, Russia was kept informed of the preliminary negotiations and of the Agreement reached.

Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.

7957

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Malta, 1 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 775

Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept

The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at OCTAGON and set out in CCS 680/2, paragraph 6, be reaffirmed, subject to the following amendment.

For existing h. substitute the following:

h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.

7958

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger Mrs. Oliver
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes
7959

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 6:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Major General Kuter Field Marshal Wilson
General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major General Jacob

CCS Minutes

February 2, 1945
Top secret

The Meeting had under consideration an interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 776/1).

The President expressed his appreciation of the amount of progress which had been made in so short a time in the military discussions.

The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph.

a. Paragraph 6h
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that discussion was proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to be included in this paragraph.

General Marshall said that the wording proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff raised a new question which involved placing supplies for liberated areas, over and above those required for the prevention of disease and unrest, in the same category as operational requirements. This would entail a change in the general priority at the expense of essential military requirements, which the United States Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to accept.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the British import program would be affected. He pointed out that Great Britain had had less than half her pre-war imports for over five years, and he was afraid lest the requirements of liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements, would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped to import into Great Britain in 1945.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the wording of the proposed basic undertaking was still under discussion, and the matter was not submitted for consideration at the present meeting.

The Prime Minister, referring to paragraph 6f, thought that great efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the Dardanelles.

Admiral King said that this was all in hand and the first convoy was expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused by the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been ready to receive the supplies.

b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8)
The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet come to take drastic measures at the expense of other operations, though it might be necessary to do so if the U-boat campaign developed in the way expected.

c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10)
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that complete agreement had been reached on this question.

The Prime Minister referred to the importance of having plenty of divisions available for the support of the main operation in the North, so that tired divisions could be replaced.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this had been allowed for. Ten divisions would be in reserve and available to replace tired divisions in the battle. Other divisions could also be taken from the less active parts of the front.

The Prime Minister inquired what action had been taken on SCAF 180.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had taken note of this telegram. General Bedell Smith had given further explanations of General Eisenhower’s proposed operations, and two further telegrams had been received from the latter. SCAF 180 should be read in the light of these additional explanations and telegrams.

The Prime Minister questioned the meaning of the words “to close the Rhine” which occurred in paragraph 10 of the report.

It was explained that these words were a quotation from General Eisenhower’s signal, and were understood to mean making contact with, or closing up to, the Rhine.

d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11, 12, and 13)
The President inquired whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that if the forces proposed were withdrawn from the Italian Front, enough troops would be left behind for the task in hand.

Sir Alan Brooke said that Field Marshal Alexander had been consulted and had agreed to the withdrawal of three divisions forthwith, and two further divisions as soon as they could be released from Greece.

The Prime Minister said that there should be no obligation to take forces away from Greece until the situation there admitted of their withdrawal. It was necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a broad-based government.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to paragraph 4 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean (Appendix “A” to the report), in which it was stated that further complete formations after the first three divisions would be sent as they could be released from Greece.

The Prime Minister said that he expected that by the time the first three divisions had moved it would be possible to start withdrawing troops from Greece. He was in full agreement with the course proposed, and was particularly glad that General Marshall had taken the view that Canadian and British troops should be withdrawn. There were special reasons for desiring the transfer to France of the Canadian Corps. He was also anxious that the British contribution to the heavy fighting which would be taking place in Northwest Europe should be as great as possible.

In reply to an inquiry by the President, Sir Henry Maitland Wilson said that he was in complete agreement with the course proposed.

With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, Sir Charles Portal explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that the move of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and proposals for further moves were to be made by the Supreme Commanders in consultation.

The Prime Minister agreed that it would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces from Italy, as to do so would be to relieve the Germans of an ever-present anxiety.

Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the Prime Minister said that he attached great importance to a rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any surrender of the German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we should occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the Russians.

Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, the Prime Minister said that he presumed that the phrase “the territory of Yugoslavia” should be interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of Yugoslavia. There were certain territories which were claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy and he was unwilling to give any suggestion of support to the claims of either side. For example, Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern Europe and the question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely reserved.

The President agreed and said that he was unwilling to see either the Yugoslavs or the Italians in complete control.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the phrase as used in the report applied to the present territory of Yugoslavia.

The War Against Japan

e. Operations in Southeast Asia Command (paragraphs 18 and 19)
The Prime Minister said that the main object of the operations to clear the enemy from Burma was to liberate the important army engaged there for further operations against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs had come to any conclusion on what these further operations should be.

Sir Alan Brooke referred to Appendix “C” of the report, which contained the proposed directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command. The directive gave as the next task the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca.

The Prime Minister hoped there would be time to review this matter in accordance with developments. For example, if the Japanese forces in Java or Sumatra were greatly weakened, small detachments might be able to go in and liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go where a good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the Japanese, particularly in the air, as this was the only way which the British had been able to discover of helping the main American operations in the Pacific.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Supreme Allied Commander was directed to submit his plans, and it would then be possible to review the matter.

The Prime Minister inquired whether paragraph 18 meant that there would be no help from United States air forces in operations in the Kra Peninsula, Malaya, et cetera.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any such help would be the subject of a separate agreement when the plan had been received.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the President had not been somewhat disappointed at the results achieved by the Chinese, having regard to the tremendous American efforts which had been made to give them support.

The President said that three generations of education and training would be required before China could become a serious factor.

General Marshall pointed out that the picture in China was now considerably changed. In the first place, certain well-trained Chinese troops were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma. Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first artillery for the Chinese Army had been able to go through. Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go well, additional trained Chinese troops could move back to China, and it was hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be in existence.

The Prime Minister said that it now appeared that the American and British operations in this part of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on into China and the British effort was turning to the south. He inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move of British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part in the operations there.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the facilities for sending equipment and supplies into China allowed of the support of Chinese forces, who required a considerably lower scale than British troops. These facilities certainly could not support British troops as well.

General Marshall agreed that the maintenance of British forces in China was not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead for critical operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps, which had a stiffening of United States personnel in their tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, et cetera, and there was an effective air force. These forces should now be able to insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they pleased in China. The aid which could be given by these forces to the American arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this way be initiated – one arm of the pincer being represented by the forces assaulting the selected spot on the Chinese Pacific Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the pincer would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm would be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the American main operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the Philippines had changed the picture in Southeast Asia, and would make further operations by Admiral Mountbatten’s forces much easier. He felt that it was important that Admiral Mountbatten should know what forces would be available to him in these operations, and that he should not plan on a false assumption. The American military authorities in Southeast Asia would know what United States forces could at any time not be supported logistically in China. These could be made available to Admiral Mountbatten in Burma. It might even be possible to bring air forces back from China for specific operations. Admiral Mountbatten should, however, be under no illusion as to what forces he could count on for his operations.

The Prime Minister repeated that if the Americans made any request for British troops to go into China, he would certainly be prepared to consider it.

Admiral Leahy said that all the transportation available was fully required for the forces now in China, or earmarked for China.

General Marshall agreed, and said that he did not think it would be practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had been secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only a very little in the way of equipping the Chinese ground army. Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs of the American air forces. It would now be possible to handle the requirements of the Chinese ground forces.

Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix “B,” which contained an outline of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific, the Prime Minister inquired whether it had been decided to delay the assault on Japan until after the close of the German war.

General Marshall said that this delay had been necessitated by the fact that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and service troops, could not be made available in sufficient quantities to enable the main operations against Japan to be carried out. If the German war had ended in December of 1944, it would have been possible to operate against Kyushu in the autumn of 1945. There were also certain seasonal limitations on operations in this area.

Summing up, the Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that such a great measure of agreement had been reached. He understood that the present report was merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast of the progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be rendered later.

The President agreed, and again expressed his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.

Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions, and Sir Alan Brooke explained that arrangements were being made to keep all the accommodations available at Malta so that the conference could be resumed there if necessary after the discussions with the Russians.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their agreement with this action, and said that although final plans need not be made until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at Malta on the return journey would be desirable.

The Meeting then adjourned.

7960

Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.

On board the USS Quincy in Grand Harbor, Malta

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger Mrs. Oliver
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Byrnes
Fleet Admiral Leahy
7961

U.S. Navy Department (February 2, 1945)

Communiqué No. 573

The LST reported in Navy Department communiqué No. 571 should have been identified as the LST-749. The LST-749 was lost in operations in the Philippine Area. The LST-759 has not been lost.

Communiqué No. 574

Far East.
U.S. submarines have reported the sinking of ten enemy vessels as a result of operations in these waters. The ships sunk were:

  • 2 medium cargo transports
  • 2 medium tankers
  • 3 small cargo vessels
  • 1 large transport
  • 1 medium transport
  • 1 small tanker

These sinkings have not been announced in any previous Navy Department communiqué.

7962

The Pittsburgh Press (February 2, 1945)

TWO ARMIES CLOSE ON MANILA
Yanks ashore southwest of Luzon capital

Other troops gain north of city

map.020245.up
New Luzon landing by the Eighth Army put U.S. forces ashore at Nasugbu, southwest of Manila, as Sixth and Eighth Army troops drove on the city from the northwest.

GEN. MACARTHUR’S HQ, Luzon, the Philippines (UP) – American tanks and infantrymen converged on Manila from two sides today.

The capital and the entire Jap defense system in southern Luzon were outflanked with a surprise landing 13 miles below the mouth of Manila Bay.

Amphibious forces of the U.S. Eighth Army, knifing into the enemy’s thinly-held west coast defenses for the third time in 48 hours, swarmed ashore early Wednesday at Nasugbu Bay, 41 miles southwest of Manila.

The landing was completed without loss and at last reports the Americans were advancing inland through weak opposition at a pace that may have already carried them to the shores of Manila Bay, within artillery range of Corregidor.

Liberate internees

Troops of the U.S. 11th Airborne Division who carried out the new invasion captured Nasugbu town, liberating a colony of interned European nationals, and struck out for Tagaytay Ridge, 20 miles to the east, where Highway 3 curves northward to Manila.

The operation started out as a “reconnaissance in force” by units of the 11th Airborne Division, but was turned into a major landing by on-the-spot orders of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the Eighth Army. He ordered the landing when the first assault units reported only token opposition.

Tokyo broadcasts said the Americans now have at least eight or nine divisions on Luzon and asserted that about 11,000 to 11,200 Yanks have been killed or wounded in the first three weeks of the campaign. The enemy accounts contended that the main Jap forces on the island have not yet been engaged.

Patrols operate freely

The new thrust broke open the back door to Manila, already menaced by U.S. Sixth Army veterans moving down from the north. The Sixth Army’s 37th “Buckeye” Infantry Division was reported 20 miles or less north of the capital, on and probably beyond the Angat River line below Calumpit.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s communiqué said the 37th Infantry Division’s patrols were operating freely throughout the area, indicating that the Japs were making no attempt at a determined stand above the capital.

Caught between the two American columns, the Japs in Manila faced the prospect of retreating southeastward around the shores of Laguna de Bay within the next few days of being trapped and annihilated inside the city. Their only other alternative was a flight to Corregidor for a death stand on “the Rock.”

Battle near Clark Field

As the battle for Manila moved into its final stage, fierce fighting in the foothills of the Zambales Mountains 50-odd miles to the northwest, where several thousand Japs were being bombed and shelled out of their hilltop positions just west of Clark Field and Fort Stotsenburg.

Considerably weaker resistance faced the U.S. Eighth Army spearheads advancing eastward across the 18-mile-wide base of Bataan Peninsula from the recaptured Olongapo Naval Base at the head of Subic Bay. Vanguards of the Eighth Army were reported nearing Dinalupihan, 13 miles east of Olongapo, where they were expected to seal off the peninsula by joining Sixth Army forces moving down from Lubao, 10 miles to the northeast.

Far to the north, other Sixth Army forces beat down savage Jap opposition northeast and east of the Lingayen Gulf beachheads. An enemy column was ambushed and destroyed on the Umingan–Balungao road near the eastern end of the American line. The Japs suffered heavy casualties and eight of their medium tanks, eight artillery pieces, 15 tracked vehicles and many supply trucks were destroyed or captured.

Gain four miles

In the upper Agno River sector 10 miles north of Umingan, U.S. troops drove four miles east of Tayug to the Nativad area, while three miles farther north they captured San Nicolas after a six-mile advance eastward from San Manuel.

U.S. heavy bombers dropped 152 tons of bombs on Corregidor and the Cavite Naval Base in Manila Bay, while other raiders swept the enemy’s road lines and airfields in northern Luzon, destroying five grounded planes at the Loag and Tuguegarao airdromes and sinking a small freighter and eight barges off the island’s north coast.

Fighter-escorted PT boats sank another coastal vessel, two barges and two small craft in a sweep around the east coast of Luzon.

Long-range U.S. fighters destroyed six and probably eight more Jap planes in a daylight sweep over Formosa and other raiders set fire to a 10,000-ton enemy tanker south of the Sakishima Islands.

Tokyo broadcasts said Jap submarines torpedoed and probably sank two large American transports and an oil tanker off the west coast of Luzon Tuesday and that a U.S. submarine was sunk by air action somewhere in the Western Pacific.

7963

Prisoners killed by Jap neglect

Rescued describe conditions on Luzon
By Frank Hewlett, United Press staff writer

…

7964

Allied troops storm Alsatian stronghold – Yanks attack West Wall

Nazis may abandon Colmar bridgehead in East France – Eisenhower, aides confer

…

7965

Berlin bracing for death stand

By the United Press

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7966

U.S. casualties increase 35,392

Army, Navy totals reach 737,342

…

7967

WPB SHUTS GAS-HEATED THEATERS, BARS
Fuel crisis perils schools, churches, too

Operations curtailed in industrial plants

…

7968

U.S. moves to curb walkout in mines

Federally-operated pits are involved

…

7969

Work-or-else bill rushed in Senate

Committee gives control to Byrnes

…

7970

Sinatra starts draft board trip

…

7971

I DARE SAY —
The real reason

By Florence Fisher Parry

…