From Roosevelt:
When I was in Cairo I had a very nice visit from the Very Reverend Arthur Hughes. We talked about the Italian priests and also the Italian nuns who are interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia, and the day I left I called the whole matter to Churchill’s attention and pleaded with him that these perfectly innocent people should be released, or at least allowed to do their work. I have not had any answer from the British as yet.
His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes called on the President.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Turkey |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | President Inönü |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu |
| Mr. Steinhardt | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Açikalin |
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen | Mr. Anderiman | |
| General Wilson | Mr. Kavur | |
| Air Chief Marshal Douglas | Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu | |
| Vice Admiral Willis | ||
| Air Vice Marshal George | ||
| Mr. Helm |
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443
December 6, 1943
Most secret
Prior to the meeting President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish President had been in private conference.
Mr. Churchill said that the Turkish President had decided to postpone his departure until midnight on 7 December. This would provide an opportunity for going over the ground in greater detail. He had submitted to the President a plan of action and this would raise the question of how it was to be carried out if Turkey were attacked and drawn into the war. In the interval a plan would be drawn up for Turkish action in conjunction with the great Allies. There was also the question of political guarantees, if Turkey by her actions should be drawn into the conflict. It was right and proper that in this event the Allies should see Turkey through.
President Roosevelt remarked that when it came to the discussion of political guarantees it would be desired to include Soviet representatives.
The Turkish President said he had been in contact with Mr. Churchill during the afternoon when the essential points had been made. They would be able to discuss these tomorrow when the position would be clearer in all directions. He thought however that one feature governed the solution of the whole question, namely the period for material preparation. After that came other phases. As the President now understood it, however, such a period of preparation was not envisaged, or rather that a mixed method was contemplated. This was a cardinal point.
President Roosevelt thought in the first period Turkey would commit only neutral acts. She would receive equipment and material (Mr. Churchill – personnel) and men in mufti. Mr. Churchill remarked that in these conditions the Germans would not want to break with Turkey.
The Turkish President said that for months Turkey would face the German army alone. He had not contemplated this. He had thought that when the Germans declared war the Turks would be in touch with some Anglo-American forces. But in this period of months the Turks would be alone with the Germans. This was a great question and the President did not think he could decide upon it.
President Roosevelt remarked that he did not think that the Germans would declare war in the first period.
President Inönü said that their record showed that the Germans always attacked for prevention. When they saw after a certain time that Turkey had taken her place openly with the Allies, they would use this argument and attack.
President Roosevelt pointed out that the Turks had already been receiving supplies on a considerable scale without the Germans taking exception thereto. Why then should the Turks worry now? In the first period there would be no question of the Turks taking the kind of action which would justify the Germans attacking them. Surely the work on airfields and the introduction of material, flak, etc., i.e., the same sort of thing as had been going on in the past, could continue. This would apply to lend-lease material and the trucks previously promised would be delivered. In fact, there would be no change except that there would be an accelerated tempo.
Mr. Eden remarked that the technicians would also have to come in. This was essential.
President Inönü said that the Turks had replied to Mr. Eden’s request for air bases for the Allies. It has been said that the provision of these would not provoke war. The Turks had replied that they must regard the matter as very serious because they were convinced that it would provoke war. This meant contemplating Turkey’s entry into the war. The Turkish army was not ready and the country was exposed to enemy air attack. They must therefore have assistance and there would have to be a period of preparation. According to the plan action would begin at the end of this phase. We were now in the first phase and he understood that it was thought that preparation would take too long at a time when the Allies could not wait. The Allies seemed to think that the Turkish Government should act in spite of risks. This was difficult.
Mr. Eden said that a German land attack was most improbable, especially in view of the warning which Russia had promised to give to Bulgaria.
President Inönü said that Turkey would be exposed to air attack and also to land attack by the Bulgarian army fortified by the Germans. President Roosevelt doubted whether Bulgaria would face a hostile Russia.
President Inönü said that perhaps a hostile Russia would induce Bulgaria to hold back, perhaps it would not. The present Bulgarian government was completely committed to Germany.
President Roosevelt did not think that Bulgaria would declare war on Turkey, and he doubted whether the Germans had enough men to stage a German land offensive against Turkey by way of Bulgaria. President Inönü thought, however, that the Germans would be able to get to Istanbul.
In reply to a question by President Roosevelt President Inönü said that Turkey had about forty divisions scattered about the country. They were not prepared. If the Allies had been able to give the desired material assistance in the past the Turkish Government could have replied affirmatively to any demand. As it was they had put all available material, including some very very old stuff, into service. They had hoped that this entirely out of date material would be replaced by new material. How was it possible to get out of the impasse?
Mr. Churchill said that the first thing was to prepare the nests for the birds. This must be done secretly and discreetly in order not to alarm the Germans. The equipment and personnel agreed upon would be put in. Then would come the second phase when all was ready and when the air squadrons would arrive within twenty-four hours. From that moment Turkey would have much greater security than during the preliminary period.
President Inönü said that even if the twenty air squadrons had arrived or were ready to come in, it would not be possible to say that Turkey was ready. Complete plans for assistance would have to be made and material would have to come in for the fortification of the army. In the event of attack the Allies would have to assist. Only one part of the preparation for this assistance was being discussed. The rest was being left to wait. But during the preparatory period proposed in the discussions, he must prepare his army, mobilize it and concentrate it. Much had been done but it was most inadequate, and a sort of concentration must take place. All this was apparently to be finished by 15 February, and the Turkish army must be put on a war footing for the Germans would strike at the first sign of the entry of the twenty squadrons.
Mr. Churchill enquired whether the Turkish army was not already mobilized and was informed that it was half mobilized.
President Roosevelt suggested that if mobilization had first to take place it would take a long time and suggested, as did Mr. Churchill, that in any case mobilization would surely be more provocative than work on airfields.
President Inönü said that precipitate action without preparation seemed to be contemplated. He did not see any possibility of undertaking this.
Mr. Churchill remarked that the Turkish President seemed to think there was a serious danger of invasion. He however thought invasion by Bulgaria was most unlikely.
President Inönü said it was a matter of opinion. One could not be sure what the enemy would do. Both the Bulgarians and the Germans had forces on the Turkish frontier, and the Turks must calculate that they would all be used.
Mr. Churchill thought that it was impossible to get to a conclusion at this meeting. He would like to go over the ground with the Turkish President on 7 December together with documents. The discussion could not be concluded this evening.
President Roosevelt said that what he envisaged was to talk of the first period and to set an objective date for it. This date would not be a hard and fast one, but it would be something to aim at. During this period, which would be in two parts, the Turks would give the Germans and Bulgarians no excuse whatever for declaring war on Turkey. In the first part of the period, work on the airfields would go ahead exactly as had happened before, and supplies and equipment, delivery of which was behindhand, would be sent forward. Neither of these would give any excuse to the Germans.
The delivery by the Americans of the thousand lorries with which they were behind-hand would give the Germans no excuse or provocation. At the same time mechanics, equipment, Radar and technical equipment would come in as it had done before, and none of this would provide an excuse for Germany.
Mr. Churchill interjected that the flow would be on the same lines as before but on a much more intense scale, otherwise Turkey would not be ready.
President Roosevelt said that as regards work on the airfields, the work would go on as before and Turkish labour would be employed. This action would not provoke the Germans.
President Roosevelt went on to say that in the second part of his contemplated first period the Turks would bring more of their troops scattered throughout the country to the European side of the Bosphorus. Turkey had the right to do this without provoking an attack. It was President Roosevelt’s expectation (not alone his hope) that Turkey could get through the whole of this period without attack or war. At the end of it the tempo would be accelerated but by that time preparations would have got so far that the twenty squadrons could be brought in and be in action within twenty-four hours if Turkey were attacked.
President Inönü said it was a question of practical things. He was afraid that hopes could not be realized. The standpoint of the British was that Turkey must come in as soon as possible. If he said yes, the plan would be that proposed by Mr. Churchill, then Turkey would begin to mobilize. The first thing would be to facilitate the arrival of the British squadrons. Mr. Churchill’s expectation would then be realized. But this would mean Turkey’s immediate entry into the war and the only assistance she would receive would be air assistance. The Turks contended that they were not ready for immediate entry. Their view was that a planned preparation must be made before Turkey could enter. It seemed to be thought that in contending thus, the Turks were merely dragging things out and adopting delaying tactics.
President Roosevelt said that the Allies also were not ready, for the twenty squadrons would only be ready on 15 February and Mr. Churchill said that he was asking for the squadrons to come in on 15 February.
President Inönü said however that other things were necessary, in particular the army had to be strengthened.
Mr. Churchill enquired how long this would take. In view of the paucity of Turkish communications it would take months to make the Turkish army completely strong so as to enable Turkey to be safe and by that time there probably would be no desire that Turkey should come in. The war was going on and the moment for Turkey would pass. This was a serious possibility for the Turks.
President Roosevelt remarked that the Turkish army was very good, particularly the infantry. Its artillery was good, especially for ground warfare. It needed improved communications and aviation. He had been wondering whether by February 15 the Turkish army could not be trained and concentrated in the north to an extent adequate to ward off attack with the aid of air support.
President Inonu said that if this was a question only of mobilization and concentration it could be done, or at least for the greater part. But at the end of it the Turkish army would only have its present material. Technical points were now being discussed and Mr. Churchill said that the strengthening of the Turkish army would take months and months. It was twenty days since the Turkish government had given their reply of November 17, and nothing had happened in the interval. Turkey’s material needs could be studied and ascertained in a week and then the Allies could say, on the basis of supply and transport possibilities, how long it would take before Turkey was ready.
Mr. Churchill pointed out that Turkish communications had been fully occupied since the delivery of the Turkish note on November 17. The Turkish army was good; it had been mobilized for four years. It was a considerable force, much stronger than the Bulgarian army, and it had already received much. It was true that it had not received as much as the Turks would have liked, but he considered that the danger of a Bulgarian land attack was negligible. Mr. Churchill suggested that it would be better to adjourn the discussions. If President Roosevelt would confide the further discussions to him he would continue conversations with President Inönü on December 7 and report to President Roosevelt by telegram.
President Roosevelt said that he would have liked to have been here to complete the discussions, but that he must leave on 7 December. He urged very strongly that serious consideration should be given to the question of how much could be done before 15 February without giving offence to Germany and Bulgaria.
President Inönü said the situation seemed to be that Turkey would intervene on 15 February (President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at once contested this). There would be a period of preparation. What could the Allies give Turkey in two months? What could be carried? The Turkish General Staff would study these points. But what would happen after February 15? That, he presumed, would be the period for action.
President Roosevelt said it would not necessarily be the period of action. But from February 15 the Turks would be expected to do things which were no longer neutral. It meant that there would be two months before Bulgaria or Germany would attack, and Mr. Churchill remarked that in that time Bulgaria might well be out of the war.
President Inönü wondered at what the level of preparations would be in two months. It could not be determined without study.
Mr. Churchill said that this would be gone into in the further conversations. To the Turkish President’s remark that he had no military experts with him, Mr. Churchill said that the Allies would say what they could put in.
President Inönü said he would wait for this information. He could not say whether it would be enough, but he would take the information and return to Ankara. He would however be obliged to reserve his reply. To President Roosevelt’s remark that his Chief of Staff (General Somerville) would arrive tomorrow and be here for two days, the Turkish President enquired why there should not be staff talks. Mr. Churchill pointed out that time was too pressing and that the twenty squadrons had to be got ready.
President Inönü said that in three or four days he would be ready to reply. The decision would be taken on all the facts. They found themselves in a situation which was fixed by time, but he would see what could be provided within two months and the Turkish staff would offer their observations, including modifications and additions.
President Roosevelt thought that agreement should be reached on that. It was useless to talk about other matters. This was the core of the whole problem. He would leave General Somerville [Somervell], or his assistant, to pursue the discussions which were mainly military. Mr. Numan again remarked that the Turks had no military experts, but Mr. Churchill pointed out that the question should be discussed and the Turks then send their observations.
Mr. Eden stressed that not everything should be adjourned for consideration at Ankara. Things must be pushed forward.
Mr. Churchill cautioned that at the best not much could be provided for the Turkish army. The Turkish communications would be blocked by the delivery of the air programme. The agreed material and technicians must go forward, and there would not be much room for anything else. The Turks must therefore not put their military material expectations too high as otherwise all hopes would be killed.
President Inönü said he was forcing himself to try to find a possible position in the Allied programme. He was doing so with the best will in the world. But he must make the position clear. So far the Turks had no material. A preparatory period of two months was now proposed to him. He had not said that this was enough. The Allies had the material and the transport, but he did not know how much was going to be available. He understood however that the main effort was to be concentrated on aviation material and personnel. (Mr. Churchill interjected that air was the only danger). At present, as the Turkish President saw it, it was contemplated that Turkey would enter the war with anti-aircraft preparation alone.
President Roosevelt then suggested the conclusion of the meeting and kept back the Turkish President to whom he wished to bid goodbye.
Cairo, December 6, 1943
Secret
CCS 426/1
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at SEXTANT Conference is submitted herewith:
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces.
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the overall objectives.
j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.
k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.
The U-boat war
We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging reports regarding the U-boat war. (CCS 399 and 399/1)
The Combined Bomber Offensive
a. We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined bombing operations against Germany. (CCS 403)
b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.
c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available.
EUREKA decisions
At the EUREKA Conference, the following military conclusions were approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin.
The Conference:
a. Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:b. Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:
c. Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:
d. Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:
e. Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.
In the light of the above EUREKA decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater:
a. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.
b. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.
c. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.
d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.
Operations against Southern France
We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at about the same time as Operation OVERLORD and that he will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date.
Operations in Italy
We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until 15 January 1944 the 68 LSTs due for return to the United Kingdom. This will still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD.
Command in the Mediterranean
We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (CCS 387/3).
Support to the Balkans
We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the Partisans (CCS 387/3, Appendix “B”).
Turkey
We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war and the extent of our commitments that is likely to be involved. (CCS 418/1).
Coordination with the USSR
We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the USSR should be arranged through the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff.
Emergency return to the continent
In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, CCS 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.
The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:
a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Düsseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [Mainz]; thence due east to Bayreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).
b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.
We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.
We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Long-term strategy
Active study continues regarding the Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and we have approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations in 1943-1944
We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944 (CCS 397 Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to BUCCANEER.
Higher direction of operations in Southeast Asia Command
We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken and their sequence and timing.
Operations in the SE Asia Command
We have agreed to major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
We have decided:
a. To make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon
We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.
United Chiefs of Staff
We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U.S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the USSR or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the USSR and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.
NOTE: The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Union of South Africa |
| President Roosevelt (in the chair) | Prime Minister Churchill | Field Marshal Smuts |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Minister Eden | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman |
December 6, 1943
Secret
The President read out paragraph by paragraph the report of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference (CCS 426/1)
There was some discussion over the Emergency Return to the Continent (paragraphs 17 to 20). The President understood that objections had been raised to the United States proposals in paragraph 18 on the grounds that they would involve a move of the United States forces from the right to the left across the British lines of communication. He understood that in practice this objection should not be a serious one, as the change-over would not take place until operations had been concluded.
The Prime Minister said that he could not commit the British Government to these proposals. They would have to be put to the War Cabinet.
With regard to the Higher Direction of Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (paragraph 23), the Prime Minister said that this did not affect the decision taken at the QUADRANT Conference that the British Chiefs of Staff were to be the channel of communication with the Southeast Asia Command.
With reference to paragraph 26, the Prime Minister said that he thought the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be sent a copy of the President’s recent signal to the Generalissimo on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command. The President agreed and the Prime Minister gave instructions for the signal to be dispatched.
After reading out paragraph 28, the President said that he had been approached by the Chinese, here at the SEXTANT Conference, with a request for Chinese representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He had made it clear at once that such representation could not be agreed to. The Chinese had also asked if a U.S.-Chinese Committee could be appointed for the consideration of the military operations with which China was concerned.
When the President came to the end of the report, he commended the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the report that they had produced.
The Prime Minister classified the report as a masterly survey of the whole military scene. He gave it as his opinion that when military historians came to adjudge the decisions of the SEXTANT Conference, they would find them fully in accordance with the classic articles of war.
The Prime Minister then expressed his deep sense of gratitude to his United States colleagues. The ANVIL operation had been a great contribution made by them to this Conference. He was convinced that this operation would contribute largely to the success of OVERLORD.
The President and Prime Minister then initialled the report (CCS 426/1).
In answer to a question from the Prime Minister as to whether the draft communiqué on the U-boat war had been approved, Admiral King stated that the communiqué had been cleared with the President, that it had been dispatched already to Washington, and that it would be released on the 10th of the month.
The Prime Minister suggested to the President that the communiqué should be made out in alternate months by the United States and the British respectively, and that as the British had prepared the present communiqué, that for next month should be prepared by the United States. The President agreed with this proposal.
A draft message to Marshal Stalin was then considered. It was approved with a minor modification and instructions given for it to be sent at once.
A draft telegram to the Generalissimo was then read out. It was agreed that on grounds of security it would be undesirable to put so much secret information into a dispatch of this nature. It was decided not to dispatch a telegram to the Generalissimo until his reply had been received to the recent telegram sent to him by the President on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.
Cairo, December 6, 1943
Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, M. Ismet Inönü, President of the Turkish Republic, and Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, met in Cairo on December 4th, 5th and 6th, 1943. Mr. Anthony Eden, His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Numan Menemencioğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, took part in their deliberations.
The participation in this conference of the Head of the Turkish State, in response to the cordial invitation addressed to him by the United States, British and Soviet Governments, bears striking testimony to the strength of the alliance which united [unites?] Great Britain and Turkey, and to the firm friendship existing between the Turkish Republic, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union.
Presidents Roosevelt and Inönü and Prime Minister Churchill reviewed the general political situation and examined at length the policy to be followed, taking into account the joint and several interests of the three countries.
The study of all problems in a spirit of understanding and loyalty showed that the closest unity existed between the United States of America, Turkey and Great Britain in their attitude towards the world situation.
The conversations in Cairo have consequently been most useful and most fruitful for the future of the relations between the four countries there represented.
The identity of interest and of views of the American and British democracies, with those of the Soviet Union, and the traditional relations of friendship existing between these powers and Turkey, have been reaffirmed throughout the proceedings of the Cairo conference.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Field Marshal Dill | ||
| Lieutenant General Ismay |
Marshall took a poll of the opinion of officers present as to when each of them thought the war with Germany would be ended.
Cairo, December 6, 1943
I had a talk with Helleu today. I have known him for the past six years quite intimately as he was Minister in Riga and Ambassador in Ankara for some time after I arrived there. He gave me the following version of the recent events in Lebanon where he was Governor General at the time they took place.
About three weeks before he left for Algiers the Lebanese authorities began to press him for consent to their proposed independence bill. He gave them every assurance that the matter would receive full and fair consideration. Four days before his departure for Algiers the matter was again urged upon him and he said he would take it up with General de Gaulle in Algiers. He says he was given to understand by the Lebanese authorities that no action would be taken during his absence. In Algiers he discussed the matter with General de Gaulle who instructed him to reiterate on his behalf the assurance already given by Helleu. When Helleu arrived in Cairo on his return from Algiers he heard that the Lebanese authorities intended to pass the bill at once and he telephoned to Beirut “begging that no action be taken pending his return ‘in twenty-four hours’.” On his arrival there the next day he found the bill had been passed the night before, but he said he regarded this as a “slap in the face to France” and that he thereupon ordered the arrests on his own initiative. He said no Sen[e]galese troops were used and that the arrests had been made by “white French sailors.” He also said that no violence or indignities had taken place and that of this he was certain. He said he attributed the false reports to “British intrigue.”
Helleu immediately reported the arrests to de Gaulle and received a telegram from him, of which he permitted me to read the original. It is dated November 13th and is de Gaulle’s telegram #3279. It is a fairly long telegram. The substance is as follows: de Gaulle stated that he assumed the action taken by Helleu was necessary or it would not have been taken and that he approved of it. The first paragraph is an unequivocal ratification of Helleu’s action. The second paragraph indicates de Gaulle anticipated a violent British reaction. The concluding paragraph states that he is sending General Catroux to Beirut, not for the purpose of disavowing Helleu’s action but for the purpose of supporting him in the action taken by him.
Helleu said that thereafter Catroux arrived and, as is known, disavowed his action. He added in the strictest confidence that he was thoroughly convinced of Catroux’s disloyalty to de Gaulle and that he was scheming to succeed him. Helleu then showed me a telegram dated November 22 from de Gaulle requesting him to proceed to Algiers immediately and closed with expressions of great friendship and signed himself as “his sincere friend.” Helleu is in Cairo today enroute to Algiers in compliance with de Gaulle’s request.
I am entirely convinced of the truthfulness of Helleu’s statement to me that the arrests were made on his own initiative but that his action was immediately confirmed and ratified by General de Gaulle. Helleu is a man of integrity and has always been entirely truthful and frank in our relations as colleagues. In view of the circumstances and substance of our meeting today it is inconceivable that the two original telegrams which he showed me and which he had carefully folded in his wallet could have been fabricated for the occasion. If the first telegram is genuine, it follows that his statement that he acted on his own in making the arrests and that de Gaulle immediately ratified his action must be true.
L. A. STEINHARDT
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.
The immediate appointment of General Eisenhower to the Command of OVERLORD has been decided upon.
ROOSEVELT
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
Secret and personal from the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.
In the Cairo Conference, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decisions as to conduct of war in 1944 against Germany additional to the agreements reached by the three of us at Teheran:
The bomber offensive against Germany, with the objective of destroying the German air combat strength, dislocating the German military, industrial and economic system, and preparing the way for a cross-channel operation, will be given the highest strategic priority.
We have reduced the scale of operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal to permit the reenforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.
We have ordered the utmost endeavors to increase the production of landing craft in the United Kingdom and the United States for the reenforcement of OVERLORD, and further orders have been issued to divert certain landing craft from the Pacific for the same purpose.
ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
Cairo, December 6, 1943
My Dear King Farouk, It is a cause of profound regret to me that owing to Your Majesty’s absence from Cairo following your regrettable accident I am forced to leave Egypt without having the pleasure of meeting you.
My visit to your country has been brief, and the exigencies of my duties while here have prevented me from enjoying all that Egypt holds of interest and beauty. I wish, however, to assure you that I have been happy to be here and that I appreciate deeply the hospitality of this land and the signal courtesies which you have proffered.
I hope that I may visit Egypt again and that then circumstances will permit our meeting. In the meanwhile, I extend to you my best wishes for your speedy recovery and for the welfare and happiness of your people.
I very much hope that you will find it possible someday to visit me at the White House. It would give all of us the greatest pleasure to greet you and to give you the opportunity of seeing the United States.
Those most delicious ducks have just arrived. I am having some of them tonight and the rest of them we are taking with us to eat on the return voyage home.
Again with many thanks, I am,
Your sincere friend,
FDR
The Pittsburgh Press (December 6, 1943)
Germans say President Inönü and aides have gone to Cairo to see Roosevelt, Churchill
By J. Edward Murray, United Press staff writer
London, England –
German troops are massing in Bulgaria near the Turkish border, a Stockholm dispatch said today as speculation mounted that the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference may bring a Balkan invasion and draw Turkey into the war.
The German movement toward the Turkish border began during the weekend and continued at a rapid rate, Hungarian circles in Stockholm said. A large troop concentration was reported at Haskovo in southeastern Bulgaria, while a Nazi motorized detachment and two cars of officers continued on to Svilengrad, only six miles west of the border, yesterday.
Trip to Cairo reported
The purported shifting of German troops coincided with a German radio report that President İsmet İnönü, Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu and Marshal Çakmak of Turkey had gone to Cairo to meet President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, presumably to discuss their country’s position in the light of the Tehran Conference.
Allied and neutral sources have speculated ever since the tri-power conference at Moscow a month ago that the Allies might prevail upon Turkey at least to provide bases under the terms of her mutual aid pact with Britain for an Allied offensive in the Balkans, even if not actively entering the war.
Eisenhower has meeting
Speculation increased following disclosure that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme allied commander in the Mediterranean, had presided at a meeting of his command at Cairo about 10 days ago, after the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang Kai-shek meeting.
It was theorized that British and possibly U.S. troops might thrust across the Adriatic from bases in southern Italy, or move into the Aegean from Africa or the Levant. A Russian amphibious landing from the Black Sea might also be planned.
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was believed to have given Menemencioğlu details of the Moscow Conference as they affected Turkey and the Turkish Minister later won his Parliament’s approval of his conduct of the negotiations.
Chungking, China (UP) – (Dec. 4, delayed)
Denouncing the Cairo Declaration’s pledge that Korea would be freed “in due course” as absurd, Kim Ku, President of the Provisional Government of Korea here, today warned that Koreans would continue their historic fight, unless they get “independence the moment the Japs collapse.”
It was the first official expression of any of the interested parties here against the Cairo Declaration signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Ku said that more than 1,000 free Koreans in free China are furious about the expression “in due course.”
He declared:
If the Allies fail to give Korea unconditional freedom and independence right after World War II, we are determined to continue our historical fighting against any aggressor or group of aggressors, regardless who they are.
Hit scoops on conferences by Reuters, TASS
Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
Seventy Allied newspaper correspondents, in a resolution to Brendan Bracken, head of the British Ministry of Information, and Elmer Davis, head of the OWI, today protested against press arrangements and breaking of releases dates on conferences of Allied leaders in the Middle East.
The resolution said:
Correspondents twice have been let down in the matter of safeguarding releases. The responsible government department so underestimated the importance of the occasion as to entrust its handling to an official with only the slightest experience in press or public relations.
The resolution added:
Many assurances given to the correspondents were not honored.
The correspondents – who watched the initial break on the Cairo Conference come from Reuters in a Lisbon dispatch and the news of the Tehran Conference released by the Russian news agency TASS via the Moscow radio – felt that the fault lay not with British or OWI officials who handled the press relations, but with Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.
Correspondents were not allowed any access to Mr. Churchill, Mr. Roosevelt or Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Cairo, and repeated requests for a press conference were turned down. After Gen. Chiang left Cairo, it was learned that he would have been glad to see the newspapermen.
Pacific conference site converted into spy-proof, enemy-proof and reporter-proof perimeter
By Richard Mowrer
Cairo, Egypt –
One bright morning, in the second week of November, an indignant British major stomped into the office of the manager of the swank Mena House hotel, famous tourist establishment within an easy walk or camel ride of the Sphinx and the Pyramids and, since the war, the favorite residence of GHQ officers.
“What’s the meaning of this?” the irate major demanded, thrusting a piece of paper at the manager.
“This,” was a short notice of request to the client to leave Mena House and find residence elsewhere.
Sixth to protest
The hotel manager barely bothered to look up from his desk.
Glancing at the crowns on the major’s shoulder, he said:
I am very sorry, sir. You are the sixth client to have protested this morning and four of them were brigadiers. Sorry.
This, according to the story, was the first intimation of the impending Mena conference. The following day, Cairo newspapers carried an item stating that Mena House was being closed down for repairs and cleaning, probably preparatory to the arrival of important personages.
Things move fast
At Mena, things began to move fast. Twenty British and American officers, assisted by 200-300 enlisted men, started the job of converting Mena House and 43 private villas near there into a strongly-protected, spy-proof, enemy-proof, reporter-proof perimeter.
Residents of Mena House having been dismissed, all the hotel staff was fired. Each servant was checked by security officers and in most cases rehired. The inside of Mena House, meanwhile, was revamped, bedrooms on the first, second and third floors being converted into 80 officers, while halls and salons on the ground floor became conference rooms.
Delegates were to live outside the hotel in villas.
One gets 1,500 pounds
Acquiring the needed villas was not easy. Owners were offered monetary compensation in return for immediate evacuation for a one-month period, from Nov. 18 to Dec. 18. One villa owner declared that he was damned if he would move out of his own home for anybody. The officers mentioned compensation. The obdurate subject remarked jokingly, “make it 1,500 pounds, Egyptian.”
One of the officers pulled out a checkbook and wrote out a check for that sum. They got the villa.
On the other hand, some villa owners were most gracious about the business. An Egyptian woman, when told the reason why her house was wanted, refused any compensation, declaring she was glad thus to contribute to the cause of the United Nations.
In the area enclosed by the Mena conference perimeter lived Egyptian peasants. There were checked by security officers and permitted to remain.
Trenches dug
Not since the gloomy days of El Alamein, when the enemy was still heading for Alexandria and Cairo felt directly threatened, has there been so much barbed wire in Mena and the Pyramids area. Each villa was surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements. Air-raid shelters and slit trenches were dug.
Mena House swimming pool was fitted with two pumps and kept filled with water in case of fire. Numerous anti-aircraft batteries were set up; searchlight emplacements were prepared. There were several British Army camps within the perimeter. An American camp to house 1,080 American drivers, MPs, guards and other personnel was also built.
On Sunday night, Nov. 21, after the arrival of Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and the Generalissimo and before the arrival of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the perimeter’s searchlights swept the skies for half an hour while a place droned overhead. Everything was all set for the conference.
U.S. State Department (December 6, 1943)
Monday, December 6 (at Cairo)
| 11:00 a.m. | The President worked on his mail, cleaning up miscellaneous matters. |
|---|---|
| 12:30 p.m. | Ambassador Kirk brought his Legation officer staff to the President’s villa and they were presented to the President. |
| 12:45 p.m. | Lt-General Stilwell and Mr. John Davies called on the President. |
| 1:15 p.m. | The President had lunch at his villa with the Prime Minister and Mr. Hopkins. |
| 2:30 p.m. | President Inönü, the Prime Minister and Ambassador Vinogradov called on the President. During their conversation they agreed on a joint communiqué to be issued to the press concerning their talks, soon to be concluded. |
| 4:00 p.m. | From the rear steps of his villa, overlooking the garden, the President made a brief address to a detachment of U.S. Army military police (approximately 125) chosen from the MP company that had guarded his villa during his stay in Cairo. A copy of his talk is appended, marked Appendix “G.” |
| 4:30 p.m. | Major General R. A. [K.] Sutherland (General MacArthur’s Chief of Staff) called on the President. |
| 4:45 p.m. | The Very Reverend Arthur Hughes, Chargé d’Affaires, Apostolic Delegation, Cairo, called on the President. |
| 5:00 p.m. | His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes (Greece) called on the President. |
| 6:00 p.m. | President Inönü and Prime Minister Churchill met with the President. At the conclusion of this meeting a communiqué, agreed on at an earlier conference between these three heads of governments, was given to the press for release at a future date. A copy is appended marked Appendix “H.” |
| 7:15 p.m. | Plenary meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Present: The President, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Captain Royal, the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Eden, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Field Marshal Dill, Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts, Lt-General Ismay, Brigadier H. Redman. All meetings and conferences in which the President took part in Cairo were held at his villa. |
| 8:30 p.m. | The President had dinner at his villa. His only guest was Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts. |
| Colonel Elliott Roosevelt departed Cairo this afternoon for Tunis. | |
| The final three days at Cairo were extremely busy ones for the President and for Mr. Hopkins. There were numerous conferences, many without a break between, so that there was no opportunity for a rest. Although today marked the official close of the Cairo Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff found it necessary to remain behind for a few days longer in order to complete certain staff work. | |
| All members of our party were extremely tired now and anxious to get started homeward. | |
| During our second visit to Cairo the weather was delightful. The mosquitoes and flies were bothersome, however. | |
| Excellent care was taken of our party while we were in Cairo, for which credit is due Major General Royce and Brigadier General Cheaves [Cheves]. |
U.S. State Department (December 7, 1943)
Cairo [?], December 7, 1943
After discussing this matter with the British military authorities I consider it inadvisable to reopen the matter at this time.
FDR
Roosevelt arrived at the airport at 8:05 a.m. and bade goodbye to Churchill and to certain Americans (Steinhardt, Kirk, Royce, and others), after which he embarked in the plane at 8:20 for the return journey.
Roosevelt discussed certain subjects with Churchill apparently on the last day of Roosevelt’s stay at Cairo. These subjects, which may have been discussed at the airport, were:
- Italian priests and nuns interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia
- The question of seeking bases in Ireland
- British gold and dollar balances.
Cairo, December 7 (?), 1943
[I]
Some time back, in different circumstances from the present, the President approved a line of policy which would permit the British gold and dollar reserves to reach some figure between $600 million and $1,000 million. There was no agreement by the British to limit their reserves to this figure.
For some little time past the British reserves have exceeded $1,000 million, and may be increasing at a rate of some $600 million a year. This includes gold and represents their total resources against growing liabilities in all parts of the world, which amount to six or seven times these reserves.
This increase in the British reserves does not reflect an improvement in their financial position. Their quick liabilities, largely caused by heavy cash outgoings in the Middle East, are increasing at four or five times the rate at which the reserves against them have increased. Their net overseas position, in fact, is deteriorating at a rate of about $3-billion a year.
The increase in their gold holdings is due to certain receipts from South Africa and Russia. The increase in their dollar balances is due to their receiving the dollar equivalent of the local currency provided to meet the pay of American troops within the sterling area. Indeed, if it were not for the pay of the American troops the British dollar balances would be going down.
Apart from certain raw materials, the British are already giving reciprocal aid to the fullest extent of American Government requirements. They have now offered raw materials purchased by the U.S. Government in Great Britain and the Colonies on reciprocal aid terms. This would retard the growth of their balances by about $100 million a year, and by $200 million if India and Australia join in.
The British argue that some growth of their reserves is indispensable to the delicate system they are operating by which they finance the war on credit throughout a large part of the world, and that the retention of some part of the above receipts, as a support to this credit system and an offset to a much larger increase of liabilities, is not open to legitimate criticism. They point out that the Russians are believed to hold gold reserves nearly double the total reserves of the British and have no significant liabilities against them. But, in the case of Russia, it is not at present proposed to require them to surrender any part of their reserves as a condition of further Lend-Lease assistance.
The British feel that they ought not to be asked to agree to a ceiling to their balances, since their reserve position must be their own concern. Nevertheless, if the British argument is accepted as valid, the position could be regularised by a new Directive, which would set up a revised formula for the guidance of American Departments. If the figure given by the new formula was being approached, then the whole question could be re-opened.
The new formula might provide that an increase in British reserves is not unreasonable if the increase does not exceed, say, 30 per cent, of the increase of British liabilities.
Figures furnished to Congress hitherto have not disclosed the full burden of British overseas liabilities, or their rate of growth. It might be necessary to justify the new arrangement to provide that the information given to Congress in future should be fuller, and should show in some fashion, which would not be dangerous to British credit, the growth of liabilities as well as the growth of reserves.
26 October 1943
[II]
There is a matter affecting our financial relations with the United States of America which I think I must bring prominently to your notice at this particular juncture. We have reason to believe that the President is about to give a decision which is of absolutely vital importance to our financial capacity to get through the transitional period and, indeed, to our diplomatic independence during that time.
We are all concerned by the mounting accumulations of sterling balances in the hands of other countries. These represent a post-war liability upon us to convert the sterling into gold or other foreign exchange which the holders of the balances may need.
It looks indeed as though we may come to the end of the war with external liabilities of not less than £2,500,000,000 (ten billion dollars).
On the other side, after being almost cleaned out by the middle of 1941, we have been gradually building up a modest reserve. Our free balances of gold and dollars have now reached £300,000,000, and there is a reasonable hope of their reaching £500,000,000 (two billion dollars) by the end of the war, or about one-fifth of our assumed liabilities at the same date. These balances represent our only quick assets against the liabilities and constitute in fact the central reserve of the whole Commonwealth, since they include dollars turned over to us under the sterling area arrangements by the Dominions and other countries in the sterling area.
These balances will be absolutely essential to see us through the difficult transition period after Lend-Lease has ceased, and before the measures we shall have to take to restore the balance of our external trade have had time to bear fruit.
Early in the year we heard, almost accidentally, that the President had authorized a directive to the effect that the British reserves were not to be allowed to rise beyond a billion dollars (£250,000,000). It is not clear that this directive was ever issued in such explicit terms, and we were certainly not consulted about it. But the U. S. Treasury maintain that this alleged directive puts the Departments under orders to cut off Lend-Lease as soon as our total reserves exceed the limit of a billion dollars.
In course of time, this figure has been passed. Our reserves are now more than $1,200 million. From now on they are likely to increase, owing to our receiving the dollar equivalent of the pay of the American troops in the sterling area. According to present estimates of the numbers of American troops who will be drawing their pay in those areas, our reserves may increase by as much as $600 million in the next year.
This does not mean, however, that we are getting richer. Our liabilities are increasing five or six times as rapidly as our reserves, and we are constantly getting deeper into the pit of net indebtedness. Indeed, I doubt if we can maintain our external financial fabric on its present basis, unless some moderate proportion of our increased liabilities is covered by reserves against them.
All this has been explained in great detail to the American Administration. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote a long letter to Mr. Morgenthau, rather more than two months ago, which the latter acknowledged and promised to answer. No reply has been received. When our Delegation was recently in Washington in connection with the currency and commercial talks, Lord Keynes and his colleagues submitted a memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration and the American Treasury on our balances and on our liabilities, asking the American Government to recognise that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose directly from the war, the position of our balances should not be regarded as open to criticism. This view received strong support in some of the American Departments, though not in all. Mr. Stettinius and the State Department are wholly convinced that, in the circumstances, there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that this small mitigation of our growing indebtedness should be allowed to accrue to us. The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they were merged in the new body) were of the same opinion. The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking up a sticky line, for reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown a disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives or to give any reasons.
Some elements in the Administration maintain that Congress was given to understand that Lend-Lease was only to apply to the extent to which the recipient countries were utterly unable to pay for imports, whether of food or military equipment. In other words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to Lend-Lease as long as we have a dollar in the till. This view might have been sustainable in some quarters before Pearl Harbour. But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the principle of the pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle that the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials, irrespective of financial liability.
Moreover, it is a doctrine apparently to be applied to us only, for no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of course, do we apply it in giving reciprocal aid to the Americans or to any other country.
To resolve the difference of opinion between his own advisers, the President set up, several months ago, an interdepartmental, ministerial Committee, to report to him. Owing to the difference of opinion on this Committee, no report emerged, and sundry meetings of the Committee were adjourned when the time came to call them. This position has gradually become intolerable from our point of view. As the U.S. Treasury takes the line that the existing Presidential directive must be followed until it is superseded, the Lend-Lease Administration is reluctantly and half-heartedly falling in with this by proposing to cut off various items of Lend-Lease, though on nothing like a large enough scale to keep our balances down to the prescribed figure. We have been urging, therefore, on the American Departments concerned that the matter should be brought to a head. During Lord Keynes’s recent visit, the State Department and the Lend-Lease Administration both agreed that this was the right course. Colonel Llewellin and Sir Ronald Campbell urged Mr. Harry Hopkins to bring it to a head. As a result, the President has instructed Mr. Morgenthau to expedite the Committee’s report.
It may be that this report is already in the President’s hands. In any case, it is absolutely vital to us that he should make the right decision when it reaches him.
There are several reasons for hoping that he will:
The force of our case, to anyone who takes the trouble to understand it, is overwhelming.
Russia’s gold and dollar reserves are nearly twice ours, and they have no liabilities against them. The Americans are not proposing to tackle the Russians with a similar proposal. We, however, are thought to be easier game.
A change of policy sufficient to keep our balances down to one billion dollars would have to be a very drastic one. The Americans will either have to ask us to meet the pay of their troops throughout the world (at a rate approximately double ours); or they will have to cut off Lend-Lease from some major item, such as food. At the very same time that the President has been emphasising the importance of our mutual aid, and when we have only just offered them raw materials, it would be a bit stiff to take either of these measures.
A favourable decision could take various forms. In no circumstances, of course, should we agree, on our side, to allow the amount of this country’s reserves to be settled by the Congress of the United States. But that is no reason why the President should not give instructions to his own Departments to the effect that they need not begin to worry about our reserves until they exceed a certain figure.
The most satisfactory revised directive would be one that fixes no limits, but asks that we should keep in consultation with the Administration about liabilities and balances. Failing that, if there is to be a ceiling, it should be raised to something not less than $2,000 million.
Apart from our post-war liabilities, which, as I have said, are likely to approach five times that amount, our adverse balance of trade in the first two or three years after the war will by itself exceed it. It is about the same amount as the Russian reserves, and they, as I have said, have no corresponding liabilities.
I attach a brief version of our case in a form which may have reached the President. This was prepared by Lord Keynes for Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Harry Hopkins, so that they could have something brief in their hands for use at an appropriate opportunity.
I again emphasise that an adverse decision would have the gravest consequences to our financial independence; whilst a favourable decision would remove a constant source of anxiety and friction.
JA
11 November 1943
[III]
Prime Minister
Great George Street, SW1
Secret
Thanks to gold from South Africa and pay to American troops in the U.K. and the Empire, our gold and dollar balances have increased to $1200 million and may rise to $2000 million by the end of the war. Much of the increase is not really ours at all but represents profits of Empire countries who choose to use us as their banker. Actually our reserves are far outweighed by our liabilities, especially in India and the Middle East, which are rising about five times as fast as our reserves and may amount to $10,000 million by the end of the war. Thus our net overseas position is deteriorating rapidly and our reserve when the war ends is likely to be only one fifth of our liabilities.
Certain Americans, ignoring these liabilities, claim that supplies on Lend/Lease should now be reduced and that we should be made to pay with our gold and dollars for goods supplied. Why they should pick on us for such treatment is not clear; it is never suggested that Russia and France with their enormous gold balances should pay for goods supplied to them.
The Lend/Lease administration who, with the State Department, are favourable to us, are reluctantly proposing to cut supplies since the United States Treasury maintain that the President issued a directive limiting British reserves to $1000 million.
The President has appointed a Committee to examine the matter, whose report may be already in his hands. It is vital to us that he should make the right decision. If our Lease/Lend supplies are cut off and our balances reduced to $1000 million, it will be almost impossible for us to tide over the difficult post-war period while we are building up our export trade.
CHERWELL
12 November 1943
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Turkey | |
| Prime Minister Churchill | President Inönü | |
| Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu | |
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen | Mr. Açikalin |
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443
December 7, 1943
Most secret
The Prime Minister put to President Inonu the proposal that by February 15 all measures should be taken to render possible the fly-in of the 20 Allied squadrons. The Prime Minister would be ready after February 15 to consult with the Turkish government before the fly-in is carried out. By that time the situation may have evolved. The Balkan satellites may be on the point of falling out of the war. We should expect all measures to have been taken by February 15 to render the fly-in possible. It would not be possible to forecast enemy action between now and February 15. The President of the United States had said that Germany would be given no excuse to attack Turkey in this interval. Germany would not consider excuses but only whether it was worth her while to attack Turkey. Therefore by February 15 we shall know more about the German reaction. We have agreed on the preliminary steps and the work on the airfields must be finished as quickly as possible. After that on February 15 if the preparations are complete, he will ask whether the squadrons can come in and the matter can be discussed as between friends and allies. If after February 15 Turkey will not receive the allied squadrons and wishes to prolong the discussions of the equipment of the Turkish army, then the Prime Minister will be forced to think of other plans. The allied squadrons cannot be wasted, they would have to be used elsewhere. February 15 will be the critical and serious moment. But if we are forced, after that, to send the squadrons elsewhere, the question cannot be reopened with Turkey. It must be closed. We should have to tell our other allies that our policy with Turkey had failed. If the Turkish answer is favorable we would begin as quickly as possible to send in further material. But before February 15 Turkish communications would be blocked with the material for the airfields. It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that Bulgaria would not attack and it was even uncertain whether the Germans would push Bulgaria to attack, because if Bulgaria did so she would have to withdraw her nine divisions from Yugoslavia and this would create difficulty for the Germans.
President Inönü understood that the Prime Minister had resumed [rèsumèed] the conversations of the last 2 or 3 days.
M. Menemencioğlu said that the Turks had said all they had to say in the last three days.
President Inönü said that he had the impression that on the essential question both sides had reserved their own opinions. The Turks had foreseen two periods (i) preparation and (ii) effective cooperation. This had been accepted by the National Assembly and had formed the subject of the answer of November 17 given by the Turkish Government. On the other hand the Prime Minister considered the first period as purely one for preparation especially as regards the airfields.
The Prime Minister explained that this was because he did not regard invasion as a serious danger.
President Inönü asked whether he had rightly understood that the Prime Minister had not excluded the supply of other goods either before or after February 15.
The Prime Minister said certainly not. The quicker the supplies were sent the better.
President Inönü asked whether the Prime Minister thought that these supplies should be complete before action was taken.
The Prime Minister said that it was not necessary that the supplies for the army should be complete by February 15th, and for the Turks to insist on this would be the same as saying that they would not come in. To complete supplies for the Turkish army is to adjourn the final Turkish decision indefinitely. On that basis the chance of shortening the war by Turkey’s entry would be lost.
President Inönü said that he thought the difference between the two sides was in their appreciation of German strength. The Allies thought that in the present situation Germany could not do much harm to Turkey.
The Prime Minister said that this applied only to land attack: air bombardment was very possible.
President Inönü said that all war risks were natural and would have to be taken. The Turkish government saw Germany as stretching from the Crimea to Rhodes and with Turkey encircled and they felt that Germans [Germany?] had fresh forces with which she could attack. If in these circumstances Turkey was left without a minimum of the essential supplies she would be seriously menaced on land. He explained a weak point in the present Turkish military position. At the beginning of November one class had been released from the colours. A new class of recruits was now being called up. On the basis of a decision by February 15th, Turkey would have to strengthen the army by 2 or 3 classes. Another point was that at the present date, the period of mud in Thrace had not yet begun. The President went on to say that he had explained the situation as he saw it. His technicians were not with him and he could not go further into detail. It was a serious question for the government to give a positive answer on matters which went against the decision of the Grand National Assembly. As to the political question in the preparatory period, it was necessary to work for a closer definition of the political situation. If he had understood the Prime Minister rightly, Mr. Churchill required his answer now, or soon, so that the situation to be taken up in the future could be defined. He would do all he could to give a clear and accurate answer in 3 or 4 days.
The Prime Minister said that the final answer was not required till February 15th, but that in the interval we must at once begin preparations.
President Inönü understood the position. The answer he proposed to give in 3 or 4 days was to the question whether and in what manner he would engage in the preparations. He would tell us the conditions in which Turkey would come in or take the risks likely to bring her in. After having considered the Prime Minister’s statement Turkey must give an answer. The President asked that an expert should be sent to Angora to study the technical questions more closely. The Turkish answer had been given in principle. The Turkish government thought that a general plan was necessary, not for the sake of prolonging the discussions but for practical reasons. It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that the preparations proposed up to February 15 were sufficient. In the interval it would be quite possible to form a general plan.
The Prime Minister said that if the President envisaged a long programme of reequipment taking into account the difficulty of communications and so forth, that was the same as saying that the negotiations were ended. It would be easy for Turkey to make prohibitive conditions and in that case the Allied forces must be sent elsewhere.
President Inönü said that this was a serious statement touching a fundamental point. He would define the position as follows:
a) given that the Turkish answer is a simple acceptance of the Prime Minister’s proposal, namely to go on with the preparations till February 15 and taking the final decision then, that would be the best answer that the Prime Minister could require.
b) alternatively to consider Allied needs and add the Turkish need for a plan which both sides could accept. If Turkey accepted, the preparations could continue; if not, the Prime Minister would have the right to change his plans.
The Prime Minister remarked that this would mean a complete change of policy. In that event the war would move westwards and Turkey would lose the chance of coming in and of reaping the advantages which entry into the war would promise her.
M. Menemencioğlu asked whether by change of policy the Prime Minister was referring to the Anglo-Turkish Alliance.
The Prime Minister replied that the Alliance would cease to have any value for war purposes. The moment would have gone when Turkey could render the great service we asked. Turkey would stay where she was. Friendship would remain, but as an effective ally for the war Turkey would count for nothing. We should win, but without Turkey. Turkey’s entry into the war was important for us as it gave a chance of including Turkey with the Allies in the future.
President Inönü said that for Turkey fidelity to Great Britain was an essential conception both during and after the war. If this was also the British view he thought it was not impossible to find a solution.
The Prime Minister mentioned the line of procedure as subsequently handed to the President and shown here as Annex A.
Mr. Eden said that as regards the Alliance we were faithful to our engagements and wished to work with our Turkish friends. But if the time for Turkey’s entry into the war came and went, it was inevitable that the spirit of the Alliance would be affected.
The Prime Minister expressed the view that Bulgaria would not attack Turkey when she knew that this would entail a Russian declaration of war on her.
M. Menemencioğlu asked whether the Russian declaration of war would be given equally if Bulgaria allowed Germany all facilities in and through Bulgaria for an attack on Turkey.
Mr. Eden undertook to put this question to the Soviet government.
The Prime Minister said that he could not guarantee that the Germans would not bomb Istanbul and Smyrna. But if our squadrons were there the Germans would have serious losses. He thought it very possible by the end of February that the situation would be reassuring for Turkey. It would be easier to see clearly then than now and in the interval the preparations did not commit Turkey to give a favourable answer to our appeal to send air squadrons after February 15. The President was quite free to say yes or no without reproach. All that would have happened would be that we had sacrificed war material for nothing. If Germany did not attack Turkey but remained in relations with her, we should not ask Turkey to declare war. Time would thus be gained for sending in further supplies. In this way Turkey would be in a very strong position and would emerge unexhausted with the advantage of cooperation with the victorious allies. The Prime Minister wanted Turkey to be strong after the war and to be friends with Great Britain, the United States and Russia. Turkey and Great Britain had common interests and the Prime Minister wanted to protect them. The Prime Minister then handed the annexed paper to President Inonu who read it and said that it was clear and that there was nothing more to say. The Prime Minister pointed out that there were two things to be done. The President would consult the National Assembly and give his answer in 4 or 5 days. Those days could also be employed in pressing on with preparations and sending in specialists. This was agreed to and the number of specialists was limited to 250. At this point the Chiefs of Staff joined the meeting and handed the Prime Minister a paper which showed that between now and February 15th, in addition to the supplies required for the AA guns and airfields, a total of 58,900 tons could be sent to Turkey by rail for Turkey’s own use, given the full cooperation of the Turkish railways and in addition as many more supplies as could be carried by sea. It was agreed that the next steps should be the following:
British experts should go to Angora. This was agreed to by the Turks.
General Kiazim Orbay and General Ceffik Cakmak and a naval representative of the Turkish General Staff should come to Cairo. The Turks reserved their final answer to this question till their return to Angora.
Matters should then be followed up by the despatch of more British officers to Angora to continue the conversations.
ANNEX A
15 February. Allies ask permission to “fly in.”
if reply negative.
Allies direct all resources to another theatre and must abandon hope of wartime cooperation with Turkey.
if reply “Yes.”
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | General Riddell Webster | |
| Major General Sutherland | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Fairchild | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Hansell | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Brigadier General Roberts | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Long | Brigadier McNair | |
| Brigadier Head | ||
| Colonel Cornwall-Jones | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Mallary | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
December 7, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them CCS 400/2 as amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December.
Sir Charles Portal said that the attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see fit. If the new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder.
General Arnold said he was anxious to implement the proposals as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir Charles Portal before taking final action.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted CCS 400/2.
b. Took note:
that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle with CCS 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals;
that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder and General Wilson;
that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties laid upon him by the directive contained in CCS 400/2 (as corrected by corrigendum of 7 December).
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten (CCS 427/1).
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that no decisions should be taken until the views of the Generalissimo were known.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views were that since BUCCANEER had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required for commando operations, if these were decided upon. The service troops might be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if Operation TARZAN was called off he felt that the operations outlined by Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by the Chinese forces on the Ledo Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some of the British forces released from BUCCANEER forming a reserve.
Sir Alan Brooke said he was in general agreement with the views which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation TARZAN, but preferred an additional air lift over the “hump,” then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and instructing him that the combat forces released from BUCCANEER should be used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while the non-fighting troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B-29s. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo would prefer the postponement of TARZAN.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 1944; and
b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the Generalissimo’s reply to the President’s dispatch of 5 December on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.
Without discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and the First Sea Lord, as set out in CCS 415/3.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the paper under consideration had been prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to be taken.
General Marshall agreed with this view. He suggested certain amendments to the report, which were agreed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in CCS 428 with the modifications approved in the course of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 428 (Rev.))
Sir Charles Portal said that there were two sides to this problem. Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon showed that Dr. Salazar was ready to allow the operation of United States anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (CCS 270/14) suggested certain formulae. These were contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the paper. He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States aircraft to be used in the Azores.
Sir Charles Portal said that he did not believe that this would now be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His Majesty’s Government under command of a British officer from a British base, and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Air Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied.
With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force.
General Arnold said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second half of paragraph 4 of CCS 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary details.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4.
b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army air forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the date on which the new Mediterranean Command should be set up, and the most suitable time for General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
It was generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that unification of command in the Mediterranean had been set up, or to announce General Eisenhower’s new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment would be necessary.
Sir Hastings Ismay put forward a draft memorandum covering these points. The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall take effect from 10 December. There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.
b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January, or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome.
c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower’s move from the Mediterranean to the U.K., his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
d. Recommend that concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.
e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary instructions.
The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (CCS 411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the airlift to China.
After a brief discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 411/5.
Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Giraud had put forward a proposal for employing at least one French armored division from the United Kingdom. He felt that in view of shipping limitations and the fact that Operation ANVIL had now been decided on, it would be better to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the South of France.
General Marshall agreed with this view. The training of a French armored division in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be better that the French armored division and other French forces should if possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation ANVIL. It must be remembered of course that General Giraud did not know that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best for the ANVIL forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important that the French forces for ANVIL should have had experience in battle before this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for Operation OVERLORD.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French armored division should be sent to take part in Operation OVERLORD.
b. That as a general policy:
A French force should participate in ANVIL and only a token force in OVERLORD.
It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with U.S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces.
c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy.
Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to express on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States Chiefs had met their views.
There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which the United States had made in the field of production.
General Marshall said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan Brooke’s gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals.
Admiral King, in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important conferences.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance at future U.S.-British Conferences.
b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next month.