Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister
Cairo, December 6, 1943
Secret
CCS 426/1
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at SEXTANT Conference is submitted herewith:
Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.
Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces.
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the overall objectives.
j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.
k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.
Execution of the overall strategic concept
The U-boat war
We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging reports regarding the U-boat war. (CCS 399 and 399/1)
The defeat of the Axis in Europe
The Combined Bomber Offensive
a. We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined bombing operations against Germany. (CCS 403)
b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.
c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available.
EUREKA decisions
At the EUREKA Conference, the following military conclusions were approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin.
The Conference:
a. Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:b. Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:
c. Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:
d. Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:
e. Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.
In the light of the above EUREKA decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater:
a. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.
b. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.
c. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.
d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.
Operations against Southern France
We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at about the same time as Operation OVERLORD and that he will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date.
Operations in Italy
We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until 15 January 1944 the 68 LSTs due for return to the United Kingdom. This will still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD.
Command in the Mediterranean
We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (CCS 387/3).
Support to the Balkans
We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the Partisans (CCS 387/3, Appendix “B”).
Turkey
We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war and the extent of our commitments that is likely to be involved. (CCS 418/1).
Coordination with the USSR
We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the USSR should be arranged through the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff.
Emergency return to the continent
In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, CCS 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.
The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:
a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Düsseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [Mainz]; thence due east to Bayreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).
b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.
We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.
We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The war against Japan
Long-term strategy
Active study continues regarding the Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and we have approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations in 1943-1944
We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944 (CCS 397 Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to BUCCANEER.
Higher direction of operations in Southeast Asia Command
We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken and their sequence and timing.
Operations in the SE Asia Command
We have agreed to major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
We have decided:
a. To make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon
We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.
Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects
United Chiefs of Staff
We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U.S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the USSR or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the USSR and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.
NOTE: The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.