Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

201

Churchill-Inönü meeting, morning

Present
United Kingdom Turkey
Prime Minister Churchill President Inönü
Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen Mr. Açikalin 
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

U.K. minutes 

December 7, 1943
Most secret

The Prime Minister put to President Inonu the proposal that by February 15 all measures should be taken to render possible the fly-in of the 20 Allied squadrons. The Prime Minister would be ready after February 15 to consult with the Turkish government before the fly-in is carried out. By that time the situation may have evolved. The Balkan satellites may be on the point of falling out of the war. We should expect all measures to have been taken by February 15 to render the fly-in possible. It would not be possible to forecast enemy action between now and February 15. The President of the United States had said that Germany would be given no excuse to attack Turkey in this interval. Germany would not consider excuses but only whether it was worth her while to attack Turkey. Therefore by February 15 we shall know more about the German reaction. We have agreed on the preliminary steps and the work on the airfields must be finished as quickly as possible. After that on February 15 if the preparations are complete, he will ask whether the squadrons can come in and the matter can be discussed as between friends and allies. If after February 15 Turkey will not receive the allied squadrons and wishes to prolong the discussions of the equipment of the Turkish army, then the Prime Minister will be forced to think of other plans. The allied squadrons cannot be wasted, they would have to be used elsewhere. February 15 will be the critical and serious moment. But if we are forced, after that, to send the squadrons elsewhere, the question cannot be reopened with Turkey. It must be closed. We should have to tell our other allies that our policy with Turkey had failed. If the Turkish answer is favorable we would begin as quickly as possible to send in further material. But before February 15 Turkish communications would be blocked with the material for the airfields. It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that Bulgaria would not attack and it was even uncertain whether the Germans would push Bulgaria to attack, because if Bulgaria did so she would have to withdraw her nine divisions from Yugoslavia and this would create difficulty for the Germans.

President Inönü understood that the Prime Minister had resumed [rèsumèed] the conversations of the last 2 or 3 days.

M. Menemencioğlu said that the Turks had said all they had to say in the last three days.

President Inönü said that he had the impression that on the essential question both sides had reserved their own opinions. The Turks had foreseen two periods (i) preparation and (ii) effective cooperation. This had been accepted by the National Assembly and had formed the subject of the answer of November 17 given by the Turkish Government. On the other hand the Prime Minister considered the first period as purely one for preparation especially as regards the airfields.

The Prime Minister explained that this was because he did not regard invasion as a serious danger.

President Inönü asked whether he had rightly understood that the Prime Minister had not excluded the supply of other goods either before or after February 15.

The Prime Minister said certainly not. The quicker the supplies were sent the better.

President Inönü asked whether the Prime Minister thought that these supplies should be complete before action was taken.

The Prime Minister said that it was not necessary that the supplies for the army should be complete by February 15th, and for the Turks to insist on this would be the same as saying that they would not come in. To complete supplies for the Turkish army is to adjourn the final Turkish decision indefinitely. On that basis the chance of shortening the war by Turkey’s entry would be lost.

President Inönü said that he thought the difference between the two sides was in their appreciation of German strength. The Allies thought that in the present situation Germany could not do much harm to Turkey.

The Prime Minister said that this applied only to land attack: air bombardment was very possible.

President Inönü said that all war risks were natural and would have to be taken. The Turkish government saw Germany as stretching from the Crimea to Rhodes and with Turkey encircled and they felt that Germans [Germany?] had fresh forces with which she could attack. If in these circumstances Turkey was left without a minimum of the essential supplies she would be seriously menaced on land. He explained a weak point in the present Turkish military position. At the beginning of November one class had been released from the colours. A new class of recruits was now being called up. On the basis of a decision by February 15th, Turkey would have to strengthen the army by 2 or 3 classes. Another point was that at the present date, the period of mud in Thrace had not yet begun. The President went on to say that he had explained the situation as he saw it. His technicians were not with him and he could not go further into detail. It was a serious question for the government to give a positive answer on matters which went against the decision of the Grand National Assembly. As to the political question in the preparatory period, it was necessary to work for a closer definition of the political situation. If he had understood the Prime Minister rightly, Mr. Churchill required his answer now, or soon, so that the situation to be taken up in the future could be defined. He would do all he could to give a clear and accurate answer in 3 or 4 days.

The Prime Minister said that the final answer was not required till February 15th, but that in the interval we must at once begin preparations.

President Inönü understood the position. The answer he proposed to give in 3 or 4 days was to the question whether and in what manner he would engage in the preparations. He would tell us the conditions in which Turkey would come in or take the risks likely to bring her in. After having considered the Prime Minister’s statement Turkey must give an answer. The President asked that an expert should be sent to Angora to study the technical questions more closely. The Turkish answer had been given in principle. The Turkish government thought that a general plan was necessary, not for the sake of prolonging the discussions but for practical reasons. It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that the preparations proposed up to February 15 were sufficient. In the interval it would be quite possible to form a general plan.

The Prime Minister said that if the President envisaged a long programme of reequipment taking into account the difficulty of communications and so forth, that was the same as saying that the negotiations were ended. It would be easy for Turkey to make prohibitive conditions and in that case the Allied forces must be sent elsewhere.

President Inönü said that this was a serious statement touching a fundamental point. He would define the position as follows:

a) given that the Turkish answer is a simple acceptance of the Prime Minister’s proposal, namely to go on with the preparations till February 15 and taking the final decision then, that would be the best answer that the Prime Minister could require.

b) alternatively to consider Allied needs and add the Turkish need for a plan which both sides could accept. If Turkey accepted, the preparations could continue; if not, the Prime Minister would have the right to change his plans.

The Prime Minister remarked that this would mean a complete change of policy. In that event the war would move westwards and Turkey would lose the chance of coming in and of reaping the advantages which entry into the war would promise her.

M. Menemencioğlu asked whether by change of policy the Prime Minister was referring to the Anglo-Turkish Alliance.

The Prime Minister replied that the Alliance would cease to have any value for war purposes. The moment would have gone when Turkey could render the great service we asked. Turkey would stay where she was. Friendship would remain, but as an effective ally for the war Turkey would count for nothing. We should win, but without Turkey. Turkey’s entry into the war was important for us as it gave a chance of including Turkey with the Allies in the future.

President Inönü said that for Turkey fidelity to Great Britain was an essential conception both during and after the war. If this was also the British view he thought it was not impossible to find a solution.

The Prime Minister mentioned the line of procedure as subsequently handed to the President and shown here as Annex A.

Mr. Eden said that as regards the Alliance we were faithful to our engagements and wished to work with our Turkish friends. But if the time for Turkey’s entry into the war came and went, it was inevitable that the spirit of the Alliance would be affected.

The Prime Minister expressed the view that Bulgaria would not attack Turkey when she knew that this would entail a Russian declaration of war on her.

M. Menemencioğlu asked whether the Russian declaration of war would be given equally if Bulgaria allowed Germany all facilities in and through Bulgaria for an attack on Turkey.

Mr. Eden undertook to put this question to the Soviet government.

The Prime Minister said that he could not guarantee that the Germans would not bomb Istanbul and Smyrna. But if our squadrons were there the Germans would have serious losses. He thought it very possible by the end of February that the situation would be reassuring for Turkey. It would be easier to see clearly then than now and in the interval the preparations did not commit Turkey to give a favourable answer to our appeal to send air squadrons after February 15. The President was quite free to say yes or no without reproach. All that would have happened would be that we had sacrificed war material for nothing. If Germany did not attack Turkey but remained in relations with her, we should not ask Turkey to declare war. Time would thus be gained for sending in further supplies. In this way Turkey would be in a very strong position and would emerge unexhausted with the advantage of cooperation with the victorious allies. The Prime Minister wanted Turkey to be strong after the war and to be friends with Great Britain, the United States and Russia. Turkey and Great Britain had common interests and the Prime Minister wanted to protect them. The Prime Minister then handed the annexed paper to President Inonu who read it and said that it was clear and that there was nothing more to say. The Prime Minister pointed out that there were two things to be done. The President would consult the National Assembly and give his answer in 4 or 5 days. Those days could also be employed in pressing on with preparations and sending in specialists. This was agreed to and the number of specialists was limited to 250. At this point the Chiefs of Staff joined the meeting and handed the Prime Minister a paper which showed that between now and February 15th, in addition to the supplies required for the AA guns and airfields, a total of 58,900 tons could be sent to Turkey by rail for Turkey’s own use, given the full cooperation of the Turkish railways and in addition as many more supplies as could be carried by sea. It was agreed that the next steps should be the following:

  1. British experts should go to Angora. This was agreed to by the Turks.

  2. General Kiazim Orbay and General Ceffik Cakmak and a naval representative of the Turkish General Staff should come to Cairo. The Turks reserved their final answer to this question till their return to Angora.

  3. Matters should then be followed up by the despatch of more British officers to Angora to continue the conversations.

ANNEX A
  1. Air preparations and other supplies till 15 February.
  2. Discussion of war plans.
  3. Programme of munitions import.
  4. Discussion of political questions.

15 February. Allies ask permission to “fly in.”

if reply negative.
Allies direct all resources to another theatre and must abandon hope of wartime cooperation with Turkey.

if reply “Yes.”

  1. Continuation at fullest speed of programme of import munitions for army and air.
  2. Opening of the sea route to Turkey.
  3. Reinforcement by British anti-tank and armoured units.
  4. Execution of agreed plan with full force of Allies and Turkey.
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Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Badger General Riddell Webster
Major General Sutherland Major General Laycock
Major General Fairchild Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Hansell Brigadier Sugden
Brigadier General Roberts Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Long Brigadier McNair
Brigadier Head
Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Lieutenant Colonel Mallary
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes 

December 7, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret

Approval of conclusions of CCS 137th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them CCS 400/2 as amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December.

Sir Charles Portal said that the attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see fit. If the new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

General Arnold said he was anxious to implement the proposals as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir Charles Portal before taking final action.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted CCS 400/2.

b. Took note:

  1. that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle with CCS 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals;

  2. that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder and General Wilson;

  3. that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties laid upon him by the directive contained in CCS 400/2 (as corrected by corrigendum of 7 December).

Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia alternative to BUCCANEER (CCS 427 and 427/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten (CCS 427/1).

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that no decisions should be taken until the views of the Generalissimo were known.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views were that since BUCCANEER had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required for commando operations, if these were decided upon. The service troops might be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if Operation TARZAN was called off he felt that the operations outlined by Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by the Chinese forces on the Ledo Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some of the British forces released from BUCCANEER forming a reserve.

Sir Alan Brooke said he was in general agreement with the views which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation TARZAN, but preferred an additional air lift over the “hump,” then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and instructing him that the combat forces released from BUCCANEER should be used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while the non-fighting troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B-29s. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo would prefer the postponement of TARZAN.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 1944; and

b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the Generalissimo’s reply to the President’s dispatch of 5 December on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.

Provision of merchant shipping types for the war against Japan (CCS 415/3)

Without discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and the First Sea Lord, as set out in CCS 415/3.

Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon (CCS 428)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the paper under consideration had been prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to be taken.

General Marshall agreed with this view. He suggested certain amendments to the report, which were agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in CCS 428 with the modifications approved in the course of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 428 (Rev.))

Development of facilities in the Azores (CCS 270/13 and 270/14)

Sir Charles Portal said that there were two sides to this problem. Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon showed that Dr. Salazar was ready to allow the operation of United States anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (CCS 270/14) suggested certain formulae. These were contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the paper. He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States aircraft to be used in the Azores.

Sir Charles Portal said that he did not believe that this would now be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His Majesty’s Government under command of a British officer from a British base, and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Air Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied.

With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force.

General Arnold said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second half of paragraph 4 of CCS 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary details.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4.

b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army air forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.

New command arrangements

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the date on which the new Mediterranean Command should be set up, and the most suitable time for General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.

It was generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that unification of command in the Mediterranean had been set up, or to announce General Eisenhower’s new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment would be necessary.

Sir Hastings Ismay put forward a draft memorandum covering these points. The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall take effect from 10 December. There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.

b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January, or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome.

c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower’s move from the Mediterranean to the U.K., his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

d. Recommend that concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.

e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary instructions.

Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 411/5)

The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (CCS 411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the airlift to China.

After a brief discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 411/5.

Employment of French forces

Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Giraud had put forward a proposal for employing at least one French armored division from the United Kingdom. He felt that in view of shipping limitations and the fact that Operation ANVIL had now been decided on, it would be better to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the South of France.

General Marshall agreed with this view. The training of a French armored division in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be better that the French armored division and other French forces should if possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation ANVIL. It must be remembered of course that General Giraud did not know that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best for the ANVIL forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important that the French forces for ANVIL should have had experience in battle before this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for Operation OVERLORD.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French armored division should be sent to take part in Operation OVERLORD.

b. That as a general policy:

  1. A French force should participate in ANVIL and only a token force in OVERLORD.

  2. It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with U.S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces.

c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy.

Final remarks

Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to express on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States Chiefs had met their views.

There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which the United States had made in the field of production.

General Marshall said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan Brooke’s gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals.

Admiral King, in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important conferences.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance at future U.S.-British Conferences.

b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next month.

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Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff 

Cairo, 7 December 1943

Secret
CCS 411/5

Operations in the Southeast Asia Command

In order to settle the question of tonnage lift to China versus availability of aircraft from ATC India-China Wing, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the following in lieu of the solution recommended in CCS 411/4, SEXTANT, 5 December 1943:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize the principle that the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command must have control over resources allocated to him for the accomplishment of the assigned objectives.

b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also recognize the necessity of firm commitments of tonnage over the “hump” into China during the next six months. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct:

  1. That the tonnage over the “hump” be maintained on the following basis of transport plane allotments:
C-87s C-46s Tons delivered
December 40 97 8,858
January 40 107 9,535
February 48 120 11,066
March 55 25 5,614
April 52 46 6,716
May 50 96 9,686
  1. They further direct that transport plane allotments to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, for TARZAN, be on the following basis:
  • 15 Dec to 31 Jan – 18 C-47s or 12 C-46s
  • 1 Feb to 28 Feb – 11 C-47s or 8 C-46s
  • 1 Mar to 31 Mar – 188 C-47s or 126 C-46s
  • 1 Apr to 15 Apr – 183 C-47s or 122 C-46s
  • 16 Apr to 15 May – 114 C-47s or 76 C-46s
  • 16 May to 30 Jun – 43 C-47s or 29 C-46s

NOTE: The above subparagraph is based on the assumption that 35 additional C-47s will be available in the theater by 1 February. (Now allotted to the 10th Air Force)

c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that any shortages in delivery of transport aircraft into the theater on present allotment bases be prorated in proportion to the allotments outlined in b (1) and (2) above. Excess in numbers of ATC aircraft over the expectations outlined in (1) and (2) above will be allocated by direction of the Commanding General, USAAF, India, during the above period.

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204

Churchill-Combined Chiefs of Staff dinner meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Union of South Africa
General Marshall Prime Minister Churchill Field Marshal Smuts
Admiral King Foreign Secretary Eden
General Arnold Lord Leathers
Mr. Casey
General Brooke
Air Chief Marshal Portal
Field Marshal Dill
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham

The topics discussed included the estimated date of the end of the war with Germany, unconditional surrender, and Churchill’s views on Russia.

205

The Pittsburgh Press (December 7, 1943)

Cairo parley may presage Balkans push

Meeting with President of Turkey may mean push north from Thrace
By Robert Dowson, United Press staff writer

London, England –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were reported conferring with President İsmet İnönü of Turkey in Cairo today in what may be a prelude to an Allied offensive in the Balkans, possibly in part through the Turkish “backdoor.”

The German Transocean News Agency broadcast a report attributed to Ankara that İnönü was returning from Cairo and a special session of the Turkish Cabinet would be held immediately.

The authoritative British Press Association, in what amounted to tacit confirmation of Axis reports of the conference, said it was expected the deliberations would “have almost as important an effect on the course of the war as the first Cairo and the Tehran Conferences.”

Promise offensive

The Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin declaration in Tehran significantly promised that new operations would be undertaken against Europe “from the south” and there was every indication that the “Big Three” discussed the possibility of bypassing the Aegean, Crete and Rhodes by striking directly into southeastern Europe from Turkish Thrace.

The Press Association said it was presumed that Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish leaders were discussing the Anglo-Turkish Pact of 1939 which bound Turkey to help Britain in the event that aggression by a European power led to war in the Mediterranean.

The Press Association’s diplomatic correspondent said:

Ankara observers state the possibilities Turkey will enter the war are increasing and Russia, whose relations with Turkey markedly improved recently, is known to have stressed the importance of Turkish intervention.

Nazi mass troops

The diplomatic correspondent doubted, however, that Turkey would officially enter the war in the immediate future. Other sources suggested that if Turkey did decide to throw in her lot with the Allies, she would hardly announce it until Allied forces have taken up dispositions that would protect her from any sudden Axis attack.

Hungarian sources in Stockholm said yesterday that German troops were moving through Bulgaria toward the Turkish frontier zone.

The Press Association said “reliable overseas reports” indicated that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Turkish Foreign Secretary Numan Menemencioğlu and Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s special assistant, were also participating in Anglo-American-Turkish conferences.

Would push from Italy

Cairo reports have implied that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, and Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British commander in the Levant, both of whom would presumably be involved in any Balkan operation, were also in Cairo, recently if not presently.

Any Allied drive through Turkey into the Balkans would probably be accompanied by a thrust across the Adriatic from newly-won bases in southern Italy into Yugoslavia for a pincer offensive.

A United Press dispatch from Cairo, which passed the strict British censorship there, said the Arabic press was speculating broadly on Turkey’s future role, though Allied authorities refused to comment on the situation.

Among the principal questions discussed by the newspapers, the dispatch said, were:

  1. Opening of the Dardanelles to Allied ships supplying Russia.
  2. Russian influence in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia.
  3. Possible German reprisals against Istanbul in the event Turkey entered the war.
  4. Possible further Russian influence through the Middle East toward Iran.

MacArthur aide attends parley

Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
The staff officer from Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters participated in the Cairo Conference and is now on his way back to report, it can be revealed today.

This officer, whose name cannot be published, told the United Press he had presented a detailed picture of Gen. MacArthur’s strategy and operations to Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Turning to the status of the Pacific Theater on the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor, this staff officer from the Southwest Pacific commented:

We are no nearer the Japanese mainland than we were a year ago, but this has not been our chief aim.

What we’ve been trying to do is cut off the Japanese lifeline, especially to the Dutch East Indies. Rather than made a head-on attack on the Japanese mainland against well-defended shores which the Japanese would prefer, we have been hitting his four weak points – oil, air strength, merchant shipping, and naval shipping.

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206

U.S. State Department (December 7, 1943)

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Tuesday, December 7 (at Cairo and en route Tunis)
7:30 a.m. The President and members of his party left his villa for the airport.
8:05 a.m. The President arrived Cairo West Airport. He bade goodbye to the Prime Minister, Ambassadors Steinhardt and Kirk, General Royce and a number of other officers from our Middle East Command who had accompanied him to the airport.
8:20 a.m. The President embarked and his plane departed Cairo for Tunis. In the President’s plane were: The President, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, General Watson, Major Boettiger, Lt-Commander Fox, Lieutenant (jg.) Rigdon, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, Secret Service Agents Spaman, Haman and Fredericks and Steward Prettyman.
. . . . . . .
207

The Pittsburgh Press (December 8, 1943)

TURKEY SPEEDS TOWARD WAR ON AXIS
Defense ring placed about Dardanelles

Balkans flareup nears; Ankara becomes Allied nonbelligerent
By Harrison Salisbury, United Press staff writer

turkeymap
New bases for Allies from which to raid the Balkans and Nazi-held Russia would be available should Turkey join the war against the Axis. The opening of the Dardanelles would speed shipments of arms to Russia. German troops were reported massed in southeastern Bulgaria, in the vicinity of the border of Turkey in Europe.

Cairo, Egypt –
Turkey has militarized the entire Dardanelles zone in an intensified program of warlike moves climaxed by a shift into the Allied camp as a benevolent nonbelligerent, reports presaging an explosion in the tense Balkan situation said today.

A United Press dispatch filed from Ankara last Thursday said Turkey was calling up one million more men to double the country’s armed strength this month.

Advices reaching Cairo in the wake of the Anglo-American-Turkish conference here said the Turks had laid out zones three miles wide on both sides of the Dardanelles and put them under strict military rule.

Nazis mass troops

The historic Dardanelles gateway between the Mediterranean and Black Sea lies below the border of European Turkey, near which the Germans were reported massing considerable armed strength. Among the security measures taken by the Turks in recent weeks, according to reports here, was the arrest of many persons suspected of espionage for the Nazis, described as on the upsweep recently.

Turkish police were also keeping close watch over Italians with Fascist sympathies, especially in the Istanbul area where there are about 75,000 Italians. All of them were under close surveillance and their names were on police registers.

Build war positions

Since 1937, the Turks have built a dense network of positions suitable for both defense and attack along the Dardanelles. High Turkish Army officers have repeatedly expressed their confidence that any attack would fail.

While foreign experts believe the Turkish Army is short of modern equipment, they are unanimous in agreeing that the morale of Turkish troops is high and their discipline is excellent. The Turk is traditionally a first-class warrior.

President İsmet İnönü of Turkey, a communiqué revealed, conferred with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill here last Saturday, Sunday and Monday and joined them in expressing the “closest unity” of the three countries in their attitude toward the “world situation.”

May enter war soon

Though an immediate Turkish declaration of war against Germany was not anticipated, barring a possible German attack, such a declaration may be only weeks or months away. Turkish sources suggested that Turkey was ready to enter the way anytime that the Allies were prepared to protect her against a German attack from Bulgaria, the Aegean or the Black Sea.

The possible Anglo-American use of Turkish airfields and supply routes, as well as an Allied thrust through Turkey into Bulgaria or Greece, were believed to have been discussed at the Cairo Conference and it was assumed that the United Nations and Turkey now have fully coordinated plans for any eventuality, including the opening of the Dardanelles as a supply route for Russia.

Some sources expected Turkey’s declaration of war, if and when it comes would be announced simultaneously with military action.

Rush reinforcements

Apparently anticipating some such move, Germany was reported rushing land and air reinforcements into southeastern Bulgaria, especially in the Eastern Rumelia area facing Turkey, and along the Black Sea coast, according to unofficial reports reaching Cairo.

Large detachments of Elite Guard forces were also reported massing at Salonika and gradually embarking for the island of Lemnos, which commands the Aegean entrance to the Dardanelles.

The bulk of the German reinforcements on the Turkish frontier, most of which were motorized infantry, were said to be concentrating in the triangle formed by the Black Sea port of Burgas, the frontier town of Rakovski on the main Sofia-Istanbul railroad, and the inland town of Plovdiv.

Speed air bases

The Germans were also rushing to completion air bases in an inner triangle based on Plovdiv, Stara Zagora and Malko Tarnovo on the frontier, it was said.

The same informants also said that German uneasiness over the attitude of the great mass of Bulgarians has been mounting steadily since the death of King Boris because of that country’s traditional sympathy for Russia. An incipient liberation movement in Bulgaria was reported to have contacted the new Partisan government of Dr. Ivan Ribar in Yugoslavia.

In a further effort to disturb the Balkans, the Allies were believed circulating through neutral channels the specific terms under which they will accept Germany’s surrender.

Repercussions expected

The stiffness of these terms was expected to touch off major repercussions among the German satellites, particularly in Hungary, which was believed ready to withdraw any time the Allies can extend any kind of assurances against Nazi retaliation.

There was every indication that the terms to Germany remained unconditional surrender with the Allies reserving the right of individual judgment over German Army officers accused of war atrocities, even if the German General Staff should instigate peace negotiations behind Hitler’s back.

Avoids direct answer

Selim Sarper, secretary general of the Turkish Press Bureau, avoided a direct answer when asked by correspondents whether the Turks had acted as the medium for any peace offers from Germany.

He said, “None were made through me.”

British and American staff officers were revealed to be engaged in a series of important conferences, at which they were believed to be drafting details of the new assaults promised by the Tehran Declaration against Axis Europe “from the south” and presumably including an invasion of the Balkans.

Smuts arrives

Marshal Jan C. Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and one of Mr. Churchill’s closest military advisers, arrived here Monday, but did not participate immediately in any Allied staff talks. He consulted Mr. Churchill shortly after his arrival and dined with Mr. Roosevelt that night.

President İnönü and his Turkish delegation of 15, including Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu and Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, flew here in British and U.S. planes from Turkey. However, it was stated officially that none of the Turkish military leaders had participated in staff talks with British and American commanders.

Soviet envoy present

The conference was held at the joint suggestion of the United States, Britain and Russia, the communiqué announcing the meeting said, and Sergei A. Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, represented the Soviet Union.

The communiqué said that the participation of the Turkish leaders in the conference:

…bears striking testimony to the strength of the alliance which unites Great Britain and Turkey and to the firm friendship existing between the Turkish people and the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Beside the principals, the conferees included British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, President Roosevelt’s special adviser Harry Hopkins and Mr. Menemencioğlu. The sessions were all held in Mena House, site of the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang Kai-shek meeting less than a fortnight earlier.

Parley story again told prematurely

London, England –
Information concerning the momentous Allied conferences in the Middle East was again released prematurely last night when the Berlin radio reported the Turkish news agency announced the news of the latest Cairo meeting at least two hours before the official deadline.

At 10:50 p.m. CET (5:50 p.m. ET), Berlin broadcast that the Turkish agency issued an official communiqué concerning the journey of President İsmet İnönü to Cairo to meet with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Berlin then proceeded to broadcast the text of an official announcement concerning the meetings – which was not released in the United States and Britain until 7:30 p.m. ET.

Previously, the British news agency Reuters has given advance information of the Cairo Conferences in which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek participated, and the Moscow radio broadcast the fact that the Tehran Conference had been held more than three days before the official release of information concerning that conference.

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Allied leaders may see Franco

Spanish move to forsake Nazis is hinted
By Leon Kay, United Press staff writer

Cairo, Egypt –
The possibility of a Roosevelt-Churchill meeting with Generalissimo Francisco Franco was speculated upon today as interest turned to the Western Mediterranean following the epic Allied conferences involving Russia, China and Turkey.

The Western Mediterranean bristles with problems just as thorny as those ironed out at Cairo and Tehran, but it was not known whether President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill propose to include Iberian, French and Italian affairs in their already-crowded scheduled.

A meeting among the two Allied chieftains and Franco at Tangier or Casablanca would afford Spain an opportunity to extricate herself further from the Axis web. Some sources suggested, however, that any such negotiations might be carried on by underlings rather than by the principals.

Though it must be emphasized that nothing definite can be revealed about the plans of Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill, their presence in Africa would obviously enable them to make on-the-spot inquiries into the troubled French and Italian situations as well as to meet Franco.

The French have felt left out in the cold by their exclusion from the Cairo and Tehran Conferences, but a courtesy call by Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill on Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Committee of National Liberation, might soothe their ruffled feelings.

May inspect front

It was not believed that the two leaders would concern themselves with the still-unsettled Italian political situation, though they might take advantage of their presence in Africa to inspect the Allies’ only active European land front.

In connection with the French and Italian situations, it might be significant that Robert Murphy and Harold MacMillan, American and British representatives respectively on the Italian Advisory Commission, twice journeyed to Cairo for consultations with Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill. Messrs. Murphy and MacMillan were formerly special ministers to North Africa and as such had close contact with the French Liberation Committee.

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209

Charles de Gaulle became the nationalist Frenchman who prefered Germans over Brits and Americans.

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210

Well… I see why he didn’t side with the brits… (a french and a british can never be friends) but why didn’t he prefer the americans?

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211

Because Americans had been the active people acting against the Free French and promoted former Vichy officers above Free France officers in Algeria.

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212

You have edited, so a new answer: Because the Germans have had no option to leave the French borders unprotected from the Soviets.

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How exactly? The soviets were on the west germany’s border.

So… I don’t get this part.

Yep. My mind races faster than my fingers. And hence I end up eating words.

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214

Germany is east of France, so the Soviet could not invade France without fighting the Germans, but the Americans can be occupied in Korea or Vietnam or with “America first”

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Early on, it was Churchill pleading de Gaulle’s case to FDR on a semi-regular basis, despite de Gaulle’s blatant dislike (edging toward open contempt) towards Churchill personally and the British generally. It’s clear from the record that the US government distrusted de Gaulle and would have preferred almost any other French leader to him.

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216

Yes, but why?..

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U.S. State Department (December 9, 1943)

Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

Cairo, December 9, 1943

Secret
509

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Most secret and personal.

I gave the paper in my immediately following to Inönü. They have asked for 4 days in which to consult their Parliament but meanwhile will allow build up to begin and 250 specialists are starting forthwith. On the whole I am hopeful. Vyshinsky liked the layout.

… I am tidying up with the King of Greece and expect a solution and arrangement in harmony with your feelings. Every good wish to you and Harry.

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740.0011 EW 1939/32275: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State

Ankara, December 9, 1943
1997

Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu made following statement at press conference of Allied and Turkish correspondents last evening:

The Cairo conference was one of the most important events in this; phase of the war. We returned from [talks?] in [Cairo?] extremely pleased and extremely satisfied with our conversations. We talked about everything there. All aspects of international politics and of the war were passed in review.

You doubtless know that the invitation to this conference was addressed to the Turkish Government by England, United States and USSR who was to have been represented by M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky]. But the latter who was at a distant place could not attend our meetings and did not reach Cairo until this morning. But I can tell you that even without M. Vichinsky [Vyshinsky] the Soviets were there.

As you have been able to see from the communiqué our alliance with England has been strengthened by this conference. Our conversations were so intimate and searching that we can likewise say that our relations with the United States and Soviet Union are almost as cordial and strong as those with England.

We studied all aspects of the problems with a frankness which was sometimes brutal but with understanding. We learned a great many things which we did not know. Our friends likewise learned many things of which they were ignorant. We drew closer to them and they drew closer to us for a better mutual understanding of our interests and our possibilities. It is because all our conversations were impregnated with this spirit that we could leave Cairo in an atmosphere of complete cordiality.

I can tell you without going into details that during our conversations we remained on the Axis [apparent omission] of the directives of the peoples party and that our foreign policy remains unchanged.

STEINHARDT

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870.01 AMG/21: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State 

London, December 9, 1943 — 5 p.m.
8552

We again took up the subject matter of the Department’s 7742, December 7, 8 p.m., with Nigel Ronald today. He told us that this was one of the matters which had been discussed at the highest level in North Africa but that the Foreign Office had not yet learned of the decision which had been reached. As soon as they did have this information they would be in a position to reply. Ronald stressed the fact that the Foreign Office was as anxious to settle the matter as was the Department.

BUCKNELL

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I haven’t done enough reading on the US viewpoint to say, but de Gaulle certainly had sandpaper for a soul … as my family used to say about some of our relatives, he could start a fight in an empty house.

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