War weapon output sets new records
Production is six times greater than pre-Pearl Harbor figure
…
U.S. State Department (December 7, 1943)
The President to the Secretary of State
Cairo [?], December 7, 1943
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
After discussing this matter with the British military authorities I consider it inadvisable to reopen the matter at this time.
FDR
Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, about 8:05 a.m.
Roosevelt arrived at the airport at 8:05 a.m. and bade goodbye to Churchill and to certain Americans (Steinhardt, Kirk, Royce, and others), after which he embarked in the plane at 8:20 for the return journey.
Roosevelt discussed certain subjects with Churchill apparently on the last day of Roosevelt’s stay at Cairo. These subjects, which may have been discussed at the airport, were:
- Italian priests and nuns interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia
- The question of seeking bases in Ireland
- British gold and dollar balances.
Composite memorandum handed by Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s special assistant
Cairo, December 7 (?), 1943
[I]
The question of the British gold and dollar balances
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Some time back, in different circumstances from the present, the President approved a line of policy which would permit the British gold and dollar reserves to reach some figure between $600 million and $1,000 million. There was no agreement by the British to limit their reserves to this figure.
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For some little time past the British reserves have exceeded $1,000 million, and may be increasing at a rate of some $600 million a year. This includes gold and represents their total resources against growing liabilities in all parts of the world, which amount to six or seven times these reserves.
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This increase in the British reserves does not reflect an improvement in their financial position. Their quick liabilities, largely caused by heavy cash outgoings in the Middle East, are increasing at four or five times the rate at which the reserves against them have increased. Their net overseas position, in fact, is deteriorating at a rate of about $3-billion a year.
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The increase in their gold holdings is due to certain receipts from South Africa and Russia. The increase in their dollar balances is due to their receiving the dollar equivalent of the local currency provided to meet the pay of American troops within the sterling area. Indeed, if it were not for the pay of the American troops the British dollar balances would be going down.
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Apart from certain raw materials, the British are already giving reciprocal aid to the fullest extent of American Government requirements. They have now offered raw materials purchased by the U.S. Government in Great Britain and the Colonies on reciprocal aid terms. This would retard the growth of their balances by about $100 million a year, and by $200 million if India and Australia join in.
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The British argue that some growth of their reserves is indispensable to the delicate system they are operating by which they finance the war on credit throughout a large part of the world, and that the retention of some part of the above receipts, as a support to this credit system and an offset to a much larger increase of liabilities, is not open to legitimate criticism. They point out that the Russians are believed to hold gold reserves nearly double the total reserves of the British and have no significant liabilities against them. But, in the case of Russia, it is not at present proposed to require them to surrender any part of their reserves as a condition of further Lend-Lease assistance.
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The British feel that they ought not to be asked to agree to a ceiling to their balances, since their reserve position must be their own concern. Nevertheless, if the British argument is accepted as valid, the position could be regularised by a new Directive, which would set up a revised formula for the guidance of American Departments. If the figure given by the new formula was being approached, then the whole question could be re-opened.
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The new formula might provide that an increase in British reserves is not unreasonable if the increase does not exceed, say, 30 per cent, of the increase of British liabilities.
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Figures furnished to Congress hitherto have not disclosed the full burden of British overseas liabilities, or their rate of growth. It might be necessary to justify the new arrangement to provide that the information given to Congress in future should be fuller, and should show in some fashion, which would not be dangerous to British credit, the growth of liabilities as well as the growth of reserves.
26 October 1943
[II]
Prime Minister
There is a matter affecting our financial relations with the United States of America which I think I must bring prominently to your notice at this particular juncture. We have reason to believe that the President is about to give a decision which is of absolutely vital importance to our financial capacity to get through the transitional period and, indeed, to our diplomatic independence during that time.
We are all concerned by the mounting accumulations of sterling balances in the hands of other countries. These represent a post-war liability upon us to convert the sterling into gold or other foreign exchange which the holders of the balances may need.
It looks indeed as though we may come to the end of the war with external liabilities of not less than £2,500,000,000 (ten billion dollars).
On the other side, after being almost cleaned out by the middle of 1941, we have been gradually building up a modest reserve. Our free balances of gold and dollars have now reached £300,000,000, and there is a reasonable hope of their reaching £500,000,000 (two billion dollars) by the end of the war, or about one-fifth of our assumed liabilities at the same date. These balances represent our only quick assets against the liabilities and constitute in fact the central reserve of the whole Commonwealth, since they include dollars turned over to us under the sterling area arrangements by the Dominions and other countries in the sterling area.
These balances will be absolutely essential to see us through the difficult transition period after Lend-Lease has ceased, and before the measures we shall have to take to restore the balance of our external trade have had time to bear fruit.
Early in the year we heard, almost accidentally, that the President had authorized a directive to the effect that the British reserves were not to be allowed to rise beyond a billion dollars (£250,000,000). It is not clear that this directive was ever issued in such explicit terms, and we were certainly not consulted about it. But the U. S. Treasury maintain that this alleged directive puts the Departments under orders to cut off Lend-Lease as soon as our total reserves exceed the limit of a billion dollars.
In course of time, this figure has been passed. Our reserves are now more than $1,200 million. From now on they are likely to increase, owing to our receiving the dollar equivalent of the pay of the American troops in the sterling area. According to present estimates of the numbers of American troops who will be drawing their pay in those areas, our reserves may increase by as much as $600 million in the next year.
This does not mean, however, that we are getting richer. Our liabilities are increasing five or six times as rapidly as our reserves, and we are constantly getting deeper into the pit of net indebtedness. Indeed, I doubt if we can maintain our external financial fabric on its present basis, unless some moderate proportion of our increased liabilities is covered by reserves against them.
All this has been explained in great detail to the American Administration. The late Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote a long letter to Mr. Morgenthau, rather more than two months ago, which the latter acknowledged and promised to answer. No reply has been received. When our Delegation was recently in Washington in connection with the currency and commercial talks, Lord Keynes and his colleagues submitted a memorandum to the State Department, the Lend-Lease Administration and the American Treasury on our balances and on our liabilities, asking the American Government to recognise that, in view of our growing external liabilities which arose directly from the war, the position of our balances should not be regarded as open to criticism. This view received strong support in some of the American Departments, though not in all. Mr. Stettinius and the State Department are wholly convinced that, in the circumstances, there should be no reduction of Lend-Lease, and that this small mitigation of our growing indebtedness should be allowed to accrue to us. The Lend-Lease Administration (at any rate before they were merged in the new body) were of the same opinion. The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, has been taking up a sticky line, for reasons which have never been explained to us. They have shown a disinclination to discuss the matter with any of our representatives or to give any reasons.
Some elements in the Administration maintain that Congress was given to understand that Lend-Lease was only to apply to the extent to which the recipient countries were utterly unable to pay for imports, whether of food or military equipment. In other words, however great our liabilities, we are not entitled to Lend-Lease as long as we have a dollar in the till. This view might have been sustainable in some quarters before Pearl Harbour. But it is, of course, utterly contrary to the principle of the pooling of resources between Allies, and also to the principle that the most convenient supplier shall provide the materials, irrespective of financial liability.
Moreover, it is a doctrine apparently to be applied to us only, for no such suggestion has been made to Russia. Nor, of course, do we apply it in giving reciprocal aid to the Americans or to any other country.
To resolve the difference of opinion between his own advisers, the President set up, several months ago, an interdepartmental, ministerial Committee, to report to him. Owing to the difference of opinion on this Committee, no report emerged, and sundry meetings of the Committee were adjourned when the time came to call them. This position has gradually become intolerable from our point of view. As the U.S. Treasury takes the line that the existing Presidential directive must be followed until it is superseded, the Lend-Lease Administration is reluctantly and half-heartedly falling in with this by proposing to cut off various items of Lend-Lease, though on nothing like a large enough scale to keep our balances down to the prescribed figure. We have been urging, therefore, on the American Departments concerned that the matter should be brought to a head. During Lord Keynes’s recent visit, the State Department and the Lend-Lease Administration both agreed that this was the right course. Colonel Llewellin and Sir Ronald Campbell urged Mr. Harry Hopkins to bring it to a head. As a result, the President has instructed Mr. Morgenthau to expedite the Committee’s report.
It may be that this report is already in the President’s hands. In any case, it is absolutely vital to us that he should make the right decision when it reaches him.
There are several reasons for hoping that he will:
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The force of our case, to anyone who takes the trouble to understand it, is overwhelming.
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Russia’s gold and dollar reserves are nearly twice ours, and they have no liabilities against them. The Americans are not proposing to tackle the Russians with a similar proposal. We, however, are thought to be easier game.
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A change of policy sufficient to keep our balances down to one billion dollars would have to be a very drastic one. The Americans will either have to ask us to meet the pay of their troops throughout the world (at a rate approximately double ours); or they will have to cut off Lend-Lease from some major item, such as food. At the very same time that the President has been emphasising the importance of our mutual aid, and when we have only just offered them raw materials, it would be a bit stiff to take either of these measures.
A favourable decision could take various forms. In no circumstances, of course, should we agree, on our side, to allow the amount of this country’s reserves to be settled by the Congress of the United States. But that is no reason why the President should not give instructions to his own Departments to the effect that they need not begin to worry about our reserves until they exceed a certain figure.
The most satisfactory revised directive would be one that fixes no limits, but asks that we should keep in consultation with the Administration about liabilities and balances. Failing that, if there is to be a ceiling, it should be raised to something not less than $2,000 million.
Apart from our post-war liabilities, which, as I have said, are likely to approach five times that amount, our adverse balance of trade in the first two or three years after the war will by itself exceed it. It is about the same amount as the Russian reserves, and they, as I have said, have no corresponding liabilities.
I attach a brief version of our case in a form which may have reached the President. This was prepared by Lord Keynes for Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Harry Hopkins, so that they could have something brief in their hands for use at an appropriate opportunity.
I again emphasise that an adverse decision would have the gravest consequences to our financial independence; whilst a favourable decision would remove a constant source of anxiety and friction.
JA
11 November 1943
[III]
Prime Minister
Great George Street, SW1
Secret
Gold and Dollar Balances
Thanks to gold from South Africa and pay to American troops in the U.K. and the Empire, our gold and dollar balances have increased to $1200 million and may rise to $2000 million by the end of the war. Much of the increase is not really ours at all but represents profits of Empire countries who choose to use us as their banker. Actually our reserves are far outweighed by our liabilities, especially in India and the Middle East, which are rising about five times as fast as our reserves and may amount to $10,000 million by the end of the war. Thus our net overseas position is deteriorating rapidly and our reserve when the war ends is likely to be only one fifth of our liabilities.
Certain Americans, ignoring these liabilities, claim that supplies on Lend/Lease should now be reduced and that we should be made to pay with our gold and dollars for goods supplied. Why they should pick on us for such treatment is not clear; it is never suggested that Russia and France with their enormous gold balances should pay for goods supplied to them.
The Lend/Lease administration who, with the State Department, are favourable to us, are reluctantly proposing to cut supplies since the United States Treasury maintain that the President issued a directive limiting British reserves to $1000 million.
The President has appointed a Committee to examine the matter, whose report may be already in his hands. It is vital to us that he should make the right decision. If our Lease/Lend supplies are cut off and our balances reduced to $1000 million, it will be almost impossible for us to tide over the difficult post-war period while we are building up our export trade.
CHERWELL
12 November 1943
Churchill-Inönü meeting, morning
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | Turkey | |
| Prime Minister Churchill | President Inönü | |
| Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu | |
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen | Mr. Açikalin |
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443
U.K. minutes
December 7, 1943
Most secret
The Prime Minister put to President Inonu the proposal that by February 15 all measures should be taken to render possible the fly-in of the 20 Allied squadrons. The Prime Minister would be ready after February 15 to consult with the Turkish government before the fly-in is carried out. By that time the situation may have evolved. The Balkan satellites may be on the point of falling out of the war. We should expect all measures to have been taken by February 15 to render the fly-in possible. It would not be possible to forecast enemy action between now and February 15. The President of the United States had said that Germany would be given no excuse to attack Turkey in this interval. Germany would not consider excuses but only whether it was worth her while to attack Turkey. Therefore by February 15 we shall know more about the German reaction. We have agreed on the preliminary steps and the work on the airfields must be finished as quickly as possible. After that on February 15 if the preparations are complete, he will ask whether the squadrons can come in and the matter can be discussed as between friends and allies. If after February 15 Turkey will not receive the allied squadrons and wishes to prolong the discussions of the equipment of the Turkish army, then the Prime Minister will be forced to think of other plans. The allied squadrons cannot be wasted, they would have to be used elsewhere. February 15 will be the critical and serious moment. But if we are forced, after that, to send the squadrons elsewhere, the question cannot be reopened with Turkey. It must be closed. We should have to tell our other allies that our policy with Turkey had failed. If the Turkish answer is favorable we would begin as quickly as possible to send in further material. But before February 15 Turkish communications would be blocked with the material for the airfields. It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that Bulgaria would not attack and it was even uncertain whether the Germans would push Bulgaria to attack, because if Bulgaria did so she would have to withdraw her nine divisions from Yugoslavia and this would create difficulty for the Germans.
President Inönü understood that the Prime Minister had resumed [rèsumèed] the conversations of the last 2 or 3 days.
M. Menemencioğlu said that the Turks had said all they had to say in the last three days.
President Inönü said that he had the impression that on the essential question both sides had reserved their own opinions. The Turks had foreseen two periods (i) preparation and (ii) effective cooperation. This had been accepted by the National Assembly and had formed the subject of the answer of November 17 given by the Turkish Government. On the other hand the Prime Minister considered the first period as purely one for preparation especially as regards the airfields.
The Prime Minister explained that this was because he did not regard invasion as a serious danger.
President Inönü asked whether he had rightly understood that the Prime Minister had not excluded the supply of other goods either before or after February 15.
The Prime Minister said certainly not. The quicker the supplies were sent the better.
President Inönü asked whether the Prime Minister thought that these supplies should be complete before action was taken.
The Prime Minister said that it was not necessary that the supplies for the army should be complete by February 15th, and for the Turks to insist on this would be the same as saying that they would not come in. To complete supplies for the Turkish army is to adjourn the final Turkish decision indefinitely. On that basis the chance of shortening the war by Turkey’s entry would be lost.
President Inönü said that he thought the difference between the two sides was in their appreciation of German strength. The Allies thought that in the present situation Germany could not do much harm to Turkey.
The Prime Minister said that this applied only to land attack: air bombardment was very possible.
President Inönü said that all war risks were natural and would have to be taken. The Turkish government saw Germany as stretching from the Crimea to Rhodes and with Turkey encircled and they felt that Germans [Germany?] had fresh forces with which she could attack. If in these circumstances Turkey was left without a minimum of the essential supplies she would be seriously menaced on land. He explained a weak point in the present Turkish military position. At the beginning of November one class had been released from the colours. A new class of recruits was now being called up. On the basis of a decision by February 15th, Turkey would have to strengthen the army by 2 or 3 classes. Another point was that at the present date, the period of mud in Thrace had not yet begun. The President went on to say that he had explained the situation as he saw it. His technicians were not with him and he could not go further into detail. It was a serious question for the government to give a positive answer on matters which went against the decision of the Grand National Assembly. As to the political question in the preparatory period, it was necessary to work for a closer definition of the political situation. If he had understood the Prime Minister rightly, Mr. Churchill required his answer now, or soon, so that the situation to be taken up in the future could be defined. He would do all he could to give a clear and accurate answer in 3 or 4 days.
The Prime Minister said that the final answer was not required till February 15th, but that in the interval we must at once begin preparations.
President Inönü understood the position. The answer he proposed to give in 3 or 4 days was to the question whether and in what manner he would engage in the preparations. He would tell us the conditions in which Turkey would come in or take the risks likely to bring her in. After having considered the Prime Minister’s statement Turkey must give an answer. The President asked that an expert should be sent to Angora to study the technical questions more closely. The Turkish answer had been given in principle. The Turkish government thought that a general plan was necessary, not for the sake of prolonging the discussions but for practical reasons. It was the Prime Minister’s opinion that the preparations proposed up to February 15 were sufficient. In the interval it would be quite possible to form a general plan.
The Prime Minister said that if the President envisaged a long programme of reequipment taking into account the difficulty of communications and so forth, that was the same as saying that the negotiations were ended. It would be easy for Turkey to make prohibitive conditions and in that case the Allied forces must be sent elsewhere.
President Inönü said that this was a serious statement touching a fundamental point. He would define the position as follows:
a) given that the Turkish answer is a simple acceptance of the Prime Minister’s proposal, namely to go on with the preparations till February 15 and taking the final decision then, that would be the best answer that the Prime Minister could require.
b) alternatively to consider Allied needs and add the Turkish need for a plan which both sides could accept. If Turkey accepted, the preparations could continue; if not, the Prime Minister would have the right to change his plans.
The Prime Minister remarked that this would mean a complete change of policy. In that event the war would move westwards and Turkey would lose the chance of coming in and of reaping the advantages which entry into the war would promise her.
M. Menemencioğlu asked whether by change of policy the Prime Minister was referring to the Anglo-Turkish Alliance.
The Prime Minister replied that the Alliance would cease to have any value for war purposes. The moment would have gone when Turkey could render the great service we asked. Turkey would stay where she was. Friendship would remain, but as an effective ally for the war Turkey would count for nothing. We should win, but without Turkey. Turkey’s entry into the war was important for us as it gave a chance of including Turkey with the Allies in the future.
President Inönü said that for Turkey fidelity to Great Britain was an essential conception both during and after the war. If this was also the British view he thought it was not impossible to find a solution.
The Prime Minister mentioned the line of procedure as subsequently handed to the President and shown here as Annex A.
Mr. Eden said that as regards the Alliance we were faithful to our engagements and wished to work with our Turkish friends. But if the time for Turkey’s entry into the war came and went, it was inevitable that the spirit of the Alliance would be affected.
The Prime Minister expressed the view that Bulgaria would not attack Turkey when she knew that this would entail a Russian declaration of war on her.
M. Menemencioğlu asked whether the Russian declaration of war would be given equally if Bulgaria allowed Germany all facilities in and through Bulgaria for an attack on Turkey.
Mr. Eden undertook to put this question to the Soviet government.
The Prime Minister said that he could not guarantee that the Germans would not bomb Istanbul and Smyrna. But if our squadrons were there the Germans would have serious losses. He thought it very possible by the end of February that the situation would be reassuring for Turkey. It would be easier to see clearly then than now and in the interval the preparations did not commit Turkey to give a favourable answer to our appeal to send air squadrons after February 15. The President was quite free to say yes or no without reproach. All that would have happened would be that we had sacrificed war material for nothing. If Germany did not attack Turkey but remained in relations with her, we should not ask Turkey to declare war. Time would thus be gained for sending in further supplies. In this way Turkey would be in a very strong position and would emerge unexhausted with the advantage of cooperation with the victorious allies. The Prime Minister wanted Turkey to be strong after the war and to be friends with Great Britain, the United States and Russia. Turkey and Great Britain had common interests and the Prime Minister wanted to protect them. The Prime Minister then handed the annexed paper to President Inonu who read it and said that it was clear and that there was nothing more to say. The Prime Minister pointed out that there were two things to be done. The President would consult the National Assembly and give his answer in 4 or 5 days. Those days could also be employed in pressing on with preparations and sending in specialists. This was agreed to and the number of specialists was limited to 250. At this point the Chiefs of Staff joined the meeting and handed the Prime Minister a paper which showed that between now and February 15th, in addition to the supplies required for the AA guns and airfields, a total of 58,900 tons could be sent to Turkey by rail for Turkey’s own use, given the full cooperation of the Turkish railways and in addition as many more supplies as could be carried by sea. It was agreed that the next steps should be the following:
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British experts should go to Angora. This was agreed to by the Turks.
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General Kiazim Orbay and General Ceffik Cakmak and a naval representative of the Turkish General Staff should come to Cairo. The Turks reserved their final answer to this question till their return to Angora.
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Matters should then be followed up by the despatch of more British officers to Angora to continue the conversations.
ANNEX A
- Air preparations and other supplies till 15 February.
- Discussion of war plans.
- Programme of munitions import.
- Discussion of political questions.
15 February. Allies ask permission to “fly in.”
if reply negative.
Allies direct all resources to another theatre and must abandon hope of wartime cooperation with Turkey.
if reply “Yes.”
- Continuation at fullest speed of programme of import munitions for army and air.
- Opening of the sea route to Turkey.
- Reinforcement by British anti-tank and armoured units.
- Execution of agreed plan with full force of Allies and Turkey.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | General Riddell Webster | |
| Major General Sutherland | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Fairchild | Captain Lambe | |
| Brigadier General Hansell | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Brigadier General Roberts | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Commander Long | Brigadier McNair | |
| Brigadier Head | ||
| Colonel Cornwall-Jones | ||
| Lieutenant Colonel Mallary | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 7, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
Approval of conclusions of CCS 137th Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 137th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them CCS 400/2 as amended by the corrigendum issued on 7 December.
Sir Charles Portal said that the attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff to the proposals had already been stated and to these views he had nothing to add. He recognized, however, that the new directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet some of the objections which had been put forward. The British Chiefs of Staff could not signify their approval of the proposals, but recognized the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to issue such directives to their own air forces as they might see fit. If the new directive were issued, he, for his part, was prepared to assume the responsibility laid on him by this directive, and to carry it out to the best of his ability. He would suggest, however, that before implementing the new policy, General Arnold should, if possible, hear the views of General Eisenhower, General Wilson, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder.
General Arnold said he was anxious to implement the proposals as soon as possible. He would, however, discuss the matter as suggested by Sir Charles Portal before taking final action.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted CCS 400/2.
b. Took note:
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that although the British Chiefs of Staff do not agree in principle with CCS 400/2, the United States Chiefs of Staff have decided to issue the directive giving effect to their proposals;
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that before issue of the directive, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces would consult General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder and General Wilson;
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that the Chief of the Air Staff undertook to carry out the duties laid upon him by the directive contained in CCS 400/2 (as corrected by corrigendum of 7 December).
Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia alternative to BUCCANEER (CCS 427 and 427/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten (CCS 427/1).
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that no decisions should be taken until the views of the Generalissimo were known.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given brief consideration to the subject that morning. In general, their views were that since BUCCANEER had been postponed, the trained forces earmarked for this operation would be available for use elsewhere. Some might be required for commando operations, if these were decided upon. The service troops might be used to assist in overcoming the logistic difficulties in Calcutta and Assam. The combat troops might be used as a reliable reserve in the rear of the Chinese forces operating on the Ledo Road. He was most anxious to ensure that our Assam bases and the pipeline should not be lost. The report received with regard to the bad morale of the Chinese forces had, he felt, been given too much weight. It was a report from one officer only, who was not in contact with the troops. The reactions of the Generalissimo could not be foretold, but if Operation TARZAN was called off he felt that the operations outlined by Admiral Mountbatten might well be undertaken with an additional advance by the Chinese forces on the Ledo Road with the United States long range penetration group of 2,500 to 3,000 men operating ahead of them, and with some of the British forces released from BUCCANEER forming a reserve.
Sir Alan Brooke said he was in general agreement with the views which had been expressed. If the Generalissimo did not agree to the undertaking of Operation TARZAN, but preferred an additional air lift over the “hump,” then a new directive might be given to Admiral Mountbatten, giving him as his objective the assurance of the Assam lines of communication and instructing him that the combat forces released from BUCCANEER should be used in active offensive operations to achieve the object while the non-fighting troops released should be used to assist in overcoming logistics difficulties and in the construction of the facilities required for the operations of the B-29s. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should inform General Wedemeyer of these views, telling him that they should form a basis for future planning, but could not be taken as a firm instruction until a reply from the Generalissimo had been received. In the meantime, a draft directive could be prepared for Admiral Mountbatten on the assumption that the Generalissimo would prefer the postponement of TARZAN.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That a new directive along the lines indicated in the above discussion should be issued to the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command regarding the campaign to be carried out in North Burma in 1944; and
b. That this directive should not be dispatched until the receipt of the Generalissimo’s reply to the President’s dispatch of 5 December on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.
Provision of merchant shipping types for the war against Japan (CCS 415/3)
Without discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and the First Sea Lord, as set out in CCS 415/3.
Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon (CCS 428)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the paper under consideration had been prepared in great haste as an interim report, and as such it could be accepted. Further work would have to be done in the light of the final decisions yet to be taken.
General Marshall agreed with this view. He suggested certain amendments to the report, which were agreed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted in principle the relation of available resources to agreed operations outlined in CCS 428 with the modifications approved in the course of discussion. (Amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 428 (Rev.))
Development of facilities in the Azores (CCS 270/13 and 270/14)
Sir Charles Portal said that there were two sides to this problem. Firstly, with regard to the political position, the latest information from Lisbon showed that Dr. Salazar was ready to allow the operation of United States anti-submarine forces and the ferrying of United States aircraft through the Azores on condition that acceptable formulae to cover these operations could be found. The British Chiefs of Staff memorandum (CCS 270/14) suggested certain formulae. These were contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the paper. He would like to know if these were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had already put forward a draft memorandum for the President to send to the State Department with regard to the changing of the insignia on the United States aircraft to be used in the Azores.
Sir Charles Portal said that he did not believe that this would now be necessary. It seemed to him that provided Dr. Salazar could be satisfied that the United States anti-submarine forces were operating on loan to His Majesty’s Government under command of a British officer from a British base, and that the American transit aircraft were controlled by the British Air Transport Command, he, Dr. Salazar, would be satisfied.
With regard to the military aspects, it had been found necessary to obtain additional facilities; for instance, more land was required, and it was desired to run a pipeline to take the place of the long haul for gasoline by road. In this connection, it was proposed that the British Government should make a further approach to the Portuguese Government, asking for these additional facilities, on the ground that these were a natural development on the agreement already in force.
General Arnold said that the formulae suggested by Sir Charles Portal were entirely acceptable to him, except for the proposal in the second half of paragraph 4 of CCS 270/14 with regard to the second airfield. He suggested, therefore, that the British proposals with this exception should be accepted and that he and Sir Charles Portal should work out the necessary details.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 270/14 with the elimination of the last sentence of paragraph 4.
b. Agreed that details regarding the use of the Azores facilities by United States Army air forces should be settled directly between General Arnold and Air Chief Marshal Portal.
New command arrangements
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the date on which the new Mediterranean Command should be set up, and the most suitable time for General Eisenhower to leave this theater and assume command of the Allied Expeditionary Force.
It was generally agreed that it was undesirable to publish the fact that unification of command in the Mediterranean had been set up, or to announce General Eisenhower’s new appointment. In this latter case, however, it was accepted that for political reasons the announcement of this appointment would be necessary.
Sir Hastings Ismay put forward a draft memorandum covering these points. The Combined Chiefs of Staff accepted this memorandum for submission to the President and Prime Minister.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the unification of Command in the Mediterranean shall take effect from 10 December. There should be no public announcement of this change of organization.
b. Agreed to recommend that General Eisenhower should hand over Command of the Mediterranean Theater on 1 January, or as soon after that date as General Eisenhower himself thinks desirable, having regard to the progress of the operations to capture Rome.
c. Agreed to recommend, that, if there is to be a public announcement of General Eisenhower’s move from the Mediterranean to the U.K., his new appointment should be described as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
d. Recommend that concurrently with the above, the announcement should be made of the new Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater.
e. Took note that the approval of the President and Prime Minister would be sought to the above before transmission of the necessary instructions.
Operations in Southeast Asia Command (CCS 411/5)
The United States Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum (CCS 411/5) setting out certain proposals with regard to the airlift to China.
After a brief discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 411/5.
Employment of French forces
Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that General Giraud had put forward a proposal for employing at least one French armored division from the United Kingdom. He felt that in view of shipping limitations and the fact that Operation ANVIL had now been decided on, it would be better to maintain the principle that the main French effort should be made in the South of France.
General Marshall agreed with this view. The training of a French armored division in the United Kingdom would prove difficult. It would be better that the French armored division and other French forces should if possible be given a period of active service in Italy, and then used for Operation ANVIL. It must be remembered of course that General Giraud did not know that this operation had been decided on. As he saw, it would probably be best for the ANVIL forces to be principally United States and the remainder French. The majority of the forces in Italy would then be British. It was most important that the French forces for ANVIL should have had experience in battle before this operation. There would, of course, have to be a token French force for Operation OVERLORD.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That for shipping and other reasons it was undesirable that a French armored division should be sent to take part in Operation OVERLORD.
b. That as a general policy:
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A French force should participate in ANVIL and only a token force in OVERLORD.
-
It will probably be best to undertake the ANVIL operation with U.S. forces with French participation, and to continue the campaign in Italy with British forces.
c. That all French formations should be given battle experience in Italy.
Final remarks
Sir Alan Brooke said he would like to express on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff their deep gratitude for the way in which the United States Chiefs had met their views.
There was one other point he would like to mention. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their appreciation of the unstinting help given to the British and other Allies from American production. This aspect of United States assistance was not mentioned in the consideration of strategy, but nevertheless had the widest repercussions on all our plans, and was playing a great part in the successful development of the war. The British Chiefs of Staff would like to express their deep admiration of the stupendous efforts which the United States had made in the field of production.
General Marshall said that he very much appreciated Sir Alan Brooke’s gracious tributes. He felt that it was most important that during the next month or so the British and United States Chiefs of Staff should both study how best the magnitude of future conferences could be reduced. They would undoubtedly in future have to take place at shorter intervals.
Admiral King, in agreeing with this view, said that every effort should also be made to cut down the number of subjects discussed at these important conferences.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That it was desirable to cut down as much as possible the attendance at future U.S.-British Conferences.
b. That a study with this in view should be carried out within the next month.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 7 December 1943
Secret
CCS 411/5
Operations in the Southeast Asia Command
In order to settle the question of tonnage lift to China versus availability of aircraft from ATC India-China Wing, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept the following in lieu of the solution recommended in CCS 411/4, SEXTANT, 5 December 1943:
a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize the principle that the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command must have control over resources allocated to him for the accomplishment of the assigned objectives.
b. The Combined Chiefs of Staff also recognize the necessity of firm commitments of tonnage over the “hump” into China during the next six months. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct:
- That the tonnage over the “hump” be maintained on the following basis of transport plane allotments:
| C-87s | C-46s | Tons delivered | |
|---|---|---|---|
| December | 40 | 97 | 8,858 |
| January | 40 | 107 | 9,535 |
| February | 48 | 120 | 11,066 |
| March | 55 | 25 | 5,614 |
| April | 52 | 46 | 6,716 |
| May | 50 | 96 | 9,686 |
- They further direct that transport plane allotments to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, for TARZAN, be on the following basis:
- 15 Dec to 31 Jan – 18 C-47s or 12 C-46s
- 1 Feb to 28 Feb – 11 C-47s or 8 C-46s
- 1 Mar to 31 Mar – 188 C-47s or 126 C-46s
- 1 Apr to 15 Apr – 183 C-47s or 122 C-46s
- 16 Apr to 15 May – 114 C-47s or 76 C-46s
- 16 May to 30 Jun – 43 C-47s or 29 C-46s
NOTE: The above subparagraph is based on the assumption that 35 additional C-47s will be available in the theater by 1 February. (Now allotted to the 10th Air Force)
c. The Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that any shortages in delivery of transport aircraft into the theater on present allotment bases be prorated in proportion to the allotments outlined in b (1) and (2) above. Excess in numbers of ATC aircraft over the expectations outlined in (1) and (2) above will be allocated by direction of the Commanding General, USAAF, India, during the above period.
Churchill-Combined Chiefs of Staff dinner meeting, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Union of South Africa |
| General Marshall | Prime Minister Churchill | Field Marshal Smuts |
| Admiral King | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| General Arnold | Lord Leathers | |
| Mr. Casey | ||
| General Brooke | ||
| Air Chief Marshal Portal | ||
| Field Marshal Dill | ||
| Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham |
The topics discussed included the estimated date of the end of the war with Germany, unconditional surrender, and Churchill’s views on Russia.
Oh. Oh no.
The foreshadowing is strong with this one.
1 Like
The Pittsburgh Press (December 7, 1943)
YANKS CAPTURE MOUNTAINS
5th Army seizes 25-mile area in bloody struggle
Americans sweep to rim of heights fringing main road to Rome; 8th Army forces crossing of key river
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
…
U.S. BOMBERS RAID ATHENS AIRDROMES
Liberators, Fortresses team in assaults
Other Allied planes pound bridge near Rome, hit guns in Albania
By James E. Roper, United Press staff writer
…
Cairo parley may presage Balkans push
Meeting with President of Turkey may mean push north from Thrace
By Robert Dowson, United Press staff writer
London, England –
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were reported conferring with President İsmet İnönü of Turkey in Cairo today in what may be a prelude to an Allied offensive in the Balkans, possibly in part through the Turkish “backdoor.”
The German Transocean News Agency broadcast a report attributed to Ankara that İnönü was returning from Cairo and a special session of the Turkish Cabinet would be held immediately.
The authoritative British Press Association, in what amounted to tacit confirmation of Axis reports of the conference, said it was expected the deliberations would “have almost as important an effect on the course of the war as the first Cairo and the Tehran Conferences.”
Promise offensive
The Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin declaration in Tehran significantly promised that new operations would be undertaken against Europe “from the south” and there was every indication that the “Big Three” discussed the possibility of bypassing the Aegean, Crete and Rhodes by striking directly into southeastern Europe from Turkish Thrace.
The Press Association said it was presumed that Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish leaders were discussing the Anglo-Turkish Pact of 1939 which bound Turkey to help Britain in the event that aggression by a European power led to war in the Mediterranean.
The Press Association’s diplomatic correspondent said:
Ankara observers state the possibilities Turkey will enter the war are increasing and Russia, whose relations with Turkey markedly improved recently, is known to have stressed the importance of Turkish intervention.
Nazi mass troops
The diplomatic correspondent doubted, however, that Turkey would officially enter the war in the immediate future. Other sources suggested that if Turkey did decide to throw in her lot with the Allies, she would hardly announce it until Allied forces have taken up dispositions that would protect her from any sudden Axis attack.
Hungarian sources in Stockholm said yesterday that German troops were moving through Bulgaria toward the Turkish frontier zone.
The Press Association said “reliable overseas reports” indicated that British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Turkish Foreign Secretary Numan Menemencioğlu and Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt’s special assistant, were also participating in Anglo-American-Turkish conferences.
Would push from Italy
Cairo reports have implied that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, and Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, British commander in the Levant, both of whom would presumably be involved in any Balkan operation, were also in Cairo, recently if not presently.
Any Allied drive through Turkey into the Balkans would probably be accompanied by a thrust across the Adriatic from newly-won bases in southern Italy into Yugoslavia for a pincer offensive.
A United Press dispatch from Cairo, which passed the strict British censorship there, said the Arabic press was speculating broadly on Turkey’s future role, though Allied authorities refused to comment on the situation.
Among the principal questions discussed by the newspapers, the dispatch said, were:
- Opening of the Dardanelles to Allied ships supplying Russia.
- Russian influence in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia.
- Possible German reprisals against Istanbul in the event Turkey entered the war.
- Possible further Russian influence through the Middle East toward Iran.
Berlin terms parley U.S.-British sellout
By the United Press
Axis propagandists today described the Tehran Conference as a sellout by Great Britain and the United States and a “diplomatic victory” for Marshal Stalin, said second front mention was vague and declared the Allies would have realized their intentions against Germany long ago “if they had been able to do so.”
The Nazi home radio belittled the statement following the conference as “even more meager and empty than the announcement issued in Moscow,” referred to the principals as “the American big capitalist, the English Tory and the Bolshevik dictator.”
Prime Minister Churchill, the radio said, was “bringing up the rear in keeping with the satellite role to which England has sunk.”
Berlin broadcasts wondered why an appeal was not made to the German people and said Germany would not lay down her arms until victory was won.
In the first Japanese reaction, the Dōmei News Agency said an attempt to “destroy German morale on the basis of the successful propaganda used against Italy will be futile: and declared that the communiqué “doesn’t in the least affect Japan’s determination to crush the United States and Britain.”
DNB, the German news agency, said the Tehran communiqué was a “farce” and that it indicated that Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt were “capitulating all along the line to Soviet demands.”
Roosevelt: ‘Very successful’
Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
President Roosevelt in two speeches to American soldiers in Iran said that he, Premier Joseph Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill at a “very successful” Iran conference made plans to win the war as soon as possible and work for a world “for our children” in which war would cease to be a necessity, it was announced today.
Early last Thursday, just before he left Tehran, the President addressed “walking” patients at an American post hospital and later American troops at an Iranian base.
They were friendly, chatty speeches calculated to cheer men far from home.
‘Very successful’
The President said:
I have had conferences with Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill during the past four days – very successful, too – laying plans insofar as we can to make it unnecessary for us again to have Americans in Iran just as long as we and our children live.
I got here four days ago to meet with the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to try to do two things.
The first was to lay military plans for cooperation between our three nations looking forward to winning the war just as fast as we possibly can and I think we have made progress toward that end.
Must win first
Our other purpose was to talk over world conditions after the war – to try to plan for a world for our children when war would cease to be a necessity. We have made great progress in that also. But, of course, the first thing is to win the war.
In addressing the hospital patients, the President said:
This place is a good deal like home. I landed about 10 days ago. This is the nearest thing to the United States I have seen yet.
The President said of plans for a warless world:
I think that is worth fighting for, even being sick for, in Iran.
MacArthur aide attends parley
Cairo, Egypt (UP) –
The staff officer from Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters participated in the Cairo Conference and is now on his way back to report, it can be revealed today.
This officer, whose name cannot be published, told the United Press he had presented a detailed picture of Gen. MacArthur’s strategy and operations to Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Turning to the status of the Pacific Theater on the second anniversary of Pearl Harbor, this staff officer from the Southwest Pacific commented:
We are no nearer the Japanese mainland than we were a year ago, but this has not been our chief aim.
What we’ve been trying to do is cut off the Japanese lifeline, especially to the Dutch East Indies. Rather than made a head-on attack on the Japanese mainland against well-defended shores which the Japanese would prefer, we have been hitting his four weak points – oil, air strength, merchant shipping, and naval shipping.
Setbacks doom Solomons Japs
Yank planes, ships pound Bougainville area
By Brydon C. Taves, United Press staff writer
…
Pearl Harbor aftermath –
Try general and admiral, Senator asks
File charges or impeach Knox and Stimson, Clark demands
…
What it took to capture Tarawa
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A sniper in his sights means another notch on this Marine’s rifle as he fires at a Jap amid the shambles of Tarawa. Although the Marine Corps caption did not indicate the sniper, the arrow shows an object that might be the enemy. Notice the gun in the background.
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Blasted out of action, this big Jap heavy turret-type gun used to defend Tarawa Island in the Gilberts failed to keep the Marines off. Notice the body of the Jap beneath the hole in the reinforced concrete blockhouse, an example of the defenses on the island.