From Roosevelt:
When I was in Cairo I had a very nice visit from the Very Reverend Arthur Hughes. We talked about the Italian priests and also the Italian nuns who are interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia, and the day I left I called the whole matter to Churchill’s attention and pleaded with him that these perfectly innocent people should be released, or at least allowed to do their work. I have not had any answer from the British as yet.
His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes called on the President.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Turkey |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | President Inönü |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu |
| Mr. Steinhardt | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Açikalin |
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen | Mr. Anderiman | |
| General Wilson | Mr. Kavur | |
| Air Chief Marshal Douglas | Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu | |
| Vice Admiral Willis | ||
| Air Vice Marshal George | ||
| Mr. Helm |
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443
December 6, 1943
Most secret
Prior to the meeting President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish President had been in private conference.
Mr. Churchill said that the Turkish President had decided to postpone his departure until midnight on 7 December. This would provide an opportunity for going over the ground in greater detail. He had submitted to the President a plan of action and this would raise the question of how it was to be carried out if Turkey were attacked and drawn into the war. In the interval a plan would be drawn up for Turkish action in conjunction with the great Allies. There was also the question of political guarantees, if Turkey by her actions should be drawn into the conflict. It was right and proper that in this event the Allies should see Turkey through.
President Roosevelt remarked that when it came to the discussion of political guarantees it would be desired to include Soviet representatives.
The Turkish President said he had been in contact with Mr. Churchill during the afternoon when the essential points had been made. They would be able to discuss these tomorrow when the position would be clearer in all directions. He thought however that one feature governed the solution of the whole question, namely the period for material preparation. After that came other phases. As the President now understood it, however, such a period of preparation was not envisaged, or rather that a mixed method was contemplated. This was a cardinal point.
President Roosevelt thought in the first period Turkey would commit only neutral acts. She would receive equipment and material (Mr. Churchill – personnel) and men in mufti. Mr. Churchill remarked that in these conditions the Germans would not want to break with Turkey.
The Turkish President said that for months Turkey would face the German army alone. He had not contemplated this. He had thought that when the Germans declared war the Turks would be in touch with some Anglo-American forces. But in this period of months the Turks would be alone with the Germans. This was a great question and the President did not think he could decide upon it.
President Roosevelt remarked that he did not think that the Germans would declare war in the first period.
President Inönü said that their record showed that the Germans always attacked for prevention. When they saw after a certain time that Turkey had taken her place openly with the Allies, they would use this argument and attack.
President Roosevelt pointed out that the Turks had already been receiving supplies on a considerable scale without the Germans taking exception thereto. Why then should the Turks worry now? In the first period there would be no question of the Turks taking the kind of action which would justify the Germans attacking them. Surely the work on airfields and the introduction of material, flak, etc., i.e., the same sort of thing as had been going on in the past, could continue. This would apply to lend-lease material and the trucks previously promised would be delivered. In fact, there would be no change except that there would be an accelerated tempo.
Mr. Eden remarked that the technicians would also have to come in. This was essential.
President Inönü said that the Turks had replied to Mr. Eden’s request for air bases for the Allies. It has been said that the provision of these would not provoke war. The Turks had replied that they must regard the matter as very serious because they were convinced that it would provoke war. This meant contemplating Turkey’s entry into the war. The Turkish army was not ready and the country was exposed to enemy air attack. They must therefore have assistance and there would have to be a period of preparation. According to the plan action would begin at the end of this phase. We were now in the first phase and he understood that it was thought that preparation would take too long at a time when the Allies could not wait. The Allies seemed to think that the Turkish Government should act in spite of risks. This was difficult.
Mr. Eden said that a German land attack was most improbable, especially in view of the warning which Russia had promised to give to Bulgaria.
President Inönü said that Turkey would be exposed to air attack and also to land attack by the Bulgarian army fortified by the Germans. President Roosevelt doubted whether Bulgaria would face a hostile Russia.
President Inönü said that perhaps a hostile Russia would induce Bulgaria to hold back, perhaps it would not. The present Bulgarian government was completely committed to Germany.
President Roosevelt did not think that Bulgaria would declare war on Turkey, and he doubted whether the Germans had enough men to stage a German land offensive against Turkey by way of Bulgaria. President Inönü thought, however, that the Germans would be able to get to Istanbul.
In reply to a question by President Roosevelt President Inönü said that Turkey had about forty divisions scattered about the country. They were not prepared. If the Allies had been able to give the desired material assistance in the past the Turkish Government could have replied affirmatively to any demand. As it was they had put all available material, including some very very old stuff, into service. They had hoped that this entirely out of date material would be replaced by new material. How was it possible to get out of the impasse?
Mr. Churchill said that the first thing was to prepare the nests for the birds. This must be done secretly and discreetly in order not to alarm the Germans. The equipment and personnel agreed upon would be put in. Then would come the second phase when all was ready and when the air squadrons would arrive within twenty-four hours. From that moment Turkey would have much greater security than during the preliminary period.
President Inönü said that even if the twenty air squadrons had arrived or were ready to come in, it would not be possible to say that Turkey was ready. Complete plans for assistance would have to be made and material would have to come in for the fortification of the army. In the event of attack the Allies would have to assist. Only one part of the preparation for this assistance was being discussed. The rest was being left to wait. But during the preparatory period proposed in the discussions, he must prepare his army, mobilize it and concentrate it. Much had been done but it was most inadequate, and a sort of concentration must take place. All this was apparently to be finished by 15 February, and the Turkish army must be put on a war footing for the Germans would strike at the first sign of the entry of the twenty squadrons.
Mr. Churchill enquired whether the Turkish army was not already mobilized and was informed that it was half mobilized.
President Roosevelt suggested that if mobilization had first to take place it would take a long time and suggested, as did Mr. Churchill, that in any case mobilization would surely be more provocative than work on airfields.
President Inönü said that precipitate action without preparation seemed to be contemplated. He did not see any possibility of undertaking this.
Mr. Churchill remarked that the Turkish President seemed to think there was a serious danger of invasion. He however thought invasion by Bulgaria was most unlikely.
President Inönü said it was a matter of opinion. One could not be sure what the enemy would do. Both the Bulgarians and the Germans had forces on the Turkish frontier, and the Turks must calculate that they would all be used.
Mr. Churchill thought that it was impossible to get to a conclusion at this meeting. He would like to go over the ground with the Turkish President on 7 December together with documents. The discussion could not be concluded this evening.
President Roosevelt said that what he envisaged was to talk of the first period and to set an objective date for it. This date would not be a hard and fast one, but it would be something to aim at. During this period, which would be in two parts, the Turks would give the Germans and Bulgarians no excuse whatever for declaring war on Turkey. In the first part of the period, work on the airfields would go ahead exactly as had happened before, and supplies and equipment, delivery of which was behindhand, would be sent forward. Neither of these would give any excuse to the Germans.
The delivery by the Americans of the thousand lorries with which they were behind-hand would give the Germans no excuse or provocation. At the same time mechanics, equipment, Radar and technical equipment would come in as it had done before, and none of this would provide an excuse for Germany.
Mr. Churchill interjected that the flow would be on the same lines as before but on a much more intense scale, otherwise Turkey would not be ready.
President Roosevelt said that as regards work on the airfields, the work would go on as before and Turkish labour would be employed. This action would not provoke the Germans.
President Roosevelt went on to say that in the second part of his contemplated first period the Turks would bring more of their troops scattered throughout the country to the European side of the Bosphorus. Turkey had the right to do this without provoking an attack. It was President Roosevelt’s expectation (not alone his hope) that Turkey could get through the whole of this period without attack or war. At the end of it the tempo would be accelerated but by that time preparations would have got so far that the twenty squadrons could be brought in and be in action within twenty-four hours if Turkey were attacked.
President Inönü said it was a question of practical things. He was afraid that hopes could not be realized. The standpoint of the British was that Turkey must come in as soon as possible. If he said yes, the plan would be that proposed by Mr. Churchill, then Turkey would begin to mobilize. The first thing would be to facilitate the arrival of the British squadrons. Mr. Churchill’s expectation would then be realized. But this would mean Turkey’s immediate entry into the war and the only assistance she would receive would be air assistance. The Turks contended that they were not ready for immediate entry. Their view was that a planned preparation must be made before Turkey could enter. It seemed to be thought that in contending thus, the Turks were merely dragging things out and adopting delaying tactics.
President Roosevelt said that the Allies also were not ready, for the twenty squadrons would only be ready on 15 February and Mr. Churchill said that he was asking for the squadrons to come in on 15 February.
President Inönü said however that other things were necessary, in particular the army had to be strengthened.
Mr. Churchill enquired how long this would take. In view of the paucity of Turkish communications it would take months to make the Turkish army completely strong so as to enable Turkey to be safe and by that time there probably would be no desire that Turkey should come in. The war was going on and the moment for Turkey would pass. This was a serious possibility for the Turks.
President Roosevelt remarked that the Turkish army was very good, particularly the infantry. Its artillery was good, especially for ground warfare. It needed improved communications and aviation. He had been wondering whether by February 15 the Turkish army could not be trained and concentrated in the north to an extent adequate to ward off attack with the aid of air support.
President Inonu said that if this was a question only of mobilization and concentration it could be done, or at least for the greater part. But at the end of it the Turkish army would only have its present material. Technical points were now being discussed and Mr. Churchill said that the strengthening of the Turkish army would take months and months. It was twenty days since the Turkish government had given their reply of November 17, and nothing had happened in the interval. Turkey’s material needs could be studied and ascertained in a week and then the Allies could say, on the basis of supply and transport possibilities, how long it would take before Turkey was ready.
Mr. Churchill pointed out that Turkish communications had been fully occupied since the delivery of the Turkish note on November 17. The Turkish army was good; it had been mobilized for four years. It was a considerable force, much stronger than the Bulgarian army, and it had already received much. It was true that it had not received as much as the Turks would have liked, but he considered that the danger of a Bulgarian land attack was negligible. Mr. Churchill suggested that it would be better to adjourn the discussions. If President Roosevelt would confide the further discussions to him he would continue conversations with President Inönü on December 7 and report to President Roosevelt by telegram.
President Roosevelt said that he would have liked to have been here to complete the discussions, but that he must leave on 7 December. He urged very strongly that serious consideration should be given to the question of how much could be done before 15 February without giving offence to Germany and Bulgaria.
President Inönü said the situation seemed to be that Turkey would intervene on 15 February (President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at once contested this). There would be a period of preparation. What could the Allies give Turkey in two months? What could be carried? The Turkish General Staff would study these points. But what would happen after February 15? That, he presumed, would be the period for action.
President Roosevelt said it would not necessarily be the period of action. But from February 15 the Turks would be expected to do things which were no longer neutral. It meant that there would be two months before Bulgaria or Germany would attack, and Mr. Churchill remarked that in that time Bulgaria might well be out of the war.
President Inönü wondered at what the level of preparations would be in two months. It could not be determined without study.
Mr. Churchill said that this would be gone into in the further conversations. To the Turkish President’s remark that he had no military experts with him, Mr. Churchill said that the Allies would say what they could put in.
President Inönü said he would wait for this information. He could not say whether it would be enough, but he would take the information and return to Ankara. He would however be obliged to reserve his reply. To President Roosevelt’s remark that his Chief of Staff (General Somerville) would arrive tomorrow and be here for two days, the Turkish President enquired why there should not be staff talks. Mr. Churchill pointed out that time was too pressing and that the twenty squadrons had to be got ready.
President Inönü said that in three or four days he would be ready to reply. The decision would be taken on all the facts. They found themselves in a situation which was fixed by time, but he would see what could be provided within two months and the Turkish staff would offer their observations, including modifications and additions.
President Roosevelt thought that agreement should be reached on that. It was useless to talk about other matters. This was the core of the whole problem. He would leave General Somerville [Somervell], or his assistant, to pursue the discussions which were mainly military. Mr. Numan again remarked that the Turks had no military experts, but Mr. Churchill pointed out that the question should be discussed and the Turks then send their observations.
Mr. Eden stressed that not everything should be adjourned for consideration at Ankara. Things must be pushed forward.
Mr. Churchill cautioned that at the best not much could be provided for the Turkish army. The Turkish communications would be blocked by the delivery of the air programme. The agreed material and technicians must go forward, and there would not be much room for anything else. The Turks must therefore not put their military material expectations too high as otherwise all hopes would be killed.
President Inönü said he was forcing himself to try to find a possible position in the Allied programme. He was doing so with the best will in the world. But he must make the position clear. So far the Turks had no material. A preparatory period of two months was now proposed to him. He had not said that this was enough. The Allies had the material and the transport, but he did not know how much was going to be available. He understood however that the main effort was to be concentrated on aviation material and personnel. (Mr. Churchill interjected that air was the only danger). At present, as the Turkish President saw it, it was contemplated that Turkey would enter the war with anti-aircraft preparation alone.
President Roosevelt then suggested the conclusion of the meeting and kept back the Turkish President to whom he wished to bid goodbye.
740.0011 EW 1939/32203: Telegram
Moscow, December 6, 1943 — 7 p.m.
U.S. urgent
2131.
The announcement in Moscow in the newspapers for December 4 of the Conference was a complete surprise to me. There was agreement at the Conference that the two agreed declarations were to be released for publication not before December 6, 8 p.m., Moscow Time. Your 1344 December 4, midnight, not urgent, which was received here December 6, 3 p.m. and promptly decoded. Release was to be made simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington. It was my distinct understanding, and I was present, that it was understood that no mention of the Conference would be made before that time for security reasons. Since my return last night I have not seen Molotov who, I believe, only arrived back today and I am therefore unable at present to give an explanation of the reason which led the Soviet Government to authorize the announcement. It is not unlikely that the original reference by Reuters in Lisbon to a meeting of The Three and reports that Senator Connally in a broadcast had stated that a meeting was then taking place in the Middle East caused the Soviet Government to make the announcement in question.
I assume you have full information now as to the arrangements for simultaneous publication. I personally gave Major John Boettiger, of the President’s press staff, authentic copies of the two declarations in order that he might make the necessary technical arrangements.
I shall take the first suitable opportunity to ascertain from Molotov the reasons which led the Soviet Government to make the announcement.
HARRIMAN
Cairo, December 6, 1943
Secret
CCS 426/1
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at SEXTANT Conference is submitted herewith:
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces.
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the overall objectives.
j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.
k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.
The U-boat war
We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging reports regarding the U-boat war. (CCS 399 and 399/1)
The Combined Bomber Offensive
a. We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined bombing operations against Germany. (CCS 403)
b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.
c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available.
EUREKA decisions
At the EUREKA Conference, the following military conclusions were approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin.
The Conference:
a. Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:b. Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:
c. Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:
d. Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:
e. Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.
In the light of the above EUREKA decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater:
a. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.
b. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.
c. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.
d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.
Operations against Southern France
We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at about the same time as Operation OVERLORD and that he will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date.
Operations in Italy
We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until 15 January 1944 the 68 LSTs due for return to the United Kingdom. This will still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD.
Command in the Mediterranean
We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (CCS 387/3).
Support to the Balkans
We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the Partisans (CCS 387/3, Appendix “B”).
Turkey
We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war and the extent of our commitments that is likely to be involved. (CCS 418/1).
Coordination with the USSR
We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the USSR should be arranged through the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff.
Emergency return to the continent
In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, CCS 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.
The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:
a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Düsseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [Mainz]; thence due east to Bayreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).
b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.
We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.
We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Long-term strategy
Active study continues regarding the Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and we have approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations in 1943-1944
We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944 (CCS 397 Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to BUCCANEER.
Higher direction of operations in Southeast Asia Command
We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken and their sequence and timing.
Operations in the SE Asia Command
We have agreed to major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
We have decided:
a. To make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon
We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.
United Chiefs of Staff
We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U.S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the USSR or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the USSR and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.
NOTE: The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Union of South Africa |
| President Roosevelt (in the chair) | Prime Minister Churchill | Field Marshal Smuts |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Minister Eden | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman |
December 6, 1943
Secret
The President read out paragraph by paragraph the report of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference (CCS 426/1)
There was some discussion over the Emergency Return to the Continent (paragraphs 17 to 20). The President understood that objections had been raised to the United States proposals in paragraph 18 on the grounds that they would involve a move of the United States forces from the right to the left across the British lines of communication. He understood that in practice this objection should not be a serious one, as the change-over would not take place until operations had been concluded.
The Prime Minister said that he could not commit the British Government to these proposals. They would have to be put to the War Cabinet.
With regard to the Higher Direction of Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (paragraph 23), the Prime Minister said that this did not affect the decision taken at the QUADRANT Conference that the British Chiefs of Staff were to be the channel of communication with the Southeast Asia Command.
With reference to paragraph 26, the Prime Minister said that he thought the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be sent a copy of the President’s recent signal to the Generalissimo on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command. The President agreed and the Prime Minister gave instructions for the signal to be dispatched.
After reading out paragraph 28, the President said that he had been approached by the Chinese, here at the SEXTANT Conference, with a request for Chinese representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He had made it clear at once that such representation could not be agreed to. The Chinese had also asked if a U.S.-Chinese Committee could be appointed for the consideration of the military operations with which China was concerned.
When the President came to the end of the report, he commended the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the report that they had produced.
The Prime Minister classified the report as a masterly survey of the whole military scene. He gave it as his opinion that when military historians came to adjudge the decisions of the SEXTANT Conference, they would find them fully in accordance with the classic articles of war.
The Prime Minister then expressed his deep sense of gratitude to his United States colleagues. The ANVIL operation had been a great contribution made by them to this Conference. He was convinced that this operation would contribute largely to the success of OVERLORD.
The President and Prime Minister then initialled the report (CCS 426/1).
In answer to a question from the Prime Minister as to whether the draft communiqué on the U-boat war had been approved, Admiral King stated that the communiqué had been cleared with the President, that it had been dispatched already to Washington, and that it would be released on the 10th of the month.
The Prime Minister suggested to the President that the communiqué should be made out in alternate months by the United States and the British respectively, and that as the British had prepared the present communiqué, that for next month should be prepared by the United States. The President agreed with this proposal.
A draft message to Marshal Stalin was then considered. It was approved with a minor modification and instructions given for it to be sent at once.
A draft telegram to the Generalissimo was then read out. It was agreed that on grounds of security it would be undesirable to put so much secret information into a dispatch of this nature. It was decided not to dispatch a telegram to the Generalissimo until his reply had been received to the recent telegram sent to him by the President on the subject of operations in the Southeast Asia Command.
If america doesn’t start sipping tea in hot weather after this… I don’t know, what the brits taught them.
Cairo, December 6, 1943
Mr. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, M. Ismet Inönü, President of the Turkish Republic, and Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, met in Cairo on December 4th, 5th and 6th, 1943. Mr. Anthony Eden, His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, M. Numan Menemencioğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, and Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, took part in their deliberations.
The participation in this conference of the Head of the Turkish State, in response to the cordial invitation addressed to him by the United States, British and Soviet Governments, bears striking testimony to the strength of the alliance which united [unites?] Great Britain and Turkey, and to the firm friendship existing between the Turkish Republic, the United States of America, and the Soviet Union.
Presidents Roosevelt and Inönü and Prime Minister Churchill reviewed the general political situation and examined at length the policy to be followed, taking into account the joint and several interests of the three countries.
The study of all problems in a spirit of understanding and loyalty showed that the closest unity existed between the United States of America, Turkey and Great Britain in their attitude towards the world situation.
The conversations in Cairo have consequently been most useful and most fruitful for the future of the relations between the four countries there represented.
The identity of interest and of views of the American and British democracies, with those of the Soviet Union, and the traditional relations of friendship existing between these powers and Turkey, have been reaffirmed throughout the proceedings of the Cairo conference.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Field Marshal Dill | ||
| Lieutenant General Ismay |
Marshall took a poll of the opinion of officers present as to when each of them thought the war with Germany would be ended.
Cairo, December 6, 1943
I had a talk with Helleu today. I have known him for the past six years quite intimately as he was Minister in Riga and Ambassador in Ankara for some time after I arrived there. He gave me the following version of the recent events in Lebanon where he was Governor General at the time they took place.
About three weeks before he left for Algiers the Lebanese authorities began to press him for consent to their proposed independence bill. He gave them every assurance that the matter would receive full and fair consideration. Four days before his departure for Algiers the matter was again urged upon him and he said he would take it up with General de Gaulle in Algiers. He says he was given to understand by the Lebanese authorities that no action would be taken during his absence. In Algiers he discussed the matter with General de Gaulle who instructed him to reiterate on his behalf the assurance already given by Helleu. When Helleu arrived in Cairo on his return from Algiers he heard that the Lebanese authorities intended to pass the bill at once and he telephoned to Beirut “begging that no action be taken pending his return ‘in twenty-four hours’.” On his arrival there the next day he found the bill had been passed the night before, but he said he regarded this as a “slap in the face to France” and that he thereupon ordered the arrests on his own initiative. He said no Sen[e]galese troops were used and that the arrests had been made by “white French sailors.” He also said that no violence or indignities had taken place and that of this he was certain. He said he attributed the false reports to “British intrigue.”
Helleu immediately reported the arrests to de Gaulle and received a telegram from him, of which he permitted me to read the original. It is dated November 13th and is de Gaulle’s telegram #3279. It is a fairly long telegram. The substance is as follows: de Gaulle stated that he assumed the action taken by Helleu was necessary or it would not have been taken and that he approved of it. The first paragraph is an unequivocal ratification of Helleu’s action. The second paragraph indicates de Gaulle anticipated a violent British reaction. The concluding paragraph states that he is sending General Catroux to Beirut, not for the purpose of disavowing Helleu’s action but for the purpose of supporting him in the action taken by him.
Helleu said that thereafter Catroux arrived and, as is known, disavowed his action. He added in the strictest confidence that he was thoroughly convinced of Catroux’s disloyalty to de Gaulle and that he was scheming to succeed him. Helleu then showed me a telegram dated November 22 from de Gaulle requesting him to proceed to Algiers immediately and closed with expressions of great friendship and signed himself as “his sincere friend.” Helleu is in Cairo today enroute to Algiers in compliance with de Gaulle’s request.
I am entirely convinced of the truthfulness of Helleu’s statement to me that the arrests were made on his own initiative but that his action was immediately confirmed and ratified by General de Gaulle. Helleu is a man of integrity and has always been entirely truthful and frank in our relations as colleagues. In view of the circumstances and substance of our meeting today it is inconceivable that the two original telegrams which he showed me and which he had carefully folded in his wallet could have been fabricated for the occasion. If the first telegram is genuine, it follows that his statement that he acted on his own in making the arrests and that de Gaulle immediately ratified his action must be true.
L. A. STEINHARDT
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.
The immediate appointment of General Eisenhower to the Command of OVERLORD has been decided upon.
ROOSEVELT
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
Secret and personal from the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.
In the Cairo Conference, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decisions as to conduct of war in 1944 against Germany additional to the agreements reached by the three of us at Teheran:
The bomber offensive against Germany, with the objective of destroying the German air combat strength, dislocating the German military, industrial and economic system, and preparing the way for a cross-channel operation, will be given the highest strategic priority.
We have reduced the scale of operation scheduled for March in the Bay of Bengal to permit the reenforcement of amphibious craft for the operation against Southern France.
We have ordered the utmost endeavors to increase the production of landing craft in the United Kingdom and the United States for the reenforcement of OVERLORD, and further orders have been issued to divert certain landing craft from the Pacific for the same purpose.
ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL
Cairo, December 6, 1943
My Dear King Farouk, It is a cause of profound regret to me that owing to Your Majesty’s absence from Cairo following your regrettable accident I am forced to leave Egypt without having the pleasure of meeting you.
My visit to your country has been brief, and the exigencies of my duties while here have prevented me from enjoying all that Egypt holds of interest and beauty. I wish, however, to assure you that I have been happy to be here and that I appreciate deeply the hospitality of this land and the signal courtesies which you have proffered.
I hope that I may visit Egypt again and that then circumstances will permit our meeting. In the meanwhile, I extend to you my best wishes for your speedy recovery and for the welfare and happiness of your people.
I very much hope that you will find it possible someday to visit me at the White House. It would give all of us the greatest pleasure to greet you and to give you the opportunity of seeing the United States.
Those most delicious ducks have just arrived. I am having some of them tonight and the rest of them we are taking with us to eat on the return voyage home.
Again with many thanks, I am,
Your sincere friend,
FDR
The Pittsburgh Press (December 6, 1943)
Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin map victory, push from east, west, south
By Oskar Guth, United Press staff writer
Historic meeting of Marshal Joseph Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill brought this picture of the three Allied leaders sitting on the portico of the Russian Embassy at Tehran, Iran. Mr. Churchill is in the uniform of an RAF marshal.
With military, naval aides, Marshal Joseph Stalin, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill pose on the portico of the Russian Embassy at Tehran after their conference. In the background are Gen. H. H. Arnold, Chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces; an unidentified British officer; Adm. Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, British Chief of Naval Staff, and Adm. William Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt.
Outside the Tehran Embassy, a group of Allied leaders are shown after the conference. Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, shakes hands with an unidentified man. others are Harry Hopkins, an interpreter, Marshal Stalin, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Russian Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov.
Tehran Conference in brief
The men
- Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States
- Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
- Joseph Stalin, Premier of the Soviet Union
The place
Tehran, capital of ancient Iran, where the mechanized military might of the Western nations who have made Iran a supply route for Russia contrasts with the customs of the Orient unchanged for centuries.What they did
Agreed to work together in the war and in the peace to follow; agreed to the scope and timing of the final assault upon Germany from east, west and south; agreed to write a peace welcoming all enemies of tyranny into a world of democratic amity.
Tehran, Iran –
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin have agreed on a master plan to crush Germany by powerful offensives on three fronts – including invasions of Western Europe and possibly the Balkans – and have mapped a peace that should endure for “many generations.”
The “Big Three” of the Allied nations announced their decisions in broad terms in a declaration issued today after 100 hours of unparalleled conferences that embraced military, diplomatic and political questions both of the war and the peace to follow.
After concluding their four-day sessions last Wednesday, Premier Stalin returned to Moscow and Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill to Cairo to translate into action the decisions that their joint declaration said guaranteed “victory will be ours.”
With the Tehran Conference, the Allies completed the blueprint for the war in the months to come in both the Atlantic and Pacific. The previous week, Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill conferred with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and laid down the broad strategy calculated to bring Japan to her knees.
Specifically, the three heads of states proclaimed in their joint Tehran declaration:
“We have reached complete understanding as to the scope and timing of operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South.”
“No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war plants from the air. Our attacks will be relentless and increasing.”
“We recognize fully the responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.”
“We will welcome… as they may choose to come into the world family of democratic nations… all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and in mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance.”
“We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.”
Contrary to expectations in many quarters, the declaration contained no ultimatum to the German people to throw out their Nazi leaders and surrender unconditionally to avoid complete devastation of their homeland.
It was believed that the “Big Three” may have decided to delay any such ultimatum until a moment when success is assured. Most Allied authorities agree that German morale has not yet reached the breaking point.
Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, in a subsidiary statement on Iran’s part in the war, said they counted upon the participation of all:
…peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four governments (including Iran) have continued to subscribe.
Though the conference laid the groundwork for an international post-war organization to build and enforce a lasting peace, the immediate military decisions overshadowed all else.
Anglo-American plans for the opening of a “second front” by an invasion of Western Europe and how it can be coordinated with a mammoth Red Army offensive from the East and new blows from the Mediterranean presumably dominated the discussions.
Military conferees who accompanied the “Big Three” included Gen. George C. Marshall, U.S. Chief of Staff and likely choice as Supreme Commander of the assault from the west, and Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov, hero of Stalingrad and one of Russia’s ablest military leaders.
The declaration’s reference to “complete agreement” on all major aspects of the three-front war by land, air and sea confirmed for the first time that Russia has accepted the date proposed by Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill for a second front.
It also indicated that Stalin for the first time had informed the United States and Britain of the most secret details of the Red Army’s plans for offensive blows from the East.
Disclosure that operations will also be undertaken “from the South” pointed to a possible Allied thrust into the turbulent Balkans, either across the Adriatic from newly-won bases in southern Italy or from Africa and the Levant into the Aegean, in addition to a quickening of the current campaign in Italy.
Turkish participation would be most helpful in any Balkan operation and there has been widespread speculation that Turkey at least will grant bases to the Allies under the terms of her mutual-assistance pact with Britain.
Held in place
The Tehran Conference sessions were held in an old Persian palace which now serves as the Soviet Embassy. All servants of the Embassy, except for some U.S. Army cooks, were Russian secret police. British soldiers and Indian Sikhs stood guard around the compound wall and armored cars were stationed at each street intersection.
Other elaborate precautions were also taken because the Germans still have many agents in Iran seeking to stir up the natives.
Marshal Stalin, making his first trip outside Russia’s borders since he went to Krakau, Austria, in 1912, arrived in Tehran Nov. 26 and Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill on Nov. 27.
Guest of Stalin
Mr. Roosevelt went to the U.S. Legation the first night, but moved into the main building of the Soviet Embassy as Premier Stalin’s guest the following night and remained there throughout the rest of the conference. Premier Stalin stayed in a small house in the Embassy compound, while Mr. Churchill stayed at the British Legation across the street.
The social program of the conference included a birthday party on Mr. Churchill’s 69th birthday Nov. 30, at which the 34 guests drank at least 34 toasts, including those by Marshal Stalin to both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, whom he called “my fighting friends,” and to American production, in which he mentioned victory in the past tense.
Roosevelt gives bowl
Mr. Roosevelt gave Mr. Churchill an old Persian bowl which connoisseurs called a “fair antique” with a card expressing the hope “may we be together for many years.” Marshal Stalin did not give a present.
Another high spot in the program was the dramatic presentation by Mr. Churchill to Premier Stalin and Marshal Voroshilov of the British honor Sword of Stalingrad on behalf of King George VI and the British people.
The conferees recognized Iran’s part in the war as a transit base for Allied supplies bound for Russia in a statement that promised all economic assistance possible during and after the war and expressed their desire for the maintenance of “the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran.”
Tehran, Iran (UP) –
The moment which President Roosevelt had said would be the realization of his fondest hope – his meeting face to face with Joseph Stalin – occurred at about 3:15 p.m. Sunday, Nov. 28.
Mr. Roosevelt, who had driven on his arrival Saturday to the U.S. Legation, had just moved over to the handsome Russian Embassy, a former palace located in a compound guarded by Russian secret service men, Russian officers bearing Tommy guns, British Army Sikhs and Tommies.
Stalin strode up the gravel path from his villa within the grounds, wearing the dark blue uniform of a Soviet marshal and a long coat. Behind him a few steps came V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister. Behind Molotov were several generals.
They vanished from view through the handsome portal.
Packed with guards
Eyewitnesses to the historic handclasp are not available. It occurred in a building closely packed with guards. Almost every few feet within the building was a Soviet secret service man. They were described as standing for hours without moving.
There were also many U.S. Secret Service men. In the kitchen were U.S. Army cooks to prepare the President’s meals.
Stalin was closeted with the President for 90 minutes while Molotov waited in an adjacent room. Mr. Churchill arrived about 4:45 p.m. and the initial plenary session began.
Four such meetings were held, one each day. The “Big Three” dined together each night.
Meanwhile, the military men of the three nations met almost continuously.
Nine-foot table
The table at which Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin conferred was made of oak and was about nine feet in diameter. The Russian Embassy gave a Tehran carpenter an order for the table shortly before the conference.
By Friday, when Stalin arrived, the Embassy compound was a fortress. Huge screens had been put up at each end of the street in which the Soviet Embassy and British Legations face one another and a four-block area, swarming with guards, was blocked off.
The excitement started long before Stalin’s arrival. For days the city’s streets had been abustle with innocent-looking Russians, Americans with broad-brimmed hats and rain-coated Englishmen. Miles of telephone wires were strung by American soldiers between the various United Nations embassies and legations.
Saturday guards around the British Legation were tripled and the city swarmed with new groups of mysterious foreigners.
Planes circle city
In midafternoon, several large planes circled the city and crowds in the streets cried:
Here they are! Roosevelt! Churchill!
The airfield was surrounded by troops armed with Tommy guns and bayonet-tipped rifles.
Mr. Roosevelt, surrounded by tanks and armored cars, led and followed by motorcycle troops, sped through Tehran to the legation at the other end of the city.
By comparison, Mr. Churchill was almost unguarded. Iranian police and horse guards lined some streets along his route.
Tehranites gathered on the main streets and cheered Mr. Roosevelt as he whizzed past.
So far as could be ascertained, Voroshilov was the only high Soviet military official participating in the vital sessions other than Stalin.
Final session Wednesday
The final conference started with a luncheon on Wednesday and continued without interruption until 10:30 p.m. Among those who participated were the three leaders, Molotov, Harry Hopkins, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, U.S. Ambassador to Russia W. Averell Harriman, U.S. Ambassador to Britain John Winant, Adm. William D. Leahy, Gen. George C. Marshall, Adm. Ernest King, Gen. H. H. Arnold, and Lt. Gen. Brehon Somervell.
Other British participants were Sir Alan Brooke, Adm. Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Sir John Dill and Clark-Kerr.
Military decisions were completed by 4:00 p.m. Thursday, after which a 10-hour session was devoted to drawing up the communiqué. The final conference broke up after Dec. 2.
By Paul Ghali
Berne, Switzerland –
The delay in issuing a communiqué concerning the Tehran tripartite conference is being exploited by Axis propagandists to belittle its importance and reassure their apprehensive peoples concerning its outcome.
From both Berlin and “Fascist circles in northern Italy” come widely-publicized reports that the conference has not attained the results hoped for by Washington and London. It is even stated that Stalin has returned from his trip a very disappointed man.
Fascist circles, according to Chiasso dispatches today, speak of a “sensational diplomatic surprise” which forthcoming days reserve for those Fascists and Nazis who have never doubted final victory.
Tehran, Iran (UP) –
The Tehran Conference was a “family affair” for President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
With the President was his son, Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt, and his son-in-law, Maj. John Boettiger.
Accompanying Mr. Churchill was his daughter, Sarah Churchill Oliver, and his son, Capt. Randolph Churchill.
Germans say President Inönü and aides have gone to Cairo to see Roosevelt, Churchill
By J. Edward Murray, United Press staff writer
London, England –
German troops are massing in Bulgaria near the Turkish border, a Stockholm dispatch said today as speculation mounted that the Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin conference may bring a Balkan invasion and draw Turkey into the war.
The German movement toward the Turkish border began during the weekend and continued at a rapid rate, Hungarian circles in Stockholm said. A large troop concentration was reported at Haskovo in southeastern Bulgaria, while a Nazi motorized detachment and two cars of officers continued on to Svilengrad, only six miles west of the border, yesterday.
Trip to Cairo reported
The purported shifting of German troops coincided with a German radio report that President İsmet İnönü, Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu and Marshal Çakmak of Turkey had gone to Cairo to meet President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, presumably to discuss their country’s position in the light of the Tehran Conference.
Allied and neutral sources have speculated ever since the tri-power conference at Moscow a month ago that the Allies might prevail upon Turkey at least to provide bases under the terms of her mutual aid pact with Britain for an Allied offensive in the Balkans, even if not actively entering the war.
Eisenhower has meeting
Speculation increased following disclosure that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme allied commander in the Mediterranean, had presided at a meeting of his command at Cairo about 10 days ago, after the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang Kai-shek meeting.
It was theorized that British and possibly U.S. troops might thrust across the Adriatic from bases in southern Italy, or move into the Aegean from Africa or the Levant. A Russian amphibious landing from the Black Sea might also be planned.
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was believed to have given Menemencioğlu details of the Moscow Conference as they affected Turkey and the Turkish Minister later won his Parliament’s approval of his conduct of the negotiations.
Nazis throw in reserves in grim effort to stop Allies
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
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