Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold		Field Marshall Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell		Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Willson		General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Cooke		Major General Stopford
Rear Admiral Bieri		Rear Admiral Troubridge
Rear Admiral Badger		Air Vice Marshal Baker
Major General Sutherland		Major General Laycock
Major General Stratemeyer		Captain Lambe
Major General Handy		Brigadier Sugden
Major General Fairchild		Air Commodore Elliot
Major General Wedemeyer		Brigadier McNair
Brigadier General Kuter		Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
	Secretariat
Captain Royal		Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland		Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 3 p.m.
Secret

Operations in Southeast Asia

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed future operations in Southeast Asia with Lt. Gen. [Major General] Stopford, Bear Admiral Troubridge and Air Vice Marshal Baker.

General Stopford said that a plan had been made for the capture of the Andamans, based on a troop lift of 58,000. It was now felt that the operation to capture Port Blair could be undertaken with a troop lift of 50,000 men. However, the latest intelligence on Japanese dispositions, particularly their air dispositions, had led to the conclusion that it would be necessary to capture Kar Nicobar and retain it for use by ourselves.

In reply to a question by Sir Andrew Cunningham, Admiral Troubridge said that shipping was available for the required assault lift of 24,700 for Port Blair. The remainder of the shipping required could be procured. The estimate of the potential strength of Japanese air forces in the area had recently risen from some 300 aircraft to 600. It had originally been intended to knock out the airstrip on Kar Nicobar with a commando raid, but now it was felt that a brigade was required and the Air Commander-in-Chief considered that the 120 carrier-borne aircraft provided in the plan were insufficient and should be raised to 240 carrier-borne aircraft. Virtually all the assault shipping required was now available.

Air Vice Marshal Baker explained that the estimate of 600 enemy aircraft was the total force the enemy could assemble within striking distance of the Andamans. This would include those based on an arc from South Burma to the north tip of Sumatra. Some 80 to 100 enemy aircraft could be based in the Andamans and Kar Nicobar.

General Stopford said that no plan had yet been completed for the capture of Kar Nicobar. It was estimated that there were 5,000 Japanese troops in the Port Blair area and that they could build up to a total of 3,000 in Kar Nicobar.

Admiral Leahy said that an estimate of 50,000 Allied troops against some 5,000 Japanese appeared excessive.

General Stopford explained that the figure of 50,000 included troops required for the development of facilities in the island, the building of airfields and strips, and for work in the docks. It was estimated that of the total of 50,000 some 34,000 would be fighting troops, including headquarters, engineers, and anti-aircraft units; some 16,000 would be non-fighting troops.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, Admiral Troubridge explained that the present date fixed for Operation BUCCANEER was 23 March. This date was dependent on tide and moon conditions and could not be advanced since the necessary naval covering force would not be available in the area before 15 March.

Sir Alan Brooke then asked what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be undertaken, assuming that the bulk of the BUCCANEER landing craft and shipping was returned to the European Theater. This operation might take place either against the islands or on the mainland.

General Stopford said that he would like to consider this possibility further before giving a definite reply.

Admiral King said that he would like to repeat a statement he had made at the Plenary Meeting earlier that day to the effect that if additional carriers were found necessary for BUCCANEER, he believed, though he could not guarantee, that he could find some four to six additional CVEs.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the remainder of the agenda in closed session.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of Operation BUCCANEER to Operation ANVIL.

Sir Alan Brooke said that as regards ANVIL, the critical part of the operation would be the seizure of a bridgehead, including a port through which the buildup could take place. The assault must be in sufficient strength to tide us over this dangerous period, otherwise we were in danger of being thrown into the sea.

General Marshall, in discussing the timing of Operation ANVIL, said that he felt that it should take place after rather than before OVERLORD and suggested that a period of approximately one week should lapse between the launching of the two operations.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he agreed with this view. COSSAC had been of the same opinion. He did not wish France to rise before the launching of Operation OVERLORD, nor could the timing of Operation OVERLORD itself be exact in view of weather conditions in the Channel.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the wording of a telegram to Admiral Mountbatten with regard to possible operations in his theater on the assumption that certain of his resources were removed to the European Theater.

At this point General Wedemeyer entered the meeting.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, had he realized General Wedemeyer was still here, he would of course have asked him to be present during the discussion with the Force Commanders. He asked General Wedemeyer if he would give his views on possible alternative amphibious operations of a hit-and-run nature capable of accomplishment with less forces than BUCCANEER.

General Wedemeyer said that he considered that some operation commensurate with these lesser resources could be undertaken. The Supreme Commander had been given the objective of opening the land route to China through Upper Burma. It was considered that an amphibious operation would contribute in the military sense to the success of this task, and Operation BUCCANEER had been decided on as the operation most likely, with the means available, to assist this task. It would deceive the enemy and split his air forces. Amphibious operations along the coast had also been considered but were rendered difficult by weather, tides, and the lack of ports through which they could be maintained.

General Wedemeyer considered that a hit-and-run operation could be undertaken but would not be so effective as BUCCANEER. For BUCCANEER it was now considered that some 120 more carrier-borne aircraft were required. This would mean 4 or 5 additional CVEs or 2 fleet carriers. He considered that both the Andamans and Kar Nicobar could be captured with an amphibious lift of 50,000. It was strongly felt that the first large operation undertaken in the Southeast Asia Command must be a success. The morale of certain of the Indian troops was low, and a smashing victory would restore it. Operation ANAKIM might be undertaken with only slightly less resources than those required for the Andamans, but it would be against a strong defensive position and would not, he considered, contain as many Japanese forces as would BUCCANEER. Hit-and-run operations would not, in his opinion, divert strong enemy forces, and their cost might well prove incommensurate with the results achieved.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note:
(1) That the assault forces for BUCCANEER have not been increased.

(2) That the resources necessary for the operation were either already available in the theater, or in sight, excepting for an increased demand of some 120 carrier-borne fighter aircraft.

(3) Of a statement by Admiral King that there was a possibility of making from 4 to 6 CVEs available from U.S. sources for this operation.

b. Agreed:
(1) That the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commanders, SEAC and the BUCCANEER force Commanders now at SEXTANT, in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners should examine and report on the morning of 6 December 1943 what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be carried out in the SE Asia Theater in 1944, assuming that the bulk of landing craft is returned to the European Theater, the report to indicate the scale, nature, and objectives of the operations proposed.

(2) To dispatch a signal to Admiral Mountbatten asking for a flash estimate on the above. (Annex)

At this point General Wedemeyer left the meeting.

Operation ANVIL (CCS 424)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners (CCS 424) on Operation ANVIL.

Admiral Leahy said that he considered that forces should be taken from BUCCANEER only if they were essential to the success of ANVIL. They should not be taken for diversionary operations, such as Rhodes.

Sir Andrew Cunningham pointed out that an early decision would have to be taken with regard to Operation BUCCANEER, since otherwise we were in danger of “falling between two stools” and the necessary time for the training of any craft which might be withdrawn would not be available.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then agreed to amend paragraph 4c on page 3 of CCS 424 by striking from the first sentence the words “from the United States” and by deleting the second sentence.

General Arnold discussed the air transport requirements for both ANVIL and operations in the Burma-China area. The additional transport aircraft required for ANVIL could only be found by cutting out the provision of these aircraft to all countries other than the United States, and to the domestic airlines in America. This he was quite prepared to do.

It was also agreed to amend paragraph 4 of Appendix “B” on page 8 by inserting the words “at least” between the words “for” and “two.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 424 as amended, and directed that the directive contained in Appendix “B” be forwarded to General Eisenhower.

b. Agreed that the detailed planning for this operation should be left entirely to General Eisenhower’s planning staff.

Directions to Combined Staff Planners and the U.S. and British shipping authorities

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed what instructions or directions could usefully be given to the Combined Staff Planners or to the United States and British shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to keep the shipping authorities closely in touch with the progress of the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and that both the Combined Staff Planners and the shipping authorities should do all possible preliminary work on their estimates of the resources required. This to be undertaken both on the basis of the decisions already taken, and on the basis of the various possible assumptions with regard to operations on which final decisions had not yet been reached.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform the Combined Staff Planners and the U.S. and British shipping authorities of the above decision.

Future work

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet at 1100 on 6 December to consider the draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426), the report by the Combined Staff Planners on the overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417), and the study of alternative amphibious operations being undertaken by the Force Commanders in consultation with General Wedemeyer and the Combined Staff Planners. The Combined Chiefs of Staff further agreed to meet on the following afternoon, if necessary, and on the following evening on receipt of the report called for from the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

ANNEX

Most immediate
Clear the line

To: SACSEA
From: Mideast

Following for Admiral Mountbatten from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. If, as a result of EUREKA Conference overriding priority were to be given to European operations, this would make it necessary to withdraw bulk of your landing craft and assault shipping during the next few weeks.

2. This would rule out BUCCANEER as at present planned before the monsoon, but the necessity would remain to stage, in conjunction with TARZAN, amphibious operations on a smaller scale, possibly of a hit-and-run nature involving carrier raids and landings of commandos.

3. Do you consider operations of this kind feasible? If so, telegraph urgently flash estimate of resources you would require.

4. Your reply must be received by 1600 GMT 6th December.

[NormanStewart]

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 424

Amphibious operation against the South of France

Reference:	CCS Memo Directive
	1 December 1943

In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions.

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

We have in addition assumed:

a. That Operation ANVIL will approximately coincide with OVERLORD.

b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of forces for ANVIL.

c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under two hypotheses where these apply:

a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

b. That the assault is carried out beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

It appears that the following cannot be found from the resources which under present agreements will be available to General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean at the time of the operation:

Naval forces
On the assumption that adequate shore-based, short-range fighter cover is provided:

1. Additional escorts, probably 10 to 20.

2. 2 AA fighter direction ships.

3. In the event that the buildup exceeds one division before D plus 8, nine A/S A/A escorts will be required for each extra division.

This indicates that if a rapid buildup is necessary, more escorts will be required.

In the event that adequate shore-based short-range air cover cannot be provided the following will be needed in addition to those above.

1. 9 to 12 escort carriers with fighters.
2. 6 AA cruisers.
3. 18 screening vessels.

To meet these deficiencies, we must draw on other theaters, most probably from the Atlantic. It might prove possible for four CVE and six escorts which are taking part in BUCCANEER to return to the Mediterranean in time. This, however, will be conditioned by the availability of fighters for reequipping these escort carriers. We have assumed that port parties will be provided from within the Mediterranean.

Land forces
Certain service forces, the number and type of which cannot be determined without careful study by AFHQ.

On the assumption that French divisions will participate, the requirement will be lessened if, as recommended by General Eisenhower, some of the French divisions scheduled for activation are not formed but are converted to service forces.

Air forces
The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be sufficient to lift one brigade and if the detailed plan requires a second brigade lift, this will have to be provided.

Shipping

1. Personnel Shipping.
   The QUADRANT allotment of personnel shipping for 80,000 trooplift in the Mediterranean expires on 31 March. Initially, personnel shipping for 32,000 will be required until after the assault, and during the period of buildup, a total personnel lift for 15,000 will be necessary. It is proposed to use cargo ships for personnel lift to the maximum extent possible.

(2) MT/Stores Shipping.
The following sailings within the Mediterranean will be required in addition to those required for the maintenance of the remainder of the theater:

First month	—	128
Second month	—	90
Third month	—	75
Fourth and subsequent months	—	40

This can obviously be provided but until the present shipping examination is completed, we cannot assess the cost.

Assault shipping and craft
Assault lift for two divisions can be provided. Methods of providing this are shown in Appendix “A.”

We consider that General Eisenhower should be directed to prepare an outline plan for the agreed operation against the South of France as a matter of urgency. We have accordingly prepared a directive to General Eisenhower, and this is attached at [as?] Appendix “B.”

Recommendation

That the directive in Appendix “B” be sent to General Eisenhower.

Appendix “B”

Draft directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AF, North Africa

December 5, 1943

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take place in conjunction with OVERLORD, with the object of establishing a bridgehead on the South Coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of OVERLORD.

You will prepare in consultation with COSSAC and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation.

The exact date for OVERLORD has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and Operation ANVIL will be timed approximately to coincide with operation OVERLORD – the exact date to be determined in consultation with COSSAC.

You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).

You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

[NormanStewart]

Report by the Combined Staff Planners

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 427

Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia alternative to BUCCANEER

Problem

On the assumption that the amphibious lift available for BUCCANEER is reduced in certain respects, to consider what minor amphibious operations or raids might be carried out in the Southeast Asia Theater, in order to harass Japanese communication, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast and obtain airfields with which to support further operations in Burma.

Resources available

An appendix is attached showing a list of the resources which we assume will be left in Southeast Asia. This list is based on the assumption that the bulk of LST and LSI (L) will be withdrawn together with a proportion of the naval forces and escort carriers now allotted to BUCCANEER, as these are the resources which are chiefly required in the European Theater.

With resources remaining in the Southeast Asia Theater it would be possible to land a force of one infantry battalion group up to one brigade group, depending on the scale of transport to be landed.

Possible operations

Detailed study by the Force Commanders of intelligence maps and photographs is necessary before any definite opinion can be formed as to the practicability of any operations.

From a general survey of the possibilities however we consider that the following merit examination and might assist Operation TARZAN:

a. Amphibious operations along the Arakan coast in conjunction with the land advance of the 15th Army Group on Indin-Rathedaung-Kyauktau, which is timed to start in mid-January and be completed in February.

b. An amphibious operation to capture and secure the northern tip of Ramree Island, prior to the beginning of the 1944 monsoon. This operation might be covered by shore-based aircraft at Maungdaw. Maintenance of a garrison in this area by sea might prove costly as convoys will be subject to air attack. It might be possible to extend air operations against Japanese communications in Burma, and to infiltrate on the Taungup-Sandaway [Sandoway] coast. The provision of fighter support to any such operations would have to be carefully balanced against the requirements of TARZAN.

Unless a target can be found to justify the landing of a raiding force, we do not believe that any raids should be attempted other than carrier-borne air raids.

[NormanStewart]

The President’s Chief of Staff to the President

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Memorandum for the President

Subject: RECOGNITION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY

The question of declaring Rome an open city has again been discussed by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff are still of the opinion that, from a military point of view, such action is undesirable.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 p.m.

	Present
	President Roosevelt
	Admiral Leahy
	Admiral King
	General Arnold
	Captain Royal

From the accounts in Leahy and King, it appears that the President called in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to inform them of his decision to stop further argumentation in favor of Operation BUCCANEER as scheduled for the spring of 1944. Churchill states that on the afternoon of December 5 “the President, in consultation with his advisers, decided to abandon the Andaman Islands plan” and that the President sent him a laconic private message reading, “BUCCANEER is off.”

According to Leahy and King, President Roosevelt expressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his reluctance in making this decision and indicated his intent to offer a substitute to Chiang Kai-shek. The alternative offer to Chiang was drafted by Roosevelt and Hopkins, presumably at the conclusion of Roosevelt’s meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was submitted to Churchill in the form of a memorandum.

In explaining his decision to Stilwell and Davies on the following day Roosevelt is reported by Stilwell to have said:

I’ve been stubborn as a mule for four days but we can’t get anywhere, and it won’t do for a conference to end that way. The British just won’t do the operation, and I can’t get them to agree to it.

The Davies notes on this conversation indicate that Roosevelt also emphasized in this connection that he had fought at Tehran, with Stalin’s support, and that Churchill had finally given in. This was presumably a reference to the argument about fixing the date of OVERLORD.

[nicholasrusson_58993]

@NormanStewart

The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (Fan 254).

This use of “NATO” seems quite anachronistic and it doesn’t seem to be expanded anywhere in the documents we’ve seen so far (or I’ve missed it). What does this use of NATO represent? North American Theatre of Operations? North Atlantic Theatre of Operations? North African Theatre of Operations?

[NormanStewart]

@nicholasrusson_58993

NATO

In 1943, it’s the North African Theater of Operations.

[NormanStewart]

Hopkins-Eden-Menemencioğlu meeting, 6 p.m.

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Turkey
Mr. Hopkins	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Açikalin
	Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen	Mr. Anderiman
	General Wilson	Mr. Kavur
	Air Chief Marshal Douglas
	Air Vice Marshal George
	Brigadier Stayner
	Mr. Helm

740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes

December 5, 1943, 6 p.m.
Most secret

Mr. Eden opened the meeting by suggesting that Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas should explain what was proposed since he had a feeling that the Turks were under a wrong impression.

Mr. Numan thanked Mr. Eden. He said he would be glad to listen. He must however make it clear that he could not commit himself on military matters which were the concern of the experts and on which he was not competent.

Sir Sholto Douglas said that he was not going to deal with technicalities. He was merely going to make a general exposé to show why we wanted advance infiltration. In this there were two main objects: the first to provide adequate defence for the most vulnerable points, and the second to provide a force for offensive operations in the Aegean. As regards the first, the vulnerable points were Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak. For these it was proposed to send in 17 squadrons (12 of them Spitfires) and 5 regiments of light and 5 of heavy anti-aircraft guns. For purposes of defence it was essential to have an adequate warning system and also adequate anti-aircraft defence for the air fields on which would depend the defence of Istanbul and other vulnerable places. Until these essentials had been secured it would not be feasible to introduce the necessary squadrons. This brought the Air Marshal to infiltration and his proposals were:

1. For radio location and operations room – 200-250 specialists and 20-30 vehicles.

2. Signals personnel for radio location and for linking airfields with operations room – 400 persons.

3. Key specialist personnel of anti-aircraft guns – 420 persons.

4. Additional personnel for radio location, i.e., for extension of system round the coast from Zonguldak to Antalya – 300 persons.

5. Administrative personnel for dumps, etc. – 500 persons.

This represented a total of about 2,000 personnel.

The introduction of this personnel was the problem. Until something like this had been introduced Turkey would not be in a position of security when the moment of need came.

Mr. Eden remarked that when all this personnel had been brought in the squadrons could be flown in in 24 hours for the defence of Turkey if Turkey were attacked. The complete effectiveness of defence would of course also be dependent on Turkey doing her share as promised with personnel for the anti-aircraft guns. It was as a result of the promise of this personnel that the estimated infiltration needs had been reduced from 7,000 to 2,000. Thus it could be seen what were the indispensable minimum needs to be introduced during the period of preparation.

Mr. Numan said that he took the infiltration to be part of the general minimum plan. He could not say whether the number of squadrons was adequate, though it sounded good. He obviously must however make a reservation on the question of their utility.

Mr. Eden stressed that in our opinion what Sir Sholto Douglas had explained was the minimum necessary for Turkey’s protection. In addition we should of course be ready to specify the material which we should be prepared to supply for use by the Turks themselves.

Mr. Numan remarked that matters were advancing. There was not an impasse. The arrival of foreigners was very important. Even a civilian arriving in Turkey to serve would be known to Germany and the latter would not be indifferent. He did not want to provoke the Germans before a certain degree of preparation could be achieved. Mr. Churchill had described this as a vicious circle. He (Mr. Numan) did not agree but saw the problem from a different point of view. He was ready to accept the requisite number of technicians for the material supplied. How many technicians these might be he did not know. That would be a matter for the Turkish General Staff. He could not however accept personnel additional to the proper complement of technicians.

Mr. Eden remarked that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs must have confidence. There surely could be no question of our wanting to introduce one single specialist more than was necessary. But how could the Turkish General Staff say whether particular personnel was necessary or not? During the preparatory period we did not wish to rush things any more than the Turks did. But we did want to get the preparations completed quickly.

Mr. Numan said that the Turks had the same object. They did not wish to provoke the Germans. He could not agree to the introduction of personnel but he did agree to the introduction of technicians, though he must make a reserve regarding the number of these. What he had said amounted to an acceptance in principle of technicians for the material promised.

Mr. Hopkins remarked that President Inönü had several times spoken of Turkey’s minimum defence requirements. He wondered if he was right in assuming that this did not refer to infiltration and air material but to other needs. He assumed that the British had been discussing such questions with the Turkish General Staff. Had the British any idea of Turkish minimum requirements? Did they, for instance, include anti-aircraft guns and aircraft? This brought up the question of the commitments to be made and he realized that it was necessary to get personnel introduced in advance. But he wished to be clear in his own mind about the details.

Mr. Eden thought this was a good question. It seemed to him that there were two points—the material to be used by us in order to give protection to Turkey, and the material to be given to Turkey for use by the Turks themselves.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned that there was also the Anglo-American force to go into Turkey in the event of war.

Mr. Eden said that in the first instance this was air alone – anti-aircraft.

Mr. Numan said he wished to make an observation and to compare what Turkey had got with what she had asked for. After the Adana Conference the Turks had prepared a list of requirements which had been more or less discussed. Later the British had entered into a definite commitment for delivery on the basis of that list. The Turkish list had remained a dead letter. The British list had not been much better (Mr. Eden said that he could not agree). Mr. Numan went on to say that only some 4% of the items on the general list had been delivered to Turkey. He did not wish to make reproaches. He would only state facts and mentioned in particular the case of lorries of which 300 a month had been promised. For some time deliveries had been about 160 or 180 a month. In recent months there had been no deliveries at all. Deliveries did in fact represent a very small proportion of promises.

Mr. Eden said that he could not accept Mr. Numan’s figures. He must make it plain that the position was not the position as it had been at Adana and he personally would not consider recommending his Government now to supply to Turkey all of the material which had been discussed at Adana.

Mr. Numan remarked that his had only been an observation.

General Wilson said that even if it had been possible to supply all the items on the Turkish Adana lists, it would have taken the Turkish railways three years to carry them. As it was, Turkey had since Adana been supplied with 350 tanks, 48 self-propelled guns, nearly 300 anti-aircraft guns (over 100 of them heavy) 300 field and medium guns, 200 mortars, rather less than 500 anti-tank guns, an enormous quantity (about 99,000) of various guns and automatics, 420 mortars, and about one million anti-tank mines for the defence of Turkey. It was unfortunately true that there had been a shortage of delivery on motor transport. This had happened because the transport did not exist in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks had however said at Adana that they had enough to defend themselves except for three anti-tank units and aviation support.

Mr. Hopkins expressed surprise at the extent of material assistance already given since Adana. He wished however to clear the position up. As he understood things, the Allies had agreed, in the event of war, to put in air squadrons and anti-aircraft guns and personnel. How far removed were we from President Inönü’s minimum requirements in the event of war?

Mr. Numan said that if it were desired to negotiate on the basis of these past figures, he also could cite figures. At one moment 40 air squadrons had been promised in the event of war. This had been reduced by half. The percentage of deliveries was not impressive. As for circumstances he agreed that they had changed since Adana, but things had turned out exactly as they had been foreseen at Adana.

Mr. Hopkins said it seemed necessary to get to grips with the problem. Was he to understand that the Turkish President considered he should have twice the air force suggested? Was he to understand that the anti-tank preparation was not enough? Were the Turkish railways a limiting factor, insofar as concerned Turkey coming into the war? He asked because if Turkey was not coming into the war, she must understand that these munitions, so vitally required elsewhere, would not come into Turkey at all.

Mr. Numan remarked that there must be some misunderstanding. The position had been quite clearly stated. The President had announced his intention of coming into the war. The question of material had however always been a serious one. At the time when the Anglo-Turkish Alliance was negotiated there had at first been a clause which postponed the operation of the Alliance until supplies were provided. He had realized that the supplies could not be provided and the clause had been suppressed. Since then and until now supplies had still not been available. Today Turkey lacked everything. Not only anti-aircraft guns and tanks but every sort of war material. He did not suggest that the Adana lists or any other list or anything like either of them should be supplied. He did however think that there ought to be a list of reasonable requirements. The Turks would not ask the impossible and with a maximum effort a list could readily be drawn up.

Mr. Eden said we had given the list of all that we wished to introduce for the defence of Turkey. If this were agreed we could then fix up what we could provide for use by the Turks. But we did not want the preparation of defence to be delayed during the consideration of the second list.

Mr. Numan said he agreed but that it must be part of a general plan in which the air preparations would of course take complete precedence. Mr. Eden enquired what general plan? Mr. Numan answered that it was necessary to decide the minimum requirements of Turkey if she were to enter the war. A list would be necessary.

Mr. Hopkins said he understood that the limiting factor was motor transport. Was it a limiting factor for anti-aircraft personnel? There had been talk of years for the introduction of requirements. We were dealing in weeks.

Mr. Numan pointed to General Wilson’s statement that two or three years would have been necessary to introduce the items on the Adana lists. Had one-third of these been introduced in the year since Adana?

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen suggested that we were all wasting our time in discussing the past. It was a wasted effort. In the interval everything had changed and it would be a waste of transport even to send to Turkey today the material contemplated at Adana. Surely, we should look at the future and not at the past.

Mr. Numan welcomed the Ambassador’s interjection and said he quite agreed. He wanted to propose something practical. Could we not at once send to Angora the two Generals (one British and one American) proposed by President Roosevelt so that they could concert at once with the Turkish General Staff and establish a list of requirements and work out complete collaboration.

Mr. Eden said that this was something apart from the fundamental question. We had this afternoon given to our Turkish friends a list of what we thought necessary for the defence of Turkey against attack. This must be the basis of working. In addition, we could discuss further material but he could not accept the delay involved in the addition of other material quite unknown.

Mr. Numan said that the President had answered Mr. Eden’s point. He said that 2,000 men and 600 vehicles were not enough for the defence of Turkey though they were no doubt enough for the defence of British air bases.

Mr. Eden pointed out that they were not for the defence of British air bases but for that of Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak.

Mr. Numan remarked that the Turks could not contemplate Turkish defence being entrusted to the British. What they would and did contemplate was the defence of Turkey by the Turks with British help.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that air defence depended essentially on fighters and this must be defended by antiaircraft guns. The first essential was to get the fighter defence established.

Mr. Eden said that there were two points. The first, what we introduced for the security of Turkey and the second the other things which the Turks must have before Turkey could take action.

General Wilson explained that what had been mentioned hitherto was for Turkish defence. It was only an advance guard. Actually the total force contemplated would be 32,000 troops (11,600 of them air), and 6,000 guns and vehicles (375 guns representing 5 light and 5 heavy anti-aircraft regiments).

Mr. Eden said the urgent plan was one for immediate defence and the execution of this represented the dangerous period.

Mr. Numan having remarked that he could not comment on these figures, Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that as men and material were introduced, the danger to Turkey would be correspondingly diminished. The first problem was to ensure safety and then to build up.

Mr. Numan said Turkey was coming into the war. It was necessary to draw up a plan of preparation and a plan of collaboration and at the same time to take up political matters in another direction.

Mr. Hopkins having remarked that reinforcement would be limited by transport facilities and that as regards priority for air we already give the Turks what they can take, said he must come to the main point. The war had reached a critical stage. It was impossible to divert to a neutral country war material which was not to be used against Germany. The British Prime Minister had been authorized to express the hope of the United States and of Russia that Turkey would enter the war at an early date. We know that when a nation went to war with Germany she might suffer losses – the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States had suffered severe losses. He knew that Turkey wanted to enter the war. In the last analysis a country went to war in its own interests. We wanted Turkey in the war even if she could not have all she wanted. Great Britain, Russia and the United States had not all they wanted when they entered the war. At this critical period in the war the entry of Turkey might save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Allied nationals. January 1st was not a set date but Turkish participation might not be useful after very long after that date. We wanted Turkey to enter the war willingly and whole-heartedly. We should like Turkey to enter the war about February even though we knew that in doing so Turkey might suffer. We hoped Turkey would enter because all Allied military and political opinion considered that her entry would shorten the war. Only the Turks themselves could speak for Turkish self-interest. If however discussions were prolonged about the adequacy of material etc. Turkey’s entry would be futile. Turkey could be sure that if she came in we would do everything we could – all possible military and air support would be afforded her. He knew he was correctly interpreting President Roosevelt when he said that he hoped that Turkey would in her own interests come in willingly and wholeheartedly.

Mr. Eden said that he wished to have the Turkish position correctly understood and Mr. Numan confirmed that it was as follows:

1. Our proposals for infiltration were accepted in principle but Mr. Numan made a reservation as regards numbers pending consideration by the Turkish General Staff.

2. If the programme involving infiltration were accepted Turkey will not take action which she considers might lead her into a state of war with Germany until material and supplies for her use have been given, and the figures of these yet remain to be determined.

3. Mr. Eden understood that Turkey had political questions to raise. He did not know what these were.

As regards (3) Mr. Numan referred to the Russian undertaking regarding Bulgaria. He thought that this was the sort of point which he would like to discuss with the Russians. There were other points which he would also like to discuss. But these discussions could take place during the period of preparation and would in no way delay either preparation or collaboration.

Mr. Eden enquired whether there were any other points to be put down.

Mr. Numan said that Mr. Hopkins had spoken of willing entry. This was also the desire of the Turks. They must however have a minimum of essential preparations. Moreover, this was a commitment to the Turkish people and to the Party.

Mr. Eden enquired what Turkey wanted under (2). Was it not possible for these requirements to be stated without discussions at Angora?

Mr. Numan repeated that he was not competent to say what the military needs were. All he asked for was comprehension. It lay in our hands to determine when Turkey could enter the war since this would be determined by the supply of the necessary material.

Mr. Numan confirmed that, as he had previously said, the infiltration programme under (1) above could go ahead while the discussion of (2) was in progress.

At this stage (8:15 p.m.) the meeting was adjourned.

[NormanStewart]

Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s special assistant

Cairo, December 5, 1943

My Dear Harry, I understand that Lord Beaverbrook has not received any favourable reply to his request to you for a conference on Civil Aviation.

Our people are anxious to get on with this and I should be grateful if you could let me know if there are any obstacles we could remove, so that progress may be made.

Yours always
W

[NormanStewart]

Quadripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins		Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy		Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Steinhardt		Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen
		Commander Thompson
		Captain Churchill
Turkey		Soviet Union
President Inönü		Mr. Vinogradov
Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu		Mr. Mikhailov
Mr. Anderiman

According to Leahy:

The next night, December 5, it was Churchill’s turn to entertain at dinner for Inönü. Same scene. Same cast. Almost the same lines except that the Turkish President talked a little more freely and impressed me with his direct approach to the question. He made it clear that before Turkey could come into the war, he would have to have enough planes, tanks, guns, etc., to make a strong resistance against invasion by the Nazis.

It was most interesting to watch the dinner-table maneuvers of the Prime Minister as he pleaded, cajoled, and almost threatened the soldier President of the once powerful Ottoman Empire in an effort to commit him to taking his people into the war. Inönü was told he would have to come in eventually if he was to have a place at the peace table. The Americans did not urge the Turks as vehemently as did the British.

[NormanStewart]

The President’s special assistant to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and reply

Cairo, December 5 (?), 1943

Anthony Has he been told squadrons do not go in until Feb 15? Is there good reason not to tell him

HARRY

Yes; he has been told. Winston gave him a paper this afternoon. He understands, but issue is he won’t agree to flying in until his army is ready. This looks like a long job.

---

The President’s special assistant to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and reply

Cairo, December 5 (?), 1943

Anthony: It looks like BUCCANEER is out & our military plans hence will be agreed to tomorrow

HARRY

If so, you have been very generous, but our chances next year will surely benefit.

President has been grand about it all.

Note reinforcements (Scotch) just came in!

[NormanStewart]

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

Cairo, December 5, 1943

Memorandum for the Prime Minister

I propose to send over my signature the following message to the Generalissimo tonight. Do you concur in this action?

I agree. WSC 5 XII

Conference with Stalin involves us in combined grand operations on European continent in late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer of 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal simultaneously with launching of TARZAN to insure success of operation.

This being the case: Would you be prepared go ahead with TARZAN as now planned, including commitment to maintain naval control of Bay of Bengal coupled with naval carrier and commando amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with launching of TARZAN? Also there is the prospect of B-29 bombing of railroad and port Bangkok.

If not, would you prefer to have TARZAN delayed until November to include heavy amphibious operation. Meanwhile concentrating all air transport on carrying supplies over the hump to air and ground forces in China.

I am influenced in this matter by the tremendous advantage to be received by China and the Pacific through the early termination of the war with Germany.

FDR

[NormanStewart]

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Sunday, December 5 (at Cairo)

11:30 a.m.	Plenary meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Present: The President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Eden, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Field Marshal Dill, General Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Lt. Gen. Clemay [Ismay], Brigadier Hollis and Captain Royal.
2:00 p.m.	President Inönü and members of the Turkish delegation called on the President and Mr. Hopkins. (Callers included President Inönü; Hon. Numan Menemencioğlu; Hon. Cevad Acikalin; Mr. Sureyya Anderiman; Mr. Selim Sarper; Mr. Sadi Kavur, and Ambassador Steinhardt.)
3:00 p.m.	The Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Air [Vice] Marshal George, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen and Ambassador Sergei Vinogradov called at the President’s villa and joined in the meeting of the President and the Turkish delegation.
4:00 p.m.	The President, the Prime Minister and President Inönü, together with members of their military staffs and other delegates, moved to the garden of the President’s villa where they posed for motion pictures and still pictures.
4:30 p.m.	The President worked on his mail. He signed the “Fathers’ Draft Act.”
5:00 p.m.	The President met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold and Captain Royal).
8:30 p.m.	The President attended a dinner at Mr. Casey’s villa given by the Prime Minister for President Inönü and President Roosevelt. The dinner list included: The President, the Prime Minister, President Inönü, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, Ambassador Steinhardt, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Captain Randolph Churchill, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, Commander Thompson, Ambassador Vinogradov, Hon. Numan Menemencioğlu, Mr. Anderiman and Mr. Mihailov.
11:45 p.m.	The President returned to his villa and retired. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt arrived in Cairo, from Tunis, this afternoon. It was hoped that all phases of the conference might be concluded today so that we might depart for home tomorrow, but this was found to be impracticable due to the heavy work load already on the hands of the Combined Staffs.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (December 6, 1943)

740.0011 EW 1939/32218

The Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 6, 1943
Confidential

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to ask you to transmit the following communication from Mr. V. M. Molotov to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins in answer to the latter’s telegram addressed to Mr. Molotov and handed to him by Mr. Hamilton on December 3, 1943.

Personal and secret to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins from V. M. Molotov

Just like you I cannot but express my satisfaction regarding our work together at the Tehran Conference and the possibility of continuation of this work in the future.

The meeting of Premier Stalin with President Roosevelt is of the greatest importance for drawing closer together the peoples of our countries in the interests of the cause of speeding up our common victory and post-war collaboration.

Best wishes.

Accept [etc.]
A. GROMYKO

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy		General Brooke
General Marshall		Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King		Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold		Field Marshall Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell		Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Willson		General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Cooke		Major General Lay cock
Rear Admiral Bieri		Captain Lambe
Rear Admiral Badger		Brigadier Sugden
Major General Sutherland		Air Commodore Elliot
Major General Handy		Brigadier McNair
Major General Fairchild		Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Brigadier General Hansell
Colonel Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
	Secretariat
Captain Royal		Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland		Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 6, 1943
Secret

Approval of conclusions of CCS 135th and 136th meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th CCS meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia Command alternative to BUCCANEER (CCS 427)

Admiral Leahy suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (CCS 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.

Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 427.

b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.

Control of Strategic Air Forces in NW Europe and in the Mediterranean (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)

At the request of General Arnold, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.

Overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417 and 417/1)

Admiral Leahy said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the overall plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.

General Marshall said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to CCS 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of CCS 417.

Sir Andrew Cunningham asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.

Admiral King said that he agreed with this concept in principle.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.

Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944 (CCS 397 (Revised))

Admiral King said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in CCS 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.

Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (CCS 427)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:

a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.

b. Make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,

c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.

d. The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

Draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 426/1).

Relation of resources to plans

It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for operations in Europe.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.

Messages to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo

General Marshall read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo. General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Future business

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U.S. Forces in the Azores.

[NormanStewart]

The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

New Delhi, December 6, 1943

Secret
Seacos 38

Following for COS from Mountbatten

Your 051430 Dec. para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons:

a. In view of enemy’s powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small.

b. BUCCANEER was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worthwhile operation which could be carried out with the forces allotted.

c. There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1.

I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I regard this aspect as of the greatest importance.

Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn 1, Escorts 3.

The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree effective would require 12 LCI (L), 15 LCT (5), 6 LCS (M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 LCM Flotillas, 1 LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC.

Cancellation of BUCCANEER must inevitably lead to collapse of TARZAN since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in “hump” tonnage and cooperation on [of] Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast is as follows:

a. That TARZAN in its original form will not be possible. In particular there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air.

b. It will still be possible to employ all the LRPG’s but in conjunction with

c. An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa [Kalewa] area.

d. The Arakan operations would remain as in TARZAN**.**

e. The Ledo force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so.

It is realized that this new operation the code for which is given in my immediately following telegram will not enable me to achieve the QUADRANT Directive of opening up the land route to China but it has certain merits.

a. It enables the LRPGs to operate thus confusing the Japanese and helping to inflict casualties.

b. It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting.

c. The capture of the Kalemyo Kalewa area will give us a starting point from which to begin land operations against Mandalay.

d. It does not necessarily commit us to further operations in the center of Burma.

The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be possessed by the Ledo Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even after the starting of TARZAN so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely isolated in Central Burma.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 6 December 1943

Secret
CCS 270/13

Use of facilities in the Azores by U.S. aircraft

Although the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 270/12), dated 3 December 1943, it is considered necessary to defer its consideration until more detailed reports and recommendations are available from such sources as the U.S. Army-Navy Reconnaissance Party in the Azores, the Air Ministry Officers now at Lagens Field, Terceira, the Air Transport Command, AAF, and the Transport Command, RAF.

Whatever decisions may be reached concerning the future extent, nature, and control of U.S. and British anti-submarine and in transit aircraft operations in the Azores, it is apparent that the expansion, completion, and maximum possible use of Lagens Field are matters of urgency. In order to render all possible assistance in the early completion of Lagens Field and to maintain U.S. anti-submarine, ferried, and transport aircraft operations, it is proposed to send appropriate U.S. construction, communications, meteorological and maintenance material and equipment, supplies, and personnel to Terceira on the first possible convoy. The United States Chiefs of Staff have been advised by representatives of the United States in Lisbon that Dr. Antonio Salazar, Premier of the Portuguese Government, has replied favorably to questions regarding this procedure.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 6 December 1943

Secret
CCS 270/14

Development of facilities in the Azores

Reports from Lisbon indicate that, provided the U.S. are prepared to work under British cover, they will be able to obtain all the essential facilities in the Azores they require for the prosecution of the war.

As regards U.S. operational facilities at Lagens, we would suggest that a formula on the following lines might be acceptable to the Portuguese Government. They might be informed that American operational units in the Azores would be on loan to HMG operating under the command of a British officer from a base under British control.

As regards transit facilities, we recommend that we should await the outcome of Dr. Salazar’s consideration of the American proposal that the U.S. should construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria on behalf of the Portuguese Government. If this is unfavorable, as it may be in view of Dr. Salazar’s insistence on retaining the framework and principles of the British agreement, the British should then ask for authority to construct an aerodrome and should use American material and assistance under British cover.

The formula we would suggest for American transit aircraft would be that aircraft in transit through the Azores are controlled by British Air Transport Command. The second airfield, when constructed, would be under British Command, and aircraft using it would fulfill the same conditions as those using Lagens.

In any case the first step would be a survey of Santa Maria which could be done ostensibly by the British, but with the assistance of the four American officers who remained behind in Terceira, pending further instructions, after completion of work by American survey party recently in that island.

We do not foresee any requirements for two B-24 squadrons in the Azores, or, in fact, for two American squadrons of any type. Our requirement is a total of three squadrons of which two should be British squadrons, and we prefer to retain the two Fortress squadrons now at Terceira. We recommend that the third squadron should be an American B-24 squadron, which would replace the Hudsons now in the Azores. If this is agreed, we could also make the point to Dr. Salazar that the majority of operational units would be British and all under British command.

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the First Sea Lord

Cairo, 6 December 1943

Secret
CCS 415/3

The provision of merchant shipping for the British Fleet for the war against Japan

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are requested to approve that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the First Sea Lord.

[NormanStewart]

Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 6 December 1943

Secret
CCS 401/2

VLR airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following interpretation of paragraph 3 of CCS 401/1:

If the necessary work in India is to be completed by the desired date of April first, it is essential that United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by the 15th of January and, in addition, that certain resources be diverted from Ledo, which would result in delaying progress of road construction for a period of six weeks to two months.

Certain preparatory work in advance of arrival of American units and equipment can be done without interfering with SEAC projects, which, with arrival of necessary resources from the U.S. by January 15, will permit completion of the airfields by May 15.

H. REDMAN
F. B. ROYAL
Combined Secretariat