Before war yes. Population wise they are the largest. Some tribes in that have an almost 100% recruitement rate.
Nice
1 Like
Völkischer Beobachter (December 14, 1943)
Noch ein ‚Ergebnis‘ von Teheran –
Hull will die ‚Kleinen‘
dnb. Berlin, 13. Dezember –
Bekanntlich waren als Ergebnis der Teheraner Konferenz sogenannte „psychologische Riesenbomben“ gegen Deutschland und seine Verbündeten angekündigt worden. Nachdem die nichtssagende Verlautbarung von Teheran die Erwartungen unserer Feinde durch das völlige Fehlen solcher Erklärungen enttäuscht hat, versuchte der US-amerikanische Außenminister Hull, das Versäumte durch eine auf plumpe Täuschung berechnete Drohrede an die Adresse Ungarns, Rumäniens und Bulgariens nachzuholen.
Die Erklärung erinnert an die vor zwei Jahren erfolgte Kriegserklärung der bulgarischen, ungarischen und rumänischen Regierung an die USA und bezeichnet diese Regierungen in der Hull geläufigen Gangstersprache als „servile Marionetten.“ Hull wirft dann überheblich die abwegige Frage auf, er wisse nicht:
…in welchem Maße diese Regierungen auf die Großmut der USA gerechnet haben, ihre Völker vor den Folgen dieses übereilten Schrittes zu verschonen.
Tatsache sei, daß die an der Macht befindlichen Regierungen in diesen drei Ländern rücksichtslos ihre Teilnahme am Kriege gegen uns fortgesetzt und mit Menschen und Material die deutsche Kriegsmaschine gestärkt haben.
Die Erklärung schließt mit der üblichen Dreistigkeit, mit der die Herren im Weißen Haus mit Worten umzuspringen pflegen, wenn die militärischen Tatsachen nicht ihren Hoffnungen entsprechen. Freche Drohung und faustdicken Bluff verbinden sie zu grotesken Formulierungen, mit denen Hull auf die Ungarn, Rumänen und Bulgaren, die ebenso wie Deutschland für nichts anderes als ihre nationale Existenz und Zukunft kämpfen, Eindruck zu machen sucht: So droht Herr Hull:
Es muß ihnen klar geworden sein, daß sie mit Sicherheit die Verantwortung für die Folgen der Niederlage, welche die Vereinigten Nationen Deutschland zufügen werden, zu teilen haben.
Rumänien antwortet
Gegenüber der plumpen Drohrede Cordell Hulls an Rumänien lassen maßgebende rumänische Kreise keinen Zweifel darüber, daß die Stellung Rumäniens in dieser Frage klar und unzweideutig Stei. Schon in vielen öffentlichen Kundgebungen des abgelaufenen Jahres sei die Überzeugung zum Ausdruck gekommen, daß Rumänien im Osten um seine völkische Existenz kämpfe und seinen Kampf gleichzeitig als einen wertvollen Beitrag zur Wahrung der europäischen Zivilisation ansehe. Man verweist in diesen Kreisen auf die von den rumänischen Blättern bereits unmittelbar nach der Konferenz von Teheran den von dort ausgehenden Gerüchten gegenüber unmißverständlich und einheitlich zum Ausdruck gebrachte Haltung. So schrieb zum Beispiel der offiziöse Timpul, das von Teheran ausgehende „moralische Trommelfeuer“ könne nur dort wirksam sein, wo man lieber auf der Lauer liege als kämpfe. Im rumänischen Volk jedenfalls finde die Nachricht von dem Siege der rumänischen Truppen auf der Krim mehr Achtung als jedes anglo-amerikanische Bluffmanöver.
Die Front meldet sich zum Wort in einem Aufsatz der Porunca Vremii: So schrieb ein Hauptmann in diesem Blatt:
Die Frontkämpfer werden der rumänisch-deutschen Waffenbrüderschaft treu bleiben.
Der Feind irrt sich
Am Sonntag fand im Militärklub in Plovdiv eine feierliche Kundgebung aller Mitglieder des Verbandes der Reserveunteroffiziere des Gaues Plovdiv statt. Der Kundgebung wohnten Ministerpräsident Boschiloff und Innenminister Dr. Christoff bei. Der Innenminister unterstrich den Gedanken, daß sich der Feind durch die Luftangriffe und durch seine Agitation bemühe, die innere Front des Landes zu schwächen. Der Feind irre sich aber, denn er werde erst über die Leichen von zehn Millionen Bulgaren die bulgarische Grenze überschreiten können. Das bulgarische Volk stehe in seinem größten Teil an der Front des Staates. Der bulgarische Bauer liebe seine Scholle und sei bereit, sie um jeden Preis zu verteidigen.
Ministerpräsident Boschiloff erklärte: Die Außenpolitik Bulgariens werde von 99% des bulgarischen Volkes gebilligt. Das bulgarische Volk verlange nichts Fremdes, könne aber auf seine nationalen Ideale nicht verzichten. Die bulgarische Außenpolitik habe die Verteidigung der legitimen Rechte der Nation und die Sicherstellung der Einigkeit und Unabhängigkeit Bulgariens für die Zukunft zum Ziel. Alle guten Bulgaren müßten sich daher verpflichtet fühlen, der Regierung in ihrem Aufbauwerk beizustehen.
Fast zur gleichen Stunde also, als Hull die Bulgaren, Ungarn und Rumänen mit dem Kinderschreck eines amerikanischen Sieges auf die Rachsucht der Plutokraten gegen die stolze Tapferkeit ihres europäischen Selbstbehauptungswillens vorbereitete, wurde ihm in dieser Plovdiver Kundgebung von den Bedrohten fest und entschlossen gesagt: „Der Feind irrt sich, nur über unsere Leichen geht sein Weg auf unserem Kontinent.“
Die Liquidierung der Hullschen Großsprechereien wirkt umso eindrucksvoller, als sie so prompt und mit so viel Selbstsicherheit geäußert wurde.
Die Kundgebung sowie die Reden der Minister wurden im bulgarischen Rundfunk übertragen. Cordell Hull hätte, wenn es ihm nicht peinlich gewesen wäre, also die wahre Meinung der von ihm mit Drohungen verfolgten europäischen Völker unmittelbar hören können.
U.S. State Department (December 15, 1943)
740.0011–EW/12–1543
Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
Moscow, December 15, 1943
The attitude of the Soviet Government toward each one of the questions listed in the attached document of course deserves detailed and special study. There are three, however, which are of particular interest since they form a pattern of Soviet views concerning post-war Europe. These three are: (1) Soviet opposition to federations; (2) Soviet determination to break up Germany; and (3) the harsh attitude toward France. To this should be added the Soviet preference for strongpoints or bases in Europe to be held by the three victorious powers as trustees. The most important indication of the Soviet concept of political organization after the war is found in the attitude toward France. The reasons advanced by Stalin for this attitude are not in themselves convincing and the facts in the French situation do not support the harshness of the treatment suggested. The real motive very probably lies elsewhere.
While this pattern obviously cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence.
There is no attempt here to analyze the motive which may lie behind the Soviet concept of post-war organization of Europe but merely to set forth the facts.
[Attachment]
Attitude of the Soviet Government on European political questions as expressed by Marshal Stalin during the Tehran Conference
SecretThese views have all been recorded in the official records of the Conference and of the conversations which took place, but as they occurred at various times and in various circumstances they are summarized here for convenient reference.
- International security after the war.
No form of international organization by itself will be sufficient to restrain Germany or Japan from recovering and reembarking on a course of aggression. Only if the victorious nations acting perhaps as trustees for some such organization retain in their hands bases and other strongpoints in the vicinity of those countries and in general the important strategic points of the war, will the world be assured against the recrudescence of German or Japanese militarism. These bases will be held as trustees for the international organization, but they should probably be operated in that capacity by individual nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The United States might retain in that fashion bases in the Azores and at Dakar; Great Britain might increase her bases in the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa.No specific mention was made of bases which might be held by the Soviet Union.
Treatment of Germany.
The Soviet Government does not consider that any international organization could prevent the revival of Germany within fifteen or twenty years. Any form of production could be transferred into war industry and supervision could not prevent this process being concealed. Germany should be broken up and kept broken up. The various parts of Germany should not be permitted to group themselves together in any federation either among themselves or in association with other central European states. To do so would provide Germany with the framework for developing another great aggressive state. Strongpoints (see 1. above) should be held in and in the vicinity of Germany to prevent Germany’s “moving a muscle.”France.
The Soviet Government feels that France should be punished for its criminal association with Germany. De Gaulle represents symbolic France, while the physical France with which he has no connection is cooperating with Nazi Germany. France should be stripped of her colonies and not permitted to retain beyond her borders any strategic points. To permit France to be treated as one of the victorious powers and retain such bases would imperil the future peace of the world. Nine-tenths of the French intelligentsia are corrupt and infected with Nazi ideology. The entire French people must bear a measure of responsibility for the actions of their leaders. France should be reduced to an insignificant military power and become a charming but weak country.Confederations.
The Soviet Government is violently opposed to the creation of any federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe for the reasons set forth at the Moscow Conference.Poland.
The Soviet Government considers the Polish Government-in-exile to be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazis. Before the Soviet Government would consider reestablishment of relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people to fight actively against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, provided it is given the northern part of East Prussia including Königsberg and Tilsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line, thereby returning to Poland those areas primarily inhabited by Poles. Although the city of Lwów is admittedly more than half Poles, it is in the center of a definitely Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason. The Soviet Government is prepared to help Poland achieve a western frontier along the Oder River.Finland.
Although dubious of the result, the Soviet Government is willing to have Finnish negotiators come to Moscow to discuss peace. The Soviet conditions are:(1) The restoration of the treaty of March 1940 and the reestablishment of the frontiers set forth in that treaty.
(a) The Soviet Government would, however, be willing to release the base at Hango in return for Petsamo, the latter town to pass into the permanent possession of the Soviet Union.(2) The Finnish army to be demobilized to peacetime strength.
(3) Finland to make reparations in kind for fifty percent of the physical damage done to the Soviet Union because of Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union; these reparations in kind to be paid over a period of from five to eight years and if Finland should default, the Red Army will occupy certain areas of Finland.
(4) Finland to break off all association with Germany and expel the German forces from her territory.
If peace is established on these terms, the Soviet Government has no intention of subjugating all Finland and transforming it into a province of the Soviet Union.
The British Empire.
Because of British military contribution, the Soviet Government considers that there should be no reduction in the British Empire, but on the contrary it should if necessary be increased by turning over to Great Britain on the basis of trusteeship certain bases and strongpoints throughout the world.The Dardanelles.
The Soviet Government would like to see the Montreux Convention in regard to the straits replaced by a regime affording freer navigation to merchant and naval vessels both in war and in peace. This question was not pursued in any detail.
U.S. State Department (December 18, 1943)
President Roosevelt to the British Minister of Information
Washington, December 18, 1943
Dear Brendan: Since my return to Washington, I have received a more complete report of the confusions over publicity which arose at Cairo and Teheran.
Whatever the causes, I am greatly disturbed at the results. Not only did the newspapers, news services, and broadcasters of the United States suffer a heavy penalty because they kept confidence and observed the designated release dates, but non-observance elsewhere has engendered bitter reproaches and many charges of bad faith. Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote.
I am resolved that we will not risk a repetition. Consequently, I have decided that hereafter no news having a security value will be issued by the Government for future release, but that all such news will be given out instead at the earliest moment consistent with safety, for immediate publication and broadcast. I have issued instructions to that effect to the various departments and agencies.
Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
U.S. State Department (December 20, 1943)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President
Moscow, 20 December 1943
Secret
Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.
At the Tehran Conference you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Italian ships requested by the Soviets should be delivered on one February. Request that I be informed of the action taken to carry out this commitment as I shall undoubtedly be queried by Molotov at a meeting with him scheduled for Friday or Saturday to discuss unfinished business of Tehran.
U.S. State Department (December 21, 1943)
The President to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
Washington, 21 December 1943
Secret
Priority
For Ambassador Harriman from the President. Repeated to Prime Minister
Referring to your message [Alusna Moscow 201719 December] it is my intention that Italian surrendered ships to a number of one-third of the total be allocated to the Soviet war effort as rapidly as they can be made available from their present employment in the Allied war effort commencing about February 1.
Title of ownership to be decided after the surrender of our common enemies.
I have requested combined Chiefs of Staff to issue necessary orders to General Eisenhower.
ROOSEVELT
U.S. State Department (December 22, 1943)
740.00119 EW 1939/2036
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Washington, December 22, 1943
Secret
Aide Mémoire
The Tehran Conference considered the question of a joint declaration to the German people on the basis of unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin informed President Roosevelt on November 29 that he thought this would be bad tactics vis-à-vis of Germany and suggested instead that the Allied Governments concerned should work out terms together and make them generally known to the German people.
Mr. Eden suggests that this matter should be dealt with as soon as possible by the European Advisory Commission. He hopes that, if the United States Government agree, they will send appropriate instructions in this sense to their representative on the Commission.
U.S. State Department (December 23, 1943)
740.00119 EW 1939/2057½
The President to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 23, 1943
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
This I think should be taken up by Winant with Prime Minister Churchill as soon as the latter gets back. It was not brought up in any way at Tehran in my presence.
FDR
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President
Moscow, 23 December 1943
Secret
Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.
Referring to your cable to me USnavcom 211720 of December, I beg respectfully to mention that the request Stalin made to you and the Prime Minister at Tehran was for the fulfillment of the Soviet request for a specific number of Italian ships, namely one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for dispatch to North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of mer[chant] shipping for use in the Black Sea.
After some discussion both you and the Prime Minister agreed that the Soviet request should be approved and that the delivery of the ships was to be made by the 1st of February. No mention was made at Moscow or Tehran of their getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured.
I believe Stalin expects all the ships he requested will be turned over to the Soviet Government’s control by February first.
If for any reason it is not now advisable to meet this commitment on time I recommend that the facts be given to the British Minister and myself in Moscow as promptly as possible with instructions that we go directly to Stalin to explain to him the situation in full. Under this method of handling I have no doubt that Stalin will be reasonable and cooperative. On the other hand if the commitment cannot be carried out and we wait for him to bring pressure on us to carry out our earliest commitment resulting from Tehran I am afraid that suspicion might be aroused in his mind or in the minds of his associates who were not present as to the firmness of the other commitments taken at Tehran.
I interpret your cable as being for my information and if queried by Molotov will simply advise him that you are giving active consideration to the matter.
U.S. State Department (December 24, 1943)
The British Ambassador to President Roosevelt
Washington, December 24, 1943
Dear Mr. President, Mr. Eden has asked me to let you know that the question of Italian ships for the Russians, which was dealt with in your telegram No. 422 of December 21 to the Prime Minister,” has been considered in London in the light of the telegram which you sent to Mr. Harriman.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
There is a further point on which there appears to be some uncertainty in London. According to our record of what was said at Tehran, it seems to have been agreed there between yourself and the Prime Minister to assign “a battleship and a cruiser” for Soviet use “about the end of January,” the title of ownership to be decided upon after the surrender of Germany. The suggestion mentioned in your telegram to Mr. Harriman of handing over to the Russians a third of surrendered Italian ships appears to be a different one. (The request which the Soviet Government made at the Moscow Conference was for one battleship, one cruiser, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines and 40,000 tons of merchant shipping.)
Eden has not specifically asked me to put to you the point contained in this last paragraph, but he has put it to our Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, who may therefore be speaking to Harriman about it.
Believe me, Dear Mr. President,
Very sincerely yours,
HALIFAX
U.S. State Department (December 27, 1943)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President
Moscow, 27 December [1943]
Secret
Unnumbered.
Personal and secret for the President from Harriman.
At a meeting with Molotov last night he gave me a memorandum in reply to the memorandum you handed Stalin at Teheran asking for action on the proposals presented by the United States Delegation at the Moscow conference concerning use of air bases for shuttle bombing, communications, etc., paraphrase of which follows:
There is no objection in principle, as was indicated previously from the Soviet side, to the granting of air bases in the territory of the USSR for American military airplanes for the purpose of carrying out the shuttle bombing of Germany. The organization of such bases, however, and the use of the appropriate airdromes for this purpose must be coordinated with the plans of the Command of the military Air Force of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Air Force Command will be instructed for this purpose to begin preliminary conversations on the above question with the appropriate military representatives in Moscow with the subsequent consideration of this question by the Soviet High Command. It goes without saying that there will be made available, after a definite decision of the question concerning the organization of air bases from the Russian side, all necessary information concerning weather related to the operation of shuttle bombing.
With regard to the establishment of air communications between the USSR and the United States along the Moscow-Teheran-Washington route, there is no objection from the Soviet side to the renewal of conversations on this question between representatives of the Chief Administration of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR and the corresponding American representatives at Moscow for the conclusion of an agreement on a reciprocal basis. December 25, 1943.
Molotov also gave me a preliminary reply to the two other memoranda you handed Marshal Stalin at Teheran concerning advance planning in the North West Pacific for Naval operations and for air operations. Reading from a paper he made the following statement orally which he preferred not to give me in writing:
Under point A of the President’s memorandum concerning Naval operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government is prepared to utilize existing facilities to obtain intelligence information concerning Japan and to make such information available to the United States authorities through the United States Military Mission in Moscow.
With reference to weather information referred to in the President’s memorandum concerning air operations in the Pacific the Soviet Government agrees to furnish the necessary supplementary information concerning the weather in the Far East. Instructions to this effect will be relayed to the Soviet Meteorological Services and information will be exchanged through the United States Military Mission in Moscow or through such other channels as the American Government may prefer. This exchange of information is to be on a reciprocal basis.
[In] Regard to the other questions contained in the President’s memoranda, certain of these questions, because of their importance and complexity require more time for study by the Soviet Government. Others for reasons which the American Government will understand it is difficult for the Soviet Government to give affirmative answers to at the present time.
In making this statement Mr. Molotov said he desired to emphasize the words “at the present time.”
I thereupon said I knew you would be glad to learn that the Soviet Government was ready to begin cooperation in regard to the Pacific war. I pointed out, however, that Marshal Stalin had indicated to you at Teheran that it was of equal importance to the Soviet Union as to the United States to bring the war against Japan to a successful conclusion at the earliest date. Molotov interrupted me to say that Stalin had made this quite clear.
I explained further in considerable detail the need for immediate planning in order to make possible the achievement of Stalin’s objectives.
Molotov appeared to accept the validity of my statement and indicated that the subject was being actively studied.
Marshal Stalin, however, had just gone to the front and I do not expect to get any further reply for some days.
U.S. State Department (December 30, 1943)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President
Moscow, 30 December 1943
Secret
Op priority
Your 291729.
The minutes prepared by Bohlen relating to the question of the Italian ships will be found beginning with the 2nd paragraph of the minutes of the 6 p.m. meeting 1 December. These minutes are as follows:
Mr. Molotov inquired whether it would be possible to obtain any answer on the Soviet Union’s request for Italian ships.
The President replied his position on this question was very clear; that the Allies had received a large number of Italian merchant ships and a lesser number of warships and that he felt they should be used by our three nations in the common cause until the end of the war when the division based on title and possession might be made.
Mr. Molotov answered that the Soviet Union would use these ships during the war in the common war effort, and after the war the question of possession could be discussed.
The Prime Minister asked where the Soviet Union would like to have these ships delivered.
Marshal Stalin replied in the Black Sea if Turkey entered the war. If not, to the northern ports.
The Prime Minister said it was a small thing to ask in the face of the tremendous sacrifices of Russia.
Marshal Stalin said that he knew how great the need for war vessels was on the part of England and the United States but that he felt the Soviet request was modest.
Both the President and the Prime Minister said they were in favor of acceptance of the Soviet suggestion.
The Prime Minister said it would require some time to work out the arrangements and that he personally would welcome the sight of these vessels in the Black Sea and hoped some English war vessels could accompany them in action against the enemy in those waters.
He said it would take a couple of months to work out the arrangements with the Italians, since they wish to avoid any possibility of mutiny in the Italian Fleet and the scuttling of the ships.
It was agreed that the ships would pass over to Soviet command sometime around the end of January, 1944.
I have compared Bohlen’s notes with those of Major Birse now in Moscow who acted as interpreter for the Prime Minister and they agree on all points of substance. Major Birse has some more detail in regard to the Prime Minister’s explanation as to why the delay of a couple of months was necessary and the desire of Great Britain to help in the reconditioning of Soviet ships when the Dardanelles was open. Both Bohlen and Birse recall the Prime Minister asking Eden during the discussion how many war vessels were covered by the Soviet request and Eden replied “1 battleship, 1 cruiser and 8 destroyers and 4 submarines.” This is the number which the Soviet Government asked for at the Moscow Conference. My recollection is quite clear[ly] confirmed by both Bohlen and Birse that the number of ships under discussion at the meeting recorded above was that requested at the Moscow Conference and no mention was made of ½ of the Italian Fleet being turned over to the Soviet Union, nor do we know of any discussion about Italian ships at any other time during the Tehran Conference.
U.S. State Department (January 2, 1944)
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
London, 2 January 1944
Secret
530
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal.
Hull tells Eden that you have no recollection of any remarks by UJ about unconditional surrender. I certainly heard, with great interest, him saying something to the effect that he thought it might be well to consider telling the Germans at some stage what unconditional surrender would involve, or perhaps what it would not involve. After that we began talking about the 50,000 and your compromise and my high falutin, and I finished up by no means certain that the Germans would be reassured if they were told what he had in mind.
Find also Anthony telegraphed to the Foreign Office on November 30 as follows:
Last night (November 29) Marshal Stalin spoke to the President about unconditional surrender. Marshal Stalin said he considered this bad tactics vis-à-vis Germany and his suggestion was that we should together work out terms and let them be made known generally to the people of Germany.
Perhaps this may give you a cue to what Anthony and I had in our memories and you may feel inclined to join with us in asking UJ whether he would care to develop his theme to us. If however, you prefer we can of course leave things where they are for the time being.
U.S. State Department (January 3, 1944)
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the President
London, 3 January 1944
Secret
To the President from Winant.
After reading the Prime Minister’s number 530 to you, I wanted you to know that a message from Mister Hull instructed me to take up the question of what was said in relation to unconditional surrender at Tehran with the Prime Minister on his return to London… I hope the Prime Minister’s query to you was in a form acceptable to you. Eden meant it to be so and the Prime Minister followed his suggestion in his cable to you. Eden thought that the subject had come up at a luncheon conversation at the Russian Embassy. There has been no further word from Stalin.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. State Department (January 6, 1944)
740.0011 EW 1939/32572: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State
Moscow, January 6, 1944
Secret
43, January 6, 4 p.m. Personal and secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Molotov continued that Marshal Stalin at Tehran had outlined the terms which the Soviet Government were prepared to accord Finland and, as he recalled it, the President and Mr. Churchill had expressed no objection to these terms.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HARRIMAN
U.S. State Department (January 7, 1944)
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
London, 7 January 1944
Secret
No. 536
Prime Minister to President Roosevelt. Personal and most secret.
Bedell Smith and Devers came through here morning of 5th. Bedell told me that he and Montgomery are convinced that it is better to put in a much heavier and broader OVERLORD than to expand ANVIL above our pre-Tehran conception and that he is putting this to Eisenhower and your Chiefs of Staff…
It also seems to me from what I heard very probable that the Y Moon (see my immediately following) will be at the earliest practicable date. I do not see why we should resist this if the Commanders feel they have a better chance then. At Tehran, however, COS recommendation was Y1 or one day earlier which you and I agreed to express more agreeably as “During May.” In conversation with UJ we never mentioned such a date as May 5 or May 8 but always spoke to him around 20th. Neither did we at any time dwell upon the exact phase of the operation which should fall on any particular day. If now the Y date is accepted as final I do not feel that we shall in any way have broken faith with him. The operation will anyhow begin in May with feints and softening bombardments and I do not think UJ is the kind of man to be unreasonable over 48 hours.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
If that is “Uncle Joe”, it is understandable why it was so easy for Stalin to get things his way. Emotionaly the western leaders made him a family member.
1 Like
U.S. State Department (January 8, 1944)
President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, 8 January 1944
Secret
Op priority
Personal and secret, Number 437. For the Former Naval Person from the President.
As I told you in my 422, Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by 1 February so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort beginning 1 February as rapidly as they could be made available.
Harriman then reminded me that Stalin’s request at Tehran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October (namely for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers and four submarines for North Russia and 40,000 tons displacement of merchant shipping for the Black Sea) and that no mention was made at Moscow or Tehran of the Russians’ getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information and he has not discussed the question of one-third with Molotov.
Harriman also emphasized the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would in his opinion only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Tehran.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. State Department (January 10, 1944)
The President to the President’s personal representative, temporarily in Iran
Washington, January 10, 1944
Personal and secret
Dear Pat: I am given to understand by the State Department that the Foreign Minister of Iran is very much perturbed about the stories the American press and radio have carried about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Tehran in December.
I wish you would explain to the Foreign Minister that there was never any question of suspicion about any Iranian, but that the report of threatened violence involved German agents who were believed to have entered Iran without authority. As you know, my move from the American Legation was made primarily in order not to expose any of the conferees to the risk of attack by Axis agents while coming to visit me. I hope that you can put at rest any misunderstanding about the incident. I do not wish to make any further statement to the American press about it as such action would only increase general attention to the matter.
I hope that you may be making fine progress in your work.
With all good wishes [etc.]
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
U.S. State Department (January 11, 1944)
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, January 11, 1944
Memorandum to the President
I wish to refer to telegram no. 9050 of December 29 from Ambassador Winant which reads in part as follows:
The Department will be familiar with the Soviet accusations against the Polish resistance groups in Poland which were lodged at Tehran to the effect that these resistance groups were actually cooperating with the Germans in that they were fighting the so-called partisans which were really Russians dropped by parachute.
It would be helpful to me and to the senior members of the Department who are handling Soviet-Polish matters if the pertinent sections of the report on the Tehran Conference with regard to the aforementioned Soviet accusations might be made available to the Department.
CH