Clapper: An ugly story
By Raymond Clapper
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Maj. de Seversky: Nazi aerial rocket torpedo is threat, despite attempts to belittle weapon
By Maj. Alexander P. de Seversky
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Ayres predicts defeat of Nazis by next year
Industrialists warned to prepare now for post-war economy
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Vinson orders production of cheaper items
WPB and OPA responsible for adequate output of low-cost goods
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Völkischer Beobachter (December 15, 1943)
‚Wofür kämpfen wir?‘ – die unbeantwortete Frage
Die USA-Bürger sehen keinen Kriegsgrund
Eigener Bericht des „Völkischen Beobachters“
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U.S. State Department (December 15, 1943)
740.0011–EW/12–1543
Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union
Moscow, December 15, 1943
The attitude of the Soviet Government toward each one of the questions listed in the attached document of course deserves detailed and special study. There are three, however, which are of particular interest since they form a pattern of Soviet views concerning post-war Europe. These three are: (1) Soviet opposition to federations; (2) Soviet determination to break up Germany; and (3) the harsh attitude toward France. To this should be added the Soviet preference for strongpoints or bases in Europe to be held by the three victorious powers as trustees. The most important indication of the Soviet concept of political organization after the war is found in the attitude toward France. The reasons advanced by Stalin for this attitude are not in themselves convincing and the facts in the French situation do not support the harshness of the treatment suggested. The real motive very probably lies elsewhere.
While this pattern obviously cannot be regarded as conclusive, it is sufficiently clear to afford a glimpse of the Soviet idea of post-war continental Europe. Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, southeastern and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or association. France is to be stripped of her colonies and strategic bases beyond her borders and will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will remain approximately their present territorial size, but it is doubtful if either will be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe. The rest of Europe would be reduced to military and political impotence.
There is no attempt here to analyze the motive which may lie behind the Soviet concept of post-war organization of Europe but merely to set forth the facts.
[Attachment]
Attitude of the Soviet Government on European political questions as expressed by Marshal Stalin during the Tehran Conference
SecretThese views have all been recorded in the official records of the Conference and of the conversations which took place, but as they occurred at various times and in various circumstances they are summarized here for convenient reference.
- International security after the war.
No form of international organization by itself will be sufficient to restrain Germany or Japan from recovering and reembarking on a course of aggression. Only if the victorious nations acting perhaps as trustees for some such organization retain in their hands bases and other strongpoints in the vicinity of those countries and in general the important strategic points of the war, will the world be assured against the recrudescence of German or Japanese militarism. These bases will be held as trustees for the international organization, but they should probably be operated in that capacity by individual nations, particularly the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. The United States might retain in that fashion bases in the Azores and at Dakar; Great Britain might increase her bases in the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa.No specific mention was made of bases which might be held by the Soviet Union.
Treatment of Germany.
The Soviet Government does not consider that any international organization could prevent the revival of Germany within fifteen or twenty years. Any form of production could be transferred into war industry and supervision could not prevent this process being concealed. Germany should be broken up and kept broken up. The various parts of Germany should not be permitted to group themselves together in any federation either among themselves or in association with other central European states. To do so would provide Germany with the framework for developing another great aggressive state. Strongpoints (see 1. above) should be held in and in the vicinity of Germany to prevent Germany’s “moving a muscle.”France.
The Soviet Government feels that France should be punished for its criminal association with Germany. De Gaulle represents symbolic France, while the physical France with which he has no connection is cooperating with Nazi Germany. France should be stripped of her colonies and not permitted to retain beyond her borders any strategic points. To permit France to be treated as one of the victorious powers and retain such bases would imperil the future peace of the world. Nine-tenths of the French intelligentsia are corrupt and infected with Nazi ideology. The entire French people must bear a measure of responsibility for the actions of their leaders. France should be reduced to an insignificant military power and become a charming but weak country.Confederations.
The Soviet Government is violently opposed to the creation of any federations in eastern, southeastern and central Europe for the reasons set forth at the Moscow Conference.Poland.
The Soviet Government considers the Polish Government-in-exile to be agents of Hitler and charges its representatives inside Poland of murdering partisans engaged in fighting the Nazis. Before the Soviet Government would consider reestablishment of relations with the Polish Government-in-exile, it must order its agents in Poland to cease fighting the partisans and must utilize its troops and call on the Polish people to fight actively against Nazi Germany. The Soviet Government, provided it is given the northern part of East Prussia including Königsberg and Tilsit, is willing to accept the Curzon Line, thereby returning to Poland those areas primarily inhabited by Poles. Although the city of Lwów is admittedly more than half Poles, it is in the center of a definitely Ukrainian area and could not be returned to Poland for that reason. The Soviet Government is prepared to help Poland achieve a western frontier along the Oder River.Finland.
Although dubious of the result, the Soviet Government is willing to have Finnish negotiators come to Moscow to discuss peace. The Soviet conditions are:(1) The restoration of the treaty of March 1940 and the reestablishment of the frontiers set forth in that treaty.
(a) The Soviet Government would, however, be willing to release the base at Hango in return for Petsamo, the latter town to pass into the permanent possession of the Soviet Union.(2) The Finnish army to be demobilized to peacetime strength.
(3) Finland to make reparations in kind for fifty percent of the physical damage done to the Soviet Union because of Finnish participation in the war against the Soviet Union; these reparations in kind to be paid over a period of from five to eight years and if Finland should default, the Red Army will occupy certain areas of Finland.
(4) Finland to break off all association with Germany and expel the German forces from her territory.
If peace is established on these terms, the Soviet Government has no intention of subjugating all Finland and transforming it into a province of the Soviet Union.
The British Empire.
Because of British military contribution, the Soviet Government considers that there should be no reduction in the British Empire, but on the contrary it should if necessary be increased by turning over to Great Britain on the basis of trusteeship certain bases and strongpoints throughout the world.The Dardanelles.
The Soviet Government would like to see the Montreux Convention in regard to the straits replaced by a regime affording freer navigation to merchant and naval vessels both in war and in peace. This question was not pursued in any detail.
Report by the Combined Administrative Committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 15 December 1943
Secret
CCS 428 (Revised)
IMPLEMENTATIONS OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 1943-1944
Availability of resources to meet the requirements of critical strategy
The problem
To examine the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the operations and undertakings indicated in CCS 426/1.
Facts bearing on the problem
The basis of investigation is given in Annex I.
We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at SEXTANT are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Military operations shall take precedence over civil relief and rehabilitation of occupied territories.
The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between governments concerned.
Conclusions
Ground Forces (Annex II)
The necessary ground forces for approved operations can be made available. Certain types of service units may be a critical factor but in no case should preclude the operations.
Naval Forces (Annex III)
So far as can be foreseen, British and United States naval forces adequate to accomplish all approved operations for 1944 will be available. The situation will be tight particularly as to destroyers, escorts and escort carriers in the early part of the year but should be considerably eased by new construction as the year progresses. The defeat of Germany will make available an increase in naval forces for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific.
Air Forces (Annex IV)
The air resources to meet the operations specified in Annex I will be available with the following exceptions:
a. A deficiency in troop carrier squadrons in the Mediterranean if the detailed plan to be made for ANVIL requires more than a one brigade lift.
b. A possible deficiency of land-based aircraft for certain operations in the Pacific if the war with Germany is not concluded in time to release the additional resources required.
c. A possible deficiency of aircraft for the approved lift into China if diversions are made to supply forces operating in North Burma.
Such support can be given to the resistance groups in Europe as will not interfere with the intensification of the bomber offensive.
Assault Shipping and Landing Craft (Annex V)
Production of combat loaders, LSTs and LCTs still continues to be the bottleneck limiting the scope of operations against the enemy and our ability to carry out operations will continue to be limited by this fact. In 1944 there should be sufficient landing craft available to carry out approved operations.
The shortage of landing craft impels the earliest practicable release of assault shipping and craft after assaults to permit proper maintenance of material, rest for personnel and reorientation to other assignments.
Supply of Critical Items (Annex VI)
In the absence of detailed plans for certain of the approved operations it is impossible to determine exact requirements for supplies and equipment. Certain shortages will exist as indicated in Annex VI. In no case, however, is it considered that shortages will be so serious as to preclude the mounting of approved operations.
Shipping (Annex VII)
Examination of personnel and cargo shipping position indicates our ability to support approved naval and military operations. In addition it will be noted that provision has been made to execute Operation HERCULES in spring 1944. In the event that this operation is not undertaken, this shipping can be made available for approved operations. While the statement of the shipping position covering the first nine months of 1944 does not include presently indefinable demands or relief requirements except for Italy, there is now no reason to expect any interference with approved military and naval operations. This applies both to personnel shipping as well as to dry cargo resources.
Oil (Annex VIII)
An examination of the oil position has revealed that the most critical petroleum products are 100 octane aviation gasoline and 80 octane motor gasoline. The situation with respect to 100 octane gasoline continues to improve and the gap between production and consumption will be closed during February 1944. It is believed that the indicated shortage of 80 octane motor gasoline will be avoided by using gasolines with lower octane numbers and will be further reduced by continued acceleration of the aviation gasoline plant building program.
In all theaters there continues to exist a shortage of small tankers or small ships suitable for use as such. There appear to be sufficient large oceangoing tankers in existence and coming from new construction to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.
The Pittsburgh Press (December 15, 1943)
300 bombers raid Greece
Yanks smash airfields and port near Athens; 8th Army gains slowly
By C. R. Cunningham, United Press staff writer
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From Italy and Africa –
50,000 V-mail greetings delivered in day here!
Postmaster says office now handles 211,000 more parcels than last year
A shipment of 50,000 V-mail Christmas greetings from North Africa and Italy was delivered in a single day this week in Pittsburgh.
But the V-mail is only a small part of the exchange of greetings that has added to the burden of employees at the Pittsburgh Post Office.
Postmaster S. A. Bodkin said today that while parcel post has been reduced slightly this year over last year, letter mail is considerably heavier.
He said:
Last year at this time, very few men were working on soldier mail. Now there are about 120 regular employees working on soldier mail alone.
This is about three times the normal complement needed to sort the mail and prepare it for shipment to the Armed Forces in camps at home and on the active front abroad.
Mr. Bodkin estimated that letter mail is already 1,300,000 pieces more than at the corresponding time last year. The deficit in parcel post is about 211,000 parcels as compared with last year.
Observing that “some response” has been felt in the appeal to mail early, Mr. Bodkin points out that mail of all sorts to be sent to soldiers within the United States must not be delayed if it is to be handled before Christmas.
Dec. 10 was the deadline for mailing gifts to members of the Armed Forces overseas.
Transfer near for Marshall
General expected to get invasion post soon
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Senator Langer: Did Patton use his revolver?
Question said to be raised by man’s relatives
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I DARE SAY —
That man Willkie
By Florence Fisher Parry
I came upon a souvenir. It was a little white button lettered in black. “We Want Willkie,” it said. How it survived these last four years, I don’t know. But there it was, a relic of the past.
And looking at it, I find myself wondering, will we wear it again? We will still want Willkie, but will our will have its way? Is it strong enough? Importunate enough? I wonder.
Remember how it started? Remember that convention? Remember how he just wasn’t to be? Remember what a short time it was before the convention, that we’d even heard the man’s name?
There he was, at that historic convention, in his hotel room reaching for his hat and coat, saying: “Come on, let’s go home.”
That was when the galleries began to chant, remember that strong, stubborn chant, deep, rhythmic, insistent, like the pounding of a spiritual “We want Willkie” – “We Want Willkie” – “WE WANT WILLKIE.”
Not to be
We wanted him so bad that we got him. And for a while it looked as though we were going to put him right in the White House. It was a crazy thing to believe, now that we look back on it. No man, no man alone, even with more than 22 million crusaders behind him, could pass that miracle. But while we were campaigning for him, we believe we could.
Even later, when the fact of his defeat hit us bang between the eyes, we still shook our heads and blinked and stared and said to each other, “It can’t be.” And even when we heard his voice, tired and hoarse, calming the then-shrill and fanatical screams of those who were still yelling “We Want Willkie,” there in the Commodore Hotel, he said:
They say I’m licked, but they don’t know me.
They may not have known him then but they’ve had plenty of chance to get acquainted with him since. Defeat, technical defeat, does one of two things to a man. It breaks him or it adds to his stature.
And could anyone say that defeat has broken this Mr. Willkie, that it even knocked him out for a day?
His stature has increased; his character enlarged; his humanity deepened beyond the improvement that we can discern in any other single individual on earth with perhaps the exception of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who, a great man in 1940, is infinitely greater today.
And this growth in both these men has been influenced by the same force; the force of defeat. At the moment of what looked like Wendell Willkie’s political extinction, he defied the conventional prescription of defeat and imbibed it as though it were elixir. And in the same year, when England was facing annihilation from the air, Winston Churchill shook his fist at the darkening Heavens and changed from a man into a Messiah.
Time to grow
Four years ago, nearly half of the nation placed its faith in an untried man and believed that he was fit to govern the greatest country on earth. And we failed to elect him. But in our very hour of political defeat, many of us found comfort in the conviction that the next four years would give our candidate time to grow; time to prepare; time to rise to the circumstance of an even mightier challenge.
The entire career of Wendell Willkie since 1940 has been a triumph of preparation. He has traveled the world over and has met with the greatest leaders of this planet. He has won their confidence. Their esteem and their affection. He has proved himself a peerless ambassador of goodwill. In a book of inspired philosophy, he has captured the imagination of the reading world.
And even now with the entire party-in-power harnessed to defeat him, and with every orthodox political leader in his own professed party working in close and frenzied teamwork to throw him out, he is defying defeat.
‘Unconditional surrender’ decreed for paralysis war
President appeals for support of fund campaign, rules our armistice with crippler
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Church’s task today outlined
Roosevelt, Willkie write of world’s needs
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Europe faces big actions in next 100 days
Allies and Axis clearing away obstacles to titanic clashes
By Robert Musel, United Press staff writer
London, England –
Military and political developments indicated today that the next 100 days will see the Allies and Germany poised for, if not engaged in, the battles that will decide the European war.
Both sides appeared equally intent on clearing away all obstacles barring the war to the titanic clashes that will be touched off by the climatic Allied offensives promised by the Tehran Conference “from the east, west and south.”
Balkans reinforced
Among the developments were:
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Germany was replacing Junkers generals with political generals pledged to support Adolf Hitler to the end to guard against any repetition of the Prussian military clique’s surrender of 1918.
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Germany reportedly dispatched 40,000 reserves from Austria and Finland and an air squadron intended for Italy to the Balkans in an attempt to wipe out Partisan forces in advance of an Allied invasion.
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The Bulgarian Cabinet held a seven-hour meeting on “current affairs” yesterday.
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Radio Vichy said the Romanian government was considering moving from Bucharest to Brașov, 90 miles to the north, because of the growing danger of air raids.
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King Peter of Yugoslavia was reported ready to make peace with Marshal Josip “Tito” Broz, Partisan leader.
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British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was believed about to take over the job of convincing the Polish government-in-exile of the wisdom of resuming relations with Russia.
A Hungarian MTI Agency dispatch said Count Anton Sigray told the Hungarian Parliament that Hungary had always pursued a “democratic policy” and “invoked Providence in securing an honorable peace.”
The German tendency to replace Junkers generals with those known to be loyal to Hitler was first seen in the replacement of Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commander in France, by Marshal Erwin Rommel as chief of the defense of Western Europe against invasion.
Peace moves rumored
Later reports reaching London said Gen. Richard Jungclaus, an SS leader and intimate friend of Gestapo chief Heinrich Himmler, had taken over the Belgian command from Gen. Alexander von Falkenhausen, a career officer.
The London Daily News relayed a rumor that Rundstedt had gone to Lisbon in an attempt to establish contact with Allied diplomats for peace feeler purposes while reports were published elsewhere that Falkenhausen’s aide-de-camp, Maj. Hertzberg-Harbou, had gone to Portugal on a similar mission.
None of the peace feeler rumors were confirmed and it appeared certain that Germany would disown the peace feelers and that the Allies would hold out for unconditional surrender.