U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)
King-Cunningham meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Captain Grantham | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Captain Hughes Hallett | |
| Captain Fife | ||
| Captain Stroop |
Minutes
September 15, 1944
Top secret
Naval facilities in Australia and forward areas
Admiral Cunningham asked if the U.S. Navy planned on evacuating their facilities at Brisbane and Sydney. If the United States Navy has moved out, he would like to make arrangements directly with the Australian Government to use evacuated facilities. It was particularly desirable to get repair facilities for fleet units and aviation facilities ashore for a fleet air arm. He pointed out that Australia would be used chiefly as a rear base and that the British Naval units would operate from more advanced bases depending upon the situation.
Admiral King stated that in general the U.S. Navy was moving out of Australia but that no “roll-up” plan had been received either from the Commander of the Seventh Fleet or the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area. Admiral King directed that Commander, Seventh Fleet, be ordered by dispatch to prepare a “roll-up” plan and forward it to the Navy Department. He wished, particularly, to know about the plans to roll up Sydney and Brisbane. Admiral King also said that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff should inform the Commander, Southwest Pacific Area with regard to the situation and the tentative requirements for basing British Naval units in Australia.
The First Sea Lord requested that the U.S. Navy act as the Royal Navy’s “agent” with the U.S. Army Air Force to have certain aviation facilities no longer required by them made available to the Naval Air Arm of the Royal Navy, where such facilities could be usefully employed.
Admiral King pointed out that Espíritu Santo was highly developed as a U.S. base and was probably the most forward location for the British Fleet to use as a rear base. He outlined the future Pacific plans and said that no other forward base could be made readily available.
The First Sea Lord said he wanted a good rear base (probably Sydney) and that all the British Navy would require in the forward area was a suitable anchorage. The Fleet would exist on their train and supply ships.
Admiral King suggested that Majuro, which had a large anchorage, might also be useful to the British Fleet.
The First Sea Lord asked if any U.S. naval landing craft bases were available in Australia.
Captain Fife pointed out that Milne Bay and Buna Roads had been used as our chief bases for landing craft until after the Manus landing. He stated that Brisbane had also been used as a rear base for landing craft during the early part of the New Guinea campaign.
Admiral King said that steps were being taken to clear a deep draft channel through Torres Strait. A new survey was being made and it was expected that a better and shorter channel which could accommodate a battleship would soon be available.
The First Sea Lord said that he thought the discussion up to this point would serve as a basis for detailed plans to be agreed upon by the Washington Planners.
Use of Avenger aircraft on British carriers
The First Sea Lord stated that the British Navy had found the Barracuda inadequate for carrier operations and that it was highly desirable to have additional Avengers allocated for use on British carriers.
Admiral King said that the production of Avengers was short of requirements and would continue to be so, that the details of the allocation of U.S. Navy-produced aircraft were arranged by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), and that he, Admiral King, would make sure that the question of additional Avengers for the British Navy would be taken under the most careful consideration, particularly, in view of the British Fleet participation in Pacific operations. He was not, however, optimistic with regard to availability of additional Avengers for at least another six months.
Release of LSTs from “OVERLORD”
The First Sea Lord said that they were having difficulty getting SHAEF to release landing craft for transfer to other theaters and it was desirable to have some released soon for use in the Burma operations.
Admiral King said that this was a matter he wanted settled too, and directed that the situation be followed up with regard to release of landing craft and that Admiral Stark should be informed of the requirements of other theaters so that he can obtain releases as quickly as feasible.
Admiral Cooke said that he believed SHAEF had a certain amount of “velvet” and suggested that it would be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to put pressure upon SHAEF to get landing craft released.
Admiral King suggested that Admiral Ramsay might also be responsible for holding landing craft in OVERLORD, but The First Sea Lord did not concur in this.
Admiral King and The First Sea Lord then directed the Combined Planning Staff to prepare a draft dispatch for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF on release of landing craft for transfer to other theaters.
Captain Hughes Hallett pointed out that landing craft were originally made available in the theater for combatant operations only and were not to be kept as a convenience for incidental shipment of supplies after the assault and combatant phases were over.
Escort carriers
The First Sea Lord said that the British Navy had received the U.S. Navy’s request for transfer of excess escort carriers for use in connection with ferrying aircraft. He said that all of the British escort carriers would be in use constantly until at least the summer of 1945.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Navy would be glad to get CVEs whenever they could get them.
The First Sea Lord said that he would definitely try to get some released but held out small hopes. However, he would make a particular note of this point.
Mosquito aircraft on carriers – highball
This matter was discussed previously by The First Sea Lord and Admiral King. Motion pictures of this are to be sent from London to be available to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
Bonaventure and “X” Craft
The First Sea Lord described in general the use of Bonaventure and “X” Craft. He said that they were available and had been offered for use in the Pacific Theater if it was thought they could be used.
Admiral King said that he thought Bonaventure and the “X” Craft might be of some use and suggested that they be moved to the Pacific Theater with the balanced British Fleet.
The First Sea Lord said that Bonaventure and the “X” Craft would be moved out to the Eastern Fleet, probably to an Australian port first, where they would await an opportunity to be used from a forward base.
Zones of occupation
It was pointed out that this matter required settlement on a higher level and it was probable that a decision might be reached soon.
The First Sea Lord said he had taken exception to the scheme which proposed a German Disarmament Commission which consisted of three generals. He said he believed there should be a committee of nine: 3 generals, 3 admirals, and 3 air officers, each responsible in his own zone for disarmament but who would act as a central committee to decide general questions.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Navy would take over such ports as they were using, providing a Port Director and staff. However, he did not want any elaborate organization set up.
With regard to minesweeping, The First Sea Lord said that he expected the Germans would be required to sweep their own mines. He considered this a part of the disarmament of Germany.
Both Admiral King and The First Sea Lord agreed that further investigation is needed of the desirability of having separate organizations for naval disarmament and control of bases and ports but that this may be a logical solution. Both agreed that if the British are to control northwest Germany, the British will invite the U.S. Navy to participate in naval disarmament in this zone.