Québec Conference 1944 (OCTAGON)

Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces and the British Minister of War Transport

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 675/2

Memorandum by the U.S. transportation, British movement, and combined shipping authorities

The attached Appendix “A” indicates the magnitude of the combined personnel movements which may be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans.

The attached Appendix “B” indicates the probable combined resources estimated to be available during the period under consideration.

Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on strategy and priorities.

It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix “A”

Analysis of the combined personnel movement problem
Subsequent to a 1 October defeat of Germany and for 1 year thereafter

British U.S.
1. Operational Requirements
a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces already engaged in the war against Japan on 1 October. 693,000
b. Buildup from U.S. for war against Japan. 826,000
c. Redeployment for war against Japan. 1,052,000 804,000
d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) to support increased strength due to b and/or c. 385,000 213,000
e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas. 265,000 10,000
f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in the war against Japan. 150,000 280,000
g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by retained ships. 250,000 768,000
Subtotal 2,102,000 3,594,000
2. Demobilization and Repatriation Without Replacement
a. British and U.S. Forces. 678,000 1,720,000
b. Dominion, Colonial and other personnel. 251,000 28,000
Subtotal 929,000 1,748,000
3. Prisoners of War
a. Allied prisoners of war. 53,000 102,000
b. Enemy prisoners of war. 466,000 243,000
Subtotal 519,000 345,000
4. TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SERVICES 3,550,000 5,687,000
Appendix “B”

Total availability of personnel shipping by categories (as of 1 Oct 1944)

British U.S.
Categories No. of Ships Capacity No. of Ships Capacity
1. Ocean Going 84 302,000 220 492,000
2. Limited Capability
(a) Indian Ocean type 31 48,000
(b) Miscellaneous 6 6,000 45 35,000
Subtotal 37 54,000 45 35,000
TOTAL TROOPSHIP LIFT 121 356,000 265 527,000
NOTES: British U.S.
1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, after allowing for additions and losses based on current CCS rates 376,000 708,000
2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily fitted to carry a few hundred troops each.
3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels.
4. Lift of LSIs and APAs is not included in above inventories but advantage will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit.
5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements.
6. No British cross-Channel type of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships.