Völkischer Beobachter (September 15, 1944)
Was bedingungslose Kapitulation bedeutet
…
Führer HQ (September 15, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Am Albert- und Maas-Schelde-Kanal wurden feindliche Brückenköpfe» durch erfolgreiche Gegenangriffe unserer Truppen weiter eingeengt. Zwischen Maastricht und Aachen setzten die Nordamerikaner ihren von’ starken Panzerkräften unterstützten Großangriff fort; Maastricht ging verloren. Südlich und südöstlich Aachen gelangen dem Gegner Einbrüche in Vorfeldstellungen der Westbefestigungen. Die schweren Kämpfe, bei denen am gestrigen Tage 40 feindliche Panzer abgeschossen wurden, dauern mit unverminderter Heftigkeit an. Auch im Raum von Nancy und vor der Burgundischen Pforte wird weiterhin erbittert gekämpft.
Von den befestigten Häfen und Stützpunkten an der Kanal- und Atlantikküste werden auch gestern schwere, aber erfolgreiche Abwehrkämpfe gemeldet. Vor dem brennenden Brest, vor Boulogne und am Kap Gris Nez erlitten die Angreifer besonders hohe Verluste.
Seit mehreren Tagen liegen die Hafenstädte an der englischen Südostküste im schweren Feuer deutscher Fernkampfbatterien.
Sicherungsfahrzeuge eines deutschen Geleits versenkten nördlich der westfriesischen Insel Texel ein britisches Schnellboot.
In Italien setzte der Gegner im Adria-Abschnitt seine Versuche fort, unsere Stellungen am Apennin noch vor Eintritt der Schlechtwetterperiode zu durchbrechen. Unter rücksichtslosem Einsatz von starken Infanterie- und Panzerkräften rannte er bis in die späten Abendstunden gegen unsere Abwehrfront an. Im Verlauf der harten Kämpfe konnte der Gegner bis auf einen Einbruch bei Coriano nur geringen Geländegewinn erzielen. Auch nördlich Florenz scheiterten alle von starker Artillerie unterstützten Angriffe, örtliche Einbrüche wurden in sofortigem Gegenstoß bereinigt.
Im südlichen Siebenbürgen und im Nordteil des Szekler Zipfels wurden zahlreiche sowjetische Angriffe zerschlagen.
Bei Sanok und Krosno scheiterten erneute Anstrengungen der Bolschewisten, unsere Front zu durchbrechen. Eine Einbruchslücke wurde im Gegenangriff geschlossen.
An der Weichsel nördlich Sandomierz beseitigten Grenadiere und Pioniere, unterstützt von Heeressturmartillerie und Werfern, in mehrtägigen harten Angriffskämpfen einen feindlichen Brückenkopf und vernichteten die Masse von zwei verstärkten sowjetischen Schützendivisionen. Zahlreiche Gefangene wurden eingebracht und 161 Geschütze sowie zahlreiche sonstige Waffen erbeutet.
Im Kampfraum von Warschau ging Praga nach harten Häuserkämpfen verloren. Nordöstlich der Stadt wurden heftige feindliche Angriffe abgewiesen. Nordwestlich Lomscha setzten sich unsere Truppen nach schweren Kämpfen auf das Nordufer des Narew ab.
Im Nordabschnitt der Ostfront traten die Bolschewisten mit über 40 Schützendivisionen und zahlreichen Panzer- und Schlachtfliegerverbänden auf breiter Front zum erwarteten Großangriff an. Trotz des überlegenen feindlichen Einsatzes an Menschen und Material vereitelten unsere Truppen in harten Kämpfen, von der Luftwaffe hervorragend unterstützt, alle Durchbruchsversuche der Sowjets. Einbrüche wurden in sofortigen Gegenangriffen aufgefangen und abgeriegelt.
Deutsche Kampf- und Schlachtfliegerkräfte bekämpften bei Tag und Nacht mit gutem Erfolg sowjetische Marschkolonnen und Verkehrsziele an der Ostfront. Sie zerstörten vor allem im Kampfgebiet der. Karpaten und bei Modohn zahlreiche Panzer und Geschütze und über 100 motorisierte Fahrzeuge des Feindes. In heftigen Luftkämpfen und durch Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe wurden am gestrigen Tag 99 sowjetische Flugzeuge abgeschossen.
An der Kandalakschafront wehrten unsere Nachtruppen auch gestern wieder mehrere sowjetische Angriffe ab.
Bei dem Einsatz mit Kampfmitteln der Kriegsmarine hat sich der Leutnant der Marineverwaltung Vetter als Führer einer Sprengbootgruppe besonders ausgezeichnet.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 15, 1944)
Communiqué No. 160
Allied troops in northeastern BELGIUM have reached the line of the LEOPOLD Canal north of MALDEGEM. Mopping-up continues in the area south of our bridgehead over the ESCAUT Canal.
Further south, Allied troops have taken several small towns inside GERMANY and are meeting increasing resistance from prepared enemy positions.
South of AACHEN, enemy resistance is strong. East of ST. VITH, we have pierced an outer section of the SIEGFRIED defenses on a six-mile front. Other units encountered extensive roadblocks and pillboxes but progress was maintained.
In the MOSELLE valley, strong enemy counterattacks against our bridgeheads were contained. Further advances have been made in the area south of NANCY, where Germans are putting up a stubborn defense with heavy mortar, small arms, machine gun and sporadic artillery fire.
The enemy garrison at BREST has rejected demands for surrender and fighting continues in the city where fires are burning and loud explosions have been heard. Enemy guns in the area were attacked yesterday by fighter-bombers. Scattered enemy fire was also encountered on the CROZON Peninsula, south of BREST, where strong points were attacked by medium and light bombers.
Fighters and fighter-bombers provided support for ground forces and attacked transportation in HOLLAND.
Strongpoints near BOULOGNE were targets for medium and light bombers.
U.S. Navy Department (September 15, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 117
U.S. Army and Marine assault troops established beachheads in the Palau Islands on September 14 (West Longitude Date) with the support of carrier aircraft and surface combat ships of the Third Fleet under the command of Adm. Halsey. Enemy defenses are being heavily bombed and shelled at close range.
Amphibious operations against the Palau Islands are being directed by VAdm. T. S. Wilkinson, USN, Commander Third Amphibious Force.
Expeditionary troops are commanded by Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith. USMC.
The landings are continuing against stiff ground opposition.
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 118
U.S. Marines are developing a beachhead in the southern portion of Peleliu Island in the Palau Islands, and are closing in upon the principal airport in the island group. The beachhead extends for approximately one and a half miles along the southwestern shore of Peleliu. Several enemy counterattacks, employing tanks, were thrown back during September 14 (West Longitude Date) by our ground forces assisted by strong air support and naval gunfire. Our casualties during the first day of the assault were light, although the landing beaches have been under sporadic mortar and artillery fire.
The landings on Peleliu Island were supported by carrier‑based aircraft which bombed, strafed, and launched rockets against enemy installations immediately behind the landing beaches on September 14. Gun emplacements and other defense installations on the northern end of the island were also heavily bombed. We lost one plane and four flight personnel in these attacks.
The fast carrier task force covering and supporting the landings by far ranging operations throughout the Western Pacific are commanded by VAdm. Marc A. Mitscher, USN.
The amphibious assault troops engaged are under the command of Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, USMC, Commander, Third Amphibious Corps.
The initial landings were made by the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus, USMC The ships in direct support are commanded by RAdm. George H. Fort, USN.
Ventura search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four bombed Shumushu Island on September 12, setting buildings afire. Anti-aircraft fire was ineffective. Seven enemy fighters rose to intercept our force but did not press home the attack. During the night of September 13‑14, 11th Army Air Force Liberators bombed installations at Paramushiru. All returned undamaged to their base.
Three Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force bombed Iwo Jima on September 13, dropping 52 tons of bombs on the airfield and adjacent installations. Large explosions visible for many miles were observed. Enemy aircraft made no attempt at interception. All planes returned safely.
Pagan Island installations were bombed by Thunderbolts of the 7th Army Air Force on September 13. Moderate anti-aircraft fire was encountered. On the same day, fighter planes of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing hit gun positions on Rota, encountering meager anti-aircraft fire.
Corsairs and Dauntless dive bombers of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing made further neutralization raids on the Marshall Island Atolls of Mille, Jaluit, and Wotje on September 12 and 13.
Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force flew through moderate anti-aircraft fire to bomb Marcus Island on September 13.
U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)
King-Cunningham meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Captain Grantham | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Captain Hughes Hallett | |
| Captain Fife | ||
| Captain Stroop |
Minutes
September 15, 1944
Top secret
Naval facilities in Australia and forward areas
Admiral Cunningham asked if the U.S. Navy planned on evacuating their facilities at Brisbane and Sydney. If the United States Navy has moved out, he would like to make arrangements directly with the Australian Government to use evacuated facilities. It was particularly desirable to get repair facilities for fleet units and aviation facilities ashore for a fleet air arm. He pointed out that Australia would be used chiefly as a rear base and that the British Naval units would operate from more advanced bases depending upon the situation.
Admiral King stated that in general the U.S. Navy was moving out of Australia but that no “roll-up” plan had been received either from the Commander of the Seventh Fleet or the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area. Admiral King directed that Commander, Seventh Fleet, be ordered by dispatch to prepare a “roll-up” plan and forward it to the Navy Department. He wished, particularly, to know about the plans to roll up Sydney and Brisbane. Admiral King also said that he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff should inform the Commander, Southwest Pacific Area with regard to the situation and the tentative requirements for basing British Naval units in Australia.
The First Sea Lord requested that the U.S. Navy act as the Royal Navy’s “agent” with the U.S. Army Air Force to have certain aviation facilities no longer required by them made available to the Naval Air Arm of the Royal Navy, where such facilities could be usefully employed.
Admiral King pointed out that Espíritu Santo was highly developed as a U.S. base and was probably the most forward location for the British Fleet to use as a rear base. He outlined the future Pacific plans and said that no other forward base could be made readily available.
The First Sea Lord said he wanted a good rear base (probably Sydney) and that all the British Navy would require in the forward area was a suitable anchorage. The Fleet would exist on their train and supply ships.
Admiral King suggested that Majuro, which had a large anchorage, might also be useful to the British Fleet.
The First Sea Lord asked if any U.S. naval landing craft bases were available in Australia.
Captain Fife pointed out that Milne Bay and Buna Roads had been used as our chief bases for landing craft until after the Manus landing. He stated that Brisbane had also been used as a rear base for landing craft during the early part of the New Guinea campaign.
Admiral King said that steps were being taken to clear a deep draft channel through Torres Strait. A new survey was being made and it was expected that a better and shorter channel which could accommodate a battleship would soon be available.
The First Sea Lord said that he thought the discussion up to this point would serve as a basis for detailed plans to be agreed upon by the Washington Planners.
Use of Avenger aircraft on British carriers
The First Sea Lord stated that the British Navy had found the Barracuda inadequate for carrier operations and that it was highly desirable to have additional Avengers allocated for use on British carriers.
Admiral King said that the production of Avengers was short of requirements and would continue to be so, that the details of the allocation of U.S. Navy-produced aircraft were arranged by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), and that he, Admiral King, would make sure that the question of additional Avengers for the British Navy would be taken under the most careful consideration, particularly, in view of the British Fleet participation in Pacific operations. He was not, however, optimistic with regard to availability of additional Avengers for at least another six months.
Release of LSTs from “OVERLORD”
The First Sea Lord said that they were having difficulty getting SHAEF to release landing craft for transfer to other theaters and it was desirable to have some released soon for use in the Burma operations.
Admiral King said that this was a matter he wanted settled too, and directed that the situation be followed up with regard to release of landing craft and that Admiral Stark should be informed of the requirements of other theaters so that he can obtain releases as quickly as feasible.
Admiral Cooke said that he believed SHAEF had a certain amount of “velvet” and suggested that it would be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to put pressure upon SHAEF to get landing craft released.
Admiral King suggested that Admiral Ramsay might also be responsible for holding landing craft in OVERLORD, but The First Sea Lord did not concur in this.
Admiral King and The First Sea Lord then directed the Combined Planning Staff to prepare a draft dispatch for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF on release of landing craft for transfer to other theaters.
Captain Hughes Hallett pointed out that landing craft were originally made available in the theater for combatant operations only and were not to be kept as a convenience for incidental shipment of supplies after the assault and combatant phases were over.
Escort carriers
The First Sea Lord said that the British Navy had received the U.S. Navy’s request for transfer of excess escort carriers for use in connection with ferrying aircraft. He said that all of the British escort carriers would be in use constantly until at least the summer of 1945.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Navy would be glad to get CVEs whenever they could get them.
The First Sea Lord said that he would definitely try to get some released but held out small hopes. However, he would make a particular note of this point.
Mosquito aircraft on carriers – highball
This matter was discussed previously by The First Sea Lord and Admiral King. Motion pictures of this are to be sent from London to be available to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
Bonaventure and “X” Craft
The First Sea Lord described in general the use of Bonaventure and “X” Craft. He said that they were available and had been offered for use in the Pacific Theater if it was thought they could be used.
Admiral King said that he thought Bonaventure and the “X” Craft might be of some use and suggested that they be moved to the Pacific Theater with the balanced British Fleet.
The First Sea Lord said that Bonaventure and the “X” Craft would be moved out to the Eastern Fleet, probably to an Australian port first, where they would await an opportunity to be used from a forward base.
Zones of occupation
It was pointed out that this matter required settlement on a higher level and it was probable that a decision might be reached soon.
The First Sea Lord said he had taken exception to the scheme which proposed a German Disarmament Commission which consisted of three generals. He said he believed there should be a committee of nine: 3 generals, 3 admirals, and 3 air officers, each responsible in his own zone for disarmament but who would act as a central committee to decide general questions.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Navy would take over such ports as they were using, providing a Port Director and staff. However, he did not want any elaborate organization set up.
With regard to minesweeping, The First Sea Lord said that he expected the Germans would be required to sweep their own mines. He considered this a part of the disarmament of Germany.
Both Admiral King and The First Sea Lord agreed that further investigation is needed of the desirability of having separate organizations for naval disarmament and control of bases and ports but that this may be a logical solution. Both agreed that if the British are to control northwest Germany, the British will invite the U.S. Navy to participate in naval disarmament in this zone.
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 15, 1944, 10 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 174th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend an alteration to the conclusion of Item 5 of the minutes. It was suggested that this should read:
Agreed to recommend that for planning production and for allocation of manpower the date for the end of the war against Japan…
Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.
Continuing, Admiral Leahy said there was one other alteration which should be made in the final sentence to General Arnold’s statement in Item 6. The number of B-29s which had been diverted to tankers should read 20 and not 40.
Sir Charles Portal said that on page 7 of the minutes his statement, as to the date on which the ground echelons for the aircraft from Europe for use in the war against Japan would have to be taken out, should read “by” December and not “in” December.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to amend the conclusion to Item 5 of CCS 174th Meeting to read as follows:
Agreed to recommend that the date for the end of the war against Japan, for planning production and for allocation of manpower should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
b. Approved the conclusions of the 174th Meeting as amended above. The detailed record of the meeting was approved subject to the amendments agreed during discussion and to later minor amendments.
Final report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed and accepted certain amendments to the report.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as amended in discussion (Subsequently circulated as CCS 680/1).
Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” (CCS 681; 681/1)
Admiral Leahy suggested the insertion in the draft letter to Marshal Stalin in CCS 681 of a final paragraph (paragraph 6) to read: “Plans for the prompt transfer of power to the Pacific Theater after the collapse of Germany were agreed upon.”
Sir Alan Brooke accepted this amendment.
With reference to the two draft messages to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in CCS 681/1, Sir Alan Brooke said that on balance he preferred the shorter draft in Enclosure “B.”
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had certain deletions to suggest to the longer draft in Enclosure “A” which he would like to put forward.
Admiral Leahy read out these suggestions.
Sir Alan Brooke said that these amendments were acceptable.
Continuing, Admiral Leahy proposed that a new sentence should be added to the draft in Enclosure “A” to read as follows: “We have agreed on future operations to intensify the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific Theater, including the opening of a seaway into China.”
Sir Alan Brooke said that this amendment was acceptable.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Subject to the amendments agreed in discussion, approved draft messages to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek reporting the results of the OCTAGON Conference. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 681/2.)
Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe (CCS 679)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in CCS 679 was acceptable. He would like the words “the combined shipping authorities” inserted after the words “Combined Military Transportation Committee” in paragraph 3.
Admiral Leahy accepted this amendment.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 679 subject to insertion in the third line of paragraph 3 of the words “combined shipping authorities” after the word “Committee.”
Combined personnel movement problem arising the first year after the defeat of Germany (CCS 675/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by Lord Leathers and General Somervell indicating the magnitude of the combined shipping movements which might be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany.
Sir Alan Brooke said that Lord Leathers had explained to him that the paper was designed merely to show the magnitude of the problem rather than to give entirely accurate figures.
General Somervell confirmed that this was the case.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of CCS 675/2.
Operation “HIGHBALL” (CCS 682)
Sir Charles Portal and Sir Andrew Cunningham gave a description of Operation HIGHBALL. They undertook to send the United States a film on this operation.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note:
a. That Operation HIGHBALL would be available in the Eastern Theater at the end of November 1944.
b. That the British Chiefs of Staff would send an informational film and technical data to the United States Chiefs of Staff.
Release to the press of information on “MULBERRY” (Scaf 79)
Sir Alan Brooke said that it had been suggested that information with regard to MULBERRY should be released to the press. General Eisenhower was not, however, prepared to make such a release unless he was instructed to do so by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral King said that base facilities in the Pacific were limited and it might well be that MULBERRY would be required in that theater, in which case it would be obviously disadvantageous if the Japanese were informed as to their potentialities.
Sir Andrew Cunningham agreed with Admiral King that if there was any chance of using them in the Pacific it was far wiser to release nothing to the press on MULBERRY for the present.
Sir Alan Brooke said that in view of the potentialities of MULBERRY for the war against Japan he agreed that security on these should be retained.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that security implications affecting other theaters precluded the release of information on MULBERRY.
Possible statement to be made to the press by the President and Prime Minister
General Marshall suggested that there might be advantages in a statement being made, possibly by the President and Prime Minister, to the effect that the only difficulty encountered at the Conference was the problem of providing employment for all the Allied forces who were eager to participate in the war against Japan. The difficulty had arisen as a result of the keenness of the competition to employ the maximum possible forces for the defeat of Japan. This was a fact and issued to the press should help to undermine Japanese morale.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that General Ismay would prepare a suitable statement for consideration.
Progress of the campaign in the Pacific
Admiral King outlined the extremely successful operations recently undertaken by Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 38 and the Fifth Air Force against the Japanese in the Leyte area, where some 500 Japanese aircraft had been destroyed. In view of the success of these operations it had been decided, after consultation with Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, to advance the date of subsequently planned operations by about two months.
General Marshall said that he felt that the success of recent operations, particularly against the Japanese air, and the decision to advance the dates for future operations would have a decisive effect on what the Japanese could do in Burma.
General Arnold pointed out that the Japanese Air Force was no longer fighting with the will to win. The pilots lacked determination and even in the Philippines it seemed that the Japanese Air Force had neither the will nor the wherewithal to act offensively.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of Admiral King’s remarks on the progress of the campaign in the Pacific.
Hour of next meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed tentatively to meet at 1000 on Saturday, 16 September.
Memorandum by the British CS
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 684
“RANKIN” planning in the Mediterranean Theater
We have noted the request from General Wilson in his telegram (Medcos 181) for a firm directive on his responsibilities for RANKIN in the Mediterranean.
We ask that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree to the immediate dispatch of the enclosed message to General Wilson.
Enclosure
CCS to SACMED
Top secret
Following for General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff.
Reference Medcos 153 and 181.
Your planning for RANKIN in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations should proceed on the following basis.
Areas of occupation
You should plan to seize immediate control of countries in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations as follows:
a) Austria with four divisions and small tactical air force. Instructions have already been issued in Fan 410 and Fan 411.
b) Greece with approximately a division of British troops and small air forces. Instructions have already been issued in Fan 409.
c) The Dodecanese with approximately 2,400 men.
d) Venezia Giulia with approximately one division.
It is not intended that you should station forces in Yugoslavia or Albania beyond guards which may be required in connection with distribution of supplies. No immediate action by you will be required in Hungary or Romania.
It is not the present intention to send any British troops to Bulgaria.
It is intended in due course to offer British naval assistance in the administration of the Danube and in particular in the clearance of mines. On no account however will any British naval forces enter the Danube except after prior agreement with the Russians.
Availability of forces
In estimating what forces are available for the above operations, you should bear the following considerations in mind:
a) As stated in Cosmed 127, United States forces will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.
b) It will probably be the policy to withdraw Dominion forces as early as possible after the defeat of Germany for repatriation at an early date. Pending repatriation they should not be employed on occupational duties in Austria, Greece or Dodecanese or for internal security duties in Middle East until after discussion with Dominion Governments, which is being initiated forthwith.
c) The four British Indian divisions in your command will be withdrawn as early as possible and should not be used for RANKIN operations.
d) French and Italian divisions will not be used.
e) The internal security commitment in the Middle East after the defeat of Germany will require three divisions from forces at present in the Mediterranean and Middle East.
After making allowance for the above considerations, we calculate that you should have sufficient forces to meet the commitments in paragraph 2 above and still retain a small reserve for contingencies.
All the above applies to RANKIN only, i.e., the immediate seizure of control in enemy and enemy occupied territories. Direction upon the final occupation of Europe after the establishment of control will be issued later.
The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to the Commanding General, Strategic Air Forces in Europe
Moscow, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Priority
MX 20970. To USSTAF for General Spaatz information copies to AGWar for General Arnold and Escom for General Walsh from Deane. Copy sent direct to Walsh.
Soviet Government informed British Government that they were prepared to cooperate with British and Americans in organizing aid to Warsaw provided this aid is rendered in accordance with a prearranged plan.
General Marshall has directed me and the President has directed Mr. Harriman to assist in working out a plan with the Russians and British. Burrows and I informed the Red Army General Staff that we wish to meet with them at once to work out a plan in which all three countries participate. So far there has been no Soviet reply. With the Red Army in Praga, the battle for Warsaw is reaching its critical and conclusive stages. In all probability American participation in relief of Polish insurgents will be limited to Frantic 7; however, both the Ambassador and I feel that it would be a great mistake to start reduction of Escom bases until the Warsaw situation has been clarified. It may develop that an additional American dropping mission will be a critical necessity and if so the facilities in Russia should remain available. The Ambassador feels that politically we would be in a most disadvantageous position if we had made additional missions impossible before the battle for Warsaw is decided or if we even gave the Russians the impression that we had abandoned the insurgents in Warsaw by initiating preparations to reduce Escom such as ordering trains.
In view of the above recommend that no firm date be set at this time for Escom reduction.
Prime Minister Churchill’s Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff
Quebec, 15 September, 1944
Admiral Leahy, I send you herewith a draft which I suggest we might send to the President and Prime Minister on the idea that General Marshall put forward at the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting this morning.
Will you let me know if you approve and I will send a copy to the Prime Minister at once: but naturally I should be grateful for any amendments or improvements that you think necessary.
H. L. ISMAY
[Enclosure]
Draft minute to the President and Prime Minister
Quebec, 15.9.44
The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to place on record that the main difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for the deployment against Japan of the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy. In colloquial language, it was a case of “standing room only,” even before the curtain rang up on the Conference.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have not included any recommendation on this subject in their Final Report, but they submit that it would have an excellent effect on world opinion in general, and a correspondingly depressing effect on Japan, if the above ideas, clothed in your own language, were included in a communiqué about the Conference (if one is issued), and, also, at the Press Conference which will be held on its conclusion.
Memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Service Forces and the British Minister of War Transport
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 675/2
Memorandum by the U.S. transportation, British movement, and combined shipping authorities
The attached Appendix “A” indicates the magnitude of the combined personnel movements which may be required during the first year after the defeat of Germany (assumed at 1 Oct. 1944) on the basis of tentative redeployment plans.
The attached Appendix “B” indicates the probable combined resources estimated to be available during the period under consideration.
Owing to changes in plans under way and in prospect a precise analysis of this problem cannot be made until the entire matter has been studied by combined agencies based on decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on strategy and priorities.
It is therefore recommended that the Combined Administrative Committee, in collaboration with the Combined Staff Planners, the Combined Military Transportation Committee, and the combined shipping authorities, study and report on this problem in the light of decisions to be made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Appendix “A”
Analysis of the combined personnel movement problem
Subsequent to a 1 October defeat of Germany and for 1 year thereafter
| British | U.S. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Operational Requirements | ||
| a. Replacements (reinforcements) for forces already engaged in the war against Japan on 1 October. | — | 693,000 | |
| b. Buildup from U.S. for war against Japan. | — | 826,000 | |
| c. Redeployment for war against Japan. | 1,052,000 | 804,000 | |
| d. Additional replacements (reinforcements) to support increased strength due to b and/or c. | 385,000 | 213,000 | |
| e. Replacements or readjustments in garrisons, of non-operational areas. | 265,000 | 10,000 | |
| f. Rotational programs for forces engaged in the war against Japan. | 150,000 | 280,000 | |
| g. Intra-Area movement accomplished by retained ships. | 250,000 | 768,000 | |
| Subtotal | 2,102,000 | 3,594,000 | |
| 2. | Demobilization and Repatriation Without Replacement | ||
| a. British and U.S. Forces. | 678,000 | 1,720,000 | |
| b. Dominion, Colonial and other personnel. | 251,000 | 28,000 | |
| Subtotal | 929,000 | 1,748,000 | |
| 3. | Prisoners of War | ||
| a. Allied prisoners of war. | 53,000 | 102,000 | |
| b. Enemy prisoners of war. | 466,000 | 243,000 | |
| Subtotal | 519,000 | 345,000 | |
| 4. | TOTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SERVICES | 3,550,000 | 5,687,000 |
Appendix “B”
Total availability of personnel shipping by categories (as of 1 Oct 1944)
| British | U.S. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Categories | No. of Ships | Capacity | No. of Ships | Capacity |
| 1. Ocean Going | 84 | 302,000 | 220 | 492,000 |
| 2. Limited Capability | ||||
| (a) Indian Ocean type | 31 | 48,000 | — | — |
| (b) Miscellaneous | 6 | 6,000 | 45 | 35,000 |
| Subtotal | 37 | 54,000 | 45 | 35,000 |
| TOTAL TROOPSHIP LIFT | 121 | 356,000 | 265 | 527,000 |
| NOTES: | British | U.S. | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Estimated lift on 1 October 1945, after allowing for additions and losses based on current CCS rates | 376,000 | 708,000 | |||
| 2. Additional trooplift may be realized by use of cargo ships temporarily fitted to carry a few hundred troops each. | |||||
| 3. An indeterminable lift may be obtained from captured enemy vessels. | |||||
| 4. Lift of LSIs and APAs is not included in above inventories but advantage will be taken of their lift whenever operational schedules permit. | |||||
| 5. Lift in U.S. Navy vessels as estimated and included in the above table for normal troop movement is subject to wide variation dependent upon possible utilization of Navy troopships for operational requirements. | |||||
| 6. No British cross-Channel type of shipping is included nor has any allowance been made for possible conversions for the naval fleet train or hospital ships. |
Note by the Secretaries of CCS
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 681/1 (OCTAGON)
Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of “OCTAGON”
The two enclosed draft messages, differing in the degree of detail included, are circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat
Enclosure “A”
Top secret
Draft message from the President and the Prime Minister to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.
Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.
-
First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.
-
Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in North Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. The detailed operations will involve overland and airborne advances by the British from Imphal to seize Kalewa, thence the Yeu-Monywa area with exploitation toward Mandalay. At the same time, the Chinese, British and American forces now in the Myitkyina area will push on to Indaw-Katha-Bhamo, thence toward Mongmit-Mogok. Concurrently, your Chinese armies now engaged west of the Salween should drive vigorously toward Hsenwi and Lashio. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.
-
Third: Without prejudice to the North Burma operations to protect the air ferry line and establish overland communications, Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to continue planning and preparations for a large scale amphibious and airborne operation in South Burma to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.
Enclosure “B”
Draft message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang
September 1944
Top secret
From Naval Aide to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by Aettsna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.
Top Secret and Personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded a short conference at Quebec and hasten to inform you of the broad conclusions we have reached.
We have agreed that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment, and that to achieve this ultimately we may well have to invade Japan itself.
We have agreed that in the west our object should be the recapture of Burma at the earliest date. We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of operations in Upper Burma in order to secure the air supply route, including the air staging posts at Myitkyina, and to open overland communications with you. It is therefore intended to pursue with the utmost vigor the present operations in Upper Burma. Reinforcements, including airborne forces, are being dispatched.
In addition, we are planning a major amphibious operation to take place in the Bay of Bengal next year. The date when it can be carried out will depend on the time when we find it possible to release the necessary resources from the European Theater.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 682
Operation “HIGHBALL”
The American Chiefs of Staff are asked to take note that Operation HIGHBALL will be available in the Eastern Theatre at the end of November 1944.
Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 11:00 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell | |
| Mr. White |
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant
[Undated]
Cherwell had a draft of a memorandum summarizing a conversation of the previous day with Churchill and the President on the subject of a policy toward Germany. This was the memorandum which they were to give to Churchill. The Secretary felt that the memorandum went too far in the wrong direction. He said he thought it represented “two steps backwards.” The Secretary said they ought to begin where Churchill left off and go forward. In the first conversation Churchill had been shocked by the proposal but on the following day he seemed to accept the program designed to weaken German economy. The memorandum ought to take that for granted. Churchill had already spoken of diverting Germany to an agricultural state as she was in the last quarter of the 19th century. The Secretary thought that rather than present too inadequate a memorandum they ought to go back that afternoon and raise the question again with Churchill and the President and write the memorandum on the conversation that will have taken place that afternoon rather than on the previous day.
The Secretary then spoke to Cherwell about Brand. He told him that he hadn’t wanted him to come to Washington to represent the British Treasury in the first place but that when he did come he gave him a chance, and that he was not helping England by his behavior. The Secretary mentioned Playfair and White suggested Opie or Keynes as possible Treasury representatives.
H. D. WHITE
The Under Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret
Supplementing yesterday’s wire on voting procedure, it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution. You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.
C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.Decisions with, respect to the following matters should be taken by blank majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council:
a. All decisions coming under section VIII-B, entitled “Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto,” and under Section VIII-C, entitled “Regional Arrangements.”
b. All matters relating to [disarmament] and regulation of armaments.
c. Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.
d. Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.
Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” should be taken by blank majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of such member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.
All other decisions should be taken by blank majority vote.
The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.
In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.
Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?
ES
Under Secretary of State
Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau |
Morgenthau had a few minutes of private conversation with Roosevelt, immediately before the latter’s meeting with Churchill, on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany.
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Lord Cherwell | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
From the Morgenthau Diary:
I met at 12:00 today with Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We took up the question of the Lend-Lease Agreement for Phase II. The President read the thing through very carefully, and the only suggestion he made was that where it read, “Naturally no articles obtained on Lend-Lease or identical thereto would be exported,” he included the words, “or sold.” Lord Cherwell said that they do sell all of their Lend-Lease; that is, all of the nonmilitary Lend-Lease, and the President then added the words also “for profit.”
Churchill was quite emotional about this agreement, and at one time he had tears in his eyes. When the thing was finally signed, he told the President how grateful he was, thanked him most effusively, and said that this was something they were doing for both countries.
Then Churchill, turning to Lord Cherwell and myself, said, “Where are the minutes on this matter of the Ruhr?” and according to our agreement we said that we didn’t have them. The reason we didn’t have them was because I felt, when I read the minutes which Lord Cherwell had written, that it presented much too weak a case, and I thought that we could get Churchill to go much further. He seemed quite put out that we didn’t have the minutes of the previous meeting, and the President said that the reason we didn’t have them was because Henry interspersed the previous discussion with too many dirty stories, and that sort of broke the ice. So Churchill broke in and said, “Well, I’ll restate it,” which he did, and he did it very forcefully and very clearly. Then he suggested that Lord Cherwell and I withdraw and try to do a job on dictating it, which we did. It only took us a few minutes, and we came back up to the room where they were meeting and just calmly walked in. When Churchill read our very short memorandum, he said, “No, this isn’t what I want.” Then he started to talk and dictate to us, and I said, “I don’t know what the rules of the game are, but is there any reason why we can’t have a stenographer present? Then you could dictate directly to her.” He said, “By all means,” and Cherwell went out and got Churchill’s secretary, and she came in and he began to dictate. He dictated the memorandum, which finally stood just the way he dictated it. He dictates extremely well because he is accustomed to doing it when he is writing his books.
While Churchill was dictating, he used the memorandum which I had dictated as a sort of a text.
Roosevelt’s important contribution, while Churchill was dictating, was that when he got talking about the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries, Roosevelt had him insert the very important words “in Germany.” What Roosevelt meant was – because it came up later – that he didn’t have in mind just the Ruhr and the Saar, but he had in mind entire Germany, and that the matter we were talking about, namely, the ease with which metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war, does not only apply to the Ruhr and the Saar, but the whole of Germany, which of course is terribly important.
When Churchill got through, Eden seemed quite shocked at what he heard, and he turned to Churchill and said, “You can’t do this. After all, you and I publicly have said quite the opposite. Furthermore, we have a lot of things in the work[s] in London which are quite different.” Then Churchill and Eden seemed to have quite a bit of argument about it. Roosevelt took no part in it, and I took a small part and kept throwing things in. Churchill’s main argument was what this meant in the way of trade; they would get the export trade of Germany. So Eden said, “How do you know what it is or where it is?” and Churchill answered him quite testily, “Well, we will get it where-ever it is.” I was quite amazed and shocked at Eden’s attitude; in fact, it was so different from the way he talked when we were in London. Finally Churchill said, “Now I hope, Anthony, you’re not going to do anything about this with the War Cabinet if you see a chance to present it.” Then he said this, “After all, the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose between my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people.” Churchill got quite nasty with Eden, and I understand from the President that all the rest of the day Eden was not at all helpful. The President was quite disappointed.
Eden describes his participation in the meeting as follows:
… On the morning of September 15th, I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the [Morgenthau] plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. It was as if one were to take the Black Country and turn it into Devonshire. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.
I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull’s opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had approved, not I am sure on his account, but on the President’s.
According to Cadogan, Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the question of voting in the Security Council of the proposed world organization at midday on September 15 and again in the middle of the afternoon. Stettinius’ memorandum of his conversation with Cadogan on September 16 records:
… He said that while Eden understood these matters clearly, Churchill had not yet studied them and [he] feared that neither Churchill nor the President had a complete understanding of what was involved. I inquired if he knew whether the President had had my message before him when this was discussed, and he said that the President had had no papers before him and did not refer to any. He said the question had come up at midday yesterday and had been discussed again in the middle of the afternoon. He did not indicate which person had taken the initiative. He indicated that the President had not been definite in his views on the matter one way or the other.…
Roosevelt, however, sent a message to Stettinius stating that neither Churchill nor he was inclined to approve the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had transmitted to Quebec.
Roosevelt and Churchill initialed two separate papers on lend-lease: (1) the summary of their discussion on September 14, and (2) a shorter paper on the establishment of a committee to deal with lend-lease questions.
Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, September 15, 1944
At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.
The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should, be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.
This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.
The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.
OK
F D R
W S C
15.9
Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, 15 September, 1944
The President and Prime Minister have agreed to put to Marshal Stalin Lord Simon’s proposals for dealing with the major war criminals, and to concert with him a list of names.
OK
F D R
Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, September 14, 1944
We have discussed the question of the scope and scale of mutual Lend/Lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan. We have agreed that a Joint Committee shall be set up to consider this question with the following membership:
Chairman: [blank]
| American Members: | British Members: |
|---|---|
| Secretary Morgenthau | [blank] |
| Under-Secretary Stettinius | |
| Mr. Leo Crowley |
The Committee will agree and recommend to the Heads of their respective Governments the amount of Mutual Aid in munitions, non-munitions and services which is to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war. The Committee is instructed to obtain from the various branches of the Governments whatever pertinent information is necessary for the preparation of their recommendations.
Pending the recommendations of the Committee to the Heads of the respective Governments, the appropriate departments of each Government shall be instructed not to make any major decision with respect to the programmes of Lend/Lease Aid for the period referred to above without the approval of the Committee.
In reaching its conclusions the Committee will be guided by the conversation between the President and Prime Minister on September 14, 1944.
OK
F D R
W S C
15.9