Which was a bit hehind time because the provisional goverment was:
1 Like
The Pittsburgh Press (September 15, 1944)
Are they going someplace else?
Roosevelt-Churchill war talks in Québec are in closing stages
Spokesman indicates parley may continue elsewhere; Eden joins discussions
Québec, Canada (UP) –
Official spokesmen of the Roosevelt-Churchill war talks said today the conference here has moved into its closing stages, but indicated the President and the Prime Minister might continue their discussions elsewhere.
White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early said the President and the Prime Minister will finish their work by noon tomorrow, then added this would “conclude their conferences in Québec.”
Reports leaped at this indication of another meeting as contained in Mr. Early’s emphasis of the words “in Québec.”
“Does this mean,” one reporter asked, “the Prime Minister will go to Washington for further conferences?”
“I can’t answer that,” Mr. Early replied.
Eden joins parley
Robin Cruikshank, British spokesman, was similarly reticent about discussing Mr. Churchill’s plans beyond noon tomorrow.
Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, were at the Citadel today to talk primarily with Mr. Churchill. They were with Mr. Churchill and the President last night until a late hour.
Plans for Germany
Peace terms for Germany obviously were the most pressing problem in which Mr., Eden was involved in talks with Mr. Churchill and the President. But a backlog of other problems was building up.
Mr. Eden was believed to have brought with him a new summary of activities of the European Advisory Commission which is dealing with the detailed planning for post-war Germany.
Following his talks here with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden is expected to hurry back to London with their latest views – and orders.
Command setup set for Pacific
Québec, Canada (UP) –
A new U.S. command setup, dominantly Navy and geared to the Pacific war plans being formulated at the Churchill-Roosevelt conferences here, is expected to be announced soon.
Decisions on the command setup have already been made, White House Secretary Stephen T. Early said, but what the command setup will be has not been revealed. Nor is there any official information as to the British part in it, if any.
More integration seen
Recent developments, together with information from usually reliable sources, permits this picture to be drawn:
The present likelihood is that there will be no super-command of all Allied forces for the whole Pacific and Asiatic theaters. Rather the outlook is for more efficient integration of certain of the present command areas.
Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, one of the President’s advisers here, is expected to relinquish his other post of Chief of Naval Operations and to move to a Pacific base for a more active role as fleet commander. Adm. King had been assigned the dual jobs shortly after the Japs attacked Pearl Harbor. But many functions of the Naval Operations office were subsequently transferred to the jurisdiction of the fleet commander’s organization.
The information here is that the Naval Operations post will be turned over to Adm. Frederick J. Horne, now Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Use of British units seen
Adm. Nimitz, Pacific Fleet commander, may move to an advanced Pacific base, closer to the scene of operations, moving ever nearer the Japanese homeland.
Since the British Navy is expected to take a part in the Pacific campaign, its fleet units may be attached to Adm. Nimitz’s fleet, rather than operate as an independent force.
Some British units have operated with the U.S. Pacific Fleet in the past as integral elements of the American force. But this was done largely for training and indoctrination in U.S. naval tactics adapted to the special needs of the Pacific.
Simms: Polish-Soviet settlement hinted in Eden’s arrival
With impending collapse of Germany, ticklish issue can’t be avoided longer
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
Québec, Canada –
With the arrival here of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, there is talk of a settlement of the ticklish, if not dangerous, quarrel between Poland and Russia.
With the impending collapse of Germany, European boundary problems become acute, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Russia has staked out expansive territorial and political claims. Thus far, Britain and America have shied away from such questions, preferring to cross those bridges as they come.
But the Polish issue can no longer be avoided. She is an ally. If she is to lose half her territory and her political independence to appease an ally, it may knock post-war world collaboration into a cocked hat.
In Washington recently, I learned that the Polish government in London was willing to meet Moscow more than halfway.
Up to the present, Moscow’s attitude toward Warsaw has been frigid.
Russia ever refused aid to Gen. Bor’s Polish Patriots, fighting in Warsaw. The British and Poles had to fly all the way from Britain to drop supplies for Gen. Bor. Russia, with airfields 10 minutes from Warsaw, refused to do anything.
It is a reasonable assumption that Mr. Eden came to give Mr. Churchill and the President a fill-in on important developments since Mr. Churchill’s departure. He may have brought news that the end of the war in Europe is nearer than was thought, and perhaps to urge upon the “Big Two” a new and early meeting of the “Big Three” – a meeting with Marshal Stalin.
Background of news –
Québec now and in 1943
By Bertram Benedict
The first conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Québec was held a little more than a year ago, from Aug. 17 to Aug. 24, 1943. There were rumors that the conference would produce a notable declaration like the Atlantic Charter, which had come out of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the high seas two years before, or like the “unconditional surrender” demand which had come out of the Casablanca Conference in the previous January, but the 1943 Québec Conference produced nothing of the sort.
The joint Roosevelt-Churchill statement issued at the close of the conference said merely that military operations all over the world, including the war against Japan, had been surveyed. Decisions had been made, but could not be disclosed. It had been resolved to hold another Anglo-American conference before the end of the year, “in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia.” Russia would be fully informed of the decisions reached as to the war against Germany and Italy.
The President’s address at Ottawa following the conference was in the nature of a “peptalk,” telling the world that Germany was about to be defeated.
Invitation denied by Moscow
In 1943, as in 1944, Soviet Russia was not represented. President Roosevelt was understood to say that Marshal Stalin had been invited to come. Thereupon Moscow denied flatly that any such invitation had been received.
While the conference met, Soviet publications continued to criticize the United States and Great Britain for not opening a real second front. The magazine War and the Working Class explained that the Québec Conference was all right as an Anglo-American parley, but said that the real need was for a tripartite Soviet-Anglo-American conference soon in Moscow.
The 1943 Québec Conference met amid fears that Russia would insist on playing a lone hand. There were rumors that Germany had offered Moscow a separate peace.
Several weeks before the 1943 Québec Conference met, Mussolini had been deposed in Italy, and Gen. Badoglio had been named Italian Premier. There was confusion as to Gen. de Gaulle’s status. After the conference adjourned, the United States recognized Gen. de Gaulle’s French Committee of National Liberation as the “administrative authority” of the French overseas territories actually under the committee’s control.
Action on war fronts
While the conference was meeting, the conquest of Sicily was completed. American and Canadian forces occupied Kiska, from which the Japanese had departed unscathed. There was hard fighting on New Guinea. In the east, the Russian advance retook Kharkov.
Goebbels told the German people over the radio that a new secret weapon was under construction which would soon give them relief from Allied air raids.
At Québec in 1943, President Roosevelt made public his executive orders allowing the War Manpower Commission to withdraw draft deferment from recalcitrant strikers and allowing union dues to be placed in escrow in any plant taken over by the government.
The War Labor Board took jurisdiction of the wage dispute in the anthracite mines. The Board also ordered Montgomery Ward to enforce a maintenance of union membership clause. Under Secretary of State Welles was said to be on the point of resigning. Mrs. Roosevelt was in New Zealand.
U.S. State Department (September 15, 1944)
Roosevelt conversation with the Archduke Otto of Austria, 5:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Archduke Otto |
Roosevelt had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons the Archdukes Otto and Felix, her lady in waiting, and Miss Tully. The following paper is a translation made in the Department of State of a memorandum prepared by the Archduke Otto regarding his conversation with Roosevelt on this occasion:
Right at the beginning Roosevelt remarked that today they had been working over the maps and had noted (namely, he and Churchill) that Austria and Hungary would of all countries undergo the least territorial changes. The situation was unclear only where Transylvania was concerned because there were differences of opinion between the Russians and the Rumanians in that respect, and “we don’t know much about it.” Immediately following this he remarked “that our main concern is now how to keep the Communist out of Hungary and Austria.” This was extremely important to them, especially Hungary.
The remainder of the conversation was rather disjointed, as is the custom with R., and each problem was touched upon repeatedly. The following is a summary of what was said on the various points:
HUNGARY. This was evidently one of the cardinal issues of the conversation. R. kept coming back to this problem time and again. Apart from the President’s personal sympathy for Hungary, the main reason for this is probably the hope of making Hungary a bulwark against Russia. He stressed that he wished Hungary would make an unconditional surrender only to the Americans and British. If this were done, Hungary could be saved from communism. Hungary would surely receive mild terms. Military operations are now being planned which are designed to make it possible for the Hungarians to establish liaison with the civilized Allies. In the course of the discussion, R. took up the idea of having the Hungarian envoys act as transmitters of his proposal for Hungary. Specific mention was made of Apor, whom he would approach through Myron Taylor. His former sympathy for Horthy had been forfeited through the latter’s weakness and senility. He was very receptive to the idea that we might perhaps be helpful to him with respect to Hungary’s surrender. It was also agreed that I would immediately send him a message for the Hungarian government. He also asked in detail about Béla Kun, concerning whose atrocious deeds he was well informed. Attempts had also been made to prejudice him very strongly against Mihály Károlyi, but obviously he does not know much about him.
RUSSIA. It is evident that the relationship between R. and the Russians is strained. While the President emphasized that he liked Stalin personally – although he said a little later that he was “untrustworthy” and deceitful (my personal impression: the praise of Stalin was merely a gesture to put a little damper on our joy, and so was not genuine) – the President was bitterly critical of the men around Stalin. All the men around Stalin were old Bolsheviks whom one could not trust. There was a general interest in keeping the Russians away as far as possible. R. seems to have been particularly disgusted by Russia’s handling of the Bulgarian question. It is obvious that the Anglo-Saxons were tricked by the Russians. From all of R.’s remarks it is quite evident that he is afraid of the Communists and wants to do everything to contain Russia’s power – naturally short of war.
POLAND. R. is in an ill humor about Poland. Apparently there is a disposition to yield there. Sharp criticism of the Warsaw revolt, which was launched without consulting the Allies.
AUSTRIA. Austria’s independence will be restored and efforts will be made to protect the country from Bolshevism. The question whether Austria would want to form a federation with South Germany was raised at the Conference, but R. said that this should be left to the Austrians themselves. He thought that the Austrians would not care for that. When he asked for my opinion, I said that Austria would primarily wish to associate with the Danube countries, especially Hungary, but if Hungary were to fall into the hands of the Russians, Austria might consider a union with Catholic South Germany on the condition that Vienna would be the capital. German, R. remarked at this point, would be divided into three parts, North, West, and South Germany. R. apparently had no knowledge of the Hull Declaration. He shared our opinion that an uprising would be far too premature at this time. The question of the Austrian underground did not seem to interest him greatly. He seems to think that the underground is so strong that nothing needs to be done for it except supply it with arms at the last moment. South Tyrol was discussed with him. He is sympathetic to our efforts. It is not clear, however, whether anything has been done in this respect. He has reports from Italy about the present Italian government: they are relatively unconcerned about any territorial questions regarding Austria, they are interested in only one thing: they want to keep Trieste. He has proposed, and the proposal seems to have been accepted, that Trieste, Pola, and Fiume become free ports under international guarantee and administration. (The same régime, by the way, is also planned for the German ports.)
VATICAN. Understanding for the power of the Holy See. An interesting item is a report by Myron Taylor that Stalin had offered Rome, as the price of an understanding, to bring about a merger of the Orthodox Church with the Catholic Church.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
YUGOSLAVIA. R. stresses once more, as in previous conversations, that Yugoslavia is in his view an unnatural state. It should be transformed into a federation. Whether that would be done he did not say. Said: Poor Peter is in a very bad shape.
MISCELLANEOUS. Marked sympathy for Leopold of Belgium. – In view of Brazil’s weakness he will propose to the United Nations the establishment of American or United Nations bases in Dakar or the Cape Verde Islands. – Is very angry at Argentina. – Beneš or Czechoslovakia was not mentioned at all. – Made the remark that Stalin had harassed Churchill constantly at Tehran.
Morgenthau-Leahy conversation, about 5:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | ||
| Admiral Leahy | ||
| Miss Tully |
Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:
While I was waiting for the President between five and six, I was sitting there talking with Grace Tully and Admiral Leahy joined us. He said that they had only settled that afternoon what part of Germany the English would go into, and what part the USA should go into. In the morning when I arrived at twelve, the President was sitting alone in his room with three different colored pencils and a map of Europe, and he then and there sketched out where he wanted us to go and where he wanted the English to go, and by that I mean our Armies. He had before him a map of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he said was terrible. According to Admiral Leahy, this afternoon the President showed Churchill his map, and got what he wanted. When I let Leahy read the memorandum on the Ruhr and the Saar, he was very happy because he said that the English were going to occupy the Ruhr and the Saar and they would have to carry this thing out.
The Secretary of the Treasury to the President
Quebec, September 15, 1944
Memorandum for the President
In regard to proposal for Lend Lease to France, my recommendation is that for the time being we postpone taking any action.
H M Jr.
Approved: F D R
Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about 6:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| President Roosevelt | ||
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau |
Morgenthau’s diary entry reads as follows:
…I got in about six o’clock and stayed until after seven-thirty… He was completely relaxed, and the conversation was entirely on the week’s work.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Late in the afternoon in my discussion with the President, to my surprise he told me that Leahy had been favorable to my plan. The President said that he had withheld bringing up this question of where our Armies should go because he wanted to get Churchill in a good humor and he wanted everything else settled.
… I asked him what he meant about the suggestion of having the United Nations meet the end of October, and he said that he felt it had taken much too long to bring up the League of Nations after World War I, and he wanted to do this in October. So I said, “Well, it makes good window dressing for the campaign,” and he said, “Yes.” His idea is to have it about the 27th of October and run through and after election.
During my conversation with the President – I think it was in the morning – I said, “Look, Mr. President, now that we have this Ruhr and Saar stuff straightened out, the thing should be presented to Stalin, and I think if Stalin knew how we felt you would find he would act much better.” The President said, “Well, I will have Harriman come back and explain it to him, and let him go back and sell it to Stalin.” “Listen,” I said, “Harriman can’t do this. You ought to send me.” I said, “I get along very well with the Russians, and you could check with Stalin as to whether I do or whether I don’t.” The President said, “Oh, I have far too important things for you to do around Washington. I can’t spare you for a thing like this.” I said, “Well, it would only be a matter of 10 days.” He thought a minute and said, “Well, it might take two weeks,” and he seemed to like the idea…
The other amazing thing that happened was he turned to me, when Grace Tully brought in a telegram in the afternoon addressed to her asking her to try to find out what happened on the French Lend-Lease, and said, “You let Harry know that we are not going to do it,” …
Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 7:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau | Lord Cherwell |
Morgenthau and Cherwell discussed the words “or sold for profit” which had been inserted in the record of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussion of lend-lease on September 14.
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mrs. Churchill | ||
| Foreign Secretary Eden | ||
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
The Secretary of War to the President
Washington, September 15, 1944
Memorandum for the President
Since the meeting with you on September 9 attended by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hopkins, and myself, I have had an opportunity to read the latest papers submitted to you by the Secretary of the Treasury on the treatment of Germany. There is no need to make any extended or detailed reply to these papers. My views have already been submitted to you in other memoranda. I merely wish to reiterate briefly that I still feel that the course proposed by the Treasury would in the long run certainly defeat what we hope to attain by a complete military victory – this is, the peace of the world, and the assurance of social, economic and political stability in the world.
The point of difference is not one of objective – continued world peace – it is one of means. When we discuss means, the difference is not whether we should be soft or tough on the German people, but rather whether the course proposed will in fact best attain our agreed objective, continued peace.
If I thought that the Treasury proposals would accomplish that objective, I would not persist in my objections. But I cannot believe that they will make for a lasting peace. In spirit and in emphasis they are punitive, not, in my judgment, corrective or constructive. They will tend through bitterness and suffering to breed another war, not to make another war undesired by the Germans nor impossible in fact. It is not within the realm of possibility that a whole nation of seventy million people, who have been outstanding for many years in the arts and the sciences and who through their efficiency and energy have attained one of the highest industrial levels in Europe, can by force be required to abandon all their previous methods of life, be reduced to a peasant level with virtually complete control of industry and science left to other peoples.
The question is not whether we want Germans to suffer for their sins. Many of us would like to see them suffer the tortures they have inflicted on others. The only question is whether over the years a group of seventy million educated, efficient and imaginative people can be kept within bounds on such a low level of subsistence as the Treasury proposals contemplate. I do not believe that is humanly possible. A subordinate question is whether even if you could do this it is good for the rest of the world either economically or spiritually. Sound thinking teaches that prosperity in one part of the world helps to create prosperity in other parts of the world. It also teaches that poverty in one part of the world usually induces poverty in other parts. Enforced poverty is even worse, for it destroys the spirit not only of the victim but debases the victor. It would be just such a crime as the Germans themselves hoped to perpetrate upon their victims – it would be a crime against civilization itself.
This country since its very beginning has maintained the fundamental belief that all men, in the long run, have the right to be free human beings and to live in the pursuit of happiness. Under the Atlantic Charter victors and vanquished alike are entitled to freedom from economic want. But the proposed treatment of Germany would, if successful, deliberately deprive many millions of people of the right to freedom from want and freedom from fear. Other peoples all over the world would suspect the validity of our spiritual tenets and question the long-range effectiveness of our economic and political principles as applied to the vanquished.
The proposals would mean a forcible revolution in all of the basic methods of life of a vast section of the population as well as a disruption of many accustomed geographical associations and communications. Such an operation would naturally and necessarily involve a chaotic upheaval in the people’s lives which would inevitably be productive of the deepest resentment and bitterness towards the authorities which had imposed such revolutionary changes upon them. Physically, considering the fact that their present enlarged population has been developed and supported under an entirely different geography and economy, it would doubtless cause tremendous suffering involving virtual starvation and death for many, and migrations and changes for others. It would be very difficult, if not impossible, for them to understand any purpose or cause for such revolutionary changes other than mere vengeance of their enemies and this alone would strongly tend towards the most bitter reactions.
I am prepared to accede to the argument that even if German resources were wiped off the map, the European economy would somehow readjust itself, perhaps with the help of Great Britain and this country. And the world would go on. The benefit to England by the suppression of German competition is greatly stressed in the Treasury memorandum. But this is an argument addressed to a shortsighted cupidity of the victors and the negation of all that Secretary Hull has been trying to accomplish since 1933. I am aware of England’s need, but I do not and cannot believe that she wishes this kind of remedy. I feel certain that in her own interest she could not afford to follow this path. The total elimination of a competitor (who is always also a potential purchaser) is rarely a satisfactory solution of a commercial problem.
The sum total of the drastic political and economic steps proposed by the Treasury is an open confession of the bankruptcy of hope for a reasonable economic and political settlement of the causes of war.
I plead for no “soft” treatment of Germany. I urge only that we take steps which in the light of history are reasonably adapted to our purpose, namely, the prevention of future wars. The Carthaginian aspect of the proposed plan would, in my judgment, provoke a reaction on the part of the people in this country and in the rest of the world which would operate not only against the measures advocated but in its violence would sweep away the proper and reasonable restrictive measures that we could justifiably impose.
I have already indicated in my memorandum of September 9, 1944, the lines along which I would recommend that we should go pending further light on other questions which can only be obtained after we have acquired greater knowledge of conditions and trends within Germany as well as of the views and intentions of our Allies.
HENRY L STIMSON
Secretary of War
Log of the President’s Visit to Canada
Friday, September 15
At 12:00 o’clock, Noon, the President met in conference with Prime Minister Churchill, Secretary Morgenthau, Lord Cherwell, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan.
At 1:00 p.m., the President lunched at the Citadel together with the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, Mr. Cadogan, Mrs. Churchill and Mr. Law. Prime Minister King dropped in on the group after lunch and joined in conference discussions that lasted until 3:00 p.m.
The President had tea with Empress Zita of Austria, her sons Archduke Otto and Archduke Felix and her Lady in Waiting, Countess Kerssenbrock, and Miss Tully in his quarters at the Citadel at 5:00 p.m.
At 6:00 p.m., Secretary Morgenthau called on the President and was in conference with him until 7:15 p.m.
Dinner at the Citadel was at 8:00 p.m. The President dined with Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Cadogan. After dinner the motion picture Wilson and a Navy film of the recent air fighting at Saipan were shown at the Citadel. Mrs. Churchill attended with the President but Prime Minister Churchill could not attend because of a scheduled British conference. This was a lengthy motion picture program and was not concluded until past midnight. The President retired immediately after the movies.
U.S. State Department (September 16, 1944)
Memorandum approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 320/27
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by [to] the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:
The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz–northern border of Hessen–Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.
American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British controlled area.
Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:15 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Roberts | |
| General Marshall | Brigadier General Bessell | |
| Admiral King | Brigadier General Everest | |
| General Arnold | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Captain Burrough | |
| Lieutenant General Handy | Captain Fife | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Colonel Peck | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Fairchild | Colonel Benner | |
| Major General Kuter | Commander Clark | |
| Major General Wood | Lieutenant Colonel Pasco | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Graves |
Joint Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Admiral Leahy said that a decision had been reached on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany. He presented a memorandum which he had prepared for presentation to the British. He had outlined the British and United States areas and had included remarks on the necessity for access to northwestern sea ports and passage through the British-controlled area.
General Marshall said that, in his opinion, it would be desirable to specify one port that would be controlled by the United States.
Admiral King concurred.
In response to a question by Admiral Leahy as to the sufficiency of a single port, General Marshall replied that one port would be enough provided the United States had complete control of it and the port had sufficient capacity to handle approximately 10,000 tons of supplies daily.
Admiral King suggested that Bremen and vicinity be proposed for United States control.
General Marshall proposed that an additional paragraph be included in the memorandum as follows: “Control of the port of Bremen and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the commander of the American zone.”
Admiral Leahy suggested that in view of General Marshall’s amendment it would be desirable to insert in the next to the last paragraph the words “in addition” after the word “have” in the first line thereof.
General Arnold felt that some reference to the source of the Soviet area boundaries should be included for identification.
Admiral Leahy said that the question of Soviet boundaries had already been settled by agreement, and mention of it would not be appropriate in this paper.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum proposed by Admiral Leahy, as amended during discussion, and agreed to its presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 320/26)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Situation of the Chinese forces in the China-Burma-India Theater
General Marshall read a message from General Stilwell outlining the military situation in the Chinese areas of operation. The situation appeared to be extremely unfavorable and unless the Chinese took immediate remedial steps, there would be reverses of far-reaching proportions.
General Marshall said he had reported the situation to the President. Pie read a message which he had prepared for the President to dispatch to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek outlining the consequences if immediate steps were not taken to rectify the unfavorable military situation, and requested the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the message from the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek proposed by General Marshall.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:00 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Handy | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Fairchild | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Kuter | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 175th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 175th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also approved subject to later minor amendments.
“RANKIN” planning in the Mediterranean Theater (CCS 684)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 684 (The directive to General Wilson was dispatched as Fan 418).
Release of amphibious craft from “OVERLORD” to other theaters (CCS 687)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 687 (The message to SCAEF was dispatched as Facs 81).
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany (CCS 320/26)
Admiral Cunningham suggested that any naval disarmament measures for U.S. controlled ports should be under the U.S. naval member of the Central Control Commission.
Admiral King agreed with this proposal. American control of the port of Bremen would have to include American control of a suitable area for disembarkation and staging.
Admiral Cunningham agreed. He suggested that the American area should also include Bremerhaven, some 40 or 50 miles down the river. Bremerhaven was, he understood, the port where large ships had to berth.
General Somervell said that the U.S. troops would probably also have to be supplied through the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam. It might well be desirable to set up an Inter-Allied Navigation Commission to control the Rhine.
General Marshall suggested that the Combined Administrative Committee might be instructed to work out the logistic details involved in the decision taken with regard to zones and the consequent maintenance of U.S. and British forces in the zones.
Certain minor amendments were then proposed to the statement of policy contained in CCS 320/26. These were accepted.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the proposals in CCS 320/26, subject to the minor amendments agreed in discussion. (The amended paper, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, circulated as CCS 320/27.)
b. Agreed that any naval disarmament measures for Bremen and Bremerhaven would be under the U.S. Naval Commander of the Central Control Commission.
c. Agreed to refer CCS 320/27 to the Combined Administrative Committee for examination of the logistics problems involved.
Situation in China
General Marshall informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram recently received from General Stilwell. The Japanese were advancing on Kweilin, if indeed they had not already captured it and were therefore only 460 miles from Kunming, the China end of the air route. Further, no Chinese replacements were being provided for the Salween forces and the Generalissimo was threatening to withdraw these forces altogether if the Ledo forces did not advance to Bhamo. The Generalissimo had not yet agreed to place all Chinese forces under the direct control of General Stilwell which he had been pressed to do for some two months.
General Marshall then informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram which had been sent to Chiang Kai-shek by the President urging early and vigorous action.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of a telegram read to the meeting by General Marshall, which the President had sent to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, stressing the need for action to remedy the situation in China in general and on the Salween front in particular.
Communiqué for release to the Press
Sir Hastings Ismay suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might wish to propose to the President and Prime Minister a paragraph dealing with the military points of the Conference for incorporation in the final press release. He presented a draft for consideration.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the text of a short note containing suggestions as to the military substance of any communiqué that the President and the Prime Minister might wish to issue to the Press on OCTAGON.
Concluding remarks
Sir Alan Brooke, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, said he would like to express warm appreciation to the United States Chiefs of Staff for their helpful cooperation in reaching agreement on the problems which had been before them.
Admiral Leahy, in expressing thanks to Sir Alan Brooke, said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were most grateful for the helpful attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff in overcoming the minor difficulties which had initially existed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Quebec, September 16, 1944
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 680/2
Report to the President and Prime Minister of the agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs Of Staff at the “OCTAGON” Conference
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at OCTAGON Conference is submitted herewith:
I. Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.
II. Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
III. Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.
d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.
e. Continue the offensive against Germany.
f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
h. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources, to assist other cobelligerents to the extent they are able effectively to employ this assistance against the enemy Powers in the present war.
i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.
j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.
IV. Execution of the overall strategic concept
DEFEAT OF GERMANY
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe
Prior to the launching of OVERLORD an air plan was developed by the Supreme Commander in preparation for and in support of OVERLORD, and in April 1944, control of the air operations out of England of all the air forces involved, including the Strategic Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command, passed to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. We have now decided that the special conditions which made it desirable that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force should control all forces operating out of the United Kingdom no longer carry their original force. We have therefore agreed that the control of the Strategic Bomber Force in Europe shall be exercised by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A directive (CCS 520/6) has accordingly been issued to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe.
Operations in Northwest Europe
The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has reported (Scaf 78) on the course of operations in France and the Low Countries and has given us a review of his future intentions.
The Supreme Commander’s broad intention is to press on with all speed to destroy the German armed forces and occupy the heart of Germany. He considers his best opportunity of defeating the enemy in the West lies in striking at the Ruhr and Saar since he is convinced that the enemy will concentrate the remainder of his available forces in the defense of these essential areas. The Supreme Commander’s first operation will be to break the Siegfried Line and seize crossings over the Rhine. In doing this his main effort will be on the left. He will then prepare logistically and otherwise for a deep thrust into Germany.
We have approved General Eisenhower’s proposals and drawn his attention (Facs 78):
a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern, and,
b. To the necessity for the opening up of the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before bad weather sets in.
Operations in Italy
We have examined a report by General Wilson (Naf 774) on operations within his theater. Insofar as the battle in Italy is concerned, he considers that operations will develop in one of two ways:
a. Either Kesselring’s forces will be routed, in which case it should be possible to undertake a rapid regrouping and a pursuit towards the Ljubljana Gap (and across the Alps through the Brenner Pass) leaving a small force to clear up northwest Italy, or,
b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal; in which event it does not seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during winter would prevent another major offensive until spring of 1945.
We have agreed:
a. That no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known;
b. That the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.
c. To inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 10th October. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander accordingly (Fan 415).
Operations in the Balkans
General Wilson considers that a situation can be anticipated in which the bulk of the German forces south of a line, Trieste-Ljubljana-Zagreb and the Danube, will be immobilized and will so remain until their supplies are exhausted, in which case they would be ready to surrender to us or will be liquidated by Partisans or the Russian forces. We have noted that as long as the battle in Italy continues there will be no forces available in the Mediterranean to employ in the Balkans except:
a. The small force of two British brigades from Egypt which is being held ready to occupy the Athens area and so pave the way for the commencement of relief and establishment of law and order and the Greek Government.
b. The small land forces in the Adriatic which are being actively used primarily for commando type operations.
Command of “DRAGOON” forces
Command of the DRAGOON forces operating from southern France has been transferred as from the 15th September to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (Facs 76).
Adjustments of the ground and air forces on which the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be required are dependent on the development of the campaign in Italy.
Logistic support for the DRAGOON forces will for the present continue to be supplied from the Mediterranean area.
Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort
Some two months ago Marshal Stalin in conversation with the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow suggested that improvement should be made in the system of military coordination between the USSR, U.S. and the United Kingdom.
We have examined the possibility of improving the coordination with the USSR and have instructed the heads of the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow to initiate action at once with the Soviet General Staff with a view to the setting up in Moscow of a Tripartite Military Committee consisting of senior representatives of the Russian General Staff, of the United States Chiefs of Staff and of the British Chiefs of Staff.
We have instructed them to make it clear that this Committee will be purely consultative and advisory, with no power to make decisions without reference to the respective Chiefs of Staff and the Russian General Staff and further, that it must be military in its character and not impinge upon the work at present being done by the European Advisory Commission such as civil affairs, et cetera.
In our instructions we have stressed that to eliminate the delays now existent in dealings between the Russians and the United States and British Military Missions, it is essential that the Russian representative on the Committee should be a senior member of the Russian General Staff. On the United States and British sides, the heads of the present missions would represent the United States and British Chiefs of Staff respectively, each being responsible to his own Chiefs of Staff.
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
Overall objective in the war against Japan
We have agreed that the overall objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.
b. Ultimately invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.
Operations in the Pacific Area
We believe that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible date and to that end our plans should retain flexibility, and provision should be made to take full advantage of possible developments in the strategic situation which may permit taking all manner of short cuts. We propose to exploit to the fullest the Allied superiority of naval and air power and to avoid, wherever possible, commitment to costly land campaigns. Unremitting submarine warfare against the enemy ships will be continued. Very long-range bomber operations against Japan Proper will be continued from China bases and will be instituted from bases being established in the Marianas and from those to be seized in the future. The air forces in China will continue to support operations of the Chinese ground forces and will also provide the maximum practical support for the campaign in the Pacific.
Pursuant to the above, the operations in the Pacific Theater are being conducted to effect the reconquest of the Philippines and the opening of a seaway to China.
We have noted that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, will require the allocation of resources. In planning production these requirements will be borne in mind.
British Empire participation in the Pacific
We have agreed that the British Fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific, with the understanding that this Fleet will be balanced and self-supporting. The method of the employment of the British Fleet in these main operations in the Pacific will be decided from time to time in accordance with the prevailing circumstances.
We have invited the British Chiefs of Staff to put forward, as a basis for planning, an estimate in general terms of the contribution the Royal Air Force will be prepared to make in the main operations against Japan.
Canadian participation is accepted in principle.
Operations in Southeast Asia
We have agreed that our object in Southeast Asia is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date, it being understood that operations to achieve this object must not prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging base at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.
We have approved the following operations:
a. Stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route and the attainment of overland communications with China;
b. Operation DRACULA.
We attach the greatest importance to the discharge of the task under paragraph 29 and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945 and with a target date of 15 March. If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, it is our intention to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945. Our directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia is attached. (See Annex)
Redeployment after the end of the war in Europe
We consider that the whole problem of the redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe, including repatriation, needs combined study in order to assure the optimum use of the resources involved, including personnel and cargo shipping, and to make certain that the forces required for operations against Japan will reach the theater of war at the earliest date. We have accordingly instructed the combined staffs in consultation with the combined shipping authorities to study and report on this problem, submitting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff such questions as may require decision before completion of the study.
Duration of the war against Japan
We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. This date is necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.
We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany; this date to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
Upon the collapse of organized resistance by the German Army the following subdivision of that part of Germany not allocated to the Soviet Government for disarmament, policing, and the preservation of order is acceptable from a military point of view by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
For disarmament, policing and preservation of order:
a. The British forces under a British Commander will occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
b. The forces of the United States under a United States Commander will occupy Germany east of the Rhine, south of the line Koblenz-northern border of Hessen-Nassau and west of the area allocated to the Soviet Government.
c. Control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, and the necessary staging areas in that immediate vicinity will be vested in the Commander of the American Zone.
d. American area to have in addition access through the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British-controlled area.
e. Accurate delineation of the above outlined British and American areas of control can be made at a later date.
F D R
W S C
Annex
Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command
Your object is the destruction or expulsion of all Japanese forces in Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, and the opening of overland communications.
The following are approved operations:
a. The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route, and the attainment of overland communications with China.
b. Operation DRACULA.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the effective discharge of the task under paragraph 2a and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15th March.
If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Field Marshal Dill | ||
| General Ismay | ||
| Major General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis |
McFarland minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Report to the President and Prime Minister
At the request of the President, Admiral Leahy read out the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680/1) paragraph, by paragraph. A number of amendments were proposed and agreed to. These are incorporated in the final report (CCS 680/2).
In addition to the agreed amendments, comments on the report were made as follows:
Operations in Italy
a. Paragraph 11
The Prime Minister suggested that the alternative developments in the operations in Italy postulated by General Wilson were rather too rigid. There might be many shades between the rout of General Kesselring’s forces and the ability of the Germans to effect an orderly withdrawal. Paragraphs 11a and b would present a better-balanced estimate if paragraph 11b was amended to read “b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not at present seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Unless the enemy’s resistance is markedly reduced, difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during the winter would prevent another major offensive until spring 1945.”
b. Paragraph 12
The Prime Minister asked that the precise implication of the statement “that no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known” might be made perfectly clear. For example, it would be quite unacceptable if paragraph 12a was intended to cover an offensive only as far, say, as the Rimini Line. He assumed that the offensive contemplated would include domination of the Valley of the Po.
General Marshall said it was his understanding that General Alexander’s present offensive included invasion of the Valley of the Po.
Admiral Leahy agreed.
c. Paragraph 12c
The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to Admiral King for his offer to provide an amphibious lift for possible operations against the Istrian Peninsula.
Admiral King said that after taking part in operations in the Adriatic, these landing craft would be required to proceed to the Southeast Asia Theater for DRACULA. It was therefore of the greatest importance that General Wilson should submit his plan for the Istrian operation and a decision be taken not later than 15 October. He pointed out that there were certain other craft now in the Mediterranean which were urgently required for the Pacific.
The Prime Minister agreed that it was of the utmost importance that the matter be settled promptly.
General Laycock confirmed that the additional craft referred to by Admiral King would not be wanted for the Istrian operation.
Overall objective for the war against Japan
d. Paragraph 21
The Prime Minister said he thought it quite possible that a heavy, sustained and ever-increasing air bombardment of the Japanese cities might cause Japan to capitulate. People could stand heavy bombardment only so long as they could hope that sooner or later it would come to some endurable end. There could be no such hope for Japan and all they could look forward to was the prospect of an ever-increasing weight of explosive on their centers of population.
e. Paragraph 23
With reference to the term “the opening of a seaway to China,” the Prime Minister said that he assumed this meant the seaway from the United States. He did not contemplate a sea route being opened from the south, for example, through the Sunda Strait.
Admiral King agreed with the Prime Minister’s interpretation on this point.
f. Paragraph 26
The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government was anxious for some assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against Japan. The Canadian Government would prefer that their forces should operate in the more northerly parts of the Pacific, as their troops were unused to tropical conditions.
It was agreed that a paragraph accepting Canadian participation in principle should be inserted in the report. (See paragraph 27)
General Arnold pointed out that the necessity for securing suitable bases for all the forces that would be operating in the Pacific might require employment of Canadian forces in the tropics.
g. The discussion then turned to the operations in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA. As regards CAPITAL**, the Prime Minister** said that, while he accepted the obligation of securing the air route and attaining overland communications with China, any tendency to overinsure in this operation would have the effect of ruling out DRACULA, which he and the British Chiefs of Staff were particularly set on carrying out before the monsoon of 1945.
h. At this point the Prime Minister read out a note on the provision of forces for Dracula (see Annex I) in amplification of which he made certain suggestions about the timing of the movements of forces from the United States. If the United States authorities could see their way to assisting the operations in Burma with one or two divisions it would be better to move two divisions from the later schedules of the United States Army transportation to Europe than to take two divisions from General Montgomery’s Army which was now actually fighting. This would bring additional troops more rapidly into action against the Japanese without withdrawing any of those already fighting in Germany. He did not ask for a decision on these proposals there and then but asked if the United States Chiefs of Staff would examine his suggestion.
General Marshall undertook to examine the Prime Minister’s proposals. He said, however, that there was only one light division available and this had been reorganized and allocated to the European Theater at the special request of General Eisenhower. Every division in the United States was already allocated either to General Eisenhower or to the Pacific. The last divisions for the European Theater of Operations were scheduled to sail either the last week in January or the first week in February. The only way of providing United States divisions for Burma was by taking them from approved allocations. In this connection he said General Stilwell was desirous of having an American division assigned him; in fact, he wanted two if he could get them.
i. Continuing, General Marshall said that he had recently learned of an impression that the increase in the requirements for DRACULA had been brought about by pressure from United States authorities. After a thorough inquiry he had found that this impression was groundless. No United States authorities had advocated any such increase.
At the President’s request, General Marshall outlined certain developments with regard to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo contemplated withdrawing the “Y” Force across the Salween unless General Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Ledo Force. No replacements had been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000 men. A note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out the consequences of the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo must accept full responsibility therefor.
Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe
j. Paragraph 30
The Prime Minister pointed out that our shipping situation would be greatly eased after the defeat of Germany by the cessation of the convoys. Lord Leathers had said that we should be able to get an additional lift of between 40 and 50 percent. The ships would be faster on passage with a much quicker turn-round at the terminal ports.
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
k. Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on a provisional demarcation of zones of occupation in Germany. The details and implications would be required to be worked out by the experts. [An addition to the report which covered this matter (CCS 320/27) was read out and agreed.]
ANNEX I: Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
l. Admiral Mountbatten’s directive was agreed, subject to certain minor amendments.
The Conference: Instructed the Secretaries to revise the report in the light of the amendments approved by the President and Prime Minister and to circulate it as an approved document.
Location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany
The President inquired whether any suggestions had been put forward for the location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany. Was this to be in Berlin or elsewhere?
Mr. Eden said that this question was under examination by the European Advisory Commission. From the administrative point of view Berlin seemed to be the best place.
Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” Conference to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
The Prime Minister said that he would like to add to the communication to Marshal Stalin a word on the political dangers of divergencies between Russia and the Western Allies in respect of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.
The President said that as the communication was purely military in character and purported to give the results of the OCTAGON Conference, he thought it would be better if political matters were omitted.
The President and Prime Minister approved the terms of the communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as set out in Enclosures “A” and “B” respectively of CCS 681/2.
Release of information on “MULBERRY”
The Prime Minister said that it had been suggested to him that the time had now come when information could be released to the press about MULBERRY. The development of the artificial harbors had been largely a British enterprise and he would naturally have liked to let the public know about them as soon as the information could safely be released. He had now been informed, however, that Admiral King thought that the release of information about MULBERRY might be helpful to the Japanese and might not permit full advantage being taken of these inventions in the war against Japan. The Prime Minister said he fully accepted Admiral King’s view and there would consequently be no release of information to the public about MULBERRY at present.
“OCTAGON” Communiqué
The Conference: Agreed on the terms of a communiqué to be issued to the Press that same afternoon (see Annex II).
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 687
Release of amphibious craft from “OVERLORD” to other theaters
The United States Chiefs of Staff propose the dispatch of the following message to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force:
Accelerated operations in the Pacific and prospective plans for SEAC require earliest practicable withdrawal of amphibious craft especially LSTs from European Theater. Having due regard for your requirements for buildup until adequate port facilities become available and considering limitation on the use of these craft in the near future due to weather, Combined Chiefs of Staff desire you review the situation carefully with the object of early release of amphibious craft from OVERLORD. Early report in this matter is desired.
Communiqué to the Press
Quebec, September 16, 1944
The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time, they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, now approaching its final stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific.
The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy.
The British Paymaster-General to the Secretary of the Treasury
Quebec, 16 September 1944
Dear Mr. Secretary, As you suggested, I am sending this note so as to clarify the meaning of the phrase “or sold for profit” in the record of the conversation between the President and the Prime Minister on September 14.
According to my recollection, you explained that it merely meant that our Government should not sell Lend/Lease goods for more than the price at which they are entered in your books plus a reasonable allowance for transport and similar charges. I should be grateful if you could let me know whether this is correct.
Though I do not know whether we are informed about the price at which Lend/Lease goods stand in your books – thanks to your generous desire to keep the dollar sign out of Lend/Lease – I feel sure that we habitually keep well within this limit and that we shall therefore find no difficulty in meeting the President’s wishes in this respect.
May I also take this opportunity of telling you how much I enjoyed seeing you at Quebec and how very grateful I am for all the kindness you showed in your dealings with such a novice as
Yours very sincerely,
CHERWELL