America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

1360

Note by the Secretaries of CCS

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 681/1 (OCTAGON)

Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on the results of “OCTAGON”

The two enclosed draft messages, differing in the degree of detail included, are circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat

Enclosure “A”
Top secret

Draft message from the President and the Prime Minister to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek

From Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by General Stilwell, a decoder appointed by him, and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Top secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded our conference in Quebec during which we discussed ways and means to bring about the earliest possible defeat of Germany so that we can reorient the entire weight of our forces and resources against Japan. We hasten to inform you of plans for our mutual effort, particularly in Southeast Asia.

  • First: We are determined fully to employ all available resources toward the earliest practicable invasion of the Japanese homeland. To this end we have devised courses of action and are taking vigorous steps to expedite the redeployment of forces to the war against Japan following the defeat of Germany.

  • Second: To continue and extend present operations under Admiral Mountbatten in North Burma to provide additional security for intermediate air ferry bases in the Myitkyina area, and at the beginning of favorable weather to launch a determined campaign to open overland communications between India and China. These operations will require continued effective cooperation of the Chinese troops who have already so distinguished themselves in Burma, as well as of your armies that are now engaged west of the Salween. The detailed operations will involve overland and airborne advances by the British from Imphal to seize Kalewa, thence the Yeu-Monywa area with exploitation toward Mandalay. At the same time, the Chinese, British and American forces now in the Myitkyina area will push on to Indaw-Katha-Bhamo, thence toward Mongmit-Mogok. Concurrently, your Chinese armies now engaged west of the Salween should drive vigorously toward Hsenwi and Lashio. All these operations will be fully supported by our preponderant air strength, and by adequate air supply. Small-scale amphibious operations on the Arakan coast, and activities by long range penetration groups will contribute to our success. We feel that the vigorous prosecution of these operations should result in securing an area by next spring which will permit the extension of the Ledo Road with accompanying pipelines in order to support the heroic effort of your forces.

  • Third: Without prejudice to the North Burma operations to protect the air ferry line and establish overland communications, Admiral Mountbatten has been further directed to continue planning and preparations for a large scale amphibious and airborne operation in South Burma to be undertaken as soon as developments in the European Theater will allow the necessary resources to be made available.

Enclosure “B”

Draft message from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang

September 1944
Top secret

From Naval Aide to the President.
My immediately following message is top secret and should be seen only by Aettsna, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible, it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery.

Top Secret and Personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
We have just concluded a short conference at Quebec and hasten to inform you of the broad conclusions we have reached.

We have agreed that operations must be devised to accomplish the defeat of Japan at the earliest possible moment, and that to achieve this ultimately we may well have to invade Japan itself.

We have agreed that in the west our object should be the recapture of Burma at the earliest date. We attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of operations in Upper Burma in order to secure the air supply route, including the air staging posts at Myitkyina, and to open overland communications with you. It is therefore intended to pursue with the utmost vigor the present operations in Upper Burma. Reinforcements, including airborne forces, are being dispatched.

In addition, we are planning a major amphibious operation to take place in the Bay of Bengal next year. The date when it can be carried out will depend on the time when we find it possible to release the necessary resources from the European Theater.

1361

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 682

Operation “HIGHBALL”

The American Chiefs of Staff are asked to take note that Operation HIGHBALL will be available in the Eastern Theatre at the end of November 1944.

1362

Morgenthau-Cherwell meeting, 11:00 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell
Mr. White

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant

[Undated]

Cherwell had a draft of a memorandum summarizing a conversation of the previous day with Churchill and the President on the subject of a policy toward Germany. This was the memorandum which they were to give to Churchill. The Secretary felt that the memorandum went too far in the wrong direction. He said he thought it represented “two steps backwards.” The Secretary said they ought to begin where Churchill left off and go forward. In the first conversation Churchill had been shocked by the proposal but on the following day he seemed to accept the program designed to weaken German economy. The memorandum ought to take that for granted. Churchill had already spoken of diverting Germany to an agricultural state as she was in the last quarter of the 19th century. The Secretary thought that rather than present too inadequate a memorandum they ought to go back that afternoon and raise the question again with Churchill and the President and write the memorandum on the conversation that will have taken place that afternoon rather than on the previous day.

The Secretary then spoke to Cherwell about Brand. He told him that he hadn’t wanted him to come to Washington to represent the British Treasury in the first place but that when he did come he gave him a chance, and that he was not helping England by his behavior. The Secretary mentioned Playfair and White suggested Opie or Keynes as possible Treasury representatives.

H. D. WHITE

1363

The Under Secretary of State to the President

Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret

Supplementing yesterday’s wire on voting procedure, it may be helpful for you to have before you the exact text of the formula which is now being studied by the three governments as a possible solution. You will note the size of the majority vote is left blank. The Russians want 51 percent and the British want two-thirds.

C. Voting
Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

Decisions with, respect to the following matters should be taken by blank majority vote including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the Security Council:

a. All decisions coming under section VIII-B, entitled “Determination of Threats to the Peace, Acts of Aggression, or any Breaches of the Peace, and Action with Respect Thereto,” and under Section VIII-C, entitled “Regional Arrangements.”

b. All matters relating to [disarmament] and regulation of armaments.

c. Recommendations to the General Assembly with regard to admission of new members, suspension and restoration of rights of membership, and expulsion of members.

d. Establishment by the Security Council of its subsidiary bodies or agencies.

Decisions under Section VIII-A, entitled “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” should be taken by blank majority including the concurring votes of the permanent members of the council, but excluding the votes of such member or members of the council as are parties to the dispute.

All other decisions should be taken by blank majority vote.

The result of adopting this procedure would be that consideration and recommendations with regard to pacific settlement of disputes referred to in numbered paragraph three above would be taken without the vote of the party to the dispute even if that party happens to be a permanent member of the council and that consideration and decisions as to enforcement action of any kind would require the unanimous consent of all the permanent members of the council, whether or not one of them is involved.

In view of the fact that this, if accepted, would represent a substantial concession to the Soviet point of view, we feel that we would be justified in trying to obtain their consent to the two-thirds majority vote.

Could we have your views as soon as convenient, both as regards the formula in the text and the size of majority vote?

ES
Under Secretary of State

1364

Roosevelt-Morgenthau conversation, about noon

Present
President Roosevelt
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau

Morgenthau had a few minutes of private conversation with Roosevelt, immediately before the latter’s meeting with Churchill, on the subject of zones of occupation in Germany.

1365

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, noon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Foreign Secretary Eden
Lord Cherwell
Sir Alexander Cadogan

From the Morgenthau Diary:

I met at 12:00 today with Roosevelt, Churchill, Eden and the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. We took up the question of the Lend-Lease Agreement for Phase II. The President read the thing through very carefully, and the only suggestion he made was that where it read, “Naturally no articles obtained on Lend-Lease or identical thereto would be exported,” he included the words, “or sold.” Lord Cherwell said that they do sell all of their Lend-Lease; that is, all of the nonmilitary Lend-Lease, and the President then added the words also “for profit.”

Churchill was quite emotional about this agreement, and at one time he had tears in his eyes. When the thing was finally signed, he told the President how grateful he was, thanked him most effusively, and said that this was something they were doing for both countries.

Then Churchill, turning to Lord Cherwell and myself, said, “Where are the minutes on this matter of the Ruhr?” and according to our agreement we said that we didn’t have them. The reason we didn’t have them was because I felt, when I read the minutes which Lord Cherwell had written, that it presented much too weak a case, and I thought that we could get Churchill to go much further. He seemed quite put out that we didn’t have the minutes of the previous meeting, and the President said that the reason we didn’t have them was because Henry interspersed the previous discussion with too many dirty stories, and that sort of broke the ice. So Churchill broke in and said, “Well, I’ll restate it,” which he did, and he did it very forcefully and very clearly. Then he suggested that Lord Cherwell and I withdraw and try to do a job on dictating it, which we did. It only took us a few minutes, and we came back up to the room where they were meeting and just calmly walked in. When Churchill read our very short memorandum, he said, “No, this isn’t what I want.” Then he started to talk and dictate to us, and I said, “I don’t know what the rules of the game are, but is there any reason why we can’t have a stenographer present? Then you could dictate directly to her.” He said, “By all means,” and Cherwell went out and got Churchill’s secretary, and she came in and he began to dictate. He dictated the memorandum, which finally stood just the way he dictated it. He dictates extremely well because he is accustomed to doing it when he is writing his books.

While Churchill was dictating, he used the memorandum which I had dictated as a sort of a text.

Roosevelt’s important contribution, while Churchill was dictating, was that when he got talking about the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries, Roosevelt had him insert the very important words “in Germany.” What Roosevelt meant was – because it came up later – that he didn’t have in mind just the Ruhr and the Saar, but he had in mind entire Germany, and that the matter we were talking about, namely, the ease with which metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war, does not only apply to the Ruhr and the Saar, but the whole of Germany, which of course is terribly important.

When Churchill got through, Eden seemed quite shocked at what he heard, and he turned to Churchill and said, “You can’t do this. After all, you and I publicly have said quite the opposite. Furthermore, we have a lot of things in the work[s] in London which are quite different.” Then Churchill and Eden seemed to have quite a bit of argument about it. Roosevelt took no part in it, and I took a small part and kept throwing things in. Churchill’s main argument was what this meant in the way of trade; they would get the export trade of Germany. So Eden said, “How do you know what it is or where it is?” and Churchill answered him quite testily, “Well, we will get it where-ever it is.” I was quite amazed and shocked at Eden’s attitude; in fact, it was so different from the way he talked when we were in London. Finally Churchill said, “Now I hope, Anthony, you’re not going to do anything about this with the War Cabinet if you see a chance to present it.” Then he said this, “After all, the future of my people is at stake, and when I have to choose between my people and the German people, I am going to choose my people.” Churchill got quite nasty with Eden, and I understand from the President that all the rest of the day Eden was not at all helpful. The President was quite disappointed.

Eden describes his participation in the meeting as follows:

… On the morning of September 15th, I joined the Prime Minister and the President, who were by now in agreement in their approval of the [Morgenthau] plan. Cherwell had supported Morgenthau and their joint advocacy had prevailed. Large areas of the Ruhr and the Saar were to be stripped of their manufacturing industries and turned into agricultural lands. It was as if one were to take the Black Country and turn it into Devonshire. I did not like the plan, nor was I convinced that it was to our national advantage.

I said so, and also suggested that Mr. Cordell Hull’s opinion should be sought for. This was the only occasion I can remember when the Prime Minister showed impatience with my views before foreign representatives. He resented my criticism of something which he and the President had approved, not I am sure on his account, but on the President’s.

According to Cadogan, Roosevelt and Churchill had discussed the question of voting in the Security Council of the proposed world organization at midday on September 15 and again in the middle of the afternoon. Stettinius’ memorandum of his conversation with Cadogan on September 16 records:

… He said that while Eden understood these matters clearly, Churchill had not yet studied them and [he] feared that neither Churchill nor the President had a complete understanding of what was involved. I inquired if he knew whether the President had had my message before him when this was discussed, and he said that the President had had no papers before him and did not refer to any. He said the question had come up at midday yesterday and had been discussed again in the middle of the afternoon. He did not indicate which person had taken the initiative. He indicated that the President had not been definite in his views on the matter one way or the other.…

Roosevelt, however, sent a message to Stettinius stating that neither Churchill nor he was inclined to approve the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had transmitted to Quebec.

Roosevelt and Churchill initialed two separate papers on lend-lease: (1) the summary of their discussion on September 14, and (2) a shorter paper on the establishment of a committee to deal with lend-lease questions.

1366

Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 15, 1944

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.

The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience. It must also be remembered that the Germans have devastated a large portion of the industries of Russia and of other neighbouring Allies, and it is only in accordance with justice that these injured countries should, be entitled to remove the machinery they require in order to repair the losses they have suffered. The industries referred to in the Ruhr and in the Saar would therefore be necessarily put out of action and closed down. It was felt that the two districts should be put under some body under the world organization which would supervise the dismantling of these industries and make sure that they were not started up again by some subterfuge.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

OK

F D R
W S C

15.9

1367

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

The President and Prime Minister have agreed to put to Marshal Stalin Lord Simon’s proposals for dealing with the major war criminals, and to concert with him a list of names.

OK

F D R

1368

Memorandum initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, September 14, 1944

We have discussed the question of the scope and scale of mutual Lend/Lease aid between the United States and the British Empire after the defeat of Germany and during the war with Japan. We have agreed that a Joint Committee shall be set up to consider this question with the following membership:

Chairman: [blank]

American Members: British Members:
Secretary Morgenthau [blank]
Under-Secretary Stettinius
Mr. Leo Crowley

The Committee will agree and recommend to the Heads of their respective Governments the amount of Mutual Aid in munitions, non-munitions and services which is to be provided for the most effective prosecution of the war. The Committee is instructed to obtain from the various branches of the Governments whatever pertinent information is necessary for the preparation of their recommendations.

Pending the recommendations of the Committee to the Heads of the respective Governments, the appropriate departments of each Government shall be instructed not to make any major decision with respect to the programmes of Lend/Lease Aid for the period referred to above without the approval of the Committee.

In reaching its conclusions the Committee will be guided by the conversation between the President and Prime Minister on September 14, 1944.

OK

F D R
W S C

15.9

1369

The President to the Under Secretary of State

Quebec, 15 September 1944

Memorandum from the President for the Under Secretary of State.

Neither the Prime Minister nor I are inclined to approve the proposed amendment.

My thought has been that this amendment or a general reference to the subject should be mentioned in the agreement as having been discussed but without reaching any agreement or decision, thus leaving it up to the meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, is afraid that this procedure will be unacceptable to the Russians, as they would know that they would be overwhelmingly defeated in a United Nations’ meeting and that they would get sore and try to take it out on all of us on some other point.

That is about the only information I can give you. Cadogan will return Monday, I think, and he can give you any further news.

I think we should keep on trying but if we cannot agree on this or any other point, I am inclined to favor either not mentioning disagreement or putting disagreements under a general statement that certain points have not been agreed on. I am still greatly in favor of a reference to the United Nations for discussion as soon as possible.

1370

Minute by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Quebec, 15 September, 1944

It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister today that the time had not yet come to recognise formally the FCNL as the Provisional Government of France, but the matter should be kept constantly under review.

W S C

16.9
F D R

1371

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Treasury

Quebec, September 15, 1944
Draft 1. HMJr. dictated this.

At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill said that he would sum up the discussion that we had been having in regard to the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar. He said that they would permit Russia and any other of our Allies to help themselves to whatever machinery they wished, that the industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar would be shut down, and that these two districts would be put under an international body which would supervise these industries to see that they would not start up again.

This programme for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and in the Saar is part of a programme looking forward to diverting Germany into largely an agricultural country.

The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this programme.

1372

The President to the Secretary of State

Quebec, 15 September 1944
Top secret

Memorandum from the President for the Secretary of State.

After many long conversations with the Prime Minister and Lord Cherwell, the general matter of post-war plans regarding industries has been worked out as per the following memoranda. This seems eminently satisfactory and I think you will approve the general idea of not rehabilitating the Ruhr, Saar, etc.

I think that I have also worked out the locations of the occupying forces.

I am going to leave here Saturday evening and go to Hyde Park where I will be joined Monday morning by the Prime Minister and his wife for a couple of days.

1373

Morgenthau-Cherwell luncheon meeting, about 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau Lord Cherwell

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Churchill
Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Law
Sir Alexander Cadogan
1374

Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, early afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom Canada
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Prime Minister Mackenzie King

Mackenzie King apparently came to the Citadel for the purpose of asking Roosevelt and Churchill to accept honorary degrees from McGill University. The rest of the conversation is described as follows in Mackenzie King’s notes:

… Churchill … then spoke to the President about our participation in the war in the Pacific; of our desire to be in the Northern part and have our forces to serve in North Pacific; also our wish to have our Chiefs of Staff have a talk with his. The President replied: Mackenzie and I had a talk together on that, last night. That is all understood.

The President then said something about the Kuriles needing a good deal of patrolling, also Northern China, probably requiring Japs to be driven out later. When he stressed that he would have his divisions leave Seattle, and that Canadian forces could leave Vancouver, Churchill referred again to naval forces coming through the Panama Canal into the Pacific.… I did not want to leave matters to just the North and indicated that we were prepared to operate in the central area as well. Churchill also indicated that we were prepared to go as far South as Burma.

Churchill said it would not do to have our Canadians fighting in the Tropics…

1375

The President’s Special Assistant to the President’s Secretary

Washington, September 15, 1944
Top secret
MR-out-412

Personal and secret to Miss Grace Tully from Harry Hopkins.

I sent to the President memorandum entitled French Lend Lease Agreement and dated September 11 from the State Department. FEA and State Department are anxious to know whether the President has initialed it.

Could you help me get an answer on this tomorrow?

HARRY HOPKINS

1376

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill had reached agreement on the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany as between United States and British forces. The agreement assigned the south western zone of occupation in Germany to United States forces and the northwestern zone to British forces; changed the boundary between the two zones by transferring the province of Hessen-Nassau and Oberhessen from the northwestern to the southwestern zone and by transferring an area west of the Rhine comprising Saarland, the Palatinate, and Rheinhessen from the southwestern to the northwestern zone; and provided that United States forces would have access “through the western and northwestern seaports” and rites of passage through the British zone of occupation.

1377

The Pittsburgh Press (September 15, 1944)

Yanks invade two Jap isles

Big invasion armada pours troops into Palau and Morotai
By Frank Tremaine, United Press staff writer

map.091544.up
Drive toward the Philippines by U.S. forces was underway today from two directions, as U.S. troops landed on Morotai Island, northernmost of the Halmahera group south of the Philippines, and went ashore on the Palau Islands, to the east.

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii –
A big American invasion armada poured fighting men ashore on the Jap island base of Palau, 560 miles east of the Philippines, today as Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s troops stormed up into the Halmahera Islands from the south in a twin offensive to clear the road back to Bataan and Corregidor.

Exploding their greatest combined offensive of the Pacific war, Gen. MacArthur and Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, breached the coastal defenses of the two island bastions under cover of shattering bombardments from sea and sky.

Gen. MacArthur led his troops ashore early Friday on Morotai Island, northernmost of the Halmaheras and only 250 miles south of the Philippines, at almost the same moment Adm. Nimitz’s Marines and Army assault units were battling across the beaches of Palau.

Gen. MacArthur issued a statement from the Morotai beachhead a few hours after the landing saying that “we now dominate the Moluccas” and “our position here is now secure and the immediate operation has achieved its purpose.” He added that “defeat now stares Japan in the face” and the campaign is entering its decisive phase.

A Navy communiqué said a number of beachheads were established on Palau, a narrow chain of 26 islands, many of them mountainous, lying between the Carolines and the Philippines. Babelthuap is the principal islet in the group.

Because of time difference, Adm. Nimitz’s announcement said the Palau landing occurred Thursday morning, Honolulu Time, which would be Friday morning Halmahera Time.

The twin invasion blow threatened to break the chain of sprawling island bases established by the Japs around the Philippines and the western and southern approaches to the Chinese mainland, and first reports from Palau said the enemy was fighting back furiously from long-prepared defenses.

U.S. battleships, cruisers and supporting warships of the Pacific Fleet stood offshore bombarding the Jap shore installations while carrier-based aircraft dive-bombed and strafed the enemy in close support of the advancing ground troops.

“Enemy defenses are being heavily bombed and shelled at close range,” the communiqué said.

Gen. MacArthur’s men on Morotai also went in under a powerful warship and aircraft screen, but their landing met only feeble Jap opposition, and casualties in the initial assault were described officially as “very light.”

The bulk of the Jap garrison in the Halmaheras were revealed to have been concentrated in the southern part of the island group in the belief that Gen. MacArthur would strike there. Instead, they were bypassed, cut off from their only direct sources of supply, and left to surrender or die.

On Palau, however, one of the toughest battles of the Pacific campaign was believed in progress, possibly exceeding in savagery the epic fight for Saipan or the Marine landing on Tarawa.

The troops who swarmed ashore had to overcome obstacles of barbed wire on the beaches, backed up by entrenched machine-gun positions. Farther inland were larger guns, probably ranging up to six inches, and the deadly mortars which caused heavy casualties on the Mariana Island beachheads.

A brief Navy communiqué said reinforcements were being put ashore from a host of transports guarded by the guns and planes of Adm. William F. Halsey’s Third Fleet, and that the landings were “continuing against stiff ground opposition.”

The reference to “ground” opposition indicated that the bulk of Palau’s aerial defenses had been smashed by Adm. Halsey’s task force in a series of softening up bombardments that began on Sept. 5 and continued almost without interruption until the zero hour.

The exact point of the landing was not disclosed, but Radio Tokyo said the attack centered on Peleliu Island, southernmost of the chain of atolls comprising the Palau group. Tokyo said the landing was made at 6:00 a.m. (Palau Time) and that the Jap garrison drove the Americans back into the sea after a two-hour battle.

“About 2,500” American dead were left on the beach, the broadcast said.

The language of the Pearl Harbor communiqué left little doubt the Japs would make a desperate attempt to hold Palau, probably their most important bastion in the Central Pacific, outranking even Truk, 1,150 miles to the west.

There was no mentioned of Jap opposition in the air, although there was a possibility that enemy might risk units of their grand fleet in an attempt to run carrier aircraft to the aid of their island garrisons.

Any such move, however, almost certainly would bring on a major battle of surface ships for which Adm. Halsey is undoubtedly well prepared. The size of the supporting battle fleet covering the Palau landing was not divulged, but it was known to include some of the Navy’s heaviest units.

The landing followed more than a week of widespread naval and air assaults by Adm. Halsey’s battlewagons and carriers against Jap positions on Palau and in the Central Philippines that cost the enemy 501 planes and scores of merchant vessels.

Truk bypassed

U.S. occupation of the Palaus would close a watery trap around 75,000 to 100,000 Jap troops now bypassed in the Western Carolines, including the once-formidable naval base at Truk.

In addition, it would remove the last island barrier astride the Central Pacific route to the Philippines and enable Adm. Nimitz to throw the full weight of his land, sea and air forces against the Jap-occupied islands.

VAdm. Theodore S. Wilkinson of Rosslyn, Virginia (commander of
the U.S. Third Amphibious Force), was directing the landing operations, while Marine Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith of Alexandria, Virginia, who commanded the 2nd Marine Division at Tarawa, led the expeditionary troops.

Win air base*

The 300-mile overwater thrust from Dutch New Guinea to Morotai cleared away the last important barrier on Gen. MacArthur’s road back to the Philippines and gave his gathering air forces fighter bases within one hour’s flight of the southern up of the latter islands.

Gen, MacArthur watched the preliminary bombardment of Morotai from the bridge of a U.S. cruiser and went ashore in the wake of his troops to inspect the Pitoe Airdrome, one of the first prizes taken on the island’s southern coast.

“We shall shortly have an air and light naval base here within 300 miles of the Philippines,” he told his officers.

Pitoe Field is about 40 miles from the northern tip of Morotai.

“They are waiting there for me,” he added. “It has been a long time.”

Japs face trap

A triumphant communiqué announcing the invasion of Morotai declared that the Halmahera-Philippines line has now been penetrated, imperiling all of the remaining Jap conquests in the South Seas and threatening to isolate the enemy’s 16th and 19th Armies, some 200,000 strong, in the East Indies.

Envelopment of these armies, the communiqué said, “would sever the vital supply lines to the Japanese mainland of oil and other war essentials.”

Gen, MacArthur told his troops at the Pitoe Airdrome:

You have done well. You now dominate the last stronghold which bars the way to the Philippines. The enemy, as usual, was not in the right place at the right time.

Morotai Island, 12 miles off the northern tip of Halmahera, is 40 miles long, with a narrow coastal strip rising steeply to 4,000-foot, densely-wooded mountains, and had a native population of about 10,000 before the Japs seized it from the Dutch.

The initial landing was made at the southwestern end of the island, within a few hundred yards of Pitoe Airfield.

New record set for Navy release

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (UP) –
The Navy established a new record for speed in announcing Pacific operations, disclosing the invasion of Palau approximately nine hours after U.S. troops hit the beaches.

1378

Nancy captured by Patton

Stronghold of Aachen surrounded in drive into Siegfried defenses
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

…

1379

British push close to Po Valley

Drive within mile of Rimini Airfield

…