|
Present |
|
| United States |
|
United Kingdom |
| Admiral Leahy |
|
Field Marshal Brooke |
| General Marshall |
|
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal |
| Admiral King |
|
Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham |
| General Arnold |
|
Field Marshal Dill |
| Lieutenant General Somervell |
|
General Ismay |
| Vice Admiral Willson |
|
Admiral Noble |
| Rear Admiral Cooke |
|
Lieutenant General Macready |
| Rear Admiral McCormick |
|
Air Marshal Welsh |
| Major General Handy |
|
Major General Laycock |
| Major General Fairchild |
|
|
| Major General Kuter |
|
|
|
Secretariat |
|
| Brigadier General McFarland |
|
Major General Hollis |
| Captain Graves |
|
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones |
|
|
Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 12, 1944, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
Machinery for coordination of United States-Soviet-British military effort (CCS 618/3)
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the proposals for improvement of liaison with the Soviets originated from a suggestion put to Mr. Harriman by Marshal Stalin some two months ago.
Admiral King said that the U.S. Planners had examined the previous British proposal (CCS 618/2) and were of the opinion that while there were advantages in the establishment of a combined committee at Moscow, this would not expedite rapid coordination of operations in the field which would require separate liaison arrangements.
Admiral Leahy stressed the value of improved liaison with the Russians.
Sir Alan Brooke said he felt Marshal Stalin’s offer should be dropped. In Moscow there were already United States and British missions and all that was required was that the Russians should appoint a suitable high-ranking officer.
Sir Charles Portal said that he felt the proposal to exchange missions between field commanders would not work. It would not be right for the Russian High Command to be represented at a field headquarters. All our own plans would flow back to Moscow and we, in turn, would gain nothing. A committee in Moscow would be a better arrangement if, indeed, the Russians could be induced to appoint a really responsible high-ranking officer. Missions in the field, he felt, would be useless and even dangerous.
Admiral King said he felt that liaison between field commanders might follow from the achievement of successful cooperation in Moscow.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the recommendations of the British Chiefs of Staff in CCS 618/3.
b. Instructed the Secretaries to draft and circulate for approval a message to the Heads of the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow based on CCS 618/3.
Zones of occupation in Germany
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Prime Minister and the President might be invited to give consideration to the outstanding problem of the zones to be occupied by United States and British forces in Germany and to give instructions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Leahy agreed. He had already mentioned this matter to the President but would do so again. He would take the line that in view of the political aspects of the problem, guidance from the heads of State was necessary.
In reply to a question by Sir John Dill, Admiral Leahy said that from a United States point of view there were, he felt, no military considerations. There was, however, the problem of transportation and supply of United States troops if they went into the southern zone.
Sir Charles Portal said that from the British point of view there were very considerable military implications involved and there were strong reasons why, militarily, the British Chiefs of Staff would want to occupy the northwest zone.
Admiral Leahy explained that the utilization of United States troops for occupation was politically difficult and in fact would be politically impossible with regard to France, Italy, and southern Europe. Whereas the occupation of Germany could be justified, that of France would meet with enormous difficulty.
Sir Charles Portal said there was, of course, no question of occupying France.
Admiral King said that he felt it would be easier for the United States to occupy the southwest zone if it could be arranged that the evacuation of American troops and supplies for the occupational troops could be undertaken through north German ports.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the question of zones of occupation in Germany had such serious political implications that they were unable to make any recommendation without guidance from their respective governments.
b. Decided to report in this sense to the President and Prime Minister and, in doing so, to invite their attention to the need for an early decision on this matter.
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/3)
General Arnold, during consideration of the British memorandum in CCS 520/3, asked why the present method of control was stated to be unsatisfactory as a long-term arrangement.
Sir Charles Portal explained that in the opening stages of OVERLORD the present system of control had been necessary and effective. However, with the move of General Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Tedder to France, they were divorced from General Spaatz’ headquarters and from the Air Ministry, and strategic control by General Eisenhower became almost a formality. Air Marshal Tedder had only a small air staff and the large staffs of the Air Ministry, Bomber Command and the U.S. Strategic Air Force in Europe had, of necessity, to exercise control over the actual strategic bombing operations.
General Arnold asked why large staffs were necessary to control strategic bombing.
Sir Charles Portal explained that full knowledge of all available enemy intelligence and adequate and rapid methods of interpreting the results of bombing attacks were essential to the effective control of strategic bombing. In addition, it was essential to keep in close touch with the degree of enemy air opposition to be expected.
General Arnold asked why no mention was made of communications in the priority of targets.
Sir Charles Portal said that communications had largely become targets for medium and fighter bombers rather than strategic forces. The proposed directive on priorities was, of course susceptible to alteration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or at the request of General Eisenhower. In fact, the priority list set forth was, he understood, that now enforced by General Eisenhower himself.
General Arnold asked what would occur if General Spaatz and the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff should disagree with regard to the control of the strategic bombing forces.
Sir Charles Portal explained that in this unlikely eventuality they would refer respectively to General Arnold and himself who, if they could not give a ruling, would refer the matter to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.
With regard to the declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander, Sir Charles Portal explained that this same procedure had been in force for approximately a year in the Mediterranean where it had worked satisfactorily. An emergency could be declared either for offense or for defense.
General Arnold said he was particularly interested in the full utilization of the strategic bombing force since the United States had in the United Kingdom 2970 heavy bombers and in the Mediterranean 1512 heavy bombers, making a total of 4482. Of these, 2980 were operational and each aircraft had two crews available and therefore could be used every day. Was the proposed chain of command the best setup to obtain the maximum use from this very large force?
Sir Charles Portal said he felt that it was. The Supreme Commander’s role in the chain of command, which had been valuable in the first phases of OVERLORD was, in his opinion, no longer useful and better results would be obtained from the proposed command arrangements.
Admiral Leahy questioned the proposed directive with regard to the right of a commander in the field to get from the strategic air forces the air support which he requested. This, he felt, was essential.
Sir Charles Portal said that the system was exactly the same as had been used in the Mediterranean where the Supreme Commander had declared an emergency on only one occasion. This, as he remembered, was on the fifth day of the battle at Salerno. The declaration of an emergency by a supreme commander was in effect a direct order from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the use of the strategic air forces as directed by the supreme commander. He said he could guarantee on the British side that the supreme commanders would always get what they needed when they needed it. The use of the emergency procedure should be regarded only as “the big stick” which could be used but probably would never have to be.
General Marshall suggested an alternative arrangement whereby a small assignment of strategic air might be made to supreme commanders, the remainder being controlled as suggested in the British paper.
Sir Charles Portal agreed that this was a possible solution. He felt, however, that in a real emergency the supreme commander must have all the bombers that he needed. Divided control might result in the supreme commander’s allotment not being fully used on all occasions.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider this matter further at their meeting the following morning.