Address parcels on one side only
…
Networks harvest millions in campaign time
Political figures are staggering
By Si Steinhauser
Some years ago, a Pittsburgh man set aside a fund of $11 million to be spent in philanthropic endeavors while he is still alive. He is still living and seeing his money at work. The boss assigned me to ask him why he gave his millions away. His answer was quite simple:
I made that money selling dehydrated potatoes to the government for shipment overseas. It doesn’t belong to me, so I’m giving it back to the people to whom it belongs.
Yesterday we asked one of the nice young women in our office to tabulate the cost of an all-network political broadcast by President Roosevelt or Governor Dewey from Standard Rate and Data, the Bible or cost book of radio. She added up the cost of a single half hour at $50,781. Since they usually talk longer, the rate may double. If each candidate spoke only a half hour on 10 broadcasts someone would pay the networks a minimum of $1 million for radio time. That figure may be doubled by talks by vice-presidential and other candidates and single station broadcasts by state, county and municipal candidates across the country will probably add another million to network and local station treasuries.
We couldn’t ask all of the people who contribute this money to campaign treasuries why they so it so we asked our associate editor and political authority, Kermit McFarland, and he gave us quite as simple an answer as the philanthropist: “Because they want to see the man to whose campaign fund they contribute elected.”
We’re naïve about politics but there must be more than that to it. Spending $2 million to get a man a $75,000 (Mr. Roosevelt cut his pay to $25,000) job doesn’t add up.
If you like comparative figures, NBC charges $15,646 for a half hour of night time, CBS asks $15,225, the Blue Network $11,869 and Mutual $8,041.
Suppose Mr. Roosevelt were to speak on all networks and a single local station decided not to carry his talk but to substitute a local candidate’s talk or even a talk by say, Mr. Dewey, who might be in town that night.
“You go ahead and suppose Steinhauser,” said a station manager. “We could do a thing like that but we wouldn’t dare.”
Stations discussed editorial and political policies last year and decided to keep hands off because the present outmoded radio law provides that if a station gives time to one side of a controversy it must give equal time and facilities to the other side.
So say the broadcasters, according to the law, if we took time to say “We’re for Roosevelt” we would have to add “And we’re also for Dewey.”
U.S. State Department (September 12, 1944)
Tripartite dinner meeting, 8:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Canada |
| President Roosevelt | The Earl of Athlone | Prime Minister Mackenzie King |
| Mrs. Roosevelt | Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone | |
| Admiral Leahy | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| General Marshall | Mrs. Churchill | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Arnold | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | ||
| Field Marshal Dill |
Arnold gives the following information which apparently pertains to the dinner meeting on September 12:
That night, at a dinner with the Governor General, the question of aid to Poland came up. Several messages [had] arrived from the Russians and from Harriman relating to Polish patriots in Warsaw. General Marshall and I talked this over at length. For some time, it had been apparent that if some help was not given to the Polish patriots in Warsaw, they would be exterminated…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It gave the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Churchill, and the President something serious to think about. Could we help the Poles in Warsaw, even though we wanted to? That rather large problem was never completely solved…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
During that dinner the Prime Minister came out with new ideas about winning the war. At that particular moment he thought it a matter of vital British interest that we (including the RAF) get more planes, ships, and soldiers into the final battle of Japan as soon as we could. I told him the question of putting planes in there wasn’t quite that simple. There were not enough land masses in the Pacific Ocean to use the heavy bombers we would have available from Europe when that phase of the war was over. As a matter of fact, if we could use 1500 out of the 3500 we had in the ETO, we would be very, very lucky. Certainly, we would much rather have the B-29s, with their longer range and their heavier bomb load than we would the B-17, the B-24, the Lancaster, or the Halifax…
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Quebec, September 12, 1944
My Dear Friend, Would it be agreeable to you to discuss with me sometime today our Italian policy? I must fill up the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission, and I feel the great need of a competent politician and Minister there, like Macmillan, rather than a General. I was distressed and disquieted by the tales I heard of serious food shortages in some parts of Rome and other great towns. Unemployment looms big in Italy. We may also soon have the populous North flowing on to our hands. I was hoping we might together make up an agreeable programme for Italy, which could be announced, comprising resumption of their export trade, interchange of diplomatic representatives à la Russe, and bringing them into the area of UNRRA as co-belligerents if that can be managed. If not, some other scheme of effective relief. You spoke of La Guardia having a Mission. This also I should like to discuss with you.
The Staffs are forming their contacts this morning and browsing over the Agenda on general lines. But would it not be well to have a plenary session tomorrow where you and I can put forward the fundamentals of our future war policy. This will enable them to go ahead much more rapidly and easily.
A small point. Leathers is longing for Admiral Land. You said you were keeping him handy; but if he could come up soon, these two would be together working out their complicated affairs, while we are busy with other things, and have results ready for us at each stage.
Some of the Boniface I sent you this morning appeared to me to be of profound significance. Alexander’s battle is a hard one, but now that Clark has crashed into the centre I am hopeful of speedy results.
Yours always,
W
Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt
Quebec, September 12, 1944
My Dear Friend, Would you let me have your views on the following suggested time-table:
- Wednesday, 13th – Plenary Meeting with Chiefs of Staff.
- Thursday, 14th, and Friday, 15th – their further discussions.
- They should report to us the evening of Friday, 15th, enabling a final Plenary to take place on Saturday, 16th.
It would probably be in conformity with, your wishes to return to Hyde Park on Saturday. If agreeable to you I would follow by Air with Clemmie early on Monday, 18th, and stay with you Monday and Tuesday. We could then have anyone necessary to wind up outstanding points. I must depart on Wednesday, 20th.
I have asked Eden to come over if possible tomorrow, so he should be here on Thursday or Friday. There are several important things to discuss with him including recognition of the French Provisional Government, as to which I am by no means convinced, I do not know whether you would require to have Hull or Stettinius for Friday, 15th.
One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that? – in which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.
Yours always,
W
The President to the Secretary of the Treasury
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Please be in Quebec by Thursday, 14 September, Noon.
The President to the War Shinning Administrator
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Please come to Quebec without delay.
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State
Twentieth Day, Tuesday, September 12, 1944
Restricted
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I then told the group in the strictest confidence that Cadogan had received a cable from Churchill asking him to come to Quebec and that he had asked my advice and opinion on the matter, and whether, if he went, we would be offended. I reported that I had told him we would have no objection to his flying up and spending the evening there if he could come back the next day. There was considerable discussion as to whether we should suggest that the President ask Church ill not to call him up, but this was entirely inconclusive. The point of view was also expressed that this changed the entire character of the Quebec conference from one of a military nature to one of a political nature and it was very serious to be having a political conference without Stalin present. Incidentally I informed the group that the President had assured me that if the British called any political men to Quebec he would do likewise. (This was not done, Morgenthau being the only person called up although through special arrangements we did have Ambassador Atherton at Quebec, although he did not participate in any direct way at the meeting.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Talks During the Day With the Secretary
Early in the day I had a discussion with the Secretary on the voting procedure and also on the question of Cadogan’s being ordered to Quebec. I also told him of the possibility that Eden was coming to Quebec. Mr. Hull made the same point which was made at the American meeting by Mr. Long, that changing the character of the meeting in a political direction, and probably discussing the future of Europe without Stalin being present was quite a serious matter. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Secretary thinks that it would be most unfortunate if Cadogan goes to Quebec, not only from the point of view of our Conversations at Dumbarton but that it would throw that conference into a discussion of general diplomatic and political affairs. He asked me to do everything in my power to keep him from going.
Discussion During the Day With Cadogan
I talked privately with Cadogan and Jebb in the early afternoon … [Cadogan] inquired if Mr. Hull had heard from the President about going to Quebec and I told him he had not. …
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Later in the afternoon I had another private talk with him on the question of his going to Quebec. He immediately prepared a cable to his Prime Minister saying that Mr. Hull felt it would be a mistake for him to go as it would arouse all types of speculation in the press in this country. He said in the cable that if the Prime Minister felt keenly about it, he hoped he would discuss it with the President. Cadogan handed me the wire and I suggested that he take out the word “terrific.” He had originally used the expression that Hull thought it would be a terrific mistake.
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Völkischer Beobachter (September 13, 1944)
Wie der Feind die Lage sieht –
Briten erwarten härteste Kämpfe
Drei unbehagliche Tatsachen für den Gegner
…
Die Konferenz in Quebec
vb. Wien, 12. September –
Wie im August 1943 treffen sich auch diesmal Roosevelt und Churchill in Quebec. Wurde dieser Tagungsort wiedergewählt, weil man Kanada, das dieser Krieg entscheidend der Saugkraft des großen Nachbarn ausgesetzt hat, auch von London aus bereits als eine Art Niemandsland zwischen Empire und USA ansieht? 1943 fanden freilich die abschließenden Gespräche in Washington statt. Es spielte die Bitte Badoglios um Waffenstillstand hinein. Man rechnete im Lager der Westmächte schon mit baldigem Kriegsende und wollte sich vor den erstrebten Besprechungen mit den Sowjets auf eine gemeinsame Marschlinie einigen.
Die Konferenzen von Moskau und Teheran haben dann allerdings gezeigt, wer im Kreise der drei großen Räuber den Ton angab. Briten und Yankees wurden völlig an die Wand gespielt, sie durften nur die salbungsvollen Deklamationen über Freiheit, Toleranz und ähnliche Deckworte für den „Frieden durch Gewalt“ liefern, erhielten „gemeinsame Entscheidung der europäischen Fragen“ versprochen und mußten sich den Termin für die Invasion diktieren lassen. Stalin verlangte sie, um seine Verbündeten machtmäßig anderweitig festzulegen, weil er sie durch den Pazifikkrieg noch nicht genügend gebunden fand. Wie er dann zu verfahren gedachte, hat sich inzwischen erwiesen.
Die gefügigen Partner Moskaus werden sich in Quebec mit der Lage auseinanderzusetzen haben, die nun besonders auf dem Balkan entstanden ist und dort, wie schon in Polen, im Zeichen einer sichtbaren Ausdehnung des bolschewistischen Machtbereiches und damit der Unterjochung all der kleinen Nationen steht, die England und die USA den Sowjets ausgeliefert haben.
An der zweiten Konferenz in Quebec nehmen die Sowjets nicht teil. Stalin ließ Roosevelt und Churchill mitteilen, er sei jetzt durch die Ereignisse an der Ostfront zu sehr in Anspruch genommen, um Zeit für derartige Besprechungen erübrigen zu können. Aber auch die Tschungking-chinesen sind einstweilen in Quebec nicht vertreten, obwohl dort einer der wichtigsten Programmpunkte der Krieg im fernen Osten ist. Roosevelt sieht sich schon aus innenpolitischen Gründen veranlasst, von Churchill eine bindende Zusäge für die britische Beteiligung an diesem Kampf mit allen verfügbaren Kräften zu erhalten, und die englische Presse beeilt sich demgemäß, zu versichern, daß den Briten diese Aufgabe nicht weniger am Herzen liege wie Roosevelt die Kriegführung in Europa.
Was den Kampf an der Westfront betrifft, so entspricht die publizistische Behandlung dieser Frage in der englisch-amerikanischen Presse anlässlich der Quebec-Konferenz mehr dem agitatorischen Bedürfnis, bereits einen Sieg vorwegzunehmen als der wirklichen Lage, die im Zeichen der sich ständig verstärkenden deutschen Abwehr und der wachsenden Schwierigkeiten steht, die sich für die Fortführung der anglo-amerikanischen Operationen ergeben. Es besteht Grund zu der Annahme, daß jetzt Roosevelt und Churchill angesichts der unermesslichen Verluste, womit sie im weiteren Verlauf des Sturmlaufes gegen die deutsche Front zu rechnen haben, eine politische Offensive ins Auge fassen werden, um nach dem Beispiel Wilsons im Jahre 1918 sich den Sieg durch Hintertüren zu erschleichen. Sie wissen genau, daß Deutschland in naher Zukunft gewichtige Trümpfe auszuspielen hat und daß für sie alles daran hängt, zu einer vorzeitigen Beendigung eines Kampfes zu gelangen, dessen Gewinnung durch Waffengewalt immer fragwürdiger werden muß.
Das deutsche Volk sieht einem Wiederaufleben der Pläne von 1943 mit dem Bewusstsein feiner unbeugsamen Moral entgegen. Es erblickt in solchen Versuchen am untauglichen Objekt nur den Beweis dafür, daß der Gegner Umwege wählen muß, weil er am Ort der militärischen Entscheidung nicht mehr mit einem Erfolg rechnen kann. Nicht nur die Erinnerung an den Betrug und Wortbruch von 1918 stärkt es in seinem Willen, diesen Kampf für Freiheit und Leben bis zum Sieg durchzufechten, sondern vor allem das Wissen um die Vernichtungspläne des Feindes, die dem Krieg das Wesen eines Ringens um Sein oder Nichtsein geben und uns eine Verknechtung zudenken, die in der Geschichte nicht ihresgleichen hätte. Alle Versuche, uns von dieser Kernfrage abzulenken und uns den Blick für die Absichten zu trüben, die unsere Gegner hegen, werden völlig ins Leere stoßen und nur dazu beitragen, unsere Entschlossenheit zum Einsatz aller Kraft für die Verteidigung des deutschen Lebens zu steigern.
vb.
Führer HQ (September 13, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
An der Westfront dauern die harten Abwehrkämpfe an den bisherigen Brennpunkten an. Zäher Widerstand unserer Truppen vereitelte feindliche Durchbruchsversuche nördlich Hasselt und aus dem Raum von Verviers in Richtung auf Aachen. In den Kämpfen der letzten Tage nördlich Luxemburg wurden 142 feindliche Panzer und Panzerspähwagen abgeschossen, 40 Panzerabwehrkanonen erbeutet oder vernichtet.
Über die obere Mosel sind amerikanische Verbände im Vorgehen auf Lunéville. Auch um Neufchâteau sind schwere Kämpfe im Gange. Der Druck des Feindes auf unsere Sicherungen zwischen Vesoul und der Schweizer Grenze hält an.
Gegen die befestigten Häfen im Westen haben sich die feindlichen Angriffe verstärkt. Der Feind griff Calais und Dünkirchen bis zu siebenmal vergeblich an. In Le Havre sind nach schwerstem Beschuss und rollenden Luftangriffen feindliche Panzer eingedrungen. Die Besatzung leistete bis zum Letzten tapferen Widerstand. Auch im Hauptkampffeld von Brest wird gegen fortgesetzte feindliche Angriffe von Truppen aller Wehrmachtteile erbittert gekämpft. Eigene Gegenangriffe warfen vor Lorient den Feind an mehreren Stellen zurück und fügten ihm erhebliche Schäden zu.
Die örtlichen Kämpfe an den Alpenpässen der französisch-italienischen Grenze dauern an. Mehrere feindliche Vorstöße wurden abgewiesen.
In Italien sind im Feber unserer überlegenen kämpfenden Nachtruppen zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe nördlich des Arno blutig zusammengebrochen. An der adriatischen Küste errangen unsere Divisionen von neuem einen vollen Abwehrerfolg gegen den zwischen Pian di Castello und Riccione vergeblich angreifenden Gegner.
Deutsche und ungarische Truppen schlugen im südlichen Siebenbürgen starke feindliche Angriffe zurück und schossen dabei eine Anzahl von Panzern ab.
Bei Sanok und Krosno halten die heftigen Angriffe der Sowjets an.
Südöstlich Warschau entbrannten heftige Kämpfe, in deren Verlauf die Sowjets, von zahlreichen Schlachtfliegern und Panzern unterstützt, einen Einbruch erzielen konnten. Weiter nördlich brachen die feindlichen Angriffe unter Verlust von 19 Panzern zusammen. Nordöstlich Ostrolenka verhinderten unsere Truppen in schweren Kämpfen unter Aufgabe von Lomscha einen auf breiter Front angestrebten Durchbruch der Sowjets.
Aus dem Raum von Raseinen, Schagarren und Bauske wird lebhaftere örtliche Kampftätigkeit gemeldet.
In Mittelfinnland versuchen die Sowjets immer wieder in unsere Absetzbewegungen hineinzustoßen. Sie mußten blutig abgewiesen werden.
Auf dem Balkan sind die Gegenmaßnahmen gegen den an die Westgrenzen Rumäniens und Bulgariens vorgehenden Feind im Gange.
Bei Tagesangriffen anglo-amerikanischer Bomberverbände auf mehrere Orte im Reichsgebiet am 12. September entstanden vor allem in Münster und München größere Schäden in Wohngebieten. Am 11. September wurde auch die Stadt Fulda betroffen.
In der vergangenen Nacht richteten sich Terrorangriffe des Feindes gegen Frankfurt am Main, Mainz und Stuttgart. Außerdem wurden Bomben auf Wiesbaden und Berlin geworfen.
In Luftkämpfen und durch Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe und der Kriegsmarine wurden 139 feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter 107 viermotorige Bomber, vernichtet.
In der Abwehrschlacht am unteren Narew haben sich die bayerische 7. Infanteriedivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant von Rappard und die Sturmgeschützbrigade 904 unter Führung von Major Türcke durch vorbildlichen Kampfgeist hervorragend bewährt. Im Panzerabwehrkampf hat sich Hauptmann Adamowitsch besonders hervorgetan.
Leutnant Voges, Kompanieführer im Grenadierregiment 11, und Stabsfeldwebel Golla, Pionierzugführer im gleichen Grenadierregiment, zeichneten sich durch besondere Tapferkeit aus.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 13, 1944)
Communiqué No. 158
LE HAVRE is now in Allied hands.
On the BELGIAN Coast, mopping-up continues between FURNES and ZEEBRUGGE.
Further progress has been made beyond the ALBERT CANAL.
North of LIÈGE, we have taken FORT ÉBEN-ÉMAEL. Forces advancing east and southeast of LIÈGE, after meeting strong resistance from German infantry, anti-tank guns, and mines in the LIMBOURG area, captured EUPEN and MALMEDY. Units crossed the German frontier east of EUPEN.
In the ARDENNES, our troops which liberated BASTOGNE, have advanced to the vicinity of CLERVAUX in northern LUXEMBOURG.
In the MOSELLE Valley, we have enlarged our bridgeheads across the river against heavy enemy resistance.
Concrete emplacements in the Seigfried Line in the neighborhood of SCHEID, some 50 miles west of KOBLENZ, were attacked by medium and light bombers yesterday. Other formations struck at a railway yard at SANKT WENDEL, artillery positions and observation posts in the BEVELAND and Dutch mainland.
Enemy transportation was attacked by fighters and fighter-bombers operating from HOLLAND to the MOSELLE River and from STRASBOURG to KARLSRUHE. Close support to our ground forces was also given by attacks on gun positions. According to reports so far received, 30 enemy aircraft were shot down and nine were destroyed in the ground. Two of our aircraft are missing.
U.S. Navy Department (September 13, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 115
Carrier-based aircraft of the Pacific Fleet shot down more than fifty enemy aircraft and destroyed more than 150 on the ground in a day-long attack against Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands in the Philippines on September 11 (West Longitude Date). Preliminary reports are fragmentary, but it is indicated that air operations are continuing against strong enemy opposition. Several cargo ships and numerous smaller craft were sunk in the initial attacks.
Paramushiru in the Kuril Islands was bombed and strafed by search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four on September 10. Waterfront installations along the southeast coast were the principal targets and several fires were started. Each of two medium cargo ships discovered near Paramushiru suffered a direct bomb hit and both were strafed. Strafing attacks were also delivered to a number of small craft offshore. On the same day, a Navy search plane bombed Shumushu Island, and another search plane shot down an enemy fighter east of Onekotan Island.
On September 11, 11th Army Air Force Mitchells bombed and strafed a number of vessels in the harbor at Shumushu, sinking one medium cargo vessel and four small cargo vessels. Two other small cargo vessels were damaged. Seven enemy fighters intercepted our planes and inflicted minor damage on one Mitchell but all returned safely. On the same day, Venturas of Fleet Air Wing Four bombed and strafed Paramushiru, Araido and Onekotan, setting fires to docks and warehouses.
Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force dropped 26 tons of bombs on airfields at Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands on September 10. Large fires were started. One of four intercepting enemy fighters was destroyed. Antiaircraft fire damaged two Liberators. On September 11, a lone Navy Catalina bombed an ammunition dump at Nauru Island, and Corsairs of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing hit the storage and magazine areas at Jaluit.
Pagan Island in the Marianas was attacked on September 11, by 7th Army Air Force Thunderbolts using bombs and rockets. Gun positions and buildings were hit.
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Ambassador Winant’s telegram number 7511 sent midnight September 12 reports that the European Advisory Commission on that date approved and signed, for submission to the three governments, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany (State Department’s note: with British and American zones left in blank) and the administration of greater Berlin.
CH
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Subject: ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO BRITISH-ARGENTINE MEAT NEGOTIATIONS
I must again refer to the matter of the British meat contract about which I sent you my memorandum of September 12.
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that the British Ministry of Food has informed the Argentine government that the British are disposed to sign a new contract for two years at the same prices as the current contract. The contract would be on the same basis as that recently concluded with New Zealand and Australia so that Britain would buy the entire exportable surplus for four years with prices subject to re-examination at the end of two years. The Embassy adds that this word from London came as a great relief to the Colonels.
I regret to say that it has become increasingly clear that the British continue to treat the Argentine Fascist threat as a matter of minor and relatively unimportant policy. To us it is a matter of major policy. If we fail in the implementation of that policy, the Nazis will have a powerful center to renew their fight in this Hemisphere economically, politically and eventually in a military way. This would mean inevitably the destruction of all that we have been trying to build since 1933.
In view of our enormous aid to the British on supply matters, it is certainly not asking too much to request that they forego the petty commercial advantages of a long-term bargain with a Fascist government. It is hard to believe that they will permit the Argentines to succeed in the “divide and conquer” tactics they are so obviously employing in the matter of the meat contract. As I have said time and again, the political implications of these meat negotiations are really tremendous. If they are concluded, as the Argentines hope they will be, their position will be greatly fortified and our own position correspondingly weakened throughout the Hemisphere.
CH
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/20
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 13, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-FIRST DAY
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
In addition to the matter which I took up in person with you today points of interest which were considered by the Joint Steering Committee at its 10:30 a.m. meeting today were as follows:
(a) Elimination of references to “technical” problems
This is a matter to which the American group attached very great importance and to which they have devoted several days of thorough discussion. At the 9:30 a.m. regular meeting of the American group this morning we agreed that we should accept a compromise provision making it one of the purposes of the organization “to achieve international cooperation in the solution of international, social and other humanitarian problem?”. At the Joint Steering Committee meeting I succeeded in obtaining the assent to this formula of Sir Alexander Cadogan and of Ambassador Gromyko, both of whom had previously rather strongly urged the inclusion of the word “technical.”
(b) Initial membership of the organization
Pursuant to a recommendation made by the American group this morning, I proposed that the provision relating to initial membership (Chapter III, paragraph 2) should read as follows: “The initial members of the organization should be signatories to the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942 and such other states as those nations may invite,” provided the four powers could now agree as to the other states to be so invited. The discussion was inconclusive and it is likely that the Soviet and British representatives do not yet thoroughly understand what we have in mind.
(c) Separate protocol as to Interim Arrangements
I also suggested that section D Interim Arrangements (p. 27) be omitted from the document and be made the subject of a separate protocol. Sir Alexander Cadogan agreed that this is a “transitory” provision and he therefore saw no objection to its being made into a separate document. However, he also apparently saw no objection to inclusion of this matter in the document itself. His assistant, Mr. Jebb, suggested that the reference in the document to this subject might say that it is intended to exclude such a provision from the charter itself in view of the provision’s transitory nature. Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought it would be appropriate to mention the subject in the document itself. We said that we would consider whether some reference to the subject might appropriately be included in the document and would give our answer subsequently.
(d) Provision designed to permit women to serve as members of the organization
The American group at its meeting this morning recommended that some provision be inserted in the document especially authorizing the organization to include women among its personnel. They approved the following provision designed to accomplish that purpose as well as other desirable purposes: “All positions under the organization should be open on the basis of pertinent qualifications without regard to race, nationality, creed, or sex.” I presented this provision at the meeting of the Joint Steering Committee and asked the British and Soviet groups to think about it and to give us their reactions later on. Their initial reaction seemed to be rather negative.
Afternoon Meeting of the American Group
At my request the American group met throughout the afternoon in an attempt to devise possible alternative formulae on the question of voting by the council in the event of disputes involving a permanent member. I explained that this is an important subject, that we had received no indication of any inclination on the part of the Soviet group to recede from the principle of unanimity of the great powers and that in view of the time element this is a matter to which the American group should proceed to give careful thought.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: DO/ConvA/JSC Mins. 13–18
Informal minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee
Washington, September 13, 1944, 10:30 a.m.
[Extract]
| Present: | Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Jebb of the British group; |
| Ambassador Gromyko, Mr. Sobolev, and Mr. Berezhkov of the Soviet group; | |
| Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Pasvolsky of the American group. | |
| Mr. Hiss also present, as secretary. |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At this point, Ambassador Gromyko said that on the basis of instructions received from his Government his position on the question of voting in the Council is unchanged. Mr. Stettinius asked whether it was likely that the instructions to which the Ambassador had referred represented the final word on this subject so far as the Soviet Government is concerned. The Ambassador said that this was the case. He went on to say that in the Soviet opinion the American and British proposal as to voting in the Council would violate the principle of unanimity. He said that the Soviet Government considers that this principle has from the beginning of negotiations relating to an international organization been a matter of very greatest importance.
Mr. Stettinius, in reply, said that the American Government attaches overriding importance to the acceptance of its proposal on this point. He said that, as the President had informed Ambassador Gromyko, it is very difficult to see how the American public, the world public, the American Senate, and the small nations throughout the world could accept a proposal by which a party to a dispute should vote. He said that the Ambassador’s statement came as a great disappointment and as a great blow. He said that the Soviet position might very easily mean that, because of the anticipated reaction of the smaller powers, no general conference on the subject could ever be held. Ambassador Gromyko said that the desire of the small nations is to live in peace and security and for this purpose their primary desire is that there be created an effective security organization.
Mr. Stettinius went on to say that the American Government simply cannot understand how any country could take the position that if it became involved in a dispute that dispute could not be brought before the Organization. Sir Alexander said that he believed that not one of the British Dominions would join the Organization if such a principle were to be adopted. Moreover, he did not believe that any of the smaller nations would join.
Mr. Stettinius said that at the moment he could not see that any purpose would be served by the issuance of a document from Dumbarton Oaks. Sir Alexander said that on the basis of the Soviet position the question arose as to what procedure should next be followed. He said that he did not know what to suggest in this connection and that he would have to think about the matter. Mr. Stettinius said that careful consideration must be given to the public effect of the Soviet position. He said that as Sir Alexander had stated the other day the question will necessarily arise in Parliament. He said that he himself had similarly said several days ago that the question will also come up in the American Congress. Both he and Sir Alexander had made plain that the views of each of the three powers on this matter would have to be made clear in answer to such questions. Sir Alexander said that however the matter may be regarded it is bound to be most awkward. If no statement is issued it will mean to the world that the Dumbarton Oaks conversations have failed. He said that he really did not know what would be the best thing to do under the circumstances.
At this point Mr. Stettinius asked Ambassador Gromyko whether he might appropriately inquire as to whether or not the President has received any message from Marshal Stalin. In reply, Ambassador Gromyko said that he did not know. In answer to a second inquiry by Mr. Stettinius, the Ambassador said that he thought that any reply to the President would have to come through his Embassy.
Mr. Pasvolsky said the Ambassador’s statement alters the whole situation and that we will all have to think about the possibilities. Sir Alexander said that he would have to consult Mr. Eden and that the question would be decided at a much higher level.
Mr. Stettinius then asked Ambassador Gromyko whether the Ambassador had any indication that his statement represented the final Soviet position on this point. Ambassador Gromyko replied that as he had said earlier this is the definite position of the Soviet Government. He said that on the general principle of unanimity there is no possibility of any kind of change. He went on to say that this position had been taken definitely by the Soviet group at the outset of the conversations and that on several occasions those views had been stated by him. He said that he had thought that the principle of unanimity had been the understood basis on which everyone was proceeding, that is to say, that the large countries should have a special position in the Organization by reason of the simple fact that they will bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace. He said that only the large countries have the necessary resources and military forces to be able to maintain peace and security. He said that he believes that the small countries accept this position and that it has in fact been taken for granted by everyone.
Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Stettinius said that they agreed that it is generally understood that the large powers must occupy a special position and must bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. Ambassador Gromyko said that it was for that reason that he had said so confidently that the other groups had agreed to the principle of unanimity.
Mr. Stettinius said that, however, the question is different with respect to disputes. Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought it was incorrect to assume that the great powers who are responsible for peace and security are necessarily going to have disputes. He added that one can assume that their successful cooperation during this war and their struggle for security at present would undoubtedly have a great importance for the maintenance of peace and security in the future. Sir Alexander said that he thought that other countries might think otherwise.
Mr. Stettinius said that the Ambassador’s statement meant that we have reached a climax. He pointed out that there remain no other open items which cannot be promptly settled. He said that if it would be possible to find an agreed formula on this point the Committee could meet again promptly.
Mr. Pasvolsky said that consideration must now be given as to whether the type of organization envisaged in the present draft of the document is still feasible.
Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether the others thought that there would be anything warranting further discussion this afternoon. Sir Alexander thought not but Mr. Stettinius thought that possibly there might be. Ambassador Gromyko said that he would be glad to meet at anytime the others desired.
Sir Alexander said that careful thought will have to be given to what recommendations can now be made to the respective governments as to what should be done under the circumstances. Mr. Stettinius said that quite frankly he was struggling in his own mind to see what could be done.
Mr. Dunn said that he thought that that is the important point, namely, to consider what can be done. He thought that the other nations will come along with any reasonable formula upon which the three groups might agree. He said that it might be possible to consider a proposal for a different kind of an organization. He said that it might be a good idea to take a look at a draft of such a proposal.
Ambassador Gromyko then said that he felt it was not necessary to point out that the Soviet group had in the course of the conversations made a number of concessions, if the word “concessions” could appropriately be used in connection with conversations in which all are working toward common agreement. He said that on several matters of importance to it, the Soviet Government had made concessions because of its realization of the great importance of reaching agreement with the other groups. Other members of the Committee remarked that concessions had been made by all the participants.
Sir Alexander then said that the matter under consideration is a vital point for all the other United Nations who, it had been hoped, could be invited to a general conference. Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the other nations of the world would accept the Soviet proposal. Mr. Sobolev said that he had no doubt of this. Ambassador Gromyko said that if the four powers present the proposal unanimously he had no shadow of doubt as to the positions of the other nations. He said that he did not believe the other nations are mainly interested in the procedure of voting within the Council; they are chiefly interested in peace and in an effective organization designed to preserve peace. He said that the four powers have not failed the other nations so far and that they merit the confidence of the other nations. Mr. Sobolev said that if the British and American proposal on this point were to be accepted it would mean that the existing situation between the great powers would thereby be changed. At present all matters are decided on the basis of unanimity.
At this point Mr. Stettinius said that he would like to ask the others to consider what the result of the Soviet proposal would be in the hypothetical situation of some action taken by the United States against Mexico. He said that there would be an impossible situation if the United States in such a case were to say that it would not permit the Council to consider the matter.
Mr. Stettinius then said we must all put our minds to the question of what we can do about this matter. Sir Alexander said that the fact of disagreement will have to become public. He said the question is just how the matter should be made public. He said we could announce that no agreement has been reached at Dumbarton Oaks, in which event the point of disagreement would become known sooner or later. Alternatively, he said, we could send a draft document to the other United Nations setting forth in the document the two alternative positions on this point. This second possible means of procedure would, he thought, give a very bad impression. Mr. Stettinius said that it would be necessary to take some action promptly.
Ambassador Gromyko then said that he could not imagine how there could be a conference if the four powers are not in agreement. He thought that any statement of alternative provisions or any footnote on disagreement would cause great confusion. Sir Alexander said that the fact of disagreement would become known in any event. Mr. Stettinius said that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would demand to see the document if the conversations ended without any publication of the document. Sir Alexander said that the press would invent all sorts of reasons for the failure to agree and that the real reason would soon have to become known.
Mr. Dunn said that he thought it would be better to issue a memorandum limited to those things on which agreement could be reached. He said that this might require a change in the form of the document, perhaps the document would have to be limited to an agreement simply to consult one another. Mr. Jebb said that enforcement provisions would have to be eliminated from the document if agreement were to be reached. Mr. Dunn agreed, saying that we could not expect the other United Nations to agree to all of the provisions now contained in the document. Mr. Jebb said the document would have to be quite a different one from the present draft. Mr. Dunn expressed his agreement with this view.
Mr. Jebb then said that recasting of the document along these lines would take quite some time; it could not be done in a day or two. Mr. Dunn said that he agreed and that he was thinking of a recasting of the whole form of the document.
Mr. Jebb wondered whether a recasting of the document would prove to be profitable employment of the time of the groups. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that a revised document would have to leave out the whole matter of voting and all provisions as to enforcement; it would provide merely for consultation. He said that he did not believe the world would think much of such a document.
Mr. Stettinius said that the American position could not be changed on this point and that he saw no area for concession from the American viewpoint. He said the matter has been thoroughly considered by the President, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Mr. Hull. He felt that the American position is unalterable regardless of future developments. He said that he wanted Ambassador Gromyko to understand this quite thoroughly; that he did not want the Ambassador to think that there is any chance of the American position being altered. Sir Alexander said that he thought that expressed Mr. Eden’s position also. Ambassador Gromyko said that he had fully informed his Government of the British and American positions.
He said that he also wished to point out that the Soviet group is unable to agree that action by the Council should require more than a simple majority. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he would have acceded to the Soviet position on this point if such a concession had been necessary in order to arrive at an agreement. Mr. Stettinius said that the American group had agreed to meet the Russian position on this point half way.
Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he felt Ambassador Gromyko’s position meant that four-power unanimity is in fact being abandoned. At this point Mr. Dunn said that he wanted to make a rather full statement. He said that the present situation is that the three powers are cooperating fully. The concept of establishing a world organization represented a new endeavor, another type of cooperation. He said that in view of the fact that the three powers are cooperating harmoniously in all cases and have every intention of continuing to cooperate in the future, he did not see why it should not be possible to draw up a document on which they could all agree. He said that it may be that such a document cannot provide for the particular machinery we have thus far had in mind. However, he felt that it is very important that we not consider that we have failed. He said that it is vastly important that these nations which are cooperating among themselves should now produce evidence that they will continue to cooperate in the future. He said that we must not allow any disagreement to creep into our relations. Sir Alexander expressed himself as in agreement with Mr. Dunn’s statement. Mr. Stettinius said that there must be no whisper that there have been any disagreements among the members of the Committee. Ambassador Gromyko said that he could give assurance that there would be no such disclosure on the part of the Soviet group.
Mr. Stettinius said that the members of the Committee must leave Dumbarton Oaks in agreement. He asked what hope there would be for future peace and security if the three nations did not remain shoulder-to-shoulder in the future as they had fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the present war. He said that this matter of continued close cooperation is a matter on which the very future of civilization depends. Sir Alexander expressed his agreement with Mr. Stettinius’ remarks but he said that consideration must be given to how the matter is to be presented publicly. He said that there is a terrible danger of speculation by the press and by others as to why no agreement along the lines previously indicated is promptly forthcoming.
Mr. Jebb said that the three groups will have to work hard and quickly. Mr. Stettinius inquired how long the others thought it would take to draw up an agreed-upon document. Mr. Dunn said that the joint formulation group has met all demands which have heretofore been made upon it. He said that it might perhaps be possible to shorten the document considerably.
At this point Mr. Stettinius asked what the others thought of the possibility of leaving the matter of voting in the Council for discussion at the general conference of the United Nations. Mr. Sobolev thought that it would not be possible to do that and Mr. Jebb also felt that that could not be done.
Mr. Stettinius then asked Ambassador Gromyko what the latter thought would be the effect of the Soviet formula on world opinion. Ambassador Gromyko replied that the effect upon the world would be the effect produced by the document as a whole. He said that he did not wish to separate the point under discussion from the rest of the document which contains many valuable and constructive provisions. He felt that the other countries of the world would gladly accept the document as a whole. He said that although the question of voting is important for the great powers and for the Organization it is, however, considered separately, a question of secondary importance for other nations. They are most of all interested in the effectiveness of the Organization.
Sir Alexander said he would wish to consult his Government as to the possibility of a new type of document.
Mr. Stettinius said that in adjourning the meeting he wanted it to be clearly understood that there would be no hint of any disagreement among the three groups and that the situation in fact is that all questions which have been raised remain under discussion. The other members of the Committee expressed their full agreement with these views.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether the others wished to meet again this afternoon. Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan said that they are prepared to meet at any time. The meeting was adjourned with the understanding that no definite time for the next meeting would be set but that the members of the Committee would remain subject to call by Mr. Stettinius, as chairman, and that in the meantime the joint formulation group would continue its work.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:45 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Brown | General Ismay | |
| Major General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves |
McFarland minutes
September 13, 1944, 11:45 a.m.
Top secret
The Prime Minister, at the President’s request, opened the discussion. He said that since SEXTANT the affairs of the United Nations had taken a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Tehran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same day as the launching of the great Operation OVERLORD, we had captured Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing. He wished to congratulate the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of DRAGOON, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of France were now being systematically cleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since Tehran.
According to the British minutes of this meeting, Churchill said “that future historians would say that the period since Tehran had shown the successful working of an extraordinarily efficient inter-Allied war machine.”
The President said that no little of the credit for the conception of DRAGOON should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his suggestion rather than ours.
The Prime Minister, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its end up with an overall population, including the overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.
Turning to Italy, the Prime Minister said that General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then, the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to make a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in this theater was the largest representative British Empire Army in existence. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander’s Army until either Kesselring’s Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy.
General Marshall said there was no thought of withdrawing any forces until the outcome of General Alexander’s present operations was known.
The Prime Minister emphasized that if the Germans were run out of Italy, we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a right-handed movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. He had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain LSTs now engaged in DRAGOON, to provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia’s policy would be after she took it.
The Prime Minister then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces.
In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the fighting in the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this reason, the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan DRACULA, which would be preceded by Plan CAPITAL Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase II. Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw forces. What was wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.
There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part. They had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command.
The President said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale.
According to the British minutes of this meeting, Roosevelt’s statement is recorded as follows: “The President intervened to say that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted.”
The Prime Minister , continuing, said there would be available a powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next year, their newest 15-inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur’s command.
As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later date. In Burma there were 15 divisions which might ultimately be drawn upon. He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific.
There was nothing cast iron in these ideas. First, we should do DRACULA, and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our keyword should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.
The President thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representatives there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany.
It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity.
In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine. In his view the “West Wall” was the right bank of the Rhine which would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose, our plans must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the “end run” method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this bypassing technique which had been employed with considerable success at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to bypass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bangkok? Singapore may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions.
The Prime Minister suggested that the seizure of localities such as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned, he did not favor the bypassing method. There would undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons to the south be completely cut off?
Admiral King replied that these garrisons would be strangulated and must ultimately perish.
The Prime Minister said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Tehran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten. There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight.
The President referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide rather than be taken.
Sir Charles Portal said that he hoped to have available between 600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber squadrons.
The Prime Minister asked about the employment to be made of the British Fleet.
The President said his thought was to use it in any way possible.
Admiral King said that a paper on this subject had been prepared for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The question was being actively studied.
The Prime Minister asked if it would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States.
Admiral King replied that speaking for himself, he could only say that the matter was under examination.
The Prime Minister said that the offer had been made and asked if it was accepted.
The President replied in the affirmative.
The Prime Minister enquired whether an undertaking could be given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations.
General Marshall said that he and General Arnold were trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes – now we had a surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and in Malaya, they would require a large proportion of their air forces for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter operations and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment of Japan?
Sir Charles Portal replied that there was a distinction. The Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of the B-29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 900 miles.
The British minutes have the following additional statement by Churchill at this point:
The Prime Minister remarked that for the future good relations of the two countries, on which so much depended, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main operations against Japan. The United States had given the most handsome assistance to the British Empire, in the fight against Germany. It could only be expected that the British Empire in return should give the United States all assistance in their power towards the defeat of Japan.
The President observed that there were certain groups in the United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory was that evil could be eradicated from the German makeup and the nation could be rejuvenated by kindness.
The Prime Minister said that such sentiments would hardly be tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.
In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that it was clear that a very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British Staffs.
Admiral Leahy agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties in reaching agreement on all points at issue.
The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to CSA
Moscow, 13 September 1944
Top secret
To AGWar for General Marshall information to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz from Deane TopSec MX 20947.
Copy sent direct to Eisenhower.
Simultaneously with the receipt of your OCTAGON 10 dated 12 September I received information from USSTAF that the project was scheduled for today, September 13. The British and American Ambassadors and I saw Mr. Molotov who arranged for approval to be given by the Red Army General Staff. General Spaatz was informed of approval and as a result the mission is now scheduled for September 14. I shall await word from General Spaatz as to whether this one mission completes the project or if he proposes to send representatives to Moscow to work out a plan for continued support. I do not believe it is necessary for representatives to come here since all details of plan should be worked out in London. Really, all that is necessary here is Soviet approval which the British and American missions can attempt to secure here once they have been informed of the plan.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President and the Secretary of State
Moscow, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Priority
Top secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.
Cable Nr 122231 WH 63 from Mr. Hull regarding aid to the insurgents in Warsaw reached me only late tonight. On the basis of an earlier message received by the Military Mission from General Spaatz I spoke to Molotov last night regarding an operation by our Air Force which Molotov approved after telephoning to Red Army General Staff. Today General Deane talked to an officer of Red Army General Staff inquiring what the Soviets intended to do on their own account. He replied that the Red Army had nothing planned. General Deane and head of British Military Mission will jointly approach Red Army General Staff tomorrow to press for the carrying out by the Red Army of the promise of the Soviet Government to render assistance itself. I will see Molotov if a satisfactory answer is not obtained.
The President’s Special Assistant to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Dear Mr. President: I have had several talks with General O’Dwyer, Crowley and the State Department relative to the Italian business. The attached memo supplements the statement which you have with you on Italy.
It seems to me that there are great advantages to be accrued to us if you can take the initiative and get Churchill’s approval to a course of action which you would announce publicly.
The machinery for getting quick action relative to immediate relief and the purchase of material for economic rehabilitation is available. The Italians can pay for all of the goods to be bought in this country, other than emergency relief supplies, out of funds which would accrue to them from our soldiers’ pay.
The Prisoner of War business, I think, should be cleared up just as soon as possible and, of equal importance, is the obvious necessity of amending the Armistice terms.
HLH
[Attachment]
Memorandum prepared in the Department of State
[Undated] Confidential and personalMemorandum for Mr. Hopkins, the White House
I refer to Mr. Jones’ conversation with you Monday morning, September 11.
American policy toward Italy is based upon our desire to see that nation return to political and economic independence and stability as quickly as possible. We do not believe that Italy will contribute to an orderly and peaceful Europe if it is subject to any one of its more powerful neighbors. This Government has specifically assured the Italian people the right to choose the form of government they may desire when they are in a position to exercise that right. Political independence for Italy, free from foreign domination, would seem to be implicit in this pledge.
The economic wellbeing of a country is the prime factor in its internal stability and its peaceful relations with other states. The economic dependence of one state upon another is not conducive to such wellbeing and may ultimately have undesirable political implications. Furthermore, since the United States is bearing the major share of the civilian supply quota for Italy, it is sound American policy to help Italy again become self-supporting and to regain a measure of economic independence at an early date.
In the immediate future increased civilian supplies, principally foodstuffs, are essential to prevent further deterioration in Italian public health and morale in the ever-increasing portions of liberated Italy. The three principal problems to be solved are:
- Available shipping to carry supplies from this country.
- Internal transportation to distribute it to the various populated centers.
- Method of payment.
A specific and sufficient allocation of shipping for civilian supplies should be obtained from the War Department or other United States agency.
Two thousand trucks are needed for the distribution of supplies for civilians in the present liberated area. Army trucks within the theater should be made available to the extent possible (not convenient) by the Supreme Allied Command. Once hostilities have ceased, a sufficient number of United States Army trucks and tractors in the theater could be made available for this purpose until the internal transportation system can be rehabilitated at least in a basic sense.
When the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy, plus immigrant remittances and Italian exports to this country, is made available to the Italian Government, almost all the foreign exchange required for the purchase of civilian supplies in this country will be provided. (It is believed that this proposal is at present on the President’s desk, having received British concurrence, and could be put into effect immediately if approved.) Limited UNRRA participation in the medical field and in assistance to displaced persons of Italian nationality up to $50,000,000 is essential to supplement the civilian supply program mentioned above. Every effort therefore should be made to assure that agreement to this proposal is given at the UNRRA conference in Montreal this month.
As to the second phase of Italy’s economic problems, we should now make possible the primary rehabilitation of its agriculture and essential industries in order that the Italian nation can begin to be self-supporting again. Hence the Italian supply program should not be limited, as it has been so far, to consumers’ goods but should make available fertilizer, seeds, spare parts and essential raw materials to permit the resumption of Italian production for the nation’s basic consumers’ needs. This will require not only a sufficient shipping allocation but sufficient funds to finance such a program even on a limited scale. The United States’ funds to be made available to the Italian Government from troop pay, immigration remittances, et cetera, will probably not cover such an undertaking in addition to the consumers goods which must be purchased over the next year for immediate consumption by the population. The following additional methods of financing might prove feasible.
The War Department could continue its present practice of certifying Lend-Lease funds, on the basis of military necessity, to finance a civilian supply program of minimum subsistence. This would provide for the principal portion of the importation of consumers’, goods, and the foreign exchange available to the Italian Government from troop pay, et cetera, would then be sufficient to finance a basic rehabilitation program for Italian agriculture and industry.
Private Italian assets in this country, estimated roughly at $74,000,000, could be taken over by the Italian Government and used as security for an Italian Government loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purchase of basic rehabilitation supplies.
On the political side it is desirable to clarify our relations with Italy, which has been a co-belligerent with the United Nations in the war against Germany for almost a year. During that time the Italian Government – Armed Forces and people – have cooperated sincerely and to the best of their limited resources in the common fight. They have “worked their passage” to a considerable extent. The United States and Great Britain could revise Italian Armistice terms which have been rendered largely obsolete by the course of events, or we could conclude a preliminary peace treaty with Italy, terminating the state of war existing between it and the United Nations, postponing for future settlement the more complicated issues of territorial dispositions and reparations.
Specific steps should meanwhile be undertaken immediately to support the representative and liberal Italian Government and to encourage the various democratic groups in Italy who are working for the regeneration of their country. These might include:
The removal from prisoner-of-war status of Italian soldiers in the British Empire, North Africa, Italy and this country and their return to regular military status under Italian Command with ultimate authority for their disposition and use resting in the Allied Theater Commander or respective British and American military authorities. It is an anomalous situation, to say the least, that while Italian divisions are fighting with the United Nations on the Italian front and Italian resources are being employed to the fullest extent in the common struggle against Germany, we continue to hold Italian prisoners of war not only abroad but in Italy itself. The non-combat services which they are now performing in these areas could be performed as effectively if they had the status of Italian soldiers under Italian command. A solution of this problem would be a concrete and important gesture of support to the present Italian Government.
The acceptance of Italian technical representatives by the various United Nations to handle financial and economic problems and to resume the protection of Italian interests in the various United Nations which is still being performed by third powers.
Italian participation in the various international organizations, such as the ILO, UNRRA, Food and Agricultural Organization, Financial and Monetary Conference, et cetera. Italy also desires to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, this without reference to membership in the United Nations.
Resumption of United States’ participation in the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome until such time as it is superseded or absorbed by the proposed Food and Agricultural Organization.
A copy of a memorandum which was prepared in this office for the President’s use in Quebec is attached for your information.