Editorial: Québec problems
International and European political questions doubtless will be dealt with by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill before their Québec Conference closes. There are plenty such hanging fire. Some, including the German and Polish problems, are of great urgency. But the early sessions of the conference are to be almost exclusively military.
European military decisions related to the approaching victory over Germany cannot be reached without Marshal Stalin, who has his hands too full on the Eastern Front to travel to Canada. Tentative Anglo-American agreements will be passed on to Moscow in preparation for the earliest possible meeting with Marshal Stalin. The weakness of this plan, however, is that smaller nations are still excluded. Unless they are called in noon, most of the basic questions will have been decided by the Big Three or by the swift passage of events – which would be neither fair nor effective.
Apparently Pacific military problems are first on the Québec agenda. Most of those boil down to the matter of British participation. Hitherto Britain has been too busy at home and in the Mediterranean to help much in the Far East. Most of her forces there are Indian and immobilized in India.
Lord Louis Mountbatten’s Southeast Asia Command, which was set up and over-advertised at a similar conference a year ago, has achieved little. The British have pushed back the Japs who slopped over the Indian border, and Gen. Stilwell’s American-Chinese forces have reclaimed much of northern Burma under hard conditions.
But Lord Mountbatten’s attack on South Burma, and his naval-air end run for Singapore and the South China sea, have not materialized. He, according to reports, is not to blame. London and New Delhi never felt they could give him the required equipment and forces.
Now the question is how much aid Britain will give in the Pacific War, and how long it will take after Hitler’s defeat. Officially the London government has given plenty of promises publicly of all-out war against Japan. But at the same time, Mr. Churchill has promised England large-scale demobilization of troops and reconversion of industry as soon as the European conflict ends. This policy is popular in England, where there is inevitable war weariness after five years and much less feeling than here about the Jap menace.
To a lesser extent the American policy of partial demobilization and reconversion after Hitler’s fall also influences Pacific war plans. Though our government says it will not permit the Army cutback or the changeover to peace production to interfere with Pacific requirements, there is hope in Tokyo and fear in Washington that there will be an American letdown.
Actually, most of our naval and air forces and many of our technical ground forces – along with increased war production in some lines – will be required for the big and bloody Pacific job ahead. Devoting one hand to military and industrial reconversion to peace, while using the other hand for so-called all-out war against Japan, calls for a near-miracle of coordination.
But a Québec agreement for a fair sharing of effort in the Pacific War can hasten Jap defeat.