Québec Conference 1943 (QUADRANT)

740.00116 European War 1939/1136

The Dutch Ambassador to President Roosevelt

Washington, August 22, 1943.

My Dear Mr. President, In the course of Her latest visit to Hyde Park the Queen discussed with you the opportunity of issuing a declaration with a view to preventing as much as possible destruction by the Germans upon their leaving the occupied countries. The Queen discussed this idea also with the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary, who were in favour of it and asked for a draft declaration. Such a draft has now been prepared and approved by Her Majesty.

Acting upon instructions I have just received, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft which has also been handed to the British Foreign Office.

Dr. van Kleffens instructs me moreover to submit to you the request that this draft be discussed with the British Prime Minister, if this would be agreeable to you.

I beg to add that the Queen would have no objection against a shorter and more strongly worded text.

Dr. van Kleffens would highly appreciate if further consultations could take place for the final drafting of this declaration and its subsequent handling, especially with regard to the opportune moment of its publication. In this connection Dr. van Kleffens ventures the suggestion whether it would be desirable to ask the Soviet Union to participate.

With my highest esteem [etc.]


Draft Declaration

In the regions of Europe which Germany has occupied, the German authorities and their subordinates have shown a measure of harshness and cruelty which not only violates clear and binding rules of international law but runs counter to the most elementary feelings of common decency. Confinement in concentration camps of evil and sinister repute, seizure of hostages (a practice expressly forbidden in a solemn treaty of 1907, to which Germany has expressly adhered) and large-scale deportation of men and even of women, are common German practice and these are far from being the worst offences committed in the name of Germany. In many cases, especially in Eastern Europe and with regard to the Jews, German action assumed proportions of bestiality. Wholesale slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people will be forever a blot on the German name. In the economic field the Germans have taken measures indicating that far from their showing any regard for the occupied countries and their population, they are bent upon crippling the resources of those territories. The German nation as a whole may not as yet have a full knowledge of all the savagery and brutality committed in its name. But that nation cannot be presumed to be ignorant of what has been and still is being done. Remembering further what the German authorities did towards the end of the last war in territory then under their occupation, the Governments of . . . . . . . issue the following warning to the German Government, civil and military authorities and people:

When the hour of liberation strikes for the occupied regions, those Germans who are stationed there may receive orders, or feel inclined to do their utmost not to leave the territory they hold before having wrought havoc, not only by an attempt to destroy objects of value to the wellbeing of the country concerned but also by murdering or deporting a still larger part of the population. All Germans should bear in mind that those guilty of such acts will be held responsible for their misdeeds, not only the leaders and authorities who plan crimes of this kind or give orders to commit them, but also the actual perpetrators. Moreover, from now on any further action against the population of the occupied regions including that part of the population that has been deported to Germany – In complete disregard of international law – either as prisoners or as hostages, as workers in war-industries or otherwise, any act of destruction calculated to obstruct the resumption of the economic or social life of the occupied countries to impoverish them or to impede their recovery, exposes Germany and the Germans to retaliation of the severest kind.

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Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Moscow, August 22, 1943.


Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to Premier Minister Winston Churchill.

  1. I have received your message[s] concerning the negotiations with the Italians and the new terms of armistice with Italy. Thank you for the information.

Mr. Eden told Mr. Sobolev that Moscow was fully informed about the negotiations with Italy. I have, however, to say that Mr. Eden’s statement does not correspond with reality, as I have received your message in which long passages are omitted and which has no concluding paragraphs. In view of this, it is necessary to state that the Soviet Government is not informed about the negotiations of the British and the Americans with the Italians. Mr. Kerr gives assurance that within a short time he will receive the complete text of your message; although the three days have passed, and Ambassador Kerr has not yet given me the complete text of the message. I cannot understand how such delay could have occurred during the transmission of the information on such important matter.

  1. I believe that the time is ripe to organize the military-political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain and the USSR with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different Governments dissociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

  2. I am waiting for the complete text of your message concerning the negotiations with Italy.

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Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Roosevelt and Churchill conferred from 11 p.m. until midnight.

U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)

Roosevelt-Robertson meeting, forenoon

United States Canada
President Roosevelt Mr. Robertson

During the morning Roosevelt received Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs.

The Pittsburgh Press (August 23, 1943)

Québec puzzle –
Russia only major ally now absent

Australia and China join in war conferences now nearing an end
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

Québec, Canada –
Announcement that Australian representation was being added to the Québec Conference today focused new attention on the absence of Russia, now the only one of the big Allied fighting powers without some representative in the war talks led by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Sir William Glasgow, High Commissioner for Australia in Canada, was due from Ottawa. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox arrived by plane from Washington. And there was some indication that Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, absent from Washington, might have been called into the conference.

Deny connection

Represented now by top men in the Québec war conferences approaching a conclusion were the United States, Great Britain, Canada, China and Australia.

Official sources still denied any connection between the Québec Conference and the Russian withdrawal of Ambassador Maxim Litvinov from Washington. But they admitted that the timing of the announcement raised a multitude of questions as to the impression the Soviet was trying to convey to the world.

Virtually every important war figure in the higher echelons of the British, American and Canadian governments was on hand. Mr. Roosevelt scheduled a series of continuous conferences during the day and it was definitely known that the meetings are at a point of final approval of a master plan for destructive operations against the Axis the remainder of this year.

Mystery continues

As the arrivals of new officials here continued so did the air of mystery over the conference of the past seven days. Last night, some officials tacitly advised some of their contacts that today would bring a big announcement. A morning press conference produced the news that Mr. Churchill and Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King were to make an automobile tour of the city.

Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, lunched with President Roosevelt and was expected to remain for additional talks in the afternoon. Mr. Roosevelt was devoting some time in preparing his Ottawa speech.

May blitz cities

While official sources cautioned against excluding any war theater from speculation, there were increasing indications that an intensification of the aerial offensive against Italy was near. The plans, it was believed, called for such cities as Naples, Brindisi and Taranto to be “Hamburged” from the air, and then, if the Italian government still refused to capitulate, an invasion.

Dr. Soong’s arrival yesterday was followed by a statement from White House Press Secretary Stephen T. Early:

The President expected to confer as soon as possible with Dr. Soong. Mr. Churchill will participate in these discussions which have to do with the plans for the war on Japan, the emphasis being given to that and all points pertaining to the war on Japan.

Welcomes Stimson

Yesterday, the conference at the Citadel began right after breakfast. Mr. Roosevelt welcomed Mr. Stimson, then lunched with the Prime Minister and the War Secretary and a number of others.

After lunch, the President drove to the Isle d’Orleans with Mrs. Churchill and inspected several old churches. Lewis O. Douglas, American deputy war shipping administrator, who was once principal of McGill University and who has an intimate knowledge of Québec Province, acted as “guide.”

Hold long parley

After the drive, Mr. Roosevelt joined Mr. Churchill, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under Secretary for External Affairs in the British government, and James C. Dunn, State Department political advisor.

The conference began about 5:30 p.m. and lasted far into the night. It obviously involved bigtime foreign policy from the political standpoint.

While the intensive conferences were going on in the Citadel, the armed staff chiefs and many of their aides, including some secretarial help and technical experts, cruised on the St. Lawrence and the Saguenay Rivers. Leaving Saturday night, they returned late yesterday.

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Québec sure Reds won’t make peace

Allied strategy based on belief that Russia will stay in war
By Henry J. Taylor

Québec, Canada –
The overwhelming fact which emerged from this conference cannot be told officially. The absolute conviction among the conferees in the Québec discussions is that Germany and Russia will not make an armistice or in any way arrive at a separate peace.

The reason this cannot be told officially is, of course, because this source of widespread anxiety and speculation throughout the United States and Great Britain cannot be recognized officially. But this correspondent has established the fact through direct contact and individual inquiry.

The directives emanating from this conference and every plan decided here are based on the conviction that there will be no diminution of fighting on Germany’s Eastern Front.

This possibility effects every fundamental in Allied strategy. In a military problem so large as this you cannot make alternate plans which include such an eventuality as this. It bears directly on the size of our forces needed for victory., the time and place of opening the so-called second front, the disposition of the British Navy from European waters to help us in the Pacific, the design of our Air Force equipment and organization, the type of it we are willing to supply Russian under Lend-Lease and, most of all, the length of the war and its cost in blood, sweat and tears.

The time comes when you have to make up your mind. The time has come. The minds are made up. Plans which would be disastrous if the Germans were in any way released from fighting on their Eastern Front have been agreed to here and the die is cast.

The news value of this dispatch – and it is vastly important news – is that anyone in our country or abroad who believes that there may be a reproachment between Russia and Germany differs with the final judgment of the conference of Québec.

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U.S. State Department (August 23, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill-Soong luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

United States United Kingdom China
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Minister Soong
Mr. Hopkins

Roosevelt lunched with Churchill, Soong, and Hopkins. Soong thanked Hull for mentioning to Roosevelt at Québec the problem of “the 40,000 tons of munitions promised China by Canada and later revoked by Canada at the request of Mr. Currie” and “said that he [Soong] followed this up with a talk with the President which was satisfactory.” The occasion on which Soong discussed this question with Roosevelt has not been definitely identified, but the luncheon meeting of August 23, 1943, appears to have been the most likely opportunity for such a discussion.

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Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Badger Admiral Noble
Major General Handy Lieutenant General Macready
Major General Fairchild Air Marshal Welsh
Brigadier General Kuter Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Brigadier Porter
Commander Freseman Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Long Captain Tollemache
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m.


Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these conclusions, certain amendments made to CCS 319/3 would necessitate consequential amendments in CCS 319/2.

Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 319/3)

Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister contained in CCS 319/3.

Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below.

In the course of discussion, General Marshall suggested that there might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that it had originally been thought that it might be possible to put the Commander-in-Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter’s operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented.

General Marshall said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties, but had hoped that some system similar to the French “zones des armées” might be instituted.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that this point had also been considered and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area.

General Arnold suggested that with regard to the examination of future operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, since the possession of these islands would be of great value to operations in this Theater.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the Planning Staff would certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the operations which they had been instructed to examine.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (subsequently circulated as CCS 319/4), and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at the Citadel.

Japanese Treatment of Prisoners

General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum on the treatment of U.S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. This memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme.

Pipeline From India to China (CCS 312; 312/1)

It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in CCS 312 might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma.

General Somervell said that the U.S. craft sent to India for the pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired.

After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved, subject to prior requirements of military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

Operations From India (CCS 327)

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that there were three possible courses open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44, and that it seemed clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow of the full accomplishment of more than one of these.

General Somervell pointed out that operations in North Burma would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the capacity of the lines of communication.

After a full discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.

b. That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he should regard the decision in a above as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the lines of communication.

Movement of the QUEENS (CCS 246/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the QUEENS should revert to running on a 21-day cycle.

Amphibians for OVERLORD (CCS 326)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 326 until after the QUADRANT conference.

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals (CCS 317/1-317/2-317/3)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 1943 be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September–31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.

b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower’s radio (W7177) of 13 August 1943.

Operation RANKIN (CCS 320)

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces could be used for occupation purposes. An insufficient emphasis had been laid on the value of air power to quell the population.

Admiral Leahy said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

Sir Alan Brooke drew attention to the recommendation, contained in Paragraph 20b, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group was of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN contained in CCS 320, but directed that this plan be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would give early consideration to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom.

Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories (CCS 324/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of CCS 324/1.

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic (CCS 222/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of this paper.

Meeting With Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day.

Future Meetings

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1030 on Tuesday, 24 August.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 23 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 327

Operations From India

  1. We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

  2. These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.

  3. Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief’s views, and we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:

a. Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at TRIDENT for Northern Burma.

b. The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.

c. If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinleck’s opinion the extensive use of LRPGs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the LRPGs must be followed up by our main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.

d. Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer-term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.

  1. We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  2. Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943-44; and it seems clear that the existing capacity of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:

  • First Course. To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the airlift to China.
  • Second Course. To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.
  • Third Course. To adopt a longer-term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.
  1. We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the L. of C.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

Québec, 23 August 1943.

Most secret
CCS 317/3

Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals

We agree with the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once subparagraphs 10a and b of CCS 317, provided that the following is inserted at the end of subparagraph a, “insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.”

If you agree, we suggest that the necessary action should now be taken without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT.

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Roosevelt-Mountbatten meeting, 5 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Vice Admiral Mountbatten

Roosevelt conferred with Mountbatten for half an hour beginning at 5 p.m.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins General Brooke
Admiral Leahy Admiral of the Fleet Pound
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Field Marshal Dill
General Arnold Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Rear Admiral Brown Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 23, 1943, 5:30 p.m.


At the request of the Prime Minister, Brigadier Jacob read CCS 819/3[319/4], a draft of the Final Report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister containing the conclusions of the Quadrant Conferences.

There was no comment on Sections I, II, and III.

Facilities in the Azores Islands

With reference to Section IV, paragraph 1b, the Prime Minister asked if any measures had been taken as yet to prepare a combined British-U.S. convoy including escorts and air support to move to the Azores about two weeks after the original British occupation on 8 October.

Admiral King said that arrangements would be made for such a convoy to leave the United States on or about 20 October.

Emergency Operation to Enter the Continent

The President asked if a study was being made regarding an emergency entrance of the Continent and indicated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians.

General Brooke replied that General Morgan’s staff had prepared plans for such an entry and that they were based on several contingencies. These include ‘a weakening of German resistance, a withdrawal of the German forces from France, or a complete German collapse.

Operation OVERLORD

The Prime Minister stated that he wished it definitely understood that British acceptance of the planning for Operation OVERLORD included the proviso that the operation could only be carried out in the event that certain conditions regarding German strength were met. These included the number of German divisions to be in France and a definite superiority over the German fighter force at the time of the initial assault. Further, that if it developed that the German ground or air fighter strength proved to be greater than that upon which success of the plan was premised, the question as to whether or not the operations should be launched would be subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In this connection he suggested that the United Nations have a “second string to their bow” in the form of a prepared plan to undertake Operation JUPITER. He did not in any way wish to imply that he was not wholeheartedly in favor of OVERLORD, but, at the same time, he wished to emphasize that its launching was dependent upon certain conditions which would give it a reasonable chance for success.

It was decided that the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister should include a paragraph which would provide for continued planning for the launching of Operation JUPITER in the event that OVERLORD should have to be abandoned.

The Prime Minister also discussed the question of moving seven trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England. He agreed that at this time the decision to return the seven divisions to England was firm but that it was subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if the strategic situation seemed to make such review advisable. He asked General Brooke if that was definitely understood.

General Brooke said that at the present time it was planned that the seven trained divisions would return from the Mediterranean to England to participate in OVERLORD unless the situation forced the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reconsider this decision. This decision of course would be dependent upon the enemy situation at the time. It might be necessary to keep one or two of these trained divisions in the Mediterranean in order to create a more favorable situation for the success of OVERLORD or to avoid a setback in Italy.

The Prime Minister said that if it becomes necessary to make an interchange of divisions between England and the Mediterranean, it might be clone without prejudice to the move of the seven divisions by exchanging others. For example, it might be necessary to send out a second Canadian division to complete a Canadian Corps and bring home a British division in its place. Meanwhile, he stated he had heard Brigadier MacLean give a presentation of the OVERLORD plan and that it seemed sound, but should be strengthened.

General Marshall agreed to this and pointed out that actually there would be four and one-half divisions in the initial assault rather than a force of three divisions which had been suggested at the last conference with the President and the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister asked if this would include an attack on the inside of the Cotentin Peninsula.

General Marshall said the present plans would not provide for such an operation but that if more landing craft could be made available there was a possibility that this landing would be included in the initial assault.

The Prime Minister expressed some surprise that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, had been designated as Naval Commander and he indicated that he had always thought of this officer as having administrative rather than outstanding tactical ability. He agreed with the choice of Air Commander-in-Chief.

Sir Dudley Pound said that he felt that the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth was the logical person to be given this command, particularly at this time. During the preliminary phases much of the naval planning and operations had to be accomplished between adjoining naval commands in Great Britain and he was the logical person to coordinate it. He said that if later events indicated the desirability, there would be no difficulty in designating a new commander.

The Prime Minister said that he had thought of giving this position to Admiral Ramsay who had been in command of the British naval operations in the attack on Sicily under the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean. He would accept the present arrangement only if it were subject to review on the appointment of the Supreme Commander.

In discussing the transport of troops across the channel, the President recalled that in 1917 two light American passenger vessels, the HARVARD and the YALE, had been sent to England and had been utilized very successfully in transporting troops across the channel. He suggested that the world should be combed to see if vessels of this type could not be made available and thus increase the troop lift from England to France.

Admiral King said that the United States had been pretty well explored in this connection but he would see what else could be done.

The Prime Minister indicated the possibility of asking Canada to help out in this respect.

Operations in Italy and Southern France

The Prime Minister said that there had recently been rumors that the Germans were planning to defend the Ravenna-Genoa Line in Italy, which is about 50 or 60 miles north of the Ancona-Pisa Line. He thought that our forces should proceed as far beyond their objective as possible with the troops allocated for the purpose.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt the Germans must defend on the forward or southern slope of the Apennines, in which case they would be somewhat south of the Ravenna-Genoa Line.

Admiral King agreed with this and thought that the terrain dictated a German defense on the Leghorn-Ancona position.

The Prime Minister felt that the further north in Italy the United Nations were able to progress, the easier would become the supply of guerrillas who might be assembled in the Maritime Alps. In this connection he said he was glad to see that steps had already been taken to investigate the possibility of intensifying fifth column activities in Sardinia. He thought that organizations such as the OSS and the British SOE should certainly enter Sardinia at this time. However, he suggested that if Italy capitulates, Sardinia would probably come into our hands without a struggle.

Sir Alan Brooke said that there were conflicting reports in this regard. One was that the Germans would attempt to hold Sardinia and another was that they were assembling landing craft between Sardinia and Corsica for the purpose of effecting an evacuation.

The Prime Minister said that if an advance into Southern France appeared to be likely he thought that General Giraud and General de Gaulle should be brought into consultation by General Eisenhower and that French forces should be fully utilized.

The President indicated that he felt guerrilla operations could be initiated in south central France as well as in the Maritime Alps.

The War Against Japan

The Prime Minister said that he was glad to see that the Chiefs of Staff included provision that plans should be made for the defeat of Japan within 12 months after the collapse of Germany; this at least would be a target towards which we should work and it discouraged planning on the basis of a prolonged war of attrition.

The paragraphs concerning operations in the Central Pacific were read and the Prime Minister suggested that these should result in bringing on a naval battle with the Japanese Fleet.

Admiral King said that was one of their main purposes but he did not feel that a large battle would develop until our forces had reached the Marianas.

Operations in the India-Burma0China Theater

The Prime Minister then asked for an explanation of what was meant by the directive to the Commanding General of the Southeast Asia Command that he should give priority to operations in Northern Burma but at the same time keep in mind the long-term necessities for improving the lines of communication.

Sir Alan Brooke said that priority must be set between operations and the maintenance of the lines of communications. This directive to the Commanding General, Southeast Asia Command, had been put forward to emphasize the importance of the Burma operations and, at the same time, to caution him to take a long-range view of the necessity for building up his lines of communication, without which no communications would be possible.

General Arnold pointed out to the President that in giving priority to the operations in Northern Burma, the delivery of supplies into China might be reduced. He said he did not disagree with the decision but he had been charged with the responsibility for the delivery of supplies to China and he wished to point out that giving first priority to the reconquest of Northern Burma might make it impossible for him completely to fulfill his responsibility.

The Prime Minister said that this would be largely a matter of judgment for the commander on the ground. He cited the necessity of sending some 2,000 men to Yunnan as part of General Wingate’s force to cover the Chinese advance from Yunnan. This would be an instance in which the delivery of supplies to China would be temporarily but justifiably interfered with.

The President said that he wished to establish some proviso which would prevent commanders on the supply lines in China confiscating supplies intended for China for use in their own theaters.

General Marshall replied that he thought that situation had been pretty well taken care of However, he said that it was necessary for someone on the ground to have authority to make decisions regarding priorities. He said that if, for example, it was arbitrarily decided to use the entire capacity of the air transport route to supply General Chennault with gasoline, this very decision might jeopardize the success of the Burma operations which in themselves were essential to keeping China in the war.

The Prime Minister then referred to studies that were directed in the report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said that as far as he was concerned he had no objection to a study being made regarding the capture of Singapore but he was very much opposed to such an operation being adopted for 1945 if action in 1944 was thereby curtailed.

He would personally be quite unable to agree to an operation for the capture of Akyab and Ramree as the main amphibious operation for the Indian Ocean in 1944. At the TRIDENT Conference, the capture of Akyab had been spoken of as a preliminary to operations in Southern Burma for the capture of Rangoon. Rangoon had then been dropped out for 1943-44, but Akyab had been retained, mainly to please Chiang Kai-shek. Later developments showed that the capture of Akyab would be a dangerous, sterile and costly operation directed against a point where the Japanese would be expecting attack. If we undertook it, we would hamstring operations in the Indian Ocean area to little purpose. He was quite prepared for a study of the operation to be made, and it might well prove right to carry it out as a sequel to some more profitable operation elsewhere; but he would not himself be able to subscribe to it as our main amphibious operation in the coming year.

The President said General Wingate had informed him that the capture of Rangoon would not cut the Japanese line of communications since they were now largely supplied overland from French Indo China and Thailand.

Southeast Asia Command

The President asked if Thailand was included in the Chinese Theater.

Admiral Leahy replied that both French Indo China and Thailand had been included in the Chinese Theater. At the beginning of the discussion on the Southeast Asia Command, it had been intended that French Indo China should be included in it. However, any operations in this area were so far in the future that it was not necessary to include French Indo China in the new command at this time. The situation with regard to Thailand, however, was quite different. Operations to be undertaken by the Southeast Asia Command might well envisage a conquest of Thailand. Forces of the Southeast Asia Command were in a position to carry out such an operation if it appeared to be desirable, whereas, Chinese forces could do nothing as far as this area is concerned. He therefore felt that regardless of what the commitments to the Generalissimo might have been, Thailand should definitely be included in the area of the Southeast Asia Command.

Admiral King indicated that a check was to be made to see if French Indo China and Thailand had not been removed from the Chinese Theater in a more recent definition of bounds.

The Prime Minister said that he was anxious to make a public announcement regarding the formation of the Southeast Asia Command and also to indicate who the commander was to be. He thought that such a public announcement would indicate that much of the discussions at the QUADRANT Conferences had been concerned with the war against Japan which would set forth a sufficient reason as to why Russia had not been included in the deliberations. He asked General Ismay to make up a short statement for release to the press.

The President said that the statement should make it clear that the Generalissimo still retains command of the Chinese Theater.

General Marshall said that the announcement should be written in such a way as not to mention the use of Chinese troops in the Southeast Asia Command or give any indication of General Stilwell’s place in the command setup. He said that General Stilwell is still the Generalissimo’s Chief of Staff and that it would be offensive to the Generalissimo if he were not to be consulted before Stilwell was assigned his additional position. Moreover, he might expect that a Chinese deputy would be appointed. Actually, General Stilwell is being made Deputy Supreme Commander for the purpose of protecting Chinese interests and also to try and insure that Chinese forces would carry out their share of the plans devised by the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

Admiral King pointed out that the mere announcement of the formation of the Southeast Asia Command would indicate General Stilwell’s status at once. He thought that any announcement should be delayed until after the Generalissimo had been informed of the decisions.

Mr. Hopkins said that Dr. Soong had said that he had just had a telegram from the Generalissimo saying that the Supreme Allied Commander should be appointed forthwith.

The Prime Minister thought that any difficulty could be overcome by making the announcement to the press extremely brief. He suggested, for example, that it might be as follows:

It has been decided to establish a combined separate Southeast Asia Command. The Supreme Commander will be (here give the officer designated by name).

He felt that the shorter the announcement the better it would be. General agreement was expressed with this proposal.

The Prime Minister then asked General Marshall if it would not be wise to place a paragraph in the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister providing for the designation of a British liaison officer as a member of General MacArthur’s staff.

General Marshall replied that he did not feel it would be necessary to include such a statement in the paper, but that he would see that the suggestion was carried out immediately.


The Prime Minister asked if the Chiefs of Staff’s recommendations regarding Spain had been submitted to the Foreign Office.

General Ismay informed him that the suggestions had been sent to the Foreign Office but no comments had as yet been received.

The Prime Minister indicated then that before committing himself on these recommendations he would like to have the advice of his government. He said that personally he did not favor putting “economic screws” on Spain at this time. The situation was still too critical. For instance, there were the negotiations with Portugal which should be settled before a new attitude regarding Spain is adopted. He said, however, that in any event even though the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were approved, the timing as to their execution would have to be determined by the governments.


The Prime Minister expressed disagreement with the proposal to have the Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East empowered to determine what amount of supplies Turkey could absorb. He felt that this decision should be retained by the British Government. He said that the time has now come to ask Turkey for something in return for the aid which the United Nations have been giving her. He thought the Turks would be considerably relieved if they were only asked to carry out the recommendations submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than being asked to give up their neutrality and enter the war.

It was decided to delete any reference to the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East’s being allowed to determine the amount of supplies to be given Turkey.

Meeting of Dr. Soong with the Combined Chiefs of Staff

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would ask Dr. Soong to meet with them on Tuesday, 24 August.

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740.00119 European War 1939/1656

Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs

Washington, August 23, 1943.


Mr. Matthews: I attended a drafting session at the War Department this morning in connection with the terms, other than military, to be imposed upon Italy in the event of a surrender. The military terms are already in General Eisenhower’s possession. Representatives of the British Embassy military and naval missions were present. These further terms were drawn up and agreed to by both the British and American representatives for transmission to Quebec today with the exception of four articles nos. 3, 4, 5a and 29. The British representatives were unable to accept these articles and we agreed to send them to Quebec pointing out our differences. Among the articles to which the British could not give their concurrence were:

No. 3, the exercise of the prerogatives of the crown will be suspended in all Italian territories. The powers of the central Italian Government will be suspended in all occupied areas as are designated by the allied commander-in-chief as Military Districts.

No. 4 …

No. 5a. Subject to the supreme authority of the allied commander-in-chief, the Italian Government will exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers in all unoccupied areas, these functions to continue only until, the general military situation permitting, the people of Italy shall have an opportunity freely to determine the form of permanent government, based on democratic principles, to be established in their country.

The other points on which we agreed to disagree were of a military character and of no particular concern to the Department.

Already approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, under General Hilldring, was the draft instrument of surrender of Italy called the “comprehensive” document because it includes military as well as other terms. This document is designed to supersede the military terms already in General Eisenhower’s hands and give him one complete instrument of surrender. This plan and procedure are generally preferred by the British representatives. It has been agreed to, as stated above, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and in our opinion is all right as far as it goes. We do not feel, however, in spite of its designation as “comprehensive” that it is sufficiently complete.

The American representatives generally favor the alternate plan and procedure which are to supplement the military terms already in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief with the additional terms necessary to define our relationship to the defeated Italian Government. These further terms, we believe, are more complete than the “comprehensive” document and do in fact contain certain political provisions not included in the “comprehensive” document.

When I left the Pentagon Building this noon, it was agreed that both plans would be sent to Quebec by plane today with the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff select the plan and procedure they prefer.

About 2:30 p.m. Colonel Laux of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department called to say that General Hilldring felt that the British reservations on the “American document” prejudiced the entire acceptance of the American plan; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be inclined to take the document on which agreement had been reached and wondered if the Department would not be willing to withdraw the two articles quoted above which caused our British colleagues to withhold their approval. He said that the War Department was prepared to withdraw the two articles of military character to which the British objected. I told the Colonel that the Department felt very strongly about retaining the two political articles referred to; that it was true that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff chose the “British plan” these political provisions would not appear, but that we felt they should be submitted to Quebec for consideration. I said that while I regretted to have to insist on inclusion of certain terms which might jeopardize the acceptance of the whole “American plan,” I felt that we could not omit them and thus leave ourselves open to possible future charges from the military that we had failed to give them proper advice on certain political phases of the highest importance with respect to the Italian situation. He asked if the Department’s position was, then, that we could not agree to have the controversial political provisions withdrawn and I answered in the affirmative.


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Hull-Eden meeting

United States United Kingdom
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden

Eden and Hull had “a brief but useful discussion about Soviet frontiers,” and that he had given Hull a note about “probable Russian demands.” It is possible that this meeting was also the occasion on which a British paper on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation which is marked “7:30 p.m. August 23” was handed to Hull.

740.00119 EW/8–2543: Telegram

The British Foreign Secretary to the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

QUADRANT, [undated.]

Most secret

President and Prime Minister are now agreed on text of comprehensive instrument for text of which see my telegram No. [blank.]

Please telegraph this to H.M. Ambassador in Lisbon, instructing him that if and when Italians return, it should be given to them with the explanation that this document embodies the points already handed to them and also contains the additional points which they were warned to expect.

Combined Chiefs of Staff are sending text to General Eisenhower, with similar instructions, in case Italians get into direct touch with his Headquarters.

The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State

Québec, August 23, 1943.

In December 1941 Stalin informed the Foreign Secretary that he regarded the question of USSR’s western frontiers as “the main question for us in the war.”

Stalin during the Foreign Secretary’s visit to Moscow in 1941, Molotov in London in 1942 and Maisky speaking to the Foreign Secretary in March 1943, have all said that Curzon Line with minor modifications would be satisfactory basis for frontier settlement.

Neither His Majesty’s Government nor, so far as we are aware, United States Government, have indicated to Soviet Government what their views on this question are. We have little doubt, however, that the Soviet Government would be much easier to deal with on Polish and other matters if His Majesty’s Government and United States Government could let them know that we are prepared in practice to contemplate a substantial measure of satisfaction on what we understand Soviet territorial claims to be, while not abandoning our principle of not recognising during the war any territorial changes.

His Majesty’s Government consider that an equitable solution of Russian claims would be something on the following lines: (a) Poland to receive in the west Danzig, East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and to be content in the east with the Curzon Line adjusted to include city of Lwów in Poland. (b) Other frontiers. – Eventual recognition of Russia’s 1941 frontiers with Finland and Roumania, and of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States.

If the views of the United States Government do not differ radically from the above, there might be a basis for a joint intimation of our views to Soviet Government, in the course of any discussion with them of the general post-war settlement. His Majesty’s Government wish to consider advisability of such action now because:
(a) Recent exchanges of personal telegrams between the Prime Minister and Stalin show that the latter desires closer consultation on future operations. This is natural now that we are embarked on operations in Europe which are likely soon to affect south-eastern Europe more or less directly. The views of Soviet Government will have to be taken into consideration and their attitude is likely to be suspicious and uncooperative unless they get some reassurances upon this “main question” of frontiers.

(b) When some time ago His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow broached with M. Molotov the question of the Soviet attitude to postwar questions in Germany, he received a definite indication that the Soviet Government wished to discuss such matters with His Majesty’s Government and United States Government, with a view to reaching firm agreement. The matter has not been pursued pending discussion with United States Government, but if we want to break down Soviet suspicions and get into real contact with them on major matters we think it unwise to leave discussions further in suspense. The organisation of a Free German Movement is an added reason for resuming discussions.

We for our part would not wish to announce formally any understanding that might be reached with the Soviet on these lines, and we should also ask them to keep it to themselves until such time as it could be presented as part of a general territorial settlement.

We must face the fact that, if we do proceed thus, we cannot be certain that publicity will not be given to the facts either from the Soviet or the Polish side.

There could, of course, be no intention of giving the Soviet Government satisfaction on the point of frontiers unless they, on their side, are willing to play a useful part in post-war organisation as we conceive it. But it is so certain that the Russians will raise this point if we get into discussion that it seems essential that we should know how we propose to deal with it.

There could, of course, be no question at this stage of any agreement written or unwritten with the Soviet Government on frontier question. This would be contrary to the assurances we gave Poland in 1941 when the Soviet Polish Treaty was signed and again in 1942 at time of the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet treaty. We should therefore propose to inform the Polish Government that in our view no final settlement of Polish-Soviet difficulties can be found so long as there is no agreement on the frontier question. This question will have to be solved sooner or later. It could be left until the Soviet armies re-enter Polish territory, but it is our belief that a satisfactory solution would then be all the harder to obtain. We and the United States Government would propose therefore to approach the Soviet Government in the matter and discuss it with them.

It is probable that the Soviet Government would agree to something on the lines of paragraph 3(a) above. We know that it is difficult, maybe impossible, for this or any Polish Government, during the course of the war, to accept any surrender of former Polish territory. But it might perhaps help them if the United States and United Kingdom Governments were to recommend to them such a solution, conditional on Poland receiving the compensation indicated.

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Dunn-Cadogan meeting

United States United Kingdom
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan

The meeting was concerned with terms for the surrender of Italy. From a memorandum from Dunn to Hull on this subject dated September 1, 1943:

Some time ago the British Chiefs of Staff brought before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a paper numbered CCS 258 which was a draft of conditions for surrender of Italy. This document came to be known thereafter as the long or comprehensive document. This paper was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and was found by that Committee to be out of order as the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca had declared the intention of the two Governments to pursue the war against the Axis until an unconditional surrender of the enemy. This view was concurred in by the Department of State, and when referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President was also confirmed by him. The War Department then proceeded to draw up a document containing the conditions to be imposed upon Italy in the event of an unconditional surrender by that nation. Although some discussion with regard to this latter document was entered into with the British members of the Civil Affairs Committee and the War Department draft was referred by the British members to London, no advance was ever made with regard to establishing this latter paper as an agreed document. In the meantime, indications suddenly appeared after the fall of Mussolini that the Italians might surrender at any time. Through cable correspondence between the Prime Minister and the President, military terms to be imposed upon Italy in the event of surrender were agreed to and were transmitted to General Eisenhower through the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the General’s use in the event of Italy tendering surrender. The General was also informed that political and economic conditions would be transmitted to him later and that in imposing the military terms on any Italian representatives he should mention that other conditions would be communicated at a later date.

The British were persistent in their efforts to have the long comprehensive document accepted and agreed to by the American Government for use as a single document comprising all conditions, military and other than military, in one paper. This matter came before you when we arrived at Quebec in the first conversation you had with Mr. Eden there. You will recall that you immediately mentioned the matter to the President and that the President took the position that there was no reason to change the arrangement which was in effect at that time, that is, that General Eisenhower had the military terms to be imposed upon the Italians in the event of a surrender and that other conditions could be sent him for transmission to the Italians after the military terms had been imposed. You did inform Mr. Eden, and I believe also the President, that as far as the content of the long paper was concerned that was entirely agreeable to the Department as far as concerned the matters contained therein which were other than military.

Apparently Mr. Eden and Mr. Churchill, after bringing this matter up with the President, were satisfied that agreement had been reached between the President and Mr. Churchill that the long document should be substituted for the military terms which had been sent to General Eisenhower. Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan informed me on Monday, August 23, the day before we left Quebec, that on the strength of the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the President, Mr. Eden had sent a telegram6 to the British Ambassador in Lisbon to substitute the long document for the military terms in any subsequent dealings with the Italians.

Mr. Cadogan asked me if we would clear this matter with the President and have the Chiefs of Staff send a similar telegram to General Eisenhower. I informed Mr. Cadogan that that was a matter not within the province of the Department of State, and if he wished to have such a matter cleared through the Chiefs of Staff it should be taken up through the medium of the British Chiefs of Staff. It was not until Thursday, August 26, that you were informed by General Deane that the President had directed the Chiefs of Staff to instruct General Eisenhower to substitute the long document for the previously agreed upon military terms.

Apparently, from the reports coming from Lisbon and from Algiers, there has been considerable confusion introduced into the dealings with the Italians by reason of the action taken by the British Government in instructing the British Ambassador at Lisbon to introduce the longer comprehensive document into the conversations.

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The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development to the President

Washington, August 23, 1943.


Memorandum for the President

[Subject:] TUBEALLOY – Interchange with the British.

We await your instructions regarding interchange with the British on this subject as a result of correspondence with Sir John Anderson recently placed in your hands through Mr. Hopkins. A report on the present status of the whole project has just been forwarded to General Marshall.

The next steps, if you approve the correspondence regarding interchange, are to convene a combined committee, which will lay down rules for security and arrange conferences between scientific groups as needed to expedite the program fully.

I suggest, before you leave the Prime Minister, one step to accelerate matters. It would help if a top British scientist, accepted and of sound judgment, could be sent here as chief liaison under Sir John Anderson, to help make arrangements for the committee’s work. He should be of the caliber of Sir Henry Dale or Sir Henry Tizard, and not one of the group working experimentally on a single phase of the problem.

I hasten to make this suggestion for the following reason. In previous negotiations difficulty was encountered because the British representative was an industrialist, Mr. Akers of International Chemical Industries. This same man is now here, apparently to make similar arrangements. He recently, and without consulting us, brought four eminent British scientific workers here for interchange. As we cannot use them until the combined committee has laid down the rules, they are likely to think us reluctant to interchange, whereas the exact opposite is true and we are anxious to get appropriate interchange going in an orderly fashion, so that relations will not this time become tangled. Akers is a very able man, but not the one to handle this matter.

We will proceed promptly with the whole affair on receiving your instructions.


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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary of the Navy Knox Mrs. Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Early Minister of Information Bracken
Admiral Leahy

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10 p.m.

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary Hull
Mr. Dunn

Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation was probably a major subject of discussion.

Draft of Statement to Be Issued by the British Government

Québec, August 23, 1943.

Recognition of French Committee of National Liberation

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, desire again to make clear their purpose of co-operating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war, that it is the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied co-operation and that it administers those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of His Majesty’s Government with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

It is common ground between His Majesty’s Government and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely. The present declaration does not therefore constitute recognition of the Committee as a Government of France or of the French Empire.

On these understandings His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom recognise the French Committee of National Liberation.

His Majesty’s Government take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the Committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee’s expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close co-operation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

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U.S. State Department (August 24, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, forenoon

United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Secretary Hull Foreign Secretary Eden

Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation was the principal subject of discussion, and it was presumably at this meeting that the final decision was taken that the United States and British Governments would issue separate statements on this subject.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

United States United Kingdom China
Admiral Leahy General Brooke Foreign Minister Soong
General Marshall Admiral of the Fleet Pound Major General Chu
Admiral King Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Vice Admiral Willson Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Badger Admiral Noble
Major General Handy Lieutenant General Macready
Major General Fairchild Air Marshal Welsh
Major General Rooks Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Kuter Brigadier McNair
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Freseman Brigadier Macleod
Commander Long Major General Whiteley
Air Commodore Foster
Captain Brownrigg
Brigadier General Deane Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

August 24, 1943, 10:30 a.m.


Conclusions of the Previous Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 115th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 319/4)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft cover note for the final report and certain amendments arising out of the Second QUADRANT Meeting between the President and Prime Minister.

Later in the meeting Sir Alan Brooke informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister considered that the names of the naval and air commanders for OVERLORD should not be mentioned in the final report.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the cover note and certain amendments to the final report (subsequently circulated as 319/5).

Mediterranean Operations

a. Directive to General Eisenhower (CCS 328)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering a draft directive to General Eisenhower based on the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT. In the course of discussion, it was agreed that General Eisenhower should be sent only those parts of the final report to the Prime Minister and President (CCS 319/5), and of the paper relating available resources to plans (CCS 329), that dealt with the European Theater.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that those extracts from the Final Report of the QUADRANT Conference (CCS 319/5) and from the Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings (CCS 329) dealing with the European Theater should be sent to General Eisenhower with the cover note contained as an enclosure to CCS 328.

b. Discussion with Generals Whiteley and Rooks
General Whiteley outlined the position with regard to forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean. His statement follows:

  1. Forthcoming operations in Italy comprise two amphibious assaults:
    a. Across the Straits of Messina (BAYTOWN);
    b. Into Salerno Bay (AVALANCHE). These assaults will be under the command of General Alexander, and have as their object the securing of the Rome airfields and the clearing of the enemy from Southern Italy.

  2. The BAYTOWN assault is being carried out by the 13th Corps, with two divisions in the assault and one in reserve. The assaulting divisions are the 5th and the Canadian. The object of the BAYTOWN assault is to contain German divisions and to open the Straits of Messina for ships carrying cargoes to Naples.

  3. The AVALANCHE assault is under the command of the 5th U.S. Army. The assault will be carried out by the 10th British Corps, comprising 46th, 56th and 7th Armored Divisions. The 6th U.S. Corps is the immediate follow-up, and later follow-ups may include a French Corps and the 5th British Corps. The immediate object of AVALANCHE is to secure the port of Naples.

  4. We expect to find 16 German divisions in Italy. The German intention seems to be to deny us the Po Valley by holding a position Pisa-Rimini. It looks as if they intend to withdraw their divisions from Southern Italy to the North. The four divisions in the extreme south are, we think, withdrawing, covered by two German divisions in the Naples-Salerno area. Two more German divisions are in the Rome area disciplining the Italian Government.

  5. The BAYTOWN assault will take place between September 2-4. General Eisenhower was anxious to have a ten-day gap between BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE so that some of the BAYTOWN landing craft could be used for AVALANCHE. The limiting factors for the AVALANCHE assault are that it cannot be launched before September 7; that, for reasons of moon, it cannot be launched between September 11 and 21. The AVALANCHE assault will probably, therefore, take place September 9-11.

  6. It looks, therefore, as if the BAYTOWN assault may not meet very strong opposition. On the other hand, the Germans had large numbers of antiaircraft dual-purpose guns on the Straits, and some of these may still be in position. Even if we do not meet with much opposition, our progress is likely to be slowed down by the physical difficulties of the country and enemy demolitions. We hope, however, to pass six divisions through Calabria by 1st December.

  7. There is, of necessity, some anxiety about the AVALANCHE operation. The assault may be opposed within a few hours by comparable German forces. If and when the Germans realize that our assault is not in very great strength, they may move divisions to the sound of the guns and attack us with up to six divisions sometime during September. On the other hand, communications in Italy are poor and it may not be easy for the Germans to alter their withdrawal plans and concentrate divisions against our AVALANCHE assault. However, General Eisenhower must naturally be anxious to protect the AVALANCHE assault with the maximum aircraft, and to build it up just as quickly as is humanly possible. Algiers estimates that, apart from air-borne divisions, six divisions and tactical air force will be ashore in the Naples area by 1st December.

  8. The strategical air force cannot be moved in until we have secured the Rome airfields. It is not possible to estimate at this stage how many divisions will be required to do this – probably of the order of 16. The maintenance commitment of the strategical air force is the equivalent of approximately four divisions so considerable development will be necessary before it can be operating at full strength. This will probably include the provision of pipelines.

  9. For any advance north of the Pisa line, we will require ports north of Naples. Civitavecchia is a good port and can be used even if the German is in occupation of Corsica and Sardinia. We must, however, deal with those two islands before we can use Leghorn and Genoa. General Eisenhower’s intention prior to the receipt of any instructions resulting from this conference, was to continue to hit the Germans whenever and wherever possible.

  10. As regards operations against Southern France, the main limiting factor is likely to be landing craft. If we can only assault with approximately two divisions, we want to create diversions as much as possible from other directions. Naturally, therefore, we would like to be in possession of the Italian coast right up to the French frontier. Whether or not it will be possible to do an amphibious operation in Southern France if we are not appreciably further north than the Pisa line has not yet been examined.

  11. We are faced with a very difficult movement and maintenance problem in the Mediterranean. For several months we will have to be manning ports in North Africa and in Italy. Moreover, the North African ports will be working at extreme pressure. They will not only have to accept U.S. and U.K. convoys, discharge these cargoes and reload them for Italian destinations, but also they will be loading divisions for Italy at top pressure. Moreover, owing to poor communications in North Africa, we cannot always move divisions to the most desirable ports of embarkation; we have to load them where they are situated.

  12. On paper, General Eisenhower has a large number of divisions available. On the other hand, it is questionable whether we will be able to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to maintain these divisions on an operational scale. There is not only the problem of shipping equipment, but of dealing with it through our bases during this period of high pressure. Moreover, many of these divisions are of foreign nationalities and this leads to less elasticity and increased maintenance commitments.

  13. Plans for Operation BACKBONE have been prepared. Until the end of the year there are likely to be some British divisions in North Africa which could be made available. After the New Year we will probably have to rely on the French to provide the insurance for BACKBONE. Our first step would have to be to move air forces from Italy to the Spanish Moroccan area to operate from fields already prepared or earmarked. We would also have to forestall the Germans in the Balearics with a view to interfering with their coastal traffic from Marseilles. If we could deny them this coastal traffic, we could interfere appreciably with their rate of buildup.

  14. To sum up, I think that General Eisenhower’s main concerns are:
    a. The anxious period during and immediately after the AVALANCHE assault;
    b. Port congestion and the difficulties of movement in the Mediterranean;
    c. Whether we will be able to maintain sufficient divisions on an operational scale.

General Rooks explained that the AVALANCHE attack would be under command of the 5th U.S. Army and would consist of two corps, one British and one American. The possibility of a German effort to sever the lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar was continually kept under review. Plans had been prepared by the Fifth Army, which had now been turned over to AFHQ, who would use such forces as were available to them. At present some two to four United States and British divisions were available for this purpose, though later it might be necessary to depend to some extent on French troops.

Air Commodore Foster said that already all the tactical fighter and most of the tactical bomber force was situated in Sicily. Air cover for the assault in the Salerno area would be provided by fighters based initially in Sicily. The single-engined fighters would operate from six to eight strips laid to the eastward of Messina and with their extra tanks could operate for between 15 and 20 minutes over the assault. The twin-engined fighters based on Catania and in Western Sicily, having a greater range, could remain longer over the area. In addition, A-26 units were also based on Catania, and the Fleet air arm would provide air cover with Seafires from four escort and one Fleet carrier. It was estimated that it would be possible to maintain 30 fighters continuously over the assault during the hours of daylight. The tactical bomber force would be used on an arc designed to stop enemy reinforcements while the strategical bomber force would concentrate on communications and airdromes. Since the enemy had good airdromes on the eastern coast of Italy opposite the assault area, it would not be possible to harry the enemy aircraft to the same extent as had been achieved in HUSKY. It was for this reason that the Commander-in-Chief had asked to retain the B-24s which had been used for the Ploești raid.

Captain Brownrigg explained the naval command arrangements. The AVALANCHE assault would all be under the command of Admiral Hewitt. Under him would be Admiral Hall, commanding the combat loaders carrying the 6th Corps; Admiral Conolly commanding the United States landing craft; and Commodore Oliver, the British landing craft. Admiral Hewitt would have a force of cruisers and destroyers operating under his orders and Admiral Vian would command the carrier force. Cover to the northward would be provided by a battleship force. There would be a further covering force operating to the south of the Toe in the unlikely event of the Italian ships in Taranto endeavoring to break out. The Naval Commander-in-Chief was not worried on the assault phase of the operation but realized the difficulties of safeguarding the long lines of sea communication and the various routes on which convoys would have to run. It would be impossible to divert convoys to avoid submarines and air attack and they would therefore have to fight their way through. For this reason, there was, of course, a large demand for escort vessels.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statements.

Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic (CCS 222/3)

Sir Dudley Pound explained that a Combined ad hoc committee had put forward the proposals contained in the enclosure to CCS 222/3 since the present arrangement of three UGS convoys per month, with a limit of 80 ships per convoy, did not provide for all the ships presenting themselves. The suggestion that four convoys per mouth should be established would require further investigation since the running of additional UGS convoys would necessitate consequential adjustments to other Atlantic convoys. With regard to paragraph 5 of the memorandum, he suggested the words “unless otherwise agreed” should be added after the words “following priority” in order to give a greater degree of flexibility.

Admiral King said that he fully appreciated that the cycle could not be changed to four convoys a month except after consultation and in relation to other convoys. He suggested that it should be agreed that the United States Navy should fix the earliest practicable date for a program of four UGS convoys a month, “with due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed,
a. That the U.S. Navy should fix the earliest practicable date when a program of four UGS convoys per month could be established, with due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic.

b. To delegate executive authority to the Combined Military Transportation Committee to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority unless otherwise agreed:
(1) U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean.
(2) U.S. and British ships destined for India.
(3) U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.
(4) U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.
(5) Ships destined for Persian Gulf.
(6) Lend-Lease to Turkey.
(7) Miscellaneous.

Meeting With Dr. T. V. Soong

Sir Alan Brooke said he understood that Dr. T. V. Soong had been informed of the progress of discussions at Quebec by the President and Prime Minister. He felt it would be very useful to have Dr. Soong’s reactions to the points made by the President and Prime Minister.

Dr. Soong said that the President and Prime Minister had given him only a general outline and had suggested that he should obtain full information about actual plans from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was most happy to know that so much consideration had been given at QUADRANT to the war with Japan. To achieve greater security he proposed to send General Chu to the Generalissimo to inform him of the decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, General Somervell explained the layout of the proposed pipeline to China which would carry 18,000 tons of gasoline per month. It was hoped by 1945-46 to achieve a lift of 65,000 tons of supplies by road. Some small amounts could, he hoped, be got over the road about three months after the opening.

Dr. Soong then asked for details with regard to the Chinese share of proposed operations. Was he right in assuming that the original plan was being adhered to and that Chinese forces at Ramgarh would operate from Ledo in conjunction with an advance by the forces from Yunnan?

General Marshall confirmed that in general this was the case.

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, Sir Alan Brooke said that the size of the British forces to be employed had not yet been settled, since the full effect of the floods on the lines of communication through Assam was not yet known. These lines of communication had to carry not only supplies to be flown by air into China and those required for the forces to operate from Ledo and Imphal, but also the supplies required for the expansion of the air route and the building up of the lines of communications themselves.

Dr. Soong asked to be informed of the date on which it was proposed these operations should commence.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that it was now proposed that they should start later than originally envisaged, since it was believed better that they should carry on into the early part of the monsoon, thus assisting us to consolidate our position. The actual date was, however, not settled, nor was it possible to disclose it.

Referring to amphibian operations, Dr. Soong said that the Generalissimo had always understood that they would be carried out in Burma.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he was not in a position to disclose the selected area for the amphibious assault, but it was to take place from India and would have a direct bearing on operations in Burma and Western China.

Dr. Soong pointed out that the Generalissimo feared the Japanese capacity to attack since they had the advantage of superior lines of communication which would be hard to combat.

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the position was improving since the Japanese no longer had the same power as hitherto, and attrition against air and shipping was being forced upon them by the ever-increasing efforts of the United Nations. In Burma it was hoped that the employment of long-range penetration groups on the principle of Brigadier Wingate’s columns, would seriously interfere with Japanese lines of communications.

Dr. Soong said that he felt that it would be of no value for him, as a civilian, to express his own views on the situation.

Admiral Leahy pointed out that the success of operations in Burma was largely dependent on the confident cooperation of the Chinese forces. With this, success could be expected, but unless this collaboration was forthcoming they could not be undertaken.

General Marshall pointed out the colossal effort required to build up and maintain communications with China. The pipeline was only a small part, though that in itself necessitated the shipping of much equipment and many technicians over a vast distance. The airline was also an immense undertaking. Last week it had achieved a rate of 7,000 tons per month. It would soon achieve 10,000 tons a month and would increase from even that figure. To make this prodigious effort worthwhile, security of the lines of communication was essential.

In the Mediterranean, by a magnificent unity of effort, a great victory had been achieved. In the Far East the position was infinitely more difficult. Unity of effort and unity of action in Burma, in India and in China must be achieved. A Supreme Commander had been proposed by the British and accepted delightedly by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This Commander-in-Chief was faced with an extremely difficult problem and his operations could never succeed unless he was assured of complete unity of action and of cooperation by China.

At this point General Marshall left the meeting with Dr. Soong in order to inform him of a certain decision taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

On his return General Marshall informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the lines of his discussion with Dr. Soong. He had once more emphasized to him that he, Dr. Soong, must ensure unity of action from China on behalf of the united effort and that this unity of action must be accompanied by no holding back or reluctance. Only thus could success be achieved and without it all our efforts would be futile.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with warm approval of the statement made by General Marshall.

Relation of Resources to Plans (CCS 329; 329/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners on the implementation of assumed basic undertakings and specific operations for the conduct of the war, 1943-44, together with certain amendments, subsequently put forward by the Combined Staff Planners. These amendments, together with certain others put forward at the meeting, were discussed in detail.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to certain amendments to the paper including that in 329/1 (amended paper subsequently published as CCS 329/2).
b. Approved the report by the Combined Staff Planners in the enclosure to the paper.
c. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare a suitable paragraph on the subject for insertion in the Final Report.

Southeast Asia Command

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them the terms of an announcement to be made with regard to the appointment of Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with approval of the proposed announcement.

Propaganda Committee (CCS 310)

Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to take action at present on this paper. He understood that it was being discussed by the British Minister of Information on a political level. He fully appreciated the importance of resolving the problem presented and would make every effort to insure that a solution was found as rapidly as possible.

General Marshall said that he realized that the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be charged with the implementation of the policy was questionable. He felt, however, that an early solution was important, particularly from the United States Chiefs of Staff point of view, since they had a particular responsibility in the matter.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed as to the necessity from the military point of view of adequate machinery for the coordination of propaganda.

b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would ascertain the result of the recent negotiations by the British authorities concerned.

c. Agreed that further action in this matter should be taken up by the Joint Staff Mission as early as possible.

Message to Stalin

General Marshall read out a draft message to Mr. Stalin, which he suggested might be put forward to the President and Prime Minister as the basis of the communication to the Soviet Government. Certain minor amendments to this draft were suggested.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft message to be put forward to the President and Prime Minister.

Concluding Remarks

General Marshall said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would like to place on record their appreciation of the work done by the Planning Staffs, by General Riddell-Webster, General Somervell and Admiral Badger, who, by their industry and long hours of toil, had contributed much to the success of the conference.

Admiral King felt that special mention of the labors of the Secretariat should also be expressed.

Admiral Leahy expressed, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, his appreciation for the consideration which had been shown by the British Chiefs of Staff for the United States point of view. This had contributed largely to the success of the conference and the easy reconciliation of ideas. He believed that the conference had been of great value and that further conferences should be held at short intervals.

Sir Alan Brooke, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed his gratitude for the patience and consideration shown by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the British points of view. He believed that each meeting was a step forward to a full appreciation by each of the other’s point of view, and agreements were therefore more quickly reached. Now that we held the initiative, the tempo of the war was faster and meetings should, he believed, be held more frequently than hitherto.

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Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King press conference, 12:15 p.m.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. King, you are now the “presiding officer.”

PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING: Gentlemen of the press, before the Conference breaks up, the President and Prime Minister hope to have an opportunity, in which I am proud indeed to be able to join them, of interchanging greetings with you, and also of expressing to you all, our thanks for the helpful cooperation which the press has given in the period of the Conference…


Well, Mr. Churchill, would you like to say a few words to the gentlemen of the press? I call on Mr. Churchill to say a few words to the gentlemen assembled.

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL: Well, ladies and gentlemen, until I arrived here I thought that the President was going to follow Mr. Mackenzie King in the proceedings. I didn’t know what I was going to say, and I thought that I would base my remarks in accordance with what he said. Now he has arrived, he tells me that he wishes me to begin. Now he is going to listen to what I have got to say, and he is reserving himself not to make any errors I may make. (LAUGHTER)

Well, I understand this is a talk which is to enable us, as Mr. Mackenzie King in his very happy phrase said, “to interchange greetings,” and rather in the same way as we did at Casablanca.

Now I have quite realized that many of you gentlemen, probably the most distinguished body of great representatives that could be gathered together, have felt impatient at the fact that you were all gathered here, and there was so very little to report and write about.

Well, that was inherent in the nature of the task, because these conferences which attract world-wide attention do not themselves yield a matter which can be continually contributive to the press, or to the world. And one hopes that as a result of the decisions taken here, events will occur weeks and months later which will fully justify all the labor which was expended. And it is by those results, which are not available in any form that can be even foreshadowed today, that those who take part in these conferences must be judged; and I hope, therefore, that you will appreciate and sympathize with our difficulties, in the same way as I have tried to show I understand yours.

As an old reporter, newspaperman, war correspondent, when most of you were still unborn, I know the feelings of irritation which come when the trouble taken by the press does not seem to reap a proportionate reward.

But we are fighting a great life-and-death struggle, and I must ask for the patriotism, tolerance, and indulgence of all those who are here to make allowances for that, criticizing anything they think should be criticized, but altogether to make fair allowances for the conditions under which we are doing our work, which are essentially those of secrecy, which are essentially those the results of which, when they can be spoken of at all, should be the subject of considered statement. Therefore, I hope that you will be to our faults a little mild, and to our virtues very kind.

This is the sixth conference I have had with the President; and I know there are some people who say, “Why is it necessary to have all these conferences?” But I think a much more reasonable way of looking at it would be to say, “How is it they are able to get on with such long intervals between the conferences?”

When you think that our armies are linked together as no two armies have ever been- our fleets, air forces, and armies linked together as never before in history, not only side by side but intermingled very often – and that the operations which they are conducting are being achieved with unexampled rapidity ahead of schedule and ahead of program; and when you think of all the difference it makes to the soldiers who are fighting with all the power at their command – and at which they will have to be kept, at the same time, at the summit and at the center – and that there will have to be a clear marking out of the course ahead, and a detailed study, a deliberate study of all the steps that have to be taken – and what a difference that all makes to the soldier, and how many lives may easily be saved, and what abridgments may be achieved in this long and devastating, desecrating war – then I feel sure that you will agree with me, and with the President, that we are rightly to come together, and to bring our staffs together, to bring not only the head staffs but all the very large staffs together indispensable to the working of modern operations.

A great advantage is achieved by personal contact. I assure you it would not be possible to carry on the complicated warfare we are waging without close, intimate, friendly, personal contacts, and they have been established at every level in the very large organizations which have been brought together here at Québec.

I certainly must tell you that I have found the work very hard here – very hard. I have hardly had a minute to spare, from the continued flow of telegrams from London to the necessity of dealing with a number of great questions which cannot be hurried in their consideration; and a great many minor decisions, some of which take just as much time and trouble. All this crowding in has certainly not left me any time to go about and see people, and to make all the exterior contacts which I should like to have done, except for an hour yesterday when I saw a few people.

That, I think, has been true also of our staffs. They have worked at tremendous pressure. Not only the combined conferences, which have been daily and twice a day and so forth, but each of the staffs has had to spend long hours in conclave together among themselves; and, of course, the President has had to sit with his officers, and I with those whom I have brought over. We have had to discuss with them all the movements – the thoughts – the decisions which have been taking place.

Well, we have got to the end of the task. We have reached very good – very sound – I hope very good conclusions. They are certainly unanimous and agreed, and most extreme cordiality prevails.

Now, you must not suppose that is a small thing, because with the best will in the world differences of view must arise, when two great Nations with their immense military forces, with problems in every quarter of the globe, are working together. They must. And it is astonishing what happens, even if you are separated for as much as three months. The differences arise not on principle but on emphasis and priority which, if they are allowed to consider, do not hamper operations therefore.

I never felt more sure about anything than I do about the fact that these conferences are an indispensable part of the successful conduct of the war, and of a shortening of the struggle, and of the saving of bloodshed to the troops. The least we can do for them is to make sure that they go into action under the best conditions and the best planning, that our foresight and deliberations have played their part in all those plans.

Well, on the whole, things are very much better than they were when we met at Casablanca.

They are even better than when we met in Washington last.

Now, great operations have been successfully accomplished. All Sicily is prostrate under our authority, and apparently taking to it in a very kindly manner.

Of course, needless to say, the moment one achievement has been made, everyone rightly expects something else to come forward onto the scene; and I have no doubt something else will come, but I am sure you would be the first to silence my lips if you thought I was going in any way to give any indication other than one that would be misleading to the enemy, as you may always hear something that is coming about future operations. Still, I do look forward to great steps being taken to beating down our antagonists one after another.

And I should like to point out that the relations between the British and American armies are different from those between any other large forces in the ages, in that they are working together in the same set of operations.

Now, another reason why we are here only two, instead of three or more, is that of course a very large part of our discussions has naturally and necessarily been concerned with the war against Japan; and those are subjects of special interest to the powers who are belligerent against Japan. That you can see for yourselves.

We have had Mr. T. V. Soong here, and we have made plans for pressing forward with the study not only of short-term action but, of course, long-term; and as we hope, final and decisive actions will have to be taken against that greedy and ambitious Government and people.

Generally speaking, I have every right to give you the groundwork on which you can feel strong and healthy confidence. We are well armed. We are better armed than before-better equipped. We, who began so weak and so in many ways ill equipped, are now enjoying that superiority in weapons and in material of all kinds.

The U-boat warfare has rolled over from the debit to the credit side. The great outflow of shipping so magnificently and prodigiously produced by the United States and by Canada, together with the heavy sinkings of U-boats and the safe conduct of convoys, has undoubtedly placed us in a position where we can say without any doubt that Britain and the United States will be able to bring the whole of their weight to bear.

And that, combined with the superb exertions of our Russian ally, far away locked in the great land battles in the heart of Europe, those two combined together should give us the very best means of helping all the toiling millions– the anxious, suffering millions of the world, thrown out of their houses, taken from their fields – who through no fault or device of their own have been condemned to toil all these four years.

Thank you very much for listening to what I have had to say. But Mr. Mackenzie King reminds me, quite properly, that four years is from the British point of view, but the Chinese were in for seven years.

Well, let’s do our utmost to bring these periods of tribulations to an end; and believe me, the work which we have done here will, I am sure, play a contributory part. It is a satisfactory milestone on the road, and I have no doubt there will be other milestones in the future.

But this, I am certain, has been a most successful Conference; and if you, while not hesitating to mingle corrections with approval, will at the same time give us the best aid you can in making a success of this, and in spreading wide that feeling of confidence which I feel, and which I am sure you are justified in feeling, then I think you might have found this Conference has yielded all that you would have liked from a press point of view, and certainly feel that you have played your part with others in the great groundwork which has ended and is steadily progressing.

PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING: Thank you very much. I invite you, Mr. President, to speak to the ladies and gentlemen of the press.

THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that I can give away a secret, by explaining that all during the early hours of this morning – I was going to say last night – the three of us were in an apologetic frame of mind to the press. We were honestly trying to give you all some spot news. And we talked for some two hours, trying to devise something along the line of a slogan – a phrase – by which this Conference might be known in the future, but we failed utterly. And that is why we come here in a spirit of apology.

The Prime Minister has well explained why there are certain things that cannot be talked about or printed, and yet I think there is one thing in which the press can help, as the press well knows, to a very great degree. This war is not being run by conferences, it goes far deeper than that. We live in democracies. The war effort in the field has gone extremely well. That is in part due to the conferences of our staffs. And yet, what the men carry, what the men eat, the ships they sail in, that all comes from the unanimity of our war effort, down to the average citizen. And I believe that it is due to the magnificent effort in all our countries, but one which must be kept up very clearly and definitely to the high pitch that it has now arrived at. We cannot afford in any way to assume that military and naval or air men can win the war alone. They need the backing of the people back home. And that is why this Conference, while of very great value, must be implemented by the people in the factories, and the shipyards, and in the fields.

We have had a series of successes. When I think back a little over a year ago – back of Casablanca – June 1942, when we were meeting in Washington, things looked pretty dark – to the days of Tobruk, to the days of a lack of an offensive on our part. We were still on the defensive, clearly, in almost every part of the world.

And we know that it takes time. We can’t order things done and have them happen overnight, or over the week end. And so, what was planned in June of 1942 didn’t go into effect until November 1942. And the things that were planned at Casablanca have only just gone into effect, as we realize through the capture of Tunis first, and then Sicily.

I think you can assume that other plans are about to be developed. But that point about the Conference being a detail, if you like, an essential part of winning the war in the shortest possible time ought to be linked with the part that the people of the United Nations must contribute–


THE PRESIDENT: (CONTINUING) –to the earliest and most satisfactory victory.

I think also that there are one or two things that might be assumed. I know the value of controversy making the front page – (LAUGHTER) and I think it’s an actual fact that we have gone through this series of conferences without controversy. We have a meeting of the minds, and I believe that that is going to last, not only through the war but for many, many long years after the war is over and peace comes.

In the same way, I think we ought to realize that this is a war throughout the world, that we are looking at it as a world war. Yes, we discussed the Atlantic situation, and the operations in the Mediterranean; but we have discussed equally the operations and the problems in the Southwest Pacific, of China, and even of that very important fact that happened during this Conference, the throwing out, or shall I say the self-removal of the Japs from the only part of this hemisphere that they had a foot in. Therefore, there is no difference, East and West, and below the equator or above the equator. It’s all one broad and general operation. That was one of our problems last night and into the early hours of this morning. We couldn’t say anything that would create a controversy, because there was none.

I can tell you also that not once but a dozen times, Mr. Churchill and I have said this spot is the best yet.


THE PRESIDENT: (CONTINUING) We have come here to Québec, and we have appreciated the wonderful hospitality of Mr. King–


THE PRESIDENT: (CONTINUING) –and of the Canadian people, because he speaks for them.

I don’t think we could find a more delightful spot than here, with its great historic background. I, like Mr. Churchill, wish we had had more time to get about and see things, and do things. I will say that I shall never forget the very excellent eating qualities of Québec trout. That is something that I shall long remember. All in all, it has been a tremendous success.

We wanted last night to give out some kind of statement that would be– what shall I call it? – a bit exciting. Well, a statement has been prepared. I don’t believe there’s a “cough in a carload” in it. (LAUGHTER)…

In the statement we were compelled, Mr. Churchill and I, to speak of the “fleets, armies, and air forces of the two nations.” The reason for that is that this is a staff conference between the British and American staffs; but I want to point out that it is only because of that restriction that we did not speak of the splendid forces of the Dominion of Canada. They are at the front, as we all know, working with the British and the Americans; and I don’t want anybody to think, anywhere in the world, that we have forgotten them – what the Canadians have been doing in this war.

Well, I think that’s about all that I can say.

And I merely want once more to thank Mr. King and the people of the Dominion for all that they have done to make this a very busy, but a very happy ten days since we came here.

THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.

PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING: Gentlemen, just one word before you part.

I would like to say in your presence to the President and to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, how greatly honored the people of Canada have felt that they should have agreed to hold the meeting which they have just been holding in Canada, and particularly in this historic old city of Québec.

My colleagues and I were very proud indeed when we received word from Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill that they were agreed upon meeting in this city, in our country. I wish to thank them most warmly for having come here and spent the time that they have spent with us. We all wish that it might be longer. We all wish that there might have been a greater opportunity for our people to have the privilege of seeing them more, as they did yesterday in the city for the Prime Minister, and also for the President. But we have realized that this is a very serious Conference, and that the matters being discussed here are the most important of any that can be discussed in the world at this time, that every moment and hour has been precious.

It has been my privilege to know something of what has been done behind the scenes, and I would just like to assure all of you ladies and gentlemen of the press that there hasn’t been a moment in which the thoughts and the minds of these gentlemen and their military advisers have not been directed to the supreme purpose for which they have met and gathered together here.

I am delighted, Mr. President and Mr. Churchill, that you have both found it possible not only to see each other but to see just a bit of the immediate environs of the city, and to carry away many happy memories of the few days that we have had the privilege of having you in our midst.

May I say to you ladies and gentlemen of the press, on behalf of the Government, how deeply we appreciate the Government of Canada – how deeply we appreciate the very helpful cooperation that you have given to all of us during the period of the Conference. And I want to thank you on behalf of what you have sent out to the world as the picture and background in which the Conference is being held, in which you have given the atmosphere in which these deliberations have taken place, and for what you have been able to give of all the proceedings.

You have helped to put our country onto the map of the world, at this time of greatest importance in the history of the world. I thank you for having done it, and for the manner in which you have done it.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Québec, August 24, 1943.

The Anglo-American War Conference which opened at Québec on the 11th of August, under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work.

The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward action of the Fleets, Armies and Air Forces of the two nations. Considering that these forces are intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.

Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens. It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.

It may however be stated that the military discussions of the Chiefs of Staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Mr. T. V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement was also reached upon the political data underlying or arising out of the military operations.

It was resolved to hold another Conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

[Consideration has been given during the conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week.]

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Québec, 24 August 1943.

Enclosure to CCS 319/5

QUADRANT: Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In previous memoranda (CCS 319 and CCS 319/2) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is submitted herewith.

Overall objective

In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

i. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

j. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

Execution of the overall strategic concept

The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept are agreed upon.

a. Progress Report
We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

b. Facilities in the Azores Islands
The facilities of the Azores Islands will be used for intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat.

NOTE: On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the Azores we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the Azores has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

We have approved the following operations in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe.

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France, operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

In case circumstances render the execution of OVERLORD impossible, it may be necessary to consider JUPITER as an alternative. Plans for this operation, with particular reference to an entry into Southern Norway, should therefore be made and kept up to date.

a. First phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. Second phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

c. Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France.

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the Toulon-Marseilles area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished guerrilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central Mediterranean bases, complementing POINTBLANK.
b. Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.
c. Air supply of Balkan and French guerrillas.

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.

We have examined the plans that have been prepared by General Morgan’s staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises regarding the attainment of air superiority and the number of troops necessary for the success of these operations.

The war against Japan

We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of Japan and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:
a. The dependence of Japan upon air power, naval power, and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan’s air force, naval forces and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.

c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.

We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. We have in mind:
a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in China as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an “air road” to China.

b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.

c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBAKUKS, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.

From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within 12 months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must await further examination on the lines indicated above.

The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the overall objective and strategic concept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above.

We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East should be started as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows.

The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.

We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against Japan in 1943-44. We therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.

We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Pacific in 1943-44 as follows:

The seizure and consolidation of the Gilberts preparatory to a further advance into the Marshalls.

The seizure of the Marshall Islands (including Wake and Kusaie) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central Pacific.

The capture of Ponape preparatory to operations against the Truk area.

The seizure of the eastern Carolines as far west as Woleai and the establishment of a fleet base at Truk.

The capture of the Palaus including Yap.

The seizure of Guam and the Japanese Marianas.

Consideration of operations against Paramushiru and the Kuriles.

The seizure or neutralization of eastern New Guinea as far west as Wewak and including the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. Rabaul is to be neutralized rather than captured.

An advance along the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop, by step-by-step airborne-water-borne advances.

To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Target date mid-February 1944.

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.

To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

To continue the preparation of India as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.

To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:
a. Keeping China in the war.
b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.

We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals to regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the longer-term development of the lines of communication.

We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to another:
a. An operation against Northern Sumatra; target date spring 1944.

b. Operations southwards from Northern Burma; target date November 1944.

c. Operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the direction of Bangkok; target date to be as early as practicable.

d. Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable.

e. The capture of Akyab and Ramree to determine whether it is necessary to the success of operations in a to d above or the operations in Upper Burma.

A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and China in 1944-45, on the assumption that Germany is defeated in the autumn of 1944.

This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 37 and 38.

The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been decided that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below:

The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in GHQ India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.

A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:
a. The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three Services and of the Allied forces.

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three Services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.

The boundaries are set out in detail in CCS 308/3, but, generally, they include Burma, Ceylon, Thailand (Siam), the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.

Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander-in-Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.

The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the overall plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.

The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander-in-Chief.

General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.

The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, and of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Bequests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander-in-Chief, India.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander-in-Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.

Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects

We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:
a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German requirements.

b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.

c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.

d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.

e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.

f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.

g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.

h. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.

We are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is not ripe for Turkey to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as follows:

a. We should ask Turkey to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value through the Straits.

b. We should ask that supplies of chrome to Germany should be stopped.

c. We should ask Turkey to continue:
(1) To improve her internal communications.
(2) To complete the airfields required for HARDIHOOD.
(3) To allow us to install the full RDF and Sector Control facilities which we require.
(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for the full HARDIHOOD Plan.
(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces.

d. Our policy on equipment to Turkey should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb.

We have approved the rearmament of French units up to and including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943 as recommended by the Commander, North African Theater.

General Morgan and General Eisenhower have been given the details of PLOUGH force and have been asked to report as to possible uses for it in their respective theaters.

We have asked General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activities in Sardinia and Corsica with a view to facilitating entry into those islands.

We have examined the possibilities of constructing “floating airfields” and have given our approval to the active pursuit of further experiments.

We have approved, subject to prior requirements for Military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam. These will facilitate air operations in China and ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

We have approved, subject to prior requirements of operations in Burma, intensified development of the supply routes into and in Assam and have issued directives to theater commanders concerned with a view to a target of 220,000 tons per month being reached by 31 December 1945.

Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon

We have carried out an examination of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon. We find in general that these resources will be sufficient to meet our needs. In some cases, however, the availability of resources is dependent upon conditions which cannot be foreseen at this time. The subject therefore should be kept under constant review, and if shortages develop or conflicts of interest arise, they will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

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