Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Attlee | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | |
| Sir Alexander Cadogan |
According to Truman, at this meeting the British participants were informed of the suggestion made by Molotov earlier in the day concerning a formal request to the Soviet Government to enter the war against Japan.
Babelsberg, July 29, 1945
My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In accordance with my letter of July 25, I enclose a copy of a memorandum directive on the issuance of Lend-Lease munitions, which I have today sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This directive eliminates the delivery of Lend-Lease material for the occupation of Axis countries. In other respects I believe it adequately covers your expressed desires.
I have noted the suggestion in the letter of July 24, that postwar economic arrangements be discussed in Washington, say in September. Mr. W. L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, will be in London shortly for the UNRRA Council meeting, and I have instructed him to engage in informal conversations with your people about these matters. When he has reported to me in Washington, we shall be able to decide upon arrangements for further discussions with your representatives.
Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]
[Enclosure]
[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945
Top secret
Referring to my memorandum of 5 July, 1945, quoted herewith following:
Approval of the issue to Allied Governments of Lend Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment will be limited to that which is to be used in the war against Japan, and it will not be used for any other purpose.
It may be given the following interpretation:
Issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to all Allied Governments, including Latin American countries is authorized when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it is to be used in direct support of redeployment of American troops, or Allied troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan.
Supply of Allied service units that are directly serving United States forces in any area with subsistence, supply, and equipment (except arms and ammunition) is authorized.
Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the USSR is authorized in accordance with my directive of 11 May, 1945, when in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it can be considered as for use in the war against Japan.
Until the receipt of further instructions issue of Lend-Lease munitions of war and military and naval equipment to the British Empire is authorized for the direct support of redeployment of American troops, and of British troops in connection with their redeployment in support of the war against Japan, taking into account commitments for approved combined operations against Japan. In accordance with my memorandum of 17 July, 1945 to the Prime Minister, and subject to the elimination of the requirements for occupational forces in Axis countries, such issue should be generally in accord with schedules of requirements and other terms arrived at by British and American supply representatives in October-November 1944, subject to changing strategic demands as well as to usual supply, procurement, and allocation considerations and procedures.
Replacement and maintenance on a military Lend-Lease basis of French units which have already been equipped by the U.S. under the North African Rearmament Program, Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and Air Forces Program is authorized for subsistence until August 31, 1945, and for other items of equipment and supply until September 30, 1945.
Supply of maintenance items for U.S. equipment now in the possession of Allied armies may be issued for purposes other than those specifically approved in this memorandum against payment under such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State Department and Foreign Economic Administration in accordance with established procedure.
HARRY S. TRUMAN
[Babelsberg, July 29, 1945]
[Translation]
Proposal of [on?] Reparations From Germany
Exactions of once-for-all removals from the national wealth of Germany in payment for reparations (plants, shops, equipment, materials, etc.) will be made by each government in its zone of occupation within two years after capitulation.
Removals must be made with a view to the quickest restoration of the economy of those countries which have suffered from German occupation. The necessity of an over-all reduction of the war potential of Germany must also be taken into account.
Because of the enormous losses of the Soviet heavy industry and also because of the small quantity of German enterprises of this kind in the Soviet zone of occupation and because of the insufficiency of the total resources of this zone, the USSR must receive in addition to the removals made in her zone, also from 5½ to 6 million tons on a special list of equipment in complete and workable condition on the reparations account from the Western Zones and predominantly from the Ruhr District. This equipment will be used for the restoration of the various branches of Soviet industry which have suffered from the enemy, and in the first instance for the metallurgical, chemical, and machine building industries. These removals must begin immediately upon the acceptance of this decision and will terminate not later than May 10, 1947. For this purpose a special agency will be created by the Allied Commission on Reparations.
The USSR will also receive corporation shares valued at $500,000,000 of industrial and transport companies which have remained in the Western Zones and which have the greatest significance from the point of view of an over-all reduction of the military potential of Germany.
Exactions of annual deliveries of goods from the current production will not be made on a zone basis but on an over-all German basis. The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange a general plan for receiving and allocating these deliveries among the nations which have the right to them. The total sum of these deliveries will amount to 8 billion dollars and will be for a period of 10 years. The USSR share in these deliveries will amount to 50% of the total sum.
The following goods will be accepted in the form of possible deliveries; coal, brown coal, metals, metal products, cement, building materials, scrap metal[,] timber, potash, paper, sugar, chemical and glass products, machines, river boats, medical instruments, agricultural products, cattle, etc. As a basis for computation, the 1938 price – valued in dollars – will be accepted with an increase of 10%.
The Allied Commission on Reparations will arrange the plan of allocating the external assets and claims of Germany among the nations which have a right to receive reparations.
In regards to that part of reparations which must be covered by once-for-all removals, the USSR will take upon herself, and for her own account, the settlement of the reparations claims of Poland. The United States of America and Great Britain will do the same in regards to France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland and Norway.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. Forrestal | Foreign Secretary Bevin |
Forrestal’s diary entry: “From there went to see Ernest Bevin and found Bevin in very good form. He said in answer to my question that the only industries they proposed to nationalize were power, railroads, mines, and textiles up to the spinning mills. He indicated he had no use for Laski. He spoke highly and appreciatively of Anthony Eden. He said he was quite familiar with tactics of the Communists because he had had to deal with them in his own labor unions in England.
“I asked him a question about the Emperor in Japan, whether he thought we ought to insist on destruction of the Emperor concept along with the surrender. He hesitated and said this question would require a bit of thinking, but he was inclined to feel there was no sense in destroying the instrument through which one might have to deal in order to effectively control Japan. He then made a rather surprising statement – for a liberal and a labor leader: ‘It might have been far better for all of us not to have destroyed the institution of the Kaiser after the last war – we might not have had this one if we hadn’t done so. It might have been far better to have guided the Germans to a constitutional monarchy rather than leaving them without a symbol and therefore opening the psychological doors to a man like Hitler.’
“He said he was determined to get going what he called the three historic axes of European trade – the Baltic axis, that is to say, the old Hanseatic League; the Antwerp axis, and the Genoa axis. He said these three were the classic foci of European trade for hundreds of years back, that if they could be restored to activity, it would do much to bring about revival of commerce in Europe.
“I asked him how he was going to deal with Southeastern Europe, that is, the Balkans, which would be under the control of Russia, and he said he didn’t think the Balkans amounted to much in the way of business. I differed with this.”
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Poland | |
| Mr. Despres | Mr. Minc | |
| Mr. Rajchman |
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2945
[Babelsberg,] July 29, 1945
I conveyed to Mr. Minc Mr. Clayton’s regret that he was unable to accept the Minister’s invitation to visit the Silesian coal fields, explaining that Mr. Clayton was heavily engaged with other matters as the conference drew toward a close. I then told Mr. Minc that we thought it would be useful for him to talk to the American military authorities in Berlin, who were now transporting coal from the Ruhr to meet their share of Berlin’s requirements; in order to explore the possibility of drawing upon Silesian coal instead, and I said that, subject to his acceptance of the invitation, we had arranged an appointment for him with Maj. General Echols. Mr. Minc replied that he would consult the other members of his Government and let me know. (He subsequently accepted, and a meeting with General Echols took place the following morning.) I then outlined the scope of functions of EECE, ECO and the projected Inland Transport Organization and expressed the hope that the Polish Government would acquaint itself with these organizations with a view to active participation in their work. Mr. Minc asked a number of questions regarding the functions, activities to date and membership of these organizations and said that he would look into the matter further.
Mr. Minc then stated that he was most eager to acquaint the United States Government as fully as possible with the present economic position and needs of Poland, in order to enable us to consider against a background of knowledge their requests for imports and for credits. He asked how this might best be accomplished. I said that we proposed to attach a well-qualified economic man to Ambassador Lane’s staff, and that we hoped that the Polish Government would extend to such man the fullest opportunities for familiarizing himself with the situation. I suggested that it would also be useful for the Polish Government to send a small number of well-qualified people to Washington for financial and supply matters. Mr. Minc expressed the personal view that it would be most desirable if the United States Government could send a special survey mission to Poland which would spend a couple of months there and then return to Washington and report. I suggested that before extending any formal invitation along these lines, it would be well to discuss this matter informally with Ambassador Lane.
After my conversation with Minc had been completed, Dr. Rajchman furnished the following bits of information:
It is a criminal offense for a Russian commander to allow any freight cars to move eastward empty. Large amounts of supplies are seen passing through Poland, including numbers of German livestock.
Dr. Rajchman believes that the Russians have adopted a three-year program of removals from their zone of occupation. They have set a physiological minimum standard of living for the German population and plan to leave only enough resources to support this minimum.
For a time the Russians carried out removals from the territory newly transferred to the Polish administration, but under an agreement with the Polish Government these removals were discontinued on a specified date.
The Red Army is having considerable difficulty in effecting the redeployment of their forces from Germany. They are believed to have had 12 million men on the whole Eastern Front. There are a number of roving bands of Red Army troops (AWOL). They are shot when caught, but drastic punishment has not solved the problem.
Except for Warsaw, which has been far more thoroughly demolished than Berlin, material damage in Poland has not been serious. Loss of life is estimated at 5,500,000, over half Jews.
The Pittsburgh Press (July 29, 1945)
New Prime Minister joins other leaders
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer
…
Youngstown Vindicator (July 29, 1945)
Our task will only have begun with the defeat of Japan – problem of Europe is small in comparison – we’re in the Pacific to stay
By Sen. Elbert Thomas, D-Utah
…
U.S. State Department (July 29, 1945)
Sunday, July 29:
1000: The President attended Protestant church services at the Coliseum. The services were conducted by Captain Northern.
1130: Mr. Molotov, accompanied by Mr. Galounsky (interpreter) called at the Little White House. The President, Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Molotov, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Galounsky conferred for more than an hour. Generalissimo Stalin was indisposed and could not attend.
The President presented autographed pictures to Colonel General S. N. Kruglov, Lieutenant General N. D. Gorlinski and Colonel M. M. Koretsky of the Red Army. These officers, members of the Soviet Advance party, had charge of arrangements at Babelsberg for the housing and security of the Big Three.…
Mail was dispatched to Washington this afternoon.
1630: Prime Minister Attlee, Mr. Bevin, and Sir Alexander Cadogan called at the Little White House. They conferred for some time with the President and Secretary Byrnes.
There was no meeting of the Big Three today. Generalissimo Stalin was still indisposed.
1930: Captain Ross was a dinner guest at the White House this evening. Dinner music was furnished by an Army band.
The Syonan Shimbun (July 30, 1945)
Army spokesman ridicules foe proclamation
…
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 30, 1945)
Die japanische Regierung ist gewillt, den Krieg bis zum bitteren Ende auszesechten
NEW YORK, 29. Juli (Reuters) – Der Japanische Rundfunk gab bekannt, dass Ministerpräsident Suzuki das Ultimatum der Alliierten, zu kapitulieren, abgelehnt hat. Radio Tokio fügte hinzu, dass Suzuki in einem Interview die Entschlossenheit der japanischen Regierung den Krieg fortzusetzen zum Ausdruck brachte. Die kaiserlich-japanische Regierung wird die Aufforderung zur Übergabe durch die Alliierten nicht zur Kenntnis nehmen.
Zur Ablehnung des Ultimatums durch Japan schreibt der Reuter-Korrespondent William Hardcastle: „Die nach den letzten Angriffen von Superfestungen entstandenen ungeheuren Brände wüteten noch in drei japanischen Kriegsindustrie-Zentren, als die japanischen Minister von dem 77-jährigen Premier, Admiral Suzuki, in aller Eile in die Residenz berufen wurden, um das Ultimatum der Großmächte, „Übergabe oder Zerstörung“, zu besprechen. Nach einer dreistündigen Kabinettssitzung verkündete die japanische Nachrichtenagentur an die Alliierten eine herausfordernde Antwort, in der es heißt, dass „Japan den Krieg seiner feststehenden Politik entsprechend bis zum bitteren Ende ausfechten werde.“
Die gesamte Propaganda-Maschine der Vereinigten Nationen wird eingesetzt, um das japanische Volk von der Proklamation in Kenntnis zu setzen. Von Superfestungen werden Flugblätter mit der Aufforderung an die Japaner, ihre Regierung zu stürzen, kreuz und quer über das ganze japanische Mutterland abgeworfen. Der Sprecher der US-Regierung, Kapitän zur See, E. M. Zacharias, sprach zum japanischen Volk und sagte, dass Japan nur die Wahl zwischen der Annahme der Bedingungen oder völliger Vernichtung hätte. Die Führer Japans könnten nicht länger ihrem Volk die Wahrheit über die Niederlage Japans vorenthalten. Japan müsse den Weg der Vernunft wählen, da seine ganze Zukunft davon abhängt. Wenn das ‚japanische Volk durch seine selbstherrliche Militärclique gezwungen würde, den Weg des Verderbens zu wählen, dann werden Schweiß und Mühe von Jahrhunderten umsonst gewesen sein.
Die Pressestimmen prangern durchgehend die eigensinnige Haltung des japanischen Kabinetts an. Die New York Times schreibt unter anderem: „Die Bedingungen dieses letzten Friedensangebotes der alliierten Regierungen wurden zurückgewiesen und somit muss und wird der Krieg im Pazifik auf dem Schlachtfeld entschieden werden. Die Bedingungen der Alliierten waren so günstig und großzügig, wie man es angesichts der langen Liste brutaler und verräterischer Angriffe Japans gerade noch verantworten konnte.“ Die New York Herald Tribune äußert sich: „Es besteht kein Anlass, durch die glatte Zurückweisung des in Potsdam erlassenen Ultimatums beunruhigt oder überrascht zu sein. Japan wird immer noch durch seine Militärclique beherrscht. Wie lange sie den Japanern noch ihre Entscheidung aufzwingen kann, ist eine andere Frage. Der Nervenkrieg, nur möglich durch Amerikas Stärke und Japans Schwäche. kann es den japanischen Militaristen bald unmöglich machen, weiteren Widerstand zu verlangen.“
L’Aube (July 30, 1945)
…
U.S. State Department (July 30, 1945)
It is not known definitely who participated in this conversation, although it appears from Despres’ memorandum of his conversation with Minc on July 29 that Major General Echols was one of the participants for the United States.
[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
[Translation]
A Polish-American conference was held at the headquarters of the Polish Delegation concerning a transaction with regard to 2,500 tons of coal to be delivered to the American occupation sector in Berlin. The transaction was based on a payment in dollars, but the Polish side retained the right to accept oil or gasoline in payment for the supply of coal. The Americans would provide railroad freight cars for the coal and would send them to the place of loading.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Commissar Molotov | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Pavlov |
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 4:30 p.m.
Top secret
THE SECRETARY said he wanted to talk to Mr. Molotov on two or three questions of importance still open before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting this afternoon.
He said, first of all, he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that in regard to the Polish western frontier, we were prepared as a concession to meet the Soviet desire and he, therefore, had a revised paper on this subject (copy attached). He pointed out that this would put Polish administration up to the western as against the eastern Neisse.
MR. MOLOTOV expressed his gratification at this proposal.
THE SECRETARY then said the next question was Italy and the entry of Italy into the United Nations. He had again been endeavoring to find a compromise between his British and Soviet friends. He proposed a new sentence at the end of the third paragraph and a new paragraph regarding freedom of the allied press to report on events in Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland (copy attached).
MR. MOLOTOV, after hearing a translation of these changes, said while he could not say finally he believed that they would be acceptable to the Soviet Delegation.
THE SECRETARY then said we come to the most difficult of all the questions, namely, that of reparations. He said that he had a new proposal to make and handed Mr. Molotov the revised United States formula (copy attached). He emphasized that this was a United States proposal and that he had not yet consulted the British, adding that if they could reach agreement here on this question he would go to see the British this afternoon and endeavor to persuade them to agree.
MR. MOLOTOV studied the new proposals and then asked who was to determine what equipment was suitable for reparations.
THE SECRETARY replied that he thought since the Ruhr lay in the British zone that that would be for the British to determine on the basis of what must be left there in order to maintain the minimum required standard of living.
MR. MOLOTOV said he thought that determination of reparation materials should be done on an Allied basis in which the Soviets would participate. He suggested that it either be the Control Council or the Reparations Commission.
THE SECRETARY said that that was a possibility and should be studied. He said the Control Council operating for all Germany could determine the general norms of living standards, but that the final authority would probably remain in the commander-in-chief of the given zone, since he was responsible for that zone.
MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the Secretary’s draft did not mention any possibility of the Control Council or the Reparations Commission determining what equipment was available for reparations. Mr. Molotov then proposed that instead of the 12% [15%?] of reparations to be received without exchange that that figure be raised to 25%, thus making 25% from the Ruhr to be exchanged and 25% without exchange to the Soviet Union.
THE SECRETARY said he doubted if the British would agree to any such figure. He felt that it would be difficult enough to get them to agree to his proposal.
MR. MOLOTOV then reverted to his argument of yesterday and to the necessity of having a fixed figure either in dollars or in pounds. He repeated all his arguments on this point.
THE SECRETARY replied for his part, giving the arguments as to why it was impossible and dangerous for us to attempt to fix a definite figure either for tonnage or for dollar value at this time.
MR. MOLOTOV said he could only give a preliminary opinion and would, of course, have to consult Marshal Stalin. He said he thought the three points of difficulty would be:
He said that before meeting Mr. Byrnes today they had prepared a counter suggestion and he handed the Secretary a copy in Russian (copy in translation attached). He then said he wished to talk about the Ruhr, that he felt that in confining the removals for the Soviet Union to the Ruhr area it narrowed the base, since there was industrial equipment in the United States zone as well.
THE SECRETARY explained that the United States from its zone would have to help meet claims from other countries, such as France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and others. He said that under his scheme the Soviet Union would be responsible for reparations to Poland, but that the reparations for other countries would come from the western zones.
MR. MOLOTOV said that despite the difference still existing he felt that some progress had been made in this question of reparations and he would so report to Marshal Stalin. He then said they had a proposal in regard to the question of the Ruhr as a whole. He recalled that there had been much discussion at previous conferences in regard to the internationalization of the Ruhr, but he said that nothing lately had been heard of it.
THE SECRETARY reminded Mr. Molotov that at one time President Roosevelt had been in favor of the dismemberment of Germany but had subsequently changed his mind. He recalled Marshal Stalin’s talks with Mr. Hopkins last spring on this point.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed and said that the paper he was now handing to the Secretary merely dealt with the setup of an Allied Commission composed of the four occupying powers to administer the Ruhr under the general direction of the Control Council (copy attached). Mr. Molotov said he had two other papers to hand the Secretary: one in regard to Italian and Austrian reparations based on the discussions of the Big Three, and the other, concerning war criminals which listed the first ten of such war criminals which were to be brought to trial in the near future. (Copies attached).
THE SECRETARY remarked that he had understood that Marshal Stalin had agreed to drop reparations from Austria.
MR. MOLOTOV replied they might be prepared to withdraw the reference to Austria but that the Yugoslavs would be offended, adding however, that if Yugoslavia received reparations from other sources she might be satisfied.
THE SECRETARY, in conclusion, said he wished to emphasize once again that these proposals were United States proposals and had not yet received British consent.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
Western Frontier of Poland
In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.
The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland’s western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River2 and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
Admission to the United Nations
The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.
For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.
The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the ratification of peace treaties with these countries.
The three Governments express the desire that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.
As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declared that:
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.
The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
German Reparations
Reparations claims of Russia and Poland to be satisfied from the Russian zone plus
(a) 25% of such industrial capital equipment as we determine is not necessary for a peace economy and should be removed from the Ruhr on condition that there would be exchanged an equivalent value in food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products and oil products, to be made available to us by the Soviets.
(b) An additional 15% of such industrial capital equipment as is determined unnecessary for a peace economy should be transferred from the Ruhr to the Soviet government without payment or exchange of any kind in return.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
[Translation]
On Ruhr Industrial District
Considering the Ruhr Industrial District as a part of Germany and having in view the necessity of all kind curtailment of Germany’s war potential the Conference has deemed expedient:
To determine that the Ruhr Industrial District shall be in respect of administration under the joint control of USA, U.K., USSR and France.
The administration of the Ruhr Industrial District shall be exercised by the Allied Council composed of representatives of U.K., USA, USSR and France.
The Industry of the Ruhr District will be utilized for reparation purposes in conformity with the common reparation plan.
To establish immediately, in view of prompt accomplishment of this decision, provisional Allied Council composed of representatives of USA, U.K., USSR and France, which in a months term will carry out necessary preparatory work and will assume the provisional Administration of the Ruhr District.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
[Babelsberg,] July 30, 1945
[Translation]
Regarding Reparations from Italy and Austria
Italy and Austria must pay reparations in compensation of those losses which they caused the United Nations by their participation in the war on the side of Germany.
Reparations shall be paid in the form of immediate removals of equipment from those branches of their economy which are the most important elements of their military potential. Such removals should be concluded during a period of one year.
The total sum of reparations from Italy shall be established at three hundred million dollars. The Allied Reparations Commission shall define the amount of reparations from Austria.
Italy shall pay reparations to the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania; and Austria to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-3045
[Babelsberg, July 30, 1945]
[Translation]
Trial of Principal War Criminals
The Conference has recognized as necessary for the trial of the principal war criminals whose crimes, as is stated in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, were not connected with a definite geographical place, to establish an International Tribunal in the near future.
The Conference has decided in the first instance that judgment should be passed on the following leaders of the Hitlerite clique: Goering, Hess, Ribbentrop, Ley, Keitel, Doenitz, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, Streicher, Krupp.
The leaders of the three Allied governments declare that according to the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943 they will take all measures at their disposal to provide for the surrender into the hands of justice war criminals who have taken refuge in neutral countries. In the case of the refusal of any such country to surrender war criminals who have taken refuge on their territory, the three Allied Governments will consult between each other concerning the measures which should be taken in order to provide for the effecting of their inflexible decision.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Bevin | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Vyshansky |
| Mr. Page | Major Theakstone | Mr. Gusev |
Potsdam, July 30, 1945, 5:00 p.m.
Top secret
MR. BEVIN in the chair.
MR. BEVIN suggested that the following questions might be disposed of:
MR. BYRNES proposed that they consider the question of German external assets and submitted a paper on this question. He pointed out that there were also several matters referred to sub-committees upon which reports had not yet been received.
MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had circulated a memorandum on German troops in Norway which should be placed on the agenda today. The Soviet Delegation was circulating a memorandum on the question of fascist activities in Austria and Germany and another memorandum on the question of the Ruhr area. He also suggested that they discuss the agenda for the Big Three meeting.
MR. BEVIN proposed that they today send a telegram to the French and Chinese Governments on this question.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that it was understood that the message would be delivered 48 hours before adjournment. He agreed to its being sent now.
MR. [SIR ALEXANDER] CADOGAN said that the sub-committee had agreed on a text but that the Foreign Ministers’ meeting had not considered it. In the final paragraph referring to the dissolution of the EAC he suggested the words “the three governments” rather than the words “the conference.”
This was agreed to as well as the despatch of the telegram to the Governments of France and China.
It was agreed without discussion to notify the French Government of the decision taken on this matter.
MR. BEVIN said they should have a clear understanding of what they had decided on this matter.
MR. MOLOTOV said he had submitted a draft of the Soviet proposals.
MR. BYRNES said he would like to submit for consideration a proposal involving three matters:
On the subject of reparations, he wished to read a proposal which he had made to the British and Soviet Delegations. (Mr. Byrnes then read the American paper on this subject). He wished to add that they had discussed the question of Italian and Austrian reparations on several occasions. The position of the President had been made clear in the meetings of the Big Three and he thought it would not be helpful to discuss it further at the present meeting. The agreement which he now proposed on reparations was conditional upon agreement on two other proposals which he would read now because they must be considered together.
The approval of the paper on the admission into the United Nations of Italy and the question of relations with the other satellite states. He proposed two amendments to the document on this question in an attempt to compromise the differences between the Soviet and British Delegations.
Mr. Byrnes said that this concerned the question of the western frontier of Poland on which he had already presented a paper to the British and Soviet Delegations. The proposal would permit the administration by the Poles of the area which they claimed pending the final determination of the disposition of this area. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that this proposal represented a sacrifice of the views held and expressed by the United States Delegation on this question. It was made in a spirit of compromise and that if agreement could be reached on these three proposals he would be satisfied. If not, he was willing to report to the Big Three and they could decide whether to continue the discussion or refer the matter to some future conference. He pointed out that on the settlement of these questions rested the settlement of several other matters, such as that concerning the economic principles for Germany.
MR. CADOGAN said he had submitted a paper on the question of reparations to the Soviet and United States Delegations. (A translator read the document in Russian translation).
MR. BEVIN pointed out that this proposal was connected with the next document which he would present.
MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that under the British proposal the Soviets would receive 10% from the western zone. Under the American proposal they would receive 25% against payment and 15% without payment.
MR. BEVIN pointed out that this was from the Ruhr, whereas the British 10% was from the whole western zone. They had not received the American paper when their proposals were made. He inquired which Mr. Molotov liked best.
MR. MOLOTOV observed that the American draft provided for 25% reparations to be taken in exchange for other goods.
MR. BEVIN said the British had in mind the economic principles drawn up for Germany as a whole. They were prepared to treat the supply of goods in Germany separately. He was concerned that the exchange proposed might lead to disputes. It would be difficult to exchange potatoes for chemical machinery. He was hoping that they could get an agreement for supplies over the whole of Germany and treat reparations separately. The question as to how supplies would be paid for by exports was dealt with in a separate paper. The difference between the United States and British approach was one of method. In order that the question could be examined in the full knowledge of their ideas on the subject, he proposed to read his second paper which he pointed out was linked to the first. (The translator then read in Russian translation the British paper on the question of supplies in Germany).
MR. BEVIN pointed out that the paper on economic principles should also be considered in this connection. (The translator read in Russian the paper on this subject).
MR. MOLOTOV said he felt the proposals made by Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin contained a number of elements that could be taken to formulate general principles, but they required amendment and some additions. He had only just read Mr. Bevin’s proposal and would have to study it. It seemed to contain a number of points on which agreement could be reached. Mr. Byrnes’ proposals appeared to raise these questions in a more simple manner. The substance of the views of the Soviet Government were the following. The Soviet Union was anxious to receive German equipment to replace destroyed factories. He felt that the proposals of Mr. Byrnes were closer to their wishes on this. The principal question of interest to the Soviet Delegation, however, remained obscure in both proposals. They both spoke of percentages but of an unknown figure. He proposed an amendment to Mr. Byrnes’ proposal to the effect that the 25% mentioned in the Byrnes draft should be not less than 800 million dollars or two million tons of equipment. The Soviet Delegation was anxious to know what minimum was contemplated. They would, of course, prefer to speak not only of the Ruhr but of the western zones. The question could be settled if they would accept the figures given.
MR. BYRNES said as he had stated before he realized the Soviet desire for an estimate in dollars but it was impossible for us to make an estimate as we had no information as to the amount of equipment that would be available for the payment of reparations. The same applied to an estimate in tons. The amount available for reparations was dependent upon the amount necessary to maintain the economy. With respect to the dollar value it was also the question of what the value was today. The United States representatives on the Reparations Commission as well as other experts did not agree on an estimate of what was available either in dollars or in tons. Our Soviet friends must accept our statement that the economy would be maintained in accordance with the decision to maintain German economy on a uniform basis. The statement on percentages was all they should say now, if they were to avoid quarrels in the future. As an example, he asked whether the two million tons referred to the weight of the equipment or the capacity.
MR. MOLOTOV replied weight of equipment.
MR. BYRNES asked if Mr. Molotov did not think that when our experts disagree his proposal would cause all kinds of misunderstandings. They were going to trust each other on matters of much greater importance than this. When we said 40% of the equipment over and above what was necessary to maintain the economy, he must take this on good faith. Our British friends did not agree on the percentage and he spoke only of his own proposal. He was not wedded to any particular plan but thought our proposal more specific and simpler and that it would avoid misunderstandings.
MR. BEVIN pointed out that in the British proposal the 10% referred to the plants that it would be agreed would be available.
MR. BYRNES urged that [the] advantage to an agreement of this kind was that the determination of what was available in the Soviet zone would concern neither the British, French nor United States and they would not, therefore, be interfering in that determination.
MR. MOLOTOV said he felt Mr. Byrnes’ proposal was in the main acceptable but he would like some indication of the minimum amount. He repeated, however, it was better to speak of the western zone and not the Ruhr.
MR. BYRNES added that when agreement was reached on the percentage of the equipment to come from the Ruhr, the United States would have to agree with their British friends on the amount of machinery necessary to come from the American zone so as fairly to compensate the British and to take care of the claims of France, Belgium and Holland. He confined his percentages to the Ruhr because it was simpler and in order to prevent a situation in which there would be competing claimants. We would have to settle this ourselves.
MR. BEVIN said he was not in a position to state a figure because he did not know what it could be. He did not suppose that Great Britain would receive very much.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired who would determine what equipment would be made available in the western zone.
MR. BEVIN said the zone commander.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested adding “and the Control Council.”
MR. BEVIN agreed that the Control Council should be added.
MR. BYRNES said that the thought of the United States Delegation was that the Control Council should determine the matter but subject to the final determination of the zone commander.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that this should be included in the text proposed by Mr. Byrnes.
MR. BEVIN said that the question of the ascertainment of the material to be removed would be subject to investigation by the Control Council but that the zone commander should have the right of veto at the time of the decision.
MR. BYRNES agreed that in case of dispute the commander of the zone would have to make the decision.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that the Control Council should have final decision.
MR. BYRNES disagreed, saying the commander in our zones and in the Soviet zone was the one who was charged with the maintaining of the economy and who had to have the final decision.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviet Delegation could not conceive of a decision which did not contain minimum figures and he thought the matter should be referred to the Big Three. On the question of who was to determine the equipment available he suggested the Control Commission or the Reparations Commission so that the Russians could take part in the matter.
MR. BYRNES repeated that he could not agree to take away the right of veto from the commander of the zone.
MR. MOLOTOV repeated who was to formulate the general program.
MR. BEVIN replied that it should be the Reparations Commission with the French added, which would work in association with the Control Council.
MR. MOLOTOV asked that this be placed in the record.
MR. BYRNES replied that so long as the commander had the right of veto he thought he could agree.
MR. MOLOTOV asked if they could accept as a basis for discussion the draft of Mr. Byrnes.
MR. BEVIN said he was sorry he could not, as he would have to defend at home the whole of this equipment being taken out of the British zone.
MR. MOLOTOV proposed that they take both zones as the basis.
MR. BYRNES replied there was no objection if the percentage was changed. In each case the percentage mentioned would have to be halved; in place of 25% it would be 12½% and in place of 15% it would be 7½%.
MR. MOLOTOV said this would mean reducing the figure too much.
MR. BEVIN said he had been working on the British figure of 10% which he thought was very high.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviets were the ones most interested in receiving equipment. A large figure had been discussed at Yalta.
MR. BYRNES said that if they could agree to designate the Ruhr and if we and the British could reach agreement, then the percentages in the American proposal were all right. If the Soviets now wanted to fix a percentage covering the two zones, it would mean simply cutting the figures in half. The Soviets would be getting 20% of the equipment in both zones. If that were done, it would be well to emphasize the Ruhr in the document because he understood that most of the equipment the Soviets wanted was there.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviet proposal was 25% of reparations by way of exchange and 25% without payment. They had in mind chiefly the Ruhr[.]
MR. BYRNES suggested that the United States and the British reach an agreement now to make an adjustment between them and added that this could be put into the protocol.
MR. BEVIN said he would rather say 12½% in exchange for other goods and 7½% without exchange. That would save him from political trouble and he added that he had the French and other claimants to think of.
MR. MOLOTOV said he was prepared to accept 20% with exchange and 25% without exchange from both zones and have it stated that they had in mind chiefly the Ruhr.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that Mr. Bevin’s proposal gave the Soviets the same amount as did his proposal. He referred again to the proposal with regard to the Polish frontier which involved a greater concession on our part than this one from the Soviets. The paper referring to the United Nations involved a concession on the part of our British friends. He knew it was a concession for the Soviets to agree to percentages but if we made concessions, the Soviets should also.
MR. MOLOTOV said it was a concession to Poland and not to them.
MR. BYRNES said he had heard his friend, Mr. Molotov, make a plea on this matter when the Poles were present and he had made a more eloquent plea than the Poles.
MR. MOLOTOV said they had received territory from the Poles and were obliged to hold to their position with respect to the western frontier of Poland.
MR. BEVIN said the British had not agreed to the American proposal on this matter and he thought it was a very good offer that was being made to the Soviets.
MR. MOLOTOV disagreed and said that they would be left with very little equipment as reparations in spite of the fact that the Germans had destroyed Soviet industries. They needed agricultural machinery and [means?] to rehabilitate their railroads. He asked if they could accept a suggestion of 25% from the Ruhr and 15% from the two zones, but added that what was important was the total figure.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that this proposal was equivalent to 55% from the Ruhr instead of 40%. He inquired if Mr. Molotov was in a position to make a final disposition today of the three questions involved in his proposal.
MR. MOLOTOV thought it should be referred to the Big Three and that the main question was that of an absolute figure.
MR. BEVIN said that it should be quite plain that the British could not agree to an absolute figure. They would not know what would remain for their other allies.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that since the Soviets would receive only a percentage the balance would remain.
MR. BEVIN raised the question of imports being a fixed [first?] charge on exports.
MR. MOLOTOV thought that the sentence on this should be supplemented by the words “to the extent to which these exports will be approved by the Control Commission, and as regards the extent of these imports not agreed by the Control Commission, priority will be given to reparations,” or it might be more simple if stated “as regards the rest, priorities should be given to reparations as compared with the satisfaction of other economic needs.”
MR. MOLOTOV repeated a previous example he had given with respect to coal. If the Control Commission decided that 500,000 tons of coal should be exported, but one member proposed an additional 200,000, the 500,000 would have priority over reparations. With respect to the remaining 200,000 priority would be given to reparations.
MR. BEVIN inquired what would happen if his own Commander bought wheat and had to export coal to pay for it. Suppose in this case approval for the export of this coal was not given and he was faced with almost starvation in the zone. Would reparations take precedence in the face of a breakdown in the whole administration.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that it must be assumed that all parties were interested in a certain volume of exports. He wished to give another example. Suppose it were planned to arrange for the production of two million tons but only one and one-half million tons were produced. There was no certainty that production could be carried out and it was not possible definitely to fix a figure but 90 percent or 80 percent agreement could be reached. He had made another proposal which would cover such a case. If there were a shortage of certain resources, exports and imports should be equally curtailed as well as internal consumption. If they produced 10 percent less coal, then they should plan to reduce by the same percentage imports, reparations, and internal consumption.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that in the early days of the Conference it became evident that it would be difficult for the Soviet delegation to reach agreement with the British and ourselves. One of the reasons he had proposed the plan discussed this afternoon was to avoid such situations and disputes arising. If the Soviets agreed to his plan they would have no interest in exports and imports from our zone. Any difficulty in regard to imports and exports would have to be settled between the British and ourselves. The Soviets would have no interest and they would get their percentage regardless of what happened to us.
MR. MOLOTOV said that if they could fix a definite figure for reparations this could be arranged.
MR. BEVIN said that so far as reparations were concerned the percentage they proposed would be delivered in any case and would not be affected by this proposal which related to the normal flow of goods. He suggested it was better to leave the question and to deal with Mr. Byrnes’ proposal on the Western frontier of Poland.
MR. BYRNES replied that his proposal was a compromise proposal on three questions. He could not agree to the [separate] settlement of any one of them and suggested that they all be passed over. He could not agree to the other two if there were no agreement on reparations.
MR. MOLOTOV said it seemed that they could reach agreement on reparations but that they had left to the Big Three the one question of an overall figure. On the rest they could reach agreement.
MR. BYRNES said that they might as well send the other two questions along to the Big Three for he could not agree to them unless there was an agreement on reparations.
MR. BEVIN said the British were submitting a paper making proposals to settle the differences that had arisen. He proposed that it be submitted to a technical committee.
MR. MOLOTOV also wished to submit a Soviet draft on this matter.
A technical committee was appointed consisting of Admiral McCarthy and Mr. Weston for the British, Admiral Cooke and Mr. Russell for the United States, and Admiral Kuznetsov and Mr. Sobolev for the Soviets.
MR. BYRNES proposed that his paper on this question be referred to the economic sub-committee.
This was agreed to.
MR. BEVIN said he had submitted a paper on this.
MR. MOLOTOV proposed that the sentence in paragraph 1 regarding treatment of the population should read, “in so far as it is practicable the treatment of the German population should be the same throughout Germany.” He thought that the last sentence of the British draft which referred to the principle of free communications between zones was not in their competence, that they were not familiar with the details. He suggested that the British could raise this on the Control Council.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that while the Control Council would have the final determination this was only a declaration of principles to guide them.
MR. MOLOTOV thought it should have more study.
MR. BYRNES proposed adding the words “subject to normal regulation by the Control Council.” He agreed that the Control Council must be charged with the regulation of these questions.
MR. BEVIN proposed accepting the paper without the paragraph on this question and that this paragraph could be sent to the Control Council for examination and it could then be discussed at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers later in the year.
MR. MOLOTOV thought it would suffice for the British to bring it before the Control Commission; otherwise they would have to set up a special committee to go fully into the matter.
MR. BEVIN inquired if they agreed to the rest of the document and pointed out that the decision in paragraph (a) would have to be included in the message to the French.
MR. MOLOTOV read a proposal for an addition to paragraph 8, sub-paragraph 4, of the document on political principles. This related to the question of a central German administration to deal with economic questions. There were hints regarding this in the document but he thought that it should be stated explicitly and that it was necessary to create such an administration subject to certain limitations.
MR. BYRNES said he saw no objection to accepting Mr. Molotov’s proposal.
MR. BEVIN wondered if this were wise unless the proposal could be shortened and confined to a statement of principles instead of a detailed proposal. He suggested that the Control Commission be asked to advise them in regard to the steps to be taken to establish a central German administration, its constitution and its functions. They were here establishing a central administration without consultation with the Control Commission.
MR. BYRNES said the Big Three had been adopting directives to the Control Commission; if they thought a central administration was necessary he saw no objection to saying so. The British thought the outlining of its functions should be done by the Control Commission. He proposed that they agree to the first paragraph and to the first two lines of the second paragraph stopping with the word “Council.”
MR. BEVIN said he accepted the idea but wanted the British delegation to have a look at it that evening.
MR. BEVIN said they had circulated a paper on this question and added that the British were interested in stopping all private wars.
MR. MOLOTOV said he would also want to circulate a document on Yugoslavia.
(The translator read a Russian translation of the British paper.)
MR. MOLOTOV commented that it was difficult for a reader to understand what was implied as different things were combined in one statement. If they should summon representatives of Yugoslavia to the Conference they could ascertain what could be done.
MR. BEVIN pointed out that an understanding had been reached that until peace was established, the status quo should be maintained and that frontiers should not be altered by force.
MR. MOLOTOV said that the paper did not mention any country by name. He would need more time to examine the draft.
MR. BEVIN said he must have more time to study the Soviet draft.
MR. MOLOTOV submitted the Soviet draft proposal which he said had already been handed to the American delegation. He pointed out that many people would expect the Berlin Conference to say a word on this question. The Soviet proposal was that the first ten war criminals who were in the hands of the Allies and who were well known be dealt with.
MR. BYRNES said that the United States representative on the War Crimes Commission, Justice Jackson, had discussed with him the situation in regard to German war criminals. The Commission had not reached agreement but hoped to do so in the immediate future as to the definition of war crimes. So long as they had a Commission of prominent representatives dealing with this matter they might communicate the proposal to them before taking action and see if they had any recommendation with regard to the language. He agreed that it might be well if the Conference made a statement on this matter, but he would like to first telephone Justice Jackson to ascertain the status of the Commission’s negotiations.
MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that they discuss the matter the next day. He had information to the effect that the disagreements in the War Crimes Commission had been disposed of with two exceptions which would be easy to settle. There had been a disagreement as to the place where the tribunal should sit – whether in Berlin or in Nuremberg. He said the Soviets would agree to either place.
MR. BEVIN said he was glad of this because the British delegation preferred Nuremberg. He asked if the British proposal could not be accepted. He pointed out that he did not mention neutrals nor particular names. The British also had a list of names but it was not necessary to state them.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that names were of interest to all.
MR. BYRNES thought it wiser not to mention persons. The men they had selected to prepare these cases had ideas as to which criminals should be tried first. He pointed out that the list which Molotov had given him earlier today differed from the list he was now submitting. The British also had a list of names.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that they take only the names concerning which there was no doubt.
MR. BYRNES said the fact that there were two lists showed that the question was disputable. It would be better to leave the order of the names to those they had chosen to represent them.
(The translator read a Russian translation of the British proposal.)
MR. BYRNES said he thought the British proposal would be a wiser statement than the Soviet proposal and he added that we each had our pet German war criminals.
MR. MOLOTOV thought the British proposal was not enough. What was said in 1943 was not enough in 1945. He asked for time to think about it and said it was not bad but should be improved.
MR. MOLOTOV said information had reached them to the effect that certain Fascist agents were operating in the American and British zones in Austria and Germany. These were persons who had been in the employ of Hitler. The Soviet delegation felt that they should not be allowed to continue to agitate among the Soviet nationals remaining in the U.S. and British zones. He would be satisfied to receive a short statement from the United States and British to the effect that inquiries would be made in such cases and that an end would be put to these hostile activities.
MR. BYRNES said that he had asked for a report from the Army Commander and hoped to receive it the next day. When he did so he would see what steps could be taken to meet the views of Mr. Molotov.
MR. BEVIN said the British had also asked for information but it was not sure whether they would receive it the next day. If not they would take the matter up with the Soviet Government through official channels.
MR. MOLOTOV said the Soviets hoped for a statement at the Conference.
MR. BEVIN said that he could not be asked to take action before the facts were received and he was not going to allow any government to make him do so.
MR. MOLOTOV said they would wait.
MR. MOLOTOV said the next question he wished to raise was that concerning the information which the Soviets had received that many Germans [in Norway?] had not been disarmed.
MR. BEVIN replied that the British were sending him a complete reply in writing.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if they should send the questions of reparations from Italy and Austria to a sub-committee.
MR. BEVIN said he thought Mr. Byrnes had withdrawn this until the main question was settled.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that he had said that this question had already been considered by them and referred to the Big Three. He understood that Marshal Stalin did not insist upon reparations from Austria but did insist upon reparations from Italy.
MR. MOLOTOV said he was only referring to Italy.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the Big Three had discussed the question at great length and could not reach agreement. If his colleagues wished they could tell the Big Three that they had not finished their work and put it on their agenda again, but he saw no purpose in doing so.
MR. MOLOTOV said he did not regard the question as finished.
MR. BYRNES said he agreed that they could ask the Big Three to decide it but he wanted the report to state that this was being done on the proposal of Mr. Molotov.
MR. MOLOTOV said he agreed.
Ruhr
MR. MOLOTOV said he had presented Mr. Byrnes a paper on the Ruhr and he was now submitting it to Mr. Bevin. He did not propose that it be discussed now.
MR. BEVIN said it was impossible for them to discuss this without the French.
MR. MOLOTOV observed that they had discussed other important questions without the French.
MR. BEVIN said he was willing to study the paper but he was not willing to decide a matter as serious as this without the French.
MR. MOLOTOV said he wished to submit a paper in regard to certain misunderstandings which the Soviet delegation wished to bring to the attention of the British and American delegations in regard to nationals of the Ukraine, White Russia, etc.
On the proposal of MR. BEVIN, it was agreed that the agenda be arranged by consultation.