Potsdam Conference (TERMINAL)

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945
[Translation]

Economic Conference with the American Delegation (Messrs. Clayton, Collado, Murphy, Despres, and Dunn on the American Side; Mikołajczyk, Rzymowski, and Modzelewski on Our Side) Held on July 25, 1945, at Babelsberg

MR. CLAYTON informs us that, on the basis of a telegram received from Mr. Harriman, he has made arrangements for 1,000 military-motor vehicles to be sent to us, and that by now they are probably on the way.

MR. MURPHY states that in addition we shall get six sedans.

In reply to a question asked by Mr. Clayton, the United States Representative to UNRRA, as to whether the UNRRA delegation had already arrived in Poland and whether we had received any UNRRA deliveries, MR. GOMUŁKA replies and stresses the problem of increased UNRRA deliveries which are necessary for Poland, particularly the problem of fats and oils. We shall need help for some time to come, and Mr. Gomułka points out that livestock has been destroyed, and he gives the approximate figures.

MR. CLAYTON is particularly interested in the question of how long we shall need help from UNRRA and whether we have enough flour to feed the population.

MR. GOMUŁKA states that with regard to grains we shall not feel any shortages unless the crops do not turn out in the future as expected, and he stresses again the problem of fats and oils.

MR. CLAYTON answers that the shortage of fats and oils is felt everywhere in the world, even in the United States, where the supply is about 10% short. Then he asks whether we applied for a loan from the United States for needed reconstruction of the country, as was done by Norway and Denmark. The United States expects a large number of such applications in the very near future. The United States Government wants to orient itself with regard to the total world requirements for loans for reconstruction so that it may grant credits in the proper ratio. Therefore he asks whether the Polish Government has prepared any figures on losses and on credit requirements.

MR. GOMUŁKA answers that we do not yet have any exact figures, but that the damages amount roughly to 20 billion in gold. First comes the problem of the reconstruction of ports. Mr. Gomułka asks about the technicalities involved in getting a loan (applications, banks, etc.).

MR. CLAYTON explains that the loan will be granted by the United States Export-Import Bank. The Bretton Woods International Bank is still being organized and presumably will not begin to function for about a year.

Mr. Mikołajczyk brings up the question of designating a representative of the Polish Government to UNRRA. Heretofore the representative has been Mr. Kwapiński, who acted on behalf of the émigré London Government and who has now been recalled.

MR. DUNN asks that a mission be designated to act on behalf of the Government of National Unity and that the names be given at Potsdam or through the American Ambassador at Warsaw.

MR. MIKOŁAJCZYK then brings up the problem of livestock in Poland, which was decimated by the occupation forces. This problem is connected with the question of fats and oils. If we do not get a sufficient amount of fats and oils from UNRRA, we shall be forced to reduce still further the already depleted livestock, which will have catastrophic consequences for agriculture. It would be desirable to obtain a certain number of cattle for breeding purposes from the United States.

MR. CLAYTON explains that at this time there are not many cattle in the United States either, but that they could sell us a small number of breeding cattle. (In Washington beef can be obtained only once a month.)

MR. GOMUŁKA asks under what conditions and in what amount we could get a reconstruction loan from the Export-Import Bank.

MR. CLAYTON points out that he would have to know what goods we need.

MR. GOMUŁKA mentions material for the reconstruction of ports, and in the first place for the reconstruction of highways and railroads. In answer to a question by Mr. Harriman, as to how many automobiles we have now, MR. GOMUŁKA states that the number is ridiculously small (10,000, including motorcycles, and even this small number of machines is in a deplorable condition and in constant need of repair).

MR. CLAYTON asks whether we have sufficient production of steel to rebuild bridges, docks, etc.

MR. GOMUŁKA states that for our present opportunities our production is sufficient, but that our internal production will not cover the needs when the reconstruction of Poland proceeds farther.

MR. MIKOŁAJCZYK points out the increasing needs in the future in connection with the reconstruction of Warsaw, and Mr. Modzelewski stresses the shortages of metallurgical establishments, rolling mills, etc.

MR. HARRIMAN is interested in our figures for the production of steel, particularly in the western areas which we have claimed.

MR. CLAYTON inquires whether we shall need technical assistance for reconstruction, such as technicians, engineers, etc.

MR. GOMUŁKA thinks that we shall be informed as to the situation in this respect only after the return of our émigrés and our technicians from abroad, where we have a large number of them. He estimates in general, however, that we shall need that kind of assistance.

MR. GOMUŁKA states, in answer to a suggestion by Mr. Harriman, that with regard to agricultural machinery we shall need primarily tractors and combines.

MR. CLAYTON inquires then about the technical condition of our textile production, particularly in Łódź.

MR. GOMUŁKA explains that the textile industry in Poland is not in bad shape and that it works, but that we shall need machinery in the future. In answer to a question by Mr. Harriman about raw material, Mr. Gomułka states that we shall import cotton from the Soviet Union, with which we have suitable agreements, but that obviously possible deliveries of that raw material from the United States can be the subject of a commercial agreement between Poland and the United States. As to the entire textile industry, Mr. Gomułka points out that we have received a large number of German plants, so that our total textile production will exceed the prewar figures.

MR. CLAYTON asks us to prepare a memorandum in which we would specify what kind of goods we need from the United States. The first part of the memorandum should indicate items which are most urgently needed, i.e., needed in the course of the first year (1946), and the second part should indicate goods necessary for later objectives. Mr. Clayton also advises us to assign to our future Embassy at Washington an experienced specialist in economic affairs who would be well acquainted with the economic and present needs of our country. At the beginning it should be only one person attached to the Embassy and only later on, when the relations between the two countries have developed, should it be a special economic mission.

Mosely-Strang and Mosely-Gusev conversations

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Mosely Sir William Strang Mr. Gusev

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
Top secret
Victory 316

For Ambassador Winant[.] London’s 44360 July 24 received. Strang told Mosely today FonOff has full authority instruct Hood accept Soviet final paragraph covering report on French zone. Meanwhile US, UK and French commanders have agreed on French area in Berlin. Strang obviously does not understand FonOff delay.

Gousev told Mosely today instructions sent Saksin yesterday to accept title of agreement on additional requirements with inclusion of words “to be imposed.”

BYRNES

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union

[Tokyo,] July 25, 1945 — 7 p.m.
[Translation]
Secret
urgent

944

Re my telegram No. 932

  1. It goes without saying that the outcome of the Big Three Conference will be very closely connected with this subject. However, Churchill and Attlee are expected to return to England temporarily on the 26th and the conference will be recessed for a while. Thus, you should take advantage of this opportunity and, if necessary, go to a place selected as suitable by the other party, meet Molotov, and explain fully the intention of the Imperial Government of Japan. Even though Molotov may find it difficult to arrange a meeting, we believe that the request for a meeting with you would have a good effect in that it would impress them with the sincerity of our desire.

  2. On the occasion of the meeting, as repeatedly mentioned in my previous telegrams, it should be pointed out that the Imperial Government has, first of all, requested the good offices of the Soviet Union and that the sending of the special envoy to the Soviet Union would enable Stalin to acquire the position of advocate of world peace. Also make it clear that we are fully prepared to recognize the wishes of the Soviet Union in the Far East (see my telegram No. 932, last paragraph). Let it be known also that should the Soviet Government react coldly to our request we have no choice but to select other ways and means. Thus, you must work hard to induce the Soviet side to recognize these points and have the Soviet Union take positive action immediately.

  3. Also, at the present time, as you are probably well aware, there are various arguments as to the substance of the demand for the unconditional surrender of Japan in Great Britain and the United States, particularly in the United States. A United States spokesman stated that: “As a rule, for the sake of formality, the Allies will hold fast to unconditional surrender until the end. However, should the Imperial Japanese Government surrender immediately, the Allies are actually prepared to modify the terms.” For instance, on the 19th [21st] Captain Zacharias – although a member of the United States Office of War Information he broadcasts to Japan as spokesman for the United States Government – disclosed the substance of surrender terms, saying that Japan had two choices to make. One was to submit to a dictated peace after the complete destruction of Japan; the other, to accept unconditional surrender and receive benefits under the Atlantic Charter. This is considered simple propaganda strategy. Although it is not definitely stated, this is to a certain degree understood to be a means of encouraging us to surrender. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to the fact that at this time the United States referred to the Atlantic Charter. As for Japan, it is impossible to accept unconditional surrender under any circumstances, but we should like to communicate to the other party through appropriate channels that we have no objection to a peace based on the Atlantic Charter. The difficult point is the attitude of the enemy, who continues to insist on the formality of unconditional surrender. Should the United States and Great Britain remain insistent on formality, there is no solution to this situation other than for us to hold out until complete collapse because of this one point alone. On the other hand, since it is possible that the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States may exercise caution and suspect that our dispatch of a special envoy may be a peace plot, we have repeatedly advised that what is described above is not a mere “peace feeler” but is in obedience to the Imperial command. Also, it is necessary to have them understand that we are trying to end hostilities by asking for very reasonable terms in order to secure and maintain our nation’s existence and honor. Should things advance to the stage where we send a special envoy to the Soviet Union, undoubtedly these problems will have to be discussed frankly. Because of the beginning of the Three-Power Conference and also in consideration of the development of the recent delicate situation in the United States, you should keep the above circumstances in mind and lose no opportunity to explain all this carefully to Molotov – if under unavoidable circumstances this is not possible, it will be well to consult Solomon A. Lozovsky, Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs – and inform us immediately by telegram regarding their attitude.

Conversation concerning the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations

This conversation considered the question of officers of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and of the Executive Committee of that Commission. It is not clear whether the meeting referred to was a bilateral Anglo-American conversation or whether Soviet representatives participated as well.

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: In reply to your letter of the 24th, the Secretary of State is preparing a copy of the memorandum directive to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the issuance of Lend Lease material. It is my intention to abide strictly by the law as passed by the United States Congress on Lend Lease, as I explained to you yesterday, although a liberal construction will be given to the distribution of those items referred to in your memorandum from your Chiefs of Staff.

I am making every effort to get a construction of the new Lend Lease renewal act so as to cause the least difficulty and embarrassment to our Allies. As soon as the memorandum to our Chiefs of Staff is finally prepared, I shall send you a copy.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]


President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945
[Extract]

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

We sent you last night a copy of our telegram to Chiang Kai-shek. I am hoping that we will receive a concurrence from him, and that we may be in a position to issue the Proclamation at the earliest possible moment. I shall inform you, as soon as I hear from him, and we will issue the Proclamation jointly from here, if that is satisfactory to you.

Very sincerely yours,
[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2545

The Soviet Delegation to the U.S. Delegation

Babelsberg, July 25, 1945
[Translation — Extract]

Aide-Mémoire

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Information has also been received concerning similar activities of white-immigrants in Germany in the zone of the First French Army. Here this activity is carried on under the active support on the part of the French military authorities from the “Sécurité Militaire.” In the British and American zones of occupation the leadership of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR is carried on by the so-called Committee led by the white-immigrants, General Skoropadski, Kostyushchenko, Mironenko and Shmega. According to information received by the Soviet military authorities this Committee in June 1945 created the so-called “Ukrainian Committees” in a number of German cities, including Weissenburg, Kassel and Nuremberg. Each member of such committee is supplied with certificates prepared in a print shop of the “Central Committee”. On each certificate there is the seal and signature of the “President of the Free Ukraine.” Persons supplied with these certificates are free to move about in the Allied zones of occupation in Germany and carry on without hinder [hindrance?] hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR in camps for Soviet citizens located in the British, American and French zones.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts.

Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Secret
  1. Pursuant to the Declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority with respect to Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, wherein it is stated, in Article 13(b), that the Allied Representatives will impose on Germany additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements, the European Advisory Commission has, in accordance with its terms of reference, considered certain of the more urgent of these additional requirements. Accordingly, it submits herewith, for consideration and approval by the four Governments, an Agreement regarding certain Additional Requirements to be imposed upon Germany.

  2. It will be recalled that the Commission agreed in March 1944, when discussing the terms of surrender of Germany, that certain broad political and economic requirements should be imposed upon Germany at the time of, or shortly after, the surrender, in addition to the mainly military requirements to be contained in the Instrument or Declaration of Surrender. The most important military requirements were announced in the Declaration of 5th June, 1945. The Commission believes that the enclosed Agreement on Additional Requirements, representing the agreed views of the four Governments, will furnish guidance to the Allied Representatives regarding additional measures to be imposed on Germany. The Commission accordingly recommends that the Agreement on Additional Requirements, as soon as it is approved by the four Governments, be transmitted to the Allied Representatives in Berlin. The Commission recommends that the four Governments authorize the Allied Representatives to decide whether publication of this document shall be in whole or in part.

  3. The Commission has several comments to make with regard to certain specific provisions in the Agreement on Additional Requirements.

    a) The Commission recommends that in exercising control over German research relating to war or the production of war material, as set forth in sub-paragraph 13(b), the Allied Representatives should, when they consider conditions in Germany appropriate, supplement this provision by issuing the following order to the German people:

    All research, experimentation, development or other study relative to war or the production of war material, whether in public or private establishments, factories, technological institutions, laboratories or elsewhere, is hereby abolished and forbidden in future.

    b) The Commission recommends that in giving effect to the provisions of sub-paragraph 15(b) the Allied Representatives should also require the German authorities to hand over, for delivery to the Allied Government concerned, any drawings, plates and other special technical equipment utilized directly for the production of monetary tokens for issue by Germany in territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere.

    c) In connection with the provisions of sub-paragraph 16(b) the Commission recommends that all property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph 16(a), which has at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, be taken under the provisional control of the Allied Representatives and preserved, pending subsequent transfer to the countries of ownership under arrangements to be worked out with the appropriate Allied Control Commissions or organs in those countries.

    d) In connection with the execution of the provisions of subparagraph 26(a), the Commission recommends to the four Governments approval of the following understanding:

    Vessels of the United Nations surrendered to the Allied Representatives in accordance with sub-paragraph 26 (a) will be returned by the Allied Representatives to the respective Allied States which own or owned, or whose nationals own or owned, such vessels. Nothing in this provision shall alter in any manner any existing agreements and procedures among any of the United Nations with respect to the pooling of the vessels surrendered by Germany under the provisions of sub-paragraph 26 (a).

    e) In connection with the execution of the provisions of paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 19, the Commission invites the attention of the four Governments to the great importance of effecting as full and as prompt restitution as possible of the property which has been looted by the Germans from occupied Allied countries. It points out the urgency of providing the Allied Representatives in Germany with guidance concerning the principles and procedures which should govern the restitution of looted Allied property, in accordance with the Declaration made at London on 5th January, 1943 on Enemy Acts of Dispossession.

  4. During the consultations which the European Advisory Commission has carried on, under instructions of the four Governments, with representatives of the European Allied Governments concerning the Declaration of 5th June, 1945, these Governments have expressed, both in writing and orally, their great interest in the additional requirements which are to be imposed upon Germany. In view of this concern, the Commission recommends that the four Governments instruct it to communicate the Agreement on Additional Requirements, upon its approval by the four Governments, to the interested Allied Governments. In so doing the Commission would point out to the representatives of those Governments that these additional requirements do not purport to be complete and will be supplemented by specific orders and instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:
JOHN G. WINANT

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:
Т. CAКCИН

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:
RONALD I. CAMPBELL

Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission:
R. MASSIGLI

Lancaster House, London, SW1
25th July, 1945

[Accompaniment]
Secret

Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on Certain Additional Requirements to Be Imposed on Germany

The Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have reached the following agreement regarding instructions to be issued by the Allied Representatives in Germany:

We, the Allied Representatives, Commanders-in-Chief of the forces of occupation of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, pursuant to the Declaration regarding the defeat of Germany, signed at Berlin on 5th June, 1945, hereby announce certain additional requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply, as follows:

Section I

  1. All German land, naval and air forces, the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers’ Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans’ organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in accordance with methods and procedures to be laid down by the Allied Representatives.

  2. All forms of military training, military propaganda and military activities of whatever nature, on the part of the German people, are prohibited, as well as the formation of any organization initiated to further any aspect of military training and the formation of war veterans’ organizations or other groups which might develop military characteristics or which are designed to carry on the German military tradition, whether such organizations or groups purport to be political, educational, religious, social, athletic or recreational or of any other nature.

Section II

  1. (a) German authorities and officials in all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 31st December, 1937, and in any areas within those frontiers indicated at any time by the Allied Representatives, will comply with such instructions as to withdrawing therefrom as they may receive from the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will issue the necessary instructions and will make the necessary arrangements for the reception and maintenance in Germany of all German civilian inhabitants of the territories or areas concerned, whose evacuation may be ordered by the Allied Representatives.

    (c) Withdrawals and evacuations under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will take place at such times and under such conditions as the Allied Representatives may direct.

  2. In the territories and areas referred to in paragraph 3 above, there shall immediately be, on the part of all forces under German command and of German authorities and civilians, a complete cessation of all measures of coercion or forced labour and of all measures involving injury to life or limb. There shall similarly cease all measures of requisitioning, seizure, removal, concealment or destruction of property. In particular, the withdrawals and evacuations mentioned in paragraph 3 above will be carried out without damage to or removal of persons or property not affected by the orders of the Allied Representatives. The Allied Representatives will determine what personal property and effects may be taken by persons evacuated under paragraph 3 above.

Section III

  1. The Allied Representatives will regulate all matters affecting Germany’s relations with other countries. No foreign obligations, undertakings or commitments of any kind will be assumed or entered into by or on behalf of German authorities or nationals without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

  2. The Allied Representatives will give directions concerning the abrogation, bringing into force, revival or application of any treaty, convention or other international agreement, or any part or provision thereof, to which Germany is or has been a party.

  3. (a) In virtue of the unconditional surrender of Germany, and as of the date of such surrender, the diplomatic, consular, commercial and other relations of the German State with other States have ceased to exist.

    (b) Diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of service missions in Germany of countries at war with any of the four Powers will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. The Allied Representatives may require the withdrawal from Germany of neutral diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of neutral service missions.

    (c) All German diplomatic, consular, commercial and other officials and members of German service missions abroad are hereby recalled. The control and disposal of the buildings, property and archives of all German diplomatic and other agencies abroad will be prescribed by the Allied Representatives.

  4. (a) German nationals will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving German territory except as authorised or directed by the Allied Representatives.

    (b) German authorities and nationals will comply with any directions issued by the Allied Representatives for the recall of German nationals resident abroad, and for the reception in Germany of any persons whom the Allied Representatives may designate.

  5. The German authorities and people will take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety, maintenance and welfare of persons not of German nationality and of their property and the property of foreign States.

Section IV

  1. The German authorities will place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inter-communication system (including all military and civilian postal and telecommunication systems and facilities and connected matters), and will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for placing such inter-communication systems under the complete control of the Allied Representatives. The German authorities will comply with any instructions give[n] by the Allied Representatives with a view to the establishment by the Allied Representatives of such censorship and control of postal and telecommunication and of documents and other articles carried by persons or otherwise conveyed and of all other forms of inter-communication as the Allied Representatives may think fit.

  2. The German authorities will comply with all directions which the Allied Representatives may give regarding the use, control and censorship of all media for influencing expression and opinion, including broadcasting, press and publications, advertising, films and public performances, entertainments and exhibitions of all kinds.

Section V

  1. The Allied Representatives will exercise such control as they deem necessary over all or any part or aspect of German finance, agriculture (including forestry), production and mining, public utilities, industry, trade, distribution and economy generally, internal and external, and over all related or ancillary matters, including the direction or prohibition of the manufacture, production, construction, treatment, use and disposal of any buildings, establishments, installations, public or private works, plant, equipment, products, materials, stocks or resources. Detailed statements of the subjects to which the present provision applies, together with the requirements of the Allied Representatives in regard thereto, will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

  2. (a) The manufacture, production and construction, and the acquisition from outside Germany, of war material and of such other products used in connection with such manufacture, production or construction, as the Allied Representatives may specify, and the import, export and transit thereof, are prohibited, except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will immediately place at the disposal of the Allied Representatives all research, experiment, development and design directly or indirectly relating to war or the production of war material, whether in government or private establishments, factories, technological institutions or elsewhere.

  3. (a) The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany) of the German State, its political subdivisions, the German Central Bank, State or semi-State, provincial, municipal or local authorities or Nazi organisations, and those situated outside Germany of any person resident or carrying on business in Germany, will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives. The property, assets, rights, titles and interests (whether situated inside or outside Germany), of such private companies, corporations, trusts, cartels, firms, partnerships and associations as may be designated by the Allied Representatives will not be disposed of in any way whatever without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

    (b) The German authorities will furnish full information about the property, assets, rights, titles and interests referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, and will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may give as to their transfer and disposal. Without prejudice to any further demands which may be made in this connection, the German authorities will hold at the disposal of the Allied Representatives for delivery to them at such times and places as they may direct all securities, certificates, deeds or other documents of title held by any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in subparagraph (a) above or by any person subject to German law, and relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated in the territories of the United Nations, including any shares, stocks, debentures or other obligations of any company incorporated in accordance with the laws of any of the United Nations.

    (c) Property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany will not be removed outside Germany or be transferred or disposed of to any person resident or carrying on business outside Germany without the sanction of the Allied Representatives.

    (d) Nothing in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above shall, as regards property, assets, rights, titles and interests situated inside Germany, be deemed to prevent sales or transfers to persons resident in Germany for the purpose of maintaining or carrying on the day-to-day national life, economy and administration, subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph 19 (b) and (c) below and to the provisions of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

  1. (a) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over to the Allied Representatives all gold and silver, in coin or bullion form, and all platinum in bullion form, situated in Germany, and all such coin and bullion situated outside Germany as is possessed by or held on behalf of any of the institutions or bodies mentioned in sub-paragraph 14 (a) above or any person resident or carrying on business in Germany.

    (b) The German authorities and all persons in Germany will hand over in full to the Allied Representatives all foreign notes and coins in the possession of any German authority, or of any corporation, association or individual resident or carrying on business in Germany, and all monetary tokens issued or prepared for issue by Germany in the territories formerly occupied by her or elsewhere.

  2. (a) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities, or held for or belonging to the nationals of any such country, or of any persons resident or carrying on business therein, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions.

    (b) All property, assets, rights, titles and interests in Germany held for or belonging to private individuals, private enterprises and companies of those countries, other than Germany and the countries referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above, which have at any time since 1st September, 1939, been at war with any of the United Nations, will be taken under control and will be preserved pending further instructions.

    (c) The German authorities will take all necessary steps to ensure the execution of the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) and (b) above, will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for that purpose, and will afford all necessary information and facilities in connection therewith.

  3. (a) There shall, on the part of the German authorities and people, be no concealment, destruction, scuttling or dismantling of, removal or transfer of, nor damage to, ships, transport, ports or harbours, nor to any form of building, establishment, installation, device, means of production, supply, distribution or communication, plant, equipment, currency, stocks or resources, or, in general, public or private works, utilities or facilities of any kind, wherever situated.

    (b) There shall be no destruction, removal, concealment, suppression or alteration of any documents, records, patents, drawings, specifications, plans or information, of any nature, affected by the provisions of this document. They shall be kept intact in their present locations until further directions are given. The German authorities will afford all information and facilities as required by the Allied Representatives in connection therewith.

    (c) Any measures already ordered, undertaken or began contrary to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above will be immediately countermanded or discontinued. All stocks, equipment, plant, records, patents, documents, drawings, specifications, plans or other material already concealed within or outside Germany will forthwith be declared, and will be dealt with as the Allied Representatives may direct.

    (d) Subject to the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and people will be responsible for the preservation, safeguarding and upkeep of all forms of property and materials affected by any of the said provisions.

    (e) All transport material, stores, equipment, plant, establishments, installations, devices and property generally, which are liable to be surrendered or delivered under the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, will be handed over intact and in good condition, or subject only to ordinary wear and tear and to any damage caused during the continuance of hostilities which it has proved impossible to make good.

  4. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with, or dealings with or for the benefit of, countries at war with any of the United Nations, or territories occupied by such countries, or with any other country or person specified by the Allied Representatives.

Section VI

  1. (a) The German authorities will carry out, for the benefit of the United Nations, such measures of restitution, reinstatement, restoration, reparation, reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation as the Allied Representatives may prescribe. For these purposes the German authorities will effect or procure the surrender or transfer of such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, effect such deliveries and carry out such repair, building and construction work, whether in Germany or elsewhere, and will provide such transport, plant, equipment and materials of all kinds, labour, personnel, and specialist and other services, for use in Germany or elsewhere, as the Allied Representatives may direct.

    (b) The German authorities will also comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give relating to property, assets, rights, titles and interests located in Germany belonging to any one of the United Nations or its nationals or having so belonged at, or at any time since, the outbreak of war between Germany and that Nation, or since the occupation of any part of its territories by Germany. The German authorities will be responsible for safeguarding, maintaining, and preventing the dissipation of, all such property, assets, rights, titles and interests, and for handing them over intact at the demand of the Allied Representatives. For these purposes the German authorities will afford all information and facilities required for tracing any property, assets, rights, titles or interests.

    (c) All persons in Germany in whose possession such property, assets, rights, titles and interests may be shall be personally responsible for reporting them and safeguarding them until they are handed over in such manner as may be prescribed.

  2. The German authorities will supply free of cost such German currency as the Allied Representatives may require, and will withdraw and redeem in German currency, within such time limits and on such terms as the Allied Representatives may specify, all holdings in German territory of currencies issued by the Allied Representatives during military operations or occupation, and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the Allied Representatives.

  3. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as may be issued by the Allied Representatives for defraying the costs of the provisioning, maintenance, pay, accommodation and transport of the forces and agencies stationed in Germany by authority of the Allied Representatives, the costs of executing the requirements of unconditional surrender, and payment for any relief in whatever form it may be provided by the United Nations.

  4. The Allied Representatives will take and make unrestricted use (whether inside or outside Germany) of any articles referred to in paragraph 12 above which the Allied Representatives may require in connection with the conduct of hostilities against any country with which any of their respective Governments is at war.

Section VII

  1. (a) No merchant ship, including fishing or other craft, shall put to sea from any German port except as may be sanctioned or directed by the Allied Representatives. German ships in ports outside Germany shall remain in port and those at sea shall proceed to the nearest German or United Nations port and there remain, pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

    (b) All German merchant shipping, including tonnage under construction or repair, will be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe.

    (c) Foreign merchant shipping in German service or under German control will likewise be made available to the Allied Representatives for such use and on such terms as they may prescribe. In the case of such foreign merchant vessels which are of neutral registration, the German authorities will take all such steps as may be required by the Allied Representatives to transfer or cause to be transferred to the Allied Representatives all rights relative thereto.

    (d) All transfer to any other flag, service or control, or the vessels covered by sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) above, is prohibited, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

  2. Any existing options to repurchase or reacquire or to resume control of vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered by Germany during the war will be exercised as directed by the Allied Representatives. Such vessels will be made available for use by the Allied Representatives in the same manner as the vessels covered by subparagraphs 23 (b) and (c) above.

  3. (a) The crews of all German merchant vessels or merchant vessels in German service or under German control will remain on board and will be maintained by the German authorities pending further instructions from the Allied Representatives regarding their future employment.

    (b) Cargoes on board any such vessels will be disposed of in accordance with instructions given to the German authorities by the Allied Representatives.

  4. (a) Merchant ships, including fishing and other craft of the United Nations (or of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany) which are in German hands, wherever such ships may be, will be surrendered to the Allied Representatives, regardless of whether title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. All such ships will be surrendered in good repair and in seaworthy condition in ports and at times to be specified by the Allied Representatives, for disposal as directed by them.

    (b) The German authorities will take all such steps as may be directed by the Allied Representatives to effect or complete transfers of title to such ships regardless of whether the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise. They will secure the discontinuance of any arrests of or proceedings against such ships in neutral ports.

  5. The German authorities will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Representatives for the destruction, dispersal, salvaging, reclamation or raising of wrecked, stranded, derelict or sunken vessels, wherever they may be situated. Such vessels salvaged, reclaimed or raised shall be dealt with as the Allied Representatives direct.

  6. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the entire German shipping, shipbuilding and ship repair industries, and all matter and facilities directly or indirectly relative or ancillary thereto, and will provide the requisite labour and specialist services. The requirements of the Allied Representatives will be specified in instructions which will from time to time be communicated to the German authorities.

Section VIII

  1. The German authorities will place at the unrestricted disposal of the Allied Representatives the whole of the German inland transport system (road, rail, air and waterways) and all connected material, plant and equipment, and all repair, construction, labour, servicing and running facilities, in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Representatives.

  2. The production in Germany and the possession, maintenance or operation by Germans of any aircraft of any kind, or any parts thereof, are prohibited.

  3. All German rights in international transport bodies or organisations, and in relation to the use of transport and the movement of traffic in other countries and the use in Germany of the transport of other countries, will be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Allied Representatives.

  4. All facilities for the generation, transmission and distribution of power, including establishments for the manufacture and repair of such facilities, will be placed under the complete control of the Allied Representatives, to be used for such purposes as they may designate.

Section IX

  1. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the regulation of movements of population and for controlling travel or removal on the part of persons in Germany.

  2. No person may leave or enter Germany without a permit issued by the Allied Representatives or on their authority.

  3. The German authorities will comply with all such directions as the Allied Representatives may give for the repatriation of persons not of German nationality in or passing through Germany, their property and effects, and for facilitating the movements of refugees and displaced persons.

Section X

  1. The German authorities will furnish any information and documents, and will secure the attendance of any witnesses, required by the Allied Representatives for the trial of

    (a) the principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied Representatives and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous offences;

    (b) any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed an offence against his national law and who may at any time be named or designated by rank, office or employment by the Allied Representative;

    and will give all aid and assistance for these purposes.

  2. The German authorities will comply with any directions given by the Allied Representatives in regard to the property of any person referred to in sub-paragraphs 36 (a) and (b) above, such as its seizure, custody or surrender.

  3. Any person referred to in sub-paragraph 36 (b) above who may be apprehended or surrendered to the Allied Representatives will be handed over immediately, on demand, to the Government of the United Nation concerned.

Section XI

  1. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) is completely and finally abolished and declared to be illegal.

  2. The German authorities will comply promptly with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the abolition of the National Socialist Party and of its subordinate organizations, affiliated associations and supervised organizations, and of all Nazi public institutions created as instruments of Nazi domination, and of such other organizations as may be regarded as a threat to the security of the Allied forces or to international peace, and for prohibiting their revival in any form; for the dismissal and internment of Nazi personnel; for the control or seizure of Nazi property and funds; and for the suppression of Nazi ideology and teaching.

  3. The German authorities and German nationals will not allow the existence of any secret organizations.

  4. The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the repeal of Nazi legislation and for the reform of German law and of the German legal, judicial, administrative, police and educational systems, including the replacement of their personnel.

  5. (a) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue for the rescinding of German legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, and for the cancellation of all legal or other disabilities resulting therefrom.

    (b) The German authorities will comply with such directions as the Allied Representatives may issue regarding the property, assets, rights, titles and interests of persons affected by legislation involving discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions.

  6. No person shall be prosecuted or molested by the German authorities or by German nationals on grounds of race, colour, creed, language or political opinions, or on account of any dealings or sympathies with the United Nations, including the performance of any action calculated to facilitate the execution of the Declaration or of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

  7. In any proceedings before any German Court or authority judicial notice shall be taken of the provisions of the Declaration and of all proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, which shall override any provisions of German law inconsistent therewith.

Section XII

  1. Without prejudice to any specific obligations contained in the provisions of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, the German authorities and any other person in a position to do so will furnish or cause to be furnished all such information and documents of every kind, public and private, as the Allied Representatives may require.

  2. The German authorities will likewise produce for interrogation and employment by the Allied Representatives upon demand any and all persons whose knowledge and experience would be useful to the Allied Representatives.

  3. The Allied Representatives will have access at all times to any building, installation, establishment, property or area, and any of the contents thereof, for the purposes of the Declaration or any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder, and in particular for the purposes of safeguarding, inspecting, copying or obtaining any of the desired documents and information. The German authorities will give all necessary facilities and assistance for this purpose, including the service of all specialist staff, including archivists.

Section XIII

  1. In the event of any doubt as to the meaning or interpretation of any term or expression in the Declaration and in any proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions issued thereunder, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.

The above text of the Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on certain Additional Requirements to be imposed on Germany has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 25th July, 1945.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission:
JOHN G. WINANT

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission:
Т. CAКCИН

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission:
RONALD I. CAMPBELL

Representative of the Provisional Government of the French Republic on the European Advisory Commission:
R. MASSIGLI

Lancaster House, London, SW1
25th July, 1945

The Pittsburgh Press (July 25, 1945)

Churchill back in London, faces tight squeeze in vote

Political forecasters say Prime Minister’s party will poll only 40 percent of ballots

Big Three awaits Churchill’s election fate

Truman to review troops at Frankfurt
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer

U.S. troops move into Vienna

Entry believed result of Potsdam parley

U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:23 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent

1450

Re my telegram No. 1449

At the time of my conference with Lozovsky on the 25th, I stated orally as follows (as indicated at the beginning of my telegram,3 the above was to be sent later to L. in written form):

  1. At the meeting with you, the Acting People’s Commissar, last July 13th, I delivered the message from the Emperor and also particularly mentioned His Majesty’s desire to dispatch Prince Konoye. Concerning the above, I received a reply from you in writing on the night of the 18th to the effect that the Government of the USSR could not give a specific answer because there was nothing concrete either in the message of the Emperor or in the Prince’s mission to Moscow.

  2. Concerning these matters, I once again made my proposal to you today to make the circumstances clear in the following manner:

    The mission of special envoy Konoye, entrusted with the Emperor’s request, is to ask the Government of the USSR to assist in the termination of the war and to explain our concrete intentions on this matter; his mission is at the same time to negotiate on matters which will solidify and improve relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become the basis of our diplomacy for the period during and after the war.

  3. In addition to stating the foregoing on instructions from our Government to the Government of the USSR, I repeated that the Emperor especially ordered the Government to dispatch the envoy as the result of His Majesty’s wishes to put an end to the tragedy of additional bloodshed from the continued exchange of fire. The special envoy will explain to the Government of the USSR the concrete intentions of the Japanese relative to the above, and will request its consideration of this matter. Therefore, I hope that the Government of the USSR will give sufficient and favorable consideration to this matter of the envoy and agree to the dispatch of the envoy very soon.

    Furthermore, since the Government of the USSR is well aware that ex-Premier Prince Konoye enjoys high trust in the Imperial Court and is prominent in Japanese political circles, I believe it will not be necessary to add my own explanation here.

761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:53 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent

1449

Re my telegram No. 1441

On the 25th I met Lozovsky in order to make the proposal contained in my telegram No. 1450, and we continued our conversation as follows:

SATO: As you have already understood from my proposal, the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in a friendly manner relative to the termination of the war, and at the same time will have Prince Konoye explain directly to you the concrete intentions of our Government.

L.: Could you give me the text of the proposal which you have just made? Its content is really important. If you could prepare a written text for me, I should be able to understand it more correctly. It is difficult to expect real accuracy from an oral presentation. It would also be convenient for me to make a report to my Government if I have a written text.

I should like to ask one or two questions: (1) I understand that the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in order to terminate the war, and (2) concerning the above problem Prince Konoye is going to bring us some concrete proposals. Now, are these concrete proposals for the termination of the war or for strengthening Russo-Japanese relations? As this point was not made clear, I should like to have you explain it to me so that I can make a report to my Government.

SATO: As to your latter question, the concrete intentions which Prince Konoye is going to explain to the Soviet Government are, as I understand it, concerned with both of the problems you have just mentioned. In other words, I understand that they are concerned, first, with the request to the Soviet Government for mediation and, second, with the problem of strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. As to your first request, it is outside the instructions which I have received to prepare a written text of the proposal which I made today. However, I shall prepare such a text for your reference on my own initiative and present it to you later, since the problem itself is significant, as you have suggested, and also in due consideration of the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin. Needless to say, however, I have to ask you to treat this text as top secret, because of its extremely secret nature. I should also like to mention that Prince Konoye, whose mission I have just explained to you, has our Emperor’s greatest confidence and occupies an eminent position in our Government. Therefore, in my opinion, his mission will cover a vast area: he will ask the Soviet Government for mediation; at the same time he will exchange views concerning problems common to both of our countries. Moreover, he may go into the problem of future relations between the two nations. I believe you will not be wrong in understanding the matter as I have indicated above.

L.: I understand well the secret nature of this problem; I also understand well that what you have conveyed to me, Mr. Ambassador, is very confidential. I will make a report to my Government as soon as I receive your written text. Moreover, I will let you know immediately concerning any instructions I receive from my Government.

SATO: Thank you for your kind help. I personally would also wish to hear from you as soon as possible.

Before leaving, I added the following:

The intention of the Japanese Government, regarding Prince Konoye’s mission, is to ask the Soviet Government’s assistance in terminating the war. I am sure that the intention is good. Therefore, it is my hope that you will be able to make arrangements so that the Soviet Government will have an opportunity to hear directly from the Prince on this matter.

This would have ended today’s meeting. However, I repeated my own explanation of the mission of the special envoy, which appeared to impress L. a great deal. Particularly the fact that our Government has asked the Soviet Government to mediate seemed to arrest his attention. L. listened to our proposal with an earnest and attentive attitude throughout, and promised me an answer from his Government.

Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference

Wednesday, July 25:

0920: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in the India-Burma Theatre) called on the President at the Little White House.

1000: General Marshall called on the President.

1035: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where they arrived at 1045. Before the conference was called to order, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo posed in the Palace garden for still and motion pictures. Photographers (service and civilian) from all three nations were represented.

1100: The Big Three and other delegates entered the conference room and the ninth meeting of the Berlin Conference was called to order by the President. The meeting adjourned at 1200, at which time the President left to return to the Little White House.

Admiral Leahy, accompanied by Rear Admiral H. A. Flanigan, USN, Captain Vardaman, Colonel Rusk, Lieutenant Elsey, Lieutenant Edelstein, Lieutenant Rigdon, and First Lieutenant Vardaman left Babelsberg this morning for a flight to London. They returned to Babelsberg Thursday afternoon.

2000: Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Caffery, and General Somervell were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. Dinner music was played by an eight-piece band from the 278th Army Ground Force band with Staff Sergeant Joe Borrelli conducting. Vocal selections were rendered by Pfc Jules Navarra.

Salzburger Nachrichten (July 26, 1945)

Die Konferenz tagt weiter

POTSDAM, 25. Juli (Reuters) – Obwohl Premierminister Churchill, Außenminister Eden und der Führer der Arbeiterpartei Attlee nach England abgereist sind, um dort die Wahlergebnisse abzuwarten, wird die Potsdamer Konferenz fortgesetzt. Dies verstärkt den Eindruck, dass in Potsdam zum allergrößten Teil die ins Einzelne gehende Arbeit der Fachleute ausschlaggebend ist.

Das ging schon aus der Bekanntmachung hervor, dass die drei Außenminister Eden, Byrnes und Molotow gemeinsam die Tagesordnung für die „Großen Drei“ aufsetzen. Man nimmt an, dass Churchill, Stalin und Truman im Verlauf ihrer acht Zusammenkünfte grundsätzliche Entscheidungen getroffen haben, die den großen Fachausschüssen Tag für Tag eine Menge Aufgaben stellen, da diese Beschlüsse in allen Einzelheiten ausgearbeitet werden müssen. Bis zur Rückkehr der britischen Staatsmänner aus England sind diese Fachausschüsse durch ihre. Arbeit Voll und ganz beansprucht, da sie auch für die Vorbereitung von Vorschlägen bezüglich der Fragen, die bisher von den „Großen Drei“ noch nicht behandelt wurden, verantwortlich sind.

Ein Blick auf den offiziellen Bericht über die Krimkonferenz gibt eine klare Vorstellung, welch enorme Kleinarbeit notwendig ist, um Beschlüsse, die in großen Umrissen herausgegeben werden, auszuarbeiten. In Potsdam ist dies noch mehr der Fall, weil es sich jetzt hauptsächlich um die alle Einzelheiten umfassende Ausarbeitung der bereits festgelegten grundsätzlichen Entscheidungen handelt. Überall in Deutschland hat man den Eindruck, dass die Besatzungsbehörden in den schwebenden Fragen zuwarten, bis sie Weisungen von Potsdam erhalten, aus denen sie dann ersehen können, welchen Standpunkt sie einnehmen sollen, und wie weit sie in der Durchführung entscheidender Verwaltungsaufgaben gehen können.

L’Aube (July 26, 1945)

Entracte à Potsdam

Churchill à Londres, Truman à Francfort

U.S. State Department (July 26, 1945)

500.CC/7-2645: Telegram

The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs

London, July 26, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extracts]
Secret

7519
Copre 2

From Gerig for Pasvolsky and Hiss.

Meeting at Potsdam yesterday considered the question of the officers of ExCom (Executive Committee), and PreCo, (Preparatory Committee), Jebb flying over to attend.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

British thinking of proposing that present mandatory powers be provisional members trusteeship council, which together with all other permanent members and elected members, would enable trusteeship council to organize and act provisionally, pending negotiation of agreements. Believe this would be feasible and would hasten and facilitate negotiation of agreements. Soviet raised question at Potsdam of their being a trust power.

500.CC (PC)/7-2845

Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative

[Washington,] July 26, 1945
Participants: Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
Mr. John Balfour British Minister

Mr. John Balfour, British Minister, called upon me this afternoon at his request at my apartment at 2:30. He stated he had just received a wire dated July 26 from London this morning in which he was instructed by the Foreign Office to call on me and inquire whether or not we would be willing to agree to have the chairmanship of the executive committee of the interim commission rotate between the five. He stated that their first position would be to have one chairman, presumably a Soviet chairman, but if they could not agree on one, he asked if we would agree to rotate.

I stated that Mr. Dunn had a memorandum with him at Potsdam on this subject and it was our thinking also that this was the best procedure – we should try for one chairman but if we couldn’t get agreement on one we would then accept rotation. I said, however, that I had heard that Mr. Jebb had flown to Potsdam yesterday on this subject and, of course, our delegation in Potsdam was prepared to deal with the whole subject right there on the ground. He said that was most satisfactory and he would communicate that to the Foreign Office.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department

[Babelsberg,] 26 July 1945
Top secret
priority

Victory 352

This is Lockup. CominCh sends No. 24 to CominCh and CNO Administrative Office for action MilMis Moscow for info. Soviets have agreed to establishment of facilities outlined your 122012 and 171951. Detailed arrangements as to entry of personnel still to be made. Soviets will receive communication and aerological material now. Request tonnage cube place and date of assembly of this material for each station. Advise schedule of Soviet west coast sailings and Hula transfers by which material could be shipped to Petropavlovsk and/or Vladivostok. Possibility of use of east coast sailings for transportation overland via Europe should also be reported. In addition desire detail your plans for transportation via United States aircraft thru Alaska in event Soviet authorize this method of delivery. Send reply MilMis Moscow for action.

Meeting of the U.S. and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
United States Soviet Union
General of the Army Marshall Army General Antonov
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov
General of the Army Arnold Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev
Lieutenant General Hull Lieutenant General Slavin
Vice Admiral Cooke Admiral Kucherov
Major General Norstad
Major General Deane
Rear Admiral Gardner
Rear Admiral Maples
Captain McDill
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland
Captain Moore
Interpreters
Lieutenant Chase Major Evsekov

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 3 p.m.
Top secret

GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he would preside at the meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated the honor but under the circumstances he suggested General Antonov preside and he hoped that he would accept.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if General Marshall had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the answers to the five questions General Marshall had given him at the meeting on 24 July (See Annex to these minutes). He said that Generalissimo Stalin had handed the written answers to President Truman yesterday at eleven o’clock a.m.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was sorry that he had not seen the answers which had been prepared by General Antonov.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the first question as follows:

The Soviet Command agrees to establish in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.

As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations.

In addition to these two stations, we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather.

When the reading of the answer to the first question was completed, GENERAL ANTONOV asked if he should proceed to read the answers to the remaining questions. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to discuss the answer to each question as it was read.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were disappointed that American personnel was not acceptable for liaison purposes at the central weather stations, since they felt that it would increase the efficiency of the Russian effort as well as our own. He thought, therefore, that we should request reconsideration of this point. If American personnel were used, he said that it was the intention to have 18 officers and 42 enlisted men at Khabarovsk and 9 officers and 24 enlisted men at Petropavlovsk. He had a memorandum relating to the details of equipment and personnel which he thought the Russian High Command should have for use in connection with the reconsideration requested.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Russian personnel had had experience in the use of the equipment and in the communication procedure in the vicinity of Sevastopol and Odessa as well as near Murmansk. The proposal to use Russian personnel had been made because it had been considered that the operation of these stations would then be more simple. However, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on American personnel at these stations, there would be no objection to employing them.

ADMIRAL KING then gave General Antonov the memorandum he had previously mentioned.

GENERAL ANTONOV pointed out that he had not received an answer as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on the use of American personnel.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to use American personnel and pointed out that the major service rendered by this personnel would be to U.S. naval forces and to the strategic air forces. For this reason he thought that American personnel would be more satisfactory.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first question could then be considered solved and American liaison personnel would be employed at the stations under discussion.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the second question as follows:

Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the United States and the USSR in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45° 45’ north 140° east thence along the parallel 45° 45’ north to the line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) (on the southern tip of southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido).

The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.

Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.

United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.

In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.

In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnev to Diomede Island and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and the United States to parallel 51° 30’ north and thence through 50° 35’ north 157° east; thence to 49° 50’ north 156° 20’ east and thence along the parallel 49° 50’ north to the Fourth Kurile Strait.

The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the line of demarcation for sea and air operations in the Sea of Japan was acceptable.

ADMIRAL KING said that he desired to confirm the proposed conditions in the Sea of Okhotsk. He said he understood that this sea would be free for operations of both the United States Navy and the Navy of the Soviet Union and that coordination would be arranged through mutual understanding and cooperation. He asked also if the area to the north of the red line shown on the chart prepared by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, and described in the answer to the second question, was subject to joint control by the United States and the Soviet Navies, in the same manner as in the Sea of Okhotsk.

Admiral King’s understanding was confirmed by ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with this understanding, the proposals by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable.

GENERAL ANTONOV repeated that the areas as set forth in answer to the second question were for both sea and air operations, and there was agreement on this answer.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the third question as follows:

The boundary line between operational zones of the United States and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun, Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia.

United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above-named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he would like to call attention to the fact that the boundary line as proposed by the Russian Chiefs of Staff would deprive the United States air forces of certain railroad centers and lines of communication north of the line as targets unless each individual mission were arranged for separately. He asked if the United States air forces could send missions north of the boundary line within 24 hours after application had been made to the local Russian authorities. He thought that if his understanding as to local coordination was correct, the desired operations of the United States air forces could be worked out satisfactorily. He called the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the range of the heavy bombers, medium bombers, and light bombers, as indicated on a map which he presented, and pointed out where the United States bombing effort could be made effective to the north of the boundary line.

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the boundary line suggested by the Russian Chiefs of Staff was to the northward of the principal railroad junctions. These junctions would therefore be available to attack by the United States air forces. If it became necessary to attack targets to the north of the line, reliable communications would permit arrangements to be made within 24 hours. Since, however, the communication might not always be reliable, this question might involve some difficulties.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with the understanding that if the means of communication for coordinating attacks north of the boundary line were too slow, the question of its position would be discussed again, the proposals made by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. However, he said, there was an additional matter he would like to raise in regard to both the second and third questions previously discussed. This concerned the flight of individual reconnaissance aircraft, and he asked that the Russian Chiefs of Staff comment on this point.

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that it was considered that as a general rule, the boundary proposed should apply to reconnaissance aircraft as well as to bombing flights. When necessary to fly reconnaissance aircraft beyond the boundary line, the flight should be coordinated through the liaison officers.

GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the fourth question as follows:

The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with military operations of the Soviet Union against Japan, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet liaison groups with General Mac Arthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition, in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.

American liaison groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, Marshal Vassilievski, in Khabarovsk; and with the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev, in Vladivostok.

The Soviet Command is ready to accept the radio-teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposal of the Russian Chiefs of Staff appeared entirely acceptable, but he wished to ask if it was the intention that the liaison groups to be provided should make it possible for immediate coordination of operations. He asked if operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, or in any other special area, would normally be referred to Washington and Moscow, or whether the necessary decisions would be made in the field with the minimum delay.

GENERAL ANTONOV replied that Marshal Vassilievski is the commander in chief of all forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Marshal Vassilievski had authority to solve all questions of local coordination which were included in the tasks assigned him by the High Command of the Soviet Union. He said that similarly Admiral Yemashev is the commander in chief of all Russian naval forces in the Pacific. He said that these two officers would be able to solve the questions of coordination of action within the limits of the questions and answers which were being discussed here.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the statement of General Antonov made the answer to the fourth question entirely acceptable.

GENERAL ANTONOV then referred back to the third answer and asked if the question of liaison was now clear.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that his question had concerned the employment of reconnaissance aircraft and that he considered the question of liaison as provided for in the fourth answer entirely satisfactory. He said, moreover, that as the operations proceeded he hoped that there would develop such an intimacy in liaison that we would find later that the commanders in the field would develop an even greater intimacy. This would of course depend on them.

GENERAL ANTONOV read the answer to the fifth question as follows:

The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above-mentioned ships and planes.

For this purpose we can designate:
a. Naval ports
In the Japanese Sea, Port Nakhodka (America Strait); in the Okhotsk and Bering Sea regions – Nikolaevsk, on the Amur, and Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka.

b. Airfields
In the region of Vladivostok, in the region of Alexandrovsk on Sakhalin Island and in the region of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposals of the Russian Chiefs of Staff were entirely acceptable.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked if the matter of identification of aircraft at the Russian airbases which would be available to United States aircraft would be handled as a local matter. He said that sometimes a plane was so disabled that it was necessary to come into a landing field from any direction, identifying itself by radio signal only.

AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the names of airfields, methods of approach, corridors and other details would be furnished and that the requirements of the aircraft and personnel upon landing would be provided. He said that a disabled aircraft, after making a certain signal, could land from any direction without other formality. Aircraft crews should be instructed, however, not to fly over such ports as Vladivostok, because of the danger of being fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that his inquiry was in regard to whether arrangements of this nature would be made locally, to which AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV replied that the principle was being established here, and that the details would be determined on the spot by the commanders in the field.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now considered that the five questions given him by General Marshall on 24 July had been answered. He wished, however, to make an additional statement in regard to them. He said that he considered that all of the arrangements provided for under the five questions would come into being on the entry of Russia into the war against Japan.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if it would be possible to get the communication equipment discussed in the first question into Siberia before that date, or if it would be necessary to wait until after Russia had entered the war.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that preliminary arrangements for the liaison wireless stations could be made beforehand, and that agreements could be reached with reference to each particular question raised.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the meeting on 24 July, Admiral King had pointed out that after the seizure of Kyushu communications might be opened from Kyushu to Vladivostok. This line of communications was very important, since the Straits of Tsushima could be used throughout the year, whereas the route through the Kuriles and through La Perousse Strait was closed during part of the year by ice. He asked General Marshall when the invasion of Kyushu would take place and when the opening of the sea route from the south could be expected.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the occupation of Kyushu depended on three factors. The first was the movement of troops from Europe. This was being done as rapidly as possible, and engineering troops were being moved first in order to prepare the way for the full application of air power. The movement involved two oceans and one continent, and although we could not be certain of carrying out the entire movement on schedule, and were now somewhat behind on both personnel and cargo, he hoped that all difficulties would be overcome. The second factor was the movement of large amounts of supplies from the Solomons, New Guinea, and Halmahera, north to the Philippines and Okinawa, to be loaded on assault ships for the tremendous amphibious effort against Kyushu. The third factor was the recent withdrawal of our divisions engaged in the Philippines and Okinawa from heavy fighting, and the problem of rehabilitation and training for the next operation.

Finally, he said, the weather conditions in the area made landings in September and early October too hazardous to undertake, although this was not a controlling factor as to date. At the present time he expected the landing on Kyushu to take place the last part of October.

GENERAL MARSHALL said further that the assault on Japan by naval and air forces which would extend also to Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula would be continued and increased. By these means he anticipated that by the time of the landing on Kyushu we will have destroyed Japanese oil, other material production, and communications, and will have virtually destroyed the Japanese air force. He said that Admiral King has added that the Japanese Navy would be destroyed as well. He said that all plans for the operation against Kyushu were complete, shipping was being assembled, the construction of bases was proceeding at top speed, and the operations of the United States Fleet and all air forces would proceed with increased vigor from now on. He thought, however, that the Tsushima Strait could not be opened before the end of October. The difficulties of opening Tsushima Strait would involve the sweeping of the passage for mines. The most serious threat to these operations would be from Japanese suicide planes which had caused us so much difficulty in previous operations.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be much pleased if the route to Vladivostok via Tsushima Strait could be opened in October since by that time communications through the Kuriles and La Perousse Strait would be closed by ice.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood and appreciated the urgent necessity to the Russian Chiefs of Staff of opening the southern route and said that we would do all in our power to clear the straits as early as possible. General Marshall said that Admiral King had pointed out that the operations to open Tsushima Strait could not take place until after the landing in Kyushu and until after our air forces were established in northwestern Kyushu. It would be necessary, of course, for our minesweepers to have adequate air cover during their operations in clearing the straits of mines. The time required to establish the necessary airfields would depend to a large degree on Japanese resistance in Kyushu and the straits might not be opened until the middle of December or about six weeks after the first landing on Kyushu. He pointed out that we would make every effort to expedite the operation for the benefit of our forces as well as for the benefit to the Russians. He wanted to make this point clear since he desired to avoid any misunderstanding as to our capabilities in clearing Tsushima Strait for traffic to Vladivostok.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read a memorandum which he said related to this discussion and which gave the progress, from partial reports, covering the last ten days of naval and air action against Japan.

GENERAL ANTONOV expressed his appreciation for the information contained in the memorandum read by General Marshall.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to furnish to the Russian Chiefs of Staff, until operations against Japan were commenced by the Soviet Union, a weekly report of operations similar to that contained in the memorandum, through General Deane or his naval associate. Thereafter, reports of such operations would be furnished through the commanders in the field.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be glad to receive this information and asked if there were any other questions to be considered at this meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that directions had been given to furnish the Russian Chiefs of Staff with copies of the minutes of this meeting in order to provide a means of determining if there was a mutual understanding of the conversations which had taken place. In the absence of comment by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, it would be assumed that the record was a correct basis for understanding and guidance.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would examine the minutes and if he had any comment he would inform the United States Chiefs of Staff thereof.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was planned that he, Admiral King and General Arnold would leave for the United States tomorrow. Admiral Leahy would remain until the conference was completed. He said that the principal assistants of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Cooke, General Hull and General Norstad would remain at the conference to handle any matters that might arise. He said that if he, Admiral King and General Arnold leave tomorrow as planned, he desired to take this occasion to express for the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the opportunity afforded to discuss these important matters with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. He was gratified that they had been able to reach decisions so satisfactory to all.

GENERAL ANTONOV also expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over the results of the conference and said that he hoped that his close contact with General Marshall would be continued in the future so that all questions that might arise might be settled promptly. He then gave General Marshall a map showing the areas which had been considered in the discussion.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he regretted that through a misunderstanding the United States Chiefs of Staff had not received the answers to the five questions and were, therefore, not well prepared for the afternoon’s discussion. He thanked General Antonov for his patience in reading the answers which he had presented.