Les résultats des élections britanniques seront connus aujourd’hui
…
U.S. State Department (July 26, 1945)
500.CC/7-2645: Telegram
The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
London, July 26, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extracts]
Secret
7519
Copre 2
From Gerig for Pasvolsky and Hiss.
Meeting at Potsdam yesterday considered the question of the officers of ExCom (Executive Committee), and PreCo, (Preparatory Committee), Jebb flying over to attend.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
British thinking of proposing that present mandatory powers be provisional members trusteeship council, which together with all other permanent members and elected members, would enable trusteeship council to organize and act provisionally, pending negotiation of agreements. Believe this would be feasible and would hasten and facilitate negotiation of agreements. Soviet raised question at Potsdam of their being a trust power.
500.CC (PC)/7-2845
Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative
[Washington,] July 26, 1945
| Participants: | Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. |
| Mr. John Balfour British Minister |
Mr. John Balfour, British Minister, called upon me this afternoon at his request at my apartment at 2:30. He stated he had just received a wire dated July 26 from London this morning in which he was instructed by the Foreign Office to call on me and inquire whether or not we would be willing to agree to have the chairmanship of the executive committee of the interim commission rotate between the five. He stated that their first position would be to have one chairman, presumably a Soviet chairman, but if they could not agree on one, he asked if we would agree to rotate.
I stated that Mr. Dunn had a memorandum with him at Potsdam on this subject and it was our thinking also that this was the best procedure – we should try for one chairman but if we couldn’t get agreement on one we would then accept rotation. I said, however, that I had heard that Mr. Jebb had flown to Potsdam yesterday on this subject and, of course, our delegation in Potsdam was prepared to deal with the whole subject right there on the ground. He said that was most satisfactory and he would communicate that to the Foreign Office.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department
[Babelsberg,] 26 July 1945
Top secret
priority
Victory 352
This is Lockup. CominCh sends No. 24 to CominCh and CNO Administrative Office for action MilMis Moscow for info. Soviets have agreed to establishment of facilities outlined your 122012 and 171951. Detailed arrangements as to entry of personnel still to be made. Soviets will receive communication and aerological material now. Request tonnage cube place and date of assembly of this material for each station. Advise schedule of Soviet west coast sailings and Hula transfers by which material could be shipped to Petropavlovsk and/or Vladivostok. Possibility of use of east coast sailings for transportation overland via Europe should also be reported. In addition desire detail your plans for transportation via United States aircraft thru Alaska in event Soviet authorize this method of delivery. Send reply MilMis Moscow for action.
Meeting of the U.S. and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.
Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Army General Antonov | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev | |
| Lieutenant General Hull | Lieutenant General Slavin | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Admiral Kucherov | |
| Major General Norstad | ||
| Major General Deane | ||
| Rear Admiral Gardner | ||
| Rear Admiral Maples | ||
| Captain McDill | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Moore | ||
| Interpreters | ||
| Lieutenant Chase | Major Evsekov |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 3 p.m.
Top secret
GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he would preside at the meeting.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated the honor but under the circumstances he suggested General Antonov preside and he hoped that he would accept.
GENERAL ANTONOV asked if General Marshall had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the answers to the five questions General Marshall had given him at the meeting on 24 July (See Annex to these minutes). He said that Generalissimo Stalin had handed the written answers to President Truman yesterday at eleven o’clock a.m.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was sorry that he had not seen the answers which had been prepared by General Antonov.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the first question as follows:
The Soviet Command agrees to establish in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.
As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations.
In addition to these two stations, we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather.
When the reading of the answer to the first question was completed, GENERAL ANTONOV asked if he should proceed to read the answers to the remaining questions. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to discuss the answer to each question as it was read.
ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were disappointed that American personnel was not acceptable for liaison purposes at the central weather stations, since they felt that it would increase the efficiency of the Russian effort as well as our own. He thought, therefore, that we should request reconsideration of this point. If American personnel were used, he said that it was the intention to have 18 officers and 42 enlisted men at Khabarovsk and 9 officers and 24 enlisted men at Petropavlovsk. He had a memorandum relating to the details of equipment and personnel which he thought the Russian High Command should have for use in connection with the reconsideration requested.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that Russian personnel had had experience in the use of the equipment and in the communication procedure in the vicinity of Sevastopol and Odessa as well as near Murmansk. The proposal to use Russian personnel had been made because it had been considered that the operation of these stations would then be more simple. However, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on American personnel at these stations, there would be no objection to employing them.
ADMIRAL KING then gave General Antonov the memorandum he had previously mentioned.
GENERAL ANTONOV pointed out that he had not received an answer as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on the use of American personnel.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to use American personnel and pointed out that the major service rendered by this personnel would be to U.S. naval forces and to the strategic air forces. For this reason he thought that American personnel would be more satisfactory.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first question could then be considered solved and American liaison personnel would be employed at the stations under discussion.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the second question as follows:
Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the United States and the USSR in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45° 45’ north 140° east thence along the parallel 45° 45’ north to the line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) (on the southern tip of southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido).
The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.
Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.
United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.
In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.
In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnev to Diomede Island and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and the United States to parallel 51° 30’ north and thence through 50° 35’ north 157° east; thence to 49° 50’ north 156° 20’ east and thence along the parallel 49° 50’ north to the Fourth Kurile Strait.
The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the line of demarcation for sea and air operations in the Sea of Japan was acceptable.
ADMIRAL KING said that he desired to confirm the proposed conditions in the Sea of Okhotsk. He said he understood that this sea would be free for operations of both the United States Navy and the Navy of the Soviet Union and that coordination would be arranged through mutual understanding and cooperation. He asked also if the area to the north of the red line shown on the chart prepared by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, and described in the answer to the second question, was subject to joint control by the United States and the Soviet Navies, in the same manner as in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Admiral King’s understanding was confirmed by ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that with this understanding, the proposals by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable.
GENERAL ANTONOV repeated that the areas as set forth in answer to the second question were for both sea and air operations, and there was agreement on this answer.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the third question as follows:
The boundary line between operational zones of the United States and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun, Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia.
United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above-named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.
GENERAL ARNOLD said he would like to call attention to the fact that the boundary line as proposed by the Russian Chiefs of Staff would deprive the United States air forces of certain railroad centers and lines of communication north of the line as targets unless each individual mission were arranged for separately. He asked if the United States air forces could send missions north of the boundary line within 24 hours after application had been made to the local Russian authorities. He thought that if his understanding as to local coordination was correct, the desired operations of the United States air forces could be worked out satisfactorily. He called the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the range of the heavy bombers, medium bombers, and light bombers, as indicated on a map which he presented, and pointed out where the United States bombing effort could be made effective to the north of the boundary line.
AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the boundary line suggested by the Russian Chiefs of Staff was to the northward of the principal railroad junctions. These junctions would therefore be available to attack by the United States air forces. If it became necessary to attack targets to the north of the line, reliable communications would permit arrangements to be made within 24 hours. Since, however, the communication might not always be reliable, this question might involve some difficulties.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that with the understanding that if the means of communication for coordinating attacks north of the boundary line were too slow, the question of its position would be discussed again, the proposals made by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. However, he said, there was an additional matter he would like to raise in regard to both the second and third questions previously discussed. This concerned the flight of individual reconnaissance aircraft, and he asked that the Russian Chiefs of Staff comment on this point.
AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that it was considered that as a general rule, the boundary proposed should apply to reconnaissance aircraft as well as to bombing flights. When necessary to fly reconnaissance aircraft beyond the boundary line, the flight should be coordinated through the liaison officers.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the fourth question as follows:
The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with military operations of the Soviet Union against Japan, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet liaison groups with General Mac Arthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition, in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.
American liaison groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, Marshal Vassilievski, in Khabarovsk; and with the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev, in Vladivostok.
The Soviet Command is ready to accept the radio-teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposal of the Russian Chiefs of Staff appeared entirely acceptable, but he wished to ask if it was the intention that the liaison groups to be provided should make it possible for immediate coordination of operations. He asked if operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, or in any other special area, would normally be referred to Washington and Moscow, or whether the necessary decisions would be made in the field with the minimum delay.
GENERAL ANTONOV replied that Marshal Vassilievski is the commander in chief of all forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Marshal Vassilievski had authority to solve all questions of local coordination which were included in the tasks assigned him by the High Command of the Soviet Union. He said that similarly Admiral Yemashev is the commander in chief of all Russian naval forces in the Pacific. He said that these two officers would be able to solve the questions of coordination of action within the limits of the questions and answers which were being discussed here.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the statement of General Antonov made the answer to the fourth question entirely acceptable.
GENERAL ANTONOV then referred back to the third answer and asked if the question of liaison was now clear.
GENERAL MARSHALL replied that his question had concerned the employment of reconnaissance aircraft and that he considered the question of liaison as provided for in the fourth answer entirely satisfactory. He said, moreover, that as the operations proceeded he hoped that there would develop such an intimacy in liaison that we would find later that the commanders in the field would develop an even greater intimacy. This would of course depend on them.
GENERAL ANTONOV read the answer to the fifth question as follows:
The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above-mentioned ships and planes.
For this purpose we can designate:
a. Naval ports
In the Japanese Sea, Port Nakhodka (America Strait); in the Okhotsk and Bering Sea regions – Nikolaevsk, on the Amur, and Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka.b. Airfields
In the region of Vladivostok, in the region of Alexandrovsk on Sakhalin Island and in the region of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposals of the Russian Chiefs of Staff were entirely acceptable.
GENERAL ARNOLD asked if the matter of identification of aircraft at the Russian airbases which would be available to United States aircraft would be handled as a local matter. He said that sometimes a plane was so disabled that it was necessary to come into a landing field from any direction, identifying itself by radio signal only.
AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the names of airfields, methods of approach, corridors and other details would be furnished and that the requirements of the aircraft and personnel upon landing would be provided. He said that a disabled aircraft, after making a certain signal, could land from any direction without other formality. Aircraft crews should be instructed, however, not to fly over such ports as Vladivostok, because of the danger of being fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries.
GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that his inquiry was in regard to whether arrangements of this nature would be made locally, to which AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV replied that the principle was being established here, and that the details would be determined on the spot by the commanders in the field.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now considered that the five questions given him by General Marshall on 24 July had been answered. He wished, however, to make an additional statement in regard to them. He said that he considered that all of the arrangements provided for under the five questions would come into being on the entry of Russia into the war against Japan.
GENERAL MARSHALL asked if it would be possible to get the communication equipment discussed in the first question into Siberia before that date, or if it would be necessary to wait until after Russia had entered the war.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that preliminary arrangements for the liaison wireless stations could be made beforehand, and that agreements could be reached with reference to each particular question raised.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the meeting on 24 July, Admiral King had pointed out that after the seizure of Kyushu communications might be opened from Kyushu to Vladivostok. This line of communications was very important, since the Straits of Tsushima could be used throughout the year, whereas the route through the Kuriles and through La Perousse Strait was closed during part of the year by ice. He asked General Marshall when the invasion of Kyushu would take place and when the opening of the sea route from the south could be expected.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the occupation of Kyushu depended on three factors. The first was the movement of troops from Europe. This was being done as rapidly as possible, and engineering troops were being moved first in order to prepare the way for the full application of air power. The movement involved two oceans and one continent, and although we could not be certain of carrying out the entire movement on schedule, and were now somewhat behind on both personnel and cargo, he hoped that all difficulties would be overcome. The second factor was the movement of large amounts of supplies from the Solomons, New Guinea, and Halmahera, north to the Philippines and Okinawa, to be loaded on assault ships for the tremendous amphibious effort against Kyushu. The third factor was the recent withdrawal of our divisions engaged in the Philippines and Okinawa from heavy fighting, and the problem of rehabilitation and training for the next operation.
Finally, he said, the weather conditions in the area made landings in September and early October too hazardous to undertake, although this was not a controlling factor as to date. At the present time he expected the landing on Kyushu to take place the last part of October.
GENERAL MARSHALL said further that the assault on Japan by naval and air forces which would extend also to Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula would be continued and increased. By these means he anticipated that by the time of the landing on Kyushu we will have destroyed Japanese oil, other material production, and communications, and will have virtually destroyed the Japanese air force. He said that Admiral King has added that the Japanese Navy would be destroyed as well. He said that all plans for the operation against Kyushu were complete, shipping was being assembled, the construction of bases was proceeding at top speed, and the operations of the United States Fleet and all air forces would proceed with increased vigor from now on. He thought, however, that the Tsushima Strait could not be opened before the end of October. The difficulties of opening Tsushima Strait would involve the sweeping of the passage for mines. The most serious threat to these operations would be from Japanese suicide planes which had caused us so much difficulty in previous operations.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be much pleased if the route to Vladivostok via Tsushima Strait could be opened in October since by that time communications through the Kuriles and La Perousse Strait would be closed by ice.
GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood and appreciated the urgent necessity to the Russian Chiefs of Staff of opening the southern route and said that we would do all in our power to clear the straits as early as possible. General Marshall said that Admiral King had pointed out that the operations to open Tsushima Strait could not take place until after the landing in Kyushu and until after our air forces were established in northwestern Kyushu. It would be necessary, of course, for our minesweepers to have adequate air cover during their operations in clearing the straits of mines. The time required to establish the necessary airfields would depend to a large degree on Japanese resistance in Kyushu and the straits might not be opened until the middle of December or about six weeks after the first landing on Kyushu. He pointed out that we would make every effort to expedite the operation for the benefit of our forces as well as for the benefit to the Russians. He wanted to make this point clear since he desired to avoid any misunderstanding as to our capabilities in clearing Tsushima Strait for traffic to Vladivostok.
GENERAL MARSHALL then read a memorandum which he said related to this discussion and which gave the progress, from partial reports, covering the last ten days of naval and air action against Japan.
GENERAL ANTONOV expressed his appreciation for the information contained in the memorandum read by General Marshall.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to furnish to the Russian Chiefs of Staff, until operations against Japan were commenced by the Soviet Union, a weekly report of operations similar to that contained in the memorandum, through General Deane or his naval associate. Thereafter, reports of such operations would be furnished through the commanders in the field.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be glad to receive this information and asked if there were any other questions to be considered at this meeting.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that directions had been given to furnish the Russian Chiefs of Staff with copies of the minutes of this meeting in order to provide a means of determining if there was a mutual understanding of the conversations which had taken place. In the absence of comment by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, it would be assumed that the record was a correct basis for understanding and guidance.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would examine the minutes and if he had any comment he would inform the United States Chiefs of Staff thereof.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was planned that he, Admiral King and General Arnold would leave for the United States tomorrow. Admiral Leahy would remain until the conference was completed. He said that the principal assistants of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Cooke, General Hull and General Norstad would remain at the conference to handle any matters that might arise. He said that if he, Admiral King and General Arnold leave tomorrow as planned, he desired to take this occasion to express for the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the opportunity afforded to discuss these important matters with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. He was gratified that they had been able to reach decisions so satisfactory to all.
GENERAL ANTONOV also expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over the results of the conference and said that he hoped that his close contact with General Marshall would be continued in the future so that all questions that might arise might be settled promptly. He then gave General Marshall a map showing the areas which had been considered in the discussion.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he regretted that through a misunderstanding the United States Chiefs of Staff had not received the answers to the five questions and were, therefore, not well prepared for the afternoon’s discussion. He thanked General Antonov for his patience in reading the answers which he had presented.
Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Mr. Cannon | Mr. Hayter | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Golunsky |
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs
[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945
Memorandum
The third meeting of the Committee to consider the second and third points of the paper on Liberated Europe was held this afternoon.
On point 2 (freedom of the press) we could only reaffirm that the divergence between our position, generally supported by the British, and the Soviet position left no alternative but to report the disagreement back to the respective Foreign Ministers. The British representative (Mr. Hayter) attempted to put through a new text, but even this, a watered-down modification of ours, was rejected by the Russians (Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Golunski). The Russian proposal, attached hereto, is of course impossible. The first paragraph is just not true, and the second paragraph talks only of better facilities for foreign correspondents, subject to “security” restrictions which Mr. Gromyko admitted may involve political censorship. The text ignores completely the question of freedom of the domestic press.
On point 3 (procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary) the Russians repeated their earlier argument that this is now superfluous in view of their proposals made in the respective capitals which would grant us and the British a better position. After a brief discussion of the points requiring elucidation it was clear that there will not be time to work out all these details during the present Conference. We finally drew up a statement to be shown to our respective delegations, as a basis for the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. It reads as follows:
The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the three representatives, improved facilities for British and American representatives, and prior joint consideration of directives. Subject to elaboration of details which will be worked out through diplomatic channels the three Governments consider that these proposals constitute a basis for the future work of the Allied Control Commissions, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs
[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945
[Extract]
Memorandum
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
If any of the delegations are willing to accept this text, note that either the British or the Soviet representative will propose a suitable passage to cover Finland.
If we accept something along the lines of the foregoing text, the title must be changed. We might propose:
Statement on Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary (and Finland).
Copies of the Soviet proposals [on revising the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania], to which reference is made above have been handed to us here. Translations of these for Hungary and Rumania are attached. We have been informed that the proposals for Bulgaria and Finland are identical with those for Rumania.
By way of comment it may be said:
-
Our representatives on the Allied Control Councils as well as the Department, seem to think these proposals give us most of what we wanted. I agree.
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We have in mind some requests for elucidation as well as some desirable additions. We might submit them to the Soviet Delegation here in the form of a personal letter. Though we could hardly expect a reply here, this would perhaps be better tactics than to start fresh through diplomatic channels. I think we could prepare a statement of these items in a couple of hours. Can we handle here the question of concurrence of the Joint Chiefs? If not, the delay of clearance through the Department might make it too late to get the letter into Soviet hands before the Conference closes.
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The Soviet proposal for Hungary would give us what purports to be a status of concurrence in decisions of the Allied Control Council, i.e., a fairly full tripartite status in matters of policy at least. In working for revision we should try to obtain this same status as regards Rumania and Bulgaria, thus achieving uniformity in a region where our interests are identical for the three countries, and where the military reasons for a distinction no longer apply.
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We may have to make some concession from our position of full tripartite participation. The substance of our desiderata would be achieved, however, if we obtain effective consultation prior to the issuance of directives.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 26, 1945]
[Translation?]
Proposed Soviet Redraft of Paragraph 2 of the Paper on Liberated Europe (Freedom of the Press)
The Conference takes note of the fact that now the representatives of the press of the Allied countries in the countries liberated from German invaders have received the opportunity to work in normal conditions and to describe on a large scale in the press the situation in these countries.
At the same time in view of the termination of the war in Europe conditions have been created which permit to grant greater facilities for the work of the representatives of the allied press in the countries with which armistice agreements have been concluded, provided the interests of the security of allied occupational forces in these countries be observed.
Harriman-Grabski conversation
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Poland | |
| Mr. Harriman | Vice President Grabski | |
| Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka | ||
| Mr. Modzelewski | ||
| Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczvk | ||
| Mr. Zebrowski |
Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister
July 26, 1945
[Translation]
Notes of a Discussion with Mr. Harriman on July 26, 1945
Persons present: from the American side --Ambassador Harriman and his secretary; from the Polish side --Professor Grabski, Messrs. Gomułka, Modzelewski, Mikołajcyzk, and interpreter Żebrowski.
MR. HARRIMAN takes the floor and asks for a short time to speak because of a meeting which is to follow, and he asks that his talk be considered confidential. As we know, the Americans now have to feed about 7 million people. At the same time, one of the most terrible wars is being waged 7,000 miles from home in the Pacific. They are aware of the fact that they will have to help Europe. Those 7 million people are mostly Germans in the American occupation zone – prisoners of war and also people of various nationalities who are in their occupation zone. The … American nation does not wish to allow any people in the world to starve in time of peace. In making their territorial claims the Poles broached a controversial issue concerning food and raw materials needed by European nations. The territories occupied by the Soviet Union in Germany and the territories claimed by Poland were a source of food supplies for the rest of the German population. There is a shortage of coal in the world. Russia has a coal shortage as well as a food shortage. France, Belgium, and the Netherlands also experience such shortages. Polish Silesia used to supply coal to Berlin. Italy is short of coal, and in such circumstances the United States has to export 7 million tons of coal annually, although its production is not sufficient for domestic needs. England cannot export coal if it is to maintain its present level of industrial production, but it does export coal at present. At this time of controversy over raw materials and food, the Poles announce their claims with regard to sources of supply for food, coal, zinc, and similar raw materials. They announce their claim to a territory formerly inhabited by 8 to 9 million Germans. The Czechs announced their claim with regard to the expulsion of 2 million Germans, the Hungarians of half a million.… At present Messrs. Harriman, Matthews, and Clayton are having their own private discussions with President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes in order to formulate the position of the American Delegation with regard to the Polish problem. He also knows that similar discussions concerning the Polish problem are going on within the British Delegation. The problem must be settled somehow at the meeting of the Three. One thing has already been settled positively so far, namely, that all of the Three Powers will actively help in the repatriation of the Poles from the west. From the legal point of view, the problem of boundaries must wait until the end of the war.… But the problem of a legal settlement of the situation at a peace conference is one thing, and the problem of establishing a Polish administration in the western territories and of securing the harvest and organizing industrial production is something else. The Russians cannot do it; it has to be done by the Poles. If they are to do it and start production on a large scale, they must repatriate their population from areas behind the Curzon Line and from the west. Yesterday’s conference, however, showed clearly that until the next harvest Poland cannot export food, yet it has to export raw materials such as coal, zinc, etc., to meet the needs of other countries, and obviously for payment.…
MR. HARRIMAN then expresses thanks for the invitation proffered on behalf of the Government to visit the western territories of Poland and promises to make this visit after the Conference, not only as an ambassador but also as a friend of Poland.
In closing, I said to Mr. Harriman, half jokingly, that Poland should not take a beating because of a quarrel between the Allies concerning food. With regard to that problem the interests of Poland must be preserved above all.
First meeting of the Protocol Subcommittee
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Mr. Dunn | Mr. Brook | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Matthews | Mr. Ward | Mr. Kozyrev |
| Mr. Cohen | Mr. Dean | Mr. Lavrentyev |
| Mr. Bohlen | ||
| Mr. Yost |
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2645
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 26, 1945
Meeting of Protocol Subcommittee, July 26, 1945
Mr. Gromyko was elected chairman of the subcommittee.
It was agreed that the Protocol of the Berlin Conference should follow exactly the form of the Protocol of the Crimea Conference.
-
It was agreed that the title of the first heading should be “Establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers” which should be followed by the text which has already been approved by the Conference. There would then be inserted the approved text of the invitation to be sent by the three governments to the Governments of China and France.
-
It was agreed that the title of the second heading should be “The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period” and that this should be followed by two sections “(A) Political Principles” and “(B) Economic Principles.” The first of these subheadings would be followed by the text already approved.
-
It was agreed that the third section would have to do with Poland and that the title of the section would be suggested by the USSR. This would be followed in the first instance by the text on the Polish question already approved by the Conference.
A draft of these first three headings of the Protocol is attached hereto.
It was agreed that the following subjects would be dealt with under succeeding headings:
- IV Tangier
- V Iran
- VI Western Frontier of the USSR.
- VII Territorial Trusteeship
- VIII Government in Austria
- IX Turkey and the Straits
The exact title of all of these will be subject to further consideration. The text will be supplied by the Delegations which raised the questions before the Conference. In other words, the Soviet Delegation will present texts on Tangier, the Western Frontier of the USSR, Territorial Trusteeship and Government in Austria. The British Delegation will present texts on Iran and Turkey and the Straits.
It was also agreed that decisions taken by the subcommittee are purely tentative and subject to revision after the various representatives have consulted their foreign ministers.
The next meeting of the subcommittee was fixed for Friday, July 27, immediately after the Big Three meeting.
Conversations among U.S. officials regarding war criminals, 9 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Secretary Byrnes | Colonel Cutter | |
| Mr. Justice Jackson | Mrs. Douglas | |
| Mr. McCloy | Colonel Gill | |
| Brigadier General Betts | Colonel Gerhardt | |
| Miss Fite | Major Coleman | |
| Mr. Fahy |
740.00116 EW/7-2745
The Assistant Secretary of War to the Secretary of State
Washington [Babelsberg], 27 July 1945
Confidential
Dear Mr. Secretary I send you herewith a copy of our minutes of the conference held in your office yesterday evening on war crimes.
Sincerely yours,
JOHN J MCCLOY
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conference in the Office of the Secretary of State, 2 Kaiser Strasse, Babelsberg, 26 July 1945 at 2100 Hours
Present: The Secretary of State, Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, Mr. John J. McCloy (Assistant Secretary of War), Brigadier General Ed C. Betts (J. A., ETO), Miss Katherine Fite, State Department, Mr. Charles Fahy (USGCC Legal Adviser), Colonel R. Ammi Cutter (Office of The Assistant Secretary of War), and Mrs. Douglas (Mr. Justice Jackson’s secretary)
Mr. Justice Jackson reviewed the course of his negotiations with the Russians, French and British in an attempt to reach a protocol governing the trial of the principal war criminals. He also urged that there be established promptly a policy and procedure on the surrender of war criminals and renegades requested by any of the United Nations or by Italy. The substance of the pending IPCOG paper on the subject was reported by Mr. McCloy, Miss Fite and Colonel Cutter.
The following decisions of policy were made by the Secretary of State after full discussion:
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With respect to the surrender of war criminals and renegades requested by the United Nations or by Italy, the Secretary of State took the position that this matter should be dealt with by the U.S. military commander having custody of the demanded prisoner. The U.S. commander should make surrender upon presentation of a request from such a government, accompanied by a reasonably full statement that charges were pending or had been made that the prisoner had committed acts constituting either a war crime or an offense constituting him a traitor or renegade. In cases of doubt the military commander should refer the matter to the Control Council to be disposed of without reference to Washington, unless political or other guidance was affirmatively desired by the U. S. representative on the Control Council. (It was understood that Mr. Justice Jackson, Mr. McCloy, General Betts, and the others would go over the pending IPCOG paper on war criminals and the pending EAC paper on United Nations Renegades and Quislings and determine whether these papers in all particulars complied with the policy mentioned above).
Mr. McCloy pointed out that this decision to leave the matter to the decision of the military commander was in some degree a departure from the United States’ traditional policy of affording asylum to political offenders. Despite this the Secretary of State expressed the opinion that the only practical place for the decision of these questions was in the field, where the military commander had full access to the facts, under a policy which left him free in cases of doubt to throw the request into the Control Council for decision.
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With respect to the arrangements being negotiated by Mr. Justice Jackson, the Secretary of State expressed the view that Mr. Justice Jackson should not make any sacrifices of or deviations from principle, either as to the place of trial, procedure, or definition of the criminal offenses. He should not make any agreement which he felt in any way derogated from fundamental axioms of justice. He should make reasonable attempts to reach an agreement for complete Russian participation on a sound basis. If he found it impossible within a fairly short time to effect such an agreement, satisfactory to him, the Secretary of State would approve his reaching an agreement with the Russians and the others, or any of them, but preferably including the Russians, defining in general terms the criminal offenses to be tried and providing for the trial by each nation (or any group of one or more of the four nations) of the criminals in their own custody, in accordance with procedures satisfactory to the nations conducting the trials. Secretary Byrnes suggested that there was ample reason for adopting this view (which could be duly explained to the public at the proper time) in (1) the administrative difficulties (due to language, differences in the national jurisprudences, etc.) of a four-party trial; (2) in the inevitable delays in reaching agreement; and (3) in the necessity for speedy trials on a basis which the United States would regard as fair.
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With respect to the substance of the protocol for the trial of the principal war criminals, the Secretary of State expressed the view that this was in general a matter committed by the President to Mr. Justice Jackson and to be decided by him. In this respect he referred to such matters as the substantive law to be applied, definitions of crimes, provisions governing procedure, etc.
Following the meeting above-mentioned, a further meeting was held at #1 Dom Strasse with all of the above present, except Mr. Byrnes. In addition, there were present Colonel Gill, Colonel Gerhardt and Major Coleman.
It was agreed:
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That the IPCOG paper on War Criminals and the SWNCC paper on United Nations Renegades and Quislings conformed to the policy stated by the Secretary of State and could be carried out in detail by the U.S. Military Government, which properly under the directive could prescribe regulations as to the form of requests, the extent to which proof of the existence of charges of war crimes should be required, and the standards for determining when the request should be referred to the Control Council;
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that the matter of requests by former satellite nations should be considered further, but that probably they should be granted (in the absence of unusual circumstances) where concurred in by the U.S. representative on the Control Council of the former satellite; and
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that the regulations governing requests worked out by the Control Council or the U.S. Zone Commander should be communicated to the other United Nations through diplomatic channels.
501.AA/7-2645
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation [?]
[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945
Top secret
Admission to the United Nations
The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties, so that as soon as possible thereafter relations between them and the ex-enemy States can, where necessary, be reestablished on a normal footing. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.
For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.
The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations.
As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations declared that:
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membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
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the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfil the qualifications set out above.
The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China and the United Kingdom
Potsdam July 26, 1945
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We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
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The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
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The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
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The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed milita[r]istic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
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Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
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There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
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Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
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The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
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The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
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We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as [a] nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strength[en]ing of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.
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Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those industries which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
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The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
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We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
HARRY S TRUMAN
WINSTON CHURCHILL
by H S T
President of China
by wire
740.00119 Potsdam/8-745: Telegram
The Ambassador in China to the President and the Secretary of State
[Chungking,] 26 July 1945
Top secret
urgent
(The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State James F Byrnes Potsdam, Germany for the President from Ambassador Hurley)
The following message is from the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai Shek, for President Truman.
I concur in the proposed proclamation to Japan, with the single alteration that paragraph (1) should be revised to read ‘We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen etc, etc, etc’ since the proclamation is to be by the heads of the three governments concerned, CHIANG KAI SHEK
Concurrence given to me by Chiang Kai Shek at Yellow Mountain, 0930 hours Chungking time July 26th. Delay in transmission due to fact I had to return to Chungking by ferry Yangtze River because lack of communications. Foregoing message handed both Army and Navy for transmission at 1105 hours Chungking time July 26th.
790.00/1-2050
The Secretary of State to the Soviet Foreign Commissar
[Babelsberg, July 26, 1945]
I am transmitting herewith for your information copy of a declaration which is being issued by the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, on the aims and purposes of the war against Japan.
This declaration has been given to the press for release and publication tomorrow morning.
The Pittsburgh Press (July 26, 1945)
DEFEATED CHURCHILL RESIGNS
British swing left; Attlee takes over
Laborite emphasizes need for new order for war prevention
…