Eliot: Japs may act to save their ‘sacred soil’
Defeat of navy could give army chance to quit and still hold head up
By Maj. George Fielding Eliot
…
Gracie Allen Reporting
By Gracie Allen
It seems that when I mentioned grown women wearing little-boy pants yesterday, I only scratched the surface of the clothing mix-up.
And from the looks of things, I’d better not scratch any farther than the surface. For Sen. Homer Ferguson of Michigan told a sympathetic Senate that men are buying and wearing women’s panties because they can’t get men’s shorts and a clothing authority at the University of Illinois charged that teenage girls are using their father’s scarce shirts and work pants.
Poor father! He’ll probably end up playing Lady Godiva. She, at least, had her long blonde tresses to protect her. I don’t know what some of the fathers I know are going to do. They haven’t enough hair on their heads to make a pair of trousers for a potato bug.
U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:23 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent
1450
Re my telegram No. 1449
At the time of my conference with Lozovsky on the 25th, I stated orally as follows (as indicated at the beginning of my telegram,3 the above was to be sent later to L. in written form):
-
At the meeting with you, the Acting People’s Commissar, last July 13th, I delivered the message from the Emperor and also particularly mentioned His Majesty’s desire to dispatch Prince Konoye. Concerning the above, I received a reply from you in writing on the night of the 18th to the effect that the Government of the USSR could not give a specific answer because there was nothing concrete either in the message of the Emperor or in the Prince’s mission to Moscow.
-
Concerning these matters, I once again made my proposal to you today to make the circumstances clear in the following manner:
The mission of special envoy Konoye, entrusted with the Emperor’s request, is to ask the Government of the USSR to assist in the termination of the war and to explain our concrete intentions on this matter; his mission is at the same time to negotiate on matters which will solidify and improve relations between Japan and the USSR, which should become the basis of our diplomacy for the period during and after the war.
-
In addition to stating the foregoing on instructions from our Government to the Government of the USSR, I repeated that the Emperor especially ordered the Government to dispatch the envoy as the result of His Majesty’s wishes to put an end to the tragedy of additional bloodshed from the continued exchange of fire. The special envoy will explain to the Government of the USSR the concrete intentions of the Japanese relative to the above, and will request its consideration of this matter. Therefore, I hope that the Government of the USSR will give sufficient and favorable consideration to this matter of the envoy and agree to the dispatch of the envoy very soon.
Furthermore, since the Government of the USSR is well aware that ex-Premier Prince Konoye enjoys high trust in the Imperial Court and is prominent in Japanese political circles, I believe it will not be necessary to add my own explanation here.
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 25, 1945 — 11:53 p.m.
[Translation]
urgent
1449
Re my telegram No. 1441
On the 25th I met Lozovsky in order to make the proposal contained in my telegram No. 1450, and we continued our conversation as follows:
SATO: As you have already understood from my proposal, the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in a friendly manner relative to the termination of the war, and at the same time will have Prince Konoye explain directly to you the concrete intentions of our Government.
L.: Could you give me the text of the proposal which you have just made? Its content is really important. If you could prepare a written text for me, I should be able to understand it more correctly. It is difficult to expect real accuracy from an oral presentation. It would also be convenient for me to make a report to my Government if I have a written text.
I should like to ask one or two questions: (1) I understand that the Japanese Government is asking the Soviet Government to mediate in order to terminate the war, and (2) concerning the above problem Prince Konoye is going to bring us some concrete proposals. Now, are these concrete proposals for the termination of the war or for strengthening Russo-Japanese relations? As this point was not made clear, I should like to have you explain it to me so that I can make a report to my Government.
SATO: As to your latter question, the concrete intentions which Prince Konoye is going to explain to the Soviet Government are, as I understand it, concerned with both of the problems you have just mentioned. In other words, I understand that they are concerned, first, with the request to the Soviet Government for mediation and, second, with the problem of strengthening Russo-Japanese relations. As to your first request, it is outside the instructions which I have received to prepare a written text of the proposal which I made today. However, I shall prepare such a text for your reference on my own initiative and present it to you later, since the problem itself is significant, as you have suggested, and also in due consideration of the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Government are now in Berlin. Needless to say, however, I have to ask you to treat this text as top secret, because of its extremely secret nature. I should also like to mention that Prince Konoye, whose mission I have just explained to you, has our Emperor’s greatest confidence and occupies an eminent position in our Government. Therefore, in my opinion, his mission will cover a vast area: he will ask the Soviet Government for mediation; at the same time he will exchange views concerning problems common to both of our countries. Moreover, he may go into the problem of future relations between the two nations. I believe you will not be wrong in understanding the matter as I have indicated above.
L.: I understand well the secret nature of this problem; I also understand well that what you have conveyed to me, Mr. Ambassador, is very confidential. I will make a report to my Government as soon as I receive your written text. Moreover, I will let you know immediately concerning any instructions I receive from my Government.
SATO: Thank you for your kind help. I personally would also wish to hear from you as soon as possible.
Before leaving, I added the following:
The intention of the Japanese Government, regarding Prince Konoye’s mission, is to ask the Soviet Government’s assistance in terminating the war. I am sure that the intention is good. Therefore, it is my hope that you will be able to make arrangements so that the Soviet Government will have an opportunity to hear directly from the Prince on this matter.
This would have ended today’s meeting. However, I repeated my own explanation of the mission of the special envoy, which appeared to impress L. a great deal. Particularly the fact that our Government has asked the Soviet Government to mediate seemed to arrest his attention. L. listened to our proposal with an earnest and attentive attitude throughout, and promised me an answer from his Government.
Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference
Wednesday, July 25:
0920: Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in the India-Burma Theatre) called on the President at the Little White House.
1000: General Marshall called on the President.
1035: The President and his party left the Little White House for Cecilienhof where they arrived at 1045. Before the conference was called to order, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Generalissimo posed in the Palace garden for still and motion pictures. Photographers (service and civilian) from all three nations were represented.
1100: The Big Three and other delegates entered the conference room and the ninth meeting of the Berlin Conference was called to order by the President. The meeting adjourned at 1200, at which time the President left to return to the Little White House.
Admiral Leahy, accompanied by Rear Admiral H. A. Flanigan, USN, Captain Vardaman, Colonel Rusk, Lieutenant Elsey, Lieutenant Edelstein, Lieutenant Rigdon, and First Lieutenant Vardaman left Babelsberg this morning for a flight to London. They returned to Babelsberg Thursday afternoon.
2000: Ambassador Murphy, Ambassador Caffery, and General Somervell were dinner guests at the Little White House this evening. Dinner music was played by an eight-piece band from the 278th Army Ground Force band with Staff Sergeant Joe Borrelli conducting. Vocal selections were rendered by Pfc Jules Navarra.
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 26, 1945)
Japans stolze Flotte vernichtet
Fünftausend Festungen fliegen täglich gegen Japan
…
Die Konferenz tagt weiter
POTSDAM, 25. Juli (Reuters) – Obwohl Premierminister Churchill, Außenminister Eden und der Führer der Arbeiterpartei Attlee nach England abgereist sind, um dort die Wahlergebnisse abzuwarten, wird die Potsdamer Konferenz fortgesetzt. Dies verstärkt den Eindruck, dass in Potsdam zum allergrößten Teil die ins Einzelne gehende Arbeit der Fachleute ausschlaggebend ist.
Das ging schon aus der Bekanntmachung hervor, dass die drei Außenminister Eden, Byrnes und Molotow gemeinsam die Tagesordnung für die „Großen Drei“ aufsetzen. Man nimmt an, dass Churchill, Stalin und Truman im Verlauf ihrer acht Zusammenkünfte grundsätzliche Entscheidungen getroffen haben, die den großen Fachausschüssen Tag für Tag eine Menge Aufgaben stellen, da diese Beschlüsse in allen Einzelheiten ausgearbeitet werden müssen. Bis zur Rückkehr der britischen Staatsmänner aus England sind diese Fachausschüsse durch ihre. Arbeit Voll und ganz beansprucht, da sie auch für die Vorbereitung von Vorschlägen bezüglich der Fragen, die bisher von den „Großen Drei“ noch nicht behandelt wurden, verantwortlich sind.
Ein Blick auf den offiziellen Bericht über die Krimkonferenz gibt eine klare Vorstellung, welch enorme Kleinarbeit notwendig ist, um Beschlüsse, die in großen Umrissen herausgegeben werden, auszuarbeiten. In Potsdam ist dies noch mehr der Fall, weil es sich jetzt hauptsächlich um die alle Einzelheiten umfassende Ausarbeitung der bereits festgelegten grundsätzlichen Entscheidungen handelt. Überall in Deutschland hat man den Eindruck, dass die Besatzungsbehörden in den schwebenden Fragen zuwarten, bis sie Weisungen von Potsdam erhalten, aus denen sie dann ersehen können, welchen Standpunkt sie einnehmen sollen, und wie weit sie in der Durchführung entscheidender Verwaltungsaufgaben gehen können.
L’Aube (July 26, 1945)
Pétain sortira-t-il de sn silence ?
« Être monté si haut être tombé si bas ! » s’exclame le président Lebrun
…
U.S. State Department (July 26, 1945)
500.CC/7-2645: Telegram
The Alternate Delegate to the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs
London, July 26, 1945 — 11 a.m.
[Extracts]
Secret
7519
Copre 2
From Gerig for Pasvolsky and Hiss.
Meeting at Potsdam yesterday considered the question of the officers of ExCom (Executive Committee), and PreCo, (Preparatory Committee), Jebb flying over to attend.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
British thinking of proposing that present mandatory powers be provisional members trusteeship council, which together with all other permanent members and elected members, would enable trusteeship council to organize and act provisionally, pending negotiation of agreements. Believe this would be feasible and would hasten and facilitate negotiation of agreements. Soviet raised question at Potsdam of their being a trust power.
500.CC (PC)/7-2845
Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative
[Washington,] July 26, 1945
| Participants: | Mr. E. R. Stettinius, Jr. |
| Mr. John Balfour British Minister |
Mr. John Balfour, British Minister, called upon me this afternoon at his request at my apartment at 2:30. He stated he had just received a wire dated July 26 from London this morning in which he was instructed by the Foreign Office to call on me and inquire whether or not we would be willing to agree to have the chairmanship of the executive committee of the interim commission rotate between the five. He stated that their first position would be to have one chairman, presumably a Soviet chairman, but if they could not agree on one, he asked if we would agree to rotate.
I stated that Mr. Dunn had a memorandum with him at Potsdam on this subject and it was our thinking also that this was the best procedure – we should try for one chairman but if we couldn’t get agreement on one we would then accept rotation. I said, however, that I had heard that Mr. Jebb had flown to Potsdam yesterday on this subject and, of course, our delegation in Potsdam was prepared to deal with the whole subject right there on the ground. He said that was most satisfactory and he would communicate that to the Foreign Office.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to the Navy Department
[Babelsberg,] 26 July 1945
Top secret
priority
Victory 352
This is Lockup. CominCh sends No. 24 to CominCh and CNO Administrative Office for action MilMis Moscow for info. Soviets have agreed to establishment of facilities outlined your 122012 and 171951. Detailed arrangements as to entry of personnel still to be made. Soviets will receive communication and aerological material now. Request tonnage cube place and date of assembly of this material for each station. Advise schedule of Soviet west coast sailings and Hula transfers by which material could be shipped to Petropavlovsk and/or Vladivostok. Possibility of use of east coast sailings for transportation overland via Europe should also be reported. In addition desire detail your plans for transportation via United States aircraft thru Alaska in event Soviet authorize this method of delivery. Send reply MilMis Moscow for action.
Meeting of the U.S. and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.
Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Army General Antonov | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev | |
| Lieutenant General Hull | Lieutenant General Slavin | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Admiral Kucherov | |
| Major General Norstad | ||
| Major General Deane | ||
| Rear Admiral Gardner | ||
| Rear Admiral Maples | ||
| Captain McDill | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Moore | ||
| Interpreters | ||
| Lieutenant Chase | Major Evsekov |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 26, 1945, 3 p.m.
Top secret
GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he would preside at the meeting.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated the honor but under the circumstances he suggested General Antonov preside and he hoped that he would accept.
GENERAL ANTONOV asked if General Marshall had had an opportunity to become acquainted with the answers to the five questions General Marshall had given him at the meeting on 24 July (See Annex to these minutes). He said that Generalissimo Stalin had handed the written answers to President Truman yesterday at eleven o’clock a.m.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was sorry that he had not seen the answers which had been prepared by General Antonov.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the first question as follows:
The Soviet Command agrees to establish in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk radio stations for transmitting weather data in accordance with the request made in a letter from President Truman delivered on 23 July 1945. The Soviet Command is ready to accept and use the radio stations and equipment proposed in that letter for the above purpose.
As regards the personnel for maintaining and operating the stations, we consider it wiser to use Soviet personnel which already has a great deal of experience in working with American radio stations.
In addition to these two stations, we shall increase the network of local stations in order to give better information on weather.
When the reading of the answer to the first question was completed, GENERAL ANTONOV asked if he should proceed to read the answers to the remaining questions. GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to discuss the answer to each question as it was read.
ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were disappointed that American personnel was not acceptable for liaison purposes at the central weather stations, since they felt that it would increase the efficiency of the Russian effort as well as our own. He thought, therefore, that we should request reconsideration of this point. If American personnel were used, he said that it was the intention to have 18 officers and 42 enlisted men at Khabarovsk and 9 officers and 24 enlisted men at Petropavlovsk. He had a memorandum relating to the details of equipment and personnel which he thought the Russian High Command should have for use in connection with the reconsideration requested.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that Russian personnel had had experience in the use of the equipment and in the communication procedure in the vicinity of Sevastopol and Odessa as well as near Murmansk. The proposal to use Russian personnel had been made because it had been considered that the operation of these stations would then be more simple. However, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on American personnel at these stations, there would be no objection to employing them.
ADMIRAL KING then gave General Antonov the memorandum he had previously mentioned.
GENERAL ANTONOV pointed out that he had not received an answer as to whether the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on the use of American personnel.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would prefer to use American personnel and pointed out that the major service rendered by this personnel would be to U.S. naval forces and to the strategic air forces. For this reason he thought that American personnel would be more satisfactory.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first question could then be considered solved and American liaison personnel would be employed at the stations under discussion.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the second question as follows:
Separate zones of naval and air operations are to be set up for the United States and the USSR in the Sea of Japan. The boundary between these zones will be along the lines connecting Cape Boltina on the coast of Korea to point 40° north 135° east to point 45° 45’ north 140° east thence along the parallel 45° 45’ north to the line connecting Cape Crillon (Kondo) (on the southern tip of southern Sakhalin) with Cape Soya Missaki (Soyasaki) (on the northern tip of Hokkaido).
The USSR naval and air forces will operate north of this line. United States naval and air forces will operate to the south of this line. This line shall be the limiting line of operations for surface and submarine craft and for aviation.
Depending upon circumstances in the future, this boundary line may be subject to change.
United States naval and air operations north of this boundary line and Soviet naval and air operations south of this boundary line will be subject to coordination.
In the Sea of Okhotsk there shall be a zone of mutual operations for the naval and air forces of the United States and the Soviet Union. Operations in the Okhotsk Sea will take place in accordance with mutual agreements.
In the Bering Sea there shall be a zone of mutual operations of our Pacific Fleet and aviation and the United States Fleet and aviation bounded on the north, east and south by a line going from Cape Dezhnev to Diomede Island and thence along the boundary of the territorial waters of the USSR and the United States to parallel 51° 30’ north and thence through 50° 35’ north 157° east; thence to 49° 50’ north 156° 20’ east and thence along the parallel 49° 50’ north to the Fourth Kurile Strait.
The remainder of the Bering Sea as well as bordering regions of the Pacific Ocean shall be the zone of operations of the United States Fleet.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the line of demarcation for sea and air operations in the Sea of Japan was acceptable.
ADMIRAL KING said that he desired to confirm the proposed conditions in the Sea of Okhotsk. He said he understood that this sea would be free for operations of both the United States Navy and the Navy of the Soviet Union and that coordination would be arranged through mutual understanding and cooperation. He asked also if the area to the north of the red line shown on the chart prepared by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, and described in the answer to the second question, was subject to joint control by the United States and the Soviet Navies, in the same manner as in the Sea of Okhotsk.
Admiral King’s understanding was confirmed by ADMIRAL KUZNETSOV.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that with this understanding, the proposals by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable.
GENERAL ANTONOV repeated that the areas as set forth in answer to the second question were for both sea and air operations, and there was agreement on this answer.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the third question as follows:
The boundary line between operational zones of the United States and Soviet air forces in Korea and Manchuria shall be as follows: Cape Boltina, Changchun, Liaoyuan, Kailu, Chihfeng, Peking, Tatung and thence along the southern boundary of Inner Mongolia.
United States aviation will operate south of this line including all the above-named points. USSR aviation will operate north of this line. Depending upon future conditions this line is subject to change. United States air operations north of this line and Soviet air operations south of this line must be coordinated.
GENERAL ARNOLD said he would like to call attention to the fact that the boundary line as proposed by the Russian Chiefs of Staff would deprive the United States air forces of certain railroad centers and lines of communication north of the line as targets unless each individual mission were arranged for separately. He asked if the United States air forces could send missions north of the boundary line within 24 hours after application had been made to the local Russian authorities. He thought that if his understanding as to local coordination was correct, the desired operations of the United States air forces could be worked out satisfactorily. He called the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the range of the heavy bombers, medium bombers, and light bombers, as indicated on a map which he presented, and pointed out where the United States bombing effort could be made effective to the north of the boundary line.
AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the boundary line suggested by the Russian Chiefs of Staff was to the northward of the principal railroad junctions. These junctions would therefore be available to attack by the United States air forces. If it became necessary to attack targets to the north of the line, reliable communications would permit arrangements to be made within 24 hours. Since, however, the communication might not always be reliable, this question might involve some difficulties.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that with the understanding that if the means of communication for coordinating attacks north of the boundary line were too slow, the question of its position would be discussed again, the proposals made by the Russian Chiefs of Staff were acceptable. However, he said, there was an additional matter he would like to raise in regard to both the second and third questions previously discussed. This concerned the flight of individual reconnaissance aircraft, and he asked that the Russian Chiefs of Staff comment on this point.
AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that it was considered that as a general rule, the boundary proposed should apply to reconnaissance aircraft as well as to bombing flights. When necessary to fly reconnaissance aircraft beyond the boundary line, the flight should be coordinated through the liaison officers.
GENERAL ANTONOV then read the answer to the fourth question as follows:
The Soviet Command agrees that beginning with military operations of the Soviet Union against Japan, to establish liaison groups between the American and Soviet commanders in the Far East. To accomplish this liaison it is suggested that there be Soviet liaison groups with General Mac Arthur, with Admiral Nimitz, and in addition, in Washington, to have a Soviet Military Mission.
American liaison groups will be located with the Soviet High Commander in the Far East, Marshal Vassilievski, in Khabarovsk; and with the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral Yemashev, in Vladivostok.
The Soviet Command is ready to accept the radio-teletype equipment for installation at the indicated points.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposal of the Russian Chiefs of Staff appeared entirely acceptable, but he wished to ask if it was the intention that the liaison groups to be provided should make it possible for immediate coordination of operations. He asked if operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, or in any other special area, would normally be referred to Washington and Moscow, or whether the necessary decisions would be made in the field with the minimum delay.
GENERAL ANTONOV replied that Marshal Vassilievski is the commander in chief of all forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East. Marshal Vassilievski had authority to solve all questions of local coordination which were included in the tasks assigned him by the High Command of the Soviet Union. He said that similarly Admiral Yemashev is the commander in chief of all Russian naval forces in the Pacific. He said that these two officers would be able to solve the questions of coordination of action within the limits of the questions and answers which were being discussed here.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the statement of General Antonov made the answer to the fourth question entirely acceptable.
GENERAL ANTONOV then referred back to the third answer and asked if the question of liaison was now clear.
GENERAL MARSHALL replied that his question had concerned the employment of reconnaissance aircraft and that he considered the question of liaison as provided for in the fourth answer entirely satisfactory. He said, moreover, that as the operations proceeded he hoped that there would develop such an intimacy in liaison that we would find later that the commanders in the field would develop an even greater intimacy. This would of course depend on them.
GENERAL ANTONOV read the answer to the fifth question as follows:
The Soviet Command agrees to select ports and airfields for ships and planes in need of repairs and to make available, as far as possible, repair facilities and medical assistance to the personnel of the above-mentioned ships and planes.
For this purpose we can designate:
a. Naval ports
In the Japanese Sea, Port Nakhodka (America Strait); in the Okhotsk and Bering Sea regions – Nikolaevsk, on the Amur, and Petropavlovsk, on Kamchatka.b. Airfields
In the region of Vladivostok, in the region of Alexandrovsk on Sakhalin Island and in the region of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the proposals of the Russian Chiefs of Staff were entirely acceptable.
GENERAL ARNOLD asked if the matter of identification of aircraft at the Russian airbases which would be available to United States aircraft would be handled as a local matter. He said that sometimes a plane was so disabled that it was necessary to come into a landing field from any direction, identifying itself by radio signal only.
AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV said that the names of airfields, methods of approach, corridors and other details would be furnished and that the requirements of the aircraft and personnel upon landing would be provided. He said that a disabled aircraft, after making a certain signal, could land from any direction without other formality. Aircraft crews should be instructed, however, not to fly over such ports as Vladivostok, because of the danger of being fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries.
GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that his inquiry was in regard to whether arrangements of this nature would be made locally, to which AIR MARSHAL FALLALEV replied that the principle was being established here, and that the details would be determined on the spot by the commanders in the field.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he now considered that the five questions given him by General Marshall on 24 July had been answered. He wished, however, to make an additional statement in regard to them. He said that he considered that all of the arrangements provided for under the five questions would come into being on the entry of Russia into the war against Japan.
GENERAL MARSHALL asked if it would be possible to get the communication equipment discussed in the first question into Siberia before that date, or if it would be necessary to wait until after Russia had entered the war.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that preliminary arrangements for the liaison wireless stations could be made beforehand, and that agreements could be reached with reference to each particular question raised.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the meeting on 24 July, Admiral King had pointed out that after the seizure of Kyushu communications might be opened from Kyushu to Vladivostok. This line of communications was very important, since the Straits of Tsushima could be used throughout the year, whereas the route through the Kuriles and through La Perousse Strait was closed during part of the year by ice. He asked General Marshall when the invasion of Kyushu would take place and when the opening of the sea route from the south could be expected.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the occupation of Kyushu depended on three factors. The first was the movement of troops from Europe. This was being done as rapidly as possible, and engineering troops were being moved first in order to prepare the way for the full application of air power. The movement involved two oceans and one continent, and although we could not be certain of carrying out the entire movement on schedule, and were now somewhat behind on both personnel and cargo, he hoped that all difficulties would be overcome. The second factor was the movement of large amounts of supplies from the Solomons, New Guinea, and Halmahera, north to the Philippines and Okinawa, to be loaded on assault ships for the tremendous amphibious effort against Kyushu. The third factor was the recent withdrawal of our divisions engaged in the Philippines and Okinawa from heavy fighting, and the problem of rehabilitation and training for the next operation.
Finally, he said, the weather conditions in the area made landings in September and early October too hazardous to undertake, although this was not a controlling factor as to date. At the present time he expected the landing on Kyushu to take place the last part of October.
GENERAL MARSHALL said further that the assault on Japan by naval and air forces which would extend also to Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula would be continued and increased. By these means he anticipated that by the time of the landing on Kyushu we will have destroyed Japanese oil, other material production, and communications, and will have virtually destroyed the Japanese air force. He said that Admiral King has added that the Japanese Navy would be destroyed as well. He said that all plans for the operation against Kyushu were complete, shipping was being assembled, the construction of bases was proceeding at top speed, and the operations of the United States Fleet and all air forces would proceed with increased vigor from now on. He thought, however, that the Tsushima Strait could not be opened before the end of October. The difficulties of opening Tsushima Strait would involve the sweeping of the passage for mines. The most serious threat to these operations would be from Japanese suicide planes which had caused us so much difficulty in previous operations.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be much pleased if the route to Vladivostok via Tsushima Strait could be opened in October since by that time communications through the Kuriles and La Perousse Strait would be closed by ice.
GENERAL MARSHALL said he understood and appreciated the urgent necessity to the Russian Chiefs of Staff of opening the southern route and said that we would do all in our power to clear the straits as early as possible. General Marshall said that Admiral King had pointed out that the operations to open Tsushima Strait could not take place until after the landing in Kyushu and until after our air forces were established in northwestern Kyushu. It would be necessary, of course, for our minesweepers to have adequate air cover during their operations in clearing the straits of mines. The time required to establish the necessary airfields would depend to a large degree on Japanese resistance in Kyushu and the straits might not be opened until the middle of December or about six weeks after the first landing on Kyushu. He pointed out that we would make every effort to expedite the operation for the benefit of our forces as well as for the benefit to the Russians. He wanted to make this point clear since he desired to avoid any misunderstanding as to our capabilities in clearing Tsushima Strait for traffic to Vladivostok.
GENERAL MARSHALL then read a memorandum which he said related to this discussion and which gave the progress, from partial reports, covering the last ten days of naval and air action against Japan.
GENERAL ANTONOV expressed his appreciation for the information contained in the memorandum read by General Marshall.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were prepared to furnish to the Russian Chiefs of Staff, until operations against Japan were commenced by the Soviet Union, a weekly report of operations similar to that contained in the memorandum, through General Deane or his naval associate. Thereafter, reports of such operations would be furnished through the commanders in the field.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would be glad to receive this information and asked if there were any other questions to be considered at this meeting.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that directions had been given to furnish the Russian Chiefs of Staff with copies of the minutes of this meeting in order to provide a means of determining if there was a mutual understanding of the conversations which had taken place. In the absence of comment by the Russian Chiefs of Staff, it would be assumed that the record was a correct basis for understanding and guidance.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he would examine the minutes and if he had any comment he would inform the United States Chiefs of Staff thereof.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was planned that he, Admiral King and General Arnold would leave for the United States tomorrow. Admiral Leahy would remain until the conference was completed. He said that the principal assistants of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Cooke, General Hull and General Norstad would remain at the conference to handle any matters that might arise. He said that if he, Admiral King and General Arnold leave tomorrow as planned, he desired to take this occasion to express for the United States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the opportunity afforded to discuss these important matters with the Russian Chiefs of Staff. He was gratified that they had been able to reach decisions so satisfactory to all.
GENERAL ANTONOV also expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over the results of the conference and said that he hoped that his close contact with General Marshall would be continued in the future so that all questions that might arise might be settled promptly. He then gave General Marshall a map showing the areas which had been considered in the discussion.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he regretted that through a misunderstanding the United States Chiefs of Staff had not received the answers to the five questions and were, therefore, not well prepared for the afternoon’s discussion. He thanked General Antonov for his patience in reading the answers which he had presented.
Third meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, afternoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Mr. Cannon | Mr. Hayter | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Golunsky |
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs
[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945
Memorandum
The third meeting of the Committee to consider the second and third points of the paper on Liberated Europe was held this afternoon.
On point 2 (freedom of the press) we could only reaffirm that the divergence between our position, generally supported by the British, and the Soviet position left no alternative but to report the disagreement back to the respective Foreign Ministers. The British representative (Mr. Hayter) attempted to put through a new text, but even this, a watered-down modification of ours, was rejected by the Russians (Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Golunski). The Russian proposal, attached hereto, is of course impossible. The first paragraph is just not true, and the second paragraph talks only of better facilities for foreign correspondents, subject to “security” restrictions which Mr. Gromyko admitted may involve political censorship. The text ignores completely the question of freedom of the domestic press.
On point 3 (procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary) the Russians repeated their earlier argument that this is now superfluous in view of their proposals made in the respective capitals which would grant us and the British a better position. After a brief discussion of the points requiring elucidation it was clear that there will not be time to work out all these details during the present Conference. We finally drew up a statement to be shown to our respective delegations, as a basis for the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. It reads as follows:
The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representative on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased. These proposals include provisions for regular and frequent meetings of the three representatives, improved facilities for British and American representatives, and prior joint consideration of directives. Subject to elaboration of details which will be worked out through diplomatic channels the three Governments consider that these proposals constitute a basis for the future work of the Allied Control Commissions, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
The First Secretary of Embassy in Portugal to the Director of European Affairs
[Babelsberg,] July 26, 1945
[Extract]
Memorandum
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
If any of the delegations are willing to accept this text, note that either the British or the Soviet representative will propose a suitable passage to cover Finland.
If we accept something along the lines of the foregoing text, the title must be changed. We might propose:
Statement on Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary (and Finland).
Copies of the Soviet proposals [on revising the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania], to which reference is made above have been handed to us here. Translations of these for Hungary and Rumania are attached. We have been informed that the proposals for Bulgaria and Finland are identical with those for Rumania.
By way of comment it may be said:
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Our representatives on the Allied Control Councils as well as the Department, seem to think these proposals give us most of what we wanted. I agree.
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We have in mind some requests for elucidation as well as some desirable additions. We might submit them to the Soviet Delegation here in the form of a personal letter. Though we could hardly expect a reply here, this would perhaps be better tactics than to start fresh through diplomatic channels. I think we could prepare a statement of these items in a couple of hours. Can we handle here the question of concurrence of the Joint Chiefs? If not, the delay of clearance through the Department might make it too late to get the letter into Soviet hands before the Conference closes.
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The Soviet proposal for Hungary would give us what purports to be a status of concurrence in decisions of the Allied Control Council, i.e., a fairly full tripartite status in matters of policy at least. In working for revision we should try to obtain this same status as regards Rumania and Bulgaria, thus achieving uniformity in a region where our interests are identical for the three countries, and where the military reasons for a distinction no longer apply.
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We may have to make some concession from our position of full tripartite participation. The substance of our desiderata would be achieved, however, if we obtain effective consultation prior to the issuance of directives.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2645
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 26, 1945]
[Translation?]
Proposed Soviet Redraft of Paragraph 2 of the Paper on Liberated Europe (Freedom of the Press)
The Conference takes note of the fact that now the representatives of the press of the Allied countries in the countries liberated from German invaders have received the opportunity to work in normal conditions and to describe on a large scale in the press the situation in these countries.
At the same time in view of the termination of the war in Europe conditions have been created which permit to grant greater facilities for the work of the representatives of the allied press in the countries with which armistice agreements have been concluded, provided the interests of the security of allied occupational forces in these countries be observed.