Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt (in the chair) Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Captain Royal

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 4, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret

The President said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say that it must be done.

The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated. This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task transcending all others. A million Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000-600,000 British. Terrific battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same Commander.

Reverting to ANVIL, the Prime Minister expressed the view that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the great importance which he had previously attached to it.

Admiral King intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL was in sight.

The Prime Minister, continuing, said that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had reached him from the Supreme Commander. Although there were only 5,000 Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalin’s promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.

The Prime Minister concluded by observing that there were still very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared away.

Sir Alan Brooke said that at all the previous Conferences there had been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so far had very few opportunities of discussion at SEXTANT. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be undertaken; second, the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma next March. The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalin’s promise to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of ANVIL was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.

Sir Andrew Cunningham observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the same time, namely OVERLORD and ANVIL. It might be possible to arrange for some of the naval forces employed in BUCCANEER to get back in time for ANVIL, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian Ocean.

Sir Charles Portal said that, according to his information, there was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly limited.

General Marshall expressed agreement with General Brooke’s observations. There was no question that there were a number of important points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means.

The Prime Minister said that he himself would at any rate be leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or three days and work out their problems together?

Admiral Leahy said that two or three days would not suffice for what they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at least one or two weeks.

Admiral King remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime Minister level.

The Prime Minister said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out.

The President agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 14,000 instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives.

Sir Alan Brooke demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault.

Admiral King said that landing craft and assault shipping for a two-division assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He added that, so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U.K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U.K. Nothing would be sent to the Pacific.

The Prime Minister observed that this was a fruitful contribution.

Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)s. Would it not be possible, asked the Prime Minister, to adapt merchant ships for this purpose instead of building special vessels?

Admiral King said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U.S. Navy used ships of 6,000–10,000 tons for this purpose, the monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops across the Atlantic.

Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, Admiral King pointed to the interrelation between the attack on Rabaul and BUCCANEER. The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated points. Admiral Leahy suggested that if it could be decided:

a. that ANVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault; and,

b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him;

the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mount-batten said that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him for other purposes.

The Prime Minister suggested that BUCCANEER might be left until after the monsoon; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced upon us by facts and figures.

Admiral King said that there was a definite commitment to the Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring.

The Prime Minister recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (the Prime Minister) had said quite firmly that he could not agree. The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this.

The President suggested the following plan of action:

a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944.

b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can.

Sir Charles Portal remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command.

Sir Alan Brooke said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3œ divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen up the European front.

Admiral Leahy entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a higher level than the Chiefs of Staff.

The Prime Minister pointed to the great military advantages that were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us.

Mr. Eden thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a coup d’etat.

The Prime Minister pointed to the great advantages that were to be gained by Rumania’s entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close in together.

There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu.

The President, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points:
a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD.
b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL.

c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war.

d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with what had already been allocated to him.

The Prime Minister suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL.

The President said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason.

The Prime Minister said that this “very good reason” might be provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3Âœ division basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The operation was at present on a very narrow margin.

Field Marshal Dill thought it was impossible for us to be strong at both OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Admiral Leahy agreed that, from the military point of view, there was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake.

General Marshall agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between Indochina [India and China?] would be at hazard.

The Prime Minister observed that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree.

The President said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed.

Admiral King, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER was out of the question.

The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Cairo, 4 December 1943
Fan 282

Secret
Priority

With reference to letter from Giraud suggesting he attend SEXTANT, you should reply on following lines:

General Giraud’s offer to come to Cairo very much appreciated by Combined Chiefs of Staff, who feel, however, that it is unnecessary to ask the General to undertake the journey, since discussions on global strategy are of the broadest possible nature and the details of operations in France are not under consideration. Please inform him that the Combined Chiefs of Staff believe that your presentation here included an accurate and sympathetic explanation of his views.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have the interest of France and of the French Armed Forces much at heart.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 4, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret

Conclusions of CCS 133rd Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 133rd Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400/1 and 400/2)

Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time to study the United States Chiefs of Staff paper thoroughly but felt from a brief consideration of it that the points put forth by the British Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum on this subject had not been fully appreciated. He would like to discuss the matter quite frankly. He would like to make three points. Firstly, he fully conceded the right of the United States Chiefs of Staff to organize their own air forces as they saw fit. Secondly, in spite of this he would like to go on record as advising most strongly against the arrangements proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff since, in his view, they would not attain the objects desired, were quite unnecessary, and would prove inefficient. Finally, he would like to make it quite clear that, if in spite of his advice, the United States Chiefs of Staff made the reorganization they proposed, he, for his part, would do his utmost to ensure that it worked as smoothly as possible.

From paragraph 2 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper, it was clear that the U.S. had sufficient personnel and equipment for each AAF group station to be organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods. He had not appreciated this point.

The points which the U.S. reorganization was aimed to achieve were better coordination of the air operations based on Italy and the United Kingdom, the ability to take advantage of varying weather in the two theaters, and the ability of one man to decide on the movements of groups of aircraft from one theater to another.

He would like to point out that after two or three years of experience in the operation of bombers, he considered that it was impossible to coordinate bomber operations from two theaters or work rigidly to a given program. The technical difficulties of getting some 2,000 aircraft in the air at a time required days of planning done by a committee which brought together all the best available knowledge. The final decision to launch the operation had to be taken within four or five hours of its taking place. No amount of unity of command or drive could overcome the inherent difficulties in the operation of large bomber forces.

In his view the insertion of an overall air commander for Europe would merely insert another link in the chain of command.

With regard to the moving of groups, a quick decision was not always the right decision, and the views not only of the bomber commander but also of the theater commanders concerned must be considered. To give the power to move groups to one man who could take his decisions without consultation with others concerned might result in faulty decisions being taken and even in the movements of groups having to be countermanded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The new proposals would, he believed, tend to break up the close integration which had been achieved between the Royal Air Force and the Eighth Bomber Command. The Air Ministry had a large staff fully integrated with all the RAF commands in England, and here the operations of the various U.S. and British commands were coordinated. This was done under his own direction and he exercised his functions under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. To insert another commander over the U.S. Air Forces would rupture the present relations between the 8th Air Force and the Air Ministry.

The U.S. proposals would also result in the elimination of the present system of dual responsibility of the Chief of the Air Staff to the British Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It must be remembered that the United Kingdom was in the front line and the operations of the bomber forces from the U.K. were of vital moment to the life and industry of England. When the use of “Window” had been advocated, it had had to be debated in consultation with the British Government over a long period. If a supreme commander were appointed, he might take action of this nature on his own initiative since he would have no responsibility to the British Government.

From the Naval point of view the Commander of the Strategic Air Force would be divorced from that close contact now existing between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty. If, for example, the German Fleet put to sea, the quickest possible action was required and aircraft of many different forces had to be brought to bear. For quick action in a case like this, coordination by the Chief of the Air Staff was, in his view, essential.

The question of additional staffs must also be considered. If the supreme commander for OVERLORD had only one air commander under him to deal with, then he, the supreme commander, did not require an air staff. If, however, there were two air commanders under him, the supreme commander must be provided with such a staff in order to integrate the two air commands. The Commander of the Strategic Air Force would also require a large staff which would be duplicating the staff already in existence in the Air Ministry. He (Sir Charles Portal) could not undertake any commitment to provide additional staffs.

With regard to the power of the Strategic Air Commander to move forces from one theater to another, he considered that no theater commander would advocate a system where he might, without consultation, be bereft of a large part of his air forces. His own proposal to deal with this matter was, briefly, that his (the Chief of the Air Staff’s) own operation headquarters should be used by the 15th Air Force as it was used at present by the 8th Air Force, under himself, acting for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He would then indicate or recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the targets for the 8th and 15th Air Forces and would move these forces as might be necessary after consultation with the theater commanders concerned.

He did not claim that he could vote against the U.S. proposal, but he did feel that he must most strongly advise against it. He would, however, if the United States Chiefs of Staff insisted on adhering to their proposal against his advice, move heaven and earth to make the new organization work.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, Sir Charles Portal said that he would certainly allow General Eisenhower to use the 15th Air Force in his theater as might be necessary since he conceded the principle that a theater commander had a right in an emergency to use such forces as were in his theater provided that he informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of his action.

With regard to coordination between the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, he felt that only one man must have authority over both or the interest of one must be subordinated to those of the other. For his part, he could not undertake to subordinate the operations of the RAF to those of the 8th Air Force.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, he said the present position with regard to operations of the 8th Air Force was as satisfactory as was possible without the full resources envisaged in the bomber plan. General Eaker had only some 75 percent of his full resources and was, as he had pointed out in his paper, therefore achieving only some 54 percent of the results expected. The program was, in fact, some three months behind. He realized the reasons which had caused this and would like to say that he felt that the 8th Air Force had done everything that was possible in the circumstances. General Eaker had done his utmost to keep the plan to schedule. In spite of his smaller resources, he had penetrated deep into Germany and had accepted the consequent losses. Air operations in Europe and in the Pacific could not be compared. In no other part of the world were our bomber forces up against some 1,600 German fighters over their own country.

General Arnold said that the proposals he had put forward were designed in part to overcome the lack of flexibility in the operations of the U.S. bomber forces in Europe. They had not changed their technique. He had sent a series of inspectors to the United Kingdom to try to probe into the reasons for this. In other theaters 60 or 70 percent of available aircraft were used in operations. In the U.K. only some 50 percent were used. Even on this basis some 1,900 sorties had been launched during the month of September. There were approximately 1,300 bombers supplied to the U.K. This gave 800 with the units and a 50 percent reserve. In addition, two crews were provided. In spite of this, only once in the last month had 600 aircraft taken part in operations on one day.

He could see no reason why at least 70 percent of the planes available should not be regularly employed. The failure to destroy targets was due directly to the failure to employ planes in sufficient numbers. A sufficient weight of bombs was not being dropped on the targets to destroy them, nor was the proper priority of targets being followed.

With regard to the transfer of groups in the U.K., aircraft were flying on an average some five sorties per month whereas in North Africa six sorties per month were being achieved. The question of flexibility between the two theaters was, therefore, of the utmost importance. Transfers of groups must be made as proved necessary and a decision to make the transfer must be taken in 24 to 48 hours. The appointment of a Strategic Air Commander would not break up the close integration between the 8th Air Force and the Royal Air Force. Interchange of ideas must and would continue. The commander to be appointed would be responsible mainly for operations. Administration and supply would be handled by the theater commanders. Training, technique, and operational efficiency must all be improved. Only a new commander divorced from day-to-day routine could achieve this.

At present, the necessary drive and ideas were coming from Washington. He believed that more aircraft were being sent to the U.K. than were being effectively used and that unless better results could be achieved no more planes should be sent.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out the difficulties inherent in the operation of huge numbers of aircraft. The joint U.S. and British staffs had yet to learn fully their lessons on this point. If a commander were appointed who insisted on keeping the bomber force rigidly to the program, it would undoubtedly be found that, in fact, less sorties would be flown, and he, for one, could never permit his own fighters to escort bombers on a mission which he did not believe to be sound. It was not always right nor was it possible to keep rigidly to a plan laid down in advance.

General Marshall said that it had always proved the case that a combat commander was loath to release any forces in his possession lest they should not return to him. As far as the air forces were concerned, there was required a commander for the strategic air both in Italy and in Europe who, by reason of his position, was not affected by this very human weakness. He realized that the U.K. was in the front line and that this entailed certain complications. He believed that the technique of precision daylight bombing was not being completely carried out in Europe. The U.S. daylight bombers were being operated from bases all over the world and in some of these places were achieving twice the results obtained in the U.K. Flexibility of thought and imagination were required. A huge force could not be allowed to collect in the U.K. unless it was employed to the maximum possible extent. Whether the 8th and 15th Air Forces were integrated or not, he still believed that a commander in England was required who could give full consideration to the many problems involved and impart the necessary drive. He suggested that action be deferred in order to afford additional time to consider the views put forward by Sir Charles Portal and General Arnold.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 400/1 and 400/2.

Mediterranean Command arrangements (CCS 387/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration on [of?] CCS 387/1 pending receipt of a memorandum on the same subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

Overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417)

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that CCS 417 would serve as a basis for further work but that it required recasting in certain respects. Paragraph 2c would, for instance, require revision in the light of the statements made by Marshal Stalin at EUREKA. He (General Brooke) was in agreement with the general concept set out in paragraph 4 that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific. He was frankly disturbed with regard to present ideas on operations in Southeast Asia. The Supreme Allied Commander had recently put forward his views which he had stressed while present at SEXTANT, that once the operations in North Burma were undertaken, either they would have to be continued to complete the capture of the whole of Burma or, alternatively, our forces would have to withdraw when the monsoon stopped. The Supreme Allied Commander had also put forward his requirements in order to continue the campaign at the end of the monsoon. He feared that Burma might become a huge vacuum and if this were the case, it would not fit in with the strategic concept set out in the plan under consideration, i.e., that the main effort should be made in the Pacific.

Admiral Leahy said that he had always regarded operations in Burma as a diversionary effort.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff could not agree to an initial campaign in Burma without considering the implications of a large further effort or a retirement. It was now considered that the major effort must be made in the Pacific and large operations to recapture North Burma would not be in accordance with this concept.

Admiral Leahy said that as he understood the position, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had not yet considered the provision of the additional requirements necessary to continue the campaign.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the paper should be returned to the Combined Staff Planners for further study in the light of a further assumption with regard to the necessity of continuing the reconquest of Burma if once the campaign were launched.

Admiral King agreed with this suggestion.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that it would obviously help the Combined Staff Planners in their further study if it could be agreed to accept paragraph 4 of the report. There were many logistic implications which would have to be taken into consideration.

Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that paragraph 6b, of Annex III, was politically unacceptable since British heavy bombers must, to a large extent, be employed to fight the enemy rather than being used as transport aircraft.

General Arnold said that he quite appreciated this point.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:

a. That the following additional subparagraph 2d should be inserted in the enclosure to CCS 417:

The possibility that a full campaign in Burma may have to be carried out following on the TARZAN operation.

b. That the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to reexamine and amend CCS 417 in the light of the above, before resubmission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Operation RANKIN (CCS 320/4)

Admiral Leahy said that he understood that the proposal in CCS 320/4 had been mentioned by the President to the Prime Minister. He considered that it would have to be examined by the political agencies concerned in both countries.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the proposals would entail a crossing of the lines of communication. This did not appear acceptable from the military point of view.

General Marshall said the logistic implications had been briefly examined and found to be difficult but possible. They were most serious when the forces were most deeply committed, i.e., in RANKIN Case “A” and least serious in RANKIN Case “C.” It had been felt necessary to put forward this paper since at present COSSAC was planning on a different basis and an early decision was required in order to be prepared when the need arose.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that paragraph 3 should be amended to read, “That COSSAC be at once directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.” This amendment was accepted.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to accept CCS 320/4 as modified (subsequently circulated as CCS 320/4 (Revised)).

Review of conditions in Europe

Sir Alan Brooke said that Sir John Dill had suggested, and he himself fully agreed, that since some six weeks were required to prepare for Operation RANKIN, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should either fix a date for planning for this operation or review at monthly intervals the state of Europe in order that they could decide the date on which the operation might have to be mounted. Plans were kept up to date by COSSAC but six weeks were required to take up the necessary shipping.

After a brief discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to instruct the Combined Intelligence Committee to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Occupation of Europe

The Combined Chiefs of Staff briefly discussed the occupation and administration of Europe after the defeat of Germany.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that each occupying power would be responsible for an area and that broad directives would be given by a centralized body. Occupation forces should be kept to a minimum and the maximum use made of the threat of air power and action by armored and mobile forces.

Sir Charles Portal said that the administration must, wherever possible, be undertaken by the Germans with the necessary degree of military control by ourselves. A European Advisory Commission had already been set up in London.

General Marshall said that there might be difficulties due to the different methods adopted, for example, by ourselves and the Russians in administering adjacent territories.

Results of the plenary session held at 1100, 3 [4] December 1943

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the conclusions of the plenary session held that morning.

General Ismay presented a brief note setting out the general sense of the meeting on the main points considered.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of BUCCANEER to Operations OVERLORD and ANVIL and the naval, shipping, and landing craft requirements for these operations.

Admiral King pointed out that since Operations OVERLORD and BUCCANEER had been planned for some time, the requirements for these were presumably available. The deficiency would lie in the resources necessary for Operation ANVIL. If necessary, he would do his utmost to provide the resources required for this operation, particularly in aircraft carriers.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively, should draw up a paper setting out a draft of matters of high policy regarding the European Theater and the Southeast Asia Command; these papers to be exchanged this evening and considered at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff tomorrow at 1100.

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Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 4 December 1943

Secret
CCS 320/4 (Revised)

Operation RANKIN

Reference: CCS 320 Series

In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, CCS 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.

The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:

a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to DĂŒsseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [Mainz]; thence due east to Bayreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).

b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.

The United States Chiefs of Staff further propose that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.


Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 4 December 1943

Secret
CCS 400/2

Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and in the Mediterranean

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the subject matter presented in the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff, CCS 400/1, and concluded that the advantages to be gained by a more effective exploitation of U.S. daylight precision bombing capabilities, through unification of the command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces, outweigh the disadvantages anticipated by the British Chiefs of Staff.

We do not consider that the occasional transfer of aircraft from one theater to another will occasion any significant wastage of manpower or facilities, as each AAF group station is organized to take care of the needs of two groups for brief periods.

Neither do we consider that there should be any slackening in the existing close coordination of operations between the U.S. Strategic Air Forces and the RAF, as the headquarters of the former will remain in the U.K. in unaltered contact with the intelligence and other services provided by the latter. In fact, this coordination should be broadened by drawing the 15th Strategic Air Force into a unified command.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, after giving careful consideration to the alternative arrangement suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, have concluded:

a. That control of all U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean area, including the control of movement of forces from one area to another, should be vested in a single command in order to exploit the flexibility of U.S. heavy bomber capabilities most effectively and that these forces should be employed primarily against POINTBLANK objectives or such other objectives as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may from time to time direct.

b. That such a command should likewise be charged with the coordination of these operations with those of the RAF Bomber Command.

c. That the responsibility for overall base services and administrative control of these Strategic Air Forces should remain with the appropriate commanders of U.S. Army Forces in the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean area.

d. That provision should be made to assure the assignment of resources, supplies, and other services between tactical and strategic operations so as to bring the required support to POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

e. That the headquarters of such U.S. Strategic Air Forces should be established in the United Kingdom because of the facilities available, the existing weight of the respective bomber forces, and the necessity for continuous integration of operations with the RAF.

f. That the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, should continue to have direct channels of approach to the U.S. Strategic Air Force Commander in order to provide direct technical control and insure that operational and training technique and uniformity of U.S. tactical doctrine are maintained.

A directive to implement the above, attached as Enclosure, is therefore being issued to the following:

  • Commanding General, USSAFE
  • Commanding General, ETOUSA
  • Commanding General, NATO
Enclosure

Draft directive by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

To: Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

  • The Commanding General, ETOUSA.
  • The Commanding General, NATO.

Effective 1 January 1944 there will be established an air command designated “The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe,” consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth U.S. Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the United Kingdom. An officer of the U.S. Army Air Forces will be designated Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

The U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander at a date to be announced later by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the interim the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF will continue to act as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, pending transfer of the USSAFE to the command of the SAC, and will be responsible under the Combined Chiefs of Staff for coordination of all POINTBLANK operations. Under his direction, the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe will be responsible for the determination of priorities of POINTBLANK targets to be attacked by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces and for the technique and tactics employed and is authorized to move the units of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces between theaters within the limits of base area facilities and available [sic] for his forces.

The Commanding General USSAFE will keep the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean Theater informed of his general intentions and requirements. As far as possible, consistent with the performance of his primary mission, the Commanding General USSAFE will coordinate his operations with those of the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.

The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the European and North African Theaters of operations will continue to be responsible for the administrative control of the U.S. Army air units in their respective area, including the provision of base services. The Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in the Mediterranean will provide the necessary logistical support to the Fifteenth Air Force in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority.

Should a strategical or tactical emergency arise requiring such action, theater commanders may, at their discretion utilize the strategic air forces, which are based within their respective theaters, for purposes other than their primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, USSAFE of the action taken.

The Commanding General, USSAFE, will employ six heavy bombardment groups and two long-range fighter groups of the Fifteenth Air Force to meet the requirements of the Commanding General, NATO, in operations against objectives other than those prescribed for POINTBLANK, until such time as the air base objective area, north and east of Rome, is secured, in accordance with the provisions of the directive issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 22 October (Fan 254).

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The Assistant Secretary of War to the President’s special assistant

Cairo, 4 December 1943

Memorandum for Mr. Harry Hopkins:
There is an increasing indication that the British are not now inclined to go along with the arrangement I made with Eden. They are placing the blame on the War Cabinet.

It is important that the arrangement we agreed to stick, but it will not be done unless we take a strong position. Until they come through as originally outlined, I propose not to send from Washington any military men to operate either on the European Commission or any transferred Combined Civil Affairs Committee in London. I believe that Winant’s appointment should go through, but as soon as I indicated that we would strengthen the London Committee with a good staff, they reverted to their former position, and that position is basically wrong. The plan we should adhere to is attached.

Sincerely,
JOHN J. McCLOY

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, December 4, 1943

Memorandum for the President From the Secretary of State:
Lisbon’s 2906 of December 2 reports that the following developed from a further conversation between Salazar and Kennan yesterday:

While maintaining neutrality Salazar is unwilling to grant our desires outright.

He is presently unwilling to extend the British further facilities for their or our use but is prepared to do so when he can be shown that the general military situation has changed in a manner to diminish the German menace to Portugal as compared with last August. He will go the limit to extend us immediate use of existing British facilities if an appearance can be maintained of adherence to the British agreement.

He demonstrated willingness to examine arrangements to allow us forthwith to proceed to constructing an airport on Santa Maria Island for Portugal, with a view to Anglo-American use when completed.

Lisbon’s 2911 of December 2 furnishes the following additional comment:

The Prime Minister agrees definitely to our full use of Terceira under a suitable formula reconciling such use with the British agreement, but he wishes to know what formula will be used. In his view a nominal marking of the planes as British would suffice.

When Kennan appraised him of our plans for sharing in antisubmarine patrol activity in Terceira, Salazar raised no objection and displayed no surprise but remarked that this must also be under a formula reconciling activities with the British agreement.

Dr. Salazar indicated that he would consider our proposal to construct in Santa Maria a new airport, and Kennan’s impression was that he would consider the proposal benevolently. He felt he could not grant us these facilities outright now. His thought evidently is that we should construct the airfield for Portugal and on completion, if it could be demonstrated that we and the British require such facilities beyond those already granted in the British agreement and that to grant them would not augment Portugal’s risk, the field would then be made available under the existing agreement and utilized by us as in the case of Lagens and Horta. As long as some formula covered Salazar’s position, it would be immaterial that the United States should make ninety-five percent use of the field. This is not a specific proposal, but is the trend of Salazar’s thought.

He mentioned an extraordinary display of curiosity by the German Minister respecting American use of the Azores, which led the Prime Minister to suspect that our use of the Islands might constitute a turning point in German policy vis-Ă -vis Portugal. He wishes to be able, as in the case of Terceira, officially to deny to the Germans that he has accorded us any special facilities in the Azores.

In wishing to make the new airfield available under section eight of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, the interpretation of article eight was his own and did not, according to the British Ambassador in Lisbon, result from any understanding with the British.

Since his last conversation with Kennan, Salazar has ascertained for himself that Flores is unsuitable for aviation, but he admits the advantages of Santa Maria. Should our views concerning Santa Maria undergo any early change, or should we have any specific additional desires along these lines, he wished us to inform him immediately.

As Ponta Delgada remains, according to the Prime Minister, the only insular port the Portuguese Navy can now call its own and is also the seat of Portuguese administration, he wishes to avoid granting facilities at this time in San [SĂŁo] Miguel Island. Kennan said we needed a port with nearby airfield for the use of carrier-based planes and suggested an informal arrangement for utilizing Ribo [Rabo] de Peixe field. The Prime Minister seemed dubious, and pointed out that under the British agreement that field was to be reserved for the Portuguese fighter forces in the Islands. He thought the British and our naval authorities had underestimated the potentialities of Horta, and felt we could have all facilities we require for such aircraft in Horta. We might station an American tanker and repair ship in Horta, for example, if we wished.

The Prime Minister did not wish to relate these questions to any hypothesis [as] to eventual Portuguese cobelligerency against Japan. He instinctively thought there was agreement concerning Timor between Germany and Japan and feared the Timor question might complicate his relations with Germany. In this regard he is extremely anxious to have an answer to his overtures for Portuguese participation in liberating Timor. Our Legation in Lisbon thinks it could be useful for us to be helpful in this regard.

The Legation recommends that our military authorities reach agreement with the British as to the formula to be used to cover our activities at Lagens, and that the Legation should communicate this to Dr. Salazar.

The Legation also recommends that we immediately draft a preliminary proposal for the airport construction on Santa Maria, and that this be communicated to the Legation. The proposal should be in broad, concise terms, leaving details for subsequent agreement. It should embody provision for immediate survey by our technicians and should establish most-favored-nation treatment for us respecting later use by commercial aviation. The Legation suggests that this matter be taken care of in a preliminary exchange of notes to permit us to go ahead with technical planning and survey.

With regard to Salazar’s anxiety respecting Germany, the Legation points out that the agreement with the British specifically signifies a desire that Portugal remain neutral, and that if this is our attitude the extent to which Salazar has gone represents real progress of which we should take advantage. The Legation desires to know precisely the extent to which our military and naval authorities desire to make use of the opportunity.

My heartiest congratulations and felicitations on magnificent achievements of yourself, Prime Minister and your other associates.

CH

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First tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, 5 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Turkey
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill President InönĂŒ
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Anderiman
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Helm
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes

December 4, 1943, 5 p.m.
Secret

President Roosevelt welcomed the opportunity of discussion with the Turkish President. It was important that as many Nations as possible should join the United Nations, now numbering about 35, and Turkey’s accession to the United Nations would be welcomed. They were concerned not only with winning the war but also with the period after the war, and for both, unity of Nations was necessary to achieve the purpose of them all. At Tehran important decisions had been reached.

(1) As regards the war itself. Agreement had been come to for operations in 1944 for Russian, British and American Forces in such a way that an Anglo-American Second Front would be opened on a very large scale. This would be timed with an increase of Russian pressure, so that attacks would be developed against Germany from all sides.

(2) As regards post-war problems. It must be seen to that Germany and Japan did not start another war in 20 years’ time.

Mr. Churchill pointed out that he had assured the Turkish President and Government that the British Government would not invoke the alliance or ask them to join the war unless and until such action could be taken without unfair risk for Turkey, for whom he had great regard. He now thought the moment had come when Turkey should very seriously consider associating herself with the great Allies. The dangers which had been present at the time of the Adana Conference had now very largely passed away. The advantages to Turkey from joining in the war would be permanent and lasting, more particularly from the point of view of Turkish relations with Russia. These were causing Turkey anxiety, but if Turkey accepted the invitation being put to her, Turco-Russian relations would be put on the best possible footing. Turkey would sit on the Bench with Russia, America and the United Kingdom and the other United Nations. Turkey’s great friend and Ally felt it would be a pity if she now missed her chance. In a few months, perhaps six, German resistance might be broken, and Turkey, if she did not accept the invitation now, might then find herself alone, not on the Bench, but wandering about in Court. It would be dangerous if Turkey now missed the chance of joining the English-speaking peoples numbering, excluding coloured races, some two hundred million souls. There were risks either way. But if Turkey associated herself with the United Nations she would also be associated with Russia, one of the strongest military Powers in the world, if not the strongest, at any rate in Europe and Asia. President Roosevelt and he had been authorized by Marshal Stalin to assure President Inonu that, if Turkey entered the war against Germany or if Germany attacked Turkey, and Bulgaria took action, Russia would at once declare war on Bulgaria.

President Roosevelt remarked that Marshal Stalin had been very clear about that. The moment Bulgaria acted, Russia would declare war.

Mr. Churchill also asked President Inonu to note that at Tehran the Soviet Union had signed, with Great Britain and the United States, a new undertaking to respect Persia.

Mr. Churchill said that these were important declarations. If in the circumstances Turkey should feel inclined, at the request of her ally, Great Britain, who was now invoking the Alliance, and of the two greatest Powers in the world, America and the Soviet Union, to throw in her lot with them in the near future, we could then go ahead and consider how best to help Turkey with her preparations, more particularly against the possibility of German and Bulgarian aerial attack. The publicity side was also most important, as the greatest possible time should be gained for preparation before everything became known. Finally it would be necessary to discuss the nature of the campaign to be waged by Turkey, i.e., whether it should take an offensive or defensive form.

Mr. Churchill said that the entry of Turkey into the Grand Alliance of 35 nations would bring about great international changes. Romania was now begging for peace. Hungary wished to get out of the war. Bulgaria was greatly divided. Mr. Churchill’s own opinion (and he had been associated with European politics for about 35 years) was that the entry of Turkey into the war, arranged in the right way and at the right time, would bring about a series of landslides in these countries. It would be most fruitful and welcome.

After a brief interval President Inonu said that he attached the greatest importance to this meeting. When he learnt that President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill wished to study and discuss the situation with him in full sympathy and friendship, the possibility of the discussion was envisaged by his country and by the Turkish Assembly with the greatest confidence. He expressed thanks for the invitation and for the offer of study.

The Turkish President said that since the beginning his country had taken a clear decision – to stand beside those who were fighting the cause of the United Nations. She had been one of the first so to state her position clearly. The war had shown great fluctuations and difficulties, but throughout Turkey had remained firmly anchored to her Alliance with Great Britain, and to the ideas which she postulated for the future of humanity. In this decision Turkey had not been moved by any egotistical or personal interest.

In connection with the object in view, it was equitable to think of the method which those who had provoked this war had used to convince their peoples – vengeance, etc. Turkey had been one of the greatest victims of the last war. From the first moment, however, she had decided firmly and seriously to collaborate with those who were fighting for the fraternity of peoples, and she had remained faithful throughout the years. These had not been without risks for Turkey. She had been alone and isolated. Great Britain had gone through a hard time and had fought gallantly. In her own way Turkey had done her best and she had sacrificed none of her principles.

President Inonu said that he did not want to go over all the ground, but President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill would remember that the Turkish attitude had been appreciated, and the Turks were very pleased at the repeated assurances of this appreciation. At the moment when Germany was about to declare war on Greece, she gave as one of the reasons for doing so that the Greeks had sent an officer to Ankara for consultation. (Mr. Churchill pointed out that it had only been a pretext.) President Inonu said that this was typical, and no doubt had Germany thought it worthwhile to make Turkey pay for her policy, she would have done so.

Now, however, President Inonu continued, the situation had totally changed. Mr. Churchill had outlined the advantages which would accrue to Turkey if she joined in the war. President Inonu must, however, first point out that so long as Turkey was not in the war she was not in danger. He could not accept the thesis that there would be danger for Turkey in staying out. Turkey’s attitude was not a matter for discussion. Turkey knew her engagement and she had replied to the invitation. She wished to collaborate with her Allies. She remained faithful to the principles which she had embraced from the first moment.

The points which President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill had disclosed were of great importance. The Soviet engagement about Persia and collaboration in connection with Bulgaria were of appreciable value. The Turkish reply of November 17 had reaffirmed Turkey’s desire to collaborate. Naturally Turkey had to state conditions, political and otherwise. But practical considerations, i.e., military needs etc., came before all others. Turkey was alone. If Germany declared war on her, the situation would be dangerous. Turkey was not prepared. From the beginning of the war there had been talk of preparation, and help had come along, sometimes quickly and sometimes more slowly. To a certain extent this was fair. The Turks had asked for aeroplanes and tanks, but these had often been refused. The President had agreed to these not being supplied when he was assured that they were needed for active operations. In face of this assurance he had had nothing to say. If, however, the reason was not active military requirements elsewhere, but because, for one consideration or another, it was not desired to supply them, the position was entirely different.

A general discussion ensued at this point as to what the Turkish President meant by consideration. He said that in spite of events Turkish cordiality had remained steadfast. When the Germans were at Stalingrad and El Alamein, i.e., at the most dangerous moment of all, the Turks had renewed their assurances. On one occasion a British statement had linked together Turkey and Spain as neutrals and the Turks had at once taken exception to this. The Turks had not changed, and they did not tolerate suspicion. Actually, and although Turkey was feeble, she had done well behind her curtain, and the Turks were happy about what they had done. To the British Ambassador, at the dangerous moment, he had repeated his advice “be strong in Egypt.” All this background conscientiously pushed him to a decision. But he was not ready. Supposing Germany collapsed tonight or tomorrow, everybody would be happy, he alone would be anxious, because Turkey had not come in.

Mr. Churchill said that he had always realised that Turkey’s preoccupation was Russia. But Turkey’s only sure course was with the Allies. As he had said at Adana, if Turkey were to come with the Allies at the chosen moment, it would be in the interest not only of Turkey but of the whole world.

President Roosevelt said there was no implication of a threat. The advantages to Turkey had been explained. The United States was 3,000 miles away, but would always remain Turkey’s friend. The United Kingdom would also be the friend of her old Ally. The big question for Turkey was Russia, and if he (President Roosevelt) were President of Turkey, he would consider very seriously the advantages offered by the opportunity of making friends with Russia – Mr. Churchill interjected “to bind themselves with Russia.”

President Inonu said he dealt with the past in order to arrive at one point. He had wanted to explain Turkey’s entirely loyal attitude. The war might finish with or without Turkey’s collaboration. In neither event would egotistical factors dominate. He had, of course, to pay attention to the interests of his country, but Turkey remained faithful to her original decision of association with the common cause. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had responded to the invitation of a month ago, and the Turkish Government had replied. Turkey wished to be with the Allies. But there was the practical side, and the practical difficulties must be resolved. Turkey was not prepared. If the Allies were prepared to meet the minimum essential requirements of Turkey, and if after these had been met Turkey could be useful to the Allies, “we will come with you.”

But the Germans would understand. They knew that there was effective collaboration, and that Turkey was doing many things which were incompatible with neutrality. It was for this reason and in order to gain time for preparation that the Germans had been told that the Allies had asked Turkey to come into the war, but that she had refused. It was possible that Germany did not believe this statement. In any case, she would watch every development most carefully. So far Germany had raised no strong objection to Turkey’s actions. There had been no serious protests against her unneutral actions. Turkey was not in the war and perhaps Germany still thought that she would not come into it. But if the day came when Germany was persuaded that Turkey was coming into the war, the Germans would react to the utmost of their ability.

Mr. Churchill agreed, but said that Germany could not do nearly as much as she could have done previously.

President Inonu said that the Turks had considered all these things. It was true that Germany could not execute a campaign from Istanbul to Syria. She could, however, by air action do vast destruction and could seize Istanbul. She had the material readily available to the westward of Turkey, where it had been concentrated for two reasons, as a menace to Turkey and to prevent the Allies getting at her.

President Inonu said, however, that for him there was one practical point, i.e., the capacity to defend herself with the minimum indispensable requirements. It was essential that in the period of preparation the Germans should not be provoked. If the Allies have no confidence in Turkey they would not discuss future developments until the period of preparation was over. If they had confidence, they could discuss plans now.

President Roosevelt remarked that this was reasonable.

President Inonu said that so far preparations and supplies had not been encouraging. If a new decision were taken it would depend on the Allies how long it would be before Turkey was ready. He could not say. But essential things must be provided. Turkey had mobilised everything she had, even material dating from the Middle Ages.

President Roosevelt enquired the position as regards anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and was told that so far about 800 of the latter had been provided.

Mr. Churchill said that this was more than the United Kingdom had at the outbreak of war.

President Inonu said that no doubt Turkey’s Allies sometimes asked themselves why they should go on sending supplies to Turkey if she was never going to come into the war. The Turks for their part complained that although they were not given supplies, they were still asked to come into the war. It was a vicious circle. But Turkey could be got in for the last stage of the war if there were collaboration. He would be glad if the war were over in two months without Turkey acquiring any glory. He thought, however, that the war would last another year, and there was therefore plenty of time for Turkey to help.

Mr. Churchill said it was most important that Turkey should decide to enter the war when her influence would be greatest, and so take her place among the victorious nations. It was essential to shorten as much as possible the conflict, which was costing so much in blood and treasure.

President Inonu said he could contemplate two things, (1) a plan of preparation involving supplies to Turkey and (2) a plan of collaboration. It was naturally essential that effective collaboration should be studied by the military experts, and he hoped it would be studied on a big basis. What would suit Turkey best would be that she should fight side by side with British and American contingents in her own part of the world. The President and Mr. Churchill could however say that they had made their plans embracing the whole field of world operations, and that Turkey’s role was so and so. That he would understand. What he would not accept was a background of suspicion of Turkey’s intentions, and a demand to come into the war blindly, with a statement that when Turkey had entered the war she would be told what her part was to be.

President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill vigorously disclaimed any such intention. Discussions could start now on the two stages indicated, and President Roosevelt said that there was no question of Turkey being asked to come in and wait for a month or six weeks without any air protection. They contemplated building up that protection at once. When that had been done by a certain date, Turkey could come in without the risk of having Istanbul bombed to the ground. If President Inonu could accept this in principle, the military authorities could take up the question and get ready.

Mr. Churchill pointed out that this work was already in hand, and he hoped that in a few weeks the preparations would be complete so that the air bases could then be used for attacks on the German held islands. A programme could be arranged.

President Roosevelt suggested that nothing should be done to induce German attacks.

Mr. Churchill said that there was always a danger of this. The Turks had been asked to allow 7000 personnel to be infiltrated, and that involved some risk.

President Roosevelt suggested that the personnel might enter Turkey in plain clothes.

Mr. Churchill said that it would be impossible to avoid dangerous moments. It might be that two-thirds of the preparatory work would be completed when the Germans would become convinced that Turkey was irrevocably committed and would act. This danger could not be eliminated. It should, however, be reduced to a minimum by precautions, camouflage etc.

President Inonu said that the period of preparation would be a delicate one in spite of all precautions. These precautions must, however, be taken and preparations made sincerely and seriously. He did not think that four or five or six weeks would be enough for the preparations, but if in that time the anti-aircraft preparations were got ready, that would be something.

Mr. Churchill said that in six or seven weeks the anti-aircraft defences could be in a good state. Moreover, in that time the strategic situation might have changed appreciably. There might, for instance, be a considerable change in the strategic situation as a result of the Russian advance towards Romania.

Mr. Churchill then said that he contemplated a programme somewhat on the following lines:

  1. A declaration after the present Conference that Turkish policy had not changed.

  2. A period of approximately six weeks during which material, especially for anti-aircraft defence, would be pushed into Turkey.

  3. Immediately thereafter, the placing of British and American combat squadrons on the prepared air fields.

  4. German protests and Turkey’s diplomatic reply, but steady continuation of reinforcement and preparation.

  5. Reactions in the satellite countries – Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. These reactions would be very important, as they would dominate the attitude of Germany. Throughout this period Turkey would continue to send supplies including chrome (but only a little) to Germany. The Germans would be afraid to push things too far. They would be afraid of the Turkish advance towards belligerency having the effect on Bulgaria of making her change sides.

President Roosevelt confirmed that in this phase American heavy bombers, which had already made two raids on Sofia, would be attacking Bulgaria on a scale much greater than they had done hitherto.

Mr. Churchill added that at the right moment in this stage the Bulgarian Government would learn that a Bulgarian declaration of war on Turkey would automatically mean a Russian declaration of war on Bulgaria.

President Roosevelt again stressed the importance of this Russian assurance, and remarked that he had been surprised when Marshal Stalin had volunteered it.

At this stage (7 p.m.) the meeting was adjourned.

President Roosevelt suggested that President Inonu would no doubt wish to consider what had been said and the conversations would be continued later.

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Quadripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Present
United States Turkey
President Roosevelt President InönĂŒ
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Admiral Leahy Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Steinhardt Mr. Anderiman
Major Boettiger Mr. Sarper
United Kingdom Soviet Union
Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Vinogradov
Foreign Secretary Eden Mr. Mikhailov
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen

According to Leahy:

President Roosevelt on December 4 gave a dinner in honor of the Turkish President. It was an interesting affair, all the conversation being in French, which the President spoke without hesitation.

After the dinner, the Prime Minister joined the party and promptly laid siege to President Inonu to induce him to cast the fate of his country with the Allies. Churchill did most of the talking. Inonu just listened. Later, the President told his British colleague that if he, Roosevelt, were a Turk, he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning neutrality and leading his nation into war.

McCloy-Jebb meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. McCloy Mr. Jebb
Major General Kirby

The principal topics of discussion were apparently the proposed liaison procedure between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, British attitudes toward the adoption of this procedure, and the desirability of McCloy’s going to London to advocate there its adoption.

The Pittsburgh Press (December 4, 1943)

Iran parley finished by ‘Big Three’

Ultimatum and plans for invasion believed approved
By Edward W. Beattie, United Press staff writer

Russians surprised by news of parley

Moscow, USSR (UP) –
The Russian people got one of their greatest surprises of the war today when they learned that Premier Joseph Stalin had gone to Tehran to confer with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

Although such a conference had been a matter of common gossip at every gathering of foreign diplomats and correspondents for two weeks, the Russians had no inkling of it.

The first public report of the conference was a broadcast of an official TASS News Agency dispatch, which all Moscow newspapers published on their front pages today.

London, England –
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin were revealed today to have concluded a conference in Tehran, Iran, at which they probably put the final stamp of approval on plans for an invasion of Western Europe and the complete defeat of Germany sometime next year.

A communiquĂ© was expected momentarily that will call upon Axis Europe to “yield or die” and proclaim Germany’s post-war fate in broad terms that become increasingly stringent for every additional month she resists.

The communiquĂ© will probably touch off an explosive crisis in the Balkans, perhaps leading to the early collapse of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and hasten Germany’s doom.

Broadcast by TASS

The first authentic details of the “Big Three” conference, about which the whole world has been speculating for nearly a month, were disclosed by the official Russian news agency TASS early today in a transmission over the Moscow radio for Russian provincial newspapers. The TASS dispatch was later repeated in the Moscow home broadcasts.

The dispatch said:

A few days ago, a conference of the three leaders of the Allied powers – President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin – occurred in Tehran.

Diplomatic and military representatives participated in the conference, at which problems of the warfare against Germany were discussed, as well as a series of political questions.

Decisions were taken which will be published.

Though TASS did not indicate the duration of the conference, the Berlin radio guessed that it began Nov. 28 – two days after the conclusion of the Roosevelt-Churchill-Chiang Kai-shek “crush Japan” meeting in Cairo – and ended yesterday.

London sources believed military discussions were confined largely to formal approval of Anglo-American plans for an invasion of Western Europe at the earliest possible moment in conjunction with an intensified Red Army drive from the east and possibly a thrust into the Balkans.

Says Montgomery present

There have been repeated rumors that the Allies were on the point of invading the Balkans from Italy, Africa or a Cyprus with a possibility that Turkey may be drawn into the war under her mutual-assistance alliance with Britain to provide additional bases for the assault.

Nazi broadcasts have suggested that Gen. Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, commander of Britain’s 8th Army, now in southern Italy attended the conference.

However, most observers were convinced that political discussions dominated the Tehran Conference.

Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have previously been reported extending peace feelers to the Allies and informed sources believed they stand ready to withdraw from the war at the first opportunity.

These quarters doubted that similar quick results can be expected in Germany, however, even though the three heads of state might explain that early capitulation would ease though never avert their punishment.

Presumably, Messrs. Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin will propose the quarantining of Germany in post-war Europe and the shackling of her manpower and industries to prevent any preparation for another world war.

The situation inside Germany was obscured by a flood of propaganda which on one side emphasized the Reich’s desperate situation and on the other side asserted that the country will never yield.

While the German people under Nazi rule may be in no position to assert themselves, the army, with the support of old-line conservatives who have already recognized the certainty of defeat, might during the next three months build up a coup.

First trip in 30 years

Premier Stalin’s trip to Tehran marked the first time in more than 30 years that he has gone outside of Russia’s borders. It was his first meeting with Mr. Roosevelt, though Mr. Churchill previously journeyed to Moscow to confer with the Soviet Premier.

Disclosure by TASS that the conference had been held was taken as an indication here that Premier Stalin had returned to Moscow and that Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill had left Tehran.

The Berlin radio, in its overseas service, predicted that the conference would result in a demand for Germany’s surrender and promptly rejected it.

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Mowrer: Press ‘in dark’ on conference of ‘Big Three’

‘Mishandling’ of coverage of Cairo parley held bad omen
By Richard Mowrer

Cairo, Egypt – (Dec. 2, delayed)
Maybe the Big Three conference was a success. Maybe it was a flop.

At any rate, the 77 correspondents who “covered” the conference wouldn’t know. Maybe it’s important that they shouldn’t know.

In any case, if the mishandling of the press coverage of this conference is setting a precedent, then the prospect for honest reporting of the peace conference, among others, is decidedly gloomy.

‘Open secrets’

Although the fact that the conference was to be held and then the fact that it was being held were open secrets, elaborate arrangements were made “for security reasons” to keep reporters away from the conference area. That was all right with the reporters who appreciate security requirements. It was arranged that the liaison between the conference and reporters would be handled by Office of War Information representatives.

That was fine for color material: Mme. Chiang wore jade-colored sunglasses; Prime Minister Churchill wore a blue polka dot tie; other principals did this and that, went hither and yon.

No direct contact

As the days passed and the conference concluded, it became evident that the correspondents would have no direct contact with any of the principals at the conference.

Despite repeated requests and pleadings, reporter saw no one officially, although Hadil Ali, chief guide of the Pyramids, was fortunate enough to get half an hour with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, and this correspondent knows a man who has a secretary who has a manicurist friend who, on the second day of the conference, tended the nails of Mme. Chiang.

The conference press mess plunked to new depths when the story, having broken everywhere, on Nov. 30, except in Cairo, correspondents here were held to a much later release date and the ban continued to be enforced on sending anything at all having to do with the conference by wireless.

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U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)

President Roosevelt’s log of the trip

Saturday, December 4 (at Cairo)

7:30 a.m. Lt-General Somervell called on Mr. Hopkins at the President’s villa.
9:30 a.m. Mr. Louis [Lewis] W. Douglas called on Mr. Hopkins at the President’s villa.
11:00 a.m. Plenary meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Present: The President, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Eden, Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Dill, Lt-General Ismay and Captain Royal.
12:30 p.m. President Ismet Inonu of Turkey arrived in Cairo by U.S. Army plane. He was accompanied from Adana by Major John Boettiger, USA.
5:00 p.m. President Inonu and the Turkish delegation, accompanied by Ambassador Steinhardt, met with the President, the Prime Minister and Mr. Hopkins at the President’s villa. The following gentlemen comprised the Turkish delegation: President General Ismet Inonu; Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu; Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Cevad Acikalin; Mr. Sureyya Anderiman, the President’s Personal and Confidential Secretary; Mr. Selim Sarper, Director General of the Press; Undersecretary’s Chief of Cabinet Turgot [Torgut] Menemencioglu; Foreign Minister’s Chief of Cabinet Sadi Kavur; First Aide-de-Camp to the President Major Celal Uner; Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, British Ambassador to Turkey; Hon. Sergei Vinogradov, Soviet Ambassador to Turkey; Hon. Laurence S. [A.] Steinhardt, United States Ambassador to Turkey.
8:30 p.m. The President was host at dinner at his villa. The dinner list included: The President, President Inonu, the Prime Minister, Sir [Mr.] Anthony Eden, Ambassador Vinogradov, Ambassador Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, Mr. Anderiman, Mr. Mihailov, Mr. Sarper, Mr. Hopkins, Major Boettiger, Mr. Numan Menemencioglu, Ambassador Steinhardt, Mr. Acikalin, Admiral Leahy and Sir Alexander Cadogan.

Völkischer Beobachter (December 5, 1943)

Von Kairo bis Teheran –
Das anglo-amerikanische VerrÀterspiel

b—r. Bern, 4. Dezember –
Durch eine Samstag vormittag in Moskau ausgegebene Mitteilung wurde nun offiziell bestĂ€tigt, daß in Teheran, der Hauptstadt Irans, eine Zusammenkunft zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill stattgefunden habe. Diplomatische und militĂ€rische Vertreter der drei beteiligten MĂ€chte hĂ€tten an der Konferenz teilgenommen. Fragen der KriegfĂŒhrung gegen Deutschland und auch eine Reihe politischer Fragen seien besprochen worden. Die Entscheidungen wĂŒrden spĂ€ter veröffentlicht werden.

Man ist also mit den abschließenden Formulierungen, die man sicherlich als Wochenendsensation herausgeben wollte, nicht rechtzeitig fertig geworden. Bei aller Gemeinsamkeit des Vernichtungswillens gegen Deutschland haben sich die realen InteressengegensĂ€tze wohl kaum als gering erwiesen. So hat man sich zunĂ€chst mit einem nichtssagenden Vorbericht begnĂŒgt, der der anglo-amerikanischen Presse noch keine festen Grundlagen fĂŒr ihre politischen Spekulationen gibt. Sie muß sich begnĂŒgen, darauf hinzuweisen, daß Stalin anlĂ€ĂŸlich dieser Konferenz zum erstenmal seit der russischen Revolution den Boden der Sowjetunion verlassen hat. Freilich hat er, wie hinzuzufĂŒgen ist, sich nur eine beschiedene Strecke weit außer Landes begeben und die beiden Anglo-Amerikaner haben ihn den weitaus grĂ¶ĂŸten Teil des Weges entgegenkommen mĂŒssen. Die Wahl des von den Sowjets besetzten Teiles von Iran fĂŒr die Konferenz ist selbstverstĂ€ndlich auf das SicherheitsbedĂŒrfnis Stalins zurĂŒckzufĂŒhren. Dieser hĂ€tte sich nie darauf eingelassen, sich an einen Ort zu begeben, wo er sich nicht durch seine eigene GPU.-Leibwache schĂŒtzen lassen könnte.

EnttÀuschung in London

tc. Stockholm, 4. Dezember –
Die Unzufriedenheit der englischen Öffentlichkeit mit den BeschlĂŒssen der Kairokonferenz ist im Zunehmen begriffen. Sofern ĂŒber die Konferenz in Teheran kein Ergebnis bekannt wird, das die Erwartungen der Öffentlichkeit in England mehr befriedigt, dĂŒrfte Churchill nach seiner RĂŒckkehr keineswegs mit der Begeisterung empfangen werden, die sich viele als Ergebnis des DreimĂ€chtetreffens versprochen hatten.

Wie Aftonbladet aus London berichtet, mehren sich die Stimmen, die in der Bekanntgabe der Kairoer BeschlĂŒsse, wenn nicht schon in diesen selbst, einen schweren taktischen Fehler erblicken. Nicht nur der Umstand, daß die Absicht der vollstĂ€ndigen Zerschlagung des japanischen Reiches den Widerstand der Japaner ebenso wie der Deutschen aufs Ă€ußerste verstĂ€rken muß, gibt zur Mißstimmung Anlaß. Nicht weniger schĂ€rf wird das Fehlen jeglicher positiven PlĂ€ne gerĂŒgt. NachdrĂŒcklich kommt die Kritik in einem Aufsatz der konservativen Wochenschrift Spectator zum Ausdruck, wo im Hinblick auf Europa die Politik der „Alliierten“ kritisiert wird, weil sie nur die deutsche These, daß die Vernichtung Deutschlands das Kriegsziel der „Alliierten“ sei, bestĂ€tige.

U.S. State Department (December 5, 1943)

The Assistant Secretary of War to the President’s special assistant

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Dear Harry: I had a good talk with Jebb and General Kirby last night. They said finally they were convinced that the arrangement we had was sound but each of them urged me to go to London and put the case to the people there on the ground. Though they were convinced, they felt they could not get anywhere with the War Cabinet by either cabling or putting the case themselves when they got home. This does not make much sense to me, particularly if Winant is on the ground and holds out for what we want, as he says he will.

I feel that this matter is something the President and the Prime Minister are not going to get to and should not get to, for that matter, as it can be settled satisfactorily on a lower level. I have some real work to do in Italy and am anxious to start back. If Winant, after getting back to London, feels that I should go up there he can cable me at Algiers and if Stimson agrees, I’ll go up – otherwise I will go on home.

If the Prime Minister should bring it up before the end of the Conference I think the thing to do is to say we are working the thing out, that all that we want is to set up the machinery whereby we have the chance to work out sound decisions on some of the most difficult problems imaginable. That, above all, it is shortsighted to attempt to move all such decisions to London. The arrangement we had will work and it is the only one which has the chance of working expeditiously.

I am leaving Colonel T. W. Hammond here until the end of the Conference. He is fully familiar with the whole subject and he will be at your service on call. His telephone number is Conference 83.

I leave early tomorrow (Monday) morning.

Sincerely,
JJ

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret

Approval of conclusions of CCS 134th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Draft agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 423 and 423/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them draft agreements prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively.

Admiral Leahy said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation TARZAN and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander must be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the operations in Southeast Asia.

Admiral Leahy said he did not think this was the case. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of TARZAN. In the latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China.

Sir Charles Portal said he did not believe this would be the case, since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops.

General Arnold said that if there were no land operations the Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our fighters.

Sir Charles Portal reminded General Arnold that the ferry route was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing.

General Arnold said he agreed that more could be done with better weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines and had a very large number of airfields available.

General Marshall said that he considered that it was not only a question of cutting the airline; there was also the Japanese ground effort to be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten with its consequent publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation TARZAN were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long-range penetration groups only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation TARZAN would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign.

Sir Charles Portal asked if it was considered that the amphibious operation was essential on purely military grounds.

General Marshall expressed the personal view that it would be of assistance but was not vital.

Sir Charles Portal then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task.

General Marshall pointed out that there was no insistence on Operation BUCCANEER. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor against Ramree were worthwhile.

Admiral King said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of BUCCANEER might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean.

Sir Andrew Cunningham denied this suggestion.

Admiral King, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of the Eastern Fleet would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. He (Admiral King) was much concerned over the success of TARZAN. He had always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the means available, far better, for instance, than CULVERIN. On purely military grounds he considered that Operation BUCCANEER was as much a part of TARZAN as ANVIL was of OVERLORD.

Sir Alan Brooke said he felt that the military implications had been overstated. If Operation BUCCANEER were not undertaken, the Chinese forces might withdraw from TARZAN, but they were, even at present, an unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific front. He did not regard Operation BUCCANEER as a justifiable diversion from our main object.

General Arnold said that the 14th Air Force was operating “on a shoestring.” They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the ground.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the need to supply them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to the use of the 14th Air Force.

Admiral King felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base.

General Arnold said that as he saw it, there were three threats: firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air action.

Sir Charles Portal asked if it was agreed that if BUCCANEER was abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, it would be of the greatest assistance to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Admiral King said that on this basis it might be suggested that resources should be given up from the Pacific to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Sir Charles Portal said that this consideration too, ought not to be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment of BUCCANEER must increase the chances of success of OVERLORD and ANVIL and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances with either of these two operations. The abandonment of BUCCANEER would give far greater military advantages to the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement (subsequently circulated as CCS 423/2).

Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive proposed by them in CCS 400/2.

b. Agreed to defer action on these papers.

Directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean (CCS 387/1 and 387/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of CCS 387/2. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted CCS 387/2 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 387/3).

Amphibious operation against the South of France (CCS 424)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that afternoon.

Directive for intensification of support of Partisan forces in Yugoslavia (CCS 425)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the draft directive to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa with regard to Balkan support, and

b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being issued.

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AF, North Africa

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 387/3

We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases in the area.

We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You should assume, therefore, that all present arrangements continue with the exceptions outlined below but you should report as necessary whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience.

To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Crete and Aegean Islands and Turkey. The British and American forces allocated to you from Middle East will be determined by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your Command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have agreed. The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for operations in these areas.

You will provide U.S. Strategic Air Forces under separate command, but operating in your area, with the necessary logistical and administrative support in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, you may, at your discretion, utilize the 15th U.S. Strategic Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, if and when that command is organized.

You will, in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups in occupied territories.

The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will remain directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in Middle East Command situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, and for the operation and security of the Middle East base with such forces as the British Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time.

You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any necessary political advice from C-in-C Middle East through the channels he at present uses.

The system of Command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix “A”). You will note that the Mediterranean Air Command will now be known as Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Appendix “B”

Balkan support

It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Patriots in the Balkans, which now falls within the area in which you are responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their effectiveness.

You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support as you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation.

You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Patriots with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be necessary with available British or American equipment.

We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff.

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Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt (in the chair) Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Hollis

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret

The President read out to the Conference a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which signatures could be affixed.

The Prime Minister suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for example, in January?

General Marshall said that this would not be possible.

The President inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given for the operation.

General Arnold said that Southeast Asia Command were working to a date in the middle of March.

Admiral Leahy remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning of May.

The Prime Minister said that he was disturbed at the growth in the forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1 was required, this, in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of course, be carried out as arranged.

The President said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with TARZAN. He, the President, was a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians.

The Prime Minister observed that BUCCANEER would not really influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon the supplies she received over the “hump.”

Mr. Hopkins inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1 March, landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL?

Sir Andrew Cunningham did not think this would be possible. A considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault.

Admiral King agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even assuming that these operations took place in late May.

Mr. Hopkins inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this question had not yet been examined in detail.

The Prime Minister, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders.

Sir John Dill inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was generally agreed that no specific date had been set.

A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new moon on 22 May.

General Marshall said that ANVIL might take place at the same time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later.

Mr. Hopkins said as far as he could see, the situation was about as follows:

There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing craft for the required assault on Southern France, then there would definitely not be enough landing craft for these operations.

Admiral Leahy said that while it was apparent that there was sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing.

The Prime Minister said he felt there were a good many new, revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between BUCCANEER and TARZAN.

Mr. Hopkins inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented if possible.

Mr. Anthony Eden said that it was unfortunate that we cannot separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them connected.

Admiral King said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except possibly as a part of other incidental operations.

General Brooke said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent operation is to continue on to Rangoon.

The Prime Minister observed that operations on land such as TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL.

Sir Charles Portal inquired whether it would not be possible to substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER. The Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the Generalissimo’s requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon.

Admiral King said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort of “hit-and-run” operations.

Mr. Hopkins inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do what he could with what he had?

The Prime Minister observed that both OVERLORD and ANVIL were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a diversion such as BUCCANEER.

Mr. Hopkins said he understood there was nothing in any CCS paper to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for ANVIL.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more.

Mr. Hopkins said it made no difference in the number of landing-craft whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He asked if Lord Mountbatten’s landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted?

Admiral Cunningham replied that Admiral Mountbatten’s lift is about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary.

Admiral King pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England with a lift of the 4œ divisions contemplated. He further observed that his understanding was that the number of troops in the initial OVERLORD assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing front in France.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, in his view, the landing could be extended and use made of other beaches.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the LSI(L)s could be more economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short cross-Channel haul.

The Prime Minister said that while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and bound up with TARZAN.

Continuing, the Prime Minister suggested that the Generalissimo should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect [affect?] TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan forces would allow more supplies to go over the “hump.”

Sir Alan Brooke said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting.

Admiral King said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month’s production of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the Pacific now.

The President said he would like the possibility of a series of “hit-and-run” raids to be examined.

Sir Andrew Cunningham, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battleships, cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL.

The Prime Minister said that assuming that the President and United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work on the problems which had emerged from the discussion. First came ANVIL. A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the beginning of February, the U.S. and British squadrons should be ready to move in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should be intensified. By this time, we should expect some reactions from Germany, but as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater risks.

Admiral Leahy said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the adjustment of resources to plans, including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with what was left in Southeast Asia.

The Prime Minister suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously narrow margin.

General Arnold explained the possibilities and capabilities of the very long-range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta.

The Prime Minister inquired how the construction of these airfields was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress reports.

The Conference:
a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing the assaults in each case.

b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks.

c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would receive if they entered the war.

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Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 423/2

Operations in the European Theater

OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.

OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.

The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.

Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Every effort must be made by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.

The decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference covering the bombing of German industrial targets and the destruction of the German Air Force, as set forth in paragraph 10 of CCS 319/5, are reaffirmed.

Operations in Southeast Asia Theater

Views of U.S. Chiefs of Staff Views of British Chiefs of Staff
Political and military considerations and commitments make it essential that Operation TARZAN and an amphibious operation in conjunction therewith should take place. Apart from political considerations, there will be serious military repercussions if this is not done, not only in Burma and China, but also in the Southwest Pacific. We fully realize that there are political and military implications in the postponement of BUCCANEER. As regards the political implications, we must leave these to be taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister. As regards the military disadvantages, these are overridden by the far greater advantages to be derived from a successful invasion of the Continent, and the collapse of Germany.
The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be told that he must do the best that he can with the resources already allocated to him.
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Roosevelt-InönĂŒ meeting, 2 p.m.

Present
United States Turkey
President Roosevelt President InönĂŒ
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Anderiman
Mr. Kavur
Mr. Sarper

Second tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, 3 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Turkey
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill President InönĂŒ
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Açikalin
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen Mr. Anderiman
General Wilson Mr. Kavur
Air Chief Marshal Douglas Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Helm
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes

December 5, 1943, 3 p.m.
Secret

Prior to the full meeting President Roosevelt had been in conference with the Turkish representatives. On the arrival of H. M. Ambassador at Ankara, but before the arrival of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, President Roosevelt had explained what he had been saying to the Turks. Though he did not know what Mr. Churchill might say, it seemed to him that there could be three stages. He saw objection to dates for these stages though there should be a general date. In the first phase he felt that the delivery of the Adana material, which he understood was considerably behind, should be got on with as quickly as possible. Also in this first phase the airfields and other defences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes themselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.

President Roosevelt’s second phase would overlap the first. It was what he would call the cooperative period, during which he regarded as a real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Military Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British representative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish officer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many military developments for the next three, four or five months. They would know all that was going on as regards military plans and activities, e.g., as regards Crete, Rhodes, etc.

Then, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase – political. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the Americans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The President thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until everything else had been tied up. Now was the time to talk. President Roosevelt doubted whether dates could be fixed for these stages.

President InönĂŒ remarked that the practical side must be envisaged. If the Allies continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in four or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war and for discussions then to start. He very much regretted that the Russians were not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would have been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could realise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates was impracticable.

President Roosevelt thought there was much in this and summarised the position as being that the Turks did not want to be caught with their pants down.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said that this would depend on the extent of infiltration in the preparatory period.

President Roosevelt said that the target date was dependent on progress.

General Wilson said that they did not want a scramble. They wanted to get the equipment and everything in so as to be in a position to operate within 24 hours. If things had to be rushed, they would not be used to the best advantage. It would be best if nothing happened before all was ready.

At this stage Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden joined the meeting. President Roosevelt then briefly summarised the above, remarking that he thought it a mistake to date each stage. The final date might be determined but not the date of the intermediate stages. He understood that there had been a fall-down on Adana promises. As an instance he quoted that 1800 trucks had been promised but only 800 delivered. These past delays today affected Turkey’s ability to defend herself.

Mr. Churchill said that there was another factor. The Turks had not taken full advantage of the school and tuition opportunities offered to them and this had affected their ability to absorb the available material. In this connection Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that 70 [sic] aircraft (54 Hurricanes and 18 Beauforts) had been waiting ready for the Turks to collect for the last three months.

President InönĂŒ reminded Mr. Churchill of his remark at Adana when inspecting newly arrived Hurricanes, that we no longer regarded these as the most modern. They were in fact out of date. No doubt imperative considerations had made it impossible to supply better planes.

Mr. Churchill said that the situation had greatly changed since Adana. In the interval Italy had fallen and it had been necessary to take military supplies for the battle-fields in the Central Mediterranean. As a result, the Eastern Mediterranean had not received full supplies. Even so Turkish sea and railway transport had been fully engaged since Adana and the greater part of the Adana supplies had been delivered. The result was that today the Turks were much stronger than they had been at Adana.

President InönĂŒ said that the position taken up by Mr. Churchill at Adana had been generous and comprehensible. The situation today was not so clear and in fact was not known. Frankly he did not know what was required. Was it not possible to get out of the impasse? If a date was fixed for pushing Turkey into the war in the near future, e.g., in a matter of weeks, there would be an impasse. Was not the decision of Turkey to come into the war of some importance?

Mr. Churchill said it was fundamental. It represented a new stage. The principle had been established. It remained to study the method.

President InönĂŒ said the question seemed to be when Turkey would enter the war. She had stated her conditions. He had spoken of plans of preparation and collaboration. Her representatives wanted to know how they could render service. They wanted to know the risks they would run and how their forces would be used.

Mr. Churchill assented.

President InönĂŒ remarked that the question of when Turkey would be ready was a practical one. It depended on preparation. Just be-for lunch he had received a plan. (Mr. Eden remarked that this plan had been based on a telegram from Tehran). President InönĂŒ went on to say that since Adana 250 medium anti-aircraft guns had been delivered; of these about half were in use and the other half had arrived in recent months. The Turks were agreeable to giving them to British personnel to handle.

Air Vice Marshal George remarked that there were 138 of these anti-aircraft guns to be taken over. According to General Wilson they would be replaced by guns already in the Middle East.

Mr. Churchill said that the replacement guns were here but that they must not go into store. They should go straight to the airfields.

President InönĂŒ said that this (the Tehran plan), though something by itself, was not a sufficient preparation for an army. He had thought it a complete plan and it seemed to him to be only a semblance of preparation.

Mr. Churchill remarked that it was not so bad as that. It seemed to Mr. Churchill that first of all there should be the period of preparation. He hoped that this could begin at once. Throughout it transport facilities should be utilised to the maximum extent. Perhaps a period of six weeks would be required. Throughout this period everything would be camouflaged though the flow would steadily grow. But Turkish policy outwardly would be unchanged. No doubt the Germans would be suspicious but the development would go steadily on.

President InönĂŒ remarked that if the experts studied the necessary measures for two or three days they would no doubt be able to say when everything would be ready.

Mr. Churchill replied that within a period of six weeks it ought to be possible to make considerable preparations against air attack.

Mr. Churchill said that the second stage would then come, i.e., British and American aircraft would come to the fields prepared for them.

President InönĂŒ said that the Turks must regard the day of the arrival of the aircraft as the day of the declaration of war. They must regard the arrival of the Allied aircraft with the utmost seriousness and must count it as the beginning of a state of war with Germany.

President Roosevelt said that it was not desired that war should occur until the fields were ready or indeed until everything was ready. He explained that by everything he meant everything in connection with the preparation and defence of the airfields.

President InönĂŒ said that, as he understood the position, the airfields would be prepared in six weeks as one part of a general plan of preparations. After six weeks the Allied planes would arrive. Mr. Churchill seemed to think that this did not necessarily mean a declaration of war by either side. In that event preparations would continue to go on, e.g., for two months (Mr. Churchill suggested one month) or two weeks, and that then the Turks should take the initiative in declaring war.

Mr. Churchill said preparations would continue so long as they were not interrupted. Effective air protection would be provided when everything was in place. Then would come the third phase when it could be arranged to employ forces against the German-held islands. At the same time American aircraft would bomb Bulgarian airfields and so reduce the possibility of air attack on Turkey. Russia also would warn Bulgaria. This might be somewhere about January 15 or 20th. He did not want to push Turkey into a bad position and perhaps she might be ready for effective action about the end of February.

President InönĂŒ said that he could not contemplate the conclusion of the first stage mentioned by Mr. Churchill and the arrival of the Allied aeroplanes without the expectation or intention of a declaration of war.

Mr. Churchill said this was not certain.

President InönĂŒ said he must be able to explain the position to his people. He must say that there had been no provocation. Turkey’s engagements to Britain were known and it was right that Turkey should be prepared to defend herself. He understood that if Turkey were attacked the aircraft would be there to help her within 24 hours.

Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas explained that this would depend on the moment of attack. If Germany were to attack immediately the Turks returned to Angora and before any preparations had been made, air assistance could not arrive for a week. If the attack came 15 days after the beginning of the period of preparation, there would be a delay of 3 or 4 days. If however it were delayed for a month after the beginning of the preparatory period, the planes would be there in 24 hours. Thus, Mr. Churchill pointed out, it was very important that the period of infiltration should be as long as possible so that the planes could come effectively into action immediately they arrived.

At the request of President InönĂŒ, Mr. Numan said that the discussions had perhaps rather wandered and that there might be some misunderstanding. It had not been President InönĂŒâ€™s purpose to ask how soon the Allied squadrons would arrive. His point was the danger of war at the end of the 6 weeks’ period of preparation. This danger might be 100%, but even if it were only 30% the Turks must still regard it as 100%, and Mr. Numan said that Turkey could not envisage being in the war at the end of this period of preparation.

Mr. Eden enquired what therefore was the Turkish proposal.

President InönĂŒ said that a general plan of preparation must be agreed among the experts. Both parties must play a part in reaching a decision as to what was a reasonable, practical plan. The British would then be able to estimate the period required for its execution. Within that period the plan of future collaboration could be developed and the contemplated political discussions could be engaged. The Allies must however give up the idea of having Turkey in the war within 6 weeks. Otherwise the discussions had reached an impasse.

Mr. Numan said that the difference between the two sides seemed to be essentially that, whereas the Allies regarded time as being the determining factor, the Turks regard preparations as being that factor. The Turkish President wanted a plan of preparation. It might be that that could be completed in 5 days. If it could, then the Turks would come in in five days. If, however, it took 5 months the Allies on their side must accept that period.

Mr. Churchill said he was in sympathy with much of what Mr. Numan had said. The preparatory period would however be over when the squadrons could land in force and be in action within 24 hours. The guns would be there to defend the nests but the fighters were the birds which used these nests. Mr. Churchill explained that what he asked for was the inception at the earliest possible moment and in full vigour of the preparatory plan. This meant the arrival of supplies and material and of men in mufti against the arrival of the protecting air squadrons. Once this protection was established the situation would become dangerous for the enemy. In the intervening period, i.e., before the arrival of the protecting squadrons, the situation would be dangerous for Turkey. Once the airfields were ready the squadrons could come in within 24 hours. He doubted whether the Germans would then declare war on Turkey. Perhaps they would not attack. The Turkish Government could say that the squadrons were there for Turkish protection. Once there, Turkey would be defended. The personnel would come in advance and the squadrons later. This was what had happened at Lisbon. He knew that the circumstances were not the same. They were however similar.

Mr. Numan contested this. He pointed out that the Germans could not attack the Azores.

Mr. Churchill replied that this was so but that the Germans could have bombed Lisbon. President Roosevelt and he had always thought that the Germans would not bomb Lisbon. They had an interest in not doing so. Portuguese wolfram was important to Germany – it was in fact the chrome of Portugal. The position was much the same as regards Turkey. What point would there be in Germany attacking her?

Mr. Numan suggested that the question of the Azores be left alone. The Atlantic battle had been decided. The use of Turkish bases was quite a different matter since it would be for direct attack on Germany.

President InönĂŒ enquired what differences there were between what the Prime Minister had said and what the British had negotiated with the Turkish General Staff.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said there was no real difference. The Air Attaché had merely been discussing the first phase.

Mr. Numan pointed out that there had been 5 points in the discussions of the Service Attachés. Some of these were practicable. Others were not. The Turks could not agree to the infiltration of personnel but they could and did agree to the infiltration of the requisite number of specialists.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that the Service Attachés had asked for the infiltration of 7,000 personnel. This figure had now been reduced to 2,000.

At the request of President InönĂŒ Mr. Numan explained that the question of the preparation of the airfields was not the only question. There must be a general plan of which the question of airfields would form a part, indeed perhaps the principal part and the one requiring the greatest priority. He suggested the despatch of experts to Angora to discuss the general plan and to make any other necessary proposals.

Mr. Churchill said that he wanted the preparations to begin at once, i.e., to get supplies, material and personnel introduced into Turkey forthwith and so get the airfields ready. This must be done with the utmost discretion and secrecy. There would be no overt change of Turkish policy. It was however essential that it should begin at once and when the airfields were ready for the planes, we should then want them to come in. The Turkish position would then be completely changed.

Mr. Numan said there was one small point on which he hoped for agreement, namely that there were two questions: that of the period of preparation and that of the declaration of war. He considered that the entry of personnel would provoke war. The second stage would come with the arrival of the squadrons, for within a few days thereafter Turkey would be at war. It was necessary to separate these two points now. At the same time, it was, however, also necessary to begin preparations now.

Mr. Churchill remarked that the discussion seemed to have got into a difficult circle. We were satisfied that no preparation could be effective without the introduction of personnel while the Turks refused the introduction of personnel because of the danger of provoking Germany. Thus, no preparation could be made against Germany being provoked.

At this stage the meeting was adjourned and on the resumption it was suggested that, before a further plenary meeting was held, a discussion should take place between a small committee headed by Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Numan and Mr. Eden. The meeting of this committee was arranged for 6 p.m.

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