U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt (in the chair) | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 4, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
The President said that he must leave Cairo on Monday morning. It was therefore necessary that all reports of the Conference should be signed by Sunday night. Apart from the question of Turkish participation in the war, which he felt should be brought about at some date between 15 February and 1 April, the only outstanding problem seemed to be the comparatively small one of the provision of about 20 landing craft or their equipment. It was unthinkable to be beaten by a small item like that, and he felt bound to say that it must be done.
The Prime Minister said that he did not wish to leave the Conference in any doubt that the British Delegation viewed the early separation of the SEXTANT Conference with great apprehension. There were still many questions of first-class importance to be settled. Two decisive events had taken place in the last few days. In the first place, Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would make war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated. This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China, and made it all the more important that we should concentrate on making OVERLORD a success. It would be necessary for the Staffs to examine how this new fact would affect operations in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The second event of first-class importance was the decision to do OVERLORD during May. He himself would have preferred the July date, but he was determined nevertheless to do all in his power to make the May date a complete success. OVERLORD was a task transcending all others. A million Americans were to be thrown in, and 500,000-600,000 British. Terrific battles were to be expected on a scale far greater than anything that we had experienced before. In order to give OVERLORD the greatest chance of success, it was necessary that Operation ANVIL should be as strong as possible. The critical time would come at about the thirtieth day, and it was essential that every possible step should be taken by action elsewhere to prevent the Germans from concentrating a superior force against our bridgeheads. As soon as the OVERLORD and ANVIL forces got into the same zone, they would come under the same Commander.
Reverting to ANVIL, the Prime Minister expressed the view that it should be planned on the basis of an assault force of at least two divisions. This would provide enough landing craft to do the outflanking operations in Italy and also, if Turkey came into the war soon, to capture Rhodes. But he wished to say at once that, in the face of the new situation, Rhodes had no longer the great importance which he had previously attached to it.
Admiral King intervened to remark that a two-division lift for ANVIL was in sight.
The Prime Minister, continuing, said that operations in Southeast Asia must be judged in their relation to the predominating importance of OVERLORD. He was astounded at the demands for BUCCANEER which had reached him from the Supreme Commander. Although there were only 5,000 Japanese in the island, 58,000 men were apparently required to capture it. As he understood it, the Americans had been fighting the Japanese successfully at odds of two and a half to one. In the face of Marshal Stalinâs promise that Russia would come into the war, operations in the Southeast Asia Command had lost a good deal of their value; while on the other hand their cost had been put up to a prohibitive extent.
The Prime Minister concluded by observing that there were still very large differences of opinion between the British and American Delegations, and that it was of the first importance that these differences should be cleared away.
Sir Alan Brooke said that at all the previous Conferences there had been a number of military meetings, as a result of which reports had been submitted from time to time to the President and Prime Minister. The last stage of the Conference had always been the submission of a final report, followed by an examination of ways and means. SEXTANT had been a very different affair. In the first place there had been meetings with the Generalissimo. Then after a short interval, the principal members of both delegations had gone to Tehran where there had been a number of Plenary Conferences on political as well as military matters. Thus the Combined Chiefs of Staff had so far had very few opportunities of discussion at SEXTANT. The following matters were still outstanding: First, an examination of the landing craft position, without which it was impossible to say what operations could or could not be undertaken; second, the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan, which in its turn was affected by the decisions to undertake operations in Upper Burma next March. The plan was also seriously affected by Marshal Stalinâs promise to make war on Japan as soon as Germany was finished. It seemed essential that these problems should be resolved before the Combined Chiefs of Staff separated. The Mediterranean was of the greatest importance. It would be fatal to let up in that area. We should go on hitting the Germans as hard as we possibly could, and in every place that we could. Finally, the question of ANVIL was still under examination and it was essential to decide how the necessary resources could be provided.
Sir Andrew Cunningham observed that, on a preliminary examination, our naval resources in cruisers, escort carriers, destroyers, and escorts were not adequate to undertake more than two amphibious operations at the same time, namely OVERLORD and ANVIL. It might be possible to arrange for some of the naval forces employed in BUCCANEER to get back in time for ANVIL, but a large proportion of them would have to remain in the Indian Ocean.
Sir Charles Portal said that, according to his information, there was only one good airfield in the Andamans. This was capable of operating squadrons of heavy bombers. There was another site which had been cleared by blasting the top off a hill, and a few strips might be made on the beach. Thus the value of the Andamans as a base for long distance bombing was strictly limited.
General Marshall expressed agreement with General Brookeâs observations. There was no question that there were a number of important points to be settled. It was impossible to say how long this settlement would take; and thereafter there would be the business of surveying ways and means.
The Prime Minister said that he himself would at any rate be leaving on Tuesday. Would it not be possible for the Staffs to stay for two or three days and work out their problems together?
Admiral Leahy said that two or three days would not suffice for what they had to do, since the detailed problems to be worked out would take at least one or two weeks.
Admiral King remarked that the staffs were unlikely to reach agreement on certain problems which could only be resolved by the President-Prime Minister level.
The Prime Minister said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo under the impression that we were going to do BUCCANEER. The new facts were, firstly, that the Soviet had declared themselves ready to go to war with Japan immediately Germany collapsed; secondly, that it had been decided to do OVERLORD in May; and, thirdly, that ANVIL was also to be undertaken. He added that he was very anxious lest the Russian promise should leak out.
The President agreed, and added that it was impossible to tell the Chinese. Continuing, he said that 18-20 additional landing craft must be provided by hook or by crook. As for the BUCCANEER assault, he thought that 14,000 instead of 58,000 men would be ample. The Supreme Commander in the Far East should be told that he must do his best with the resources which had already been allocated to him. It should be possible for the staffs to settle their problems in principle, leaving the details to be worked out afterwards. They appeared already to have reached agreement on the objectives.
Sir Alan Brooke demurred. Many questions, such as shipping, landing craft, and naval resources would have to be examined in detail, as would the relation between ANVIL and BUCCANEER. The former was being examined on the basis of a two-division assault, whereas it might be found that the proper strategy was to divert landing craft from BUCCANEER to the Mediterranean and to increase this to say a three-division assault.
Admiral King said that landing craft and assault shipping for a two-division assault was already in sight, subject to certain complications. He added that, so long as the target date for OVERLORD was 1 May, it had been necessary to arrange for landing craft to be in the U.K. by 1 March. Consequently, the intention had been to send all new construction of landing craft after that date to the Pacific. Now that it had been decided to postpone OVERLORD by 2-4 weeks, this new construction would come to the U.K. Nothing would be sent to the Pacific.
The Prime Minister observed that this was a fruitful contribution.
Some discussion followed on the subject of LSI(L)s. Would it not be possible, asked the Prime Minister, to adapt merchant ships for this purpose instead of building special vessels?
Admiral King said that conversions of this character were in progress. The U.S. Navy used ships of 6,000â10,000 tons for this purpose, the monster liners being reserved for transportation of large bodies of troops across the Atlantic.
Some discussion followed about the increase of Japanese fighter strength in Southeast Asia, and, in connection with this matter, Admiral King pointed to the interrelation between the attack on Rabaul and BUCCANEER. The Japanese air force was going to be in difficulties at two widely separated points. Admiral Leahy suggested that if it could be decided:
a. that ANVIL should go ahead on the basis of a two-division assault; and,
b. that Admiral Mountbatten should be instructed to do the best he could with the resources already allocated to him;
the picture would begin to be filled in. Of course, if Admiral Mount-batten said that he could do nothing, some of his resources could be taken away from him for other purposes.
The Prime Minister suggested that BUCCANEER might be left until after the monsoon; in fact this solution of the problem might be forced upon us by facts and figures.
Admiral King said that there was a definite commitment to the Generalissimo that there should be an amphibious operation in the spring.
The Prime Minister recalled that at the Plenary Meeting with the Generalissimo, the latter had said that it was essential that an amphibious operation should be undertaken simultaneously with TARZAN. He (the Prime Minister) had said quite firmly that he could not agree. The Generalissimo could be under no illusion about this.
The President suggested the following plan of action:
a. Accept OVERLORD and ANVIL as the paramount operations of 1944.
b. Make every effort to get the additional 18-20 landing craft for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.
c. Let Admiral Mountbatten be told that he could keep what he has got, but is going to get nothing else; and that he must do the best that he can.
Sir Charles Portal remarked that ANVIL had only come seriously into the picture last week. At the present, nobody knew whether a two-division assault would, or would not, be enough. It was merely a yardstick for the planning staffs to work on. It might well be that the proper strategy would be to get a lift for at least another division out of the Southeast Asia Command.
Sir Alan Brooke said that for OVERLORD the assault was only 3œ divisions; and for ANVIL only a two-division assault was at present contemplated. Surely it would be better to employ all the BUCCANEER resources to strengthen up the European front.
Admiral Leahy entirely agreed with the idea of strengthening up the European front, but observed that BUCCANEER had been decided on a higher level than the Chiefs of Staff.
The Prime Minister pointed to the great military advantages that were to be gained by operations in the Aegean. If Turkey entered the war, there would be great political reactions. Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary might all fall into our hands. We ought to make these German satellites work for us.
Mr. Eden thought that Russia would probably agree to postponing the date for the Turkish entry into the war from 31 December 1943 to about 15 February 1944. As for Rumania, the Russians had, in the first place, refused to have anything to do with the feelers put out by Maniu, except on the basis of unconditional surrender. Maniu had now said that he was prepared to send a representative to negotiate on that basis. It was true that he did not represent the Government of Rumania, but there was always the possibility of a coup dâetat.
The Prime Minister pointed to the great advantages that were to be gained by Rumaniaâs entry into the war. If we could get a grip on the Balkans, there would be a tremendous abridgement of our difficulties. The next Conference might perhaps be held at Budapest! All this would help OVERLORD. He himself was not apprehensive about the landing; but the critical period would be at about the 30th day. It was therefore essential that the Germans should be held at every point, and that the whole ring should close in together.
There followed some discussion of the conduct of the political conversations with President Inonu.
The President, summing up the discussion, asked whether he was correct in thinking that there was general agreement on the following points:
a. Nothing should be done to hinder OVERLORD.
b. Nothing should be done to hinder ANVIL.
c. By hook or by crook we should scrape up sufficient landing craft to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey came into the war.
d. Admiral Mountbatten should be told to go ahead and do his best with what had already been allocated to him.
The Prime Minister suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from BUCCANEER in order to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL.
The President said that he could not agree with this. We had a moral obligation to do something for China and he would not be prepared to forego the amphibious operation, except for some very great and readily apparent reason.
The Prime Minister said that this âvery good reasonâ might be provided by OVERLORD. At present the assault was only on a 3Âœ division basis, whereas we had put 9 divisions ashore in Sicily on the first day. The operation was at present on a very narrow margin.
Field Marshal Dill thought it was impossible for us to be strong at both OVERLORD and ANVIL.
Admiral Leahy agreed that, from the military point of view, there was everything to be said for strengthening up OVERLORD and ANVIL at the expense of other theaters; but there were serious political issues at stake.
General Marshall agreed with Field Marshal Dill and Admiral Leahy. He pointed out, however, that the difficulties in abandoning or postponing BUCCANEER were not merely political. If BUCCANEER was cancelled, the Generalissimo would not allow Chinese forces to take part in TARZAN. There would be no campaign in Upper Burma, and this would have its repercussion on the operations in the Pacific. There would be a revulsion of feeling in China; the effect on Japan would be bad, and the line of communication between Indochina [India and China?] would be at hazard.
The Prime Minister observed that he had never committed himself to the scale or timing of the amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater. Perhaps it might be advisable to revert to Akyab or Ramree.
The President said that the Generalissimo was anxious that we should secure a base from which the supply line from Bangkok could be bombed.
Admiral King, in reply to a question from the Prime Minister, said that he had no fear of the Japanese being able to retake the Andamans once we had occupied them. He added that any increase in the scale of BUCCANEER was out of the question.
The meeting concluded with an injunction from the President and Prime Minister to their respective staffs to meet together and try to reach agreement on the points at issue in the light of the discussion which had taken place.