Second tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, 3 p.m.
|
Present |
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| United States |
United Kingdom |
Turkey |
| President Roosevelt |
Prime Minister Churchill |
President Inönü |
| Mr. Hopkins |
Foreign Secretary Eden |
Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu |
| Mr. Steinhardt |
Sir Alexander Cadogan |
Mr. Açikalin |
|
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen |
Mr. Anderiman |
|
General Wilson |
Mr. Kavur |
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Air Chief Marshal Douglas |
Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu |
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Air Vice Marshal George |
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|
Mr. Helm |
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740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443
U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes
December 5, 1943, 3 p.m.
Secret
Prior to the full meeting President Roosevelt had been in conference with the Turkish representatives. On the arrival of H. M. Ambassador at Ankara, but before the arrival of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, President Roosevelt had explained what he had been saying to the Turks. Though he did not know what Mr. Churchill might say, it seemed to him that there could be three stages. He saw objection to dates for these stages though there should be a general date. In the first phase he felt that the delivery of the Adana material, which he understood was considerably behind, should be got on with as quickly as possible. Also in this first phase the airfields and other defences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes themselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.
President Roosevelt’s second phase would overlap the first. It was what he would call the cooperative period, during which he regarded as a real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Military Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British representative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish officer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many military developments for the next three, four or five months. They would know all that was going on as regards military plans and activities, e.g., as regards Crete, Rhodes, etc.
Then, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase – political. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the Americans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The President thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until everything else had been tied up. Now was the time to talk. President Roosevelt doubted whether dates could be fixed for these stages.
President Inönü remarked that the practical side must be envisaged. If the Allies continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in four or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war and for discussions then to start. He very much regretted that the Russians were not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would have been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could realise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates was impracticable.
President Roosevelt thought there was much in this and summarised the position as being that the Turks did not want to be caught with their pants down.
Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said that this would depend on the extent of infiltration in the preparatory period.
President Roosevelt said that the target date was dependent on progress.
General Wilson said that they did not want a scramble. They wanted to get the equipment and everything in so as to be in a position to operate within 24 hours. If things had to be rushed, they would not be used to the best advantage. It would be best if nothing happened before all was ready.
At this stage Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden joined the meeting. President Roosevelt then briefly summarised the above, remarking that he thought it a mistake to date each stage. The final date might be determined but not the date of the intermediate stages. He understood that there had been a fall-down on Adana promises. As an instance he quoted that 1800 trucks had been promised but only 800 delivered. These past delays today affected Turkey’s ability to defend herself.
Mr. Churchill said that there was another factor. The Turks had not taken full advantage of the school and tuition opportunities offered to them and this had affected their ability to absorb the available material. In this connection Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that 70 [sic] aircraft (54 Hurricanes and 18 Beauforts) had been waiting ready for the Turks to collect for the last three months.
President Inönü reminded Mr. Churchill of his remark at Adana when inspecting newly arrived Hurricanes, that we no longer regarded these as the most modern. They were in fact out of date. No doubt imperative considerations had made it impossible to supply better planes.
Mr. Churchill said that the situation had greatly changed since Adana. In the interval Italy had fallen and it had been necessary to take military supplies for the battle-fields in the Central Mediterranean. As a result, the Eastern Mediterranean had not received full supplies. Even so Turkish sea and railway transport had been fully engaged since Adana and the greater part of the Adana supplies had been delivered. The result was that today the Turks were much stronger than they had been at Adana.
President Inönü said that the position taken up by Mr. Churchill at Adana had been generous and comprehensible. The situation today was not so clear and in fact was not known. Frankly he did not know what was required. Was it not possible to get out of the impasse? If a date was fixed for pushing Turkey into the war in the near future, e.g., in a matter of weeks, there would be an impasse. Was not the decision of Turkey to come into the war of some importance?
Mr. Churchill said it was fundamental. It represented a new stage. The principle had been established. It remained to study the method.
President Inönü said the question seemed to be when Turkey would enter the war. She had stated her conditions. He had spoken of plans of preparation and collaboration. Her representatives wanted to know how they could render service. They wanted to know the risks they would run and how their forces would be used.
Mr. Churchill assented.
President Inönü remarked that the question of when Turkey would be ready was a practical one. It depended on preparation. Just be-for lunch he had received a plan. (Mr. Eden remarked that this plan had been based on a telegram from Tehran). President Inönü went on to say that since Adana 250 medium anti-aircraft guns had been delivered; of these about half were in use and the other half had arrived in recent months. The Turks were agreeable to giving them to British personnel to handle.
Air Vice Marshal George remarked that there were 138 of these anti-aircraft guns to be taken over. According to General Wilson they would be replaced by guns already in the Middle East.
Mr. Churchill said that the replacement guns were here but that they must not go into store. They should go straight to the airfields.
President Inönü said that this (the Tehran plan), though something by itself, was not a sufficient preparation for an army. He had thought it a complete plan and it seemed to him to be only a semblance of preparation.
Mr. Churchill remarked that it was not so bad as that. It seemed to Mr. Churchill that first of all there should be the period of preparation. He hoped that this could begin at once. Throughout it transport facilities should be utilised to the maximum extent. Perhaps a period of six weeks would be required. Throughout this period everything would be camouflaged though the flow would steadily grow. But Turkish policy outwardly would be unchanged. No doubt the Germans would be suspicious but the development would go steadily on.
President Inönü remarked that if the experts studied the necessary measures for two or three days they would no doubt be able to say when everything would be ready.
Mr. Churchill replied that within a period of six weeks it ought to be possible to make considerable preparations against air attack.
Mr. Churchill said that the second stage would then come, i.e., British and American aircraft would come to the fields prepared for them.
President Inönü said that the Turks must regard the day of the arrival of the aircraft as the day of the declaration of war. They must regard the arrival of the Allied aircraft with the utmost seriousness and must count it as the beginning of a state of war with Germany.
President Roosevelt said that it was not desired that war should occur until the fields were ready or indeed until everything was ready. He explained that by everything he meant everything in connection with the preparation and defence of the airfields.
President Inönü said that, as he understood the position, the airfields would be prepared in six weeks as one part of a general plan of preparations. After six weeks the Allied planes would arrive. Mr. Churchill seemed to think that this did not necessarily mean a declaration of war by either side. In that event preparations would continue to go on, e.g., for two months (Mr. Churchill suggested one month) or two weeks, and that then the Turks should take the initiative in declaring war.
Mr. Churchill said preparations would continue so long as they were not interrupted. Effective air protection would be provided when everything was in place. Then would come the third phase when it could be arranged to employ forces against the German-held islands. At the same time American aircraft would bomb Bulgarian airfields and so reduce the possibility of air attack on Turkey. Russia also would warn Bulgaria. This might be somewhere about January 15 or 20th. He did not want to push Turkey into a bad position and perhaps she might be ready for effective action about the end of February.
President Inönü said that he could not contemplate the conclusion of the first stage mentioned by Mr. Churchill and the arrival of the Allied aeroplanes without the expectation or intention of a declaration of war.
Mr. Churchill said this was not certain.
President Inönü said he must be able to explain the position to his people. He must say that there had been no provocation. Turkey’s engagements to Britain were known and it was right that Turkey should be prepared to defend herself. He understood that if Turkey were attacked the aircraft would be there to help her within 24 hours.
Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas explained that this would depend on the moment of attack. If Germany were to attack immediately the Turks returned to Angora and before any preparations had been made, air assistance could not arrive for a week. If the attack came 15 days after the beginning of the period of preparation, there would be a delay of 3 or 4 days. If however it were delayed for a month after the beginning of the preparatory period, the planes would be there in 24 hours. Thus, Mr. Churchill pointed out, it was very important that the period of infiltration should be as long as possible so that the planes could come effectively into action immediately they arrived.
At the request of President Inönü, Mr. Numan said that the discussions had perhaps rather wandered and that there might be some misunderstanding. It had not been President Inönü’s purpose to ask how soon the Allied squadrons would arrive. His point was the danger of war at the end of the 6 weeks’ period of preparation. This danger might be 100%, but even if it were only 30% the Turks must still regard it as 100%, and Mr. Numan said that Turkey could not envisage being in the war at the end of this period of preparation.
Mr. Eden enquired what therefore was the Turkish proposal.
President Inönü said that a general plan of preparation must be agreed among the experts. Both parties must play a part in reaching a decision as to what was a reasonable, practical plan. The British would then be able to estimate the period required for its execution. Within that period the plan of future collaboration could be developed and the contemplated political discussions could be engaged. The Allies must however give up the idea of having Turkey in the war within 6 weeks. Otherwise the discussions had reached an impasse.
Mr. Numan said that the difference between the two sides seemed to be essentially that, whereas the Allies regarded time as being the determining factor, the Turks regard preparations as being that factor. The Turkish President wanted a plan of preparation. It might be that that could be completed in 5 days. If it could, then the Turks would come in in five days. If, however, it took 5 months the Allies on their side must accept that period.
Mr. Churchill said he was in sympathy with much of what Mr. Numan had said. The preparatory period would however be over when the squadrons could land in force and be in action within 24 hours. The guns would be there to defend the nests but the fighters were the birds which used these nests. Mr. Churchill explained that what he asked for was the inception at the earliest possible moment and in full vigour of the preparatory plan. This meant the arrival of supplies and material and of men in mufti against the arrival of the protecting air squadrons. Once this protection was established the situation would become dangerous for the enemy. In the intervening period, i.e., before the arrival of the protecting squadrons, the situation would be dangerous for Turkey. Once the airfields were ready the squadrons could come in within 24 hours. He doubted whether the Germans would then declare war on Turkey. Perhaps they would not attack. The Turkish Government could say that the squadrons were there for Turkish protection. Once there, Turkey would be defended. The personnel would come in advance and the squadrons later. This was what had happened at Lisbon. He knew that the circumstances were not the same. They were however similar.
Mr. Numan contested this. He pointed out that the Germans could not attack the Azores.
Mr. Churchill replied that this was so but that the Germans could have bombed Lisbon. President Roosevelt and he had always thought that the Germans would not bomb Lisbon. They had an interest in not doing so. Portuguese wolfram was important to Germany – it was in fact the chrome of Portugal. The position was much the same as regards Turkey. What point would there be in Germany attacking her?
Mr. Numan suggested that the question of the Azores be left alone. The Atlantic battle had been decided. The use of Turkish bases was quite a different matter since it would be for direct attack on Germany.
President Inönü enquired what differences there were between what the Prime Minister had said and what the British had negotiated with the Turkish General Staff.
Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said there was no real difference. The Air Attaché had merely been discussing the first phase.
Mr. Numan pointed out that there had been 5 points in the discussions of the Service Attachés. Some of these were practicable. Others were not. The Turks could not agree to the infiltration of personnel but they could and did agree to the infiltration of the requisite number of specialists.
Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that the Service Attachés had asked for the infiltration of 7,000 personnel. This figure had now been reduced to 2,000.
At the request of President Inönü Mr. Numan explained that the question of the preparation of the airfields was not the only question. There must be a general plan of which the question of airfields would form a part, indeed perhaps the principal part and the one requiring the greatest priority. He suggested the despatch of experts to Angora to discuss the general plan and to make any other necessary proposals.
Mr. Churchill said that he wanted the preparations to begin at once, i.e., to get supplies, material and personnel introduced into Turkey forthwith and so get the airfields ready. This must be done with the utmost discretion and secrecy. There would be no overt change of Turkish policy. It was however essential that it should begin at once and when the airfields were ready for the planes, we should then want them to come in. The Turkish position would then be completely changed.
Mr. Numan said there was one small point on which he hoped for agreement, namely that there were two questions: that of the period of preparation and that of the declaration of war. He considered that the entry of personnel would provoke war. The second stage would come with the arrival of the squadrons, for within a few days thereafter Turkey would be at war. It was necessary to separate these two points now. At the same time, it was, however, also necessary to begin preparations now.
Mr. Churchill remarked that the discussion seemed to have got into a difficult circle. We were satisfied that no preparation could be effective without the introduction of personnel while the Turks refused the introduction of personnel because of the danger of provoking Germany. Thus, no preparation could be made against Germany being provoked.
At this stage the meeting was adjourned and on the resumption it was suggested that, before a further plenary meeting was held, a discussion should take place between a small committee headed by Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Numan and Mr. Eden. The meeting of this committee was arranged for 6 p.m.