Landis refuses to change ruling on Phils’ prexy
Judge announces after six-hour open hearing that ban on Cox will stand
…
Völkischer Beobachter (December 6, 1943)
Tokios Antwort auf Kairo –
Japan versetzt der USA.-Flotte neue schwere Schläge
3 Flugzeugträger, 1 Schlachtschiff, 1 Kreuzer versenkt
…
Der ‚psychologische Hammerschlag‘ ging daneben –
Europa erkennt den großen jüdischen Bluff
Wien, 5. Dezember –
Das große Bluffschaustück, das uns der Feind in Ägypten und Iran vor zuführen gedachte, ist zu einer lächerlichen Komödie geworden. Die Akteure haben sich bei dem „psychologischen Hammerschlag auf die deutsche Kriegsmoral“ auf die eigenen Finger gehauen. Erst mehrere Tage nach Beendigung der Konferenz in dem von den Sowjets besetzten Iran erhielt die Welt aus dem alliierten Lager überhaupt erst Kunde davon, daß diese Konferenz statt gefunden hat. Dabei gab Reuter nicht einmal eine eigene Meldung, sondern übernahm wortwörtlich die deutsche Meldung.
Auch- über die Nennung des Tagungsortes bestand im Feindlager keine Einigkeit. Während Reuters Täbris nannte, meldete der Sender Moskau Teheran. Aus den USA verlautete überhaupt nichts darüber. Dort hüllt man sich in Schweigen und ist sehr böse darüber, daß die englischen und sowjetischen Meldungen Roosevelt das Konzept verdorben haben. Von Roosevelt stammt nämlich die Idee, die Welt mit einer Bluffsensation zu überraschen. Er wollte die große Propaganda-bombe gegen Deutschland plötzlich in die Luft gehen lassen und muß nun voller Wut feststellen, daß die Bombe vorzeitig zerplatzt ist.
Die ganze „psychologische Wirkung,“ auf die es die jüdischen Agitationsstrategen Roosevelts angelegt hatten, ist verpufft. Es ist daher nicht mehr als ein Rückzugsgefecht, wenn Reuters aus Washington meldet, die Meldung des Moskauer Rundfunks über den Abschluß der Besprechungen in Teheran habe die Erwartungen in Washington noch erhöht, daß „große psychologische Schläge gegen Deutschland bevorstehen, um den Krieg in Europa zu beenden.“
Roosevelts Agitationschef Elmer Davis bleibt nun nichts weiter übrig, als in London und Moskau Beschwerde einzulegen, weil man dort in der Nachrichtengebung entgegen dem Plan des Weißen Hauses vorgeprellt ist. Die Engländer haben einen gehörigen Rüffel einstecken müssen, mit den Sowjets geht Elmer Davis natürlich wesentlich sanfter um. Er gibt nur zu verstehen, daß die frühzeitige Nachrichtenübermittlung des Moskauer Rundfunks zur Konferenz in Iran „für die amerikanischen Informationsstellen wie ein Blitz aus heiterem Himmel“ kam.
Weit wichtiger als dieser Nachrichten krieg am Rande der großen Bluffaktion ist der Satz in der Moskauer Meldung, daß das Konferenzkommuniqué „noch heraus gegeben werde.“ Das ist immerhin kennzeichnend. Denn wenn man sich einige Tage nach Konferenzschluß noch nicht auf die Formel geeinigt hat, läßt das eindeutig darauf schließen, daß es mit der vielgerühmten „Einigkeit der Alliierten“ nicht weit her ist. Offenbar sucht man nach einem möglichst guten Abgang von der Bühne, nachdem man erkannt hat, daß mit Bluffmätzchen die deutsche Moral nicht erschüttert werden kann. Vermutlich sollten die Terrorangriffe, die die britische und nordamerikanische Luftwaffe gegen deutsche Städte unternahm, eine Probe aufs Exempel sein. Das Ergebnis muß aber wohl ebenfalls höchst unbefriedigend gewesen sein, nachdem man hat feststellen müssen, daß die deutsche Moral nach wie vor ausgezeichnet ist, und daß das deutsche Volk weder durch Drohungen noch durch Terrorakte mürbe gemacht werden kann.
Die reichlich abgegriffenen Drohungen, wie etwa die der News Chronicle, daß das deutsche Volk „auf jeden Fall unter drückt und ganz kurz gehalten werden müsse“ und die Schreckensmär der New York Herald Tribune, daß man im Washingtoner Kongreß und sonstigen politischen Kreisen annehme, Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin arbeiteten an dem „Kapitulation- oder Todesultimatum“ an Deutschland, verfehlen so völlig ihre Wirkung, um so mehr, wenn New York Herald Tribune mit der grotesk wirken den Behauptung operiert, daß „Italien glücklicher nach der bedingungslosen Kapitulation” sei.
Neuer Druck auf die Türkei
Wenn jetzt davon die Rede ist, daß Roosevelt auf der Heimreise den türkischen Außenminister Menemencioglu sprechen werde, dann zeigt das, daß der USA.-Präsident auch kein besseres Rezept weiß, den europäischen Krieg zu beenden, als daß die Türken in den Krieg hineingezerrt werden sollen. Eine solche Aussprache Roosevelts mit Menemencioglu wäre weiter ein Beweis dafür, daß der Feind die Schwäche seiner Mittelmeeropposition erkannt hat und keine Möglichkeit sieht, die Südostflanke Europas aufzureißen. Die Türkei wird sich also nach den Konferenzen von Kairo und Teheran einem neuen Druck der Kriegsbrandstifter ausgesetzt sehen, der darauf berechnet ist, das türkische Volk aus seiner strikten Neutralität herauszudrängen.
Schlußstrich für die kleinen Staaten
Die Ansicht griechischer Kreise über die Konferenz von Teheran faßt die Saloniker Zeitung Nea Evropi dahin zusammen, daß Teheran den Schlußstrich unter die Auslieferung der kleinen Staaten, insbesondere aber der Emigrantenkomitees an den Bolschewismus setze. Bezüglich des ehemaligen griechischen Königs habe Churchill ja bereits entsprechende Erklärungen abgegeben, als er im Unterhaus mitteilte, England sei beileibe keine Verpflichtungen hinsichtlich der Wiedereinsetzung des Königs nach dem Kriege eingegangen. Auch der ehemalige König des einstigen Jugoslawiens habe seine Befehle erhalten, indem man ihn aufgefordert habe, die Banden Mihailowitschs aufzulösen und sie dem Kommunistengeneral Tito unterzuordnen. England gebe damit endgültig die beiden Balkanstaaten auf, nachdem es sie mit seinen Versprechungen und Garantien in den Krieg hineingetrieben habe. Es sei offensichtlich, daß sich England den sowjetischen Wünsche völlig unterworfen habe.
Täuschung nicht möglich
Zu Teheran schreibt die Bukarester Viatza: Eines sei gewiß: ganz Europa denke mit Entsetzen an seine geplante Bolschewisierung, so umgänglich und demokratisch man die Bolschewisten auch immer darstellen möge. Schließlich könnten auch die Erklärungen, die kürzlich in den USA und in England, abgegeben worden seien – das Blatt beruft sich dabei auf die Erklärungen von Smuts und Berle – die Befürchtungen über die aggressiven Absichten der Sowjets gegen ihre Nachbarländer und selbst gegen die Exilregierungen nur verstärken.
‚Ein Gang nach Kanossa‘
Die Konferenz von Teheran war für Churchill und Roosevelt ein Gang nach Kanossa, schreibt die in Pamplona erscheinende. Zeitung Diario de Navarra zu der Konferenz von Teheran. Stalin habe mit satanischer Bosheit darauf bestanden, daß die Konferenz nicht außerhalb seines Machtbereichs stattfinde, und die beiden angelsächsischen Staatsmänner hätten wohl oder übel den Kanossagang antreten müssen, um den roten Zaren persönlich zu sprechen. Diese Nachgiebigkeit der plutokratisch und kapitalistisch regierten Länder aber beweise, welche Macht Stalin heute den Anglo-Amerikanern gegenüber bereits besitze. Es sei daher kaum abwegig anzunehmen, daß es auch Stalin gewesen sei, der Churchill und Roosevelt seine Pläne und Ziele einfach diktiert habe.
Fallschirmjäger an der süditalienischen Front –
Einzelkämpfer gegen Truppenmassen und Material
Von Kriegsberichter Hans Georg Schnitzer
…
Englands Gegenangebot –
Bombenterror nicht kriegsentscheidend
Von unserem skandinavischen Vertreter
k. a. Stockholm, 5. Dezember –
Der Außenpolitiker von Dagsposten Rüdver Essen, beschäftigt sich im Helsingborg Dagbladet mit der Frage, ob der englisch-amerikanische Bombenterror von kriegsentscheidender Bedeutung sei. Die Frage dürfte bei den jüngsten Besprechungen Churchills und Roosevelts mit Stalin von besonderer Bedeutung gewesen sein.
Rüdver Essen weist darauf hin, daß der These nie widersprochen worden ist, die Terrorangriffe auf Berlin seien durch Stalin auf der Moskauer Konferenz erzwungen worden. Der Bombenterror gegen die deutsche Reichshauptstadt sei wahrscheinlich ein britisches Gegenangebot auf die kategorische sowjetrussische Forderung gewesen, endlich die zweite Front im Westen zu errichten. Sollte Stalin bei den jetzigen Besprechungen die Auffassung nicht teilen, daß die Bombenangriffe auf deutsche Städte nicht entscheidend seien, dann werde es für die Westmächte immer schwieriger, diese ihre Fiktion aufrechtzuerhalten.
Die Hauptfrage sei, ob der angelsächsische Bombenterror eine Kriegsentscheidung herbeiführen könne. Die Antwort darauf sei, daß auch die schweren Angriffe auf Berlin in keiner Weise dieses Ziel als erreichbar. erscheinen ließen. Es sei zwar möglich, mit Massen von Spreng- und Brandbomben vielleicht Hunderttausende von Zivilpersonen zu töten und ihre Häuser zu zerstören, aber es sei sehr schwierig, wirklich kriegswichtige und -entscheidende Anlagen zu treffen. Das absolute Maximum an Wirkung, das der Terrorkrieg erreichen könne, sei die Räumung der deutschen Großstädte von der Zivilbevölkerung. Schließlich dürfe man die deutschen Vergeltungsdrohungen gegen die britischen Inseln ja nicht als Bluff betrachten.
Die Schlußfolgerung sei also die, daß man von dem englisch-amerikanischen Terrorkrieg aus der Luft keine Kriegsentscheidung erwarten könne. England, das mit diesem Terror als Mittel der Kriegführung als Ersatz für die unmöglich gemachte Hungerblockade als erster begonnen habe, sollte eigentlich am wenigsten von allen europäischen Ländern ein Interesse daran haben, diese Art der Kriegführung hervorzurufen. Aber was einmal geschehen sei, sei geschehen.
U.S. State Department (December 6, 1943)
740.0011 EW 1939/32218
The Soviet Ambassador to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 6, 1943
Confidential
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to ask you to transmit the following communication from Mr. V. M. Molotov to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins in answer to the latter’s telegram addressed to Mr. Molotov and handed to him by Mr. Hamilton on December 3, 1943.
Personal and secret to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins from V. M. Molotov
Just like you I cannot but express my satisfaction regarding our work together at the Tehran Conference and the possibility of continuation of this work in the future.
The meeting of Premier Stalin with President Roosevelt is of the greatest importance for drawing closer together the peoples of our countries in the interests of the cause of speeding up our common victory and post-war collaboration.
Best wishes.
Accept [etc.]
A. GROMYKO
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshall Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Major General Lay cock | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Captain Lambe | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Major General Sutherland | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Major General Handy | Brigadier McNair | |
| Major General Fairchild | Colonel Cornwall-Jones | |
| Brigadier General Hansell | ||
| Colonel Roberts | ||
| Captain Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 6, 1943
Secret
Approval of conclusions of CCS 135th and 136th meetings
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 135th and 136th CCS meetings and also the minutes of the 4th Plenary Session held at the Kirk Villa. The detailed records of the meetings were also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia Command alternative to BUCCANEER (CCS 427)
Admiral Leahy suggested that the report by the Combined Staff Planners (CCS 427) should be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that the Appendix would require revision in the light of the decisions taken.
Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of CCS 427.
b. Agreed that the forces to be left in the Indian Ocean or to be withdrawn for the European Theater should be decided later.
Control of Strategic Air Forces in NW Europe and in the Mediterranean (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)
At the request of General Arnold, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer consideration of CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2 until their meeting on Tuesday, 7 December.
Overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417 and 417/1)
Admiral Leahy said that he felt no final decision could be taken on these papers pending decisions on operations to be undertaken in Burma and the Bay of Bengal.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it would assist the Combined Staff Planners in their further studies if the overall plan for the defeat of Japan could be accepted in principle as a basis for further work.
General Marshall said that he considered that in their further study, the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to prepare a plan of campaign for the China Theater proper, together with an estimate of forces required. He did not agree with the amendment suggested in paragraph 4 of the Enclosure to CCS 417/1 and preferred the original wording of paragraph 14 of CCS 417.
Sir Andrew Cunningham asked if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were prepared to approve the general concept that the main effort against Japan should be made in the Pacific.
Admiral King said that he agreed with this concept in principle.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan of campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944 (CCS 397 (Revised))
Admiral King said that he considered that this paper should be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff less any references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the specific operations against Japan, 1944 set out in CCS 397 (Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to Operation BUCCANEER.
Operations in the Southeast Asia Command (CCS 427)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff with regard to decisions covering operations in the Southeast Asia Command, as follows:
a. Delay major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
b. Make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
d. The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426). Certain additions and amendments were considered and agreed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the draft report to the President and the Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 426/1).
Relation of resources to plans
It was pointed out that though no final decision could be taken on operations in Burma pending replies to the messages sent to the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation with the shipping authorities, might well proceed with their examination of the extent to which the resources of the United Nations would meet the requirements in the light of decisions already taken. In this examination they should take into account the fact that the amphibious resources previously allocated to BUCCANEER would now be available for operations in Europe.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to instruct the Combined Staff Planners to proceed as proposed above.
Messages to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo
General Marshall read out draft messages which he had prepared which might be sent by the President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo. General Marshall undertook to circulate copies of these messages to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Future business
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet on Tuesday, 7 December 1943, and to include on their agenda the discussion of the Control of Strategic Air Forces in Northwest Europe and the Mediterranean, and Facilities for U.S. Forces in the Azores.
The Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
New Delhi, December 6, 1943
Secret
Seacos 38
Following for COS from Mountbatten
Your 051430 Dec. para 2 we have examined proposal very carefully and consider that no small amphibious operation can be carried out for the following reasons:
a. In view of enemy’s powers of concentration our seaborne air requirements will be the same whether the operation is large or small.
b. BUCCANEER was selected as objective for amphibious operation because it was the only worthwhile operation which could be carried out with the forces allotted.
c. There is no other objective which could be seized and held with the landing craft and assault shipping likely to be available under your para 1.
I am totally opposed to landing troops and withdrawing them since the psychological effect of such withdrawal is considerable and in this theater I regard this aspect as of the greatest importance.
Possibility remains of hit and run operations by carriers with a view to containing enemy air and possibly surface forces. This may reduce pressure on the SW Pacific and is being examined. Least force which would be necessary for operation of this type is Fleet carriers 2, Unicorn 1, Escorts 3.
The utility of extending inshore operations on the Arakan coast is being examined but they cannot be represented as amphibious operations or be considered to be of great significance. Such operations in order to be in any degree effective would require 12 LCI (L), 15 LCT (5), 6 LCS (M), 3 LCA Flotillas, 2 LCM Flotillas, 1 LCP Flotilla. Some of these forces might however be more profitably employed in some other theater other than SEAC.
Cancellation of BUCCANEER must inevitably lead to collapse of TARZAN since Generalissimo has only agreed to reduction in “hump” tonnage and cooperation on [of] Yunnan force if amphibious operation is staged at the same time. I have carried out a rapid examination of what could be done in the light of these circumstances and assuming that we could get the additional 25 first line transport aircraft promised by General Arnold in China a rough forecast is as follows:
a. That TARZAN in its original form will not be possible. In particular there will not be enough transport aircraft to fly in the 60th Parachute Brigade and the 26th Infantry Division to Indaw or to maintain them by air.
b. It will still be possible to employ all the LRPG’s but in conjunction with
c. An advance by 4th Corps down the Kabaw Valley and through the Chin Hills on to the Kalemyo Kalawa [Kalewa] area.
d. The Arakan operations would remain as in TARZAN**.**
e. The Ledo force would still be available to advance if the Generalissimo gave permission and they prove capable of doing so.
It is realized that this new operation the code for which is given in my immediately following telegram will not enable me to achieve the QUADRANT Directive of opening up the land route to China but it has certain merits.
a. It enables the LRPGs to operate thus confusing the Japanese and helping to inflict casualties.
b. It will still produce a considerable amount of air fighting.
c. The capture of the Kalemyo Kalewa area will give us a starting point from which to begin land operations against Mandalay.
d. It does not necessarily commit us to further operations in the center of Burma.
The original plan was based on the high fighting qualities believed to be possessed by the Ledo Force. If, however, they fail to advance in accordance with the general program the fly in to Indaw would have to be cancelled even after the starting of TARZAN so as to avoid leaving the 26th Division entirely isolated in Central Burma.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 270/13
Use of facilities in the Azores by U.S. aircraft
Although the United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 270/12), dated 3 December 1943, it is considered necessary to defer its consideration until more detailed reports and recommendations are available from such sources as the U.S. Army-Navy Reconnaissance Party in the Azores, the Air Ministry Officers now at Lagens Field, Terceira, the Air Transport Command, AAF, and the Transport Command, RAF.
Whatever decisions may be reached concerning the future extent, nature, and control of U.S. and British anti-submarine and in transit aircraft operations in the Azores, it is apparent that the expansion, completion, and maximum possible use of Lagens Field are matters of urgency. In order to render all possible assistance in the early completion of Lagens Field and to maintain U.S. anti-submarine, ferried, and transport aircraft operations, it is proposed to send appropriate U.S. construction, communications, meteorological and maintenance material and equipment, supplies, and personnel to Terceira on the first possible convoy. The United States Chiefs of Staff have been advised by representatives of the United States in Lisbon that Dr. Antonio Salazar, Premier of the Portuguese Government, has replied favorably to questions regarding this procedure.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 270/14
Development of facilities in the Azores
Reports from Lisbon indicate that, provided the U.S. are prepared to work under British cover, they will be able to obtain all the essential facilities in the Azores they require for the prosecution of the war.
As regards U.S. operational facilities at Lagens, we would suggest that a formula on the following lines might be acceptable to the Portuguese Government. They might be informed that American operational units in the Azores would be on loan to HMG operating under the command of a British officer from a base under British control.
As regards transit facilities, we recommend that we should await the outcome of Dr. Salazar’s consideration of the American proposal that the U.S. should construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria on behalf of the Portuguese Government. If this is unfavorable, as it may be in view of Dr. Salazar’s insistence on retaining the framework and principles of the British agreement, the British should then ask for authority to construct an aerodrome and should use American material and assistance under British cover.
The formula we would suggest for American transit aircraft would be that aircraft in transit through the Azores are controlled by British Air Transport Command. The second airfield, when constructed, would be under British Command, and aircraft using it would fulfill the same conditions as those using Lagens.
In any case the first step would be a survey of Santa Maria which could be done ostensibly by the British, but with the assistance of the four American officers who remained behind in Terceira, pending further instructions, after completion of work by American survey party recently in that island.
We do not foresee any requirements for two B-24 squadrons in the Azores, or, in fact, for two American squadrons of any type. Our requirement is a total of three squadrons of which two should be British squadrons, and we prefer to retain the two Fortress squadrons now at Terceira. We recommend that the third squadron should be an American B-24 squadron, which would replace the Hudsons now in the Azores. If this is agreed, we could also make the point to Dr. Salazar that the majority of operational units would be British and all under British command.
Memorandum by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, and the First Sea Lord
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 415/3
The provision of merchant shipping for the British Fleet for the war against Japan
The Combined Chiefs of Staff are requested to approve that the Ministry of War Transport and the War Shipping Administration should take into consideration the need for Fleet Auxiliaries for the British Fleet for operations in the war against Japan, and that they should take steps to provide the requisite ships after agreement in detail between the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the First Sea Lord.
Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 6 December 1943
Secret
CCS 401/2
VLR airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the following interpretation of paragraph 3 of CCS 401/1:
If the necessary work in India is to be completed by the desired date of April first, it is essential that United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by the 15th of January and, in addition, that certain resources be diverted from Ledo, which would result in delaying progress of road construction for a period of six weeks to two months.
Certain preparatory work in advance of arrival of American units and equipment can be done without interfering with SEAC projects, which, with arrival of necessary resources from the U.S. by January 15, will permit completion of the airfields by May 15.
H. REDMAN
F. B. ROYAL
Combined Secretariat
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:15 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Colonel Roosevelt |
The principal topic of conversation was the language of the proposed communiqué to the press respecting the conversations with Inönü.
The Shah of Iran to President Roosevelt
Tehran, December 6, 1943
Dear Mr. President, Your Minister duly delivered the framed photograph which Your Excellency was good enough to present to me, just before your departure, as a souvenir of your memorable visit to Tehran.
This handsome gift, a very good likeness, stands in a prominent place in my study and will always remind me of your great personality and the interesting conversation we had together on November 30.
Your Excellency’s kind letter of December 1 has also been gratefully received. The cordial sentiments therein expressed are entirely reciprocated, and I look forward to an ever-increasing cooperation between our two countries in the arts of peace to our mutual advantage.
Let me assure Your Excellency that the friendship of the American People is very precious to us; my constant desire will be to foster closer ties between Iran and the United States of America which have already been brought so near to one another in the common struggle for freedom.
It is indeed a matter for gratification that the momentous Tehran Conference was a success. We have to be particularly grateful to Your Excellency for your share in obtaining approval of the satisfactory communiqué issued yesterday regarding Iran, in the drafting of which Mr. Dreyfus, Your able and distinguished representative, has taken an outstanding part.
The kind invitation to visit Washington, extended by Your Excellency, is much appreciated and I hope to be able to avail myself of it and to have the pleasure of seeing You again as soon as circumstances permit.
With the assurance of my friendship and highest consideration, I remain dear Mr. President
Yours sincerely
MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI
Quadripartite meeting, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | ||
| Colonel Elliott Roosevelt | ||
| Turkey | Soviet Union | |
| President Inönü | Mr. Vinogradov |
The meeting discussed and agreed upon the language of the communiqué to be issued to the press respecting the conversations with Inönü.
Roosevelt-Hughes meeting, 4:45 p.m.
From Roosevelt:
When I was in Cairo I had a very nice visit from the Very Reverend Arthur Hughes. We talked about the Italian priests and also the Italian nuns who are interned or detained in Egypt and in Ethiopia, and the day I left I called the whole matter to Churchill’s attention and pleaded with him that these perfectly innocent people should be released, or at least allowed to do their work. I have not had any answer from the British as yet.
Roosevelt meeting with the King of Greece, 5 p.m.
His Majesty King George II of the Hellenes called on the President.
Third tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, 6 p.m. President’s villa
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Turkey |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | President Inönü |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu |
| Mr. Steinhardt | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Açikalin |
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen | Mr. Anderiman | |
| General Wilson | Mr. Kavur | |
| Air Chief Marshal Douglas | Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu | |
| Vice Admiral Willis | ||
| Air Vice Marshal George | ||
| Mr. Helm |
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443
U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes
December 6, 1943
Most secret
Prior to the meeting President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and the Turkish President had been in private conference.
Mr. Churchill said that the Turkish President had decided to postpone his departure until midnight on 7 December. This would provide an opportunity for going over the ground in greater detail. He had submitted to the President a plan of action and this would raise the question of how it was to be carried out if Turkey were attacked and drawn into the war. In the interval a plan would be drawn up for Turkish action in conjunction with the great Allies. There was also the question of political guarantees, if Turkey by her actions should be drawn into the conflict. It was right and proper that in this event the Allies should see Turkey through.
President Roosevelt remarked that when it came to the discussion of political guarantees it would be desired to include Soviet representatives.
The Turkish President said he had been in contact with Mr. Churchill during the afternoon when the essential points had been made. They would be able to discuss these tomorrow when the position would be clearer in all directions. He thought however that one feature governed the solution of the whole question, namely the period for material preparation. After that came other phases. As the President now understood it, however, such a period of preparation was not envisaged, or rather that a mixed method was contemplated. This was a cardinal point.
President Roosevelt thought in the first period Turkey would commit only neutral acts. She would receive equipment and material (Mr. Churchill – personnel) and men in mufti. Mr. Churchill remarked that in these conditions the Germans would not want to break with Turkey.
The Turkish President said that for months Turkey would face the German army alone. He had not contemplated this. He had thought that when the Germans declared war the Turks would be in touch with some Anglo-American forces. But in this period of months the Turks would be alone with the Germans. This was a great question and the President did not think he could decide upon it.
President Roosevelt remarked that he did not think that the Germans would declare war in the first period.
President Inönü said that their record showed that the Germans always attacked for prevention. When they saw after a certain time that Turkey had taken her place openly with the Allies, they would use this argument and attack.
President Roosevelt pointed out that the Turks had already been receiving supplies on a considerable scale without the Germans taking exception thereto. Why then should the Turks worry now? In the first period there would be no question of the Turks taking the kind of action which would justify the Germans attacking them. Surely the work on airfields and the introduction of material, flak, etc., i.e., the same sort of thing as had been going on in the past, could continue. This would apply to lend-lease material and the trucks previously promised would be delivered. In fact, there would be no change except that there would be an accelerated tempo.
Mr. Eden remarked that the technicians would also have to come in. This was essential.
President Inönü said that the Turks had replied to Mr. Eden’s request for air bases for the Allies. It has been said that the provision of these would not provoke war. The Turks had replied that they must regard the matter as very serious because they were convinced that it would provoke war. This meant contemplating Turkey’s entry into the war. The Turkish army was not ready and the country was exposed to enemy air attack. They must therefore have assistance and there would have to be a period of preparation. According to the plan action would begin at the end of this phase. We were now in the first phase and he understood that it was thought that preparation would take too long at a time when the Allies could not wait. The Allies seemed to think that the Turkish Government should act in spite of risks. This was difficult.
Mr. Eden said that a German land attack was most improbable, especially in view of the warning which Russia had promised to give to Bulgaria.
President Inönü said that Turkey would be exposed to air attack and also to land attack by the Bulgarian army fortified by the Germans. President Roosevelt doubted whether Bulgaria would face a hostile Russia.
President Inönü said that perhaps a hostile Russia would induce Bulgaria to hold back, perhaps it would not. The present Bulgarian government was completely committed to Germany.
President Roosevelt did not think that Bulgaria would declare war on Turkey, and he doubted whether the Germans had enough men to stage a German land offensive against Turkey by way of Bulgaria. President Inönü thought, however, that the Germans would be able to get to Istanbul.
In reply to a question by President Roosevelt President Inönü said that Turkey had about forty divisions scattered about the country. They were not prepared. If the Allies had been able to give the desired material assistance in the past the Turkish Government could have replied affirmatively to any demand. As it was they had put all available material, including some very very old stuff, into service. They had hoped that this entirely out of date material would be replaced by new material. How was it possible to get out of the impasse?
Mr. Churchill said that the first thing was to prepare the nests for the birds. This must be done secretly and discreetly in order not to alarm the Germans. The equipment and personnel agreed upon would be put in. Then would come the second phase when all was ready and when the air squadrons would arrive within twenty-four hours. From that moment Turkey would have much greater security than during the preliminary period.
President Inönü said that even if the twenty air squadrons had arrived or were ready to come in, it would not be possible to say that Turkey was ready. Complete plans for assistance would have to be made and material would have to come in for the fortification of the army. In the event of attack the Allies would have to assist. Only one part of the preparation for this assistance was being discussed. The rest was being left to wait. But during the preparatory period proposed in the discussions, he must prepare his army, mobilize it and concentrate it. Much had been done but it was most inadequate, and a sort of concentration must take place. All this was apparently to be finished by 15 February, and the Turkish army must be put on a war footing for the Germans would strike at the first sign of the entry of the twenty squadrons.
Mr. Churchill enquired whether the Turkish army was not already mobilized and was informed that it was half mobilized.
President Roosevelt suggested that if mobilization had first to take place it would take a long time and suggested, as did Mr. Churchill, that in any case mobilization would surely be more provocative than work on airfields.
President Inönü said that precipitate action without preparation seemed to be contemplated. He did not see any possibility of undertaking this.
Mr. Churchill remarked that the Turkish President seemed to think there was a serious danger of invasion. He however thought invasion by Bulgaria was most unlikely.
President Inönü said it was a matter of opinion. One could not be sure what the enemy would do. Both the Bulgarians and the Germans had forces on the Turkish frontier, and the Turks must calculate that they would all be used.
Mr. Churchill thought that it was impossible to get to a conclusion at this meeting. He would like to go over the ground with the Turkish President on 7 December together with documents. The discussion could not be concluded this evening.
President Roosevelt said that what he envisaged was to talk of the first period and to set an objective date for it. This date would not be a hard and fast one, but it would be something to aim at. During this period, which would be in two parts, the Turks would give the Germans and Bulgarians no excuse whatever for declaring war on Turkey. In the first part of the period, work on the airfields would go ahead exactly as had happened before, and supplies and equipment, delivery of which was behindhand, would be sent forward. Neither of these would give any excuse to the Germans.
The delivery by the Americans of the thousand lorries with which they were behind-hand would give the Germans no excuse or provocation. At the same time mechanics, equipment, Radar and technical equipment would come in as it had done before, and none of this would provide an excuse for Germany.
Mr. Churchill interjected that the flow would be on the same lines as before but on a much more intense scale, otherwise Turkey would not be ready.
President Roosevelt said that as regards work on the airfields, the work would go on as before and Turkish labour would be employed. This action would not provoke the Germans.
President Roosevelt went on to say that in the second part of his contemplated first period the Turks would bring more of their troops scattered throughout the country to the European side of the Bosphorus. Turkey had the right to do this without provoking an attack. It was President Roosevelt’s expectation (not alone his hope) that Turkey could get through the whole of this period without attack or war. At the end of it the tempo would be accelerated but by that time preparations would have got so far that the twenty squadrons could be brought in and be in action within twenty-four hours if Turkey were attacked.
President Inönü said it was a question of practical things. He was afraid that hopes could not be realized. The standpoint of the British was that Turkey must come in as soon as possible. If he said yes, the plan would be that proposed by Mr. Churchill, then Turkey would begin to mobilize. The first thing would be to facilitate the arrival of the British squadrons. Mr. Churchill’s expectation would then be realized. But this would mean Turkey’s immediate entry into the war and the only assistance she would receive would be air assistance. The Turks contended that they were not ready for immediate entry. Their view was that a planned preparation must be made before Turkey could enter. It seemed to be thought that in contending thus, the Turks were merely dragging things out and adopting delaying tactics.
President Roosevelt said that the Allies also were not ready, for the twenty squadrons would only be ready on 15 February and Mr. Churchill said that he was asking for the squadrons to come in on 15 February.
President Inönü said however that other things were necessary, in particular the army had to be strengthened.
Mr. Churchill enquired how long this would take. In view of the paucity of Turkish communications it would take months to make the Turkish army completely strong so as to enable Turkey to be safe and by that time there probably would be no desire that Turkey should come in. The war was going on and the moment for Turkey would pass. This was a serious possibility for the Turks.
President Roosevelt remarked that the Turkish army was very good, particularly the infantry. Its artillery was good, especially for ground warfare. It needed improved communications and aviation. He had been wondering whether by February 15 the Turkish army could not be trained and concentrated in the north to an extent adequate to ward off attack with the aid of air support.
President Inonu said that if this was a question only of mobilization and concentration it could be done, or at least for the greater part. But at the end of it the Turkish army would only have its present material. Technical points were now being discussed and Mr. Churchill said that the strengthening of the Turkish army would take months and months. It was twenty days since the Turkish government had given their reply of November 17, and nothing had happened in the interval. Turkey’s material needs could be studied and ascertained in a week and then the Allies could say, on the basis of supply and transport possibilities, how long it would take before Turkey was ready.
Mr. Churchill pointed out that Turkish communications had been fully occupied since the delivery of the Turkish note on November 17. The Turkish army was good; it had been mobilized for four years. It was a considerable force, much stronger than the Bulgarian army, and it had already received much. It was true that it had not received as much as the Turks would have liked, but he considered that the danger of a Bulgarian land attack was negligible. Mr. Churchill suggested that it would be better to adjourn the discussions. If President Roosevelt would confide the further discussions to him he would continue conversations with President Inönü on December 7 and report to President Roosevelt by telegram.
President Roosevelt said that he would have liked to have been here to complete the discussions, but that he must leave on 7 December. He urged very strongly that serious consideration should be given to the question of how much could be done before 15 February without giving offence to Germany and Bulgaria.
President Inönü said the situation seemed to be that Turkey would intervene on 15 February (President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at once contested this). There would be a period of preparation. What could the Allies give Turkey in two months? What could be carried? The Turkish General Staff would study these points. But what would happen after February 15? That, he presumed, would be the period for action.
President Roosevelt said it would not necessarily be the period of action. But from February 15 the Turks would be expected to do things which were no longer neutral. It meant that there would be two months before Bulgaria or Germany would attack, and Mr. Churchill remarked that in that time Bulgaria might well be out of the war.
President Inönü wondered at what the level of preparations would be in two months. It could not be determined without study.
Mr. Churchill said that this would be gone into in the further conversations. To the Turkish President’s remark that he had no military experts with him, Mr. Churchill said that the Allies would say what they could put in.
President Inönü said he would wait for this information. He could not say whether it would be enough, but he would take the information and return to Ankara. He would however be obliged to reserve his reply. To President Roosevelt’s remark that his Chief of Staff (General Somerville) would arrive tomorrow and be here for two days, the Turkish President enquired why there should not be staff talks. Mr. Churchill pointed out that time was too pressing and that the twenty squadrons had to be got ready.
President Inönü said that in three or four days he would be ready to reply. The decision would be taken on all the facts. They found themselves in a situation which was fixed by time, but he would see what could be provided within two months and the Turkish staff would offer their observations, including modifications and additions.
President Roosevelt thought that agreement should be reached on that. It was useless to talk about other matters. This was the core of the whole problem. He would leave General Somerville [Somervell], or his assistant, to pursue the discussions which were mainly military. Mr. Numan again remarked that the Turks had no military experts, but Mr. Churchill pointed out that the question should be discussed and the Turks then send their observations.
Mr. Eden stressed that not everything should be adjourned for consideration at Ankara. Things must be pushed forward.
Mr. Churchill cautioned that at the best not much could be provided for the Turkish army. The Turkish communications would be blocked by the delivery of the air programme. The agreed material and technicians must go forward, and there would not be much room for anything else. The Turks must therefore not put their military material expectations too high as otherwise all hopes would be killed.
President Inönü said he was forcing himself to try to find a possible position in the Allied programme. He was doing so with the best will in the world. But he must make the position clear. So far the Turks had no material. A preparatory period of two months was now proposed to him. He had not said that this was enough. The Allies had the material and the transport, but he did not know how much was going to be available. He understood however that the main effort was to be concentrated on aviation material and personnel. (Mr. Churchill interjected that air was the only danger). At present, as the Turkish President saw it, it was contemplated that Turkey would enter the war with anti-aircraft preparation alone.
President Roosevelt then suggested the conclusion of the meeting and kept back the Turkish President to whom he wished to bid goodbye.
740.0011 EW 1939/32203: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State
Moscow, December 6, 1943 — 7 p.m.
U.S. urgent
2131.
The announcement in Moscow in the newspapers for December 4 of the Conference was a complete surprise to me. There was agreement at the Conference that the two agreed declarations were to be released for publication not before December 6, 8 p.m., Moscow Time. Your 1344 December 4, midnight, not urgent, which was received here December 6, 3 p.m. and promptly decoded. Release was to be made simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington. It was my distinct understanding, and I was present, that it was understood that no mention of the Conference would be made before that time for security reasons. Since my return last night I have not seen Molotov who, I believe, only arrived back today and I am therefore unable at present to give an explanation of the reason which led the Soviet Government to authorize the announcement. It is not unlikely that the original reference by Reuters in Lisbon to a meeting of The Three and reports that Senator Connally in a broadcast had stated that a meeting was then taking place in the Middle East caused the Soviet Government to make the announcement in question.
I assume you have full information now as to the arrangements for simultaneous publication. I personally gave Major John Boettiger, of the President’s press staff, authentic copies of the two declarations in order that he might make the necessary technical arrangements.
I shall take the first suitable opportunity to ascertain from Molotov the reasons which led the Soviet Government to make the announcement.
HARRIMAN
Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and the Prime Minister
Cairo, December 6, 1943
Secret
CCS 426/1
The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at SEXTANT Conference is submitted herewith:
Overall objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.
Overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.
Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Basic undertakings in support of overall strategic concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia, including the coordinated action of our forces.
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.
i. Undertake such action to exploit the entry of Turkey into the war as is considered most likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the overall objectives.
j. Continue assistance to the French and Italian forces to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.
k. Prepare to reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as soon as the German situation allows.
Execution of the overall strategic concept
The U-boat war
We have received from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs encouraging reports regarding the U-boat war. (CCS 399 and 399/1)
The defeat of the Axis in Europe
The Combined Bomber Offensive
a. We have received a most encouraging report covering the combined bombing operations against Germany. (CCS 403)
b. The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.
c. We are agreed that the present plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive should remain unchanged except for revision of the bombing objectives which should be made periodically. The intensity of the operations of the 8th Air Force should be limited only by the aircraft and crews available.
EUREKA decisions
At the EUREKA Conference, the following military conclusions were approved by the President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin.
The Conference:
a. Agreed that the Partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by supplies and equipment to the greatest possible extent, and also by commando operations:b. Agreed that, from the military point of view, it was most desirable that Turkey should come into the war on the side of the Allies before the end of the year:
c. Took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that if Turkey found herself at war with Germany, and as a result Bulgaria declared war on Turkey or attacked her, the Soviet would immediately be at war with Bulgaria. The Conference further took note that this fact could be explicitly stated in the forthcoming negotiations to bring Turkey into the war:
d. Took note that Operation OVERLORD would be launched during May 1944, in conjunction with an operation against Southern France. The latter operation would be undertaken in as great a strength as availability of landing-craft permitted. The Conference further took note of Marshal Stalin’s statement that the Soviet forces would launch an offensive at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front:
e. Agreed that the military staffs of the three Powers should henceforward keep in close touch with each other in regard to the impending operations in Europe. In particular it was agreed that a cover plan to mystify and mislead the enemy as regards these operations should be concerted between the staffs concerned.
In the light of the above EUREKA decisions, we have reached agreement as follows regarding operations in the European Theater:
a. OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.
b. OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.
c. The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.
d. Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
e. Every effort must be made, by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.
Operations against Southern France
We have examined the operations to be undertaken against Southern France. We have instructed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in consultation with COSSAC, to submit, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation. He has been informed that it will take place at about the same time as Operation OVERLORD and that he will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions. He has been instructed to inform us of his requirements which cannot be met from the resources he will have at his disposal in the Mediterranean on that date.
Operations in Italy
We have agreed that in Italy the advance should be continued to the Pisa-Rimini line. We have informed the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, that he may retain in the Mediterranean until 15 January 1944 the 68 LSTs due for return to the United Kingdom. This will still allow these landing craft to reach the United Kingdom in time for OVERLORD.
Command in the Mediterranean
We have agreed to the unification of command in the Mediterranean Theater and have issued the necessary directive to General Eisenhower (CCS 387/3).
Support to the Balkans
We have issued special instructions to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, with regard to the assistance he should render to the Partisans (CCS 387/3, Appendix “B”).
Turkey
We have examined the role that Turkey might be called upon to adopt if she agrees to come into the war and the extent of our commitments that is likely to be involved. (CCS 418/1).
Coordination with the USSR
We have agreed that the necessary coordination of effort with the USSR should be arranged through the United States and British Military Missions in Moscow. We have agreed that deception experts should proceed to Moscow to coordinate plans with the Soviet Staff.
Emergency return to the continent
In developing his plans for RANKIN, COSSAC has submitted a recommendation (paragraph 11, CCS 320/2) that under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander the territories to be occupied should be divided into two spheres, the British sphere, including northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark, and the U.S. sphere, generally southern Germany and France, with Austria a U.S. sphere, initially under the Mediterranean command. It is understood that planning by COSSAC is now proceeding on this basis.
The United States Chiefs of Staff now propose that these spheres be changed as follows:
a. U.S. sphere. The general area Netherlands, Northern Germany as far east as the line Berlin-Stettin, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The boundary of this area is to be as follows: Southern boundary of the Netherlands; thence to Düsseldorf on the Rhine; down the east bank of the Rhine to Mains [Mainz]; thence due east to Bayreuth; thence north to Leipzig; thence northeast to Cottbus; thence north to Berlin (exclusive); thence to Stettin (inclusive).
b. British sphere. Generally the territory to the west and south of the American western boundary.
We have agreed that COSSAC be directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation.
We have further agreed that the Combined Intelligence Committee be instructed to keep the situation in Europe under constant review in relation to RANKIN and to report on the first of each month regarding this to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The war against Japan
Long-term strategy
Active study continues regarding the Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and we have approved in principle CCS 417 and 417/1 (less paragraph 4 of the enclosure to CCS 417/1) as a basis for further investigation and preparation, subject to final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to plan a campaign for the Chinese Theater proper, together with an estimate of the forces involved.
Specific operations in 1943-1944
We have approved the Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan in 1944 (CCS 397 Revised) with the exception of the references contained therein to BUCCANEER.
Higher direction of operations in Southeast Asia Command
We agree that it is undesirable for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to enter into details of various operations in this theater, but consider that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the exercise of their general jurisdiction over strategy in this theater must reach decisions as to which of several courses of action are to be undertaken and their sequence and timing.
Operations in the SE Asia Command
We have agreed to major amphibious operations in the Bay of Bengal until after the next monsoon and divert the landing craft now assigned to BUCCANEER to Operations ANVIL and OVERLORD.
We have decided:
a. To make all preparations to conduct TARZAN as planned, less BUCCANEER, for which will be substituted naval carrier and amphibious raiding operations simultaneous with the launching of TARZAN; and carry out air bombardment of the Bangkok-Burma railroad and the harbor of Bangkok, in the meantime maintaining naval control of the Bay of Bengal, or, alternatively,
c. Postpone TARZAN, increase to a maximum with planes available the airlift to China across the “hump,” and intensify the measures which will enable the B-29s to be brought to bear on the enemy.
The choice between alternatives b and c above will be made at a later date by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after obtaining an expression of opinion by the Generalissimo and the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command.
Relation of available resources to the operations decided upon
We have now in process of examination a study of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.
Conclusions on miscellaneous subjects
United Chiefs of Staff
We have studied proposals for the possible formation of a United Chiefs of Staff organization and, alternatively, the possible representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff of powers other than the U.S. and the British. We have agreed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should not take the initiative in putting forward either of the above proposals. We feel that if the USSR or China should raise the question, the difficulties of and objections to any form of standing United Chiefs of Staff Committee should be frankly explained to them. It should then be pointed out that the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington are responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the Anglo-American forces which are closely integrated in accordance with the broad policy laid down at the formal conferences such as Casablanca, TRIDENT, QUADRANT and SEXTANT, which are convened from time to time; and that the USSR and/or the Chinese Governments will be invited to join in any formal conferences which may be convened in the future, to take part in the discussion of any military problems with which they are specifically concerned.
NOTE: The matters still under study and decisions which have yet to be taken, notably in paragraphs 11, 15, 19, 21, 25, and 27, will be duly brought to your attention for approval.