America at war! (1941–) – Part 3

586

Senate puts soldier vote up to individual states

…

587

Baseball front quiet as Majors’ meeting ends

Landis to give deposed Cox chance to ‘clear his reputation’ today; only one deal put through in week

…

588

U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)

Quadripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.

Present
United States Turkey
President Roosevelt President Inönü
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Admiral Leahy Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Steinhardt Mr. Anderiman
Major Boettiger Mr. Sarper
United Kingdom Soviet Union
Prime Minister Churchill Mr. Vinogradov
Foreign Secretary Eden Mr. Mikhailov
Sir Alexander Cadogan
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen

According to Leahy:

President Roosevelt on December 4 gave a dinner in honor of the Turkish President. It was an interesting affair, all the conversation being in French, which the President spoke without hesitation.

After the dinner, the Prime Minister joined the party and promptly laid siege to President Inonu to induce him to cast the fate of his country with the Allies. Churchill did most of the talking. Inonu just listened. Later, the President told his British colleague that if he, Roosevelt, were a Turk, he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning neutrality and leading his nation into war.

589

McCloy-Jebb meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. McCloy Mr. Jebb
Major General Kirby

The principal topics of discussion were apparently the proposed liaison procedure between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, British attitudes toward the adoption of this procedure, and the desirability of McCloy’s going to London to advocate there its adoption.

590

U.S. State Department (December 5, 1943)

The Assistant Secretary of War to the President’s special assistant

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Dear Harry: I had a good talk with Jebb and General Kirby last night. They said finally they were convinced that the arrangement we had was sound but each of them urged me to go to London and put the case to the people there on the ground. Though they were convinced, they felt they could not get anywhere with the War Cabinet by either cabling or putting the case themselves when they got home. This does not make much sense to me, particularly if Winant is on the ground and holds out for what we want, as he says he will.

I feel that this matter is something the President and the Prime Minister are not going to get to and should not get to, for that matter, as it can be settled satisfactorily on a lower level. I have some real work to do in Italy and am anxious to start back. If Winant, after getting back to London, feels that I should go up there he can cable me at Algiers and if Stimson agrees, I’ll go up – otherwise I will go on home.

If the Prime Minister should bring it up before the end of the Conference I think the thing to do is to say we are working the thing out, that all that we want is to set up the machinery whereby we have the chance to work out sound decisions on some of the most difficult problems imaginable. That, above all, it is shortsighted to attempt to move all such decisions to London. The arrangement we had will work and it is the only one which has the chance of working expeditiously.

I am leaving Colonel T. W. Hammond here until the end of the Conference. He is fully familiar with the whole subject and he will be at your service on call. His telephone number is Conference 83.

I leave early tomorrow (Monday) morning.

Sincerely,
JJ

591

Völkischer Beobachter (December 5, 1943)

Von Kairo bis Teheran –
Das anglo-amerikanische Verräterspiel

b—r. Bern, 4. Dezember –
Durch eine Samstag vormittag in Moskau ausgegebene Mitteilung wurde nun offiziell bestätigt, daß in Teheran, der Hauptstadt Irans, eine Zusammenkunft zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill stattgefunden habe. Diplomatische und militärische Vertreter der drei beteiligten Mächte hätten an der Konferenz teilgenommen. Fragen der Kriegführung gegen Deutschland und auch eine Reihe politischer Fragen seien besprochen worden. Die Entscheidungen würden später veröffentlicht werden.

Man ist also mit den abschließenden Formulierungen, die man sicherlich als Wochenendsensation herausgeben wollte, nicht rechtzeitig fertig geworden. Bei aller Gemeinsamkeit des Vernichtungswillens gegen Deutschland haben sich die realen Interessengegensätze wohl kaum als gering erwiesen. So hat man sich zunächst mit einem nichtssagenden Vorbericht begnügt, der der anglo-amerikanischen Presse noch keine festen Grundlagen für ihre politischen Spekulationen gibt. Sie muß sich begnügen, darauf hinzuweisen, daß Stalin anläßlich dieser Konferenz zum erstenmal seit der russischen Revolution den Boden der Sowjetunion verlassen hat. Freilich hat er, wie hinzuzufügen ist, sich nur eine beschiedene Strecke weit außer Landes begeben und die beiden Anglo-Amerikaner haben ihn den weitaus größten Teil des Weges entgegenkommen müssen. Die Wahl des von den Sowjets besetzten Teiles von Iran für die Konferenz ist selbstverständlich auf das Sicherheitsbedürfnis Stalins zurückzuführen. Dieser hätte sich nie darauf eingelassen, sich an einen Ort zu begeben, wo er sich nicht durch seine eigene GPU.-Leibwache schützen lassen könnte.

Enttäuschung in London

tc. Stockholm, 4. Dezember –
Die Unzufriedenheit der englischen Öffentlichkeit mit den Beschlüssen der Kairokonferenz ist im Zunehmen begriffen. Sofern über die Konferenz in Teheran kein Ergebnis bekannt wird, das die Erwartungen der Öffentlichkeit in England mehr befriedigt, dürfte Churchill nach seiner Rückkehr keineswegs mit der Begeisterung empfangen werden, die sich viele als Ergebnis des Dreimächtetreffens versprochen hatten.

Wie Aftonbladet aus London berichtet, mehren sich die Stimmen, die in der Bekanntgabe der Kairoer Beschlüsse, wenn nicht schon in diesen selbst, einen schweren taktischen Fehler erblicken. Nicht nur der Umstand, daß die Absicht der vollständigen Zerschlagung des japanischen Reiches den Widerstand der Japaner ebenso wie der Deutschen aufs äußerste verstärken muß, gibt zur Mißstimmung Anlaß. Nicht weniger schärf wird das Fehlen jeglicher positiven Pläne gerügt. Nachdrücklich kommt die Kritik in einem Aufsatz der konservativen Wochenschrift Spectator zum Ausdruck, wo im Hinblick auf Europa die Politik der „Alliierten“ kritisiert wird, weil sie nur die deutsche These, daß die Vernichtung Deutschlands das Kriegsziel der „Alliierten“ sei, bestätige.

592

U.S. State Department (December 5, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret

Approval of conclusions of CCS 134th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.

Draft agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 423 and 423/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them draft agreements prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively.

Admiral Leahy said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation TARZAN and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander must be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the operations in Southeast Asia.

Admiral Leahy said he did not think this was the case. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of TARZAN. In the latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China.

Sir Charles Portal said he did not believe this would be the case, since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops.

General Arnold said that if there were no land operations the Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our fighters.

Sir Charles Portal reminded General Arnold that the ferry route was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing.

General Arnold said he agreed that more could be done with better weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines and had a very large number of airfields available.

General Marshall said that he considered that it was not only a question of cutting the airline; there was also the Japanese ground effort to be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten with its consequent publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation TARZAN were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long-range penetration groups only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation TARZAN would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign.

Sir Charles Portal asked if it was considered that the amphibious operation was essential on purely military grounds.

General Marshall expressed the personal view that it would be of assistance but was not vital.

Sir Charles Portal then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task.

General Marshall pointed out that there was no insistence on Operation BUCCANEER. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor against Ramree were worthwhile.

Admiral King said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of BUCCANEER might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean.

Sir Andrew Cunningham denied this suggestion.

Admiral King, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of the Eastern Fleet would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. He (Admiral King) was much concerned over the success of TARZAN. He had always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the means available, far better, for instance, than CULVERIN. On purely military grounds he considered that Operation BUCCANEER was as much a part of TARZAN as ANVIL was of OVERLORD.

Sir Alan Brooke said he felt that the military implications had been overstated. If Operation BUCCANEER were not undertaken, the Chinese forces might withdraw from TARZAN, but they were, even at present, an unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific front. He did not regard Operation BUCCANEER as a justifiable diversion from our main object.

General Arnold said that the 14th Air Force was operating “on a shoestring.” They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the ground.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the need to supply them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to the use of the 14th Air Force.

Admiral King felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base.

General Arnold said that as he saw it, there were three threats: firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air action.

Sir Charles Portal asked if it was agreed that if BUCCANEER was abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, it would be of the greatest assistance to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Admiral King said that on this basis it might be suggested that resources should be given up from the Pacific to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Sir Charles Portal said that this consideration too, ought not to be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment of BUCCANEER must increase the chances of success of OVERLORD and ANVIL and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances with either of these two operations. The abandonment of BUCCANEER would give far greater military advantages to the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement (subsequently circulated as CCS 423/2).

Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive proposed by them in CCS 400/2.

b. Agreed to defer action on these papers.

Directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean (CCS 387/1 and 387/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of CCS 387/2. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted CCS 387/2 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 387/3).

Amphibious operation against the South of France (CCS 424)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that afternoon.

Directive for intensification of support of Partisan forces in Yugoslavia (CCS 425)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the draft directive to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa with regard to Balkan support, and

b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being issued.

593

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AF, North Africa 

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 387/3

We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases in the area.

We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You should assume, therefore, that all present arrangements continue with the exceptions outlined below but you should report as necessary whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience.

To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Crete and Aegean Islands and Turkey. The British and American forces allocated to you from Middle East will be determined by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your Command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have agreed. The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for operations in these areas.

You will provide U.S. Strategic Air Forces under separate command, but operating in your area, with the necessary logistical and administrative support in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, you may, at your discretion, utilize the 15th U.S. Strategic Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, if and when that command is organized.

You will, in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups in occupied territories.

The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will remain directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in Middle East Command situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, and for the operation and security of the Middle East base with such forces as the British Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time.

You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any necessary political advice from C-in-C Middle East through the channels he at present uses.

The system of Command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix “A”). You will note that the Mediterranean Air Command will now be known as Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

Appendix “B”

Balkan support

It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Patriots in the Balkans, which now falls within the area in which you are responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their effectiveness.

You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support as you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation.

You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Patriots with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be necessary with available British or American equipment.

We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff.

594

Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt (in the chair) Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Hollis

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes 

December 5, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret

The President read out to the Conference a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which signatures could be affixed.

The Prime Minister suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for example, in January?

General Marshall said that this would not be possible.

The President inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given for the operation.

General Arnold said that Southeast Asia Command were working to a date in the middle of March.

Admiral Leahy remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning of May.

The Prime Minister said that he was disturbed at the growth in the forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1 was required, this, in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of course, be carried out as arranged.

The President said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with TARZAN. He, the President, was a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians.

The Prime Minister observed that BUCCANEER would not really influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon the supplies she received over the “hump.”

Mr. Hopkins inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1 March, landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL?

Sir Andrew Cunningham did not think this would be possible. A considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault.

Admiral King agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even assuming that these operations took place in late May.

Mr. Hopkins inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this question had not yet been examined in detail.

The Prime Minister, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders.

Sir John Dill inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was generally agreed that no specific date had been set.

A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new moon on 22 May.

General Marshall said that ANVIL might take place at the same time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later.

Mr. Hopkins said as far as he could see, the situation was about as follows:

There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing craft for the required assault on Southern France, then there would definitely not be enough landing craft for these operations.

Admiral Leahy said that while it was apparent that there was sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing.

The Prime Minister said he felt there were a good many new, revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between BUCCANEER and TARZAN.

Mr. Hopkins inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented if possible.

Mr. Anthony Eden said that it was unfortunate that we cannot separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them connected.

Admiral King said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except possibly as a part of other incidental operations.

General Brooke said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent operation is to continue on to Rangoon.

The Prime Minister observed that operations on land such as TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL.

Sir Charles Portal inquired whether it would not be possible to substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER. The Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the Generalissimo’s requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon.

Admiral King said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort of “hit-and-run” operations.

Mr. Hopkins inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do what he could with what he had?

The Prime Minister observed that both OVERLORD and ANVIL were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a diversion such as BUCCANEER.

Mr. Hopkins said he understood there was nothing in any CCS paper to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for ANVIL.

The Prime Minister pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more.

Mr. Hopkins said it made no difference in the number of landing-craft whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He asked if Lord Mountbatten’s landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted?

Admiral Cunningham replied that Admiral Mountbatten’s lift is about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary.

Admiral King pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England with a lift of the 4½ divisions contemplated. He further observed that his understanding was that the number of troops in the initial OVERLORD assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing front in France.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, in his view, the landing could be extended and use made of other beaches.

Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the LSI(L)s could be more economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short cross-Channel haul.

The Prime Minister said that while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and bound up with TARZAN.

Continuing, the Prime Minister suggested that the Generalissimo should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect [affect?] TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan forces would allow more supplies to go over the “hump.”

Sir Alan Brooke said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting.

Admiral King said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month’s production of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the Pacific now.

The President said he would like the possibility of a series of “hit-and-run” raids to be examined.

Sir Andrew Cunningham, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battleships, cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL.

The Prime Minister said that assuming that the President and United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work on the problems which had emerged from the discussion. First came ANVIL. A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the beginning of February, the U.S. and British squadrons should be ready to move in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should be intensified. By this time, we should expect some reactions from Germany, but as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater risks.

Admiral Leahy said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the adjustment of resources to plans, including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with what was left in Southeast Asia.

The Prime Minister suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously narrow margin.

General Arnold explained the possibilities and capabilities of the very long-range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta.

The Prime Minister inquired how the construction of these airfields was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress reports.

The Conference:
a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing the assaults in each case.

b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks.

c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would receive if they entered the war.

595

Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 423/2

Operations in the European Theater

OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.

OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.

The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.

Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.

Every effort must be made by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.

The decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference covering the bombing of German industrial targets and the destruction of the German Air Force, as set forth in paragraph 10 of CCS 319/5, are reaffirmed.

Operations in Southeast Asia Theater

Views of U.S. Chiefs of Staff Views of British Chiefs of Staff
Political and military considerations and commitments make it essential that Operation TARZAN and an amphibious operation in conjunction therewith should take place. Apart from political considerations, there will be serious military repercussions if this is not done, not only in Burma and China, but also in the Southwest Pacific. We fully realize that there are political and military implications in the postponement of BUCCANEER. As regards the political implications, we must leave these to be taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister. As regards the military disadvantages, these are overridden by the far greater advantages to be derived from a successful invasion of the Continent, and the collapse of Germany.
The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be told that he must do the best that he can with the resources already allocated to him.
596

Roosevelt-Inönü meeting, 2 p.m.

Present
United States Turkey
President Roosevelt President Inönü
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt Mr. Açikalin
Mr. Anderiman
Mr. Kavur
Mr. Sarper
597 
891.00/2068: Telegram

The Minister in Iran to the Secretary of State 

Tehran, December 5, 1943 — 4 p.m.
1090.

Persian language newspaper Friend of Iran published by (reference my 1086, December 3) Soviet Embassy press section this morning carried full text of declaration regarding Iran signed here December 1.

So far as I know, no other Tehran morning paper published text of referred to declaration in any way. However, upon learning of its publication in Soviet paper, Prime Minister Soheily this morning released it to Tehran press and it will undoubtedly appear in all afternoon newspapers.

General Hurley and I had understood definitely that no release was to be made by anyone until 8 tomorrow night, Moscow time, and neither the British nor ourselves had released anything regarding the conference or the declaration on Iran. We shall still delay until tomorrow in accordance with instructions.

Repeated to Moscow and Cairo.

DREYFUS

598

Second tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, 3 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Turkey
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill President Inönü
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Açikalin
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen Mr. Anderiman
General Wilson Mr. Kavur
Air Chief Marshal Douglas Mr. Torgut Menemencioğlu
Air Vice Marshal George
Mr. Helm 
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes 

December 5, 1943, 3 p.m.
Secret

Prior to the full meeting President Roosevelt had been in conference with the Turkish representatives. On the arrival of H. M. Ambassador at Ankara, but before the arrival of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden, President Roosevelt had explained what he had been saying to the Turks. Though he did not know what Mr. Churchill might say, it seemed to him that there could be three stages. He saw objection to dates for these stages though there should be a general date. In the first phase he felt that the delivery of the Adana material, which he understood was considerably behind, should be got on with as quickly as possible. Also in this first phase the airfields and other defences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes themselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.

President Roosevelt’s second phase would overlap the first. It was what he would call the cooperative period, during which he regarded as a real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Military Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British representative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish officer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many military developments for the next three, four or five months. They would know all that was going on as regards military plans and activities, e.g., as regards Crete, Rhodes, etc.

Then, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase – political. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the Americans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The President thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until everything else had been tied up. Now was the time to talk. President Roosevelt doubted whether dates could be fixed for these stages.

President Inönü remarked that the practical side must be envisaged. If the Allies continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in four or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war and for discussions then to start. He very much regretted that the Russians were not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would have been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could realise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates was impracticable.

President Roosevelt thought there was much in this and summarised the position as being that the Turks did not want to be caught with their pants down.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said that this would depend on the extent of infiltration in the preparatory period.

President Roosevelt said that the target date was dependent on progress.

General Wilson said that they did not want a scramble. They wanted to get the equipment and everything in so as to be in a position to operate within 24 hours. If things had to be rushed, they would not be used to the best advantage. It would be best if nothing happened before all was ready.

At this stage Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden joined the meeting. President Roosevelt then briefly summarised the above, remarking that he thought it a mistake to date each stage. The final date might be determined but not the date of the intermediate stages. He understood that there had been a fall-down on Adana promises. As an instance he quoted that 1800 trucks had been promised but only 800 delivered. These past delays today affected Turkey’s ability to defend herself.

Mr. Churchill said that there was another factor. The Turks had not taken full advantage of the school and tuition opportunities offered to them and this had affected their ability to absorb the available material. In this connection Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that 70 [sic] aircraft (54 Hurricanes and 18 Beauforts) had been waiting ready for the Turks to collect for the last three months.

President Inönü reminded Mr. Churchill of his remark at Adana when inspecting newly arrived Hurricanes, that we no longer regarded these as the most modern. They were in fact out of date. No doubt imperative considerations had made it impossible to supply better planes.

Mr. Churchill said that the situation had greatly changed since Adana. In the interval Italy had fallen and it had been necessary to take military supplies for the battle-fields in the Central Mediterranean. As a result, the Eastern Mediterranean had not received full supplies. Even so Turkish sea and railway transport had been fully engaged since Adana and the greater part of the Adana supplies had been delivered. The result was that today the Turks were much stronger than they had been at Adana.

President Inönü said that the position taken up by Mr. Churchill at Adana had been generous and comprehensible. The situation today was not so clear and in fact was not known. Frankly he did not know what was required. Was it not possible to get out of the impasse? If a date was fixed for pushing Turkey into the war in the near future, e.g., in a matter of weeks, there would be an impasse. Was not the decision of Turkey to come into the war of some importance?

Mr. Churchill said it was fundamental. It represented a new stage. The principle had been established. It remained to study the method.

President Inönü said the question seemed to be when Turkey would enter the war. She had stated her conditions. He had spoken of plans of preparation and collaboration. Her representatives wanted to know how they could render service. They wanted to know the risks they would run and how their forces would be used.

Mr. Churchill assented.

President Inönü remarked that the question of when Turkey would be ready was a practical one. It depended on preparation. Just be-for lunch he had received a plan. (Mr. Eden remarked that this plan had been based on a telegram from Tehran). President Inönü went on to say that since Adana 250 medium anti-aircraft guns had been delivered; of these about half were in use and the other half had arrived in recent months. The Turks were agreeable to giving them to British personnel to handle.

Air Vice Marshal George remarked that there were 138 of these anti-aircraft guns to be taken over. According to General Wilson they would be replaced by guns already in the Middle East.

Mr. Churchill said that the replacement guns were here but that they must not go into store. They should go straight to the airfields.

President Inönü said that this (the Tehran plan), though something by itself, was not a sufficient preparation for an army. He had thought it a complete plan and it seemed to him to be only a semblance of preparation.

Mr. Churchill remarked that it was not so bad as that. It seemed to Mr. Churchill that first of all there should be the period of preparation. He hoped that this could begin at once. Throughout it transport facilities should be utilised to the maximum extent. Perhaps a period of six weeks would be required. Throughout this period everything would be camouflaged though the flow would steadily grow. But Turkish policy outwardly would be unchanged. No doubt the Germans would be suspicious but the development would go steadily on.

President Inönü remarked that if the experts studied the necessary measures for two or three days they would no doubt be able to say when everything would be ready.

Mr. Churchill replied that within a period of six weeks it ought to be possible to make considerable preparations against air attack.

Mr. Churchill said that the second stage would then come, i.e., British and American aircraft would come to the fields prepared for them.

President Inönü said that the Turks must regard the day of the arrival of the aircraft as the day of the declaration of war. They must regard the arrival of the Allied aircraft with the utmost seriousness and must count it as the beginning of a state of war with Germany.

President Roosevelt said that it was not desired that war should occur until the fields were ready or indeed until everything was ready. He explained that by everything he meant everything in connection with the preparation and defence of the airfields.

President Inönü said that, as he understood the position, the airfields would be prepared in six weeks as one part of a general plan of preparations. After six weeks the Allied planes would arrive. Mr. Churchill seemed to think that this did not necessarily mean a declaration of war by either side. In that event preparations would continue to go on, e.g., for two months (Mr. Churchill suggested one month) or two weeks, and that then the Turks should take the initiative in declaring war.

Mr. Churchill said preparations would continue so long as they were not interrupted. Effective air protection would be provided when everything was in place. Then would come the third phase when it could be arranged to employ forces against the German-held islands. At the same time American aircraft would bomb Bulgarian airfields and so reduce the possibility of air attack on Turkey. Russia also would warn Bulgaria. This might be somewhere about January 15 or 20th. He did not want to push Turkey into a bad position and perhaps she might be ready for effective action about the end of February.

President Inönü said that he could not contemplate the conclusion of the first stage mentioned by Mr. Churchill and the arrival of the Allied aeroplanes without the expectation or intention of a declaration of war.

Mr. Churchill said this was not certain.

President Inönü said he must be able to explain the position to his people. He must say that there had been no provocation. Turkey’s engagements to Britain were known and it was right that Turkey should be prepared to defend herself. He understood that if Turkey were attacked the aircraft would be there to help her within 24 hours.

Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas explained that this would depend on the moment of attack. If Germany were to attack immediately the Turks returned to Angora and before any preparations had been made, air assistance could not arrive for a week. If the attack came 15 days after the beginning of the period of preparation, there would be a delay of 3 or 4 days. If however it were delayed for a month after the beginning of the preparatory period, the planes would be there in 24 hours. Thus, Mr. Churchill pointed out, it was very important that the period of infiltration should be as long as possible so that the planes could come effectively into action immediately they arrived.

At the request of President Inönü, Mr. Numan said that the discussions had perhaps rather wandered and that there might be some misunderstanding. It had not been President Inönü’s purpose to ask how soon the Allied squadrons would arrive. His point was the danger of war at the end of the 6 weeks’ period of preparation. This danger might be 100%, but even if it were only 30% the Turks must still regard it as 100%, and Mr. Numan said that Turkey could not envisage being in the war at the end of this period of preparation.

Mr. Eden enquired what therefore was the Turkish proposal.

President Inönü said that a general plan of preparation must be agreed among the experts. Both parties must play a part in reaching a decision as to what was a reasonable, practical plan. The British would then be able to estimate the period required for its execution. Within that period the plan of future collaboration could be developed and the contemplated political discussions could be engaged. The Allies must however give up the idea of having Turkey in the war within 6 weeks. Otherwise the discussions had reached an impasse.

Mr. Numan said that the difference between the two sides seemed to be essentially that, whereas the Allies regarded time as being the determining factor, the Turks regard preparations as being that factor. The Turkish President wanted a plan of preparation. It might be that that could be completed in 5 days. If it could, then the Turks would come in in five days. If, however, it took 5 months the Allies on their side must accept that period.

Mr. Churchill said he was in sympathy with much of what Mr. Numan had said. The preparatory period would however be over when the squadrons could land in force and be in action within 24 hours. The guns would be there to defend the nests but the fighters were the birds which used these nests. Mr. Churchill explained that what he asked for was the inception at the earliest possible moment and in full vigour of the preparatory plan. This meant the arrival of supplies and material and of men in mufti against the arrival of the protecting air squadrons. Once this protection was established the situation would become dangerous for the enemy. In the intervening period, i.e., before the arrival of the protecting squadrons, the situation would be dangerous for Turkey. Once the airfields were ready the squadrons could come in within 24 hours. He doubted whether the Germans would then declare war on Turkey. Perhaps they would not attack. The Turkish Government could say that the squadrons were there for Turkish protection. Once there, Turkey would be defended. The personnel would come in advance and the squadrons later. This was what had happened at Lisbon. He knew that the circumstances were not the same. They were however similar.

Mr. Numan contested this. He pointed out that the Germans could not attack the Azores.

Mr. Churchill replied that this was so but that the Germans could have bombed Lisbon. President Roosevelt and he had always thought that the Germans would not bomb Lisbon. They had an interest in not doing so. Portuguese wolfram was important to Germany – it was in fact the chrome of Portugal. The position was much the same as regards Turkey. What point would there be in Germany attacking her?

Mr. Numan suggested that the question of the Azores be left alone. The Atlantic battle had been decided. The use of Turkish bases was quite a different matter since it would be for direct attack on Germany.

President Inönü enquired what differences there were between what the Prime Minister had said and what the British had negotiated with the Turkish General Staff.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas said there was no real difference. The Air Attaché had merely been discussing the first phase.

Mr. Numan pointed out that there had been 5 points in the discussions of the Service Attachés. Some of these were practicable. Others were not. The Turks could not agree to the infiltration of personnel but they could and did agree to the infiltration of the requisite number of specialists.

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that the Service Attachés had asked for the infiltration of 7,000 personnel. This figure had now been reduced to 2,000.

At the request of President Inönü Mr. Numan explained that the question of the preparation of the airfields was not the only question. There must be a general plan of which the question of airfields would form a part, indeed perhaps the principal part and the one requiring the greatest priority. He suggested the despatch of experts to Angora to discuss the general plan and to make any other necessary proposals.

Mr. Churchill said that he wanted the preparations to begin at once, i.e., to get supplies, material and personnel introduced into Turkey forthwith and so get the airfields ready. This must be done with the utmost discretion and secrecy. There would be no overt change of Turkish policy. It was however essential that it should begin at once and when the airfields were ready for the planes, we should then want them to come in. The Turkish position would then be completely changed.

Mr. Numan said there was one small point on which he hoped for agreement, namely that there were two questions: that of the period of preparation and that of the declaration of war. He considered that the entry of personnel would provoke war. The second stage would come with the arrival of the squadrons, for within a few days thereafter Turkey would be at war. It was necessary to separate these two points now. At the same time, it was, however, also necessary to begin preparations now.

Mr. Churchill remarked that the discussion seemed to have got into a difficult circle. We were satisfied that no preparation could be effective without the introduction of personnel while the Turks refused the introduction of personnel because of the danger of provoking Germany. Thus, no preparation could be made against Germany being provoked.

At this stage the meeting was adjourned and on the resumption it was suggested that, before a further plenary meeting was held, a discussion should take place between a small committee headed by Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Numan and Mr. Eden. The meeting of this committee was arranged for 6 p.m.

599

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Admiral Leahy General Brooke
General Marshall Air Chief Marshal Portal
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Arnold Field Marshall Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell Lieutenant General Ismay
Vice Admiral Willson General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Cooke Major General Stopford
Rear Admiral Bieri Rear Admiral Troubridge
Rear Admiral Badger Air Vice Marshal Baker
Major General Sutherland Major General Laycock
Major General Stratemeyer Captain Lambe
Major General Handy Brigadier Sugden
Major General Fairchild Air Commodore Elliot
Major General Wedemeyer Brigadier McNair
Brigadier General Kuter Colonel Cornwall-Jones
Brigadier General Hansell
Brigadier General Roberts
Captain Freseman
Commander Long
Secretariat
Captain Royal Brigadier Redman
Colonel McFarland Commander Coleridge

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

December 5, 1943, 3 p.m.
Secret

Operations in Southeast Asia

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed future operations in Southeast Asia with Lt. Gen. [Major General] Stopford, Bear Admiral Troubridge and Air Vice Marshal Baker.

General Stopford said that a plan had been made for the capture of the Andamans, based on a troop lift of 58,000. It was now felt that the operation to capture Port Blair could be undertaken with a troop lift of 50,000 men. However, the latest intelligence on Japanese dispositions, particularly their air dispositions, had led to the conclusion that it would be necessary to capture Kar Nicobar and retain it for use by ourselves.

In reply to a question by Sir Andrew Cunningham, Admiral Troubridge said that shipping was available for the required assault lift of 24,700 for Port Blair. The remainder of the shipping required could be procured. The estimate of the potential strength of Japanese air forces in the area had recently risen from some 300 aircraft to 600. It had originally been intended to knock out the airstrip on Kar Nicobar with a commando raid, but now it was felt that a brigade was required and the Air Commander-in-Chief considered that the 120 carrier-borne aircraft provided in the plan were insufficient and should be raised to 240 carrier-borne aircraft. Virtually all the assault shipping required was now available.

Air Vice Marshal Baker explained that the estimate of 600 enemy aircraft was the total force the enemy could assemble within striking distance of the Andamans. This would include those based on an arc from South Burma to the north tip of Sumatra. Some 80 to 100 enemy aircraft could be based in the Andamans and Kar Nicobar.

General Stopford said that no plan had yet been completed for the capture of Kar Nicobar. It was estimated that there were 5,000 Japanese troops in the Port Blair area and that they could build up to a total of 3,000 in Kar Nicobar.

Admiral Leahy said that an estimate of 50,000 Allied troops against some 5,000 Japanese appeared excessive.

General Stopford explained that the figure of 50,000 included troops required for the development of facilities in the island, the building of airfields and strips, and for work in the docks. It was estimated that of the total of 50,000 some 34,000 would be fighting troops, including headquarters, engineers, and anti-aircraft units; some 16,000 would be non-fighting troops.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, Admiral Troubridge explained that the present date fixed for Operation BUCCANEER was 23 March. This date was dependent on tide and moon conditions and could not be advanced since the necessary naval covering force would not be available in the area before 15 March.

Sir Alan Brooke then asked what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be undertaken, assuming that the bulk of the BUCCANEER landing craft and shipping was returned to the European Theater. This operation might take place either against the islands or on the mainland.

General Stopford said that he would like to consider this possibility further before giving a definite reply.

Admiral King said that he would like to repeat a statement he had made at the Plenary Meeting earlier that day to the effect that if additional carriers were found necessary for BUCCANEER, he believed, though he could not guarantee, that he could find some four to six additional CVEs.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered the remainder of the agenda in closed session.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the relationship of Operation BUCCANEER to Operation ANVIL.

Sir Alan Brooke said that as regards ANVIL, the critical part of the operation would be the seizure of a bridgehead, including a port through which the buildup could take place. The assault must be in sufficient strength to tide us over this dangerous period, otherwise we were in danger of being thrown into the sea.

General Marshall, in discussing the timing of Operation ANVIL, said that he felt that it should take place after rather than before OVERLORD and suggested that a period of approximately one week should lapse between the launching of the two operations.

Sir Alan Brooke said that he agreed with this view. COSSAC had been of the same opinion. He did not wish France to rise before the launching of Operation OVERLORD, nor could the timing of Operation OVERLORD itself be exact in view of weather conditions in the Channel.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed the wording of a telegram to Admiral Mountbatten with regard to possible operations in his theater on the assumption that certain of his resources were removed to the European Theater.

At this point General Wedemeyer entered the meeting.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, had he realized General Wedemeyer was still here, he would of course have asked him to be present during the discussion with the Force Commanders. He asked General Wedemeyer if he would give his views on possible alternative amphibious operations of a hit-and-run nature capable of accomplishment with less forces than BUCCANEER.

General Wedemeyer said that he considered that some operation commensurate with these lesser resources could be undertaken. The Supreme Commander had been given the objective of opening the land route to China through Upper Burma. It was considered that an amphibious operation would contribute in the military sense to the success of this task, and Operation BUCCANEER had been decided on as the operation most likely, with the means available, to assist this task. It would deceive the enemy and split his air forces. Amphibious operations along the coast had also been considered but were rendered difficult by weather, tides, and the lack of ports through which they could be maintained.

General Wedemeyer considered that a hit-and-run operation could be undertaken but would not be so effective as BUCCANEER. For BUCCANEER it was now considered that some 120 more carrier-borne aircraft were required. This would mean 4 or 5 additional CVEs or 2 fleet carriers. He considered that both the Andamans and Kar Nicobar could be captured with an amphibious lift of 50,000. It was strongly felt that the first large operation undertaken in the Southeast Asia Command must be a success. The morale of certain of the Indian troops was low, and a smashing victory would restore it. Operation ANAKIM might be undertaken with only slightly less resources than those required for the Andamans, but it would be against a strong defensive position and would not, he considered, contain as many Japanese forces as would BUCCANEER. Hit-and-run operations would not, in his opinion, divert strong enemy forces, and their cost might well prove incommensurate with the results achieved.

After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note:
(1) That the assault forces for BUCCANEER have not been increased.

(2) That the resources necessary for the operation were either already available in the theater, or in sight, excepting for an increased demand of some 120 carrier-borne fighter aircraft.

(3) Of a statement by Admiral King that there was a possibility of making from 4 to 6 CVEs available from U.S. sources for this operation.

b. Agreed:
(1) That the representatives of the Supreme Allied Commanders, SEAC and the BUCCANEER force Commanders now at SEXTANT, in consultation with the Combined Staff Planners should examine and report on the morning of 6 December 1943 what operations of a hit-and-run nature might be carried out in the SE Asia Theater in 1944, assuming that the bulk of landing craft is returned to the European Theater, the report to indicate the scale, nature, and objectives of the operations proposed.

(2) To dispatch a signal to Admiral Mountbatten asking for a flash estimate on the above. (Annex)

At this point General Wedemeyer left the meeting.

Operation ANVIL (CCS 424)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners (CCS 424) on Operation ANVIL.

Admiral Leahy said that he considered that forces should be taken from BUCCANEER only if they were essential to the success of ANVIL. They should not be taken for diversionary operations, such as Rhodes.

Sir Andrew Cunningham pointed out that an early decision would have to be taken with regard to Operation BUCCANEER, since otherwise we were in danger of “falling between two stools” and the necessary time for the training of any craft which might be withdrawn would not be available.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff then agreed to amend paragraph 4c on page 3 of CCS 424 by striking from the first sentence the words “from the United States” and by deleting the second sentence.

General Arnold discussed the air transport requirements for both ANVIL and operations in the Burma-China area. The additional transport aircraft required for ANVIL could only be found by cutting out the provision of these aircraft to all countries other than the United States, and to the domestic airlines in America. This he was quite prepared to do.

It was also agreed to amend paragraph 4 of Appendix “B” on page 8 by inserting the words “at least” between the words “for” and “two.”

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 424 as amended, and directed that the directive contained in Appendix “B” be forwarded to General Eisenhower.

b. Agreed that the detailed planning for this operation should be left entirely to General Eisenhower’s planning staff.

Directions to Combined Staff Planners and the U.S. and British shipping authorities

The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed what instructions or directions could usefully be given to the Combined Staff Planners or to the United States and British shipping authorities.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should be instructed to keep the shipping authorities closely in touch with the progress of the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and that both the Combined Staff Planners and the shipping authorities should do all possible preliminary work on their estimates of the resources required. This to be undertaken both on the basis of the decisions already taken, and on the basis of the various possible assumptions with regard to operations on which final decisions had not yet been reached.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to inform the Combined Staff Planners and the U.S. and British shipping authorities of the above decision.

Future work

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet at 1100 on 6 December to consider the draft report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 426), the report by the Combined Staff Planners on the overall plan for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417), and the study of alternative amphibious operations being undertaken by the Force Commanders in consultation with General Wedemeyer and the Combined Staff Planners. The Combined Chiefs of Staff further agreed to meet on the following afternoon, if necessary, and on the following evening on receipt of the report called for from the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command.

ANNEX

Most immediate
Clear the line

To: SACSEA
From: Mideast

Following for Admiral Mountbatten from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  1. If, as a result of EUREKA Conference overriding priority were to be given to European operations, this would make it necessary to withdraw bulk of your landing craft and assault shipping during the next few weeks.

  2. This would rule out BUCCANEER as at present planned before the monsoon, but the necessity would remain to stage, in conjunction with TARZAN, amphibious operations on a smaller scale, possibly of a hit-and-run nature involving carrier raids and landings of commandos.

  3. Do you consider operations of this kind feasible? If so, telegraph urgently flash estimate of resources you would require.

  4. Your reply must be received by 1600 GMT 6th December.

600

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 424

Amphibious operation against the South of France
Reference: CCS Memo Directive
1 December 1943

In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions.

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

We have in addition assumed:

a. That Operation ANVIL will approximately coincide with OVERLORD.

b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of forces for ANVIL.

c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under two hypotheses where these apply:

a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

b. That the assault is carried out beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

It appears that the following cannot be found from the resources which under present agreements will be available to General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean at the time of the operation:

Naval forces
On the assumption that adequate shore-based, short-range fighter cover is provided:

  1. Additional escorts, probably 10 to 20.

  2. 2 AA fighter direction ships.

  3. In the event that the buildup exceeds one division before D plus 8, nine A/S A/A escorts will be required for each extra division.

This indicates that if a rapid buildup is necessary, more escorts will be required.

In the event that adequate shore-based short-range air cover cannot be provided the following will be needed in addition to those above.

  1. 9 to 12 escort carriers with fighters.
  2. 6 AA cruisers.
  3. 18 screening vessels.

To meet these deficiencies, we must draw on other theaters, most probably from the Atlantic. It might prove possible for four CVE and six escorts which are taking part in BUCCANEER to return to the Mediterranean in time. This, however, will be conditioned by the availability of fighters for reequipping these escort carriers. We have assumed that port parties will be provided from within the Mediterranean.

Land forces
Certain service forces, the number and type of which cannot be determined without careful study by AFHQ.

On the assumption that French divisions will participate, the requirement will be lessened if, as recommended by General Eisenhower, some of the French divisions scheduled for activation are not formed but are converted to service forces.

Air forces
The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be sufficient to lift one brigade and if the detailed plan requires a second brigade lift, this will have to be provided.

Shipping

  1. Personnel Shipping.
    The QUADRANT allotment of personnel shipping for 80,000 trooplift in the Mediterranean expires on 31 March. Initially, personnel shipping for 32,000 will be required until after the assault, and during the period of buildup, a total personnel lift for 15,000 will be necessary. It is proposed to use cargo ships for personnel lift to the maximum extent possible.

(2) MT/Stores Shipping.
The following sailings within the Mediterranean will be required in addition to those required for the maintenance of the remainder of the theater:
First month — 128
Second month — 90
Third month — 75
Fourth and subsequent months — 40

This can obviously be provided but until the present shipping examination is completed, we cannot assess the cost.

Assault shipping and craft
Assault lift for two divisions can be provided. Methods of providing this are shown in Appendix “A.”

We consider that General Eisenhower should be directed to prepare an outline plan for the agreed operation against the South of France as a matter of urgency. We have accordingly prepared a directive to General Eisenhower, and this is attached at [as?] Appendix “B.”

Recommendation

That the directive in Appendix “B” be sent to General Eisenhower.

Appendix “B”

Draft directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AF, North Africa 

December 5, 1943

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take place in conjunction with OVERLORD, with the object of establishing a bridgehead on the South Coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of OVERLORD.

You will prepare in consultation with COSSAC and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation.

The exact date for OVERLORD has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and Operation ANVIL will be timed approximately to coincide with operation OVERLORD – the exact date to be determined in consultation with COSSAC.

You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).

You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for ANVIL; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

601

Report by the Combined Staff Planners 

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Secret
CCS 427

Amphibious operations in Southeast Asia alternative to BUCCANEER

Problem

On the assumption that the amphibious lift available for BUCCANEER is reduced in certain respects, to consider what minor amphibious operations or raids might be carried out in the Southeast Asia Theater, in order to harass Japanese communication, destroy Japanese installations and equipment, or alternatively to support the land advance on the Arakan coast and obtain airfields with which to support further operations in Burma.

Resources available

An appendix is attached showing a list of the resources which we assume will be left in Southeast Asia. This list is based on the assumption that the bulk of LST and LSI (L) will be withdrawn together with a proportion of the naval forces and escort carriers now allotted to BUCCANEER, as these are the resources which are chiefly required in the European Theater.

With resources remaining in the Southeast Asia Theater it would be possible to land a force of one infantry battalion group up to one brigade group, depending on the scale of transport to be landed.

Possible operations

Detailed study by the Force Commanders of intelligence maps and photographs is necessary before any definite opinion can be formed as to the practicability of any operations.

From a general survey of the possibilities however we consider that the following merit examination and might assist Operation TARZAN:

a. Amphibious operations along the Arakan coast in conjunction with the land advance of the 15th Army Group on Indin-Rathedaung-Kyauktau, which is timed to start in mid-January and be completed in February.

b. An amphibious operation to capture and secure the northern tip of Ramree Island, prior to the beginning of the 1944 monsoon. This operation might be covered by shore-based aircraft at Maungdaw. Maintenance of a garrison in this area by sea might prove costly as convoys will be subject to air attack. It might be possible to extend air operations against Japanese communications in Burma, and to infiltrate on the Taungup-Sandaway [Sandoway] coast. The provision of fighter support to any such operations would have to be carefully balanced against the requirements of TARZAN.

Unless a target can be found to justify the landing of a raiding force, we do not believe that any raids should be attempted other than carrier-borne air raids.

602

The President’s Chief of Staff to the President 

Cairo, 5 December 1943

Memorandum for the President

Subject: RECOGNITION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY

The question of declaring Rome an open city has again been discussed by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff with the British Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff are still of the opinion that, from a military point of view, such action is undesirable.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy

603

Roosevelt meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 p.m.

Present
President Roosevelt
Admiral Leahy
Admiral King
General Arnold
Captain Royal

From the accounts in Leahy and King, it appears that the President called in the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to inform them of his decision to stop further argumentation in favor of Operation BUCCANEER as scheduled for the spring of 1944. Churchill states that on the afternoon of December 5 “the President, in consultation with his advisers, decided to abandon the Andaman Islands plan” and that the President sent him a laconic private message reading, “BUCCANEER is off.”

According to Leahy and King, President Roosevelt expressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his reluctance in making this decision and indicated his intent to offer a substitute to Chiang Kai-shek. The alternative offer to Chiang was drafted by Roosevelt and Hopkins, presumably at the conclusion of Roosevelt’s meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was submitted to Churchill in the form of a memorandum.

In explaining his decision to Stilwell and Davies on the following day Roosevelt is reported by Stilwell to have said:

I’ve been stubborn as a mule for four days but we can’t get anywhere, and it won’t do for a conference to end that way. The British just won’t do the operation, and I can’t get them to agree to it.

The Davies notes on this conversation indicate that Roosevelt also emphasized in this connection that he had fought at Tehran, with Stalin’s support, and that Churchill had finally given in. This was presumably a reference to the argument about fixing the date of OVERLORD.

604

Hopkins-Eden-Menemencioğlu meeting, 6 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Turkey
Mr. Hopkins Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu
Mr. Steinhardt Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Açikalin
Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen Mr. Anderiman
General Wilson Mr. Kavur
Air Chief Marshal Douglas
Air Vice Marshal George
Brigadier Stayner
Mr. Helm 
740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

U.S.-U.K. agreed minutes 

December 5, 1943, 6 p.m.
Most secret

Mr. Eden opened the meeting by suggesting that Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas should explain what was proposed since he had a feeling that the Turks were under a wrong impression.

Mr. Numan thanked Mr. Eden. He said he would be glad to listen. He must however make it clear that he could not commit himself on military matters which were the concern of the experts and on which he was not competent.

Sir Sholto Douglas said that he was not going to deal with technicalities. He was merely going to make a general exposé to show why we wanted advance infiltration. In this there were two main objects: the first to provide adequate defence for the most vulnerable points, and the second to provide a force for offensive operations in the Aegean. As regards the first, the vulnerable points were Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak. For these it was proposed to send in 17 squadrons (12 of them Spitfires) and 5 regiments of light and 5 of heavy anti-aircraft guns. For purposes of defence it was essential to have an adequate warning system and also adequate anti-aircraft defence for the air fields on which would depend the defence of Istanbul and other vulnerable places. Until these essentials had been secured it would not be feasible to introduce the necessary squadrons. This brought the Air Marshal to infiltration and his proposals were:

  1. For radio location and operations room – 200-250 specialists and 20-30 vehicles.

  2. Signals personnel for radio location and for linking airfields with operations room – 400 persons.

  3. Key specialist personnel of anti-aircraft guns – 420 persons.

  4. Additional personnel for radio location, i.e., for extension of system round the coast from Zonguldak to Antalya – 300 persons.

  5. Administrative personnel for dumps, etc. – 500 persons.

This represented a total of about 2,000 personnel.

The introduction of this personnel was the problem. Until something like this had been introduced Turkey would not be in a position of security when the moment of need came.

Mr. Eden remarked that when all this personnel had been brought in the squadrons could be flown in in 24 hours for the defence of Turkey if Turkey were attacked. The complete effectiveness of defence would of course also be dependent on Turkey doing her share as promised with personnel for the anti-aircraft guns. It was as a result of the promise of this personnel that the estimated infiltration needs had been reduced from 7,000 to 2,000. Thus it could be seen what were the indispensable minimum needs to be introduced during the period of preparation.

Mr. Numan said that he took the infiltration to be part of the general minimum plan. He could not say whether the number of squadrons was adequate, though it sounded good. He obviously must however make a reservation on the question of their utility.

Mr. Eden stressed that in our opinion what Sir Sholto Douglas had explained was the minimum necessary for Turkey’s protection. In addition we should of course be ready to specify the material which we should be prepared to supply for use by the Turks themselves.

Mr. Numan remarked that matters were advancing. There was not an impasse. The arrival of foreigners was very important. Even a civilian arriving in Turkey to serve would be known to Germany and the latter would not be indifferent. He did not want to provoke the Germans before a certain degree of preparation could be achieved. Mr. Churchill had described this as a vicious circle. He (Mr. Numan) did not agree but saw the problem from a different point of view. He was ready to accept the requisite number of technicians for the material supplied. How many technicians these might be he did not know. That would be a matter for the Turkish General Staff. He could not however accept personnel additional to the proper complement of technicians.

Mr. Eden remarked that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs must have confidence. There surely could be no question of our wanting to introduce one single specialist more than was necessary. But how could the Turkish General Staff say whether particular personnel was necessary or not? During the preparatory period we did not wish to rush things any more than the Turks did. But we did want to get the preparations completed quickly.

Mr. Numan said that the Turks had the same object. They did not wish to provoke the Germans. He could not agree to the introduction of personnel but he did agree to the introduction of technicians, though he must make a reserve regarding the number of these. What he had said amounted to an acceptance in principle of technicians for the material promised.

Mr. Hopkins remarked that President Inönü had several times spoken of Turkey’s minimum defence requirements. He wondered if he was right in assuming that this did not refer to infiltration and air material but to other needs. He assumed that the British had been discussing such questions with the Turkish General Staff. Had the British any idea of Turkish minimum requirements? Did they, for instance, include anti-aircraft guns and aircraft? This brought up the question of the commitments to be made and he realized that it was necessary to get personnel introduced in advance. But he wished to be clear in his own mind about the details.

Mr. Eden thought this was a good question. It seemed to him that there were two points—the material to be used by us in order to give protection to Turkey, and the material to be given to Turkey for use by the Turks themselves.

Mr. Hopkins mentioned that there was also the Anglo-American force to go into Turkey in the event of war.

Mr. Eden said that in the first instance this was air alone – anti-aircraft.

Mr. Numan said he wished to make an observation and to compare what Turkey had got with what she had asked for. After the Adana Conference the Turks had prepared a list of requirements which had been more or less discussed. Later the British had entered into a definite commitment for delivery on the basis of that list. The Turkish list had remained a dead letter. The British list had not been much better (Mr. Eden said that he could not agree). Mr. Numan went on to say that only some 4% of the items on the general list had been delivered to Turkey. He did not wish to make reproaches. He would only state facts and mentioned in particular the case of lorries of which 300 a month had been promised. For some time deliveries had been about 160 or 180 a month. In recent months there had been no deliveries at all. Deliveries did in fact represent a very small proportion of promises.

Mr. Eden said that he could not accept Mr. Numan’s figures. He must make it plain that the position was not the position as it had been at Adana and he personally would not consider recommending his Government now to supply to Turkey all of the material which had been discussed at Adana.

Mr. Numan remarked that his had only been an observation.

General Wilson said that even if it had been possible to supply all the items on the Turkish Adana lists, it would have taken the Turkish railways three years to carry them. As it was, Turkey had since Adana been supplied with 350 tanks, 48 self-propelled guns, nearly 300 anti-aircraft guns (over 100 of them heavy) 300 field and medium guns, 200 mortars, rather less than 500 anti-tank guns, an enormous quantity (about 99,000) of various guns and automatics, 420 mortars, and about one million anti-tank mines for the defence of Turkey. It was unfortunately true that there had been a shortage of delivery on motor transport. This had happened because the transport did not exist in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks had however said at Adana that they had enough to defend themselves except for three anti-tank units and aviation support.

Mr. Hopkins expressed surprise at the extent of material assistance already given since Adana. He wished however to clear the position up. As he understood things, the Allies had agreed, in the event of war, to put in air squadrons and anti-aircraft guns and personnel. How far removed were we from President Inönü’s minimum requirements in the event of war?

Mr. Numan said that if it were desired to negotiate on the basis of these past figures, he also could cite figures. At one moment 40 air squadrons had been promised in the event of war. This had been reduced by half. The percentage of deliveries was not impressive. As for circumstances he agreed that they had changed since Adana, but things had turned out exactly as they had been foreseen at Adana.

Mr. Hopkins said it seemed necessary to get to grips with the problem. Was he to understand that the Turkish President considered he should have twice the air force suggested? Was he to understand that the anti-tank preparation was not enough? Were the Turkish railways a limiting factor, insofar as concerned Turkey coming into the war? He asked because if Turkey was not coming into the war, she must understand that these munitions, so vitally required elsewhere, would not come into Turkey at all.

Mr. Numan remarked that there must be some misunderstanding. The position had been quite clearly stated. The President had announced his intention of coming into the war. The question of material had however always been a serious one. At the time when the Anglo-Turkish Alliance was negotiated there had at first been a clause which postponed the operation of the Alliance until supplies were provided. He had realized that the supplies could not be provided and the clause had been suppressed. Since then and until now supplies had still not been available. Today Turkey lacked everything. Not only anti-aircraft guns and tanks but every sort of war material. He did not suggest that the Adana lists or any other list or anything like either of them should be supplied. He did however think that there ought to be a list of reasonable requirements. The Turks would not ask the impossible and with a maximum effort a list could readily be drawn up.

Mr. Eden said we had given the list of all that we wished to introduce for the defence of Turkey. If this were agreed we could then fix up what we could provide for use by the Turks. But we did not want the preparation of defence to be delayed during the consideration of the second list.

Mr. Numan said he agreed but that it must be part of a general plan in which the air preparations would of course take complete precedence. Mr. Eden enquired what general plan? Mr. Numan answered that it was necessary to decide the minimum requirements of Turkey if she were to enter the war. A list would be necessary.

Mr. Hopkins said he understood that the limiting factor was motor transport. Was it a limiting factor for anti-aircraft personnel? There had been talk of years for the introduction of requirements. We were dealing in weeks.

Mr. Numan pointed to General Wilson’s statement that two or three years would have been necessary to introduce the items on the Adana lists. Had one-third of these been introduced in the year since Adana?

Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen suggested that we were all wasting our time in discussing the past. It was a wasted effort. In the interval everything had changed and it would be a waste of transport even to send to Turkey today the material contemplated at Adana. Surely, we should look at the future and not at the past.

Mr. Numan welcomed the Ambassador’s interjection and said he quite agreed. He wanted to propose something practical. Could we not at once send to Angora the two Generals (one British and one American) proposed by President Roosevelt so that they could concert at once with the Turkish General Staff and establish a list of requirements and work out complete collaboration.

Mr. Eden said that this was something apart from the fundamental question. We had this afternoon given to our Turkish friends a list of what we thought necessary for the defence of Turkey against attack. This must be the basis of working. In addition, we could discuss further material but he could not accept the delay involved in the addition of other material quite unknown.

Mr. Numan said that the President had answered Mr. Eden’s point. He said that 2,000 men and 600 vehicles were not enough for the defence of Turkey though they were no doubt enough for the defence of British air bases.

Mr. Eden pointed out that they were not for the defence of British air bases but for that of Istanbul, Izmir and Zonguldak.

Mr. Numan remarked that the Turks could not contemplate Turkish defence being entrusted to the British. What they would and did contemplate was the defence of Turkey by the Turks with British help.

Air Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas pointed out that air defence depended essentially on fighters and this must be defended by antiaircraft guns. The first essential was to get the fighter defence established.

Mr. Eden said that there were two points. The first, what we introduced for the security of Turkey and the second the other things which the Turks must have before Turkey could take action.

General Wilson explained that what had been mentioned hitherto was for Turkish defence. It was only an advance guard. Actually the total force contemplated would be 32,000 troops (11,600 of them air), and 6,000 guns and vehicles (375 guns representing 5 light and 5 heavy anti-aircraft regiments).

Mr. Eden said the urgent plan was one for immediate defence and the execution of this represented the dangerous period.

Mr. Numan having remarked that he could not comment on these figures, Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen pointed out that as men and material were introduced, the danger to Turkey would be correspondingly diminished. The first problem was to ensure safety and then to build up.

Mr. Numan said Turkey was coming into the war. It was necessary to draw up a plan of preparation and a plan of collaboration and at the same time to take up political matters in another direction.

Mr. Hopkins having remarked that reinforcement would be limited by transport facilities and that as regards priority for air we already give the Turks what they can take, said he must come to the main point. The war had reached a critical stage. It was impossible to divert to a neutral country war material which was not to be used against Germany. The British Prime Minister had been authorized to express the hope of the United States and of Russia that Turkey would enter the war at an early date. We know that when a nation went to war with Germany she might suffer losses – the United Kingdom, Russia and the United States had suffered severe losses. He knew that Turkey wanted to enter the war. In the last analysis a country went to war in its own interests. We wanted Turkey in the war even if she could not have all she wanted. Great Britain, Russia and the United States had not all they wanted when they entered the war. At this critical period in the war the entry of Turkey might save the lives of hundreds of thousands of Allied nationals. January 1st was not a set date but Turkish participation might not be useful after very long after that date. We wanted Turkey to enter the war willingly and whole-heartedly. We should like Turkey to enter the war about February even though we knew that in doing so Turkey might suffer. We hoped Turkey would enter because all Allied military and political opinion considered that her entry would shorten the war. Only the Turks themselves could speak for Turkish self-interest. If however discussions were prolonged about the adequacy of material etc. Turkey’s entry would be futile. Turkey could be sure that if she came in we would do everything we could – all possible military and air support would be afforded her. He knew he was correctly interpreting President Roosevelt when he said that he hoped that Turkey would in her own interests come in willingly and wholeheartedly.

Mr. Eden said that he wished to have the Turkish position correctly understood and Mr. Numan confirmed that it was as follows:

  1. Our proposals for infiltration were accepted in principle but Mr. Numan made a reservation as regards numbers pending consideration by the Turkish General Staff.

  2. If the programme involving infiltration were accepted Turkey will not take action which she considers might lead her into a state of war with Germany until material and supplies for her use have been given, and the figures of these yet remain to be determined.

  3. Mr. Eden understood that Turkey had political questions to raise. He did not know what these were.

As regards (3) Mr. Numan referred to the Russian undertaking regarding Bulgaria. He thought that this was the sort of point which he would like to discuss with the Russians. There were other points which he would also like to discuss. But these discussions could take place during the period of preparation and would in no way delay either preparation or collaboration.

Mr. Eden enquired whether there were any other points to be put down.

Mr. Numan said that Mr. Hopkins had spoken of willing entry. This was also the desire of the Turks. They must however have a minimum of essential preparations. Moreover, this was a commitment to the Turkish people and to the Party.

Mr. Eden enquired what Turkey wanted under (2). Was it not possible for these requirements to be stated without discussions at Angora?

Mr. Numan repeated that he was not competent to say what the military needs were. All he asked for was comprehension. It lay in our hands to determine when Turkey could enter the war since this would be determined by the supply of the necessary material.

Mr. Numan confirmed that, as he had previously said, the infiltration programme under (1) above could go ahead while the discussion of (2) was in progress.

At this stage (8:15 p.m.) the meeting was adjourned.

605

Prime Minister Churchill to the President’s special assistant 

Cairo, December 5, 1943

My Dear Harry, I understand that Lord Beaverbrook has not received any favourable reply to his request to you for a conference on Civil Aviation.

Our people are anxious to get on with this and I should be grateful if you could let me know if there are any obstacles we could remove, so that progress may be made.

Yours always
W