Senate speeds tax bill action
Committee wants work completed by Dec. 20
…
Treasury balks at subsidy plan for newspapers
Morgenthau says fund for bond advertising would be waste of money; opposition may kill three pending bills
By Robert Taylor, Press Washington correspondent
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Simms: Allied demand may instigate Nazi collapse
But Hitler and gang will hang on as long as possible
By Willian Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
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Mowrer: Press ‘in dark’ on conference of ‘Big Three’
‘Mishandling’ of coverage of Cairo parley held bad omen
By Richard Mowrer
Cairo, Egypt – (Dec. 2, delayed)
Maybe the Big Three conference was a success. Maybe it was a flop.
At any rate, the 77 correspondents who “covered” the conference wouldn’t know. Maybe it’s important that they shouldn’t know.
In any case, if the mishandling of the press coverage of this conference is setting a precedent, then the prospect for honest reporting of the peace conference, among others, is decidedly gloomy.
‘Open secrets’
Although the fact that the conference was to be held and then the fact that it was being held were open secrets, elaborate arrangements were made “for security reasons” to keep reporters away from the conference area. That was all right with the reporters who appreciate security requirements. It was arranged that the liaison between the conference and reporters would be handled by Office of War Information representatives.
That was fine for color material: Mme. Chiang wore jade-colored sunglasses; Prime Minister Churchill wore a blue polka dot tie; other principals did this and that, went hither and yon.
No direct contact
As the days passed and the conference concluded, it became evident that the correspondents would have no direct contact with any of the principals at the conference.
Despite repeated requests and pleadings, reporter saw no one officially, although Hadil Ali, chief guide of the Pyramids, was fortunate enough to get half an hour with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, and this correspondent knows a man who has a secretary who has a manicurist friend who, on the second day of the conference, tended the nails of Mme. Chiang.
The conference press mess plunked to new depths when the story, having broken everywhere, on Nov. 30, except in Cairo, correspondents here were held to a much later release date and the ban continued to be enforced on sending anything at all having to do with the conference by wireless.
Background of news –
Bills during President’s absence
By Bertram Benedict, editorial research reports
…
Baseball front quiet as Majors’ meeting ends
Landis to give deposed Cox chance to ‘clear his reputation’ today; only one deal put through in week
…
U.S. State Department (December 4, 1943)
Quadripartite dinner meeting, 8:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Turkey | |
| President Roosevelt | President Inönü | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu | |
| Admiral Leahy | Mr. Açikalin | |
| Mr. Steinhardt | Mr. Anderiman | |
| Major Boettiger | Mr. Sarper | |
| United Kingdom | Soviet Union | |
| Prime Minister Churchill | Mr. Vinogradov | |
| Foreign Secretary Eden | Mr. Mikhailov | |
| Sir Alexander Cadogan | ||
| Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen |
According to Leahy:
President Roosevelt on December 4 gave a dinner in honor of the Turkish President. It was an interesting affair, all the conversation being in French, which the President spoke without hesitation.
After the dinner, the Prime Minister joined the party and promptly laid siege to President Inonu to induce him to cast the fate of his country with the Allies. Churchill did most of the talking. Inonu just listened. Later, the President told his British colleague that if he, Roosevelt, were a Turk, he would require more assurance of aid than Britain had promised before abandoning neutrality and leading his nation into war.
McCloy-Jebb meeting, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Mr. McCloy | Mr. Jebb | |
| Major General Kirby |
The principal topics of discussion were apparently the proposed liaison procedure between the European Advisory Commission and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, British attitudes toward the adoption of this procedure, and the desirability of McCloy’s going to London to advocate there its adoption.
U.S. State Department (December 5, 1943)
The Assistant Secretary of War to the President’s special assistant
Cairo, 5 December 1943
Dear Harry: I had a good talk with Jebb and General Kirby last night. They said finally they were convinced that the arrangement we had was sound but each of them urged me to go to London and put the case to the people there on the ground. Though they were convinced, they felt they could not get anywhere with the War Cabinet by either cabling or putting the case themselves when they got home. This does not make much sense to me, particularly if Winant is on the ground and holds out for what we want, as he says he will.
I feel that this matter is something the President and the Prime Minister are not going to get to and should not get to, for that matter, as it can be settled satisfactorily on a lower level. I have some real work to do in Italy and am anxious to start back. If Winant, after getting back to London, feels that I should go up there he can cable me at Algiers and if Stimson agrees, I’ll go up – otherwise I will go on home.
If the Prime Minister should bring it up before the end of the Conference I think the thing to do is to say we are working the thing out, that all that we want is to set up the machinery whereby we have the chance to work out sound decisions on some of the most difficult problems imaginable. That, above all, it is shortsighted to attempt to move all such decisions to London. The arrangement we had will work and it is the only one which has the chance of working expeditiously.
I am leaving Colonel T. W. Hammond here until the end of the Conference. He is fully familiar with the whole subject and he will be at your service on call. His telephone number is Conference 83.
I leave early tomorrow (Monday) morning.
Sincerely,
JJ
Völkischer Beobachter (December 5, 1943)
Von Kairo bis Teheran –
Das anglo-amerikanische Verräterspiel
b—r. Bern, 4. Dezember –
Durch eine Samstag vormittag in Moskau ausgegebene Mitteilung wurde nun offiziell bestätigt, daß in Teheran, der Hauptstadt Irans, eine Zusammenkunft zwischen Stalin, Roosevelt und Churchill stattgefunden habe. Diplomatische und militärische Vertreter der drei beteiligten Mächte hätten an der Konferenz teilgenommen. Fragen der Kriegführung gegen Deutschland und auch eine Reihe politischer Fragen seien besprochen worden. Die Entscheidungen würden später veröffentlicht werden.
Man ist also mit den abschließenden Formulierungen, die man sicherlich als Wochenendsensation herausgeben wollte, nicht rechtzeitig fertig geworden. Bei aller Gemeinsamkeit des Vernichtungswillens gegen Deutschland haben sich die realen Interessengegensätze wohl kaum als gering erwiesen. So hat man sich zunächst mit einem nichtssagenden Vorbericht begnügt, der der anglo-amerikanischen Presse noch keine festen Grundlagen für ihre politischen Spekulationen gibt. Sie muß sich begnügen, darauf hinzuweisen, daß Stalin anläßlich dieser Konferenz zum erstenmal seit der russischen Revolution den Boden der Sowjetunion verlassen hat. Freilich hat er, wie hinzuzufügen ist, sich nur eine beschiedene Strecke weit außer Landes begeben und die beiden Anglo-Amerikaner haben ihn den weitaus größten Teil des Weges entgegenkommen müssen. Die Wahl des von den Sowjets besetzten Teiles von Iran für die Konferenz ist selbstverständlich auf das Sicherheitsbedürfnis Stalins zurückzuführen. Dieser hätte sich nie darauf eingelassen, sich an einen Ort zu begeben, wo er sich nicht durch seine eigene GPU.-Leibwache schützen lassen könnte.
Enttäuschung in London
tc. Stockholm, 4. Dezember –
Die Unzufriedenheit der englischen Öffentlichkeit mit den Beschlüssen der Kairokonferenz ist im Zunehmen begriffen. Sofern über die Konferenz in Teheran kein Ergebnis bekannt wird, das die Erwartungen der Öffentlichkeit in England mehr befriedigt, dürfte Churchill nach seiner Rückkehr keineswegs mit der Begeisterung empfangen werden, die sich viele als Ergebnis des Dreimächtetreffens versprochen hatten.
Wie Aftonbladet aus London berichtet, mehren sich die Stimmen, die in der Bekanntgabe der Kairoer Beschlüsse, wenn nicht schon in diesen selbst, einen schweren taktischen Fehler erblicken. Nicht nur der Umstand, daß die Absicht der vollständigen Zerschlagung des japanischen Reiches den Widerstand der Japaner ebenso wie der Deutschen aufs äußerste verstärken muß, gibt zur Mißstimmung Anlaß. Nicht weniger schärf wird das Fehlen jeglicher positiven Pläne gerügt. Nachdrücklich kommt die Kritik in einem Aufsatz der konservativen Wochenschrift Spectator zum Ausdruck, wo im Hinblick auf Europa die Politik der „Alliierten“ kritisiert wird, weil sie nur die deutsche These, daß die Vernichtung Deutschlands das Kriegsziel der „Alliierten“ sei, bestätige.
U.S. State Department (December 5, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Redman | |
| Colonel McFarland | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 5, 1943, 10:30 a.m.
Secret
Approval of conclusions of CCS 134th Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 134th Meeting. The detailed report of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.
Draft agreement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 423 and 423/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them draft agreements prepared by the United States and British Chiefs of Staff, respectively.
Admiral Leahy said he felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff paper expressed better the views put forward at the Plenary Session of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the President and the Prime Minister. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that Operation TARZAN and a simultaneous amphibious operation were essential. The Supreme Commander must be told to do his best with the amphibious forces available to him. The British Chiefs of Staff paper, on the other hand, visualized the abandonment of the amphibious operation. If no agreement could be reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff it would be necessary for the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to submit their different views to the President and Prime Minister.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement militarily and only in disagreement on the political aspects of the operations in Southeast Asia.
Admiral Leahy said he did not think this was the case. The United States Chiefs of Staff believed that the abandonment of the amphibious operation would mean either the failure or the abandonment of TARZAN. In the latter case, there would be serious military repercussions throughout the Pacific. In his opinion, the military implications of the abandonment of the amphibious operation were therefore equally as important as the political implications. He considered that the enemy must be engaged in Burma, since unless this were done, they would be able to stop the supply route to China.
Sir Charles Portal said he did not believe this would be the case, since if there was no land battle, the whole Allied air force could be directed against the Japanese air instead of supporting the troops.
General Arnold said that if there were no land operations the Japanese could put more air forces into their many fields out of range of our fighters.
Sir Charles Portal reminded General Arnold that the ferry route was now being flown at night. Though our fighters might not be able to reach the Japanese airfields, our bombers could, and this form of attack would prove increasingly effective with the good weather now prevailing. In Sicily it had been possible completely to defeat the German air effort by intensified bombing.
General Arnold said he agreed that more could be done with better weather, but it must be remembered that the Japanese were on interior lines and had a very large number of airfields available.
General Marshall said that he considered that it was not only a question of cutting the airline; there was also the Japanese ground effort to be considered. The appointment of Admiral Mountbatten with its consequent publicity had resulted in large Japanese reinforcements to the area. If Operation TARZAN were not carried out, this large Japanese force would take the initiative and could not be stopped by the use of long-range penetration groups only. The Japanese could carry out a ground campaign against our lines of communication to China. The Chinese might well be better in defensive operations than in the offensive, but their task would be a difficult one. We had provoked an increased Japanese garrison, and to take no action against it would have serious results in relation to our supply line to China. Further, extraordinary efforts had been made to increase our forces in the area, and these increased forces would now remain immobile. All this was based on the assumption that if no amphibious operation took place, Operation TARZAN would also not take place. This in turn was based on the assumption that the Chinese would not advance unless the amphibious operation took place. There were therefore strong military reasons why the amphibious operation should take place, and there would be serious military implications if it did not take place, particularly in the Southwest Pacific. If it were possible to abandon the amphibious operation and still to do the North Burma campaign, he personally would not be seriously disturbed. He did not believe, however, that without the amphibious operation, there would be any Burma campaign.
Sir Charles Portal asked if it was considered that the amphibious operation was essential on purely military grounds.
General Marshall expressed the personal view that it would be of assistance but was not vital.
Sir Charles Portal then drew attention to paragraph 7 of the United States Chiefs of Staff paper. Had the implications of the proposal that the Supreme Commander should be told that he must do his best with the resources already allocated to him been fully considered? He had now put forward his requirements, which were in excess of the resources he now had. There seemed two courses open to him; either to carry out the operation with these smaller resources and risk a reverse, or to ask to be relieved of the task.
General Marshall pointed out that there was no insistence on Operation BUCCANEER. He could, for example, undertake the amphibious operation against Ramree instead. He recalled that prior to Guadalcanal, the commanders had felt that the operation was impossible of achievement without additional resources, yet it had been undertaken and had been successful.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that there were admittedly advantages in the taking of the Andaman Islands. They would form a base not only for reconnaissance, but to some extent for bombing Bangkok and the Japanese lines of communication. They would also form a good stepping-off place for a further advance on Sumatra. Their seizure would, however, produce for ourselves a very heavy commitment in maintenance. They were a thousand miles away from our nearest base. They were surrounded by Japanese air and it would be difficult to supply them to an extent which would make their use possible. In his opinion, the capture of the Andamans was not worth the candle, except as a stepping-stone to a southward advance. In this connection, however, it had been agreed that the main effort should be made in the Pacific, and therefore neither amphibious operations against the Andamans nor against Ramree were worthwhile.
Admiral King said that all were agreed that the capture of Ramree would not give us much. He realized that the abandonment of BUCCANEER might fit in with the British view that it would be best to withdraw the Eastern Fleet to the Mediterranean.
Sir Andrew Cunningham denied this suggestion.
Admiral King, continuing, said that he felt that the commander of the Eastern Fleet would feel more secure if he had an air base in the Andamans. He (Admiral King) was much concerned over the success of TARZAN. He had always felt that the Andaman operation was the most useful one with the means available, far better, for instance, than CULVERIN. On purely military grounds he considered that Operation BUCCANEER was as much a part of TARZAN as ANVIL was of OVERLORD.
Sir Alan Brooke said he felt that the military implications had been overstated. If Operation BUCCANEER were not undertaken, the Chinese forces might withdraw from TARZAN, but they were, even at present, an unknown factor, and reports suggested that their troops now in action were not too promising. With regard to the security of the air route to China, he did not believe that this would be seriously threatened. The Assam airfields could be protected and Japanese air bases bombed. An offensive-defensive should hold the Japanese forces, coupled as it would be by a serious threat. We had, in fact, by our preparations in the Southeast Asia Command, built up an ideal cover plan which would hold the Japanese forces away from the Pacific front. He did not regard Operation BUCCANEER as a justifiable diversion from our main object.
General Arnold said that the 14th Air Force was operating “on a shoestring.” They were operating at only 50% of their strength, through lack of supplies. Transport aircraft were being shot down, and for each one of these lost, 3 aircraft must stay on the ground. If our aircraft were grounded, the Japanese could then attack Kunming, and knock out our aircraft on the ground.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that if the Chinese troops refused to advance from Yunnan, then we should be relieved from the need to supply them with 3,000 tons per month by air, and this tonnage could be diverted to the use of the 14th Air Force.
Admiral King felt that it would, on the other hand, be necessary to give more to the Chinese in order to assist them to defend the Kunming base.
General Arnold said that as he saw it, there were three threats: firstly, the air threat against our bases in Assam; secondly, the air threat to the transport line itself, which was difficult to contend with, since the Japanese airfields were numerous and well scattered, and full use was made of dispersal; thirdly, the threat to Kunming both by ground and more particularly air action.
Sir Charles Portal asked if it was agreed that if BUCCANEER was abandoned and the amphibious lift of 35,000 men was transferred to Europe, it would be of the greatest assistance to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
Admiral King said that on this basis it might be suggested that resources should be given up from the Pacific to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
Sir Charles Portal said that this consideration too, ought not to be ruled out. The British Chiefs of Staff felt no doubt that the abandonment of BUCCANEER must increase the chances of success of OVERLORD and ANVIL and must therefore be accepted. We could not afford to take chances with either of these two operations. The abandonment of BUCCANEER would give far greater military advantages to the war as a whole than the disadvantages entailed in its postponement.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to put forward a memorandum to the President and Prime Minister setting out the various points of agreement and disagreement (subsequently circulated as CCS 423/2).
Integrated command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area (CCS 400, 400/1 and 400/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the alterations proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the draft directive proposed by them in CCS 400/2.
b. Agreed to defer action on these papers.
Directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean (CCS 387/1 and 387/2)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the directive for unification of command in the Mediterranean on the basis of CCS 387/2. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed to in this paper.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted CCS 387/2 as amended in the course of the discussion (subsequently circulated as 387/3).
Amphibious operation against the South of France (CCS 424)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 424 at their meeting to be held at 1500 that afternoon.
Directive for intensification of support of Partisan forces in Yugoslavia (CCS 425)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the draft directive to Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces in North Africa with regard to Balkan support, and
b. Instructed the Secretaries to include this directive in the main directive to the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean, now being issued.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AF, North Africa
Cairo, 5 December 1943
Secret
CCS 387/3
We have decided to set up a unified command in the Mediterranean Theater on account of its geographical unity and its dependence on all bases in the area.
We have no intention of changing existing organization and arrangements any more than is necessary to give effect to our main intention. You should assume, therefore, that all present arrangements continue with the exceptions outlined below but you should report as necessary whether you consider any further changes are required in the light of experience.
To your present responsibilities you will add responsibility for operations in Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Crete and Aegean Islands and Turkey. The British and American forces allocated to you from Middle East will be determined by the British and United States Chiefs of Staff, respectively. You will have full liberty to transfer forces from one part of your Command to another for the purposes of conducting operations which we have agreed. The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will be under your orders for operations in these areas.
You will provide U.S. Strategic Air Forces under separate command, but operating in your area, with the necessary logistical and administrative support in performance of Operation POINTBLANK as the air operation of first priority. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, you may, at your discretion, utilize the 15th U.S. Strategic Air Force for purposes other than its primary mission, informing the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, if and when that command is organized.
You will, in addition, assume responsibility for the conduct of guerrilla and subversive action in all the territories in your command and for setting up the necessary organization for the dispatch of supplies to resistance groups in occupied territories.
The Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, will remain directly responsible to the British Chiefs of Staff for all the territories at present in Middle East Command situated in Africa, Palestine, Syria and the Lebanon, and for the operation and security of the Middle East base with such forces as the British Chiefs of Staff may allot for this purpose from time to time.
You will be notified later of any adjustments which are thought necessary to the machinery by which you receive political guidance. In the meantime, in respect of the new territories in your command you should obtain any necessary political advice from C-in-C Middle East through the channels he at present uses.
The system of Command is shown on the attached diagram (Appendix “A”). You will note that the Mediterranean Air Command will now be known as Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.
Appendix “B”
Balkan support
It was agreed at the EUREKA Conference that our support of the Patriots in the Balkans, which now falls within the area in which you are responsible for Allied operations, should be intensified in order to increase their effectiveness.
You will be responsible for supporting them to the greatest practicable extent by increasing the supply of arms and equipment, clothing, medical stores, food and such other supplies as they may require. You should also support them by commando operations and by furnishing such air support as you may consider advisable in the light of the general situation.
You should examine the possibility of continuing to supply the Patriots with Italian equipment, in the use of which they are already experienced, making good deficiencies in Italian formations to such extent as may be necessary with available British or American equipment.
We consider that this mission is of such importance that it would best be controlled on a regular basis by a special commander and joint staff.
Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt (in the chair) | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Ismay | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | Brigadier Hollis |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 5, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
The President read out to the Conference a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which signatures could be affixed.
The Prime Minister suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for example, in January?
General Marshall said that this would not be possible.
The President inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given for the operation.
General Arnold said that Southeast Asia Command were working to a date in the middle of March.
Admiral Leahy remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning of May.
The Prime Minister said that he was disturbed at the growth in the forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1 was required, this, in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of course, be carried out as arranged.
The President said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with TARZAN. He, the President, was a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians.
The Prime Minister observed that BUCCANEER would not really influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon the supplies she received over the “hump.”
Mr. Hopkins inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1 March, landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL?
Sir Andrew Cunningham did not think this would be possible. A considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault.
Admiral King agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even assuming that these operations took place in late May.
Mr. Hopkins inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL.
Sir Alan Brooke said that this question had not yet been examined in detail.
The Prime Minister, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders.
Sir John Dill inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was generally agreed that no specific date had been set.
A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new moon on 22 May.
General Marshall said that ANVIL might take place at the same time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later.
Mr. Hopkins said as far as he could see, the situation was about as follows:
There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing craft for the required assault on Southern France, then there would definitely not be enough landing craft for these operations.
Admiral Leahy said that while it was apparent that there was sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing.
The Prime Minister said he felt there were a good many new, revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between BUCCANEER and TARZAN.
Mr. Hopkins inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented if possible.
Mr. Anthony Eden said that it was unfortunate that we cannot separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them connected.
Admiral King said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except possibly as a part of other incidental operations.
General Brooke said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent operation is to continue on to Rangoon.
The Prime Minister observed that operations on land such as TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL.
Sir Charles Portal inquired whether it would not be possible to substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER. The Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the Generalissimo’s requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon.
Admiral King said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort of “hit-and-run” operations.
Mr. Hopkins inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do what he could with what he had?
The Prime Minister observed that both OVERLORD and ANVIL were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a diversion such as BUCCANEER.
Mr. Hopkins said he understood there was nothing in any CCS paper to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for ANVIL.
The Prime Minister pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more.
Mr. Hopkins said it made no difference in the number of landing-craft whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He asked if Lord Mountbatten’s landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted?
Admiral Cunningham replied that Admiral Mountbatten’s lift is about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary.
Admiral King pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England with a lift of the 4½ divisions contemplated. He further observed that his understanding was that the number of troops in the initial OVERLORD assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing front in France.
Sir Alan Brooke said that, in his view, the landing could be extended and use made of other beaches.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the LSI(L)s could be more economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short cross-Channel haul.
The Prime Minister said that while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and bound up with TARZAN.
Continuing, the Prime Minister suggested that the Generalissimo should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect [affect?] TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan forces would allow more supplies to go over the “hump.”
Sir Alan Brooke said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting.
Admiral King said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month’s production of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the Pacific now.
The President said he would like the possibility of a series of “hit-and-run” raids to be examined.
Sir Andrew Cunningham, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battleships, cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL.
The Prime Minister said that assuming that the President and United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work on the problems which had emerged from the discussion. First came ANVIL. A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the beginning of February, the U.S. and British squadrons should be ready to move in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should be intensified. By this time, we should expect some reactions from Germany, but as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater risks.
Admiral Leahy said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the adjustment of resources to plans, including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with what was left in Southeast Asia.
The Prime Minister suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously narrow margin.
General Arnold explained the possibilities and capabilities of the very long-range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta.
The Prime Minister inquired how the construction of these airfields was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress reports.
The Conference:
a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing the assaults in each case.
b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks.
c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would receive if they entered the war.
Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 5 December 1943
Secret
CCS 423/2
Operations in the European Theater
OVERLORD and ANVIL are the supreme operations for 1944. They must be carried out during May 1944. Nothing must be undertaken in any other part of the world which hazards the success of these two operations.
OVERLORD as at present planned is on a narrow margin. Everything practicable should be done to increase its strength.
The examination of ANVIL on the basis of not less than a two-division assault should be pressed forward as fast as possible. If the examination reveals that it requires strengthening, consideration will have to be given to the provision of additional resources.
Operations in the Aegean, including in particular the capture of Rhodes, are desirable, provided that they can be fitted in without detriment to OVERLORD and ANVIL.
Every effort must be made by accelerated building and conversion, to provide the essential additional landing craft for the European Theater.
The decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference covering the bombing of German industrial targets and the destruction of the German Air Force, as set forth in paragraph 10 of CCS 319/5, are reaffirmed.
Operations in Southeast Asia Theater
| Views of U.S. Chiefs of Staff | Views of British Chiefs of Staff |
|---|---|
| Political and military considerations and commitments make it essential that Operation TARZAN and an amphibious operation in conjunction therewith should take place. Apart from political considerations, there will be serious military repercussions if this is not done, not only in Burma and China, but also in the Southwest Pacific. | We fully realize that there are political and military implications in the postponement of BUCCANEER. As regards the political implications, we must leave these to be taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister. As regards the military disadvantages, these are overridden by the far greater advantages to be derived from a successful invasion of the Continent, and the collapse of Germany. |
| The Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be told that he must do the best that he can with the resources already allocated to him. |