Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11 a.m.
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Present |
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United States |
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United Kingdom |
President Roosevelt (in the chair) |
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Prime Minister Churchill |
Mr. Hopkins |
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Foreign Secretary Eden |
Admiral Leahy |
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General Brooke |
General Marshall |
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Air Chief Marshal Portal |
Admiral King |
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Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham |
General Arnold |
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Field Marshal Dill |
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Lieutenant General Ismay |
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Secretariat |
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Captain Royal |
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Brigadier Hollis |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
December 5, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
The President read out to the Conference a report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on operations in the European Theater. The point at issue between the two staffs was Operation BUCCANEER, and on this agreement still remained to be reached. He would like to have had a document to which signatures could be affixed.
The Prime Minister suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the date of BUCCANEER could be advanced. Would it be possible to do it, for example, in January?
General Marshall said that this would not be possible.
The President inquired what date Admiral Mountbatten had given for the operation.
General Arnold said that Southeast Asia Command were working to a date in the middle of March.
Admiral Leahy remarked that if a mid-March date was adopted, the landing craft could not be returned to the European Theater till the beginning of May.
The Prime Minister said that he was disturbed at the growth in the forces required for BUCCANEER. If a superiority of 10 to 1 was required, this, in fact, made the conduct of war impossible. Could not BUCCANEER be postponed till after the monsoon and the Generalissimo be informed that, as a result of developments arising from the discussions with the Russians, we could not carry out BUCCANEER as originally contemplated? TARZAN would, of course, be carried out as arranged.
The President said that the Generalissimo had left Cairo quite clearly under the impression that an amphibious operation would be carried out simultaneously with TARZAN. He, the President, was a little dubious about putting all our eggs in one basket. Suppose Marshal Stalin was unable to be as good as his word; we might find that we had forfeited Chinese support without obtaining commensurate help from the Russians.
The Prime Minister observed that BUCCANEER would not really influence Chinese continuation in the war. This would depend much more upon the supplies she received over the “hump.”
Mr. Hopkins inquired whether, if BUCCANEER took place on 1 March, landing craft and naval forces could leave the Indian Ocean for ANVIL?
Sir Andrew Cunningham did not think this would be possible. A considerable portion of the naval forces would have to remain in the vicinity of BUCCANEER, perhaps up to a month, after the assault.
Admiral King agreed that the follow-up for BUCCANEER might take up to four weeks before the ships in any numbers could be released. This would leave no margin at all for fitting them in to OVERLORD or ANVIL, even assuming that these operations took place in late May.
Mr. Hopkins inquired whether the Combined Staffs had examined the adequacy of a two-divisional assault for ANVIL.
Sir Alan Brooke said that this question had not yet been examined in detail.
The Prime Minister, reverting to BUCCANEER, said that there was no question of providing any additional forces. When Admiral Mountbatten was told this, he would be quite likely to say that he could not do BUCCANEER and revert to BULLFROG. This was an operation which found favor with no one. The next step would be to discuss the possibilities of an amphibious operation in the Southeast Asia Theater with the Force Commanders.
Sir John Dill inquired as to the earliest date for OVERLORD. It was generally agreed that no specific date had been set.
A discussion followed regarding the phases of the moon in May 1944. It was finally ascertained that the full moon would be on 8 May and the new moon on 22 May.
General Marshall said that ANVIL might take place at the same time as OVERLORD or possibly a week later.
Mr. Hopkins said as far as he could see, the situation was about as follows:
There were probably sufficient landing craft for a two-division lift for ANVIL; there were also landing craft available for BUCCANEER and landing craft provided for OVERLORD on the scale now planned, although possibly inadequate in the latter case for an additional lift which might be hoped for. Unless the Chiefs of Staff have ascertained that there are sufficient landing craft for the required assault on Southern France, then there would definitely not be enough landing craft for these operations.
Admiral Leahy said that while it was apparent that there was sufficient lift for two divisions for ANVIL it was unquestionably true that a greater lift would be more likely to insure the success of the operation. He felt that if the Generalissimo could be induced to put his forces into TARZAN without accomplishing BUCCANEER, it might be a good thing.
The Prime Minister said he felt there were a good many new, revolutionary ideas recently injected as regards the relationship between BUCCANEER and TARZAN.
Mr. Hopkins inquired as to whether it was not a question that OVERLORD and ANVIL are of such great importance that they should be augmented if possible.
Mr. Anthony Eden said that it was unfortunate that we cannot separate BUCCANEER and TARZAN and continually have to consider them connected.
Admiral King said that if the BUCCANEER operation was postponed, he believed there would be no operations in Burma after the monsoon except possibly as a part of other incidental operations.
General Brooke said if we do TARZAN and then run on into the monsoon we cannot sit still; we must go on. There are two further steps. The next operation is to go down to Mandalay and the Irrawaddy. The subsequent operation is to continue on to Rangoon.
The Prime Minister observed that operations on land such as TARZAN would not cut into OVERLORD or ANVIL.
Sir Charles Portal inquired whether it would not be possible to substitute some form of amphibious operations in lieu of BUCCANEER. The Generalissimo had made a special point of naval operations. It might be possible to organize commando groups and make a descent on some part of the coast. He considered that commando raids supported by naval forces would fulfill the Generalissimo’s requirements. He believed that operations of this sort would be suitable without making a definite commitment which we will have to continue further. He also believed that the Generalissimo might be told that amphibious operations on a large scale could be carried out after the monsoon.
Admiral King said that Sir Charles Portal probably meant some sort of “hit-and-run” operations.
Mr. Hopkins inquired whether or not the Chiefs of Staff would get any further if they sent Admiral Mountbatten a wire. He inquired whether the Chiefs of Staff would recommend against the whole business if Admiral Mountbatten said he could not accomplish BUCCANEER with the means available. Would the Chiefs of Staff still tell Admiral Mountbatten to go ahead and do what he could with what he had?
The Prime Minister observed that both OVERLORD and ANVIL were known to be of great importance and will be seriously affected by a diversion such as BUCCANEER.
Mr. Hopkins said he understood there was nothing in any CCS paper to the effect that landing craft were not available for either OVERLORD or ANVIL. On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff had never stipulated that there should be a six-division assault for OVERLORD or a three-division assault for ANVIL.
The Prime Minister pointed out that the Southeast Asia Command had 50,000 men against 5,000 Japs and were now asking for more.
Mr. Hopkins said it made no difference in the number of landing-craft whether 30,000 men or 50,000 men were being used for BUCCANEER because the size of the initial assault was gauged by the number of landing craft. He asked if Lord Mountbatten’s landing craft were made available in the Mediterranean, how many more men could be lifted?
Admiral Cunningham replied that Admiral Mountbatten’s lift is about 25,000 men. In other words, these landing craft meant an additional lift of about one division for ANVIL. He also believed that the landing craft from the Indian Ocean could get to OVERLORD in time if necessary.
Admiral King pointed out that the difficulty in lifting additional troops in the initial assault for OVERLORD was a function of the ports available. There was already considerable port congestion anticipated in England with a lift of the 4½ divisions contemplated. He further observed that his understanding was that the number of troops in the initial OVERLORD assault was predicated on what could properly be used on the available landing front in France.
Sir Alan Brooke said that, in his view, the landing could be extended and use made of other beaches.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that the LSI(L)s could be more economically employed in the longer Mediterranean hauls than in the short cross-Channel haul.
The Prime Minister said that while he did not feel committed to an amphibious operation on any specific date in Southeast Asia, he realized the difficulty which faced the President with regard to the Generalissimo. Either Admiral Mountbatten should plan for BUCCANEER with the existing resources or start sending back the forces at once. He favored TARZAN going ahead. He had not realized that the amphibious operation was directly related to and bound up with TARZAN.
Continuing, the Prime Minister suggested that the Generalissimo should be informed that Admiral Mountbatten had now said that he wanted more forces than had been contemplated when he, the Generalissimo, had been in Cairo. It was therefore proposed to postpone BUCCANEER until after the monsoon. Meanwhile, TARZAN would go forward. The postponement of BUCCANEER would not effect [affect?] TARZAN. If the Generalissimo expressed surprise and threatened to withhold the Yunnan forces, we should say that we would go on without them. Alternatively, we could say that the inaction of the Yunnan forces would allow more supplies to go over the “hump.”
Sir Alan Brooke said that if the Yunnan forces were to be withdrawn from TARZAN, the whole plan would need recasting.
Admiral King said that the two-divisional lift for ANVIL was already in sight and it might even be possible to improve on this. He explained, however, that the two-divisional lift entailed keeping back one month’s production of landing craft output from the Pacific. Nothing at all was going to the Pacific now.
The President said he would like the possibility of a series of “hit-and-run” raids to be examined.
Sir Andrew Cunningham, in reply to a question by the Prime Minister, said that the naval force for BUCCANEER would include battleships, cruisers, destroyers and one or two big carriers. No great difficulty should be encountered in doing a raid or raids. He remarked that Admiral King had promised to help by providing American naval forces for ANVIL.
The Prime Minister said that assuming that the President and United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to extend their time at Cairo for a day or so, it would be necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to get to work on the problems which had emerged from the discussion. First came ANVIL. A more detailed study was required of the strength to be employed in the assault and in the follow-up. Next, we ought to deal with the Turks. He had in mind a program on the following lines: At the end of January the Turkish airdromes should be fitted out with Radar and anti-aircraft defenses. At the beginning of February, the U.S. and British squadrons should be ready to move in to Turkey, and medium bombers should start a softening process from airfields in Cyrenaica. By 15 February the bombing attacks on the islands should be intensified. By this time, we should expect some reactions from Germany, but as they grew progressively stronger, the Turks would have to face up to greater risks.
Admiral Leahy said that, as far as the United States Chiefs of Staff were concerned, they were quite right to leave the Turkish program to the British Chiefs of Staff to decide upon.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the adjustment of resources to plans, including particularly shipping, could not yet be worked out. The adjustment of resources depended on the decision about BUCCANEER and ANVIL. As regards the former operation, the right thing seemed to be to take what was required for the European Theater, and then see what could be done with what was left in Southeast Asia.
The Prime Minister suggested that Admiral Mountbatten should be asked what he could do as an alternative to BUCCANEER assuming that the bulk of his landing craft and assault shipping was to be withdrawn at once. We could not get away from the fact that we should be doing wrong strategically if we used vital resources such as landing craft on operations of comparatively insignificant importance, instead of using these resources to strengthen up OVERLORD and ANVIL, where it looks like we are working to a dangerously narrow margin.
General Arnold explained the possibilities and capabilities of the very long-range aircraft which would operate from the four airfields at Calcutta.
The Prime Minister inquired how the construction of these airfields was progressing. He called for a special report, to be followed by weekly progress reports.
The Conference:
a. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to initiate further studies concerning the scope of OVERLORD and ANVIL with a view to increasing the assaults in each case.
b. Invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to consult with the Force Commanders of BUCCANEER and thereafter to ask Admiral Mountbatten what amphibious operations he could do on a smaller scale than BUCCANEER if the bulk of landing craft and assault shipping were withdrawn from Southeast Asia during the next few weeks.
c. Agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should prepare a statement for presentation to the Turks showing what assistance they would receive if they entered the war.