Über 1000 Mann verloren –
Schwere Niederlage anglo-amerikanischer Terrorverbände
…
Führer HQ (September 13, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
An der Westfront dauern die harten Abwehrkämpfe an den bisherigen Brennpunkten an. Zäher Widerstand unserer Truppen vereitelte feindliche Durchbruchsversuche nördlich Hasselt und aus dem Raum von Verviers in Richtung auf Aachen. In den Kämpfen der letzten Tage nördlich Luxemburg wurden 142 feindliche Panzer und Panzerspähwagen abgeschossen, 40 Panzerabwehrkanonen erbeutet oder vernichtet.
Über die obere Mosel sind amerikanische Verbände im Vorgehen auf Lunéville. Auch um Neufchâteau sind schwere Kämpfe im Gange. Der Druck des Feindes auf unsere Sicherungen zwischen Vesoul und der Schweizer Grenze hält an.
Gegen die befestigten Häfen im Westen haben sich die feindlichen Angriffe verstärkt. Der Feind griff Calais und Dünkirchen bis zu siebenmal vergeblich an. In Le Havre sind nach schwerstem Beschuss und rollenden Luftangriffen feindliche Panzer eingedrungen. Die Besatzung leistete bis zum Letzten tapferen Widerstand. Auch im Hauptkampffeld von Brest wird gegen fortgesetzte feindliche Angriffe von Truppen aller Wehrmachtteile erbittert gekämpft. Eigene Gegenangriffe warfen vor Lorient den Feind an mehreren Stellen zurück und fügten ihm erhebliche Schäden zu.
Die örtlichen Kämpfe an den Alpenpässen der französisch-italienischen Grenze dauern an. Mehrere feindliche Vorstöße wurden abgewiesen.
In Italien sind im Feber unserer überlegenen kämpfenden Nachtruppen zahlreiche feindliche Angriffe nördlich des Arno blutig zusammengebrochen. An der adriatischen Küste errangen unsere Divisionen von neuem einen vollen Abwehrerfolg gegen den zwischen Pian di Castello und Riccione vergeblich angreifenden Gegner.
Deutsche und ungarische Truppen schlugen im südlichen Siebenbürgen starke feindliche Angriffe zurück und schossen dabei eine Anzahl von Panzern ab.
Bei Sanok und Krosno halten die heftigen Angriffe der Sowjets an.
Südöstlich Warschau entbrannten heftige Kämpfe, in deren Verlauf die Sowjets, von zahlreichen Schlachtfliegern und Panzern unterstützt, einen Einbruch erzielen konnten. Weiter nördlich brachen die feindlichen Angriffe unter Verlust von 19 Panzern zusammen. Nordöstlich Ostrolenka verhinderten unsere Truppen in schweren Kämpfen unter Aufgabe von Lomscha einen auf breiter Front angestrebten Durchbruch der Sowjets.
Aus dem Raum von Raseinen, Schagarren und Bauske wird lebhaftere örtliche Kampftätigkeit gemeldet.
In Mittelfinnland versuchen die Sowjets immer wieder in unsere Absetzbewegungen hineinzustoßen. Sie mußten blutig abgewiesen werden.
Auf dem Balkan sind die Gegenmaßnahmen gegen den an die Westgrenzen Rumäniens und Bulgariens vorgehenden Feind im Gange.
Bei Tagesangriffen anglo-amerikanischer Bomberverbände auf mehrere Orte im Reichsgebiet am 12. September entstanden vor allem in Münster und München größere Schäden in Wohngebieten. Am 11. September wurde auch die Stadt Fulda betroffen.
In der vergangenen Nacht richteten sich Terrorangriffe des Feindes gegen Frankfurt am Main, Mainz und Stuttgart. Außerdem wurden Bomben auf Wiesbaden und Berlin geworfen.
In Luftkämpfen und durch Flakartillerie der Luftwaffe und der Kriegsmarine wurden 139 feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter 107 viermotorige Bomber, vernichtet.
In der Abwehrschlacht am unteren Narew haben sich die bayerische 7. Infanteriedivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant von Rappard und die Sturmgeschützbrigade 904 unter Führung von Major Türcke durch vorbildlichen Kampfgeist hervorragend bewährt. Im Panzerabwehrkampf hat sich Hauptmann Adamowitsch besonders hervorgetan.
Leutnant Voges, Kompanieführer im Grenadierregiment 11, und Stabsfeldwebel Golla, Pionierzugführer im gleichen Grenadierregiment, zeichneten sich durch besondere Tapferkeit aus.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 13, 1944)
Communiqué No. 158
LE HAVRE is now in Allied hands.
On the BELGIAN Coast, mopping-up continues between FURNES and ZEEBRUGGE.
Further progress has been made beyond the ALBERT CANAL.
North of LIÈGE, we have taken FORT ÉBEN-ÉMAEL. Forces advancing east and southeast of LIÈGE, after meeting strong resistance from German infantry, anti-tank guns, and mines in the LIMBOURG area, captured EUPEN and MALMEDY. Units crossed the German frontier east of EUPEN.
In the ARDENNES, our troops which liberated BASTOGNE, have advanced to the vicinity of CLERVAUX in northern LUXEMBOURG.
In the MOSELLE Valley, we have enlarged our bridgeheads across the river against heavy enemy resistance.
Concrete emplacements in the Seigfried Line in the neighborhood of SCHEID, some 50 miles west of KOBLENZ, were attacked by medium and light bombers yesterday. Other formations struck at a railway yard at SANKT WENDEL, artillery positions and observation posts in the BEVELAND and Dutch mainland.
Enemy transportation was attacked by fighters and fighter-bombers operating from HOLLAND to the MOSELLE River and from STRASBOURG to KARLSRUHE. Close support to our ground forces was also given by attacks on gun positions. According to reports so far received, 30 enemy aircraft were shot down and nine were destroyed in the ground. Two of our aircraft are missing.
U.S. Navy Department (September 13, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 115
Carrier-based aircraft of the Pacific Fleet shot down more than fifty enemy aircraft and destroyed more than 150 on the ground in a day-long attack against Cebu, Negros, and Panay Islands in the Philippines on September 11 (West Longitude Date). Preliminary reports are fragmentary, but it is indicated that air operations are continuing against strong enemy opposition. Several cargo ships and numerous smaller craft were sunk in the initial attacks.
Paramushiru in the Kuril Islands was bombed and strafed by search planes of Fleet Air Wing Four on September 10. Waterfront installations along the southeast coast were the principal targets and several fires were started. Each of two medium cargo ships discovered near Paramushiru suffered a direct bomb hit and both were strafed. Strafing attacks were also delivered to a number of small craft offshore. On the same day, a Navy search plane bombed Shumushu Island, and another search plane shot down an enemy fighter east of Onekotan Island.
On September 11, 11th Army Air Force Mitchells bombed and strafed a number of vessels in the harbor at Shumushu, sinking one medium cargo vessel and four small cargo vessels. Two other small cargo vessels were damaged. Seven enemy fighters intercepted our planes and inflicted minor damage on one Mitchell but all returned safely. On the same day, Venturas of Fleet Air Wing Four bombed and strafed Paramushiru, Araido and Onekotan, setting fires to docks and warehouses.
Liberators of the 7th Army Air Force dropped 26 tons of bombs on airfields at Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands on September 10. Large fires were started. One of four intercepting enemy fighters was destroyed. Antiaircraft fire damaged two Liberators. On September 11, a lone Navy Catalina bombed an ammunition dump at Nauru Island, and Corsairs of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing hit the storage and magazine areas at Jaluit.
Pagan Island in the Marianas was attacked on September 11, by 7th Army Air Force Thunderbolts using bombs and rockets. Gun positions and buildings were hit.
U.S. State Department (September 13, 1944)
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Ambassador Winant’s telegram number 7511 sent midnight September 12 reports that the European Advisory Commission on that date approved and signed, for submission to the three governments, the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany (State Department’s note: with British and American zones left in blank) and the administration of greater Berlin.
CH
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Subject: ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO BRITISH-ARGENTINE MEAT NEGOTIATIONS
I must again refer to the matter of the British meat contract about which I sent you my memorandum of September 12.
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires reports that the British Ministry of Food has informed the Argentine government that the British are disposed to sign a new contract for two years at the same prices as the current contract. The contract would be on the same basis as that recently concluded with New Zealand and Australia so that Britain would buy the entire exportable surplus for four years with prices subject to re-examination at the end of two years. The Embassy adds that this word from London came as a great relief to the Colonels.
I regret to say that it has become increasingly clear that the British continue to treat the Argentine Fascist threat as a matter of minor and relatively unimportant policy. To us it is a matter of major policy. If we fail in the implementation of that policy, the Nazis will have a powerful center to renew their fight in this Hemisphere economically, politically and eventually in a military way. This would mean inevitably the destruction of all that we have been trying to build since 1933.
In view of our enormous aid to the British on supply matters, it is certainly not asking too much to request that they forego the petty commercial advantages of a long-term bargain with a Fascist government. It is hard to believe that they will permit the Argentines to succeed in the “divide and conquer” tactics they are so obviously employing in the matter of the meat contract. As I have said time and again, the political implications of these meat negotiations are really tremendous. If they are concluded, as the Argentines hope they will be, their position will be greatly fortified and our own position correspondingly weakened throughout the Hemisphere.
CH
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/20
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 13, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – TWENTY-FIRST DAY
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
In addition to the matter which I took up in person with you today points of interest which were considered by the Joint Steering Committee at its 10:30 a.m. meeting today were as follows:
(a) Elimination of references to “technical” problems
This is a matter to which the American group attached very great importance and to which they have devoted several days of thorough discussion. At the 9:30 a.m. regular meeting of the American group this morning we agreed that we should accept a compromise provision making it one of the purposes of the organization “to achieve international cooperation in the solution of international, social and other humanitarian problem?”. At the Joint Steering Committee meeting I succeeded in obtaining the assent to this formula of Sir Alexander Cadogan and of Ambassador Gromyko, both of whom had previously rather strongly urged the inclusion of the word “technical.”
(b) Initial membership of the organization
Pursuant to a recommendation made by the American group this morning, I proposed that the provision relating to initial membership (Chapter III, paragraph 2) should read as follows: “The initial members of the organization should be signatories to the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942 and such other states as those nations may invite,” provided the four powers could now agree as to the other states to be so invited. The discussion was inconclusive and it is likely that the Soviet and British representatives do not yet thoroughly understand what we have in mind.
(c) Separate protocol as to Interim Arrangements
I also suggested that section D Interim Arrangements (p. 27) be omitted from the document and be made the subject of a separate protocol. Sir Alexander Cadogan agreed that this is a “transitory” provision and he therefore saw no objection to its being made into a separate document. However, he also apparently saw no objection to inclusion of this matter in the document itself. His assistant, Mr. Jebb, suggested that the reference in the document to this subject might say that it is intended to exclude such a provision from the charter itself in view of the provision’s transitory nature. Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought it would be appropriate to mention the subject in the document itself. We said that we would consider whether some reference to the subject might appropriately be included in the document and would give our answer subsequently.
(d) Provision designed to permit women to serve as members of the organization
The American group at its meeting this morning recommended that some provision be inserted in the document especially authorizing the organization to include women among its personnel. They approved the following provision designed to accomplish that purpose as well as other desirable purposes: “All positions under the organization should be open on the basis of pertinent qualifications without regard to race, nationality, creed, or sex.” I presented this provision at the meeting of the Joint Steering Committee and asked the British and Soviet groups to think about it and to give us their reactions later on. Their initial reaction seemed to be rather negative.
Afternoon Meeting of the American Group
At my request the American group met throughout the afternoon in an attempt to devise possible alternative formulae on the question of voting by the council in the event of disputes involving a permanent member. I explained that this is an important subject, that we had received no indication of any inclination on the part of the Soviet group to recede from the principle of unanimity of the great powers and that in view of the time element this is a matter to which the American group should proceed to give careful thought.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: DO/ConvA/JSC Mins. 13–18
Informal minutes of Meeting No. 14 of the Joint Steering Committee
Washington, September 13, 1944, 10:30 a.m.
[Extract]
| Present: | Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Jebb of the British group; |
| Ambassador Gromyko, Mr. Sobolev, and Mr. Berezhkov of the Soviet group; | |
| Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Pasvolsky of the American group. | |
| Mr. Hiss also present, as secretary. |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At this point, Ambassador Gromyko said that on the basis of instructions received from his Government his position on the question of voting in the Council is unchanged. Mr. Stettinius asked whether it was likely that the instructions to which the Ambassador had referred represented the final word on this subject so far as the Soviet Government is concerned. The Ambassador said that this was the case. He went on to say that in the Soviet opinion the American and British proposal as to voting in the Council would violate the principle of unanimity. He said that the Soviet Government considers that this principle has from the beginning of negotiations relating to an international organization been a matter of very greatest importance.
Mr. Stettinius, in reply, said that the American Government attaches overriding importance to the acceptance of its proposal on this point. He said that, as the President had informed Ambassador Gromyko, it is very difficult to see how the American public, the world public, the American Senate, and the small nations throughout the world could accept a proposal by which a party to a dispute should vote. He said that the Ambassador’s statement came as a great disappointment and as a great blow. He said that the Soviet position might very easily mean that, because of the anticipated reaction of the smaller powers, no general conference on the subject could ever be held. Ambassador Gromyko said that the desire of the small nations is to live in peace and security and for this purpose their primary desire is that there be created an effective security organization.
Mr. Stettinius went on to say that the American Government simply cannot understand how any country could take the position that if it became involved in a dispute that dispute could not be brought before the Organization. Sir Alexander said that he believed that not one of the British Dominions would join the Organization if such a principle were to be adopted. Moreover, he did not believe that any of the smaller nations would join.
Mr. Stettinius said that at the moment he could not see that any purpose would be served by the issuance of a document from Dumbarton Oaks. Sir Alexander said that on the basis of the Soviet position the question arose as to what procedure should next be followed. He said that he did not know what to suggest in this connection and that he would have to think about the matter. Mr. Stettinius said that careful consideration must be given to the public effect of the Soviet position. He said that as Sir Alexander had stated the other day the question will necessarily arise in Parliament. He said that he himself had similarly said several days ago that the question will also come up in the American Congress. Both he and Sir Alexander had made plain that the views of each of the three powers on this matter would have to be made clear in answer to such questions. Sir Alexander said that however the matter may be regarded it is bound to be most awkward. If no statement is issued it will mean to the world that the Dumbarton Oaks conversations have failed. He said that he really did not know what would be the best thing to do under the circumstances.
At this point Mr. Stettinius asked Ambassador Gromyko whether he might appropriately inquire as to whether or not the President has received any message from Marshal Stalin. In reply, Ambassador Gromyko said that he did not know. In answer to a second inquiry by Mr. Stettinius, the Ambassador said that he thought that any reply to the President would have to come through his Embassy.
Mr. Pasvolsky said the Ambassador’s statement alters the whole situation and that we will all have to think about the possibilities. Sir Alexander said that he would have to consult Mr. Eden and that the question would be decided at a much higher level.
Mr. Stettinius then asked Ambassador Gromyko whether the Ambassador had any indication that his statement represented the final Soviet position on this point. Ambassador Gromyko replied that as he had said earlier this is the definite position of the Soviet Government. He said that on the general principle of unanimity there is no possibility of any kind of change. He went on to say that this position had been taken definitely by the Soviet group at the outset of the conversations and that on several occasions those views had been stated by him. He said that he had thought that the principle of unanimity had been the understood basis on which everyone was proceeding, that is to say, that the large countries should have a special position in the Organization by reason of the simple fact that they will bear the main responsibility for the maintenance of peace. He said that only the large countries have the necessary resources and military forces to be able to maintain peace and security. He said that he believes that the small countries accept this position and that it has in fact been taken for granted by everyone.
Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Stettinius said that they agreed that it is generally understood that the large powers must occupy a special position and must bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace. Ambassador Gromyko said that it was for that reason that he had said so confidently that the other groups had agreed to the principle of unanimity.
Mr. Stettinius said that, however, the question is different with respect to disputes. Ambassador Gromyko said that he thought it was incorrect to assume that the great powers who are responsible for peace and security are necessarily going to have disputes. He added that one can assume that their successful cooperation during this war and their struggle for security at present would undoubtedly have a great importance for the maintenance of peace and security in the future. Sir Alexander said that he thought that other countries might think otherwise.
Mr. Stettinius said that the Ambassador’s statement meant that we have reached a climax. He pointed out that there remain no other open items which cannot be promptly settled. He said that if it would be possible to find an agreed formula on this point the Committee could meet again promptly.
Mr. Pasvolsky said that consideration must now be given as to whether the type of organization envisaged in the present draft of the document is still feasible.
Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether the others thought that there would be anything warranting further discussion this afternoon. Sir Alexander thought not but Mr. Stettinius thought that possibly there might be. Ambassador Gromyko said that he would be glad to meet at anytime the others desired.
Sir Alexander said that careful thought will have to be given to what recommendations can now be made to the respective governments as to what should be done under the circumstances. Mr. Stettinius said that quite frankly he was struggling in his own mind to see what could be done.
Mr. Dunn said that he thought that that is the important point, namely, to consider what can be done. He thought that the other nations will come along with any reasonable formula upon which the three groups might agree. He said that it might be possible to consider a proposal for a different kind of an organization. He said that it might be a good idea to take a look at a draft of such a proposal.
Ambassador Gromyko then said that he felt it was not necessary to point out that the Soviet group had in the course of the conversations made a number of concessions, if the word “concessions” could appropriately be used in connection with conversations in which all are working toward common agreement. He said that on several matters of importance to it, the Soviet Government had made concessions because of its realization of the great importance of reaching agreement with the other groups. Other members of the Committee remarked that concessions had been made by all the participants.
Sir Alexander then said that the matter under consideration is a vital point for all the other United Nations who, it had been hoped, could be invited to a general conference. Mr. Stettinius inquired whether the other nations of the world would accept the Soviet proposal. Mr. Sobolev said that he had no doubt of this. Ambassador Gromyko said that if the four powers present the proposal unanimously he had no shadow of doubt as to the positions of the other nations. He said that he did not believe the other nations are mainly interested in the procedure of voting within the Council; they are chiefly interested in peace and in an effective organization designed to preserve peace. He said that the four powers have not failed the other nations so far and that they merit the confidence of the other nations. Mr. Sobolev said that if the British and American proposal on this point were to be accepted it would mean that the existing situation between the great powers would thereby be changed. At present all matters are decided on the basis of unanimity.
At this point Mr. Stettinius said that he would like to ask the others to consider what the result of the Soviet proposal would be in the hypothetical situation of some action taken by the United States against Mexico. He said that there would be an impossible situation if the United States in such a case were to say that it would not permit the Council to consider the matter.
Mr. Stettinius then said we must all put our minds to the question of what we can do about this matter. Sir Alexander said that the fact of disagreement will have to become public. He said the question is just how the matter should be made public. He said we could announce that no agreement has been reached at Dumbarton Oaks, in which event the point of disagreement would become known sooner or later. Alternatively, he said, we could send a draft document to the other United Nations setting forth in the document the two alternative positions on this point. This second possible means of procedure would, he thought, give a very bad impression. Mr. Stettinius said that it would be necessary to take some action promptly.
Ambassador Gromyko then said that he could not imagine how there could be a conference if the four powers are not in agreement. He thought that any statement of alternative provisions or any footnote on disagreement would cause great confusion. Sir Alexander said that the fact of disagreement would become known in any event. Mr. Stettinius said that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would demand to see the document if the conversations ended without any publication of the document. Sir Alexander said that the press would invent all sorts of reasons for the failure to agree and that the real reason would soon have to become known.
Mr. Dunn said that he thought it would be better to issue a memorandum limited to those things on which agreement could be reached. He said that this might require a change in the form of the document, perhaps the document would have to be limited to an agreement simply to consult one another. Mr. Jebb said that enforcement provisions would have to be eliminated from the document if agreement were to be reached. Mr. Dunn agreed, saying that we could not expect the other United Nations to agree to all of the provisions now contained in the document. Mr. Jebb said the document would have to be quite a different one from the present draft. Mr. Dunn expressed his agreement with this view.
Mr. Jebb then said that recasting of the document along these lines would take quite some time; it could not be done in a day or two. Mr. Dunn said that he agreed and that he was thinking of a recasting of the whole form of the document.
Mr. Jebb wondered whether a recasting of the document would prove to be profitable employment of the time of the groups. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that a revised document would have to leave out the whole matter of voting and all provisions as to enforcement; it would provide merely for consultation. He said that he did not believe the world would think much of such a document.
Mr. Stettinius said that the American position could not be changed on this point and that he saw no area for concession from the American viewpoint. He said the matter has been thoroughly considered by the President, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by Mr. Hull. He felt that the American position is unalterable regardless of future developments. He said that he wanted Ambassador Gromyko to understand this quite thoroughly; that he did not want the Ambassador to think that there is any chance of the American position being altered. Sir Alexander said that he thought that expressed Mr. Eden’s position also. Ambassador Gromyko said that he had fully informed his Government of the British and American positions.
He said that he also wished to point out that the Soviet group is unable to agree that action by the Council should require more than a simple majority. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he would have acceded to the Soviet position on this point if such a concession had been necessary in order to arrive at an agreement. Mr. Stettinius said that the American group had agreed to meet the Russian position on this point half way.
Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he felt Ambassador Gromyko’s position meant that four-power unanimity is in fact being abandoned. At this point Mr. Dunn said that he wanted to make a rather full statement. He said that the present situation is that the three powers are cooperating fully. The concept of establishing a world organization represented a new endeavor, another type of cooperation. He said that in view of the fact that the three powers are cooperating harmoniously in all cases and have every intention of continuing to cooperate in the future, he did not see why it should not be possible to draw up a document on which they could all agree. He said that it may be that such a document cannot provide for the particular machinery we have thus far had in mind. However, he felt that it is very important that we not consider that we have failed. He said that it is vastly important that these nations which are cooperating among themselves should now produce evidence that they will continue to cooperate in the future. He said that we must not allow any disagreement to creep into our relations. Sir Alexander expressed himself as in agreement with Mr. Dunn’s statement. Mr. Stettinius said that there must be no whisper that there have been any disagreements among the members of the Committee. Ambassador Gromyko said that he could give assurance that there would be no such disclosure on the part of the Soviet group.
Mr. Stettinius said that the members of the Committee must leave Dumbarton Oaks in agreement. He asked what hope there would be for future peace and security if the three nations did not remain shoulder-to-shoulder in the future as they had fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the present war. He said that this matter of continued close cooperation is a matter on which the very future of civilization depends. Sir Alexander expressed his agreement with Mr. Stettinius’ remarks but he said that consideration must be given to how the matter is to be presented publicly. He said that there is a terrible danger of speculation by the press and by others as to why no agreement along the lines previously indicated is promptly forthcoming.
Mr. Jebb said that the three groups will have to work hard and quickly. Mr. Stettinius inquired how long the others thought it would take to draw up an agreed-upon document. Mr. Dunn said that the joint formulation group has met all demands which have heretofore been made upon it. He said that it might perhaps be possible to shorten the document considerably.
At this point Mr. Stettinius asked what the others thought of the possibility of leaving the matter of voting in the Council for discussion at the general conference of the United Nations. Mr. Sobolev thought that it would not be possible to do that and Mr. Jebb also felt that that could not be done.
Mr. Stettinius then asked Ambassador Gromyko what the latter thought would be the effect of the Soviet formula on world opinion. Ambassador Gromyko replied that the effect upon the world would be the effect produced by the document as a whole. He said that he did not wish to separate the point under discussion from the rest of the document which contains many valuable and constructive provisions. He felt that the other countries of the world would gladly accept the document as a whole. He said that although the question of voting is important for the great powers and for the Organization it is, however, considered separately, a question of secondary importance for other nations. They are most of all interested in the effectiveness of the Organization.
Sir Alexander said he would wish to consult his Government as to the possibility of a new type of document.
Mr. Stettinius said that in adjourning the meeting he wanted it to be clearly understood that there would be no hint of any disagreement among the three groups and that the situation in fact is that all questions which have been raised remain under discussion. The other members of the Committee expressed their full agreement with these views.
Mr. Stettinius asked whether the others wished to meet again this afternoon. Ambassador Gromyko and Sir Alexander Cadogan said that they are prepared to meet at any time. The meeting was adjourned with the understanding that no definite time for the next meeting would be set but that the members of the Committee would remain subject to call by Mr. Stettinius, as chairman, and that in the meantime the joint formulation group would continue its work.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:45 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Rear Admiral Brown | General Ismay | |
| Major General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves |
McFarland minutes
September 13, 1944, 11:45 a.m.
Top secret
The Prime Minister, at the President’s request, opened the discussion. He said that since SEXTANT the affairs of the United Nations had taken a revolutionary turn for the good. Everything we had touched had turned to gold, and during the last seven weeks there had been an unbroken run of military successes. The manner in which the situation had developed since the Tehran Conference gave the impression of remarkable design and precision of execution. First there had been the Anzio landing, and then, on the same day as the launching of the great Operation OVERLORD, we had captured Rome, which had seemed the most perfect timing. He wished to congratulate the United States Chiefs of Staff on the success of DRAGOON, which had produced the most gratifying results. It was already probable that eight or nine thousand prisoners had been captured, and the south and western parts of France were now being systematically cleared of the enemy. He was firmly convinced that future historians would give a great account of the period since Tehran.
According to the British minutes of this meeting, Churchill said “that future historians would say that the period since Tehran had shown the successful working of an extraordinarily efficient inter-Allied war machine.”
The President said that no little of the credit for the conception of DRAGOON should be attributed to Marshal Stalin. It was close to being his suggestion rather than ours.
The Prime Minister, continuing, said that he was glad to be able to record that, although the British Empire had now entered the sixth year of the war it was still keeping its end up with an overall population, including the overseas Dominions and Colonies, of only 70,000,000 white people. The British Empire effort in Europe, counted in terms of divisions in the field, was about equal to that of the United States. This was as it should be. He was proud that the British Empire could claim equal partnership with their great ally, the United States, whom he regarded as the greatest military power in the world. The British Empire effort had now reached its peak, whereas that of their ally was ever-increasing. There was complete confidence in General Eisenhower and his relations with General Montgomery were of the best, as were those between General Montgomery and General Bradley. The part played by General W. B. Smith in directing and cementing the staffs was of the highest order. The control of operations in France was in capable hands. An efficient integrated American-British staff machine had been built up, and the battle was being brilliantly exploited.
Turning to Italy, the Prime Minister said that General Alexander had resumed the offensive at the end of August. Since then, the Eighth Army had suffered about 8,000 and the Fifth Army about 1,000 casualties. The Fifth Army had hitherto not been so heavily engaged, but they were expected to make a thrust that very day. The British have a great stake in Italy. The army in this theater was the largest representative British Empire Army in existence. There were in all sixteen British Empire divisions, consisting of eight British, two Canadian, one New Zealand, one South African and four British Indian divisions. He, the Prime Minister, had been anxious lest General Alexander might be shorn of certain essentials for the vigorous prosecution of his campaign. He now understood that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed that there should be no withdrawals from General Alexander’s Army until either Kesselring’s Army had been beaten, or was on the run out of Italy.
General Marshall said there was no thought of withdrawing any forces until the outcome of General Alexander’s present operations was known.
The Prime Minister emphasized that if the Germans were run out of Italy, we should have to look for fresh fields and pastures new. It would never do for our armies to remain idle. He had always been attracted by a right-handed movement, with the purpose of giving Germany a stab in the armpit. Our objective should be Vienna. If German resistance collapsed, we should, of course, be able to reach Vienna more quickly and more easily. If not, to assist this movement, he had given considerable thought to an operation for the capture of Istria, which would include the occupation of Trieste and Fiume. He had been relieved to learn that the United States Chiefs of Staff were willing to leave in the Mediterranean certain LSTs now engaged in DRAGOON, to provide an amphibious lift for the Adriatic operation, if this was found desirable and necessary. An added reason for this right-handed movement was the rapid encroachment of the Russians into the Balkans and the consequent dangerous spread of Russian influence in this area. He preferred to get into Vienna before the Russians did as he did not know what Russia’s policy would be after she took it.
The Prime Minister then reviewed the campaign in Burma. This had been on a considerable scale. 250,000 men had been engaged, and the fighting for Imphal and Kohima had been extremely bitter. General Stilwell was to be congratulated on his brilliant operation, resulting in the capture of Myitkyina. There had been 40,000 battle casualties and 288,000 sick of which latter, happily, the great proportion recovered and returned to duty. As a result of this campaign, the air line to China had been kept open and India rendered secure from attack. It was estimated that the Japanese had lost 100,000 men in this, the largest land engagement of Japanese forces.
In spite of these successes, it was, however, most undesirable that the fighting in the jungles of Burma should go on indefinitely. For this reason, the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward Plan DRACULA, which would be preceded by Plan CAPITAL Phase I and as much as was necessary of Phase II. Difficulties were being experienced in making available the necessary forces and transporting them to the Southeast Asia Theater in time to carry out DRACULA before the monsoon of 1945. The present situation in Europe, favorable as it was, did not permit a decision being taken now to withdraw forces. What was wanted was to keep an option open for as long as possible, and every effort was being directed to this end.
There were certain elements inimical to Anglo-American good relations which were putting it about that Great Britain would take no share in the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Far from shirking this task, the British Empire was eager to play the greatest possible part. They had every reason for doing so. Japan was as much the bitter enemy of the British Empire as of the United States. British territory had been captured in battle and grievous losses had been suffered. The offer he, the Prime Minister, now wished to make, was for the British Main Fleet to take part in the main operations against Japan under United States Supreme Command.
The President said that the offer was accepted on the largest possible scale.
According to the British minutes of this meeting, Roosevelt’s statement is recorded as follows: “The President intervened to say that the British fleet was no sooner offered than accepted.”
The Prime Minister , continuing, said there would be available a powerful and well-balanced force, including, it was hoped, at the end of next year, their newest 15-inch battleship. A fleet train of ample proportions had been built up, which would render the fleet independent for a considerable time of shore base resources. He said that the placing of a British fleet in the Central Pacific would not prevent a detachment being made to work with General MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific if this was desired. This would include air forces. There was, of course, no intention to interfere in any way with General MacArthur’s command.
As a further contribution to the defeat of the enemy, the Royal Air Force would like to take a part in the heavy bombardment of Japan. A bomber force of 1500 planes could be made available for this purpose and would like a proportionate share with the four or five thousand American planes in striking at the heart of the enemy. As regards land forces, when Germany had been beaten, it would probably be possible to move six divisions from the European Theater to the East, to be followed perhaps by a further six at a later date. In Burma there were 15 divisions which might ultimately be drawn upon. He had always advocated an advance across the Bay of Bengal and operations to recover Singapore, the loss of which had been a grievous and shameful blow to British prestige which must be avenged. It would not be good enough for Singapore to be returned to us at the peace table. We should recover it in battle. These operations would not debar the employment of small British Empire components with United States forces in the Pacific.
There was nothing cast iron in these ideas. First, we should do DRACULA, and then survey the situation. If a better plan could be evolved, it should certainly not be ruled out in advance. Our keyword should be to engage the largest number of our own forces against the largest number of the enemy at the earliest possible moment.
The President thanked the Prime Minister for his lucid and comprehensive review of the situation. It was a matter of profound satisfaction that at each succeeding conference between the American and British representatives there had been ever-increasing solidarity of outlook and identity of basic thought. Added to this there had always been an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship. Our fortunes had prospered but it was still not quite possible to forecast the date of the end of the war with Germany.
It seemed clear that the Germans were withdrawing from the Balkans and appeared likely that in Italy they would retire to the line of the Alps. The Russians were on the edge of Hungary. The Germans had shown themselves good at staging withdrawals and had been able to save large numbers of personnel although much material had been lost. If the battle went well with General Alexander, we should reach the Piave reasonably soon. All forces in Italy should be engaged to the maximum intensity.
In the west it seemed probable that the Germans would retire behind the Rhine. In his view the “West Wall” was the right bank of the Rhine which would present a formidable obstacle. He thought we should plan to force the barrier of the Rhine and then consider the situation. We should have to turn the line either from the east or from the west. For this purpose, our plans must be flexible. The Germans could not yet be counted out and one more big battle would have to be fought. The operations in the East would to some extent depend on how the situation developed in Europe. He agreed that we should not remain in Burma any longer than it was necessary to clean up the Japanese in that theater. The American plan was to regain the Philippines and to dominate the mainland of Japan from the Philippines or Formosa and from bridgeheads which would be seized in China. If forces could be established on the mainland of China, China could be saved. American experience had been that the “end run” method paid a handsome dividend. Rabaul was an example of this bypassing technique which had been employed with considerable success at small cost of life. Would it not be equally possible to bypass Singapore by seizing an area to the north or east of it, for example, Bangkok? Singapore may be very strong and he was opposed to going up against strong positions.
The Prime Minister suggested that the seizure of localities such as Penang and the Kra Isthmus or Moulmein should be studied. As far as Singapore was concerned, he did not favor the bypassing method. There would undoubtedly be a large force of Japanese in the Malay Peninsula and it would help the American operations in the Pacific if we could bring these forces to action and destroy them in addition to achieving the great prize of the recapture of Singapore. If Formosa were captured, would the Japanese garrisons to the south be completely cut off?
Admiral King replied that these garrisons would be strangulated and must ultimately perish.
The Prime Minister said that all these projects were being examined and would be put in order. No decision could be taken until after Rangoon had been captured. It should not be overlooked that Marshal Stalin had volunteered a solemn undertaking at Tehran that Russia would enter the war against Japan the day that Hitler was beaten. There was no reason to doubt that Stalin would be as good as his word. The Russians undoubtedly had great ambitions in the East. If Hitler was beaten, say, by January, and Japan was confronted with the three most powerful nations in the world, they would undoubtedly have cause for reflection as to whether they could continue the fight.
The President referred to the almost fanatical Japanese tenacity. In Saipan not only the soldiers but also the civilians had committed suicide rather than be taken.
Sir Charles Portal said that he hoped to have available between 600 and 800 heavy bombers for operations against the mainland of Japan. These could be supplemented by a considerable number of medium bomber squadrons.
The Prime Minister asked about the employment to be made of the British Fleet.
The President said his thought was to use it in any way possible.
Admiral King said that a paper on this subject had been prepared for reference to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The question was being actively studied.
The Prime Minister asked if it would not be better to employ the new British ships in place of battle-worn vessels of the United States.
Admiral King replied that speaking for himself, he could only say that the matter was under examination.
The Prime Minister said that the offer had been made and asked if it was accepted.
The President replied in the affirmative.
The Prime Minister enquired whether an undertaking could be given for the British Air Force to participate in the main operations.
General Marshall said that he and General Arnold were trying to see how best to fit in the maximum number of aircraft for these operations. It was not so long ago that we were crying out for airplanes – now we had a surplus. He suggested that if the British were heavily engaged in Southeast Asia and in Malaya, they would require a large proportion of their air forces for these operations. Was there a distinction between these latter operations and the operations envisaged by Sir Charles Portal for heavy bombardment of Japan?
Sir Charles Portal replied that there was a distinction. The Lancaster bomber, if refuelled in the air, had a range nearly approaching that of the B-29. Without refuelling in the air these aircraft had a range of 800 or 900 miles.
The British minutes have the following additional statement by Churchill at this point:
The Prime Minister remarked that for the future good relations of the two countries, on which so much depended, it was of vital importance that the British should be given their fair share in the main operations against Japan. The United States had given the most handsome assistance to the British Empire, in the fight against Germany. It could only be expected that the British Empire in return should give the United States all assistance in their power towards the defeat of Japan.
The President observed that there were certain groups in the United States, and he had no doubt that similar groups existed in Great Britain, who evinced a kindly attitude towards the Germans. Their theory was that evil could be eradicated from the German makeup and the nation could be rejuvenated by kindness.
The Prime Minister said that such sentiments would hardly be tolerated in Great Britain. The British people would demand a strong policy against the Germans. The German working man should be allowed sufficient food for his bare need, and work, but no more. The more virulent elements such as the Gestapo and the young fanatics should be deported to work in rehabilitating the devastated areas of Europe. Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.
In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that it was clear that a very great measure of agreement existed between the American and British Staffs.
Admiral Leahy agreed that this was so. He did not foresee any insuperable difficulties in reaching agreement on all points at issue.
The Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union to CSA
Moscow, 13 September 1944
Top secret
To AGWar for General Marshall information to General Eisenhower and General Spaatz from Deane TopSec MX 20947.
Copy sent direct to Eisenhower.
Simultaneously with the receipt of your OCTAGON 10 dated 12 September I received information from USSTAF that the project was scheduled for today, September 13. The British and American Ambassadors and I saw Mr. Molotov who arranged for approval to be given by the Red Army General Staff. General Spaatz was informed of approval and as a result the mission is now scheduled for September 14. I shall await word from General Spaatz as to whether this one mission completes the project or if he proposes to send representatives to Moscow to work out a plan for continued support. I do not believe it is necessary for representatives to come here since all details of plan should be worked out in London. Really, all that is necessary here is Soviet approval which the British and American missions can attempt to secure here once they have been informed of the plan.
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the President and the Secretary of State
Moscow, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Priority
Top secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.
Cable Nr 122231 WH 63 from Mr. Hull regarding aid to the insurgents in Warsaw reached me only late tonight. On the basis of an earlier message received by the Military Mission from General Spaatz I spoke to Molotov last night regarding an operation by our Air Force which Molotov approved after telephoning to Red Army General Staff. Today General Deane talked to an officer of Red Army General Staff inquiring what the Soviets intended to do on their own account. He replied that the Red Army had nothing planned. General Deane and head of British Military Mission will jointly approach Red Army General Staff tomorrow to press for the carrying out by the Red Army of the promise of the Soviet Government to render assistance itself. I will see Molotov if a satisfactory answer is not obtained.
The President’s Special Assistant to the President
Washington, September 13, 1944
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
Dear Mr. President: I have had several talks with General O’Dwyer, Crowley and the State Department relative to the Italian business. The attached memo supplements the statement which you have with you on Italy.
It seems to me that there are great advantages to be accrued to us if you can take the initiative and get Churchill’s approval to a course of action which you would announce publicly.
The machinery for getting quick action relative to immediate relief and the purchase of material for economic rehabilitation is available. The Italians can pay for all of the goods to be bought in this country, other than emergency relief supplies, out of funds which would accrue to them from our soldiers’ pay.
The Prisoner of War business, I think, should be cleared up just as soon as possible and, of equal importance, is the obvious necessity of amending the Armistice terms.
HLH
[Attachment]
Memorandum prepared in the Department of State
[Undated] Confidential and personalMemorandum for Mr. Hopkins, the White House
I refer to Mr. Jones’ conversation with you Monday morning, September 11.
American policy toward Italy is based upon our desire to see that nation return to political and economic independence and stability as quickly as possible. We do not believe that Italy will contribute to an orderly and peaceful Europe if it is subject to any one of its more powerful neighbors. This Government has specifically assured the Italian people the right to choose the form of government they may desire when they are in a position to exercise that right. Political independence for Italy, free from foreign domination, would seem to be implicit in this pledge.
The economic wellbeing of a country is the prime factor in its internal stability and its peaceful relations with other states. The economic dependence of one state upon another is not conducive to such wellbeing and may ultimately have undesirable political implications. Furthermore, since the United States is bearing the major share of the civilian supply quota for Italy, it is sound American policy to help Italy again become self-supporting and to regain a measure of economic independence at an early date.
In the immediate future increased civilian supplies, principally foodstuffs, are essential to prevent further deterioration in Italian public health and morale in the ever-increasing portions of liberated Italy. The three principal problems to be solved are:
- Available shipping to carry supplies from this country.
- Internal transportation to distribute it to the various populated centers.
- Method of payment.
A specific and sufficient allocation of shipping for civilian supplies should be obtained from the War Department or other United States agency.
Two thousand trucks are needed for the distribution of supplies for civilians in the present liberated area. Army trucks within the theater should be made available to the extent possible (not convenient) by the Supreme Allied Command. Once hostilities have ceased, a sufficient number of United States Army trucks and tractors in the theater could be made available for this purpose until the internal transportation system can be rehabilitated at least in a basic sense.
When the dollar equivalent of American troop pay spent in Italy, plus immigrant remittances and Italian exports to this country, is made available to the Italian Government, almost all the foreign exchange required for the purchase of civilian supplies in this country will be provided. (It is believed that this proposal is at present on the President’s desk, having received British concurrence, and could be put into effect immediately if approved.) Limited UNRRA participation in the medical field and in assistance to displaced persons of Italian nationality up to $50,000,000 is essential to supplement the civilian supply program mentioned above. Every effort therefore should be made to assure that agreement to this proposal is given at the UNRRA conference in Montreal this month.
As to the second phase of Italy’s economic problems, we should now make possible the primary rehabilitation of its agriculture and essential industries in order that the Italian nation can begin to be self-supporting again. Hence the Italian supply program should not be limited, as it has been so far, to consumers’ goods but should make available fertilizer, seeds, spare parts and essential raw materials to permit the resumption of Italian production for the nation’s basic consumers’ needs. This will require not only a sufficient shipping allocation but sufficient funds to finance such a program even on a limited scale. The United States’ funds to be made available to the Italian Government from troop pay, immigration remittances, et cetera, will probably not cover such an undertaking in addition to the consumers goods which must be purchased over the next year for immediate consumption by the population. The following additional methods of financing might prove feasible.
The War Department could continue its present practice of certifying Lend-Lease funds, on the basis of military necessity, to finance a civilian supply program of minimum subsistence. This would provide for the principal portion of the importation of consumers’, goods, and the foreign exchange available to the Italian Government from troop pay, et cetera, would then be sufficient to finance a basic rehabilitation program for Italian agriculture and industry.
Private Italian assets in this country, estimated roughly at $74,000,000, could be taken over by the Italian Government and used as security for an Italian Government loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for the purchase of basic rehabilitation supplies.
On the political side it is desirable to clarify our relations with Italy, which has been a co-belligerent with the United Nations in the war against Germany for almost a year. During that time the Italian Government – Armed Forces and people – have cooperated sincerely and to the best of their limited resources in the common fight. They have “worked their passage” to a considerable extent. The United States and Great Britain could revise Italian Armistice terms which have been rendered largely obsolete by the course of events, or we could conclude a preliminary peace treaty with Italy, terminating the state of war existing between it and the United Nations, postponing for future settlement the more complicated issues of territorial dispositions and reparations.
Specific steps should meanwhile be undertaken immediately to support the representative and liberal Italian Government and to encourage the various democratic groups in Italy who are working for the regeneration of their country. These might include:
The removal from prisoner-of-war status of Italian soldiers in the British Empire, North Africa, Italy and this country and their return to regular military status under Italian Command with ultimate authority for their disposition and use resting in the Allied Theater Commander or respective British and American military authorities. It is an anomalous situation, to say the least, that while Italian divisions are fighting with the United Nations on the Italian front and Italian resources are being employed to the fullest extent in the common struggle against Germany, we continue to hold Italian prisoners of war not only abroad but in Italy itself. The non-combat services which they are now performing in these areas could be performed as effectively if they had the status of Italian soldiers under Italian command. A solution of this problem would be a concrete and important gesture of support to the present Italian Government.
The acceptance of Italian technical representatives by the various United Nations to handle financial and economic problems and to resume the protection of Italian interests in the various United Nations which is still being performed by third powers.
Italian participation in the various international organizations, such as the ILO, UNRRA, Food and Agricultural Organization, Financial and Monetary Conference, et cetera. Italy also desires to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, this without reference to membership in the United Nations.
Resumption of United States’ participation in the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome until such time as it is superseded or absorbed by the proposed Food and Agricultural Organization.
A copy of a memorandum which was prepared in this office for the President’s use in Quebec is attached for your information.
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:00 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill |
According to the Secretary of the Treasury’s Assistant, Roosevelt had asked Churchill, who had been very glum, how he would like to have the steel business of Europe for twenty or thirty years, and Churchill had “seemed much excited over the possibility.”
At one of the Roosevelt-Churchill meetings on September 13, a suggestion was made that Fiorello La Guardia should go to Italy as the President’s representative and that while there he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Allied Control Commission.
SACMED to CCS
Caserta, 13 September 1944
Confidential
Priority
FX 24540 to AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff repeated to UK Base Section for British Chiefs of Staff, HQ Com Zone Main and SHAEF for information signed Wilson cite fhcos. This is Naf 778.
Subject is guidance on economic policy for Italy.
As battle line in Italy moves north and the operational phase in large portions of occupied territory is terminated, I feel that approach to problems of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation must be re-examined. While purely military considerations remain predominant in the forward areas, problems associated with civil administration, particularly of an economic character, raise general questions on which I, in my capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission, require guidance.
During the active operational phase, activities of an economic character conducted by the Allied Control Commission and other agencies in Italy under my command of necessity have been directly related to support of military operations. Supplies have been imported and distributed to the civilian population in order to minimize disease and prevent unrest, and efforts toward economic rehabilitation have had the primary, if not the exclusive, purpose of utilizing Italy’s resources for the war effort and producing in Italy goods which would otherwise have had to be imported.
In the light of the changed operational situation the limited directives which have governed seem no longer to be adequate. The Armistice agreement, under which the Allied Control Commission operates, contains no commitment to the Italian people as to any measure of material assistance. However, there has arisen in Italy the expectation, if not the assumption, presumably by reason of the known humanitarian policies of the two governments, that an additional measure of assistance and relief to the civil population would be forthcoming. Public utterances in both countries have tended to support this view. Moreover, if the two governments continue at this stage to consider only what is required in the interest of the war effort, they may lose the opportunity of ensuring one of their own long-term interests, i.e., the establishment of a reasonably prosperous and contented Italy after the war. Notwithstanding this fact the standard of military necessity still obtains and in the provision of supply is being strictly adhered to. For example, a clothing programme was submitted in June (Lac airgram 32) based on the estimated essential needs of the population this winter, but also having regard to the anti-inflationary effects of an increased supply of consumer goods. I am now asked, however, (Cal 738) to certify that this clothing is the minimum requirement to prevent disease and unrest which would prejudice military operations. As another example, not of great importance in itself but indicating the type of question which is now arising, in response to a requisition of paper essential for proper keeping of Italian tax records, it is asked (Cal 566) whether the paper is necessary “to control and manage the civil population.”
For the foregoing reasons I request that directives which govern the provision of civilian supply and economic rehabilitation be reexamined and that, if the policy of the governments is to furnish aid to Italy beyond that required by strict military necessity of the Allied Forces, the standards applicable to that aid be revised. In particular I request that I be informed:
a. To what extent, if any, I may take into account factors tending toward inflation, and to what degree I am responsible for measures to counter these tendencies.
b. To what extent, if any, is it desired that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out and if any rehabilitation is intended what industries should be given precedence?
c. Within the limitations of available shipping, to what extent, if any, are exports to be stimulated and machinery to handle export trade developed?
If my revised directive gives me responsibilities in the economic field broader than those now existing, I may require additional personnel of suitable technical training and experience, presumably drawn more from civil than military ranks. I am, as I have already indicated, prepared to accept qualified civilian experts in major proportion in the Allied Control Commission as soon as they are available.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Handy | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Major General Kuter | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 13, 1944, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
Approval of the minutes of the 172nd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
General Marshall drew attention to his statement recorded in the penultimate paragraph on page 3 of the minutes. He requested that this should be amended to read: “… the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable.”
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the 172nd Meeting. The detailed record was amended as proposed by General Marshall and approved subject to later minor amendments.
Control of the strategic bomber forces in Europe (CCS 520/4)
Sir Charles Portal said that he had not had time fully to study the proposed directive. It appeared, however, to be acceptable except with regard to certain small details.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to consider CCS 520/4 at their meeting to be held on the following day.
Machinery for coordination of U.S.-Soviet-British military effort (CCS 618/4)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to the dispatch of the messages in Enclosures “A” and “B” to CCS 618/4 to Generals Burrows and Deane respectively.
Report on the enemy situation in the Pacific (CCS 643/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee on the enemy situation in the Pacific–Far East (CCS 643/1).
General progress report on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the progress report by the United States Chiefs of Staff on recent operations in the Pacific (CCS 676).
Strategy for the defeat of Japan (CCS 417/8)
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the course of action for planning purposes outlined by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/8. There was, however, one point he would like to make. In addition to the operations outlined in the paper there would, of course, be certain British operations which the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had an opportunity to put forward. For instance, the British Fleet participating in the Pacific operations, the British Task Force in the Southwest Pacific and Operation DRACULA. In making provision, therefore, for the U.S. operations it should be borne in mind that there would also be certain British operations, the forces for which will require allocation of certain items of equipment for which provision should be made and a margin of requirements allowed.
Sir John Dill explained that supplies would be required for British forces for the war against Japan which could not yet be requested since the operations were not yet fully approved.
Admiral Leahy said that he quite appreciated the points made by Sir Alan Brooke, but he was not clear how they could be incorporated in the existing paper.
Sir Alan Brooke said that all that was required was that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note that certain British operations against Japan were not included in the program outlined in CCS 417/8 and that requirements with regard to provision of equipment and the logistic support of these forces would be put forward at a later date.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Accepted the proposals in CCS 417/8 as a basis for planning.
b. Took note that British operations against Japan, not yet approved, would require the allocation of resources and that in planning production therefor these requirements should be borne in mind.
c. Took note that the size of the British forces to be employed against Japan would be notified as soon as possible.
Basic policies for the “OCTAGON” Conference (CCS 654/8)
Admiral Leahy said that it seemed to him that the U.S. and British proposals as to the wording of paragraph 6i of CCS 654 were very similar.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British wording “inescapable commitments” was aimed to cover such points as the return of Dominion forces to their homelands which was a commitment which could not be avoided.
Admiral King suggested that the two proposals should be incorporated and that the wording should read: “having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments.”
Sir Alan Brooke said that this proposal was entirely acceptable.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the following wording for paragraph 6i of CCS 654:
Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, as a matter of highest priority, having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments, as soon as the German situation allows.
Future operations in the Mediterranean (CCS 677/1)
Admiral Leahy explained that with regard to paragraph 2b of the U.S. draft of the message to General Wilson, it was felt that the wording “for planning the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” was more appropriate than “for the capture of the Istrian Peninsula” since the operation was not yet approved and might, in fact, never take place.
General Marshall explained that the words “major units” in paragraph 1a had been inserted at his suggestion to cover such possible withdrawals as that of the Japanese battalion which he had mentioned the previous day.
Admiral Leahy pointed out that in the U.S. draft the date on which General Wilson was to submit his plan had been altered to 10 October. Since a decision had to be reached by the 15th, it would be safer to call for the report on the 10th.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the U.S. draft was acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean the draft message in Enclosure “B” to CCS 677/1. (Subsequently dispatched as Fan 415.)
Next meeting, Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to meet at 1000 on Thursday, 14 September, and to permit photographs to be taken at that time.
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 520/4 (OCTAGON)
Control of strategic bomber forces in Europe following the establishment of Allied forces on the continent
| References: | a. CCS 150th Mtg., Item 5 |
| b. CCS 520 Series | |
| c. CCS 304/13 | |
| d. CCS 172d Mtg., Item 10 |
While not accepting all points in CCS 520/3, the United States Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with the establishment of control of the Strategic Bomber Forces in Europe by the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, acting jointly for the Chief of the Air Staff, RAF and the Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces, the latter acting as agents of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
In the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, the directive proposed in the Annex to CCS 520/3 is in several respects inadequate, and therefore they recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and dispatch a revised directive as set forth in the Enclosure.
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/27
British participation in the war against Japan
The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome a British naval task force in the Pacific to participate in the main operations against Japan. They consider that the initial use of such a force should be on the western flank of the advance in the Southwest Pacific. They assume that such a force would be balanced and self-supporting.
The United States Chiefs of Staff repeat their acceptance of the British proposal to form a British Empire task force in the Southwest Pacific. It is realized that the time of formation of such a force depends to a considerable extent on the end of the war in Europe as well as on DRACULA and on the requirements of projected operations in the Southwest Pacific.
Memorandum by the British CS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 452/28 (OCTAGON)
Directive to SACSEA
We recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now despatch the following directive to Admiral Mountbatten.
Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command
Your primary object is the recapture of all Burma at the earliest date. Operations to achieve this object must not, however, prejudice the security of the existing air supply route to China, including the air staging post at Myitkyina, adequate protection of which is essential throughout.
The following are approved operations:
a) The stages of Operation CAPITAL necessary to the security of the air route;
b) Operation DRACULA.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach the greatest importance to the vigorous prosecution of Operation CAPITAL and to the execution of Operation DRACULA before the monsoon in 1945, with a target date of 15 March.
If DRACULA has to be postponed until after the monsoon of 1945, you will continue to exploit Operation CAPITAL as far as may be possible without prejudice to preparations for the execution of Operation DRACULA in November 1945.
Note by the Secretaries of CCS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 675/1
A combined memorandum on troop movements, covering the period October 1944 to March 1945
The Representatives of United States and British military services in conjunction with appropriate shipping authorities submit the attached report of the examination of troop shipping requirements suggested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 172nd Meeting of 12 September.
A. J. McFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat
[Enclosure]
Top secret
Combined memorandum on troop movements covering the period October 1944 to March 1945
Assumptions
The state of war in Europe is such that the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree:
a. That it is feasible to release British troops from Europe for Operation DRACULA.
b. No further U.S. troops need be transported to European theaters.
If the decision with regard to the two conditions in 1 above is not made by 1 October the necessary transfer of British forces to India cannot be accomplished in time to execute the operation before the monsoon.
Statement of the problem
The problem therefore is to determine the effect of employment of troop shipping for DRACULA on U.S. and British deployments subsequent to the defeat of Germany.
Facts bearing on the problem
The buildup of a British task force in India for DRACULA involves the movement of six British divisions or 370,000 personnel from Europe to India prior to 1 March 1945.
It is estimated that this movement will during its peak period involve virtually the entire British trooping lift.
This requirement will limit British assistance to the United States in the Atlantic to a trooplift of about 25,000 per month from November 1944 to April 1945 by leaving only the two Queens on this run. However, in the event of any unforeseen difficulties in meeting the DRACULA program it might prove necessary to withdraw one or both of the Queens from the Atlantic service.
A further effect will be the withdrawal of all British ocean-going troopships now employed in cross-Channel movements. This amounts to a capacity of 25-30,000 troop spaces for combined cross-Channel troop movements. It is estimated that British cross-Channel troop movements can be accomplished in other type vessels. The scale of U.S. cross-Channel troop movements cannot be determined but should be relatively light in proportion to total U.S. withdrawals from the Continent. To the extent required such movement must be accomplished in U.S. shipping.
The DRACULA movement of British troops absorbs the full capacity of Indian ports with the exception of such U.S. troops as can be received through the port of Calcutta. India has stated that they can disembark two “General” class ships off Calcutta simultaneously by the use of Indian Ocean shipping.
Discussion
- Effect on British movement up to approximately mid-March
a. After 30 September it will not be possible to carry out any normal trooping from the United Kingdom to theaters abroad other than any replacements included in the DRACULA program. Allowance has been made for 4,500 a month between Canada and the United Kingdom.
b. No non-operational movement can take place except those which might be capable of being effected in ships returning empty from operational voyages.
c. No troop ships could be spared for conversion to other tasks, viz: fleet train, hospital ships, etc.
d. It will only be possible to carry out movement already planned between theaters abroad, mainly reinforcements from West and East Africa to India and New Zealanders to Italy which are small in relation to the total fleet and for which shipping is being positioned. Internal movement in the Mediterranean will be reduced to a local lift of some 15,000.
- Effect on U.S. movements up to approximately end of March
a. U.S. shipping schedules for redeployment have included the movement of 70,000 U.S. troops per month from Europe to the United States in British ships. Under this assumption the strength of U.S. forces in Europe will be:
| 1 Oct 44 | 2,760,000 |
| 1 Apr 45 | 1,535,000 |
| 6 months withdrawals from Europe | 1,225,000 |
b. The reduction of British assistance in the Atlantic to 25,000 troops monthly would result in the following European position:
| 1 Oct 44 | 2,760,000 |
| 1 Apr 45 | 1,805,000 |
| 6 months withdrawals from Europe | 955,000 |
In other words a reduction in the rate of return of U.S. troops from the European Theater will be required amounting to 270,000 in six months.
c. Troop movements to Pacific theaters in accordance with redeployment plans tentatively set up, but now under review, would be possible.
Conclusion
Until the strategic requirements for the furtherance of the war against Japan subsequent to the defeat of Germany have been determined and until shipping priorities have been established as between operational and non-operational moves, it is not possible to present more detailed shipping implications during and after the period 1 October 1944 to 1 April 1945.
Memorandum by the British CS
Quebec, 13 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 678
Planning date for the end of the war against Japan
The British Chiefs of Staff feel that it is important that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree and promulgate a planning date for the end of the war against Japan. The following planning must be related to an estimated date for the end of the war against Japan:
a. The redeployment of forces against Japan.
b. The planning of production.
c. The allocation of manpower.
The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that, in order to make due allowance for contingencies, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should accept as a planning date two years after the defeat of Germany.
The Pittsburgh Press (September 13, 1944)
YANKS TAKE GERMAN TOWN
Bombs rained on Siegfried Line
New U.S. thrusts into Reich indicated; U.S. 9th Army in field
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer
New invasion of Germany was made by U.S. forces yesterday as they crossed the frontier below Aachen (2), following the initial thrust into the Reich near Trier (3). Hard fighting continued to the south as the U.S. 3rd Army battled from its bridgeheads across the Moselle River (4). Junction of the 3rd Army with the 7th Army was strengthened (5) when French forces reached Châtillon. French and U.S. forces also gained above Dijon and toward the Belfort Gap into Germany. There was no announced change in the British 2nd Army front in northern Belgium, while on the coast (1), British troops captured Le Havre and battled for the other holdout Channel ports.
Bulletin
SHAEF, London, England (UP) –
Dispatches from American-conquered German soil reported tonight that U.S. troops had captured the village of Roetgen – their first specific victory in the Reich – and had overrun a forested height in their drive east from the Eupen area of Belgium. Roetgen is six miles east of Eupen.Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s 3rd Army lashed out in a newly-announced drive in the Moselle Valley and captured Neufchâteau, 32 miles southwest of Nancy, and raced eastward 27 miles to the Moselle. Forcing a crossing, the Americans were fighting heavily at Charmes on the east bank.
United Press writer Jack Frankish said in a dispatch filed at 11:30 a.m. CET today that the Americans had made the first dent in the Siegfried Line, spearing through the first wall of its frontier crust and driving forward more than a mile and a half.
SHAEF, London, England –
Strong U.S. armored forces, leading a general advance against Germany, reached the Siegfried Line today, while indications grew that other U.S. troops might be pouring across the border in new invasions at unidentified points.
A dispatch from Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley’s 12th Army Group headquarters said U.S. tank and infantry forces were in contact with the Siegfried Line, which was taking one of the heaviest aerial poundings of the war from thousands of Allied planes.
The first spearhead was driven against the Siegfried Line, which lies five to 10 miles behind the frontier on the 1st Army front, by one of the armored forces smashing steadily deeper into Germany after crossings from Luxembourg and Belgium, the headquarters dispatch indicated, with advanced elements reaching within some 35 miles of the Rhine River.
A new U.S. army – the 9th Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson – was revealed to have landed in France to join in the climactic assault on Germany. Its location was not disclosed.
The 12th Army Group headquarters dispatch emphasized that the announcement that the Allies had crossed the German border in “at least” two places – eight miles northwest of Trier and east of Eupen – appeared to imply that other crossings may have been made.
For whatever it was worth in that connection, a Nazi-controlled Oslo broadcast reported crossings east of Malmedy, Belgium, between Trier and Eupen, and southeast of Trier.
Indications were that the Americans would be in close contact with the Siegfried Line at a number of points very soon.
On behalf of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied headquarters broadcast a warning to workers of northwestern, western and southern Germany that “you are in danger.”
Following by 24 hours a warning to the people of the Ruhr and Rhineland that their homes might soon be in the battle area, the new warning said that “in the next few days you may have the greatest opportunities for action” and added:
In a desperate effort to eliminate Allied support among the workers, Himmler plans to repeat in the west what he and the Gestapo have already done in the east. Workers there have been sent to man the fortifications. Thousands have been herded into concentration camps as hostages. Workers in the Ruhr and Rhineland are at this moment under threat of the same danger.
The workers were told to leave the German factories at once and go into hiding, since “the Nazis will not have the men to spare to search for you or to control your movements.”
Headquarters revealed that bombs were dropping on the Siegfried Line and its supporting bases at the rate of six tons a minute, day and night, in a mighty softening-up barrage that thundered into its sixth straight day today.
A blanket of security censorship obscured the advance of the U.S. 1st Army’s two spearheads into Germany south of Aachen and beyond Trier, but correspondents were permitted to reveal that both columns were operating in strength and that new crossings of the border were imminent at six other undisclosed points.
Another great striking arm, the newly-constituted Allied Airborne Army, was also ready to join in the battle for the Nazi homeland. Headquarters refused to comment, however, on a Paris radio report that the paratroopers and glider-borne infantry would soon be landed behind the Siegfried Line to smash the enemy’s communications and transport.
Disclosure that the 9th Army was in the field came as French units of the U.S. 7th Army from the south reached the Seine at Châtillon, 42 miles northwest of Dijon and 93 miles southeast of Nancy, and effected a junction in force with Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s 3rd Army.
Front dispatches said the U.S. 1st Army spearheads in Germany were pounding steadily eastward against relatively light opposition, probing into the main works of the Siegfried Line. Tanks equipped with great flails moved ahead of the invasion columns of clear away the enemy minefields, while formations of dive bombers streaked in overhead to bomb and machine-gun the retreating enemy.
Latest reports placed one American force about a mile inside the German border beyond Lammersdorf, 10 miles east of Eupen and 12 miles south-southeast of Aachen.
United Press writer Henry T. Gorrell, riding eastward with the invaders, reported that U.S. tanks, troops and guns were streaming into Germany in force, rolling swiftly past sullen German villagers who made no open attempt to interfere.
More than 50 miles to the south, the second invasion column last was reported more than six miles into the Reich after a thrust across the Luxembourg border north of the ancient Teuton city of Trier. The main works of the Siegfried Line at that point lay some 10 to 12 miles east of the frontier and it was indicated that the Yanks were just driving into the fortified belt.
Between the two columns, another 1st Army force captured the Belgian town of Bastogne in the Ardennes Forest and drove forward 13 miles to take Clervaux in Luxembourg, only four miles short of the Nazi frontier.
Malmedy and Spa, southeast of Liège, also fell to the Americans.
Battle near Moselle
On the 1st Army’s southern flank, Gen. Patton’s 3rd Army fought one of the bitterest battles of the campaign along the Moselle River line from Metz to Nancy.
A front dispatch from United Press writer Robert Richards said Gen. Patton was putting additional punching power into a half-dozen bridgeheads on the east bank of the river and the situation was more favorable than at any time since the offensive began.
Mr. Richards said the Germans were drawing reinforcements from other sectors to prevent a breakthrough on the Moselle.
On the British 2nd Army front to the north, the Germans withdrew from the Albert Canal line in Belgium to the Escaut Line, to the north.
Roundabout German reports via Stockholm said the British advanced 18 miles north of the Belgian towns of Petit-Brogel and reached the Eindhoven area, almost 10 miles inside Holland.
Other British units driving eastward through Belgium said to be within four and a half miles of the German border above Maastricht.
Three miles south of Maastricht, a U.S. 1st Army flying column captured the “mystery fort” of Ében-Émael, which the Germans overwhelmed in the first hours of their invasion of the Low Countries more than four years ago.
Capture 7,000
More than 7,000 German prisoners were rounded up in the captured port of Le Havre, after a bloody 36-hour assault by British units of the 1st Canadian Army, but the battle for the other Channel ports continued unabated.
Observers of the British coast reported a thunderous artillery duel was in progress throughout most of last night as the Canadians wheeled hundreds of siege guns up to within point-blank range of Calais, Boulogne and Dunkerque in an effort to blast the Nazis into submission.
Nazi counterattacks repulsed by infantry
With U.S. infantry on the German-Belgian border (UP) – (11:30 a.m. CET)
U.S. infantry units which went into Germany yesterday repulsed a series of small counterattacks throughout the night and retained possession of a forest height.
The infantry penetrated more than a mile and a half inside Germany, crossing the frontier shortly after the armored units.
Lt. Col. Edmund Driscoll of Garden City, New York, commanded the unit which made the greatest penetration. He was believed to have made the first telephone call from Germany, opening his report with: “This is a unit commander speaking from Germany.”